Introduction

The "Reply to the Foole" is one of the most well-known passages in Thomas Hobbes's influential *Leviathan*. In the passage, Hobbes attempts to rebuke those who argue that violating covenants can *sometimes* be beneficial for one's self-interest. Despite the work's general merits, a prima facie reading of the passage fails to sufficiently rebuke the Foole's central claim—that rational self-interest can, under certain conditions, justify the breach of covenant. Other interpretations of Hobbes similarly fail to create a reading of the work that meets these burdens. In this paper, I argue an interpretation of the passage and the preceding chapters that remains textually and methodologically faithful to Hobbes's political project while meeting the necessary burdens.

In Section 1, I detail what the "Reply to the Foole" must accomplish in order to maintain logical and textual consistency. In Section 2, I argue that the prima facie reading of the passage, along with other current interpretations, fails to meet the requirements detailed in Section 1. In Section 3, I outline the merits and textual fidelity of my account, which I call the Combinatorial Definitional Account. Finally, in Section 4, I present the derivation showing that the interpretation meets the requirements from Section 1.

S1: Set-Up of the "Reply to the Foole"

In this section, I will attempt to clarify what Hobbes must accomplish in his "Reply to the Foole" in order to maintain consistency within his system. These textually supported burdens form the underpinnings of my analysis, given that any interpretation of the "Reply to the Foole" that seeks consistency must meet them. I hope to illustrate a myriad of uncontroversial burdens, but, most importantly, I hope to show that an interpretation of the "Reply to the Foole" must provide reason for the Foole to *always* keep his covenant in order to maintain consistency.

First, it is clear and uncontroversial that the Foole made his covenant under the jurisdiction of a Commonwealth rather than a pre-political state. According to Hobbes, a covenant can only exist under a Commonwealth. Hobbes defines injustice as "no other than the not performance of covenant" (89.2), and later states that "because covenants of mutual trust where there is a fear of not performance on either part are invalid… before the names of just and unjust can have place, there must be some coercive power to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants" (89.3). This coercive power is the Commonwealth.

Second, it is similarly clear that the Foole is using his judgement in a way that is contrary to what the Sovereign, the leader of the Commonwealth, has explicitly allowed. Hobbes states that subjects have the right to do "those things which, in regulating their actions, the sovereign hath praetermitted" (138.6). But, by definition, breaking a covenant must not be one of those liberties afforded to subjects. Hobbes defines civil law as "to every subject, those rules which the commonwealth hath commanded him… to make use of" (173.3). Later, Hobbes states, "The law of nature and the civil law contain each other" (174.8). Thus, the Laws of Nature, one of which is not breaking covenants, is by definition included in civil law, and civil law comprises the explicit commands of the Sovereign to his subjects. The Foole is violating the civil law, and, by extension, using his own private judgement in a way not allowed by the Sovereign. This point will be important in my definitional derivation of the universal rationality of the Third Law of Nature.

Third, Hobbes' Foole cannot be persuaded by appeals to God. Hobbes states that the reply must be done "taking away the fear of God (for the same fool hath said in his heart there is no God)" (90.4). Significantly, this means that there is no theological trump card Hobbes can play against the Foole; he must reason with him in terms of a logic that does not contain godly punishments or rewards as a premise.

Finally and most importantly, I argue that Hobbes's reasoning about keeping covenants must apply universally. Hobbes defines a Law of Nature as a "precept or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life or taketh away the means of preserving the same, and to omit that by which he thinketh it may be best preserved" (79.3). Thus, it follows from this passage that the Laws of Nature forbid one from doing (or not doing) some action, and each Law of Nature instantiates one of these actions. The term "forbidden" itself indicates an intuitive semantics of universality. On the basis of textual consistency, it seems odd that Hobbes would posit a set of rules that "forbid" one from doing certain actions, while allowing exceptions to the rule within the system (without ever explicitly explaining as much). In any case, given that the Law of Nature relevant for Hobbes' "Reply to the Foole" is the third, which is "that men perform their covenants made" (89.1), there are further reasons for universality motivated by logical and textual consistency.

Logically, the universality of the Laws of Nature is necessitated per Hobbes' definition of reason itself. Hobbes defines reason as "nothing but reckoning (that is, adding and subtracting)

of the consequences of general names agreed upon for the marking and signifying of our thoughts" (22.2). From this, we can conclude that Hobbes views reason to be a process of thinking that is carried out with mathematical precision. In fact, Hobbes differentiated himself from other "lesser" philosophers by saying that his ratiocination is "from the definitions, or explications of the names they are to use; which is a method that hath been used only in geometry" (23.7). Thus, in the same way that the Pythagorean Theorem must necessarily hold true per the geometric definitions of a right triangle, so must the Laws of Nature per correct reasoning. As they are products of reason, they are nothing other than an addition and subtraction of smaller, primitive definitions to construct more complex concepts strung together to make complex judgments. It would be absurd to think that, per a process similar to addition and subtraction, one can conclude both the Third Law of Nature and the proposition that one can sometimes break a covenant. For Hobbes, this sort of paradox would be akin to someone reasoning $2 + 2 = 4$, but sometimes $2 + 2 = 5$.

Secondly, an interpretation of Hobbes that allows for contingency in the "Reply to the Foole," and thus the Laws of Nature, would create serious textual inconsistencies. Hobbes explicitly states that the Laws of Nature are "immutable and eternal" (99.38). He also says, "The laws of nature oblige *in foro interno*, that is to say, they bind to a desire they should take place; but *in foro externo*, that is, to the putting them in act, not always" (99.36). It is clear that, by this comparison, Hobbes intends to build his system with *in foro interno* obligations of the Laws of Nature holding universally regardless of any empirical fact. He is willing to admit that, in a state of nature, the Laws of Nature might not always necessitate action, but since the Foole is under a Commonwealth prior to breaking his covenant, it must hold.

In this section, I have shown the following: Hobbes' "Reply to the Foole" must, without appealing to God, provide universal reason to someone living under a Commonwealth to keep their covenants, or his system risks logical and textual inconsistency.

S2: Other Interpretations

Next, given the analysis above on what Hobbes needs in his "Reply to the Foole," I attempt to evaluate his prima facie textual attempt at fulfilling those burdens and, further, the two main academic schools of interpretations of the "Reply to the Foole" (or, in many cases, the Laws of Nature): divine command theory, definitional derivations, and the silent Foole. I

conclude that both the prima facie response and the current major interpretations fail in some regard to maintain Hobbes' commitment to the universality of the laws of nature.

Prima facie textual reading:

Hobbes gives two explicit, surface-level reasons as to why the Foole ought to keep his covenant even if it is not seemingly in his self-interest. First, Hobbes states that the Foole is likely to be found out, and, as such, face long-term consequences for his self-interested pursuit. In essence, Hobbes argues that the Foole is making a risky, unreasonable choice in choosing to violate a covenant. Secondly, Hobbes argues that the Foole, if found out, is unlikely to be seen as trustworthy according to others around him, and, as such, he risks being expelled from any society that he attempts to enter.

This reasoning is obviously contingent, and this is the general problem plaguing other interpretations as well. The prima facie textual reading relies on other people finding out the Foole has violated a covenant, but one can imagine a case wherein someone has broken their covenant with no risk of anyone knowing. For example, the other party can forget about the covenant or have no means of telling others that the Foole violated it. Thus, this reading clearly does not suffice to meet the conditions that Hobbes' "Reply to the Foole" needs.

Martinich's divine command theory:

In the chapter "Law" of *The Two Gods of the Leviathan*, Professor A. P. Martinich interprets Hobbes as using God to provide deontic force to the laws of nature. In so doing, he leaves open possible contradictions to the laws of nature by way of God himself. One of Martinich's central points is that the laws of nature are promulgated to us by God through our reasoning of self-preservation. This is problematic, because if the Foole can correctly reason that it is in his self-interest (which includes self-preservation) to violate a law of nature, then it seems that this interpretation fares little better than the prima facie reading. In fact, divine command theory would almost seem to countenance a God-approved exception to the third law of nature. Again, it seems reasonable to imagine a case wherein one, in a commonwealth, will benefit both their self-interest and self-preservation by breaking a covenant; Martinich gives no analysis as to why this is never possible. Further, while Martinich states, "Hobbes does not approve of all self-interest, only long-range, rule-governed self-interest," (Martinich 119) there is no reason to

believe why covenant breaking cannot be beneficial for long-term, rule-governed self-interest. Finally, Professor Martinich does add that the Foole should keep his promise because that is the only sure way "of gaining the secure and perpetual felicity of heaven" (92.6), but this does not help in supplying what is needed. First, if God promulgates to us his laws of nature through reason, God approves of seeking long-term self-interest, and one can successfully reason to long-term gains by breaking a covenant, then there is no reason to believe that the Foole cannot be admitted into heaven despite his breaking of the covenant. The Foole seems to be doing exactly what God is telling him to do. Second, it feels disingenuous to Hobbes' stated goals to respond to the Foole by appealing to God, as Hobbes explicitly rejected their belief in godly rewards or punishments. Thus, divine command theory does not rescue Hobbes from inconsistency.

Definitional derivations:

Definitional derivations seem to get the closest to supplying a non-contingent "Reply to the Foole" by seriously considering Hobbes' commitment to reasoning as a mathematical process. In so doing, proponents of different definitional derivations attempt to remove synthetic assumptions from Hobbes' reasoning, and thus prove his reasoning is universally applicable to any arbitrary individual. However, I will argue that the following major definitional derivations fail in achieving this goal.

McNeilly's definitional derivation: The non-contingent foundation Hobbes needs is not provided by McNeilly's understanding of the laws of nature. McNeilly contends that the first and most basic law of nature, which states that men should want peace, only applies when each agent determines that doing so is in their best interests. An agent's own assessment of their goals, their sense of power, and their strategic location all influence whether or not they should accept peace. However, this interpretation brings back the very type of subjective judgment that Hobbes' political philosophy aims to exclude. As Lloyd notes, in McNeilly's model, "[w]hether and on what terms to settle a peace is entirely up to the individual" and "so long as enough others do seek peace," the individual need not actually participate; he may merely "fly under the radar" or appear to conform in order to further his personal goals. That is, the Foole is McNeilly's agent. McNeilly's derivation does not disprove covenant-breaking as unreasonable; rather, it validates it

when done subtly or ingeniously. This violates Hobbes's own methodological requirement that the rules are derivable as theorems of reason and binding universally *in foro interno*, collapsing his rules of nature into conditional strategies of prudence.

 Professor Lloyd's reciprocity theorem: I will not attempt to fully reconstruct Lloyd's argument for the reciprocity theorem, but, for our purposes, we can say it relies on two main premises that are found in Hobbes's definitions. The first is that "to do what one judges to be done without right is to act contrary," and the second is that "if one judges another's doing of an action to be without right, one judges the action done to be done without right." Thus, if we accept these premises, Lloyd is able to conclude the following: "to do what one condemns in another is contrary to reason." From this theorem, Lloyd argues that Hobbes's worry about the Foole is solved, for the theorem "licenses only symmetrical worlds in which (from the individual's point of view) everyone is justified in doing/forbearing certain types of action in the circumstances, or no one is justified in doing/forbearing those types of action in the circumstances" (Lloyd 235). While this is an appealing interpretation, and, on its face, can seemingly provide a response to the free-riding Foole, I believe it fails in meeting the standard of universal non-contingency. It seems as though one can maximally specify each action-description in order to abide by the reciprocity theorem while also continuing to free-ride. For example, one can imagine a Foole who views their particular breaking of a covenant to be so specific and rarely profitable so that they can claim they would allow for others to do so. Thus, an action is likely not labeled "breaking a covenant," but rather "breaking a covenant with *X, Y, Z...*," where the variables stand in for a potentially infinite number of qualifying conditions. This seems fair, as most share a genuine intuition that each action is different. A proponent of the reciprocity theorem might respond by saying that one would view it unreasonable for others to define action-descriptions as specifically as the Foole above does, but the Foole can equally state that, given his litany of unique conditions, anyone in these circumstances could do the same. This places us, at best, in a position of infinite regress with the Foole. Lloyd later states that the Foole also seems to make a reasoning error in concluding that, because a particular violation of a covenant happened to work out in the Foole's favor, that does not mean the Foole reasoned correctly. Lloyd gives a compelling example: "The fact that the holder of a winning lottery ticket chose his winning number by compiling the birthdates of his family members does not allow us to infer that his betting those numbers [or any numbers, for that matter] was rational" (Lloyd

235). However, this also fails to achieve the coveted universal status, as it seems reasonable to believe that there is a plethora of circumstances wherein people can profit while breaking covenants and still act on probabilistically sound reasoning. Thus, the reciprocity theorem and probability-oriented responses are unlikely to help Hobbes access a universal "Reply to the Foole."

Silent Foole:

Kinch Hoekstra pioneered an innovative and textually plausible account that Hobbes was not concerned about the "silent Foole." According to Hoekstra, Hobbes only cared about some sort of "explicit" Foole, who would threaten to undermine the stability of general covenant-keeping by flagrantly violating the Sovereign's judgement. There are a few reasons this reinterpretation of the burdens is not persuasive. First, it seems as though, at best, while this has eliminated the force of a set of troubling contingent examples (the "silent" Foole), the contingency question still must be answered. That is, one can easily imagine a flagrant Foole who still reasonably stands to benefit from the breaking of a covenant. Thus, whether Hobbes's main stated goal is rebuking the flagrant Foole and preventing large-scale rebellion, Hobbes still seems to offer some sort of universal account as to why covenants must be kept. Secondly, accepting that Hobbes would accept, or even support, the "successful wickedness" of the "silent" Foole feels inconsistent with Hobbes's logical system and other textual pieces (see the last point of S1). Thirdly, as Lloyd points out, it is unclear whether the explicit Foole is as problematic for the destruction of the state as Hoekstra would like to paint. As she writes, "explicit fools are much less dangerous than Hoekstra seems to imagine," since a declaration of intent to rebel for personal gain "offers [others] no reason to believe that they would profit," and "the example of their fate at the hands of the state [is] not likely to inspire imitation" (Lloyd 314). In other words, the explicit Foole is not inherently more dangerous than the silent one, and thus the interpretation does little to explain why Hobbes would narrow the scope of his reply so dramatically.

S3: Combinatorial Definitional Account Set-Up

My goal is to describe a definitional interpretation of Hobbes similar to McNeilly's, but I hope to avoid any sort of synthetic premises so as to preserve the universality of the Law of Nature. I will call this the Combinatorial Definitional Account. I use the term "combinatorial"

simply to signify the nature of Hobbes's ratiocination, which starts from defining complex concepts (like Peace) as the result of conjoining simpler concepts, which are eventually defined by primitives that Hobbes holds true by assumption. In so doing, I hope to show that the Foole leads to the negation of a conjunct that is definitionally necessary to construct some condition that any rational person must endeavor to by assumption in Hobbes's system. While this strengthens the assumptions of Hobbes's system, it leaves him no longer vulnerable to contingent counterexamples that undermine his Third Law of Nature and, ultimately, preserves his system from contradiction and textual infidelity. I will explain each step (and the shorthand) of the following relevant definitions:

1. CausesOfQuarrel(G) := EqA(G) $\land$ EqH(G) $\land$ OverlappingJudgement(G) $\land$ ¬Commonwealth(G)
2. War(G) := CausesOfQuarrel(G)
3. Commonwealth(G) := PublicJudgement(G)
4. PublicJudgement(G) := ¬(PrivateJudgement(G)) $\land$ SovereignJudgement(G)
5. Peace(G) = ¬War(G)

Each concept (complex or primitive) should be read as a function that takes in *G*, a variable standing in for a group in a duration of time, and outputs a particular condition for that group of people in a duration of time. The general strategy is as follows: The Foole violates PublicJudgement(G), which violates Commonwealth(G), which then, along with other primitively true conditions, creates CausesOfQuarrel(G), finally creating a state of War(G) (or ¬Peace(G)).

Definition 1:

This definition should be largely uncontroversial. Hobbes holds it to be primitively true that, in a state of nature, people have sufficiently equal ability (EqA(G)) to harm or kill others. Hobbes states, "Nature hath made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind as that…when all is reckoned together the difference between man and man is not so considerable…[and] the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest." (74.1). Further, Hobbes writes, "From this equality of ability ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our ends" (75.3). Thus, (EqA(G)) is

a primitive truth, and the equality of hope (EqH(G)) follows it. Next, it is clear that overlapping judgements play a critical role in creating the initial conditions for war. Hobbes states that "if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end… endeavor to destroy or subdue one another" (75.5). Hobbes further concludes that, in this state of nature, "we find…[the] principal causes of quarrel" (76.5). Throughout these pages, Hobbes continually qualifies that, while this is human nature, a "commonpower to keep them in quiet," (76.5) which can be taken to represent the Commonwealth, pulls people away from the causes of quarrel. Thus, the conjunction of these conditions—equality of ability, equality of hope, overlapping desires, and the absence of a common adjudicating power—forms the basis for the combinatorial definition of CausesOfQuarrel(G).

Definition 2:

The second definition is slightly more controversial. In *Leviathan*, Hobbes defines War as "a tract of time wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known." (76.8) The causes of quarrel are substantively synonymous with the "will to contend," but it seems as though Hobbes also has a function, one that signifies an epistemic state of "sufficient knowledge", that takes in the CausesOfQuarrel(G) condition. For example, the second definition could read:

2_1. War(G) := SufficientKnowledge(CausesOfQuarrel(G))

This would be problematic for the stated goal of providing a universal, non-contingent pathway that the Foole creates a state of defined war, as the function SufficientKnowledge seems intrinsically empirical. However, there is good reason to take out the SufficientKnowledge function in order to read Hobbes more faithfully to his goal of ratiocination by "geometric process." He does not define what it means for something to be sufficiently known, and it seems to be an implausible concept to have a primitive understanding of. Additionally, in Hobbes' earlier writings. Namely, *De Cive* and *Elements of Law Natural and Politic*. Hobbes does not countenance the Sufficient Knowledge function. In the former, Hobbes defines War as "that same time in which the will of contesting by force, is fully declar'd either by Words, or Deeds." (*De*

Cive 12). In the latter, he defines war as "nothing else but that time wherein the will and intention of contending by force is either by words or actions sufficiently declared" (*Element of Law Natural and Politic* 11) In both of these definitions, a group's knowledge of actions is not needed to bring about War; it is sufficiently brought about by actions themselves.

The acceptance of 2_1 rather than 2 would likely come from a stated desire of complete textual fidelity to Hobbes's work in *Leviathan*, even in the face of historical oddities relative to his other work and methodological commitments. Thus, as a result of that strong commitment, then there is another aspect of the definition that must be accounted for. In the paragraph after his definition of War in *Leviathan*, Hobbes states, "Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man, the same is consequent to the time wherein men live without other security than what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them withal" (76. 9). This can reasonably provide the following disjunct to Hobbes' definition of War:

2_{1a}. War(G) := SufficientKnowledge(CausesOfQuarrel(G)) v ¬Commonwealth(G)

As plainly as sufficient knowledge seems to be laid out as a necessary function to take in the causes of quarrel, so is the non-existence of a Commonwealth as a sufficient condition for War. Thus, one must either accept *definition 2* (War(G) := CausesOfQuarrel(G)), the definition that is more consistent with Hobbes entire body of work and methodological commitments, or *2_{1a}* (War(G) := SufficientKnowledge(CausesOfQuarrel(G)) v ¬Commonwealth(G)), the definition emanating from a commitment to complete textual fidelity to *Leviathan*. I will argue that, in either of these definitions, Hobbes constructs a logic such that the fool makes a *de dicto* irrational choice.

Definitions 3 and 4:

In Chapter 17 of *Leviathan*, Hobbes explicitly defines the term "Commonwealth":

> The only way to erect such a common power as may be able to defend them from the invasion and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort as that

> by their own industry, and by the fruits of the earth, they may nourish themselves and live
> contentedly, is to confer all their power and strength upon one man…that may reduce
> their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will…therein to submit their wills, every one
> to his will, and their judgements, to his judgement. This done, the multitude so united in
> one person is called a COMMONWEALTH. (17.13)

From this quotation, it seems clear that a Commonwealth is nothing more than a state of time wherein everyone in a group *G* "reduce[s] their wills…and their judgements" to a singular leader's judgement. I represent this state of time as PublicJudgement(*G*). This is the uncontroversial third definition. Further, it seems as though PublicJudgement(*G*) is nothing more than a state of time wherein no one utilizes their private judgement in any way not authorized by the Sovereign (see point three in Section 1), and the Sovereign's judgement stands supreme. I represent this state of time as $\neg$(PrivateJudgement(G)) $\wedge$ SovereignJudgement(G), which is the fourth definition.

      Here, I will flag Hobbes's use of universal terminology in defining the necessary conditions for a Commonwealth. He explicitly states that "every one" in a group must submit their will in order to create the "multitude…called a COMMONWEALTH." This is an important definitional quality; Hobbes is not wary of using terms like "sufficient" (as noted above), so if he intended a softer definition of Commonwealth(G), he would have likely indicated as such. *Definition 5*:

      The last definition is the least contestable. Hobbes, after defining War(G), states, "All other time is PEACE" (76.8). Thus, it seems Peace(G) can faithfully be defined as $\neg$War(G), and, as such, the entire definition set is accounted for with textual support.

S4: The Foole's Irrationality

In the previous section, I showed the textual and methodological faithfulness of the following set of definitions:

1. CausesOfQuarrel(G) := EqAbility(G) $\wedge$ EqH(G) $\wedge$ PrivJudgement(G) $\wedge$
   $\neg$Commonwealth(G)

2. War(G) := CausesOfQuarrel(G) **OR**

    2_{1a}. War(G) := SufficientKnowledge(CausesOfQuarrel(G)) v ¬Commonwealth(G)

3. Commonwealth(G) := PublicJudgement(G)

4. PublicJudgement(G) := ¬(PrivateJudgement(G)) $\land$ SovereignJudgement(G)

5. Peace(G) = ¬War(G)

Now, I will show how, given these definitions, there is a derivation that universally follows from the Foole's actions showing his irrationality within Hobbes's system. I will begin with the derivation that uses *definition 2*.

Derivation with Definition 2:

1. The Foole breaks a covenant.
2. Breaking a covenant is contrary to the Civil Law.
3. The Civil Law is an expression of the Sovereign's Judgement.
4. Thus, the Foole's action instantiates PrivateJudgement(G).
5. Per (4) and *definition 4*, PublicJudgement(G) fails to be instantiated.
6. Per (5) and *definition 3*, Commonwealth(G) fails to be instantiated.
7. The Foole is already in a condition where EqAbility(G), EqH(G), and PrivJudgement(G) are instantiated.
8. Per (6), (7), and *definition 1*, CausesOfQuarrel(G) is instantiated.
9. Per (8) and *definition 2*, War(G) is instantiated.
10. Per (9) and *definition 5*, Peace(G) fails to be instantiated.

In the derivation, (1) through (3) are clearly true, given what is established in S1. (4) also seems clearly true. The Foole desires to break a covenant to maximize his own narrow self-interest in the face of a judgement from his Sovereign to follow covenants universally; thus, he employs his own private judgement. (5) follows. A state of time whereby a group is under a public judgement only comes about only when *everyone* forgoes their private judgement and instead listens to a Sovereign. The Foole violates these conditions. Given that there is no longer a state of

PublicJudgement(*G*), there cannot be a Commonwealth, which is (6). Here, I will caveat that there are two prima facie reasonable interpretations to this step.

First, one can interpret the Foole's actions as systematically deconstructing a Commonwealth for a group *G* of which he is a member of. While this feels intuitively unreasonable, it is important to note that our semantic intuitions of "Commonwealth," "deconstruction," or other keywords are not important in the evaluation of Hobbes as creating a logical system of definitions. Secondly, this interpretation feels textually consistent with Hobbes's views on absolute government. For example, Hobbes explicitly countenances the logical dissolution of a Commonwealth that follows a state of divided judgements: "There is a sixth doctrine plainly and directly against the essence of a commonwealth, and it is this: That the sovereign power may be divided. For what is it to divide the power of a commonwealth, but to dissolve it." (214.12) It feels completely fair to say that the Foole's denial of Civil Law in favor of his private judgement is an instantiation of dividing the power of a commonwealth; to Hobbes, that definitionally means a dissolution of the Commonwealth. This sentiment is further corroborated during Hobbes's discussion of systematically divided governments. Hobbes states, "if the king bear the person of the people, and the general assembly bear also the person of the people, and another assembly bear the person of a part of the people, they are not one person, nor one sovereign, but three persons, and three sovereigns" (217.16). By utilizing his private judgement, the Foole seems to be bearing his own person, and, thus, there is no longer one supreme Sovereign but multiple. This is contrary to the nature of the absolutist Commonwealth that Hobbes defines.

Second, one can interpret the Foole's actions as pulling himself out of a Commonwealth, while the Commonwealth remains for others. This feels more intuitive. The rationale for the view is as follows: obviously, a singular, potentially miniscule action by one subject cannot bring down an entire Commonwealth, but it might be enough for the Foole to exit the group that submits their judgements to the Sovereign. Thus, the Foole is no longer in the Commonwealth. In either interpretation, my derivation will still follow. *But*, there do seem to be potential complications that could derive from this second interpretation. It seems unclear as to whether the Foole would exist outside of a Commonwealth alone, and, thus, no longer in a state of overlapping private judgements. Teasing out this distinction is too large of a task to undertake in this paper's current form, and, given the textual evidence I have provided for the first reading

(along with the non-persuasiveness of using "intuition" to analyze a formal definitional system), I am comfortable with endorsing the less problematic interpretation.

Next, after a bit of analysis, (7) seems to be true as well. Hobbes holds the rough equal ability of people to be a primitive—something true by nature or assumption. Also, as noted above, he argues that from the rough equality of ability (EqA(G))follows the equality of hope (EqH(G)) for attaining ends. Thus, given that EqA(G) is a primitive, and EqH(G) follows from EqA(G), the first two conditions of (7) uncontroversially follow. Next, clearly the Foole is in a state of time wherein private judgement is employed *and* there are overlapping judgements, as that is precisely illustrated when the Foole breaks a covenant. Independent of that, Hobbes seems to take it that, unless humans are in conditions of absolute material abundance, there will be overlapping private judgements, and, thus, given that communities are almost intrinsically never in a state of absolute material abundance, it feels safe to assume the third condition of (7).

The final three steps in the derivation follow straightforwardly from the definitions provided. Step (8) simply instantiates the definition of CausesOfQuarrel(G)—once the conditions specified in (6) and (7) are in place (namely, the absence of a Commonwealth, the presence of PrivateJudgement, and the baseline conditions of equal ability and hope), it follows by definitional composition that CausesOfQuarrel(G) obtains. Step (9) then applies the definition of War: since, per *definition 2*, War is just the presence of CausesOfQuarrel, War(G) is instantiated. Finally, by *definition 5*, Peace is defined as the negation of War; thus, the instantiation of War(G) entails the failure of Peace(G) to be instantiated. These final steps clarify the logical endpoint of the Foole's action: he dismantles a necessary conjunct in the combinatorial structure that generates Peace.

Derivation with Definition 2$_{1a}$:

1. The Foole breaks a covenant.
2. Breaking a covenant is contrary to the Civil Law.
3. The Civil Law is an expression of the Sovereign's Judgement.
4. Thus, the Foole's action instantiates PrivateJudgement(G).
5. Per (4) and *definition 4*, PublicJudgement(G) fails to be instantiated.
6. Per (5) and *definition 3*, Commonwealth(G) fails to be instantiated.

7. Per (6) and *definition 2_{1a}*, War(G) is instantiated.
8. Per (7) and *definition 5*, Peace(G) is not instantiated.

This derivation is even simpler than the previous one. Steps (1) through (5) are the exact same, and, as such, I will not repeat the analysis. Given that Commonwealth(G) fails to be instantiated, and that the strict textual fidelity to *Leviathan* demanded by the motivations that created *definition 2_{1a}*, this derivation has no problems with arriving at a state where the definitional Peace(G) is not instantiated for the Foole.

The Final Step:

Under both derivations, Hobbes's combinatorial definitional system demands that the Foole is no longer in a state of Peace(G) as a result of his violation of the covenant. The final step to close the logic while accomplishing this paper's stated goal is to prove that Hobbes assumes a rational man must endeavor for Peace(G). If I can accomplish that, then the Foole is, by the logic of the system, irrational, as he commits some action that violates the construction of a complex state that he must preserve by rationality. This goal is not difficult.

First, it is clear that Hobbes finds War(G) to be an extremely undesirable state of possible complete destruction. Hobbes states:

> "In such a condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and consequently, no culture of the earth, no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by the sea, no commodious building, no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force, no knowledge of the face of the earth, no account of time, no arts, no letters, no society, and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" (76)

An important piece of this quotation to flag is Hobbes's use of modal or probabilistic language to justify his claim that War(G) is undesirable. Hobbes states that the fruit of industry is "uncertain," and, thus, that all of the disastrous consequences of War(G) *could* follow. Thus, Hobbes states a primitive assumption of his system: "Every man ought to endeavour peace, as far

as he has hope of obtaining it." (80.4) An instinctive pushback here would be to say that my reintroduction of modality/probability *is* empirical and, as such, counter to my stated goals throughout this paper. I do not believe this pushback goes far. Hobbes does discuss modality and probability, but, this time, it *is on the side* of the primitive assumptions rather than the derivation. In other words, Hobbes's assumption is this: War(G) introduces a state of time whereby there is a possibility of complete destruction; any rational man would endeavor to avoid this possibility, no matter how small it is. This idea should not be viewed as a revolutionary re-interpretation of Hobbes, as it seems to clearly follow from famous Hobbesian ideas of sufficient equality in a state of nature. When Hobbes discusses why a state of nature is necessarily dangerous for everyone, he does not state that every person in the state of nature *will* be killed, but that every person in the state of nature *could* be killed. Obviously, some people will be less likely to be killed than others (for example, those physically stronger or more cunning may fare better), but Hobbes's point is that no one in a state of nature avoids the possibility of death. Someone could kill a stronger person in their sleep, or poison them over a meal, or so on. This is similar to my reading of Hobbes's primitive assumption that a rational man must endeavor to Peace(G), as Peace(G) is the only thing that pulls one away from War(G), which carries with it an uncertainty of absolute destruction.

This analysis helps deal with another pushback to my view. Namely, one can state that it is *obviously* true that one person's (potentially miniscule) actions could not plunge a group into a full-fledged war. First, appeals to intuition or obviousness on the basis of our non-logical semantic understanding of words like "war" does not take seriously Hobbes's creation of his own logical system and methodological commitment of defining complex concepts from smaller primitives. Second, my view posits that Hobbes's system shows that the only way to be maximally certain of living in a non-disastrous state of time is, by definition, to collapse a group of people's private judgement into a singular public judgement. The rational pursuit, by assumption, is to endeavour for the maximal certainty of a living in a non-disastrous state of time. Thus, while the Foole might not clearly cause a visible state of war, his actions definitionally contribute to a degradation of certainty.

In any case, one need not agree with Hobbes's assumptions. In fact, I personally believe a reasonable position would be that the assumptions feel too strong. All I hope to do is to construct

a definitional interpretation of Hobbes that is textually faithful and maintains consistency within his system.

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