



# Welcome to the world of Cyber Threat Intelligence!

Andreas Sfakianakis - 30/06/2021

# whoami

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CTI Lead EMEA @ S&P Global

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CTI @ Financial and Oil & Gas sectors

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ENISA, FIRST.org, SANS, European Commission


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Twitter: [@asfakian](https://twitter.com/asfakian) Website: [www.threatintel.eu](http://www.threatintel.eu)



## Outline

- Intro to CTI
- A view at the Threat Landscape
- CTI Analyst Skillset



# INCIDENT RESPONSE & COMPUTER FORENSICS

Luttgens  
Pepe  
Mandia

Image:  
Katie Nickels

# threat modeling

designing for security

## hology of Intelligence Analysis

Richards J. Heuer, Jr.

HEUER PHERSON  
**STRUCTURED ANALYTIC TECHNIQUES FOR INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS**  
SECOND EDITION

SAGE  
COPRESS

## Intelligence-Driven Incident Response

Roberts & Brown

O'REILLY®

## IVE MEASURES

Thomas Rid

nic  
T S  
Another Until



## THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

SIXTH EDITION



WESTVIEW PRESS

## ED TEAM DEVELOPMENT AND OPERATIONS

JOE VEST & JAMES TUBBERVILLE

Spurious Correlations

Tyler  
Vigen



Hachette  
BOOKS

## The Art of Intelligence

Henry A. Crumpton



BLOOMSBURY

## ENEMIES OF INTELLIGENCE

ETTS

## DECISION

THE UNTOLD STORY  
OF EAST-WEST  
ESPIONAGE TODAY

UNCERTAIN SHIELD

THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM IN THE THROES OF REFORM


ROWMAN &  
LITTLEFIELD

mac


mac books

mac books

# From Intelligence to Cyber Threat Intelligence



Reference:





How old is  
Cyber Threat Intelligence?


# When everything started in CTI!



Data is not information, Information is not knowledge, Knowledge is not understanding, Understanding is not wisdom.

— Clifford Stoll —


AZ QUOTES




# CTI, IR and SecOps

	CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE	INCIDENT RESPONSE	SECURITY OPERATIONS
Adoption	Early adoption phase	Mainstream since ~2010	Mainstream since ~2005
Focus	External threat monitoring	Security incidents and risk escalation	Notable security event monitoring
Best practices	Evolving best practices	Mature best practices	Mature best practices
Technology enablement	Evolving technology enablement	Mature technology enablement	Mature technology enablement

# Timeline of important events in CTI history




# CTI Hype Cycle






How would you  
consume or generate  
(cyber threat) intelligence?




intelligence is a product and a process  
intelligence is a product and a process




Repeat after me

# Let me introduce you to the intelligence cycle



*All models are wrong, but some are useful (especially within corporate environments)*

# Intelligence Direction



# Questions to be answered

- Does your org need a CTI function? Why do you need intelligence?
- How do you identify which threats are relevant to your organisation?
- How do you prioritize to which threats to spend time on?
- Has your CTI team identified and connected with its stakeholders?
- How does your analysis bring value to the CyberDefence and your organisation?

*“CTI teams should not do intelligence for intelligence’s sake; it costs money and time”*

# Intelligence Requirements

- Intelligence requirements are enduring questions that consumers of intelligence need answers to.
- Answer critical questions intelligence customers care about (not what YOU care about).



**Sergio Caltagirone**  
@cnoanalysis

Following



#ThreatIntel 101: It starts with the customer (requirements) and ends with the customer (feedback)

6:23 PM - 15 Aug 2016

Reference: Sergio Caltagirone

# CTI Focus and Stakeholders

## Tactical Intelligence

Security Engineering

SOC Team

## Operational Intelligence

Incident Responders

Threat Hunters

Vulnerability Management

Red Team

Fraud Team

Sys Admins

IT Managers

## Strategic Intelligence

C-Suite / Executives

Group Security


Risk Managers

Business Stakeholders

Regional Stakeholders

IT Architects

# **Threat Modeling**




Reference:  
Katie Nickels


# Simple Threat Model



Reference:  
SANS

# Intelligence Collection





Where would you go to collect data  
for cyber threat intelligence?

# Intelligence Collection Sources


- Internal Security Incident Data
  - (Listen to your enemy, for God is talking. ~ Jewish Proverb)
- Internal Log Data Lake
- Internal Stakeholders
  - Corporate Security/Business
- Vendor Reports
- Sharing Communities, ISACs
- Governmental Sources
- OSINT
- Paid IOC Feeds



<https://medium.com/@sroberts/intelligence-collection-priorities-a80fa3ed73cd>


Reference:  
Scott J Roberts

# Intelligence Processing



# Data versus Intelligence

- Data is a piece of information, a fact, or a statistic.  
Data is something that describes something that is.
- Intelligence is derived from a process of collecting, processing, and analyzing data.
- The difference between data and true intelligence is **analysis**.



# Threat Intelligence Platforms



Open Source

Commercial

Community Exchange Platforms

# The Analyst's Dream: Data Into Buckets




# Intrusion Analysis Frameworks 101

- Kill Chain
- Diamond Model
- ATT&CK Framework



KEEP  
CALM  
AND  
ANALYZE  
INTRUSIONS

# The Kill Chain




Reference:

Original: Hutchins, Cloppert, Amin

Graphic: SANS CTI Poster

# Diamond Model of Intrusion Analysis



Reference: Caltagirone, Pendergast, Betz

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control
9 techniques	10 techniques	18 techniques	12 techniques	34 techniques	14 techniques	24 techniques	9 techniques	16 techniques	16 techniques
Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter (7)	Account Manipulation (4)	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (4)	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (4)	Brute Force (4)	Account Discovery (4)	Exploitation of Remote Services	Archive Collected Data (3)	Application Layer Protocol (4)
Exploit Public-Facing Application	Exploitation for Client Execution	BITS Jobs	Access Token Manipulation (5)	Credentials from Password Stores (3)	Application Window Discovery	Internal Spearphishing	Audio Capture	Communication Through Removable Media	
External Remote Services	Inter-Process Communication (2)	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (11)	BITS Jobs	Exploitation for Credential Access	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Lateral Tool Transfer	Automated Collection	Data Encoding (2)	
Hardware Additions	Native API	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (5)	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Forced Authentication	Cloud Service Dashboard	Clipboard Data	Clipboard Data	Data Obfuscation (3)	
Phishing (3)	Scheduled Task/Job (5)	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (5)	Direct Volume Access	Input Capture (4)	Cloud Service Discovery	Remote Service Session Hijacking (2)	Data from Cloud Storage Object	Dynamic Resolution (3)	
Replication Through Removable Media	Shared Modules	Browser Extensions	Execution Guardrails (1)	Man-in-the-Middle (1)	Domain Trust Discovery	Remote Services (6)	Data from Information Repositories (2)	Encrypted Channel (2)	
Supply Chain Compromise (3)	Software Deployment Tools	Compromise Client Software Binary	Exploitation for Defense Evasion	Modify Authentication Process (3)	File and Directory Discovery	Replication Through Removable Media	Data from Local System	Fallback Channels	
Trusted Relationship	System Services (2)	Create Account (3)	Event Triggered Execution (15)	Network Sniffing	Network Service Scanning	Software Deployment Tools	Data from Network Shared Drive	Ingress Tool Transfer	
Valid Accounts (4)	User Execution (2)	Create or Modify System Process (4)	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Group Policy Modification	Network Share Discovery	Taint Shared Content	Data from Removable Media	Multi-Stage Channels	
	Windows Management Instrumentation	Event Triggered Execution (15)	Group Policy Modification	Hide Artifacts (6)	Network Sniffing	Use Alternate Authentication Material (4)	Data Staged (2)	Non-Application Layer Protocol	
		External Remote Services	Hijack Execution Flow (11)	Hijack Execution Flow (11)	OS Credential Dumping (8)	Email Collection (3)	Email Collection (3)	Non-Standard Port	
		Hijack Execution Flow (11)	Impair Defenses (6)	Steal Application Access Token	Peripheral Device Discovery	Input Capture (4)	Input Capture (4)	Protocol Tunneling	
		Implant Container Image	Indicator Removal on Host (6)	Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets (3)	Permission Groups Discovery (3)	Man in the Browser	Man in the Browser	Proxy (4)	
		Office Application Startup (6)	Indirect Command Execution	Process Discovery	Process Discovery	Man-in-the-Middle (1)	Man-in-the-Middle (1)	Remote Access Software	
		Pre-OS Boot (3)	Masquerading (6)	Query Registry	Query Registry	Screen Capture	Screen Capture	Traffic Signaling (1)	
		Scheduled Task/Job (5)	Modify Authentication Process (3)	Remote System Discovery	Remote System Discovery	Video Capture	Video Capture	Web Service (3)	
		Scheduled Task/Job (5)	Modify Cloud Compute	Software Discovery (1)	Software Discovery (1)				
				Unsecured Credentials (6)	System Information Discovery				

# Intelligence Analysis







Figure 1



# Cognitive Biases

# Overcoming Biases





Jrnl Intel & Nat Sec  
@IntelNatSecJnl


Following

We are very sad to hear of the recent death of Richards J. 'Dick' Heuer, a former senior CIA officer and scholar, whose seminal works on intelligence analysis are still a great influence on many of us. We send our deepest condolences to his family, friends, and colleagues.

1:23 PM - 24 Aug 2018



# Intelligence Dissemination







# THREAT INTELLIGENCE

## LEVELS

### Strategic

*Who and why?*

### Operational

*How and where?*

### Tactical

*What?*

#### Audience

BOD; Executive Leadership; Security Leadership

Security Leadership; Incident Response; Threat Hunters

Security Operations; Network Defenders; Incident Response; Automation

#### Deliverable

Business context; strategic impact; risk management

- M & A
- Brand reputation
- Compliance

Support to remediation, hunting, detection; budget decisions; collection management

- Prioritize and budget security operations

Technical indicator ingest; threat behavior analytics (TBA)

- Malware analysis
- Automated tools & processes

What about intelligence  
tradecraft in reporting?


# Sample Report Structure

## Report Structure

- Title
- Executive Summary (BLUF)
- What?
- So what?
- What next?
- References
- Appendix
  - Indicators (machine readable?)
  - Tradecraft used

# Intelligence Feedback


We are here !



# Getting Feedback



- Orally
- Written feedback
- SharePoint metrics
- Dissemination and feedback via corporate comms app
- Microsoft Forms
- Threat Intel Portal



Wrapping  
up

From intelligence to CTI

Intelligence cycle

Basic CTI concepts and  
frameworks

A dark silhouette of a group of graduates in caps and gowns, some holding diplomas, against a light blue background.

End of the 1<sup>st</sup> part of the presentation

Questions?



A view at the Threat Landscape



CROWDSTRIKE



# The human behind the keyboard



Script Kiddie



Malicious  
Insider



Organised  
Cybercrime




Hacktivism



Cyber Terrorism



State Sponsored



What is the top cyber threat  
nowadays for organisations?



@mikko  
@mikko

Today, I was scheduled to have an interview with a journalist. The topic was the recent growth in ransomware attacks. The interview was just cancelled, because the publishing company itself was hit with a ransomware attack.

11:42 AM · Apr 26, 2021 · Twitter Web App

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**306** Retweets   **37** Quote Tweets   **1,629** Likes

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# Evolution of Ransomware



# Ransomware Trends


- Target is the whole organisation
- Data exfiltration before ransomware payload
- Public shaming sites
- Cold-calling victims
- Triple extortion
- Ransomware cartels
- Interconnected cybercrime ecosystem
- The role of insurance companies
- OFAC guidance on ransom payment





How much is the average  
ransom payment?

## Ransom Payments By Quarter




# Number of Ransomware Attacks That Used Data Extortion in 2020 By Continent


1 - 50

51 - 100

101 - 150

200+






How long does it take to get  
ransomwared?

## Ryuk Speed Run, 2 Hours to Ransom



Reference:  
DFIRReport

## Ransomware Attacks per Week





As a network defender, how can you  
detect and respond to ransomware?

# CHOOSE YOUR HACKER



RUSSIA CHINA

NORTH KOREA

IRAN

USA


CREDITS: 0

State Sponsored Threat Groups


What does the term APT mean?

# APT

- Advanced
- Persistent
- Threat




# Another way to look at APTs...




Source:  
Joe Slowik

# When everything started! (version 2)



# External Threat Intelligence Services Q1 2021




Source:  
Forrester

# I SEE THREAT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS




# THREAT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS EVERYWHERE

# Bears, Pandas, Kittens and the rest



# FireEye APT Groups

- FireEye's list of sophisticated actors and naming conventions looks like this:
    - APT0-27, 30/31, 40/41 = China
    - APT28/29 = Russia
    - APT32 = Vietnam
    - APT33/34/35/39 = Iran
    - APT36 = Pakistan
    - APT37/38 = North Korea
- ~2.5k UNC threat groups



# CrowdStrike APT Groups

►  **UNCOVER THE ADVERSARY**



**CHINA**

- Comment Panda: Commercial, Government, Non-profit
- Deep Panda: Financial, Technology, Non-profit
- Foxy Panda: Technology & Communications
- Anchor Panda: Government organizations, Defense & Aerospace, Industrial Engineering, NGOs
- Impersonating Panda: Financial Sector
- Karma Panda: Dissident groups
- Keyhole Panda: Electronics & Communications
- Poisonous Panda: Energy Technology, G20, NGOs, Dissident Groups
- Putter Panda: Governmental & Military
- Toxic Panda: Dissident Groups
- Union Panda: Industrial companies
- Vixen Panda: Government

**CRIMINAL**

- Singing Spider: Commercial, Financial
- Union Spider: Manufacturing
- Andromeda Spider: Numerous

**RUSSIA**

- Energetic Bear: Oil and Gas Companies

**NORTH KOREA**

- Silent Chollima: Government, Military, Financial

**IRAN**

- Magic Kitten: Dissidents
- Cutting Kitten: Energy Companies

**INDIA**

- Viceroy Tiger: Government, Legal, Financial, Media, Telecom

**HACTIVIST/TERRORIST**

- Deadeye Jackal: Commercial, Financial, Media, Social Networking
- Ghost Jackal: Commercial, Energy, Financial
- Corsair Jackal: Commercial, Technology, Financial, Energy
- Extreme Jackal: Military, Government

2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.

<b>Adversary</b>	<b>Category or Nation-State</b>	
	<b>SPIDER</b>	ECRIME
	<b>CHOLLIMA</b>	DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (NORTH KOREA)
	<b>JACKAL</b>	HACKTIVIST
	<b>TIGER</b>	INDIA
	<b>KITTEN</b>	IRAN
	<b>LEOPARD</b>	PAKISTAN
	<b>PANDA</b>	PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
	<b>BEAR</b>	RUSSIAN FEDERATION
	<b>CRANE</b>	SOUTH KOREA
	<b>BUFFALO</b>	Vietnam

FireEye and CrowdStrike track APT groups from: China, Russia, Iran, N. Korea, Vietnam, Pakistan, India and S. Korea.


Why only groups from these states?





How do governments do attribution?  
What sources do they use?

# NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY



Jason Healey, Atlantic Council

# On attribution

- Type of attribution
  - Person? Organisation?
  - Country? Threat group?
- Technology enablement
- False flags
- Usage of open-source offensive tools



# APT Research

**THE ETHICS AND PERILS OF APT RESEARCH**

**An Unexpected Transition into Intelligence Brokerage**

Juan Andres Guerrero-Saade  
Senior Security Researcher, GReAT, Kaspersky Lab  
[@juanandres\\_gs](https://twitter.com/juanandres_gs)



## 'Slingshot' Campaign Outed by Kaspersky is U.S. Operation Targeting Terrorists: Report

Computing / Cybersecurity

By [Eduard Kovacs](#) on March 21, 2018

## Google's top security teams unilaterally shut down a counterterrorism operation

The decision to block an “expert” level cyberattack has caused controversy inside Google after it emerged that the hackers in question were working for a US ally.

by **Patrick Howell O'Neill**

March 26, 2021

# THE HACKER | AND THE STATE

Cyber Attacks and  
the New Normal  
of Geopolitics

BEN BUCHANAN

## Geopolitics and Cyber

- Adversary intent
- Geopolitical signaling
- Geopolitical shaping

# Wrapping up

Ransomware threat

State sponsored threats

Threat group tracking & attribution

# CTI Analyst Skillset



# Computer Security



What my parents think I do



What my friends think I do



What my boss thinks I do



What my girlfriend thinks I do



What the media thinks I do



IT'S WORKING  
BUT I HAVE NO IDEA WHY

What I actually do




# **WELCOME TO CYBERSECURITY**



## **THE MORE YOU LEARN, THE LESS YOU KNOW**

# CTI Analyst Skillset




Reference:



INTELLIGENCE AND  
NATIONAL SECURITY  
ALLIANCE

# Cyber Threat Intel Analyst Tradecraft



Reference:



INTELLIGENCE AND  
NATIONAL SECURITY  
ALLIANCE

# Threat Intelligence Paths

Law  
Enforcement

National  
Security

Military  
Intelligence

Journalism

Data Science

Cybersecurity

# Maintaining External Situational Awareness

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RSS Aggregator (e.g., Feedly)

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Twitter

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Nuzzel application

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Reddit

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Podcasts (e.g., CyberWire)

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Newsletter Team (e.g., TC Dragon News Bytes)

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Strategic sources (e.g., Economist, CFR, etc.)

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Weekly Summaries (e.g. This Week in 4n6)

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Threat Intelligence Reports

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ISACs

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Trust Groups (e.g., Slack channels, mailing lists)

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Threat Intelligence vendors

# Maintaining Internal Situational Awareness

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Incident ticketing system

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Phishing campaigns

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Signature hits and alerts

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Failed intrusions

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Hunting/red team findings

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Business strategy

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Internal events

# Continuous Education

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Self-initiated

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CTFs

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Academic programs

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Certifications

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Online training material

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Conferences

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Books


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Audiobooks

# Cyber Security Analyst Maturity Curve

"A senior cyber security analyst should be able to reach the **simplicity at the far side of complexity** and to be able to communicate the cyber security risks, threats and related countermeasures **simply, effectively and actionable.**"

General  
Simplicity



**Junior**

Low Experience

**Senior**

High Experience

If you gonna read  
2 articles...

- [A Cyber Threat Intelligence Self-Study Plan: Part 1](#)
- [FAQs on Getting Started in Cyber Threat Intelligence](#)

# Wrapping up

Lifelong learner

Be part of the community

Build communication skills

Evolve

# Final Thoughts

- Remember the process of the intelligence cycle
- Discussion on the evolving cyber threat landscape:  
major cybercrime and state sponsored threats
- Diverse skillset of the CTI analyst



Thank you!

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