

# GAIN BETTER VISIBILITY INTO CONTAINER IMAGE SIGNATURES



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## Agenda

- 1 How Code Signing Works
- 2 Introduction to SigScan
- 3 Signature Discovery for Containers

- 4 Signature Discovery for Files
- 5 Demo
- 6 Future Work



#### Motivation

- Container Image security is under the spotlight as the industry continues to focus on modern software supply chain security
- Risks to running unsigned container images or images with unknown signatures (self-signed, standalone software keypairs, etc.).
- Current OSS tooling (e.g., sigstore/cosign) has limited enterprise key management support, which means users can generate local software keys or rely non-compliant code signing certificates.
- Enterprises lack visibility into what applications, container images, artifacts have been signed.
- Signature Discovery:
  - Sigscan can scan an OCI-compliant registry for cosign/notaryv2 signed container images, and report to screen or output to JSON. It can also scan the file system for signed artifacts.
- Inspired by Jetstack/paranoia tool for detecting certificates in container images

https://github.com/venafi/sigscan




#### **QUICK REVIEW**

## How Code Signing Works

To sign an artifact / source code / software executable / macro / etc:


The signer uses the sign tool provided with their software development environment. The code sign tool does the following:

- 1. A hash is generated on the file(s)
- 2. The hash is encrypted with a <u>private key</u> (signature)
- 3. The code + signature + code signing certificate are are bundled together





## Sigscan Architecture





#### OSS Resources Leveraged by SigScan

- Registry:
  - Oras Go -> <a href="https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go">https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go</a>
  - Google Go Container Registry -> <a href="https://github.com/google/go-containerregistry">https://github.com/google/go-containerregistry</a>
- Container Image Signing
  - Sigstore/cosign -> <a href="https://github.com/sigstore/cosign">https://github.com/sigstore/cosign</a>
  - Notary v2 Project -> <a href="https://github.com/notaryproject/notation">https://github.com/notaryproject/notation</a>
- Filesystem:
  - SAS Software Relic -> <a href="https://github.com/sassoftware/relic">https://github.com/sassoftware/relic</a>



#### History of (Traditional) Signatures

- Embedded
  - Traditional applications
    - EXE
    - JAR
    - XML
    - ...
- Detached
  - RedHat Simple Signing

ivan.wallis@07WKSMAC150894 sigscan % tar tvf test/tempdir1/hello-signed.jar drwxrwxr-x 0 0 0 feb 16 17:14 META-INF/
-rw-rw-r- 0 0 0 150 Feb 16 17:14 META-INF/MANIFEST.MF
-rw-rw-r- 0 0 0 316 Feb 16 17:14 META-INF/VSIGN-RSA2048-CERT.SF
-rw-rw-r- 0 0 0 1993 Feb 16 17:14 META-INF/VSIGN-RSA2048-CERT.RSA
-rw-rw-r- 0 0 0 12 Mar 27 2017 hello.txt

#### Typical Windows PE **Authenticode Signature Format** File Format PKCS#7 MS-DOS 2.0 Section contentInfo PE File Header Set to SPCIndirectDataContent, and Optional Header PE file hash value Legacy structures Windows-Specific Fields certificates Checksum Includes: X.509 certificates for software Data Directories publisher's signature X.509 certificates for timestamp Certificate Table signature (optional) SignerInfos Section Table (Headers) Section 1 Signed hash of contentInfo Publisher description and URL Section 2 (optional) Timestamp (optional) Timestamp (optional) Section N A PKCS#9 counter-signature, stored as an unauthenticated **Attribute Certificate Table** attribute, which includes: bCertificate binary array · Hash value of the SignerInfos (contains Authenticode signature) UTC timestamp creation time Timestamping authority Remaining content signature Objects with gray background are omitted from the Authenticode hash value Objects in bold describe the location of the Authenticode-related data



### Sigstore cosign signature discovery (1/2)

- Signature Specification
  - OCI object layout as follows:
    - payload -> Contents of signed data in byte-form
    - mediaType -> application/vnd.dev.cosign.simplesigning.v1+json
    - signature -> Base64-encoded signature
    - certificate -> OPTIONAL -> PEM-encoded X.509 certificate
    - chain -> OPTIONAL -> PEM-encoded x.509 certificate chain
    - bundle -> OPTIONAL -> JSON formatted, useful for offline verification of Tlog (i.e. Rekor)
    - rfc3161timestamp -> OPTIONAL -> JSON Formatted RFC 3161 timestamp from a TSA
  - Image signatures are stored in an OCI registry and are designed to make use of existing specifications.





### Sigstore cosign signature discovery (2/2)

- Discovery
  - Tag-based
    - Signatures are stored in an OCI registry in a predictable location, addressable by tag

"annotations": {

- If object is referenced by tag, tag must resolve to a digest (sha256:abcdef...)
  - Replace : with -
  - Append the .sig suffix
- Signature is base64 encoded and stored as annotation

```
"annotations": {
   "dev.cosignproject.cosign/signature": "MEUCIE
     /\lwViyPxsJsbnIHj86sSbb7L3qvpEFoAiEA2ZCh0
     /67CuAPQKJLBVsAc7bs9hBK8RpsdfjBsByGKJM="
}
```

```
"dev.sigstore.cosign/certificate": "----BEGIN CERTIFICATE
  ----\nMIICrjCCAjSgAwIBAgIUAM4mURWUSkg06fmHmFfTmerYKaUwCgYIKoZI
  zj0EAwMw\nKjEVMBMGA1UEChMMc2lnc3RvcmUuZGV2MREwDwYDVQQDEwhzaWdzd
  G9yZTAeFw0y\nMTA0MDExNTU5MDZaFw0yMTA0MDExNjE4NTlaMDoxGzAZBgNVBA
  oMEmRsb3JlbmNA\nZ29vZ2xlLmNvbTEbMBkGA1UEAwwSZGxvcmVuY0Bnb29nbGU
 uY29tMFkwEwYHKoZI\nzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE3R0ZtpfBd3Y8DaXuB1gM
  8JPlhsDIEfX0/WsMJEN1\n4hEn8wajX2HklqL7igZPFICv6tBUGylIHp2mTH2Nh
  v38mg0CASYwggEiMA4GA1Ud\nDwEB
  /wQEAwIHgDATBqNVHSUEDDAKBqqrBqEFBQcDAzAMBqNVHRMBAf8EAjAAMB0G\nA
 1UdDqQWBBTy3UWIop0bNrdNqSrVHHD10qSASTAfBqNVHSMEGDAWqBTIxR0AQZok
  \nKTJRJ0sNrkrtSqbT7DCBjQYIKwYBBQUHAQEEqYAwfjB8BqqrBqEFBQcwAoZwa
  HR0\ncDovL3ByaXZhdGVjYS1jb250ZW50LTYwM2ZlN2U3LTAwMDAtMjIyNy1iZj
  c1LWY0\nZjVl0DBkMjk1NC5zdG9yYWdlLmdvb2dsZWFwaXMuY29tL2NhMzZhMWU
  5NjI0MmI5\nZmNiMTQ2L2NhLmNydDAdBgNVHREEFjAUgRJkbG9yZW5jQGdvb2ds
  ZS5jb20wCgYI\nKoZIzj0EAwMDaAAwZQIwC15Gtd9F6W9lmJuoXMym9DfWlBpK5
 HEPak38WPXqowRp\n6p+2
 /3jSLkFT5Nn5fuISAjEAouVlX4zH2rlkfg45HnDJax7o6ZV+E0
  /6BdAms44D\nEj6T/GLK6XJSB28haSPRWB7k\n----END CERTIFICATE
  ----\n"
```



#### Artifacts

- OCI Artifact Manifest Specification (OCI 1.1):
  - Define content addressable artifacts in order to store them along side container images
  - Examples of artifacts that may be stored along with container images are Software Bill of Materials (SBOM), Digital Signatures, Provenance data, Supply Chain Attestations, scan results, and Helm charts.
- OCI Image Manifest
  - Existing image spec already supports artifact representations (and their signatures)
- OCI 1.1 is in RC phase:
  - Hasn't been released with an active discussion on whether to leverage existing **image.manifest** or enable **artifact.manifest**
  - Update -> PR #999 removed the artifact manifest media type




## Referrer API

ID	Method	API Endpoint	Success	Failure
end-1	GET	/v2/	200	404 / 401
end-2	GET / HEAD	/v2/ <name>/blobs/<digest></digest></name>	200	404
end-3	GET / HEAD	/v2/ <name>/manifests/<reference></reference></name>	200	404
end-4a	POST	/v2/ <name>/blobs/uploads/</name>	202	404
end-4b	POST	/v2/ <name>/blobs/uploads/?digest=<digest></digest></name>	201 / 202	404 / 400
end-5	PATCH	/v2/ <name>/blobs/uploads/<reference></reference></name>	202	404 / 416
end-6	PUT	/v2/ <name>/blobs/uploads/<reference>?digest=<digest></digest></reference></name>	201	404 / 400
end-7	PUT	/v2/ <name>/manifests/<reference></reference></name>	201	404
end-8a	GET	/v2/ <name>/tags/list</name>	200	404
end-8b	GET	/v2/ <name>/tags/list?n=<integer>&amp;last=<integer></integer></integer></name>	200	404
end-9	DELETE	/v2/ <name>/manifests/<reference></reference></name>	202	404 / 400 / 405
end-10	DELETE	/v2/ <name>/blobs/<digest></digest></name>	202	404 / 405
end-11	POST	/v2/ <name>/blobs/uploads/?mount=<digest>&amp;from=<other_name></other_name></digest></name>	201	404
end-12a	GET	/v2/ <name>/referrers/<digest></digest></name>	200	404 / 400
end-12b	GET	/v2/ <name>/referrers/<digest>?artifactType=<artifacttype></artifacttype></digest></name>	200	404 / 400
end-13	GET	/v2/ <name>/blobs/uploads/<reference></reference></name>	204	404



## Notary v2 signature discovery (1/2)

Notary v2 provides for multiple signatures of an OCI artifact (including container images)



application/vnd.cncf.notary.signature



### Notary v2 signature discovery (2/2)

- artifactType -> Required property references the Notary version of the signature
- blobs -> Required collection of only one OCI descriptor referencing signature envelope
  - mediaType -> type of signature envelope blob

```
application/jose+json
application/cose
```

- subject -> Required artifact descriptor referencing the signed manifest, including, but not limited to image manifest, image index, OCI artifact manifest
- annotations -> Required property contains metadata for the artifact manifest.
  - Uses io.cncf.notary namespace reserved for use in Notary
  - io.cncf.notary.x509chain.thumbprint#S256 A required annotation containing the list of SHA256 thumbprints of signing certificate and chain (including root).

Backward Compatibility: Notary v2 supports using OCI Image Manifest to store signatures in registries with partial support for OCI Image Specification 1.1



#### Artifact/SBOM signature discovery

#### <Experimental>

- SBOMs can be attached to containers via the in-progress OCI references API
- SBOM objects are represented as an OCI Image Manifest V1
- This means they can be signed like container images!
- Cosign uses mediaType application/vnd.dev.cosign.artifact.sig.v1+json to represent the signature. Annotations remain consistent with container image signature payload.

</Experimental>




## OCI compatibility

Sigstore cosign	Notaryv2 (notation)
<ul> <li>AWS Elastic Container Registry</li> <li>GCP's Artifact Registry and Container Registry</li> <li>Docker Hub</li> <li>Azure Container Registry</li> <li>JFrog Artifactory Container Registry</li> <li>The CNCF distribution/distribution Registry</li> <li>GitLab Container Registry</li> <li>GitHub Container Registry</li> <li>The CNCF Harbor Registry</li> <li>Digital Ocean Container Registry</li> <li>Sonatype Nexus Container Registry</li> <li>Alibaba Cloud Container Registry</li> <li>Red Hat Quay Container Registry 3.6+ / Red Hat quay.io</li> <li>Elastic Container Registry</li> <li>IBM Cloud Container Registry</li> <li>Cloudsmith Container Registry</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>OCI Artifacts</li> <li>Zot</li> <li>Azure Container Registry</li> <li>Amazon Container Registry</li> <li>GAR</li> <li>ORAS Project registry</li> <li>GitHub</li> <li>Bundle Bar</li> <li>Docker Hub</li> <li>Image Manifest</li> <li>Any OCI compliant registry</li> </ul>



#### File signature discovery

Windows executables/DLL/PS1 scripts rely on PE/COFF format



## Demo



#### Considerations

- Performance
  - API rate limiting
- Compatibility
  - Registry OCI spec implementations
- Artifact Types (Signed)
  - SBOMs
  - Attestations
  - Vulnerability reports
  - Helm charts
- FileSystem Types
  - XML
  - PDF



#### Future Enhancements

- Improved readability, visualization
- Ability to export results to Grafana
- Ability to export results to policy controllers
- Ability to map signer identities to Issuing Authority, CMDB, etc.



#### Thank You

- Download and test Sigscan -> <a href="https://github.com/venafi/sigscan">https://github.com/venafi/sigscan</a>
- Contribute via Issues or PR



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