

Verified Construction of Fair Voting Rules

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Abstract

Voting rules aggregate multiple individual preferences in order to make a collective decision. Commonly, these mechanisms are expected to respect a multitude of different notions of fairness and reliability, which must be carefully balanced to avoid inconsistencies.

This article contains a formalisation of a framework for the construction of such fair voting rules using composable modules [1, 2]. The framework is a formal and systematic approach for the flexible and verified construction of voting rules from individual composable modules to respect such social-choice properties by construction. Formal composition rules guarantee resulting social-choice properties from properties of the individual components which are of generic nature to be reused for various voting rules. We provide proofs for a selected set of structures and composition rules. The approach can be readily extended in order to support more voting rules, e.g., from the literature by extending the sets of modules and composition rules.

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Chapter 1

Social-Choice Types

1.1 Preference Relation

```
theory Preference-Relation
  imports Main
begin
```

The very core of the composable modules voting framework: types and functions, derivations, lemmas, operations on preference relations, etc.

1.1.1 Definition

Each voter expresses pairwise relations between all alternatives, thereby inducing a linear order.

```
type-synonym 'a Preference-Relation = 'a rel

type-synonym 'a Vote = 'a set × 'a Preference-Relation

fun is-less-preferred-than :: 'a ⇒ 'a Preference-Relation ⇒ 'a ⇒ bool
  (- ≤r - [50, 1000, 51] 50) where
    a ≤r b = ((a, b) ∈ r)

fun alts-ℳ :: 'a Vote ⇒ 'a set where
  alts-ℳ V = fst V

fun pref-ℳ :: 'a Vote ⇒ 'a Preference-Relation where
  pref-ℳ V = snd V

lemma lin-imp-antisym:
  fixes
    A :: 'a set and
    r :: 'a Preference-Relation
  assumes linear-order-on A r
  shows antisym r
```

```

using assms
unfolding linear-order-on-def partial-order-on-def
by simp

lemma lin-imp-trans:
  fixes
    A :: 'a set and
    r :: 'a Preference-Relation
  assumes linear-order-on A r
  shows trans r
  using assms order-on-defs
  by blast

```

1.1.2 Ranking

```

fun rank :: 'a Preference-Relation  $\Rightarrow$  'a  $\Rightarrow$  nat where
  rank r a = card (above r a)

```

```

lemma rank-gt-zero:
  fixes
    r :: 'a Preference-Relation and
    a :: 'a
  assumes
    refl: a  $\preceq_r$  a and
    fin: finite r
  shows rank r a  $\geq$  1
proof (unfold rank.simps above-def)
  have a  $\in$  {b  $\in$  Field r. (a, b)  $\in$  r}
  using FieldI2 refl
  by fastforce
  hence {b  $\in$  Field r. (a, b)  $\in$  r}  $\neq$  {}
  by blast
  hence card {b  $\in$  Field r. (a, b)  $\in$  r}  $\neq$  0
  by (simp add: fin finite-Field)
  thus 1  $\leq$  card {b. (a, b)  $\in$  r}
  using Collect-cong FieldI2 less-one not-le-imp-less
  by (metis (no-types, lifting))
qed

```

1.1.3 Limited Preference

```

definition limited :: 'a set  $\Rightarrow$  'a Preference-Relation  $\Rightarrow$  bool where
  limited A r  $\equiv$  r  $\subseteq$  A  $\times$  A

```

```

lemma limited-dest:
  fixes
    A :: 'a set and
    r :: 'a Preference-Relation and
    a :: 'a and
    b :: 'a

```

```

assumes
   $a \preceq_r b$  and
   $\text{limited } A \ r$ 
shows  $a \in A \wedge b \in A$ 
using assms
unfolding limited-def
by auto

fun limit :: 'a set  $\Rightarrow$  'a Preference-Relation  $\Rightarrow$  'a Preference-Relation where
  limit  $A \ r = \{(a, b) \in r. a \in A \wedge b \in A\}$ 

definition connex :: 'a set  $\Rightarrow$  'a Preference-Relation  $\Rightarrow$  bool where
  connex  $A \ r \equiv \text{limited } A \ r \wedge (\forall a \in A. \forall b \in A. a \preceq_r b \vee b \preceq_r a)$ 

lemma connex-imp-refl:
fixes
   $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
   $r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ 
assumes connex  $A \ r$ 
shows refl-on  $A \ r$ 
proof
from assms
show  $r \subseteq A \times A$ 
  unfolding connex-def limited-def
  by simp
next
fix  $a :: 'a$ 
assume  $a \in A$ 
with assms
have  $a \preceq_r a$ 
  unfolding connex-def
  by metis
thus  $(a, a) \in r$ 
  by simp
qed

lemma lin-ord-imp-connex:
fixes
   $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
   $r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ 
assumes linear-order-on  $A \ r$ 
shows connex  $A \ r$ 
proof (unfold connex-def limited-def, safe)
fix
   $a :: 'a$  and
   $b :: 'a$ 
assume  $(a, b) \in r$ 
moreover have refl-on  $A \ r$ 
  using assms partial-order-onD

```

```

      unfolding linear-order-on-def
      by safe
    ultimately show  $a \in A$ 
      by (simp add: refl-on-domain)
  next
  fix
     $a :: 'a$  and
     $b :: 'a$ 
  assume  $(a, b) \in r$ 
  moreover have refl-on  $A$   $r$ 
    using assms partial-order-onD
    unfolding linear-order-on-def
    by safe
  ultimately show  $b \in A$ 
    by (simp add: refl-on-domain)
next
fix
   $a :: 'a$  and
   $b :: 'a$ 
  assume
     $a \in A$  and
     $b \in A$  and
     $\neg b \preceq_r a$ 
  moreover from this
  have  $(b, a) \notin r$ 
    by simp
  moreover from this
  have refl-on  $A$   $r$ 
    using assms partial-order-onD
    unfolding linear-order-on-def
    by blast
  ultimately have  $(a, b) \in r$ 
    using assms refl-onD
    unfolding linear-order-on-def total-on-def
    by metis
  thus  $a \preceq_r b$ 
    by simp
qed

```

```

lemma connex-antsym-and-trans-imp-lin-ord:
  fixes
     $A :: 'a$  set and
     $r :: 'a$  Preference-Relation
  assumes
    connex-r: connex  $A$   $r$  and
    antisym-r: antisym  $r$  and
    trans-r: trans  $r$ 
  shows linear-order-on  $A$   $r$ 
proof (unfold connex-def linear-order-on-def partial-order-on-def

```

```

preorder-on-def refl-on-def total-on-def, safe)

fix
  a :: 'a and
  b :: 'a
assume (a, b) ∈ r
thus a ∈ A
  using connex-r refl-on-domain connex-imp-refl
  by metis
next
fix
  a :: 'a and
  b :: 'a
assume (a, b) ∈ r
thus b ∈ A
  using connex-r refl-on-domain connex-imp-refl
  by metis
next
fix a :: 'a
assume a ∈ A
thus (a, a) ∈ r
  using connex-r connex-imp-refl refl-onD
  by metis
next
from trans-r
show trans r
  by simp
next
from antisym-r
show antisym r
  by simp
next
fix
  a :: 'a and
  b :: 'a
assume
  a ∈ A and
  b ∈ A and
  (b, a) ∉ r
moreover from this
have a ≼r b ∨ b ≼r a
  using connex-r
  unfolding connex-def
  by metis
hence (a, b) ∈ r ∨ (b, a) ∈ r
  by simp
ultimately show (a, b) ∈ r
  by metis
qed

```

```

lemma limit-to-limits:
  fixes
     $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ 
  shows limited A (limit A r)
  unfolding limited-def
  by fastforce

lemma limit-presv-connex:
  fixes
     $B :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ 
  assumes
    connex: connex B r and
    subset: A ⊆ B
  shows connex A (limit A r)
proof (unfold connex-def limited-def, simp, safe)
  let  $?s = \{(a, b). (a, b) \in r \wedge a \in A \wedge b \in A\}$ 
  fix
     $a :: 'a$  and
     $b :: 'a$ 
  assume
    a-in-A: a ∈ A and
    b-in-A: b ∈ A and
    not-b-pref-r-a: (b, a) ∉ r
  have  $b \preceq_r a \vee a \preceq_r b$ 
    using a-in-A b-in-A connex connex-def in-mono subset
    by metis
  hence  $a \preceq_{?s} b \vee b \preceq_{?s} a$ 
    using a-in-A b-in-A
    by auto
  hence  $a \preceq_{?s} b$ 
    using not-b-pref-r-a
    by simp
  thus  $(a, b) \in r$ 
    by simp
qed

lemma limit-presv-antisym:
  fixes
     $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ 
  assumes antisym r
  shows antisym (limit A r)
  using assms
  unfolding antisym-def
  by simp

```

```

lemma limit-presv-trans:
  fixes
     $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ 
  assumes  $\text{trans } r$ 
  shows  $\text{trans } (\text{limit } A \ r)$ 
  unfolding  $\text{trans-def}$ 
  using  $\text{transE assms}$ 
  by auto

lemma limit-presv-lin-ord:
  fixes
     $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $B :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ 
  assumes
     $\text{linear-order-on } B \ r$  and
     $A \subseteq B$ 
  shows  $\text{linear-order-on } A \ (\text{limit } A \ r)$ 
  using  $\text{assms connex-antisym-and-trans-imp-lin-ord limit-presv-antisym limit-presv-connex}$ 
     $\text{limit-presv-trans lin-ord-imp-connex}$ 
  unfolding  $\text{preorder-on-def partial-order-on-def linear-order-on-def}$ 
  by metis

lemma limit-presv-prefs:
  fixes
     $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$  and
     $a :: 'a$  and
     $b :: 'a$ 
  assumes
     $a \preceq_r b$  and
     $a \in A$  and
     $b \in A$ 
  shows  $\text{let } s = \text{limit } A \ r \text{ in } a \preceq_s b$ 
  using  $\text{assms}$ 
  by simp

lemma limit-rel-presv-prefs:
  fixes
     $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$  and
     $a :: 'a$  and
     $b :: 'a$ 
  assumes  $(a, b) \in \text{limit } A \ r$ 
  shows  $a \preceq_r b$ 
  using  $\text{mem-Collect-eq assms}$ 
  by simp

```

```

lemma limit-trans:
  fixes
     $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $B :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ 
  assumes  $A \subseteq B$ 
  shows  $\text{limit } A \ r = \text{limit } A \ (\text{limit } B \ r)$ 
  using assms
  by auto

lemma lin-ord-not-empty:
  fixes  $r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ 
  assumes  $r \neq \{\}$ 
  shows  $\neg \text{linear-order-on } \{\} \ r$ 
  using assms connex-imp-refl lin-ord-imp-connex refl-on-domain subrelI
  by fastforce

lemma lin-ord-singleton:
  fixes  $a :: 'a$ 
  shows  $\forall \ r. \text{linear-order-on } \{a\} \ r \longrightarrow r = \{(a, a)\}$ 
proof (clarify)
  fix  $r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ 
  assume lin-ord-r-a: linear-order-on {a} r
  hence  $a \preceq_r a$ 
    using lin-ord-imp-connex singletonI
    unfolding connex-def
    by metis
  moreover from lin-ord-r-a
  have  $\forall \ (b, c) \in r. \ b = a \wedge c = a$ 
    using connex-imp-refl lin-ord-imp-connex refl-on-domain split-beta
    by fastforce
  ultimately show  $r = \{(a, a)\}$ 
    by auto
qed

```

1.1.4 Auxiliary Lemmas

```

lemma above-trans:
  fixes
     $r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$  and
     $a :: 'a$  and
     $b :: 'a$ 
  assumes
    trans r and
     $(a, b) \in r$ 
  shows  $\text{above } r \ b \subseteq \text{above } r \ a$ 
  using Collect-mono assms transE
  unfolding above-def
  by metis

```


lemma *above-refl*:

fixes

$A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**

$r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ **and**

$a :: 'a$

assumes

refl-on A r **and**

$a \in A$

shows $a \in \text{above } r \ a$

using *assms refl-onD*

unfolding *above-def*

by *simp*

lemma *above-subset-geq-one*:

fixes

$A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**

$r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ **and**

$r' :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ **and**

$a :: 'a$

assumes

linear-order-on A r **and**

linear-order-on A r' **and**

$\text{above } r \ a \subseteq \text{above } r' \ a$ **and**

$\text{above } r' \ a = \{a\}$

shows $\text{above } r \ a = \{a\}$

using *assms connex-imp-refl above-refl insert-absorb lin-ord-imp-connex mem-Collect-eq
refl-on-domain singletonI subset-singletonD*

unfolding *above-def*

by *metis*

lemma *above-connex*:

fixes

$A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**

$r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ **and**

$a :: 'a$

assumes

connex A r **and**

$a \in A$

shows $a \in \text{above } r \ a$

using *assms connex-imp-refl above-refl*

by *metis*

lemma *pref-imp-in-above*:

fixes

$r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ **and**

$a :: 'a$ **and**

$b :: 'a$

shows $(a \preceq_r b) = (b \in \text{above } r \ a)$

unfolding *above-def*
by *simp*

lemma *limit-presv-above*:
fixes
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ **and**
 $a :: 'a$ **and**
 $b :: 'a$
assumes
 $b \in \text{above } r \ a$ **and**
 $a \in A$ **and**
 $b \in A$
shows $b \in \text{above } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ a$
using *assms pref-imp-in-above limit-presv-prefs*
by *metis*

lemma *limit-rel-presv-above*:
fixes
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $B :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ **and**
 $a :: 'a$ **and**
 $b :: 'a$
assumes $b \in \text{above } (\text{limit } B \ r) \ a$
shows $b \in \text{above } r \ a$
using *assms limit-rel-presv-prefs mem-Collect-eq pref-imp-in-above*
unfolding *above-def*
by *metis*

lemma *above-one*:
fixes
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$
assumes
 $\text{lin-ord-r: linear-order-on } A \ r$ **and**
 $\text{fin-A: finite } A$ **and**
 $\text{non-empty-A: } A \neq \{\}$
shows $\exists a \in A. \text{above } r \ a = \{a\} \wedge (\forall a' \in A. \text{above } r \ a' = \{a'\} \longrightarrow a' = a)$
proof –
obtain $n :: \text{nat}$ **where**
 $\text{len-n-plus-one: } n + 1 = \text{card } A$
using *Suc-eq-plus1 antisym-conv2 fin-A non-empty-A card-eq-0-iff*
 $\text{gr0-implies-Suc le0}$
by *metis*
have $\text{linear-order-on } A \ r \wedge \text{finite } A \wedge A \neq \{\} \wedge n + 1 = \text{card } A \longrightarrow$
 $(\exists a. a \in A \wedge \text{above } r \ a = \{a\})$
proof (*induction n arbitrary: A r*)
case 0

```

show ?case
proof (clarify)
  fix
     $A' :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $r' :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ 
  assume
     $\text{lin-ord-r: linear-order-on } A' \ r'$  and
     $\text{len-A-is-one: } 0 + 1 = \text{card } A'$ 
  then obtain  $a$  where  $A' = \{a\}$ 
    using  $\text{card-1-singletonE add.left-neutral}$ 
    by metis
  hence  $a \in A' \wedge \text{above } r' \ a = \{a\}$ 
    using  $\text{above-def lin-ord-r connex-imp-refl above-refl lin-ord-imp-connex}$ 
     $\text{refl-on-domain}$ 
    by fastforce
  thus  $\exists a'. a' \in A' \wedge \text{above } r' \ a' = \{a'\}$ 
    by metis
qed
next
case (Suc  $n$ )
show ?case
proof (clarify)
  fix
     $A' :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $r' :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ 
  assume
     $\text{lin-ord-r: linear-order-on } A' \ r'$  and
     $\text{fin-A: finite } A'$  and
     $\text{A-not-empty: } A' \neq \{\}$  and
     $\text{len-A-n-plus-one: } \text{Suc } n + 1 = \text{card } A'$ 
  then obtain  $B$  where
     $\text{subset-B-card: } \text{card } B = n + 1 \wedge B \subseteq A'$ 
    using  $\text{Suc-inject add-Suc card.insert-remove finite.cases insert-Diff-single}$ 
     $\text{subset-insertI}$ 
    by (metis (mono-tags, lifting))
  then obtain  $a$  where
     $a: A' - B = \{a\}$ 
  using  $\text{Suc-eq-plus1 add-diff-cancel-left' fin-A len-A-n-plus-one card-1-singletonE}$ 
     $\text{card-Diff-subset finite-subset}$ 
    by metis
  have  $\exists a' \in B. \text{above } (\text{limit } B \ r') \ a' = \{a'\}$ 
  using  $\text{subset-B-card Suc.IH add-diff-cancel-left' lin-ord-r card-eq-0-iff diff-le-self}$ 
     $\text{leD lessI limit-presv-lin-ord}$ 
    unfolding  $\text{One-nat-def}$ 
    by metis
  then obtain  $b$  where
     $\text{alt-b: above } (\text{limit } B \ r') \ b = \{b\}$ 
    by blast
  hence  $b\text{-above: } \{a'. (b, a') \in \text{limit } B \ r'\} = \{b\}$ 

```

unfolding above-def
 by metis
 hence $b\text{-pref-}b$: $b \preceq_{r'} b$
 using CollectD limit-rel-presv-prefs singletonI
 by (metis (lifting))
 show $\exists a'. a' \in A' \wedge \text{above } r' a' = \{a'\}$
 proof (cases)
 assume $a\text{-pref-}r\text{-}b$: $a \preceq_{r'} b$
 have refl-A:
 $\forall A'' r'' a' a''. \text{refl-on } A'' r'' \wedge (a'::'a, a'') \in r'' \longrightarrow a' \in A'' \wedge a'' \in A''$
 using refl-on-domain
 by metis
 have connex-refl: $\forall A'' r''. \text{connex } (A''::'a \text{ set}) r'' \longrightarrow \text{refl-on } A'' r''$
 using connex-imp-refl
 by metis
 have $\forall A'' r''. \text{linear-order-on } (A''::'a \text{ set}) r'' \longrightarrow \text{connex } A'' r''$
 by (simp add: lin-ord-imp-connex)
 hence refl-A': $\text{refl-on } A' r'$
 using connex-refl lin-ord-r
 by metis
 hence $a \in A' \wedge b \in A'$
 using refl-A a-pref-r-b
 by simp
 hence $b\text{-in-}r$: $\forall a'. a' \in A' \longrightarrow b = a' \vee (b, a') \in r' \vee (a', b) \in r'$
 using lin-ord-r
 unfolding linear-order-on-def total-on-def
 by metis
 have $b\text{-in-}lim\text{-}B\text{-}r$: $(b, b) \in \text{limit } B r'$
 using alt-b mem-Collect-eq singletonI
 unfolding above-def
 by metis
 have $b\text{-wins}$: $\{a'. (b, a') \in \text{limit } B r'\} = \{b\}$
 using alt-b
 unfolding above-def
 by (metis (no-types))
 have $b\text{-refl}$: $(b, b) \in \{(a', a''). (a', a'') \in r' \wedge a' \in B \wedge a'' \in B\}$
 using $b\text{-in-}lim\text{-}B\text{-}r$
 by simp
 moreover have $b\text{-wins-}B$: $\forall b' \in B. b \in \text{above } r' b'$
 using subset-B-card $b\text{-in-}r$ $b\text{-wins}$ $b\text{-refl}$ CollectI Product-Type.Collect-case-prodD
 unfolding above-def
 by fastforce
 moreover have $b \in \text{above } r' a$
 using $a\text{-pref-}r\text{-}b$ pref-imp-in-above
 by metis
 ultimately have $b\text{-wins}$: $\forall a' \in A'. b \in \text{above } r' a'$
 using Diff-iff a empty-iff insert-iff
 by (metis (no-types))
 hence $\forall a' \in A'. a' \in \text{above } r' b \longrightarrow a' = b$

```

using CollectD lin-ord-r lin-imp-antisym
unfolding above-def antisym-def
by metis
hence  $\forall a' \in A'. (a' \in \text{above } r' b) = (a' = b)$ 
using b-wins
by blast
moreover have above-b-in-A:  $\text{above } r' b \subseteq A'$ 
unfolding above-def
using refl-A' refl-A
by auto
ultimately have  $\text{above } r' b = \{b\}$ 
using alt-b
unfolding above-def
by fastforce
thus ?thesis
using above-b-in-A
by blast
next
assume  $\neg a \preceq_{r'} b$ 
hence  $b \preceq_{r'} a$ 
using subset-B-card DiffE a lin-ord-r alt-b limit-to-limits limited-dest
    singletonI subset-iff lin-ord-imp-connex pref-imp-in-above
unfolding connex-def
by metis
hence b-smaller-a:  $(b, a) \in r'$ 
by simp
have lin-ord-subset-A:
 $\forall B' B'' r''. \text{linear-order-on } (B''::'a \text{ set}) r'' \wedge B' \subseteq B'' \longrightarrow$ 
 $\text{linear-order-on } B' (\text{limit } B' r'')$ 
using limit-presv-lin-ord
by metis
have  $\{a'. (b, a') \in \text{limit } B r'\} = \{b\}$ 
using alt-b
unfolding above-def
by metis
hence b-in-B:  $b \in B$ 
by auto
have limit-B:  $\text{partial-order-on } B (\text{limit } B r') \wedge \text{total-on } B (\text{limit } B r')$ 
using lin-ord-subset-A subset-B-card lin-ord-r
unfolding linear-order-on-def
by metis
have
 $\forall A'' r''. \text{total-on } A'' r'' =$ 
 $(\forall a'. (a'::'a) \notin A'' \vee$ 
 $(\forall a''. a'' \notin A'' \vee a' = a'' \vee (a', a'') \in r'' \vee (a'', a') \in r''))$ 
unfolding total-on-def
by metis

```

hence $\forall a' a''. a' \in B \longrightarrow a'' \in B \longrightarrow$
 $a' = a'' \vee (a', a'') \in \text{limit } B \ r' \vee (a'', a') \in \text{limit } B \ r'$
 using *limit-B*
 by *simp*
 hence $\forall a' \in B. b \in \text{above } r' \ a'$
 using *limit-rel-presv-prefs pref-imp-in-above singletonD mem-Collect-eq*
lin-ord-r alt-b b-above b-pref-b subset-B-card b-in-B
 by (*metis (lifting)*)
 hence $\forall a' \in B. a' \preceq_{r'} b$
 unfolding *above-def*
 by *simp*
 hence *b-wins*: $\forall a' \in B. (a', b) \in r'$
 by *simp*
 have *trans* r'
 using *lin-ord-r lin-imp-trans*
 by *metis*
 hence $\forall a' \in B. (a', a) \in r'$
 using *transE b-smaller-a b-wins*
 by *metis*
 hence $\forall a' \in B. a' \preceq_{r'} a$
 by *simp*
 hence *nothing-above-a*: $\forall a' \in A'. a' \preceq_{r'} a$
 using *a lin-ord-r lin-ord-imp-connex above-connex Diff-iff empty-iff insert-iff*
pref-imp-in-above
 by *metis*
 have $\forall a' \in A'. (a' \in \text{above } r' \ a) = (a' = a)$
 using *lin-ord-r lin-imp-antisym nothing-above-a pref-imp-in-above CollectD*
 unfolding *antisym-def above-def*
 by *metis*
 moreover have *above-a-in-A*: $\text{above } r' \ a \subseteq A'$
 using *lin-ord-r connex-imp-refl lin-ord-imp-connex mem-Collect-eq refl-on-domain*
 unfolding *above-def*
 by *fastforce*
 ultimately have $\text{above } r' \ a = \{a\}$
 using *a*
 unfolding *above-def*
 by *blast*
 thus ?thesis
 using *above-a-in-A*
 by *blast*
 qed
 qed
 qed
 hence $\exists a. a \in A \wedge \text{above } r \ a = \{a\}$
 using *fin-A non-empty-A lin-ord-r len-n-plus-one*
 by *blast*
 thus ?thesis
 using *assms lin-ord-imp-connex pref-imp-in-above singletonD*
 unfolding *connex-def*

by *metis*
qed

lemma *above-one-eq*:

fixes

$A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**

$r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ **and**

$a :: 'a$ **and**

$b :: 'a$

assumes

lin-ord: *linear-order-on* A r **and**

fin-A: *finite* A **and**

not-empty-A: $A \neq \{\}$ **and**

above-a: *above* r $a = \{a\}$ **and**

above-b: *above* r $b = \{b\}$

shows $a = b$

proof –

have $a \preceq_r a$

using *above-a singletonI pref-imp-in-above*

by *metis*

also have $b \preceq_r b$

using *above-b singletonI pref-imp-in-above*

by *metis*

moreover have

$\exists a' \in A. \text{above } r \ a' = \{a'\} \wedge (\forall a'' \in A. \text{above } r \ a'' = \{a''\} \longrightarrow a'' = a')$

using *lin-ord fin-A not-empty-A*

by (*simp add: above-one*)

moreover have *connex* A r

using *lin-ord*

by (*simp add: lin-ord-imp-connex*)

ultimately show $a = b$

using *above-a above-b limited-dest*

unfolding *connex-def*

by *metis*

qed

lemma *above-one-imp-rank-one*:

fixes

$r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ **and**

$a :: 'a$

assumes *above* r $a = \{a\}$

shows *rank* r $a = 1$

using *assms*

by *simp*

lemma *rank-one-imp-above-one*:

fixes

$A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**

$r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ **and**

```

  a :: 'a
assumes
  lin-ord: linear-order-on A r and
  rank-one: rank r a = 1
shows above r a = {a}
proof -
from lin-ord
have refl-on A r
  using linear-order-on-def partial-order-onD
  by blast
moreover from assms
have a ∈ A
  unfolding rank.simps above-def linear-order-on-def partial-order-on-def
    preorder-on-def total-on-def
  using card-1-singletonE insertI1 mem-Collect-eq refl-onD1
  bymetis
ultimately have a ∈ above r a
  using above-refl
  by fastforce
with rank-one
show above r a = {a}
  using card-1-singletonE rank.simps singletonD
  bymetis
qed

```

```

theorem above-rank:
fixes
  A :: 'a set and
  r :: 'a Preference-Relation and
  a :: 'a
assumes linear-order-on A r
shows (above r a = {a}) = (rank r a = 1)
using assms above-one-imp-rank-one rank-one-imp-above-one
bymetis

```

```

lemma rank-unique:
fixes
  A :: 'a set and
  r :: 'a Preference-Relation and
  a :: 'a and
  b :: 'a
assumes
  lin-ord: linear-order-on A r and
  fin-A: finite A and
  a-in-A: a ∈ A and
  b-in-A: b ∈ A and
  a-neq-b: a ≠ b
shows rank r a ≠ rank r b
proof (unfold rank.simps above-def, clarify)

```



```

assume card-eq:  $\text{card } \{a'. (a, a') \in r\} = \text{card } \{a'. (b, a') \in r\}$ 
have refl-r: refl-on A r
  using lin-ord
  by (simp add: lin-ord-imp-connex connex-imp-refl)
hence rel-refl-b:  $(b, b) \in r$ 
  using b-in-A
  unfolding refl-on-def
  by (metis (no-types))
have rel-refl-a:  $(a, a) \in r$ 
  using a-in-A refl-r refl-onD
  by (metis (full-types))
obtain p :: 'a  $\Rightarrow$  bool where
  rel-b:  $\forall y. p\ y = ((b, y) \in r)$ 
  using is-less-preferred-than.simps
  by metis
hence finite (Collect p)
  using refl-r refl-on-domain fin-A rev-finite-subset mem-Collect-eq subsetI
  by metis
hence finite  $\{a'. (b, a') \in r\}$ 
  using rel-b
  by (simp add: Collect-mono rev-finite-subset)
moreover from this
have finite  $\{a'. (a, a') \in r\}$ 
  using card-eq card-gt-0-iff rel-refl-b
  by force
moreover have trans r
  using lin-ord lin-imp-trans
  by metis
moreover have  $(a, b) \in r \vee (b, a) \in r$ 
  using lin-ord a-in-A b-in-A a-neq-b
  unfolding linear-order-on-def total-on-def
  by metis
ultimately have sets-eq:  $\{a'. (a, a') \in r\} = \{a'. (b, a') \in r\}$ 
  using card-eq above-trans card-seteq order-refl
  unfolding above-def
  by metis
hence  $(b, a) \in r$ 
  using rel-refl-a sets-eq
  by blast
hence  $(a, b) \notin r$ 
  using lin-ord lin-imp-antisym a-neq-b antisymD
  by metis
thus False
  using lin-ord partial-order-onD sets-eq b-in-A
  unfolding linear-order-on-def refl-on-def
  by blast
qed

```

lemma *above-presv-limit*:

fixes
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ **and**
 $a :: 'a$
shows $\text{above } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ a \subseteq A$
unfolding above-def
by auto

1.1.5 Lifting Property

definition $\text{equiv-rel-except-a} :: 'a \text{ set} \Rightarrow 'a \text{ Preference-Relation} \Rightarrow$
 $'a \text{ Preference-Relation} \Rightarrow 'a \Rightarrow \text{bool}$ **where**
 $\text{equiv-rel-except-a } A \ r \ r' \ a \equiv$
 $\text{linear-order-on } A \ r \wedge \text{linear-order-on } A \ r' \wedge a \in A \wedge$
 $(\forall a' \in A - \{a\}. \forall b' \in A - \{a\}. (a' \preceq_r b') = (a' \preceq_{r'} b'))$

definition $\text{lifted} :: 'a \text{ set} \Rightarrow 'a \text{ Preference-Relation} \Rightarrow$
 $'a \text{ Preference-Relation} \Rightarrow 'a \Rightarrow \text{bool}$ **where**
 $\text{lifted } A \ r \ r' \ a \equiv$
 $\text{equiv-rel-except-a } A \ r \ r' \ a \wedge (\exists a' \in A - \{a\}. a \preceq_r a' \wedge a' \preceq_{r'} a)$

lemma $\text{trivial-equiv-rel}:$
fixes
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$
assumes $\text{linear-order-on } A \ r$
shows $\forall a \in A. \text{equiv-rel-except-a } A \ r \ r \ a$
unfolding $\text{equiv-rel-except-a-def}$
using assms
by simp

lemma $\text{lifted-imp-equiv-rel-except-a}:$
fixes
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ **and**
 $r' :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ **and**
 $a :: 'a$
assumes $\text{lifted } A \ r \ r' \ a$
shows $\text{equiv-rel-except-a } A \ r \ r' \ a$
using assms
unfolding $\text{lifted-def equiv-rel-except-a-def}$
by simp

lemma $\text{lifted-imp-switched}:$
fixes
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ **and**
 $r' :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ **and**
 $a :: 'a$

assumes *lifted* $A \ r \ r' \ a$
shows $\forall a' \in A - \{a\}. \neg (a' \preceq_r a \wedge a \preceq_{r'} a')$
proof (*safe*)
fix $b :: 'a$
assume
 $b\text{-in-}A$: $b \in A$ **and**
 $b\text{-neq-}a$: $b \neq a$ **and**
 $b\text{-pref-}a$: $b \preceq_r a$ **and**
 $a\text{-pref-}b$: $a \preceq_{r'} b$
hence $b\text{-pref-}a\text{-rel}$: $(b, a) \in r$
by *simp*
have $a\text{-pref-}b\text{-rel}$: $(a, b) \in r'$
using $a\text{-pref-}b$
by *simp*
have *antisym* r
using *assms lifted-imp-equiv-rel-except-a lin-imp-antisym*
unfolding *equiv-rel-except-a-def*
by *metis*
hence $\forall a' b'. (a', b') \in r \longrightarrow (b', a') \in r \longrightarrow a' = b'$
unfolding *antisym-def*
by *metis*
hence $imp\text{-}b\text{-eq-}a$: $(b, a) \in r \implies (a, b) \in r \implies b = a$
by *simp*
have $\exists a' \in A - \{a\}. a \preceq_r a' \wedge a' \preceq_{r'} a$
using *assms*
unfolding *lifted-def*
by *metis*
then obtain $c :: 'a$ **where**
 $c \in A - \{a\} \wedge a \preceq_r c \wedge c \preceq_{r'} a$
by *metis*
hence $c\text{-eq-}r\text{-s-exc-}a$: $c \in A - \{a\} \wedge (a, c) \in r \wedge (c, a) \in r'$
by *simp*
have $equiv\text{-}r\text{-s-exc-}a$: *equiv-rel-except-a* $A \ r \ r' \ a$
using *assms*
unfolding *lifted-def*
by *metis*
hence $\forall a' \in A - \{a\}. \forall b' \in A - \{a\}. (a' \preceq_r b') = (a' \preceq_{r'} b')$
unfolding *equiv-rel-except-a-def*
by *metis*
hence $equiv\text{-}r\text{-s-exc-}a\text{-rel}$:
 $\forall a' \in A - \{a\}. \forall b' \in A - \{a\}. ((a', b') \in r) = ((a', b') \in r')$
by *simp*
have $\forall a' b' c'. (a', b') \in r \longrightarrow (b', c') \in r \longrightarrow (a', c') \in r$
using $equiv\text{-}r\text{-s-exc-}a$
unfolding *equiv-rel-except-a-def linear-order-on-def partial-order-on-def*
preorder-on-def trans-def
by *metis*
hence $(b, c) \in r'$
using $b\text{-in-}A \ b\text{-neq-}a \ b\text{-pref-}a\text{-rel} \ c\text{-eq-}r\text{-s-exc-}a \ equiv\text{-}r\text{-s-exc-}a \ equiv\text{-}r\text{-s-exc-}a\text{-rel}$

```

      insertE insert-Diff
    unfolding equiv-rel-except-a-def
  by metis
  hence  $(a, c) \in r'$ 
    using a-pref-b-rel b-pref-a-rel imp-b-eq-a b-neq-a equiv-r-s-exc-a
          lin-imp-trans transE
    unfolding equiv-rel-except-a-def
  by metis
  thus False
    using c-eq-r-s-exc-a equiv-r-s-exc-a antisymD DiffD2 lin-imp-antisym singletonI
    unfolding equiv-rel-except-a-def
  by metis
qed

```

lemma *lifted-mono*:

```

  fixes
    A :: 'a set and
    r :: 'a Preference-Relation and
    r' :: 'a Preference-Relation and
    a :: 'a and
    a' :: 'a
  assumes
    lifted: lifted A r r' a and
    a'-pref-a:  $a' \preceq_r a$ 
  shows  $a' \preceq_{r'} a$ 
proof (simp)
  have a'-pref-a-rel:  $(a', a) \in r$ 
    using a'-pref-a
  by simp
  hence a'-in-A:  $a' \in A$ 
    using lifted connex-imp-refl lin-ord-imp-connex refl-on-domain
    unfolding equiv-rel-except-a-def lifted-def
  by metis
  have  $\forall b \in A - \{a\}. \forall b' \in A - \{a\}. (b \preceq_r b') = (b \preceq_{r'} b')$ 
    using lifted
    unfolding lifted-def equiv-rel-except-a-def
  by metis
  hence rest-eq:
     $\forall b \in A - \{a\}. \forall b' \in A - \{a\}. ((b, b') \in r) = ((b, b') \in r')$ 
  by simp
  have  $\exists b \in A - \{a\}. a \preceq_r b \wedge b \preceq_{r'} a$ 
    using lifted
    unfolding lifted-def
  by metis
  hence ex-lifted:  $\exists b \in A - \{a\}. (a, b) \in r \wedge (b, a) \in r'$ 
  by simp
  show  $(a', a) \in r'$ 
proof (cases  $a' = a$ )
  case True

```

```

thus ?thesis
  using connex-imp-refl refl-onD lifted lin-ord-imp-connex
  unfolding equiv-rel-except-a-def lifted-def
  by metis
next
  case False
  thus ?thesis
    using a'-pref-a-rel a'-in-A rest-eq ex-lifted insertE insert-Diff
    lifted lin-imp-trans lifted-imp-equiv-rel-except-a
    unfolding equiv-rel-except-a-def trans-def
    by metis
qed
qed

lemma lifted-above-subset:
  fixes
    A :: 'a set and
    r :: 'a Preference-Relation and
    r' :: 'a Preference-Relation and
    a :: 'a
  assumes lifted A r r' a
  shows above r' a  $\subseteq$  above r a
proof (unfold above-def, safe)
  fix a' :: 'a
  assume a-pref-x: (a, a')  $\in$  r'
  from assms
  have  $\exists b \in A - \{a\}. a \preceq_r b \wedge b \preceq_{r'} a$ 
    unfolding lifted-def
    by metis
  hence lifted-r:  $\exists b \in A - \{a\}. (a, b) \in r \wedge (b, a) \in r'$ 
    by simp
  from assms
  have  $\forall b \in A - \{a\}. \forall b' \in A - \{a\}. (b \preceq_r b') = (b \preceq_{r'} b')$ 
    unfolding lifted-def equiv-rel-except-a-def
    by metis
  hence rest-eq:  $\forall b \in A - \{a\}. \forall b' \in A - \{a\}. ((b, b') \in r) = ((b, b') \in r')$ 
    by simp
  from assms
  have trans-r:  $\forall b c d. (b, c) \in r \longrightarrow (c, d) \in r \longrightarrow (b, d) \in r$ 
    using lin-imp-trans
    unfolding trans-def lifted-def equiv-rel-except-a-def
    by metis
  from assms
  have trans-s:  $\forall b c d. (b, c) \in r' \longrightarrow (c, d) \in r' \longrightarrow (b, d) \in r'$ 
    using lin-imp-trans
    unfolding trans-def lifted-def equiv-rel-except-a-def
    by metis
  from assms
  have refl-r: (a, a)  $\in$  r

```

```

    using connex-imp-refl lin-ord-imp-connex refl-onD
    unfolding equiv-rel-except-a-def lifted-def
    by metis
  from a-pref-x assms
  have  $a' \in A$ 
    using connex-imp-refl lin-ord-imp-connex refl-onD2
    unfolding equiv-rel-except-a-def lifted-def
    by metis
  with a-pref-x lifted-r rest-eq trans-r trans-s refl-r
  show  $(a, a') \in r$ 
    using Diff-iff singletonD
    by (metis (full-types))
qed

```

lemma *lifted-above-mono*:

```

  fixes
     $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$  and
     $r' :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$  and
     $a :: 'a$  and
     $a' :: 'a$ 
  assumes
    lifted-a:  $\text{lifted } A \ r \ r' \ a$  and
    a'-in-A-sub-a:  $a' \in A - \{a\}$ 
  shows  $\text{above } r \ a' \subseteq \text{above } r' \ a' \cup \{a\}$ 
proof (safe, simp)
  fix  $b :: 'a$ 
  assume
    b-in-above-r:  $b \in \text{above } r \ a'$  and
    b-not-in-above-s:  $b \notin \text{above } r' \ a'$ 
  have  $\forall b' \in A - \{a\}. (a' \preceq_r b') = (a' \preceq_{r'} b')$ 
    using a'-in-A-sub-a lifted-a
    unfolding lifted-def equiv-rel-except-a-def
    by metis
  hence  $\forall b' \in A - \{a\}. (b' \in \text{above } r \ a') = (b' \in \text{above } r' \ a')$ 
    unfolding above-def
    by simp
  hence  $(b \in \text{above } r \ a') = (b \in \text{above } r' \ a')$ 
    using lifted-a b-not-in-above-s lifted-mono limited-dest lifted-def lin-ord-imp-connex
      member-remove pref-imp-in-above
    unfolding equiv-rel-except-a-def remove-def connex-def
    by metis
  thus  $b = a$ 
    using b-in-above-r b-not-in-above-s
    by simp
qed

```

lemma *limit-lifted-imp-eq-or-lifted*:

fixes

$A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $A' :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ **and**
 $r' :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ **and**
 $a :: 'a$
assumes
 $\text{lifted: lifted } A' \ r \ r' \ a$ **and**
 $\text{subset: } A \subseteq A'$
shows $\text{limit } A \ r = \text{limit } A \ r' \vee \text{lifted } A \ (\text{limit } A \ r) \ (\text{limit } A \ r') \ a$
proof $-$
have $\forall a' \in A - \{a\}. \forall b' \in A - \{a\}. (a' \preceq_r b') = (a' \preceq_{r'} b')$
using lifted subset
unfolding $\text{lifted-def equiv-rel-except-a-def}$
by auto
hence eql-rs:
 $\forall a' \in A - \{a\}. \forall b' \in A - \{a\}. ((a', b') \in (\text{limit } A \ r)) = ((a', b') \in (\text{limit } A \ r'))$
using $\text{DiffD1 limit-presv-prefs limit-rel-presv-prefs}$
by simp
have $\text{lin-ord-r-s: linear-order-on } A \ (\text{limit } A \ r) \wedge \text{linear-order-on } A \ (\text{limit } A \ r')$
using $\text{lifted subset lifted-def equiv-rel-except-a-def limit-presv-lin-ord}$
by metis
show $?thesis$
proof (cases)
assume $a\text{-in-}A: a \in A$
thus $?thesis$
proof (cases)
assume $\exists a' \in A - \{a\}. a \preceq_r a' \wedge a' \preceq_{r'} a$
hence $\exists a' \in A - \{a\}. (let \ q = \text{limit } A \ r \ \text{in } a \preceq_q a') \wedge (let \ u = \text{limit } A \ r' \ \text{in } a' \preceq_u a)$
using $\text{DiffD1 limit-presv-prefs a-in-}A$
by simp
thus $?thesis$
using $a\text{-in-}A \ \text{eql-rs} \ \text{lin-ord-r-s}$
unfolding $\text{lifted-def equiv-rel-except-a-def}$
by simp
next
assume $\neg (\exists a' \in A - \{a\}. a \preceq_r a' \wedge a' \preceq_{r'} a)$
hence $\text{strict-pref-to-}a: \forall a' \in A - \{a\}. \neg (a \preceq_r a' \wedge a' \preceq_{r'} a)$
by simp
moreover **have** $\text{not-worse: } \forall a' \in A - \{a\}. \neg (a' \preceq_r a \wedge a \preceq_{r'} a')$
using $\text{lifted subset lifted-imp-switched}$
by fastforce
moreover **have** $\text{connex: connex } A \ (\text{limit } A \ r) \wedge \text{connex } A \ (\text{limit } A \ r')$
using $\text{lifted subset limit-presv-lin-ord lin-ord-imp-connex}$
unfolding $\text{lifted-def equiv-rel-except-a-def}$
by metis
moreover **have**
 $\forall A'' \ r''. \text{connex } A'' \ r'' =$

$(\text{limited } A'' r'' \wedge$
 $(\forall b b'. (b::'a) \in A'' \longrightarrow b' \in A'' \longrightarrow (b \preceq_{r''} b' \vee b' \preceq_{r''} b)))$
unfolding *connex-def*
by (*simp add: Ball-def-raw*)
hence *limit-rel-r*:
 $\text{limited } A (\text{limit } A r) \wedge$
 $(\forall b b'. b \in A \wedge b' \in A \longrightarrow (b, b') \in \text{limit } A r \vee (b', b) \in \text{limit } A r)$
using *connex*
by *simp*
have *limit-imp-rel*: $\forall b b' A'' r''. (b::'a, b') \in \text{limit } A'' r'' \longrightarrow b \preceq_{r''} b'$
using *limit-rel-presv-prefs*
by *metis*
have *limit-rel-s*:
 $\text{limited } A (\text{limit } A r') \wedge$
 $(\forall b b'. b \in A \wedge b' \in A \longrightarrow (b, b') \in \text{limit } A r' \vee (b', b) \in \text{limit } A r')$
using *connex*
unfolding *connex-def*
by *simp*
ultimately have
 $\forall a' \in A - \{a\}. a \preceq_r a' \wedge a \preceq_{r'} a' \vee a' \preceq_r a \wedge a' \preceq_{r'} a$
using *DiffD1 limit-rel-r limit-rel-presv-prefs a-in-A*
by *metis*
have $\forall a' \in A - \{a\}. ((a, a') \in (\text{limit } A r)) = ((a, a') \in (\text{limit } A r'))$
using *DiffD1 limit-imp-rel limit-rel-r limit-rel-s a-in-A*
strict-pref-to-a not-worse
by *metis*
hence
 $\forall a' \in A - \{a\}.$
 $(\text{let } q = \text{limit } A r \text{ in } a \preceq_q a') = (\text{let } q = \text{limit } A r' \text{ in } a \preceq_q a')$
by *simp*
moreover have
 $\forall a' \in A - \{a\}. ((a', a) \in (\text{limit } A r)) = ((a', a) \in (\text{limit } A r'))$
using *a-in-A strict-pref-to-a not-worse DiffD1 limit-rel-presv-prefs*
limit-rel-s limit-rel-r
by *metis*
moreover have $(a, a) \in (\text{limit } A r) \wedge (a, a) \in (\text{limit } A r')$
using *a-in-A connex connex-imp-refl refl-onD*
by *metis*
ultimately show *?thesis*
using *eql-rs*
by *auto*
qed
next
assume $a \notin A$
thus *?thesis*
using *limit-to-limits limited-dest subrelI subset-antisym eql-rs*
by *auto*
qed
qed

lemma *negl-diff-imp-eq-limit*:

fixes

$A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**

$A' :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**

$r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ **and**

$r' :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ **and**

$a :: 'a$

assumes

change: *equiv-rel-except-a* $A' r r' a$ **and**

subset: $A \subseteq A'$ **and**

not-in-A: $a \notin A$

shows $\text{limit } A r = \text{limit } A r'$

proof $-$

have $A \subseteq A' - \{a\}$

unfolding *subset-Diff-insert*

using *not-in-A subset*

by *simp*

hence $\forall b \in A. \forall b' \in A. (b \preceq_r b') = (b \preceq_{r'} b')$

using *change in-mono*

unfolding *equiv-rel-except-a-def*

by *metis*

thus *?thesis*

by *auto*

qed

theorem *lifted-above-winner-alts*:

fixes

$A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**

$r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ **and**

$r' :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ **and**

$a :: 'a$ **and**

$a' :: 'a$

assumes

lifted-a: *lifted* $A r r' a$ **and**

a'-above-a': *above* $r a' = \{a'\}$ **and**

fin-A: *finite* A

shows $\text{above } r' a' = \{a'\} \vee \text{above } r' a = \{a\}$

proof (*cases*)

assume $a = a'$

thus *?thesis*

using *above-subset-geq-one lifted-a a'-above-a' lifted-above-subset*

unfolding *lifted-def equiv-rel-except-a-def*

by *metis*

next

assume $a \neq a'$

thus *?thesis*

proof (*cases*)

assume $\text{above } r' a' = \{a'\}$

```

thus ?thesis
  by simp
next
  assume  $a' \text{-not-above-} a'$ :  $\text{above } r' \ a' \neq \{a'\}$ 
  have  $\forall a'' \in A. a'' \preceq_r a'$ 
  proof (safe)
    fix  $b :: 'a$ 
    assume  $y \text{-in-} A$ :  $b \in A$ 
    hence  $A \neq \{\}$ 
    by blast
    moreover have  $\text{linear-order-on } A \ r$ 
    using lifted-a
    unfolding equiv-rel-except-a-def lifted-def
    by simp
    ultimately show  $b \preceq_r a'$ 
    using  $y \text{-in-} A \ a' \text{-above-} a' \ \text{lin-ord-imp-connex} \ \text{pref-imp-in-above}$ 
      singletonD limited-dest singletonI
    unfolding connex-def
    by (metis (no-types))
  qed
  moreover have  $\text{equiv-rel-except-a } A \ r \ r' \ a$ 
  using lifted-a
  unfolding lifted-def
  by metis
  moreover have  $a' \in A - \{a\}$ 
  using  $a \text{-neg-} a' \ \text{calculation} \ \text{member-remove}$ 
    limited-dest lin-ord-imp-connex
  using equiv-rel-except-a-def remove-def connex-def
  by metis
  ultimately have  $\forall a'' \in A - \{a\}. a'' \preceq_{r'} a'$ 
  using DiffD1 lifted-a
  unfolding equiv-rel-except-a-def
  by metis
  hence  $\forall a'' \in A - \{a\}. \text{above } r' \ a'' \neq \{a''\}$ 
  using  $a' \text{-not-above-} a' \ \text{empty-iff} \ \text{insert-iff} \ \text{pref-imp-in-above}$ 
  by metis
  hence  $\text{above } r' \ a = \{a\}$ 
  using Diff-iff all-not-in-conv lifted-a above-one singleton-iff fin-A
  unfolding lifted-def equiv-rel-except-a-def
  by metis
  thus  $\text{above } r' \ a' = \{a'\} \vee \text{above } r' \ a = \{a\}$ 
  by simp
  qed
qed

theorem lifted-above-winner-single:
  fixes
     $A :: 'a \ \text{set}$  and
     $r :: 'a \ \text{Preference-Relation}$  and

```

```

     $r' :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$  and
     $a :: 'a$ 
  assumes
     $\text{lifted } A \ r \ r' \ a$  and
     $\text{above } r \ a = \{a\}$  and
     $\text{finite } A$ 
  shows  $\text{above } r' \ a = \{a\}$ 
  using assms lifted-above-winner-alts
  by metis

theorem lifted-above-winner-other:
  fixes
     $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$  and
     $r' :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$  and
     $a :: 'a$  and
     $a' :: 'a$ 
  assumes
    lifted-a:  $\text{lifted } A \ r \ r' \ a$  and
    a'-above-a':  $\text{above } r' \ a' = \{a'\}$  and
    fin-A:  $\text{finite } A$  and
    a-not-a':  $a \neq a'$ 
  shows  $\text{above } r \ a' = \{a'\}$ 
proof (rule ccontr)
  assume not-above-x:  $\text{above } r \ a' \neq \{a'\}$ 
  then obtain  $b$  where
    b-above-b:  $\text{above } r \ b = \{b\}$ 
    using lifted-a fin-A insert-Diff insert-not-empty above-one
    unfolding lifted-def equiv-rel-except-a-def
    by metis
  hence  $\text{above } r' \ b = \{b\} \vee \text{above } r' \ a = \{a\}$ 
    using lifted-a fin-A lifted-above-winner-alts
    by metis
  moreover have  $\forall a''. \text{above } r' \ a'' = \{a''\} \longrightarrow a'' = a'$ 
    using all-not-in-conv lifted-a a'-above-a' fin-A above-one-eq
    unfolding lifted-def equiv-rel-except-a-def
    by metis
  ultimately have  $b = a'$ 
    using a-not-a'
    by presburger
  moreover have  $b \neq a'$ 
    using not-above-x b-above-b
    by blast
  ultimately show False
    by simp
qed

end

```

1.2 Norm

```

theory Norm
  imports HOL-Library.Extended-Real
           HOL-Combinatorics.List-Permutation
begin

```

A norm on R to n is a mapping $N: R \mapsto n$ on R that has the following properties:

- positive scalability: $N(a * u) = |a| * N(u)$ for all u in R to n and all a in R ;
- positive semidefiniteness: $N(u) \geq 0$ for all u in R to n , and $N(u) = 0$ if and only if $u = (0, 0, \dots, 0)$;
- triangle inequality: $N(u + v) \leq N(u) + N(v)$ for all u and v in R to n .

1.2.1 Definition

```

type-synonym Norm = ereal list  $\Rightarrow$  ereal

```

```

definition norm :: Norm  $\Rightarrow$  bool where
  norm n  $\equiv \forall (x :: \text{ereal list}). n\ x \geq 0 \wedge (\forall\ i < \text{length}\ x. (x!i = 0) \longrightarrow n\ x = 0)$ 

```

1.2.2 Auxiliary Lemmas

```

lemma sum-over-image-of-bijection:

```

```

  fixes
    A :: 'a set and
    A' :: 'b set and
    f :: 'a  $\Rightarrow$  'b and
    g :: 'a  $\Rightarrow$  ereal
  assumes bij-betw f A A'
  shows  $(\sum a \in A. g\ a) = (\sum a' \in A'. g\ (\text{the-inv-into}\ A\ f\ a'))$ 
  using assms
proof (induction card A arbitrary: A A')
  case 0
  hence card A' = 0
  using bij-betw-same-card assms
  by metis
  hence  $(\sum a \in A. g\ a) = 0 \wedge (\sum a' \in A'. g\ (\text{the-inv-into}\ A\ f\ a')) = 0$ 
  using 0 card-0-eq sum.empty sum.infinite
  by metis

```

```

thus ?case
  by simp
next
  case (Suc x)
  fix
    A :: 'a set and
    A' :: 'b set and
    x :: nat
  assume
    IH:  $\bigwedge A A'. x = \text{card } A \implies$ 
       $\text{bij-betw } f A A' \implies \text{sum } g A = (\sum a \in A'. g (\text{the-inv-into } A f a))$  and
    suc: Suc x = card A and
    bij-A-A':  $\text{bij-betw } f A A'$ 
  obtain a where
    a-in-A:  $a \in A$ 
    using suc card-eq-SucD insertI1
    by metis
  have a-compl-A:  $\text{insert } a (A - \{a\}) = A$ 
    using a-in-A
    by blast
  have inj-on-A-A':  $\text{inj-on } f A \wedge A' = f ' A$ 
    using bij-A-A'
    unfolding bij-betw-def
    by simp
  hence inj-on-A:  $\text{inj-on } f A$ 
    by simp
  have img-of-A:  $A' = f ' A$ 
    using inj-on-A-A'
    by simp
  have inj-on f (insert a A)
    using inj-on-A a-compl-A
    by simp
  hence A'-sub-fa:  $A' - \{f a\} = f ' (A - \{a\})$ 
    using img-of-A
    by blast
  hence bij-without-a:  $\text{bij-betw } f (A - \{a\}) (A' - \{f a\})$ 
    using inj-on-A a-compl-A inj-on-insert
    unfolding bij-betw-def
    by (metis (no-types))
  have  $\forall f A A'. \text{bij-betw } f (A :: 'a \text{ set}) (A' :: 'b \text{ set}) = (\text{inj-on } f A \wedge f ' A = A')$ 
    unfolding bij-betw-def
    by simp
  hence inv-without-a:
     $\forall a' \in A' - \{f a\}. \text{the-inv-into } (A - \{a\}) f a' = \text{the-inv-into } A f a'$ 
    using inj-on-A A'-sub-fa
    by (simp add: inj-on-diff the-inv-into-f-eq)
  have card-without-a:  $\text{card } (A - \{a\}) = x$ 
    using suc a-in-A Diff-empty card-Diff-insert diff-Suc-1 empty-iff
    by simp

```

hence *card-A'-from-x*: $\text{card } A' = \text{Suc } x \wedge \text{card } (A' - \{f a\}) = x$
using *suc bij-A-A' bij-without-a*
by (*simp add: bij-betw-same-card*)
hence $(\sum a \in A. g a) = (\sum a \in (A - \{a\}). g a) + g a$
using *suc add.commute card-Diff1-less-iff insert-Diff insert-Diff-single lessI sum.insert-remove card-without-a*
by *metis*
also have $\dots = (\sum a' \in (A' - \{f a\}). g (\text{the-inv-into } (A - \{a\}) f a')) + g a$
using *IH bij-without-a card-without-a*
by *simp*
also have $\dots = (\sum a' \in (A' - \{f a\}). g (\text{the-inv-into } A f a')) + g a$
using *inv-without-a*
by *simp*
also have $\dots = (\sum a' \in (A' - \{f a\}). g (\text{the-inv-into } A f a')) +$
 $g (\text{the-inv-into } A f (f a))$
using *a-in-A bij-A-A'*
by (*simp add: bij-betw-imp-inj-on the-inv-into-f-f*)
also have $\dots = (\sum a' \in A'. g (\text{the-inv-into } A f a'))$
using *add.commute card-Diff1-less-iff insert-Diff insert-Diff-single lessI sum.insert-remove card-A'-from-x*
by *metis*
finally show $(\sum a \in A. g a) = (\sum a' \in A'. g (\text{the-inv-into } A f a'))$
by *simp*
qed

1.2.3 Common Norms

fun *l-one* :: *Norm* **where**
l-one $x = (\sum i < \text{length } x. |x[i]|)$

1.2.4 Properties

definition *symmetry* :: *Norm* \Rightarrow *bool* **where**
symmetry $n \equiv \forall x y. x <\sim\sim> y \longrightarrow n x = n y$

1.2.5 Theorems

theorem *l-one-is-sym*: *symmetry l-one*

proof (*unfold symmetry-def, safe*)

fix

l :: *ereal list* **and**

l' :: *ereal list*

assume *perm*: $l <\sim\sim> l'$

from *perm* **obtain** π

where

perm $_{\pi}$: π *permutes* $\{.. < \text{length } l\}$ **and**

l $_{\pi}$: *permute-list* $\pi l = l'$

using *mset-eq-permutation*

by *metis*

from *perm* $_{\pi}$ *l* $_{\pi}$

```

have (∑ i < length l. |l!i|) = (∑ i < length l. |l!(π i)|)
  using permute-list-nth
  by fastforce
also have ... = (∑ i < length l. |l!(π (inv π i))|)
  using perm_π permutes-inv-eq f-the-inv-into-f-bij-betw permutes-imp-bij
    sum.cong sum-over-image-of-bijection
  by (smt (verit, ccfv-SIG))
also have ... = (∑ i < length l. |l!i|)
  using perm_π permutes-inv-eq
  by metis
finally have (∑ i < length l. |l!i|) = (∑ i < length l. |l!i|)
  by simp
moreover have length l = length l'
  using perm perm-length
  by metis
ultimately show l-one l = l-one l'
  using l-one.elims
  by metis
qed

end

```

1.3 Electoral Result

```

theory Result
  imports Main
begin

```

An electoral result is the principal result type of the composable modules voting framework, as it is a generalization of the set of winning alternatives from social choice functions. Electoral results are selections of the received (possibly empty) set of alternatives into the three disjoint groups of elected, rejected and deferred alternatives. Any of those sets, e.g., the set of winning (elected) alternatives, may also be left empty, as long as they collectively still hold all the received alternatives.

1.3.1 Auxiliary Functions

```

type-synonym 'r Result = 'r set * 'r set * 'r set

```

A partition of a set A are pairwise disjoint sets that "set equals partition" A. For this specific predicate, we have three disjoint sets in a three-tuple.

```

fun disjoint3 :: 'r Result ⇒ bool where
  disjoint3 (e, r, d) =

```

$$((e \cap r = \{\}) \wedge \\ (e \cap d = \{\}) \wedge \\ (r \cap d = \{\}))$$

fun *set-equals-partition* :: 'r set \Rightarrow 'r Result \Rightarrow bool **where**
set-equals-partition X (e, r, d) = (e \cup r \cup d = X)

1.3.2 Definition

A result generally is related to the alternative set A (of type 'a). A result should be well-formed on the alternatives. Also it should be possible to limit a well-formed result to a subset of the alternatives.

Specific result types like social choice results (sets of alternatives) can be realized via sublocales of the result locale.

locale *result* =
fixes
well-formed :: 'a set \Rightarrow ('r Result) \Rightarrow bool **and**
limit-set :: 'a set \Rightarrow 'r set \Rightarrow 'r set
assumes \bigwedge (A::('a set)) (r::('r Result)).
(set-equals-partition (limit-set A UNIV) r \wedge disjoint3 r) \implies well-formed A r

These three functions return the elect, reject, or defer set of a result.

fun (**in** *result*) *limit-res* :: 'a set \Rightarrow 'r Result \Rightarrow 'r Result **where**
limit-res A (e, r, d) = (*limit-set* A e, *limit-set* A r, *limit-set* A d)

abbreviation *elect-r* :: 'r Result \Rightarrow 'r set **where**
elect-r r \equiv *fst* r

abbreviation *reject-r* :: 'r Result \Rightarrow 'r set **where**
reject-r r \equiv *fst* (*snd* r)

abbreviation *defer-r* :: 'r Result \Rightarrow 'r set **where**
defer-r r \equiv *snd* (*snd* r)

end

1.4 Preference Profile

theory *Profile*
imports *Preference-Relation*
HOL-Library.Extended-Nat
HOL-Combinatorics.Permutations

begin

Preference profiles denote the decisions made by the individual voters on the eligible alternatives. They are represented in the form of one preference relation (e.g., selected on a ballot) per voter, collectively captured in a mapping of voters onto their respective preference relations. If there are finitely many voters, they can be enumerated and the mapping can be interpreted as a list of preference relations. Unlike the common preference profiles in the social-choice sense, the profiles described here consider only the (sub-)set of alternatives that are received.

1.4.1 Definition

A profile contains one ballot for each voter. An election consists of a set of participating voters, a set of eligible alternatives and a corresponding profile.

type-synonym $('a, 'v) \text{ Profile} = 'v \Rightarrow ('a \text{ Preference-Relation})$

type-synonym $('a, 'v) \text{ Election} = 'a \text{ set} \times 'v \text{ set} \times ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$

fun *election-equality* :: $('a, 'v) \text{ Election} \Rightarrow ('a, 'v) \text{ Election} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$ **where**
election-equality $(A, V, p) (A', V', p') = (A = A' \wedge V = V' \wedge (\forall v \in V. p\ v = p'\ v))$

fun *alternatives- \mathcal{E}* :: $('a, 'v) \text{ Election} \Rightarrow 'a \text{ set}$ **where**
alternatives- \mathcal{E} $E = \text{fst } E$

fun *voters- \mathcal{E}* :: $('a, 'v) \text{ Election} \Rightarrow 'v \text{ set}$ **where**
voters- \mathcal{E} $E = \text{fst } (\text{snd } E)$

fun *profile- \mathcal{E}* :: $('a, 'v) \text{ Election} \Rightarrow ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ **where**
profile- \mathcal{E} $E = \text{snd } (\text{snd } E)$

A profile on a set of alternatives A and a voter set V consists of ballots that are linear orders on A for all voters in V. A finite profile is one with finitely many alternatives and voters.

definition *profile* :: $'v \text{ set} \Rightarrow 'a \text{ set} \Rightarrow ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$ **where**
profile $V A p \equiv \forall v \in V. \text{linear-order-on } A (p\ v)$

abbreviation *finite-profile* :: $'v \text{ set} \Rightarrow 'a \text{ set} \Rightarrow ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$ **where**
finite-profile $V A p \equiv \text{finite } A \wedge \text{finite } V \wedge \text{profile } V A p$

abbreviation *finite-election* :: $('a, 'v) \text{ Election} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$ **where**
finite-election $E \equiv \text{finite-profile } (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E) (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E)$

definition *finite-voter-elections* :: $('a, 'v) \text{ Election set}$ **where**
finite-voter-elections =
 $\{el :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election}. \text{finite } (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ el)\}$

definition *finite-elections* :: ('a, 'v) Election set **where**

finite-elections =
 $\{el :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election. } \text{finite-profile } (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \text{ } el) (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \text{ } el) (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \text{ } el)\}$

definition *valid-elections* :: ('a, 'v) Election set **where**

valid-elections = $\{E. \text{profile } (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \text{ } E) (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \text{ } E) (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \text{ } E)\}$

— Elections with fixed alternatives, finite voters and a default value for the profile value on non-voters.

fun *fixed-alt-elections* :: 'a set \Rightarrow ('a, 'v) Election set **where**

fixed-alt-elections $A = \text{valid-elections} \cap$
 $\{E. \text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \text{ } E = A \wedge \text{finite } (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \text{ } E) \wedge (\forall v. v \notin \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \text{ } E \longrightarrow \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \text{ } E \text{ } v = \{\})\}$

— Counts the occurrences of a ballot in an election, i.e., how many voters chose that exact ballot.

fun *vote-count* :: 'a Preference-Relation \Rightarrow ('a, 'v) Election \Rightarrow nat **where**

vote-count $p \text{ } E = \text{card } \{v \in (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \text{ } E). (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \text{ } E) \text{ } v = p\}$

1.4.2 Vote Count

lemma *sum-comp*:

fixes

$f :: 'x \Rightarrow 'z :: \text{comm-monoid-add}$ **and**

$g :: 'y \Rightarrow 'x$ **and**

$X :: 'x \text{ set}$ **and**

$Y :: 'y \text{ set}$

assumes *bij-betw* $g \text{ } Y \text{ } X$

shows $\text{sum } f \text{ } X = \text{sum } (f \circ g) \text{ } Y$

using *assms*

proof (*induction card X arbitrary: X Y f g*)

case 0

assume *bij-betw* $g \text{ } Y \text{ } X$

hence $\text{card } Y = 0$

using *bij-betw-same-card 0.hyps*

unfolding *0.hyps*

by *simp*

hence $\text{sum } f \text{ } X = 0 \wedge \text{sum } (f \circ g) \text{ } Y = 0$

using *assms 0 card-0-eq sum.empty sum.infinite*

by *metis*

thus *?case*

by *simp*

next

case (*Suc n*)

assume

card-X: Suc n = card X **and**

bij: bij-betw g Y X **and**

$hyp: \bigwedge X Y f g. n = \text{card } X \implies \text{bij-betw } g \ Y \ X \implies \text{sum } f \ X = \text{sum } (f \circ g) \ Y$
then obtain $x :: 'x$
where $x\text{-in-}X: x \in X$
by *fastforce*
with *bij* **have** $\text{bij-betw } g \ (Y - \{\text{the-inv-into } Y \ g \ x\}) \ (X - \{x\})$
using *bij-betw-DiffI* *bij-betw-apply* *bij-betw-singletonI* *bij-betw-the-inv-into*
empty-subsetI *f-the-inv-into-f-bij-betw* *insert-subsetI*
by (*metis* (*mono-tags*, *lifting*))
moreover have $n = \text{card } (X - \{x\})$
using *card-X* *x-in-X*
by *fastforce*
ultimately have $\text{sum } f \ (X - \{x\}) = \text{sum } (f \circ g) \ (Y - \{\text{the-inv-into } Y \ g \ x\})$
using *hyp* *Suc*
by *blast*
moreover have
 $\text{sum } (f \circ g) \ Y = f \ (g \ (\text{the-inv-into } Y \ g \ x)) + \text{sum } (f \circ g) \ (Y - \{\text{the-inv-into } Y \ g \ x\})$
using *Suc.hyps*(2) *x-in-X* *bij* *bij-betw-def* *calculation* *card.infinite*
f-the-inv-into-f-bij-betw *nat.discI* *sum.reindex* *sum.remove*
by *metis*
moreover have $f \ (g \ (\text{the-inv-into } Y \ g \ x)) + \text{sum } (f \circ g) \ (Y - \{\text{the-inv-into } Y \ g \ x\}) =$
 $f \ x + \text{sum } (f \circ g) \ (Y - \{\text{the-inv-into } Y \ g \ x\})$
using *x-in-X* *bij* *f-the-inv-into-f-bij-betw*
by *metis*
moreover have $\text{sum } f \ X = f \ x + \text{sum } f \ (X - \{x\})$
using *Suc.hyps*(2) *Zero-neq-Suc* *x-in-X* *card.infinite* *sum.remove*
by *metis*
ultimately show *?case*
by *simp*
qed

lemma *vote-count-sum*:

fixes $E :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election}$
assumes
 $\text{finite } (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \text{ and}$
 $\text{finite } (UNIV :: ('a \times 'v) \text{ set})$
shows $\text{sum } (\lambda p. \text{vote-count } p \ E) \ UNIV = \text{card } (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E)$
proof (*unfold* *vote-count.simps*)
have $\forall p. \text{finite } \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\}$
using *assms*
by *force*
moreover have
 $\text{disjoint } \{\{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \mid p. p \in UNIV\}$
unfolding *disjoint-def*
by *blast*
moreover have *partition*:
 $\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E = \bigcup \{\{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \mid p. p \in UNIV\}$
using *Union-eq*[of $\{\{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \mid p. p \in UNIV\}$]

by *blast*
 ultimately have *card-eq-sum'*:
 $\text{card } (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E) = \text{sum card } \{\{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \mid p. p \in \text{UNIV}\}$
 using *card-Union-disjoint*[of $\{\{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \mid p. p \in \text{UNIV}\}$]
 by *auto*
 have *finite* $\{\{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \mid p. p \in \text{UNIV}\}$
 using *partition assms*
 by (*simp add: finite-UnionD*)
 moreover have
 $\{\{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \mid p. p \in \text{UNIV}\} =$
 $\{\{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \mid p.$
 $p \in \text{UNIV} \wedge \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \neq \{\}\} \cup$
 $\{\{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \mid p.$
 $p \in \text{UNIV} \wedge \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} = \{\}\}$
 by *blast*
 moreover have
 $\{\} = \{\{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \mid p.$
 $p \in \text{UNIV} \wedge \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \neq \{\}\} \cap$
 $\{\{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \mid p.$
 $p \in \text{UNIV} \wedge \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} = \{\}\}$
 by *blast*
 ultimately have *sum card* $\{\{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \mid p. p \in \text{UNIV}\}$
 =
 $\text{sum card } \{\{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \mid p.$
 $p \in \text{UNIV} \wedge \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \neq \{\}\} +$
 $\text{sum card } \{\{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \mid p.$
 $p \in \text{UNIV} \wedge \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} = \{\}\}$
 using *sum.union-disjoint*[of
 $\{\{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \mid p.$
 $p \in \text{UNIV} \wedge \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \neq \{\}\}$
 $\{\{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \mid p.$
 $p \in \text{UNIV} \wedge \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} = \{\}\}]$
 by *simp*
 moreover have
 $\forall X \in \{\{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \mid p.$
 $p \in \text{UNIV} \wedge \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} = \{\}\}. \text{card } X = 0$
 using *card-eq-0-iff*
 by *fastforce*
 ultimately have *card-eq-sum*:
 $\text{card } (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E) = \text{sum card } \{\{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \mid p.$
 $p \in \text{UNIV} \wedge \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \neq \{\}\}$
 using *card-eq-sum'*
 by *simp*
 have *inj-on* $(\lambda p. \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\})$
 $\{p. \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \neq \{\}\}$
 unfolding *inj-on-def*
 by *blast*

moreover have

$$\begin{aligned} & (\lambda p. \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\}) \text{ ' } \{p. \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v \\ & = p\} \neq \{\}\} \subseteq \\ & \quad \{\{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \mid p. \\ & \quad p \in \text{UNIV} \wedge \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \neq \{\}\} \end{aligned}$$

by blast

moreover have

$$\begin{aligned} & (\lambda p. \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\}) \text{ ' } \{p. \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v \\ & = p\} \neq \{\}\} \supseteq \\ & \quad \{\{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \mid p. \\ & \quad p \in \text{UNIV} \wedge \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \neq \{\}\} \end{aligned}$$

by blast

ultimately have *bij-betw* $(\lambda p. \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\})$

$$\{p. \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \neq \{\}\}$$

$$\{\{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \mid p.$$

$$p \in \text{UNIV} \wedge \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \neq \{\}\}$$

unfolding *bij-betw-def*

by simp

hence *sum-rewrite*:

$$\begin{aligned} & (\sum x \in \{p. \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \neq \{\}\}. \\ & \quad \text{card } \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = x\}) = \\ & \quad \text{sum card } \{\{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \mid p. \\ & \quad p \in \text{UNIV} \wedge \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \neq \{\}\} \end{aligned}$$

using *sum-comp*[of

$$\lambda p. \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\}$$

$$\{p. \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \neq \{\}\}$$

$$\{\{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \mid p.$$

$$p \in \text{UNIV} \wedge \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \neq \{\}\}$$

$$\text{card}]$$

unfolding *comp-def*

by simp

have $\{p. \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} = \{\}\} \cap$

$$\{p. \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \neq \{\}\} = \{\}$$

by blast

moreover have $\{p. \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} = \{\}\} \cup$

$$\{p. \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \neq \{\}\} = \text{UNIV}$$

by blast

ultimately have $(\sum p \in \text{UNIV}. \text{card } \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\}) =$

$$(\sum x \in \{p. \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \neq \{\}\}. \\ \text{card } \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = x\}) +$$

$$(\sum x \in \{p. \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} = \{\}\}. \\ \text{card } \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = x\})$$

$$\text{card } \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = x\})$$

using *assms sum.union-disjoint*[of

$$\{p. \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} = \{\}\}$$

$$\{p. \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \neq \{\}\}]$$

using *Finite-Set.finite-set add commute finite-Un*

by (*metis (mono-tags, lifting)*)

moreover have

$$\forall x \in \{p. \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} = \{\}\}.$$

```

      card {v ∈ voters- $\mathcal{E}$  E. profile- $\mathcal{E}$  E v = x} = 0
    using card-eq-0-iff
    by fastforce
    ultimately show ( $\sum p \in UNIV. \text{card } \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\}$ ) =
card (voters- $\mathcal{E}$  E)
      using card-eq-sum sum-rewrite
      by simp
qed

```

1.4.3 Voter Permutations

A common action of interest on elections is renaming the voters, e.g., when talking about anonymity.

```

fun rename :: ('v  $\Rightarrow$  'v)  $\Rightarrow$  ('a, 'v) Election  $\Rightarrow$  ('a, 'v) Election where
  rename  $\pi$  (A, V, p) = (A,  $\pi$  ' V, p  $\circ$  (the-inv  $\pi$ ))

```

lemma rename-sound:

```

fixes
  A :: 'a set and
  V :: 'v set and
  p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
   $\pi$  :: 'v  $\Rightarrow$  'v
assumes
  prof: profile V A p and
  renamed: (A, V', q) = rename  $\pi$  (A, V, p) and
  bij: bij  $\pi$ 
shows profile V' A q
proof (unfold profile-def, safe)
  fix v' :: 'v
  assume v'-in-V': v'  $\in$  V'
  let ?q-img = ((the-inv  $\pi$ ) v')
  have V' =  $\pi$  ' V
    using renamed
    by simp
  hence ?q-img  $\in$  V
    using UNIV-I v'-in-V' bij bij-is-inj bij-is-surj
      f-the-inv-into-f inj-image-mem-iff
    by metis
  hence linear-order-on A (p ?q-img)
    using prof
    unfolding profile-def
    by simp
  moreover have q v' = p ?q-img
    using renamed bij
    by simp
  ultimately show linear-order-on A (q v')
    by simp
qed

```

lemma *rename-finite*:

fixes
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $V :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ **and**
 $\pi :: 'v \Rightarrow 'v$
assumes
 $\text{prof}: \text{finite-profile } V \ A \ p$ **and**
 $\text{renamed}: (A, V', q) = \text{rename } \pi \ (A, V, p)$ **and**
 $\text{bij}: \text{bij } \pi$
shows $\text{finite-profile } V' \ A \ q$
proof (*safe*)
show $\text{finite } A$
using *prof*
by *simp*
show $\text{finite } V'$
using *bij renamed prof*
by *simp*
show $\text{profile } V' \ A \ q$
using *assms rename-sound*
by *metis*
qed

lemma *rename-inv*:

fixes
 $\pi :: 'v \Rightarrow 'v$ **and**
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $V :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$
assumes $\text{bij } \pi$
shows $\text{rename } \pi \ (\text{rename } (\text{the-inv } \pi) \ (A, V, p)) = (A, V, p)$
proof –
have $\text{rename } \pi \ (\text{rename } (\text{the-inv } \pi) \ (A, V, p)) =$
 $(A, \pi \ ' (\text{the-inv } \pi) \ ' V, p \circ (\text{the-inv } (\text{the-inv } \pi)) \circ (\text{the-inv } \pi))$
by *simp*
moreover **have** $\pi \ ' (\text{the-inv } \pi) \ ' V = V$
using *assms*
by (*simp add: f-the-inv-into-f-bij-betw image-comp*)
moreover **have** $(\text{the-inv } (\text{the-inv } \pi)) = \pi$
using *assms bij-betw-def inj-on-the-inv-into surj-def surj-imp-inv-eq the-inv-f-f*
by (*metis (mono-tags, opaque-lifting)*)
moreover **have** $\pi \circ (\text{the-inv } \pi) = \text{id}$
using *assms f-the-inv-into-f-bij-betw*
by *fastforce*
ultimately **show** $\text{rename } \pi \ (\text{rename } (\text{the-inv } \pi) \ (A, V, p)) = (A, V, p)$
by (*simp add: rewriteR-comp-comp*)
qed

lemma *rename-inj*:

```

fixes  $\pi :: 'v \Rightarrow 'v$ 
assumes bij  $\pi$ 
shows inj (rename  $\pi$ )
proof (unfold inj-def, clarsimp)
  fix
     $V :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
     $V' :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
     $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$  and
     $p' :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ 
  assume
    eq-V:  $\pi \circ V = \pi \circ V'$  and
     $p \circ \text{the-inv } \pi = p' \circ \text{the-inv } \pi$ 
  hence  $p \circ \text{the-inv } \pi \circ \pi = p' \circ \text{the-inv } \pi \circ \pi$ 
    by simp
  hence  $p = p'$ 
    using assms bij-betw-the-inv-into bij-is-surj surj-fun-eq
    by metis
  moreover have  $V = V'$ 
    using assms eq-V
    by (simp add: bij-betw-imp-inj-on inj-image-eq-iff)
  ultimately show  $V = V' \wedge p = p'$ 
    by blast
qed

lemma rename-surj:
  fixes  $\pi :: 'v \Rightarrow 'v$ 
  assumes bij  $\pi$ 
  shows
    on-valid-els: rename  $\pi \circ \text{valid-elections} = \text{valid-elections}$  and
    on-finite-els: rename  $\pi \circ \text{finite-elections} = \text{finite-elections}$ 
proof (safe)
  fix
     $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $A' :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $V :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
     $V' :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
     $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$  and
     $p' :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ 
  assume valid:  $(A, V, p) \in \text{valid-elections}$ 
  have bij (the-inv  $\pi$ )
    using assms bij-betw-the-inv-into
    by blast
  hence rename (the-inv  $\pi$ )  $(A, V, p) \in \text{valid-elections}$ 
    using rename-sound valid
    unfolding valid-elections-def
    by fastforce
  thus  $(A, V, p) \in \text{rename } \pi \circ \text{valid-elections}$ 
    using assms image-eqI rename-inv[of ]
    by metis

```



```

assume ( $A', V', p'$ ) = rename  $\pi$  ( $A, V, p$ )
thus ( $A', V', p'$ )  $\in$  valid-elections
  using rename-sound valid assms
  unfolding valid-elections-def
  by fastforce
next
fix
   $A :: 'b$  set and
   $A' :: 'b$  set and
   $V :: 'v$  set and
   $V' :: 'v$  set and
   $p :: ('b, 'v)$  Profile and
   $p' :: ('b, 'v)$  Profile
assume finite: ( $A, V, p$ )  $\in$  finite-elections
have bij (the-inv  $\pi$ )
  using assms bij-betw-the-inv-into
  by blast
hence rename (the-inv  $\pi$ ) ( $A, V, p$ )  $\in$  finite-elections
  using rename-finite finite
  unfolding finite-elections-def
  by fastforce
thus ( $A, V, p$ )  $\in$  rename  $\pi$  ' finite-elections
  using assms image-eqI rename-inv[of  $\pi$ ]
  by metis
assume ( $A', V', p'$ ) = rename  $\pi$  ( $A, V, p$ )
thus ( $A', V', p'$ )  $\in$  finite-elections
  using rename-sound finite assms
  unfolding finite-elections-def
  by fastforce
qed

```

1.4.4 List Representation for Ordered Voter Types

A profile on a voter set that has a natural order can be viewed as a list of ballots.

fun *to-list* :: $'v::\text{linorder}$ *set* \Rightarrow $('a, 'v)$ *Profile* \Rightarrow $('a$ *Preference-Relation*) *list*
where

to-list V p = (*if* (*finite* V)
 then (*map* p (*sorted-list-of-set* V))
 else [])

lemma *map2-helper*:

fixes

$f :: 'x \Rightarrow 'y \Rightarrow 'z$ **and**
 $g :: 'x \Rightarrow 'x$ **and**
 $h :: 'y \Rightarrow 'y$ **and**
 $l1 :: 'x$ *list* **and**
 $l2 :: 'y$ *list*

shows *map2* f (*map* g $l1$) (*map* h $l2$) = *map2* $(\lambda x y. f (g x) (h y))$ $l1$ $l2$

proof –
have $\text{map2 } f \text{ (map } g \text{ l1) (map } h \text{ l2) = map } (\lambda (x, y). f \ x \ y) \text{ (zip (map } g \text{ l1) (map } h \text{ l2))}$
by *simp*
moreover have $\text{map } (\lambda (x, y). f \ x \ y) \text{ (zip (map } g \text{ l1) (map } h \text{ l2)) =}$
 $\text{map } (\lambda (x, y). f \ x \ y) \text{ (map } (\lambda (x, y). (g \ x, h \ y)) \text{ (zip l1 l2))}$
using *zip-map-map*
by *metis*
moreover have $\text{map } (\lambda (x, y). f \ x \ y) \text{ (map } (\lambda (x, y). (g \ x, h \ y)) \text{ (zip l1 l2)) =}$
 $\text{map } ((\lambda (x, y). f \ x \ y) \circ (\lambda (x, y). (g \ x, h \ y))) \text{ (zip l1 l2)}$
by *simp*
moreover have $\text{map } ((\lambda (x, y). f \ x \ y) \circ (\lambda (x, y). (g \ x, h \ y))) \text{ (zip l1 l2) =}$
 $\text{map } (\lambda (x, y). f \ (g \ x) \ (h \ y)) \text{ (zip l1 l2)}$
by *auto*
moreover have $\text{map } (\lambda (x, y). f \ (g \ x) \ (h \ y)) \text{ (zip l1 l2) = map2 } (\lambda x \ y. f \ (g \ x) \ (h \ y)) \text{ l1 l2}$
by *simp*
ultimately show
 $\text{map2 } f \text{ (map } g \text{ l1) (map } h \text{ l2) = map2 } (\lambda x \ y. f \ (g \ x) \ (h \ y)) \text{ l1 l2}$
by *simp*
qed

lemma *to-list-simp*:

fixes
 $i :: \text{nat}$ **and**
 $V :: 'v::\text{linorder set}$ **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{Profile}$
assumes
 $i < \text{card } V$
shows $(\text{to-list } V \ p)!i = p \ ((\text{sorted-list-of-set } V)!i)$
proof –
have $(\text{to-list } V \ p)!i = (\text{map } p \ (\text{sorted-list-of-set } V))!i$
by *simp*
also have $\dots = p \ ((\text{sorted-list-of-set } V)!i)$
using *assms*
by *simp*
finally show *?thesis*
by *simp*
qed

lemma *to-list-comp*:

fixes
 $V :: 'v::\text{linorder set}$ **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{Profile}$ **and**
 $f :: 'a \text{ rel} \Rightarrow 'a \text{ rel}$
shows $\text{to-list } V \ (f \circ p) = \text{map } f \ (\text{to-list } V \ p)$
proof –
have $\forall i < \text{card } V. (\text{to-list } V \ (f \circ p))!i = (f \circ p) \ ((\text{sorted-list-of-set } V)!i)$
using *to-list-simp*

```

    by blast
  moreover have
     $\forall i < \text{card } V. (f \circ p) ((\text{sorted-list-of-set } V)!i) = (\text{map } (f \circ p) (\text{sorted-list-of-set } V))!i$ 
  unfolding map-def
  by simp
  moreover have
     $\forall i < \text{card } V. (\text{map } (f \circ p) (\text{sorted-list-of-set } V))!i =$ 
     $(\text{map } f (\text{map } p (\text{sorted-list-of-set } V)))!i$ 
  by simp
  moreover have  $\text{map } p (\text{sorted-list-of-set } V) = \text{to-list } V p$ 
  using to-list-simp list-eq-iff-nth-eq
  by simp
  ultimately have  $\forall i < \text{card } V. (\text{to-list } V (f \circ p))!i = (\text{map } f (\text{to-list } V p))!i$ 
  by presburger
  moreover have  $\text{length } (\text{map } f (\text{to-list } V p)) = \text{card } V$ 
  by simp
  moreover have  $\text{length } (\text{to-list } V (f \circ p)) = \text{card } V$ 
  by simp
  ultimately show ?thesis
  using nth-equalityI
  by simp
qed

```

lemma *set-card-upper-bound*:

```

  fixes
     $i :: \text{nat}$  and
     $V :: \text{nat set}$ 
  assumes
     $\text{fin-}V$ : finite  $V$  and
     $\text{bound-}v$ :  $\forall v \in V. i > v$ 
  shows  $i \geq \text{card } V$ 
  proof (cases  $V = \{\}$ )
  case True
  thus ?thesis
  by simp
  next
  case False
  hence  $\text{Max } V \in V$ 
  using fin-V
  by simp
  moreover have  $\text{Max } V \geq (\text{card } V) - 1$ 
  using False Max-ge-iff fin-V calculation card-Diff1-less finite-le-enumerate
    card-Diff-singleton finite-enumerate-in-set
  by metis
  ultimately show ?thesis
  using fin-V bound-v
  by fastforce
qed

```

lemma *sorted-list-of-set-nth-equals-card*:

fixes

$V :: 'v::\text{linorder set}$ **and**

$x :: 'v$

assumes

$\text{fin-}V$: *finite* V **and**

$x\text{-}V$: $x \in V$

shows $\text{sorted-list-of-set } V!(\text{card } \{v \in V. v < x\}) = x$

proof –

let $?c = \text{card } \{v \in V. v < x\}$ **and**

$?set = \{v \in V. v < x\}$

have ex-index : $\forall v \in V. \exists n. n < \text{card } V \wedge (\text{sorted-list-of-set } V!n) = v$

using $\text{sorted-list-of-set.distinct-sorted-key-list-of-set}$

$\text{sorted-list-of-set.length-sorted-key-list-of-set}$

$\text{sorted-list-of-set.set-sorted-key-list-of-set}$

$\text{distinct-Ex1 fin-}V$

by *metis*

then obtain φ **where**

$\text{index-}\varphi$: $\forall v \in V. \varphi v < \text{card } V \wedge (\text{sorted-list-of-set } V!(\varphi v)) = v$

by *metis*

let $?i = \varphi x$

have $\text{inj-}\varphi$: *inj-on* φV

using $\text{inj-onI index-}\varphi$

by *metis*

have $\text{mono-}\varphi$: $\forall v v'. v \in V \wedge v' \in V \wedge v < v' \longrightarrow \varphi v < \varphi v'$

using $\text{sorted-list-of-set.idem-if-sorted-distinct dual-order.strict-trans2 fin-}V \text{ in-}$

$\text{dex-}\varphi$

$\text{finite-sorted-distinct-unique linorder-neqE-nat sorted-wrt-iff-nth-less}$

$\text{sorted-list-of-set.length-sorted-key-list-of-set order-less-irrefl}$

by (*metis* (*full-types*))

have $\forall v \in ?set. v < x$

by *simp*

hence $\forall v \in ?set. \varphi v < ?i$

using $\text{mono-}\varphi x\text{-}V$

by *simp*

hence $\forall j \in \{\varphi v \mid v. v \in ?set\}. ?i > j$

by *blast*

moreover have fin-img : *finite* $?set$

using $\text{fin-}V$

by *simp*

ultimately have $?i \geq \text{card } \{\varphi v \mid v. v \in ?set\}$

using $\text{set-card-upper-bound}$

by *simp*

also have $\text{card } \{\varphi v \mid v. v \in ?set\} = ?c$

using $\text{inj-}\varphi$

by (*simp add: card-image inj-on-subset setcompr-eq-image*)

finally have geq : $?i \geq ?c$

```

    by simp
  have sorted-φ:
    ∀ i j. i < card V ∧ j < card V ∧ i < j
      → (sorted-list-of-set V!i) < (sorted-list-of-set V!j)
    by (simp add: sorted-wrt-nth-less)
  have leq: ?i ≤ ?c
  proof (rule ccontr, cases ?c < card V)
    case True
    let ?A = λ j. {sorted-list-of-set V!j}
    assume ¬ ?i ≤ ?c
    hence ?i > ?c
    by simp
    hence ∀ j ≤ ?c. sorted-list-of-set V!j ∈ V ∧ sorted-list-of-set V!j < x
    using sorted-φ dual-order.strict-trans2 geq index-φ x-V fin-V
      nth-mem sorted-list-of-set.length-sorted-key-list-of-set
      sorted-list-of-set.set-sorted-key-list-of-set
    by (metis (mono-tags, lifting))
    hence {sorted-list-of-set V!j | j. j ≤ ?c} ⊆ {v ∈ V. v < x}
    by blast
    also have {sorted-list-of-set V!j | j. j ≤ ?c}
      = {sorted-list-of-set V!j | j. j ∈ {0 ..< (?c+1)}}
    using add.commute
    by auto
    also have {sorted-list-of-set V!j | j. j ∈ {0 ..< (?c+1)}}
      = (⋃ j ∈ {0 ..< (?c+1)}. {sorted-list-of-set V!j})
    by blast
    finally have subset: (⋃ j ∈ {0 ..< (?c+1)}. ?A j) ⊆ {v ∈ V. v < x}
    by simp
    have ∀ i ≤ ?c. ∀ j ≤ ?c. i ≠ j → sorted-list-of-set V!i ≠ sorted-list-of-set
      V!j
    using True
    by (simp add: nth-eq-iff-index-eq)
    hence ∀ i ∈ {0 ..< (?c+1)}. ∀ j ∈ {0 ..< (?c+1)}.
      (i ≠ j → {sorted-list-of-set V!i} ∩ {sorted-list-of-set V!j} = {})
    by fastforce
    hence disjoint-family-on ?A {0 ..< (?c+1)}
    unfolding disjoint-family-on-def
    by simp
    moreover have finite {0 ..< (?c+1)}
    by simp
    moreover have ∀ j ∈ {0 ..< (?c+1)}. card (?A j) = 1
    by simp
    ultimately have card (⋃ j ∈ {0 ..< (?c+1)}. ?A j) = (∑ j ∈ {0 ..< (?c+1)}.
1)
    using card-UN-disjoint'
    by fastforce
    also have (∑ j ∈ {0 ..< (?c+1)}. 1) = ?c + 1
    by auto
    finally have card (⋃ j ∈ {0 ..< (?c+1)}. ?A j) = ?c + 1

```

```

    by simp
  hence ?c + 1 ≤ ?c
    using subset card-mono fin-img
    by (metis (no-types, lifting))
  thus False
    by simp
next
  case False
  assume ¬ ?i ≤ ?c
  thus False
    using False x-V index-φ geq order-le-less-trans
    by blast
qed
thus ?thesis
  using geq leq x-V index-φ
  by simp
qed

lemma to-list-permutes-under-bij:
  fixes
    π :: 'v::linorder ⇒ 'v and
    V :: 'v set and
    p :: ('a, 'v) Profile
  assumes
    bij: bij π
  shows
    let φ = (λ i. card {v ∈ π ' V. v < π ((sorted-list-of-set V)!i)})
    in (to-list V p) = permute-list φ (to-list (π ' V) (λ x. p (the-inv π x)))
proof (cases finite V)
  case False

    hence to-list V p = []
      by simp
    moreover have to-list (π ' V) (λ x. p (the-inv π x)) = []
      proof -
        have infinite (π ' V)
          using False assms bij-betw-finite bij-betw-subset top-greatest
          by metis
        thus ?thesis
          by simp
      qed
    qed
  ultimately show ?thesis
    by simp
next
  case True
  let
    ?q = λ x. p (the-inv π x) and
    ?img = π ' V and
    ?n = length (to-list V p) and

```

```

?perm = λ i. card {v ∈ π ‘ V. v < π ((sorted-list-of-set V)!i)}

have card-eq: card ?img = card V
  using assms bij-betw-same-card bij-betw-subset top-greatest
  by metis
also have card-length-V: ?n = card V
  by simp
also have card-length-img: length (to-list ?img ?q) = card ?img
  using True
  by simp
finally have eq-length: length (to-list ?img ?q) = ?n
  by simp
show ?thesis
proof (unfold Let-def permute-list-def, rule nth-equalityI)

  show length (to-list V p) =
    length
      (map (λ i. to-list ?img ?q ! card {v ∈ ?img. v < π (sorted-list-of-set
V!i)}))
        [0 ..< length (to-list ?img ?q)])
    using eq-length
    by simp
next

fix i :: nat
assume in-bnds: i < ?n
let ?c = card {v ∈ ?img. v < π (sorted-list-of-set V!i)}
have map (λ i. (to-list ?img ?q)!?c) [0 ..< ?n]!i = p ((sorted-list-of-set V)!i)
proof -
  have ∀ v. v ∈ ?img ⟶ {v' ∈ ?img. v' < v} ⊆ ?img - {v}
    by blast
  moreover have elem-of-img: π (sorted-list-of-set V!i) ∈ ?img
    using True in-bnds image-eqI nth-mem card-length-V
      sorted-list-of-set.length-sorted-key-list-of-set
      sorted-list-of-set.set-sorted-key-list-of-set
    by metis
  ultimately have {v ∈ ?img. v < π (sorted-list-of-set V!i)}
    ⊆ ?img - {π (sorted-list-of-set V!i)}
    by simp
  hence {v ∈ ?img. v < π (sorted-list-of-set V!i)} ⊂ ?img
    using elem-of-img
    by blast
  moreover have img-card-eq-V-length: card ?img = ?n
    using card-eq card-length-V
    by presburger
  ultimately have card-in-bnds: ?c < ?n
    using True finite-imageI psubset-card-mono
    by (metis (mono-tags, lifting))
  moreover have img-list-map:

```

```

    map (λ i. to-list ?img ?q! ?c) [0 ..< ?n]!i = to-list ?img ?q! ?c
  using in-bnds
  by simp
also have img-list-card-eq-inv-img-list:
  to-list ?img ?q! ?c = ?q ((sorted-list-of-set ?img)! ?c)
  using in-bnds to-list-simp in-bnds img-card-eq-V-length card-in-bnds
  by (metis (no-types, lifting))
also have img-card-eq-img-list-i:
  (sorted-list-of-set ?img)! ?c = π (sorted-list-of-set V!i)
  using True elem-of-img sorted-list-of-set-nth-equals-card
  by blast
finally show ?thesis
  using assms bij-betw-imp-inj-on the-inv-f-f
    img-list-map img-card-eq-img-list-i
    img-list-card-eq-inv-img-list
  by metis
qed
also have to-list V p!i = p ((sorted-list-of-set V)!i)
  using True in-bnds
  by simp
finally show to-list V p!i =
  map (λ i. (to-list ?img ?q)!(card {v ∈ ?img. v < π (sorted-list-of-set V !
i)})))
    [0 ..< length (to-list ?img ?q)]!i
  using in-bnds eq-length Collect-cong card-eq
  by simp
qed
qed

```

1.4.5 Preference Counts and Comparisons

The win count for an alternative a with respect to a finite voter set V in a profile p is the amount of ballots from V in p that rank alternative a in first position. If the voter set is infinite, counting is not generally possible.

```

fun win-count :: 'v set ⇒ ('a, 'v) Profile ⇒ 'a ⇒ enat where
  win-count V p a = (if (finite V)
    then card {v ∈ V. above (p v) a = {a}} else infinity)

```

```

fun prefer-count :: 'v set ⇒ ('a, 'v) Profile ⇒ 'a ⇒ 'a ⇒ enat where
  prefer-count V p x y = (if (finite V)
    then card {v ∈ V. (let r = (p v) in (y ≤r x))} else infinity)

```

lemma *pref-count-voter-set-card*:

```

fixes
  V :: 'v set and
  p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
  a :: 'a and
  b :: 'a
assumes fin-V: finite V

```


shows $\text{prefer-count } V \ p \ a \ b \leq \text{card } V$
proof (*simp*)
have $\{v \in V. (b, a) \in p \ v\} \subseteq V$
by *simp*
hence $\text{card } \{v \in V. (b, a) \in p \ v\} \leq \text{card } V$
using *fin-V Finite-Set.card-mono*
by *metis*
thus $(\text{finite } V \longrightarrow \text{card } \{v \in V. (b, a) \in p \ v\} \leq \text{card } V) \wedge \text{finite } V$
using *fin-V*
by *simp*
qed

lemma *set-compr*:
fixes
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $f :: 'a \Rightarrow 'a \text{ set}$
shows $\{f \ x \mid x. x \in A\} = f \ ` \ A$
by *auto*

lemma *pref-count-set-compr*:
fixes
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $V :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ **and**
 $a :: 'a$
shows $\{\text{prefer-count } V \ p \ a \ a' \mid a'. a' \in A - \{a\}\} = (\text{prefer-count } V \ p \ a) \ ` \ (A - \{a\})$
by *auto*

lemma *pref-count*:
fixes
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $V :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ **and**
 $a :: 'a$ **and**
 $b :: 'a$
assumes
 $\text{prof}: \text{profile } V \ A \ p$ **and**
 $\text{fin}: \text{finite } V$ **and**
 $a\text{-in-}A: a \in A$ **and**
 $b\text{-in-}A: b \in A$ **and**
 $\text{neg}: a \neq b$
shows $\text{prefer-count } V \ p \ a \ b = \text{card } V - (\text{prefer-count } V \ p \ b \ a)$
proof –
have $\forall v \in V. \text{connex } A \ (p \ v)$
using *prof*
unfolding *profile-def*
by (*simp add: lin-ord-imp-connex*)
hence *asym*: $\forall v \in V. \neg (\text{let } r = (p \ v) \text{ in } (b \preceq_r a)) \longrightarrow (\text{let } r = (p \ v) \text{ in } (a \preceq_r$

b))
using *a-in-A b-in-A*
unfolding *connex-def*
by *metis*
have $\forall v \in V. ((b, a) \in (p \ v) \longrightarrow (a, b) \notin (p \ v))$
using *antisymD neq lin-imp-antisym prof*
unfolding *profile-def*
by *metis*
hence $\{v \in V. (\text{let } r = (p \ v) \text{ in } (b \preceq_r a))\} =$
 $V - \{v \in V. (\text{let } r = (p \ v) \text{ in } (a \preceq_r b))\}$
using *asym*
by *auto*
thus *?thesis*
by (*simp add: card-Diff-subset Collect-mono fin*)
qed

lemma *pref-count-sym*:

fixes

p :: ('a, 'v) *Profile* **and**

V :: 'v *set* **and**

a :: 'a **and**

b :: 'a **and**

c :: 'a

assumes

pref-count-ineq: *prefer-count V p a c* \geq *prefer-count V p c b* **and**

prof: *profile V A p* **and**

a-in-A: *a* $\in A$ **and**

b-in-A: *b* $\in A$ **and**

c-in-A: *c* $\in A$ **and**

a-neq-c: *a* $\neq c$ **and**

c-neq-b: *c* $\neq b$

shows *prefer-count V p b c* \geq *prefer-count V p c a*

proof (*cases*)

assume *fin-V*: *finite V*

have *nat1*: *prefer-count V p c a* $\in \mathbb{N}$

unfolding *Nats-def*

using *of-nat-eq-enat fin-V*

by *simp*

have *nat2*: *prefer-count V p b c* $\in \mathbb{N}$

unfolding *Nats-def*

using *of-nat-eq-enat fin-V*

by *simp*

have *smaller*: *prefer-count V p c a* \leq *card V*

using *prof fin-V pref-count-voter-set-card*

by *metis*

have *prefer-count V p a c* $=$ *card V* $-$ (*prefer-count V p c a*)

using *pref-count prof a-in-A c-in-A a-neq-c fin-V*

by (*metis (no-types, opaque-lifting)*)

moreover **have** *pref-count-b-eq*:

```

    prefer-count V p c b = card V - (prefer-count V p b c)
    using pref-count prof a-in-A c-in-A a-neq-c b-in-A c-neq-b fin-V
    by metis
  hence ineq: card V - (prefer-count V p b c) ≤ card V - (prefer-count V p c a)
    using calculation pref-count-ineq
    by simp
  hence card V - (prefer-count V p b c) + (prefer-count V p c a) ≤
    card V - (prefer-count V p c a) + (prefer-count V p c a)
    using pref-count-b-eq pref-count-ineq
    by auto
  hence card V + (prefer-count V p c a) ≤ card V + (prefer-count V p b c)
    using nat1 nat2 fin-V smaller
    by simp
  thus ?thesis
    by simp
next
  assume inf-V: infinite V
  have prefer-count V p c a = infinity
    using inf-V
    by simp
  moreover have prefer-count V p b c = infinity
    using inf-V
    by simp
  thus ?thesis
    by simp
qed

lemma empty-prof-imp-zero-pref-count:
  fixes
    p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    V :: 'v set and
    a :: 'a and
    b :: 'a
  assumes V = {}
  shows prefer-count V p a b = 0
  unfolding zero-enat-def
  using assms
  by simp

fun wins :: 'v set ⇒ 'a ⇒ ('a, 'v) Profile ⇒ 'a ⇒ bool where
  wins V a p b =
    (prefer-count V p a b > prefer-count V p b a)

lemma wins-inf-voters:
  fixes
    p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    a :: 'a and

```

```

    b :: 'a and
    V :: 'v set
  assumes infinite V
  shows wins V b p a = False
  using assms
  by simp

```

Alternative a wins against b implies that b does not win against a.

```

lemma wins-antisym:
  fixes
    p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    a :: 'a and
    b :: 'a and
    V :: 'v set
  assumes wins V a p b
  shows  $\neg$  wins V b p a
  using assms
  by simp

```

```

lemma wins-irreflex:
  fixes
    p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    a :: 'a and
    V :: 'v set
  shows  $\neg$  wins V a p a
  using wins-antisym
  by metis

```

1.4.6 Condorcet Winner

```

fun condorcet-winner :: 'v set  $\Rightarrow$  'a set  $\Rightarrow$  ('a, 'v) Profile  $\Rightarrow$  'a  $\Rightarrow$  bool where
  condorcet-winner V A p a =
    (finite-profile V A p  $\wedge$  a  $\in$  A  $\wedge$  ( $\forall$  x  $\in$  A - {a}. wins V a p x))

```

```

lemma cond-winner-unique-eq:
  fixes
    V :: 'v set and
    A :: 'a set and
    p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    a :: 'a and
    b :: 'a
  assumes
    condorcet-winner V A p a and
    condorcet-winner V A p b
  shows b = a
proof (rule ccontr)
  assume b-neq-a: b  $\neq$  a
  have wins V b p a

```

```

    using b-neq-a insert-Diff insert-iff assms
  by simp
hence  $\neg \text{wins } V a p b$ 
  by (simp add: wins-antisym)
moreover have a-wins-against-b:  $\text{wins } V a p b$ 
  using Diff-iff b-neq-a singletonD assms
  by auto
ultimately show False
  by simp
qed

lemma cond-winner-unique:
  fixes
    A :: 'a set and
    p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    a :: 'a
  assumes condorcet-winner V A p a
  shows  $\{a' \in A. \text{condorcet-winner } V A p a'\} = \{a\}$ 
proof (safe)
  fix a' :: 'a
  assume condorcet-winner V A p a'
  thus a' = a
    using assms cond-winner-unique-eq
    by metis
next
  show  $a \in A$ 
    using assms
    unfolding condorcet-winner.simps
    by (metis (no-types))
next
  show condorcet-winner V A p a
    using assms
    by presburger
qed

lemma cond-winner-unique-2:
  fixes
    V :: 'v set and
    A :: 'a set and
    p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    a :: 'a and
    b :: 'a
  assumes
    condorcet-winner V A p a and
     $b \neq a$ 
  shows  $\neg \text{condorcet-winner } V A p b$ 
  using cond-winner-unique-eq assms
  by metis

```

1.4.7 Limited Profile

This function restricts a profile p to a set A of alternatives and a set V of voters s.t. voters outside of V do not have any preferences or do not cast a vote. This keeps all of A 's preferences.

fun *limit-profile* :: 'a set \Rightarrow ('a, 'v) Profile \Rightarrow ('a, 'v) Profile **where**
limit-profile A p = (λ v. *limit* A (p v))

lemma *limit-prof-trans*:

fixes

A :: 'a set **and**

B :: 'a set **and**

C :: 'a set **and**

p :: ('a, 'v) Profile

assumes

B \subseteq A **and**

C \subseteq B

shows *limit-profile* C p = *limit-profile* C (*limit-profile* B p)

using *assms*

by *auto*

lemma *limit-profile-sound*:

fixes

A :: 'a set **and**

B :: 'a set **and**

V :: 'v set **and**

p :: ('a, 'v) Profile

assumes

profile: *profile* V B p **and**

subset: A \subseteq B

shows *profile* V A (*limit-profile* A p)

proof –

have $\forall v \in V. \text{linear-order-on } A (\text{limit } A (p v))$

using *profile subset limit-presv-lin-ord*

unfolding *profile-def*

by *metis*

hence $\forall v \in V. \text{linear-order-on } A ((\text{limit-profile } A p) v)$

by *simp*

thus *?thesis*

unfolding *profile-def*

by *simp*

qed

1.4.8 Lifting Property

definition *equiv-prof-except-a* :: 'v set \Rightarrow 'a set \Rightarrow ('a, 'v) Profile \Rightarrow
('a, 'v) Profile \Rightarrow 'a \Rightarrow bool **where**
equiv-prof-except-a V A p p' a \equiv
profile V A p \wedge *profile* V A p' \wedge a \in A \wedge

$$(\forall v \in V. \text{equiv-rel-except-a } A (p v) (p' v) a)$$

An alternative gets lifted from one profile to another iff its ranking increases in at least one ballot, and nothing else changes.

definition *lifted* :: 'v set \Rightarrow 'a set \Rightarrow ('a, 'v) Profile \Rightarrow ('a, 'v) Profile \Rightarrow 'a \Rightarrow bool **where**

lifted V A p p' a \equiv
 finite-profile V A p \wedge finite-profile V A p' \wedge a \in A
 \wedge ($\forall v \in V. \neg \text{Preference-Relation.lifted } A (p v) (p' v) a \longrightarrow (p v) = (p' v)$)
 \wedge ($\exists v \in V. \text{Preference-Relation.lifted } A (p v) (p' v) a$)

lemma *lifted-imp-equiv-prof-except-a*:

fixes

A :: 'a set **and**

V :: 'v set **and**

p :: ('a, 'v) Profile **and**

p' :: ('a, 'v) Profile **and**

a :: 'a

assumes *lifted* V A p p' a

shows *equiv-prof-except-a* V A p p' a

proof (*unfold equiv-prof-except-a-def, safe*)

from *assms*

show *profile* V A p

unfolding *lifted-def*

by *metis*

next

from *assms*

show *profile* V A p'

unfolding *lifted-def*

by *metis*

next

from *assms*

show a \in A

unfolding *lifted-def*

by *metis*

next

fix v :: 'v

assume v \in V

with *assms*

show *equiv-rel-except-a* A (p v) (p' v) a

using *lifted-imp-equiv-rel-except-a trivial-equiv-rel*

unfolding *lifted-def profile-def*

by (*metis (no-types)*)

qed

lemma *negl-diff-imp-eq-limit-prof*:

fixes

A :: 'a set **and**

```

  A' :: 'a set and
  V :: 'v set and
  p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
  p' :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
  a :: 'a
assumes
  change: equiv-prof-except-a V A' p q a and
  subset: A ⊆ A' and
  not-in-A: a ∉ A
shows ∀ v ∈ V. (limit-profile A p) v = (limit-profile A q) v
proof (clarify)
  fix
    v :: 'v
  assume v ∈ V
  hence equiv-rel-except-a A' (p v) (q v) a
    using change equiv-prof-except-a-def
    by metis
  hence limit A (p v) = limit A (q v)
    using not-in-A negl-diff-imp-eq-limit subset
    by metis
  thus limit-profile A p v = limit-profile A q v
    by simp
qed

lemma limit-prof-eq-or-lifted:
  fixes
    A :: 'a set and
    A' :: 'a set and
    V :: 'v set and
    p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    p' :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    a :: 'a
  assumes
    lifted-a: lifted V A' p p' a and
    subset: A ⊆ A'
  shows (∀ v ∈ V. limit-profile A p v = limit-profile A p' v) ∨
    lifted V A (limit-profile A p) (limit-profile A p') a
proof (cases)
  assume a-in-A: a ∈ A
  have ∀ v ∈ V. (Preference-Relation.lifted A' (p v) (p' v) a ∨ (p v) = (p' v))
    using lifted-a
    unfolding lifted-def
    by metis
  hence one:
    ∀ v ∈ V.
      (Preference-Relation.lifted A (limit A (p v)) (limit A (p' v)) a ∨
       (limit A (p v)) = (limit A (p' v)))
    using limit-lifted-imp-eq-or-lifted subset
    by metis

```



```

thus ?thesis
proof (cases)
  assume  $\forall v \in V. (\text{limit } A (p \ v)) = (\text{limit } A (p' \ v))$ 
  thus ?thesis
  by simp
next
  assume forall-limit-p-q:
     $\neg (\forall v \in V. (\text{limit } A (p \ v)) = (\text{limit } A (p' \ v)))$ 
  let ?p = limit-profile A p
  let ?q = limit-profile A p'
  have profile V A ?p  $\wedge$  profile V A ?q
    using lifted-a limit-profile-sound subset
    unfolding lifted-def
    by metis
  moreover have
     $\exists v \in V. \text{Preference-Relation.lifted } A ( ?p \ v) ( ?q \ v) \ a$ 
    using forall-limit-p-q lifted-a limit-profile.simps one
    unfolding lifted-def
    by (metis (no-types, lifting))
  moreover have
     $\forall v \in V. (\neg \text{Preference-Relation.lifted } A ( ?p \ v) ( ?q \ v) \ a) \longrightarrow ( ?p \ v) = ( ?q \ v)$ 
    using lifted-a limit-profile.simps one
    unfolding lifted-def
    by metis
  ultimately have lifted V A ?p ?q a
    using a-in-A lifted-a rev-finite-subset subset
    unfolding lifted-def
    by (metis (no-types, lifting))
  thus ?thesis
  by simp
qed
next
  assume  $a \notin A$ 
  thus ?thesis
    using lifted-a negl-diff-imp-eq-limit-prof subset lifted-imp-equiv-prof-except-a
    by metis
qed

end

```

1.5 Social Choice Result

```

theory Social-Choice-Result
  imports Result
begin

```

1.5.1 Social Choice Result

A social choice result contains three sets of alternatives: elected, rejected, and deferred alternatives.

```
fun well-formed-social-choice :: 'a set  $\Rightarrow$  'a Result  $\Rightarrow$  bool where
  well-formed-social-choice A res = (disjoint3 res  $\wedge$  set-equals-partition A res)
```

```
fun limit-set-social-choice :: 'a set  $\Rightarrow$  'a set  $\Rightarrow$  'a set where
  limit-set-social-choice A r = A  $\cap$  r
```

1.5.2 Auxiliary Lemmas

lemma *result-imp-rej*:

```
fixes
  A :: 'a set and
  e :: 'a set and
  r :: 'a set and
  d :: 'a set
assumes well-formed-social-choice A (e, r, d)
shows A - (e  $\cup$  d) = r
proof (safe)
  fix a :: 'a
  assume
    a  $\in$  A and
    a  $\notin$  r and
    a  $\notin$  d
  moreover have (e  $\cap$  r = {})  $\wedge$  (e  $\cap$  d = {})  $\wedge$  (r  $\cap$  d = {})  $\wedge$  (e  $\cup$  r  $\cup$  d =
A)
    using assms
    by simp
  ultimately show a  $\in$  e
    by blast
next
  fix a :: 'a
  assume a  $\in$  r
  moreover have (e  $\cap$  r = {})  $\wedge$  (e  $\cap$  d = {})  $\wedge$  (r  $\cap$  d = {})  $\wedge$  (e  $\cup$  r  $\cup$  d =
A)
    using assms
    by simp
  ultimately show a  $\in$  A
    by blast
next
  fix a :: 'a
  assume
    a  $\in$  r and
    a  $\in$  e
  moreover have (e  $\cap$  r = {})  $\wedge$  (e  $\cap$  d = {})  $\wedge$  (r  $\cap$  d = {})  $\wedge$  (e  $\cup$  r  $\cup$  d =
A)
    using assms
```

```

    by simp
  ultimately show False
    by auto
next
  fix a :: 'a
  assume
    a ∈ r and
    a ∈ d
  moreover have (e ∩ r = {}) ∧ (e ∩ d = {}) ∧ (r ∩ d = {}) ∧ (e ∪ r ∪ d =
A)
    using assms
  by simp
  ultimately show False
    by blast
qed

```

lemma *result-count*:

```

  fixes
    A :: 'a set and
    e :: 'a set and
    r :: 'a set and
    d :: 'a set
  assumes
    wf-result: well-formed-social-choice A (e, r, d) and
    fin-A: finite A
  shows card A = card e + card r + card d
proof -
  have e ∪ r ∪ d = A
    using wf-result
  by simp
  moreover have (e ∩ r = {}) ∧ (e ∩ d = {}) ∧ (r ∩ d = {})
    using wf-result
  by simp
  ultimately show ?thesis
    using fin-A Int-Un-distrib2 finite-Un card-Un-disjoint sup-bot.right-neutral
  by metis
qed

```

lemma *defer-subset*:

```

  fixes
    A :: 'a set and
    r :: 'a Result
  assumes well-formed-social-choice A r
  shows defer-r r ⊆ A
proof (safe)
  fix a :: 'a
  assume a ∈ defer-r r
  moreover obtain
    f :: 'a Result ⇒ 'a set ⇒ 'a set and

```

```

  g :: 'a Result  $\Rightarrow$  'a set  $\Rightarrow$  'a Result where
  A = f r A  $\wedge$  r = g r A  $\wedge$  disjoint3 (g r A)  $\wedge$  set-equals-partition (f r A) (g r A)
using assms
by simp
moreover have  $\forall p. \exists e r d. \text{set-equals-partition } A p \longrightarrow (e, r, d) = p \wedge e \cup$ 
r  $\cup d = A$ 
by simp
ultimately show  $a \in A$ 
using UnCI snd-conv
by metis
qed

```

lemma *elect-subset*:

```

fixes
  A :: 'a set and
  r :: 'a Result
assumes well-formed-social-choice A r
shows elect-r r  $\subseteq$  A
proof (safe)
fix a :: 'a
assume  $a \in \text{elect-r } r$ 
moreover obtain
  f :: 'a Result  $\Rightarrow$  'a set  $\Rightarrow$  'a set and
  g :: 'a Result  $\Rightarrow$  'a set  $\Rightarrow$  'a Result where
  A = f r A  $\wedge$  r = g r A  $\wedge$  disjoint3 (g r A)  $\wedge$  set-equals-partition (f r A) (g r A)
using assms
by simp
moreover have
 $\forall p. \exists e r d. \text{set-equals-partition } A p \longrightarrow (e, r, d) = p \wedge e \cup r \cup d = A$ 
by simp
ultimately show  $a \in A$ 
using UnCI assms fst-conv
by metis
qed

```

lemma *reject-subset*:

```

fixes
  A :: 'a set and
  r :: 'a Result
assumes well-formed-social-choice A r
shows reject-r r  $\subseteq$  A
proof (safe)
fix a :: 'a
assume  $a \in \text{reject-r } r$ 
moreover obtain
  f :: 'a Result  $\Rightarrow$  'a set  $\Rightarrow$  'a set and
  g :: 'a Result  $\Rightarrow$  'a set  $\Rightarrow$  'a Result where
  A = f r A  $\wedge$  r = g r A  $\wedge$  disjoint3 (g r A)  $\wedge$  set-equals-partition (f r A) (g r A)
using assms

```

```

    by simp
  moreover have
     $\forall p. \exists e r d. \text{set-equals-partition } A \ p \longrightarrow (e, r, d) = p \wedge e \cup r \cup d = A$ 
    by simp
  ultimately show  $a \in A$ 
    using UnCI assms fst-conv snd-conv disjoint3.cases
    by metis
qed
end

```

1.6 Social Welfare Result

```

theory Social-Welfare-Result
  imports Result
           Preference-Relation
begin

```

1.6.1 Social Welfare Result

A social welfare result contains three sets of relations: elected, rejected, and deferred A well-formed social welfare result consists only of linear orders on the alternatives.

```

fun well-formed-welfare :: 'a set  $\Rightarrow$  ('a Preference-Relation) Result  $\Rightarrow$  bool where
  well-formed-welfare A res = (disjoint3 res  $\wedge$ 
                                set-equals-partition {r. linear-order-on A r} res)

```

```

fun limit-set-welfare ::
  'a set  $\Rightarrow$  ('a Preference-Relation) set  $\Rightarrow$  ('a Preference-Relation) set where
  limit-set-welfare A res = {limit A r | r. r  $\in$  res  $\wedge$  linear-order-on A (limit A r)}

end

```

1.7 Specific Electoral Result Types

```

theory Result-Interpretations
  imports Social-Choice-Result
           Social-Welfare-Result
           Collections.Locale-Code
begin

```

Interpretations of the result locale are placed inside a Locale-Code block in order to enable code generation of later definitions in the locale. Those definitions need to be added via a Locale-Code block as well.

setup *Locale-Code.open-block*

global-interpretation *social-choice-result:*

result well-formed-social-choice limit-set-social-choice

proof (*unfold-locales, auto*) **qed**

global-interpretation *committee-result:*

result $\lambda A r. \text{set-equals-partition } (\text{Pow } A) r \wedge \text{disjoint3 } r \lambda A rs. \{r \cap A \mid r. r \in rs\}$

proof (*unfold-locales, safe, auto*) **qed**

global-interpretation *social-welfare-result:*

result well-formed-welfare limit-set-welfare

proof (*unfold-locales, safe*)

fix

A :: 'a set **and**

e :: ('a Preference-Relation) set **and**

r :: ('a Preference-Relation) set **and**

d :: ('a Preference-Relation) set

assume

partition: set-equals-partition (limit-set-welfare A UNIV) (e, r, d) and

disj: disjoint3 (e, r, d)

have *limit-set-welfare A UNIV =*

{limit A r' | r'. r' ∈ UNIV ∧ linear-order-on A (limit A r')}

by *simp*

also have *... = {limit A r' | r'. r' ∈ UNIV} ∩*

{limit A r' | r'. linear-order-on A (limit A r')}

by *blast*

also have *... = {limit A r' | r'. linear-order-on A (limit A r')}*

by *blast*

also have *... = {r'. linear-order-on A r'}*

proof (*safe*)

fix

r' :: 'a Preference-Relation

assume

lin-ord: linear-order-on A r'

hence $\forall a b. (a, b) \in r' \longrightarrow (a, b) \in \text{limit } A r'$

unfolding *linear-order-on-def partial-order-on-def preorder-on-def refl-on-def*

by *fastforce*

hence $r' \subseteq \text{limit } A r'$

by *fastforce*

moreover have $\text{limit } A r' \subseteq r'$

by *fastforce*

ultimately have $r' = \text{limit } A r'$

by *simp*

thus $\exists x. r' = \text{limit } A x \wedge \text{linear-order-on } A (\text{limit } A x)$

using *lin-ord*

by *metis*

qed

```

thus well-formed-welfare  $A (e, r, d)$ 
  using partition disj
  by simp
qed

setup Locale-Code.close-block

end

```

1.8 Function Symmetry Properties

```

theory Symmetry-Of-Functions
  imports HOL-Algebra.Group-Action
           HOL-Algebra.Generated-Groups
begin

```

1.8.1 Functions

```

type-synonym ('x, 'y) binary-fun = 'x  $\Rightarrow$  'y  $\Rightarrow$  'y

```

```

fun extensional-continuation :: ('x  $\Rightarrow$  'y)  $\Rightarrow$  'x set  $\Rightarrow$  ('x  $\Rightarrow$  'y) where
  extensional-continuation f s = ( $\lambda x.$  if ( $x \in s$ ) then (f x) else undefined)

```

```

fun preimg :: ('x  $\Rightarrow$  'y)  $\Rightarrow$  'x set  $\Rightarrow$  'y  $\Rightarrow$  'x set where
  preimg f s x = {x'  $\in$  s. f x' = x}

```

Relations

```

fun restr-rel :: 'x rel  $\Rightarrow$  'x set  $\Rightarrow$  'x set  $\Rightarrow$  'x rel where
  restr-rel r s s' = r  $\cap$  s  $\times$  s'

```

```

fun closed-under-restr-rel :: 'x rel  $\Rightarrow$  'x set  $\Rightarrow$  'x set  $\Rightarrow$  bool where
  closed-under-restr-rel r s t = ((restr-rel r t s) “ t  $\subseteq$  t)

```

```

fun rel-induced-by-action :: 'x set  $\Rightarrow$  'y set  $\Rightarrow$  ('x, 'y) binary-fun  $\Rightarrow$  'y rel where
  rel-induced-by-action s t  $\varphi$  = {(y, y')  $\in$  t  $\times$  t.  $\exists x \in s. \varphi x y = y'$ }

```

```

fun product-rel :: 'x rel  $\Rightarrow$  ('x * 'x) rel where
  product-rel r = {(p, p'). (fst p, fst p')  $\in$  r  $\wedge$  (snd p, snd p')  $\in$  r}

```

```

fun equivariance-rel :: 'x set  $\Rightarrow$  'y set  $\Rightarrow$  ('x, 'y) binary-fun  $\Rightarrow$  ('y * 'y) rel where
  equivariance-rel s t  $\varphi$  = {((u, v), (x, y)). (u, v)  $\in$  t  $\times$  t  $\wedge$  ( $\exists z \in s. x = \varphi z u$ 
 $\wedge y = \varphi z v$ )}

```

```

fun set-closed-under-rel :: 'x set  $\Rightarrow$  'x rel  $\Rightarrow$  bool where
  set-closed-under-rel s r = ( $\forall x y. (x, y) \in r \longrightarrow x \in s \longrightarrow y \in s$ )

```

```

fun singleton-set-system :: 'x set  $\Rightarrow$  'x set set where

```

singleton-set-system $s = \{\{x\} \mid x. x \in s\}$

fun *set-action* :: ('x, 'r) *binary-fun* \Rightarrow ('x, 'r *set*) *binary-fun* **where**
set-action ψ $x = \text{image } (\psi \ x)$

1.8.2 Invariance and Equivariance

Invariance and equivariance are symmetry properties of functions: Invariance means that related preimages have identical images and equivariance denotes consistent changes.

datatype ('x, 'y) *property* =
Invariance 'x *rel* |
Equivariance 'x *set* (('x \Rightarrow 'x) \times ('y \Rightarrow 'y)) *set*

fun *satisfies* :: ('x \Rightarrow 'y) \Rightarrow ('x, 'y) *property* \Rightarrow *bool* **where**
satisfies f (*Invariance* r) = ($\forall x. \forall y. (x, y) \in r \longrightarrow f \ x = f \ y$) |
satisfies f (*Equivariance* $s \ \tau$) = ($\forall (\varphi, \psi) \in \tau. \forall x \in s. \varphi \ x \in s \longrightarrow f \ (\varphi \ x) = \psi \ (f \ x)$)

definition *equivar-ind-by-act* :: 'z *set* \Rightarrow 'x *set* \Rightarrow ('z, 'x) *binary-fun*
 \Rightarrow ('z, 'y) *binary-fun* \Rightarrow ('x, 'y) *property* **where**
equivar-ind-by-act $s \ t \ \varphi \ \psi = \text{Equivariance } t \ \{(\varphi \ x, \psi \ x) \mid x. x \in s\}$

1.8.3 Auxiliary Lemmas

lemma *inj-imp-inj-on-set-system*:

fixes $f :: 'x \Rightarrow 'y$
assumes *inj* f
shows *inj* $(\lambda s. \{f \ 'x \mid x. x \in s\})$

proof (*unfold inj-def, safe*)

fix

$s :: 'x \text{ set set}$ **and**
 $t :: 'x \text{ set set}$ **and**
 $x :: 'x \text{ set}$

assume *f-elem-s-eq-f-elem-t*: $\{f \ 'x' \mid x'. x' \in s\} = \{f \ 'x' \mid x'. x' \in t\}$

then obtain $y :: 'x \text{ set}$ **where**

$f \ 'y = f \ 'x$

by *metis*

hence *y-eq-x*: $y = x$

using *image-inv-f-f assms*

by *metis*

moreover have

$x \in t \longrightarrow f \ 'x \in \{f \ 'x' \mid x'. x' \in s\}$ **and**

$x \in s \longrightarrow f \ 'x \in \{f \ 'x' \mid x'. x' \in t\}$

using *f-elem-s-eq-f-elem-t*

by *auto*

ultimately have $x \in t \longrightarrow y \in s$ **and** $x \in s \longrightarrow y \in t$

using *assms*

by (*simp add: inj-image-eq-iff, simp add: inj-image-eq-iff*)

thus $x \in t \implies x \in s$ and $x \in s \implies x \in t$
 using *y-eq-x*
 by (*simp*, *simp*)
 qed

lemma *inj-and-surj-imp-surj-on-set-system*:
 fixes $f :: 'x \Rightarrow 'y$
 assumes
 inj f and
 surj f
 shows *surj* $(\lambda s. \{f \text{ ` } x \mid x. x \in s\})$
proof (*unfold surj-def*, *safe*)
 fix $s :: 'y \text{ set set}$
 have $\forall x. f \text{ ` } (the\text{-}inv\ f) \text{ ` } x = x$
 using *image-f-inv-f* *assms* *surj-imp-inv-eq* *the-inv-f-f*
 by (*metis* (*no-types*, *opaque-lifting*))
 hence $s = \{f \text{ ` } (the\text{-}inv\ f) \text{ ` } x \mid x. x \in s\}$
 by *simp*
 also have $\{f \text{ ` } (the\text{-}inv\ f) \text{ ` } x \mid x. x \in s\} =$
 $\{f \text{ ` } x \mid x. x \in \{(the\text{-}inv\ f) \text{ ` } x \mid x. x \in s\}\}$
 by *blast*
 finally show $\exists t. s = \{f \text{ ` } x \mid x. x \in t\}$
 by *blast*
 qed

lemma *bij-imp-bij-on-set-system*:
 fixes $f :: 'x \Rightarrow 'y$
 assumes *bij* f
 shows *bij* $(\lambda s. \{f \text{ ` } x \mid x. x \in s\})$
proof (*unfold bij-def*)
 have *range* $f = UNIV$
 using *assms*
 unfolding *bij-betw-def*
 by *safe*
 moreover have *inj* f
 using *assms*
 unfolding *bij-betw-def*
 by *safe*
 ultimately show *inj* $(\lambda s. \{f \text{ ` } x \mid x. x \in s\}) \wedge$ *surj* $(\lambda s. \{f \text{ ` } x \mid x. x \in s\})$
 using *inj-imp-inj-on-set-system*
 by (*simp* *add*: *inj-and-surj-imp-surj-on-set-system*)
 qed

lemma *un-left-inv-singleton-set-system*: $\bigcup \circ singleton\text{-}set\text{-}system = id$
proof
 fix $s :: 'x \text{ set}$
 have $(\bigcup \circ singleton\text{-}set\text{-}system) s = \{x. \exists s' \in singleton\text{-}set\text{-}system\ s. x \in s'\}$
 by *auto*
 also have $\{x. \exists s' \in singleton\text{-}set\text{-}system\ s. x \in s'\} = \{x. \{x\} \in singleton\text{-}set\text{-}system\}$

$s\}$
 by *auto*
 also have $\{x. \{x\} \in \text{singleton-set-system } s\} = \{x. \{x\} \in \{\{x\} \mid x. x \in s\}\}$
 by *simp*
 finally show $(\bigcup \circ \text{singleton-set-system}) s = \text{id } s$
 by *simp*
 qed

lemma *the-inv-comp:*

fixes
 $f :: 'y \Rightarrow 'z$ and
 $g :: 'x \Rightarrow 'y$ and
 $s :: 'x \text{ set}$ and
 $t :: 'y \text{ set}$ and
 $u :: 'z \text{ set}$ and
 $x :: 'z$
 assumes
 $\text{bij-betw } f \ t \ u$ and
 $\text{bij-betw } g \ s \ t$ and
 $x \in u$
 shows $\text{the-inv-into } s \ (f \circ g) \ x = ((\text{the-inv-into } s \ g) \circ (\text{the-inv-into } t \ f)) \ x$
proof (*clarsimp*)
 have $\text{el-}Y: \text{the-inv-into } t \ f \ x \in t$
 using *assms* *bij-betw-apply* *bij-betw-the-inv-into*
 by *metis*
 hence $g \ (\text{the-inv-into } s \ g \ (\text{the-inv-into } t \ f \ x)) = \text{the-inv-into } t \ f \ x$
 using *assms* *f-the-inv-into-f-bij-betw*
 by *metis*
 moreover have $f \ (\text{the-inv-into } t \ f \ x) = x$
 using *el-Y* *assms* *f-the-inv-into-f-bij-betw*
 by *metis*
 ultimately have $(f \circ g) \ (\text{the-inv-into } s \ g \ (\text{the-inv-into } t \ f \ x)) = x$
 by *simp*
 hence $\text{the-inv-into } s \ (f \circ g) \ x =$
 $\text{the-inv-into } s \ (f \circ g) \ ((f \circ g) \ (\text{the-inv-into } s \ g \ (\text{the-inv-into } t \ f \ x)))$
 by *presburger*
 also have
 $\text{the-inv-into } s \ (f \circ g) \ ((f \circ g) \ (\text{the-inv-into } s \ g \ (\text{the-inv-into } t \ f \ x))) =$
 $\text{the-inv-into } s \ g \ (\text{the-inv-into } t \ f \ x)$
 using *assms* *bij-betw-apply* *bij-betw-imp-inj-on* *bij-betw-the-inv-into* *bij-betw-trans*
 the-inv-into-f-eq
 by (*metis* (*no-types*, *lifting*))
 finally show $\text{the-inv-into } s \ (f \circ g) \ x = \text{the-inv-into } s \ g \ (\text{the-inv-into } t \ f \ x)$
 by *blast*
 qed

lemma *preimg-comp:*

fixes
 $f :: 'x \Rightarrow 'y$ and

```

    g :: 'x ⇒ 'x and
    s :: 'x set and
    x :: 'y
  shows preimg f (g ' s) x = g ' preimg (f ∘ g) s x
proof (safe)
  fix y :: 'x
  assume y ∈ preimg f (g ' s) x
  then obtain z :: 'x where
    g z = y and
    z ∈ preimg (f ∘ g) s x
  unfolding comp-def
  by fastforce
  thus y ∈ g ' preimg (f ∘ g) s x
  by blast
next
  fix y :: 'x
  assume y ∈ preimg (f ∘ g) s x
  thus g y ∈ preimg f (g ' s) x
  by simp
qed

```

1.8.4 Rewrite Rules

```

theorem rewrite-invar-as-equivar:
  fixes
    f :: 'x ⇒ 'y and
    s :: 'x set and
    t :: 'z set and
    φ :: ('z, 'x) binary-fun
  shows satisfies f (Invariance (rel-induced-by-action t s φ)) =
    satisfies f (equivar-ind-by-act t s φ (λ g. id))
proof (unfold equivar-ind-by-act-def, simp, safe)
  fix
    x :: 'x and
    y :: 'z
  assume
    x ∈ s and
    y ∈ t and
    φ y x ∈ s
  thus
    (∀ x' y'. x' ∈ s ∧ y' ∈ s ∧ (∃ z ∈ t. φ z x' = y') ⟶ f x' = f y')
      ⟹ (f (φ y x) = id (f x)) and
    (∀ x' y'. (∃ z. x' = φ z ∧ y' = id ∧ z ∈ t) ⟶
      (∀ z ∈ s. x' z ∈ s ⟶ f (x' z) = y' (f z)))
      ⟹ (f x = f (φ y x))
  unfolding id-def
  by (metis, metis)
qed

```

```

lemma rewrite-invar-ind-by-act:
  fixes
     $f :: 'x \Rightarrow 'y$  and
     $s :: 'z \text{ set}$  and
     $t :: 'x \text{ set}$  and
     $\varphi :: ('z, 'x) \text{ binary-fun}$ 
  shows satisfies  $f$  (Invariance (rel-induced-by-action  $s$   $t$   $\varphi$ )) =
     $(\forall x \in s. \forall y \in t. \varphi x y \in t \longrightarrow f y = f (\varphi x y))$ 
proof (safe)
  fix
     $y :: 'x$  and
     $x :: 'z$ 
  assume
    satisfies  $f$  (Invariance (rel-induced-by-action  $s$   $t$   $\varphi$ )) and
     $y \in t$  and
     $x \in s$  and
     $\varphi x y \in t$ 
  moreover from this have  $(y, \varphi x y) \in \text{rel-induced-by-action } s \ t \ \varphi$ 
  unfolding rel-induced-by-action.simps
  by blast
  ultimately show  $f y = f (\varphi x y)$ 
  by simp
next
  assume  $\forall x \in s. \forall y \in t. \varphi x y \in t \longrightarrow f y = f (\varphi x y)$ 
  moreover have
     $\forall (x, y) \in \text{rel-induced-by-action } s \ t \ \varphi. x \in t \wedge y \in t \wedge (\exists z \in s. y = \varphi z x)$ 
  by auto
  ultimately show satisfies  $f$  (Invariance (rel-induced-by-action  $s$   $t$   $\varphi$ ))
  by auto
qed

lemma rewrite-equivar-ind-by-act:
  fixes
     $f :: 'x \Rightarrow 'y$  and
     $s :: 'z \text{ set}$  and
     $t :: 'x \text{ set}$  and
     $\varphi :: ('z, 'x) \text{ binary-fun}$  and
     $\psi :: ('z, 'y) \text{ binary-fun}$ 
  shows satisfies  $f$  (equivar-ind-by-act  $s$   $t$   $\varphi$   $\psi$ ) =
     $(\forall x \in s. \forall y \in t. \varphi x y \in t \longrightarrow f (\varphi x y) = \psi x (f y))$ 
  unfolding equivar-ind-by-act-def
  by auto

lemma rewrite-group-act-img:
  fixes
     $m :: 'x \text{ monoid}$  and
     $s :: 'y \text{ set}$  and
     $\varphi :: ('x, 'y) \text{ binary-fun}$  and
     $t :: 'y \text{ set}$  and

```

```

  x :: 'x and
  y :: 'x
assumes
  t ⊆ s and
  x ∈ carrier m and
  y ∈ carrier m and
  group-action m s φ
shows φ (x ⊗ m y) ' t = φ x ' φ y ' t
proof (safe)
  fix z :: 'y
  assume z-in-t: z ∈ t
  hence φ (x ⊗ m y) z = φ x (φ y z)
    using assms group-action.composition-rule[of m s]
    by blast
  thus
    φ (x ⊗ m y) z ∈ φ x ' φ y ' t and
    φ x (φ y z) ∈ φ (x ⊗ m y) ' t
    using z-in-t
    by (blast, force)
qed

```

```

lemma rewrite-carrier: carrier (BijGroup UNIV) = {f'. bij f'}
  unfolding BijGroup-def Bij-def
  by simp

```

```

lemma universal-set-carrier-imp-bij-group:
  fixes f :: 'a ⇒ 'a
  assumes f ∈ carrier (BijGroup UNIV)
  shows bij f
  using rewrite-carrier assms
  by blast

```

```

lemma rewrite-sym-group:
  fixes
    f :: 'a ⇒ 'a and
    g :: 'a ⇒ 'a and
    s :: 'a set
  assumes
    f-carrier: f ∈ carrier (BijGroup s) and
    g-carrier: g ∈ carrier (BijGroup s)
  shows
    rewrite-mult: f ⊗ BijGroup s g = extensional-continuation (f ∘ g) s and
    rewrite-mult-univ: s = UNIV ⟶ f ⊗ BijGroup s g = f ∘ g
  proof -
    show f ⊗ BijGroup s g = extensional-continuation (f ∘ g) s
      using f-carrier g-carrier
      unfolding BijGroup-def compose-def comp-def restrict-def
      by simp
  next

```

```

show  $s = UNIV \longrightarrow f \otimes BijGroup\ s\ g = f \circ g$ 
  using f-carrier g-carrier
  unfolding BijGroup-def compose-def comp-def restrict-def
  by fastforce
qed

lemma simp-extensional-univ:
  fixes  $f :: 'a \Rightarrow 'b$ 
  shows extensional-continuation f UNIV = f
  unfolding If-def
  by simp

lemma extensional-continuation-subset:
  fixes
     $f :: 'a \Rightarrow 'b$  and
     $s :: 'a\ set$  and
     $t :: 'a\ set$  and
     $x :: 'a$ 
  assumes
     $t \subseteq s$  and
     $x \in t$ 
  shows extensional-continuation f s x = extensional-continuation f t x
  using assms
  unfolding subset-iff
  by simp

lemma rel-ind-by-coinciding-action-on-subset-eq-restr:
  fixes
     $\varphi :: ('a, 'b)\ binary\_fun$  and
     $\psi :: ('a, 'b)\ binary\_fun$  and
     $s :: 'a\ set$  and
     $t :: 'b\ set$  and
     $u :: 'b\ set$ 
  assumes
     $u \subseteq t$  and
     $\forall x \in s. \forall y \in u. \psi\ x\ y = \varphi\ x\ y$ 
  shows rel-induced-by-action s u  $\psi$  = Restr (rel-induced-by-action s t  $\varphi$ ) u
proof (unfold rel-induced-by-action.simps)
  have  $\{(x, y). (x, y) \in u \times u \wedge (\exists z \in s. \psi\ z\ x = y)\}$ 
     $= \{(x, y). (x, y) \in u \times u \wedge (\exists z \in s. \varphi\ z\ x = y)\}$ 
  using assms
  by auto
  also have  $\dots = Restr\ \{(x, y). (x, y) \in t \times t \wedge (\exists z \in s. \varphi\ z\ x = y)\}\ u$ 
  using assms
  by blast
  finally show  $\{(x, y). (x, y) \in u \times u \wedge (\exists z \in s. \psi\ z\ x = y)\} =$ 
     $Restr\ \{(x, y). (x, y) \in t \times t \wedge (\exists z \in s. \varphi\ z\ x = y)\}\ u$ 
  by simp
qed

```

```

lemma coinciding-actions-ind-equal-rel:
  fixes
     $s :: 'x \text{ set}$  and
     $t :: 'y \text{ set}$  and
     $\varphi :: ('x, 'y) \text{ binary-fun}$  and
     $\psi :: ('x, 'y) \text{ binary-fun}$ 
  assumes  $\forall x \in s. \forall y \in t. \varphi x y = \psi x y$ 
  shows rel-induced-by-action s t  $\varphi$  = rel-induced-by-action s t  $\psi$ 
  unfolding extensional-continuation.simps
  using assms
  by auto

```

1.8.5 Group Actions

```

lemma const-id-is-group-act:
  fixes  $m :: 'x \text{ monoid}$ 
  assumes group m
  shows group-action m UNIV ( $\lambda x. id$ )
proof (unfold group-action-def group-hom-def group-hom-axioms-def hom-def, safe)
  show group m
    using assms
    by blast
next
  show group (BijGroup UNIV)
    using group-BijGroup
    by metis
next
  show  $id \in \text{carrier (BijGroup UNIV)}$ 
    unfolding BijGroup-def Bij-def
    by simp
  thus  $id = id \otimes \text{BijGroup UNIV } id$ 
    using rewrite-mult-univ comp-id
    by metis
qed

```

```

theorem group-act-induces-set-group-act:
  fixes
     $m :: 'x \text{ monoid}$  and
     $s :: 'y \text{ set}$  and
     $\varphi :: ('x, 'y) \text{ binary-fun}$ 
  defines  $\varphi\text{-img} \equiv (\lambda x. \text{extensional-continuation (image } (\varphi x)) (\text{Pow } s))$ 
  assumes group-action m s  $\varphi$ 
  shows group-action m (Pow s)  $\varphi\text{-img}$ 
proof (unfold group-action-def group-hom-def group-hom-axioms-def hom-def, safe)
  show group m
    using assms
    unfolding group-action-def group-hom-def
    by simp

```

```

next
  show group (BijGroup (Pow s))
  using group-BijGroup
  by metis
next
{
  fix x :: 'x
  assume car-x: x ∈ carrier m
  hence bij-betw (φ x) s s
    using assms group-action.surj-prop
    unfolding bij-betw-def
    by (simp add: group-action.inj-prop)
  hence bij-betw (image (φ x)) (Pow s) (Pow s)
    using bij-betw-Pow
    by metis
  moreover have ∀ t ∈ Pow s. φ-img x t = image (φ x) t
    unfolding φ-img-def
    by simp
  ultimately have bij-betw (φ-img x) (Pow s) (Pow s)
    using bij-betw-cong
    by fastforce
  moreover have φ-img x ∈ extensional (Pow s)
    unfolding φ-img-def extensional-def
    by simp
  ultimately show φ-img x ∈ carrier (BijGroup (Pow s))
    unfolding BijGroup-def Bij-def
    by simp
}
fix
  x :: 'x and
  y :: 'x
note
  car-x-el = ⟨x ∈ carrier m ⟹ φ-img x ∈ carrier (BijGroup (Pow s))⟩ and
  car-y-el = ⟨y ∈ carrier m ⟹ φ-img y ∈ carrier (BijGroup (Pow s))⟩
assume
  car-x: x ∈ carrier m and
  car-y: y ∈ carrier m
hence car-els: φ-img x ∈ carrier (BijGroup (Pow s)) ∧ φ-img y ∈ carrier
(BijGroup (Pow s))
  using car-x-el car-y-el car-y
  by blast
hence h-closed: ∀ t. t ∈ Pow s ⟶ φ-img y t ∈ Pow s
  using bij-betw-apply Int-Collect partial-object.select-convs(1)
  unfolding BijGroup-def Bij-def
  by metis
from car-els
have φ-img x ⊗ BijGroup (Pow s) φ-img y =
  extensional-continuation (φ-img x ∘ φ-img y) (Pow s)
  using rewrite-mult

```



```

    by blast
  moreover have
     $\forall t. t \notin \text{Pow } s \longrightarrow \text{extensional-continuation } (\varphi\text{-img } x \circ \varphi\text{-img } y) (\text{Pow } s) t =$ 
    undefined
    by simp
  moreover have  $\forall t. t \notin \text{Pow } s \longrightarrow \varphi\text{-img } (x \otimes_m y) t = \text{undefined}$ 
    unfolding  $\varphi\text{-img-def}$ 
    by simp
  moreover have
     $\forall t. t \in \text{Pow } s \longrightarrow \text{extensional-continuation } (\varphi\text{-img } x \circ \varphi\text{-img } y) (\text{Pow } s) t =$ 
 $\varphi x \text{ ' } \varphi y \text{ ' } t$ 
    using h-closed
    unfolding  $\varphi\text{-img-def}$ 
    by simp
  moreover have  $\forall t. t \in \text{Pow } s \longrightarrow \varphi\text{-img } (x \otimes_m y) t = \varphi x \text{ ' } \varphi y \text{ ' } t$ 
    unfolding  $\varphi\text{-img-def}$  extensional-continuation.simps
    using rewrite-group-act-img car-x car-y assms PowD
    by metis
  ultimately have  $\forall t. \varphi\text{-img } (x \otimes_m y) t = (\varphi\text{-img } x \otimes \text{BijGroup } (\text{Pow } s) \varphi\text{-img } y) t$ 
    by metis
  thus  $\varphi\text{-img } (x \otimes_m y) = \varphi\text{-img } x \otimes \text{BijGroup } (\text{Pow } s) \varphi\text{-img } y$ 
    by blast
qed

```

1.8.6 Invariance and Equivariance

It suffices to show invariance under the group action of a generating set of a group to show invariance under the group action of the whole group. For example, it is enough to show invariance under transpositions to show invariance under a complete finite symmetric group.

theorem *invar-generating-system-imp-invar:*

```

fixes
   $f :: 'x \Rightarrow 'y$  and
   $m :: 'z \text{ monoid}$  and
   $s :: 'z \text{ set}$  and
   $t :: 'x \text{ set}$  and
   $\varphi :: ('z, 'x) \text{ binary-fun}$ 
assumes
  invar: satisfies f (Invariance (rel-induced-by-action s t  $\varphi$ )) and
  action- $\varphi$ : group-action m t  $\varphi$  and
  gen: carrier m = generate m s
shows satisfies f (Invariance (rel-induced-by-action (carrier m) t  $\varphi$ ))
proof (unfold satisfies.simps rel-induced-by-action.simps, safe)
fix
   $g :: 'z$  and
   $x :: 'x$ 
assume

```

```

    group-elem:  $g \in \text{carrier } m$  and
    x-in-t:  $x \in t$ 
interpret interpr-action-φ: group-action  $m \ t \ \varphi$ 
    using action-φ
    by blast
have  $g \in \text{generate } m \ s$ 
    using group-elem gen
    by blast
hence  $\forall x \in t. f \ x = f \ (\varphi \ g \ x)$ 
proof (induct g rule: generate.induct)
    case one
    hence  $\forall x \in t. \varphi \ 1 \ m \ x = x$ 
        using action-φ group-action.id-eq-one restrict-apply
        by metis
    thus ?case
        by simp
next
    case (incl g)
    hence  $\forall x \in t. (x, \varphi \ g \ x) \in \text{rel-induced-by-action } s \ t \ \varphi$ 
        using gen action-φ generate.incl group-action.element-image
        unfolding rel-induced-by-action.simps
        by fastforce
    thus ?case
        using invar
        unfolding satisfies.simps
        by blast
next
    case (inv g)
    hence  $\forall x \in t. \varphi \ (\text{inv } m \ g) \ x \in t$ 
        using action-φ gen generate.inv group-action.element-image
        by metis
    hence  $\forall x \in t. f \ (\varphi \ g \ (\varphi \ (\text{inv } m \ g) \ x)) = f \ (\varphi \ (\text{inv } m \ g) \ x)$ 
        using gen generate.incl group-action.element-image action-φ
        invar local.inv rewrite-invar-ind-by-act
        by metis
    moreover have  $\forall x \in t. \varphi \ g \ (\varphi \ (\text{inv } m \ g) \ x) = x$ 
        using action-φ gen generate.incl group.inv-closed group-action.orbit-sym-aux
        group.inv-inv group-hom.axioms(1) interpr-action-φ.group-hom local.inv
        by (metis (full-types))
    ultimately show ?case
        by simp
next
    case (eng g1 g2)
    assume
        invar1:  $\forall x \in t. f \ x = f \ (\varphi \ g_1 \ x)$  and
        invar2:  $\forall x \in t. f \ x = f \ (\varphi \ g_2 \ x)$  and
        gen1:  $g_1 \in \text{generate } m \ s$  and
        gen2:  $g_2 \in \text{generate } m \ s$ 
    hence  $\forall x \in t. \varphi \ g_2 \ x \in t$ 

```

```

    using gen interpr-action-φ.element-image
  by blast
hence  $\forall x \in t. f (\varphi g_1 (\varphi g_2 x)) = f (\varphi g_2 x)$ 
  using invar1
  by simp
moreover have  $\forall x \in t. f (\varphi g_2 x) = f x$ 
  using invar2
  by simp
moreover have  $\forall x \in t. f (\varphi (g_1 \otimes_m g_2) x) = f (\varphi g_1 (\varphi g_2 x))$ 
  using action-φ gen interpr-action-φ.composition-rule gen1 gen2
  by simp
ultimately show ?case
  by simp
qed
thus  $f x = f (\varphi g x)$ 
  using x-in-t
  by simp
qed

```

lemma *invar-parameterized-fun:*

```

fixes
  f :: 'x  $\Rightarrow$  ('x  $\Rightarrow$  'y) and
  r :: 'x rel
assumes
  param-invar:  $\forall x. \text{satisfies } (f x) \text{ (Invariance } r) \text{ and}$ 
  invar:  $\text{satisfies } f \text{ (Invariance } r)$ 
shows  $\text{satisfies } (\lambda x. f x x) \text{ (Invariance } r)$ 
using invar param-invar
by auto

```

lemma *invar-under-subset-rel:*

```

fixes
  f :: 'x  $\Rightarrow$  'y and
  r :: 'x rel
assumes
  subset:  $r \subseteq \text{rel}$  and
  invar:  $\text{satisfies } f \text{ (Invariance rel)}$ 
shows  $\text{satisfies } f \text{ (Invariance } r)$ 
using assms
by auto

```

lemma *equivar-ind-by-act-coincide:*

```

fixes
  s :: 'x set and
  t :: 'y set and
  f :: 'y  $\Rightarrow$  'z and
  φ :: ('x, 'y) binary-fun and
  φ' :: ('x, 'y) binary-fun and
  ψ :: ('x, 'z) binary-fun

```

assumes $\forall x \in s. \forall y \in t. \varphi x y = \varphi' x y$
shows $\text{satisfies } f \text{ (equivar-ind-by-act } s \text{ } t \text{ } \varphi \text{ } \psi) = \text{satisfies } f \text{ (equivar-ind-by-act } s$
 $t \text{ } \varphi' \text{ } \psi)$
using *assms*
unfolding *rewrite-equivar-ind-by-act*
by *simp*

lemma *equivar-under-subset:*

fixes
 $f :: 'x \Rightarrow 'y$ **and**
 $s :: 'x \text{ set}$ **and**
 $t :: 'x \text{ set}$ **and**
 $\tau :: (('x \Rightarrow 'x) \times ('y \Rightarrow 'y)) \text{ set}$
assumes
 $\text{satisfies } f \text{ (Equivariance } s \text{ } \tau)$ **and**
 $t \subseteq s$
shows $\text{satisfies } f \text{ (Equivariance } t \text{ } \tau)$
using *assms*
unfolding *satisfies.simps*
by *blast*

lemma *equivar-under-subset':*

fixes
 $f :: 'x \Rightarrow 'y$ **and**
 $s :: 'x \text{ set}$ **and**
 $\tau :: (('x \Rightarrow 'x) \times ('y \Rightarrow 'y)) \text{ set}$ **and**
 $v :: (('x \Rightarrow 'x) \times ('y \Rightarrow 'y)) \text{ set}$
assumes
 $\text{satisfies } f \text{ (Equivariance } s \text{ } \tau)$ **and**
 $v \subseteq \tau$
shows $\text{satisfies } f \text{ (Equivariance } s \text{ } v)$
using *assms*
unfolding *satisfies.simps*
by *blast*

theorem *group-act-equivar-f-imp-equivar-preimg:*

fixes
 $f :: 'x \Rightarrow 'y$ **and**
 $\mathcal{D}_f :: 'x \text{ set}$ **and**
 $s :: 'x \text{ set}$ **and**
 $m :: 'z \text{ monoid}$ **and**
 $\varphi :: ('z, 'x) \text{ binary-fun}$ **and**
 $\psi :: ('z, 'y) \text{ binary-fun}$ **and**
 $x :: 'z$
defines $\text{equivar-prop} \equiv \text{equivar-ind-by-act (carrier } m) \mathcal{D}_f \varphi \psi$
assumes
 $\text{action-}\varphi$: $\text{group-action } m \text{ } s \text{ } \varphi$ **and**
 action-res : $\text{group-action } m \text{ } \text{UNIV } \psi$ **and**
 $\text{dom-in-}s$: $\mathcal{D}_f \subseteq s$ **and**

```

    closed-domain:
      closed-under-restr-rel (rel-induced-by-action (carrier m) s  $\varphi$ ) s  $\mathcal{D}_f$  and
      equivar-f: satisfies f equivar-prop and
      group-elem-x:  $x \in \text{carrier } m$ 
    shows  $\forall y. \text{preimg } f \ \mathcal{D}_f \ (\psi \ x \ y) = (\varphi \ x) \ ' (\text{preimg } f \ \mathcal{D}_f \ y)$ 
  proof (safe)
    interpret action- $\varphi$ : group-action m s  $\varphi$ 
      using action- $\varphi$ 
      by simp
    interpret action-results: group-action m UNIV  $\psi$ 
      using action-res
      by simp
    have group-elem-inv:  $(\text{inv } m \ x) \in \text{carrier } m$ 
      using group.inv-closed group-hom.axioms(1) action- $\varphi$ .group-hom group-elem-x
      by metis
    fix
      y :: 'y and
      z :: 'x
    assume preimg-el:  $z \in \text{preimg } f \ \mathcal{D}_f \ (\psi \ x \ y)$ 
    obtain a :: 'x where
      img:  $a = \varphi \ (\text{inv } m \ x) \ z$ 
      by simp
    have domain:  $z \in \mathcal{D}_f \wedge z \in s$ 
      using preimg-el dom-in-s
      by auto
    hence  $a \in s$ 
      using dom-in-s action- $\varphi$  group-elem-inv preimg-el img action- $\varphi$ .element-image
      by auto
    hence  $(z, a) \in (\text{rel-induced-by-action } (\text{carrier } m) \ s \ \varphi) \cap (\mathcal{D}_f \times s)$ 
      using img preimg-el domain group-elem-inv
      by auto
    hence  $a \in ((\text{rel-induced-by-action } (\text{carrier } m) \ s \ \varphi) \cap (\mathcal{D}_f \times s)) \ \text{`` } \mathcal{D}_f$ 
      using img preimg-el domain group-elem-inv
      by auto
    hence a-in-domain:  $a \in \mathcal{D}_f$ 
      using closed-domain
      by auto
    moreover have  $(\varphi \ (\text{inv } m \ x), \psi \ (\text{inv } m \ x)) \in \{(\varphi \ g, \psi \ g) \mid g. g \in \text{carrier } m\}$ 
      using group-elem-inv
      by auto
    ultimately have  $f \ a = \psi \ (\text{inv } m \ x) \ (f \ z)$ 
      using domain equivar-f img
      unfolding equivar-prop-def equivar-ind-by-act-def
      by simp
    also have  $f \ z = \psi \ x \ y$ 
      using preimg-el
      by simp
    also have  $\psi \ (\text{inv } m \ x) \ (\psi \ x \ y) = y$ 
      using action-results.group-hom action-results.orbit-sym-aux group-elem-x

```

```

    by simp
  finally have  $f a = y$ 
    by simp
  hence  $a \in \text{preimg } f \ \mathcal{D}_f \ y$ 
    using a-in-domain
    by simp
  moreover have  $z = \varphi x a$ 
    using group-hom.axioms(1) action-φ.group-hom action-φ.orbit-sym-aux
      img domain a-in-domain group-elem-x group-elem-inv group.inv-inv
    by metis
  ultimately show  $z \in (\varphi x) \cdot (\text{preimg } f \ \mathcal{D}_f \ y)$ 
    by simp
next
fix
   $y :: 'y$  and
   $z :: 'x$ 
  assume preimg-el:  $z \in \text{preimg } f \ \mathcal{D}_f \ y$ 
  hence domain:  $f z = y \wedge z \in \mathcal{D}_f \wedge z \in s$ 
    using dom-in-s
    by auto
  hence  $\varphi x z \in s$ 
    using group-elem-x group-action.element-image action-φ
    by metis
  hence  $(z, \varphi x z) \in (\text{rel-induced-by-action } (\text{carrier } m) \ s \ \varphi) \cap (\mathcal{D}_f \times s) \cap \mathcal{D}_f \times s$ 
    using group-elem-x domain
    by auto
  hence  $\varphi x z \in \mathcal{D}_f$ 
    using closed-domain
    by auto
  moreover have  $(\varphi x, \psi x) \in \{(\varphi a, \psi a) \mid a. a \in \text{carrier } m\}$ 
    using group-elem-x
    by blast
  ultimately show  $\varphi x z \in \text{preimg } f \ \mathcal{D}_f \ (\psi x y)$ 
    using equivar-f domain
      unfolding equivar-prop-def equivar-ind-by-act-def
    by simp
qed

```

Invariance and Equivariance Function Composition

lemma *invar-comp*:

```

fixes
   $f :: 'x \Rightarrow 'y$  and
   $g :: 'y \Rightarrow 'z$  and
   $r :: 'x \text{ rel}$ 
assumes satisfies f (Invariance r)
shows satisfies (g ∘ f) (Invariance r)
using assms
by simp

```

lemma *equivar-comp*:

fixes

$f :: 'x \Rightarrow 'y$ **and**
 $g :: 'y \Rightarrow 'z$ **and**
 $s :: 'x$ *set* **and**
 $t :: 'y$ *set* **and**
 $\tau :: (('x \Rightarrow 'x) \times ('y \Rightarrow 'y))$ *set* **and**
 $v :: (('y \Rightarrow 'y) \times ('z \Rightarrow 'z))$ *set*

defines

transitive-acts \equiv
 $\{(\varphi, \psi). \exists \chi :: 'y \Rightarrow 'y. (\varphi, \chi) \in \tau \wedge (\chi, \psi) \in v \wedge \chi \text{ ' } f \text{ ' } s \subseteq t\}$

assumes

$f \text{ ' } s \subseteq t$ **and**
satisfies f (*Equivariance* $s \tau$) **and**
satisfies g (*Equivariance* $t v$)

shows *satisfies* $(g \circ f)$ (*Equivariance* s *transitive-acts*)

proof (*unfold transitive-acts-def, simp, safe*)

fix

$\varphi :: 'x \Rightarrow 'x$ **and**
 $\chi :: 'y \Rightarrow 'y$ **and**
 $\psi :: 'z \Rightarrow 'z$ **and**
 $x :: 'x$

assume

x-in-X: $x \in s$ **and**
 φ -*x-in-X*: $\varphi x \in s$ **and**
 χ -*img_f-img_s-in-t*: $\chi \text{ ' } f \text{ ' } s \subseteq t$ **and**
act-f: $(\varphi, \chi) \in \tau$ **and**
act-g: $(\chi, \psi) \in v$

hence $f x \in t \wedge \chi (f x) \in t$

using *assms*

by *blast*

hence $\psi (g (f x)) = g (\chi (f x))$

using *act-g assms*

by *fastforce*

also have $g (f (\varphi x)) = g (\chi (f x))$

using *assms act-f x-in-X φ -x-in-X*

by *fastforce*

finally show $g (f (\varphi x)) = \psi (g (f x))$

by *simp*

qed

lemma *equivar-ind-by-act-comp*:

fixes

$f :: 'x \Rightarrow 'y$ **and**
 $g :: 'y \Rightarrow 'z$ **and**
 $s :: 'w$ *set* **and**
 $t :: 'x$ *set* **and**
 $u :: 'y$ *set* **and**

$\varphi :: ('w, 'x) \text{ binary-fun and}$
 $\chi :: ('w, 'y) \text{ binary-fun and}$
 $\psi :: ('w, 'z) \text{ binary-fun}$
assumes
 $f \text{ ' } t \subseteq u \text{ and}$
 $\forall x \in s. \chi x \text{ ' } f \text{ ' } t \subseteq u \text{ and}$
 $\text{satisfies } f \text{ (equivar-ind-by-act } s \text{ } t \text{ } \varphi \text{ } \chi) \text{ and}$
 $\text{satisfies } g \text{ (equivar-ind-by-act } s \text{ } u \text{ } \chi \text{ } \psi)$
shows $\text{satisfies } (g \circ f) \text{ (equivar-ind-by-act } s \text{ } t \text{ } \varphi \text{ } \psi)$
proof –
let $?a_\varphi = \{(\varphi a, \chi a) \mid a. a \in s\} \text{ and}$
 $?a_\psi = \{(\chi a, \psi a) \mid a. a \in s\}$
have $\forall a \in s. (\varphi a, \chi a) \in \{(\varphi a, \chi a) \mid b. b \in s\} \wedge$
 $(\chi a, \psi a) \in \{(\chi b, \psi b) \mid b. b \in s\} \wedge \chi a \text{ ' } f \text{ ' } t \subseteq u$
using *assms*
by *blast*
hence $\{(\varphi a, \psi a) \mid a. a \in s\} \subseteq$
 $\{(\varphi, \psi). \exists v. (\varphi, v) \in ?a_\varphi \wedge (v, \psi) \in ?a_\psi \wedge v \text{ ' } f \text{ ' } t \subseteq u\}$
by *blast*
hence $\text{satisfies } (g \circ f) \text{ (Equivariance } t \text{ } \{(\varphi a, \psi a) \mid a. a \in s\})$
using *assms equivar-comp[of f t u ?a_\varphi g ?a_\psi] equivar-under-subset'*
unfolding *equivar-ind-by-act-def*
by (*metis (no-types, lifting)*)
thus *?thesis*
unfolding *equivar-ind-by-act-def*
by *blast*
qed

lemma *equivar-set-minus:*

fixes

$f :: 'x \Rightarrow 'y \text{ set and}$

$g :: 'x \Rightarrow 'y \text{ set and}$

$s :: 'z \text{ set and}$

$t :: 'x \text{ set and}$

$\varphi :: ('z, 'x) \text{ binary-fun and}$

$\psi :: ('z, 'y) \text{ binary-fun}$

assumes

$f\text{-equivar: satisfies } f \text{ (equivar-ind-by-act } s \text{ } t \text{ } \varphi \text{ (set-action } \psi)) \text{ and}$

$g\text{-equivar: satisfies } g \text{ (equivar-ind-by-act } s \text{ } t \text{ } \varphi \text{ (set-action } \psi)) \text{ and}$

$\text{bij-}a: \forall a \in s. \text{bij } (\psi a)$

shows $\text{satisfies } (\lambda b. f b - g b) \text{ (equivar-ind-by-act } s \text{ } t \text{ } \varphi \text{ (set-action } \psi))$

proof –

have $\forall a \in s. \forall x \in t. \varphi a x \in t \longrightarrow f (\varphi a x) = \psi a \text{ ' } (f x)$

using *f-equivar*

unfolding *rewrite-equivar-ind-by-act*

by *simp*

moreover **have** $\forall a \in s. \forall x \in t. \varphi a x \in t \longrightarrow g (\varphi a x) = \psi a \text{ ' } (g x)$

using *g-equivar*

unfolding *rewrite-equivar-ind-by-act*


```

    by simp
  ultimately have
     $\forall a \in s. \forall b \in t. \varphi a b \in t \longrightarrow f (\varphi a b) - g (\varphi a b) = \psi a ' (f b) - \psi a ' (g$ 
    b)
    by blast
  moreover have  $\forall a \in s. \forall u v. \psi a ' u - \psi a ' v = \psi a ' (u - v)$ 
    using bij-a image-set-diff
    unfolding bij-def
    by blast
  ultimately show ?thesis
    unfolding set-action.simps
    using rewrite-equivar-ind-by-act
    by fastforce
qed

lemma equivar-union-under-img-act:
  fixes
    f :: 'x  $\Rightarrow$  'y and
    s :: 'z set and
     $\varphi :: ('z, 'x)$  binary-fun
  shows satisfies  $\bigcup$  (equivar-ind-by-act s UNIV
    (set-action (set-action  $\varphi$ )) (set-action  $\varphi$ ))
proof (unfold equivar-ind-by-act-def, clarsimp, safe)
  fix
    x :: 'z and
    ts :: 'x set set and
    t :: 'x set and
    y :: 'x
  assume
    y  $\in$  t and
    t  $\in$  ts
  thus
     $\varphi x y \in \varphi x ' \bigcup ts$  and
     $\varphi x y \in \bigcup ((') (\varphi x) ' ts)$ 
    by (blast, blast)
qed

end

```

1.9 Symmetry Properties of Voting Rules

```

theory Voting-Symmetry
  imports Symmetry-Of-Functions
    Social-Choice-Result
    Social-Welfare-Result
    Profile
begin

```

1.9.1 Definitions

fun (in result) results-closed-under-rel :: ('a, 'v) Election rel \Rightarrow bool **where**
 results-closed-under-rel r =
 (\forall (e, e') \in r. limit-set (alternatives- \mathcal{E} e) UNIV = limit-set (alternatives- \mathcal{E} e'))
 UNIV)

fun result-action :: ('x, 'r) binary-fun \Rightarrow ('x, 'r Result) binary-fun **where**
 result-action ψ x = (λ r. (ψ x 'elect-r r, ψ x 'reject-r r, ψ x 'defer-r r))

Anonymity

definition anonymity $_{\mathcal{G}}$:: ('v \Rightarrow 'v) monoid **where**
 anonymity $_{\mathcal{G}}$ = BijGroup (UNIV::'v set)

fun φ -anon :: ('a, 'v) Election set \Rightarrow ('v \Rightarrow 'v) \Rightarrow (('a, 'v) Election
 \Rightarrow ('a, 'v) Election) **where**
 φ -anon \mathcal{E} π = extensional-continuation (rename π) \mathcal{E}

fun anonymity $_{\mathcal{R}}$:: ('a, 'v) Election set \Rightarrow ('a, 'v) Election rel **where**
 anonymity $_{\mathcal{R}}$ \mathcal{E} = rel-induced-by-action (carrier anonymity $_{\mathcal{G}}$) \mathcal{E} (φ -anon \mathcal{E})

Neutrality

fun rel-rename :: ('a \Rightarrow 'a, 'a Preference-Relation) binary-fun **where**
 rel-rename π r = {(π a, π b) | a b. (a, b) \in r}

fun alternatives-rename :: ('a \Rightarrow 'a, ('a, 'v) Election) binary-fun **where**
 alternatives-rename π \mathcal{E} = (π ' (alternatives- \mathcal{E} \mathcal{E}), voters- \mathcal{E} \mathcal{E} , (rel-rename π) \circ
 (profile- \mathcal{E} \mathcal{E}))

definition neutrality $_{\mathcal{G}}$:: ('a \Rightarrow 'a) monoid **where**
 neutrality $_{\mathcal{G}}$ = BijGroup (UNIV::'a set)

fun φ -neutr :: ('a, 'v) Election set \Rightarrow ('a \Rightarrow 'a, ('a, 'v) Election) binary-fun **where**
 φ -neutr \mathcal{E} π = extensional-continuation (alternatives-rename π) \mathcal{E}

fun neutrality $_{\mathcal{R}}$:: ('a, 'v) Election set \Rightarrow ('a, 'v) Election rel **where**
 neutrality $_{\mathcal{R}}$ \mathcal{E} = rel-induced-by-action (carrier neutrality $_{\mathcal{G}}$) \mathcal{E} (φ -neutr \mathcal{E})

fun ψ -neutr $_{\mathcal{C}}$:: ('a \Rightarrow 'a, 'a) binary-fun **where**
 ψ -neutr $_{\mathcal{C}}$ π r = π r

fun ψ -neutr $_{\mathcal{W}}$:: ('a \Rightarrow 'a, 'a rel) binary-fun **where**
 ψ -neutr $_{\mathcal{W}}$ π r = rel-rename π r

Homogeneity

fun homogeneity $_{\mathcal{R}}$:: ('a, 'v) Election set \Rightarrow ('a, 'v) Election rel **where**
 homogeneity $_{\mathcal{R}}$ \mathcal{E} =

$\{(E, E') \in \mathcal{E} \times \mathcal{E}.$
 $\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E = \text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E' \wedge \text{finite} (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \wedge \text{finite} (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E') \wedge$
 $(\exists n > 0. \forall r::('a \text{ Preference-Relation}). \text{vote-count } r \ E = n * (\text{vote-count } r \ E'))\}$

fun *copy-list* :: *nat* \Rightarrow *'x list* \Rightarrow *'x list* **where**
copy-list 0 *l* = [] |
copy-list (Suc *n*) *l* = *copy-list* *n* *l* @ *l*

fun *homogeneity_R'* :: (*'a, 'v::linorder*) *Election set* \Rightarrow (*'a, 'v*) *Election rel* **where**
homogeneity_R' \mathcal{E} =
 $\{(E, E') \in \mathcal{E} \times \mathcal{E}.$
 $\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E = \text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E' \wedge \text{finite} (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \wedge \text{finite} (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E') \wedge$
 $(\exists n > 0. \text{to-list} (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E') (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E') =$
 $\text{copy-list } n (\text{to-list} (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E) (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E)))\}$

Reversal Symmetry

fun *rev-rel* :: *'a rel* \Rightarrow *'a rel* **where**
rev-rel *r* = {(*a, b*). (*b, a*) \in *r*}

fun *rel-app* :: (*'a rel* \Rightarrow *'a rel*) \Rightarrow (*'a, 'v*) *Election* \Rightarrow (*'a, 'v*) *Election* **where**
rel-app *f* (*A, V, p*) = (*A, V, f* \circ *p*)

definition *reversal_G* :: (*'a rel* \Rightarrow *'a rel*) *monoid* **where**
reversal_G = (|*carrier* = {*rev-rel, id*}, *monoid.mult* = *comp*, *one* = *id*)

fun φ -*rev* :: (*'a, 'v*) *Election set* \Rightarrow (*'a rel* \Rightarrow *'a rel*, (*'a, 'v*) *Election*) *binary-fun*
where
 φ -*rev* \mathcal{E} φ = *extensional-continuation* (*rel-app* φ) \mathcal{E}

fun ψ -*rev* :: (*'a rel* \Rightarrow *'a rel*, *'a rel*) *binary-fun* **where**
 ψ -*rev* φ *r* = φ *r*

fun *reversal_R* :: (*'a, 'v*) *Election set* \Rightarrow (*'a, 'v*) *Election rel* **where**
reversal_R \mathcal{E} = *rel-induced-by-action* (*carrier reversal_G*) \mathcal{E} (φ -*rev* \mathcal{E})

1.9.2 Auxiliary Lemmas

fun *n-app* :: *nat* \Rightarrow (*'x* \Rightarrow *'x*) \Rightarrow (*'x* \Rightarrow *'x*) **where**
n-app 0 *f* = *id* |
n-app (Suc *n*) *f* = *f* \circ *n-app* *n* *f*

lemma *n-app-rewrite*:
fixes
f :: *'x* \Rightarrow *'x* **and**
n :: *nat* **and**
x :: *'x*

shows $(f \circ n\text{-app } n \ f) \ x = (n\text{-app } n \ f \circ f) \ x$
proof (*clarsimp*, *induction n f arbitrary: x rule: n-app.induct*)
case (1 *f*)
fix
 $f :: 'x \Rightarrow 'x$ **and**
 $x :: 'x$
show $f \ (n\text{-app } 0 \ f \ x) = n\text{-app } 0 \ f \ (f \ x)$
by *simp*
next
case (2 *n f*)
fix
 $f :: 'x \Rightarrow 'x$ **and**
 $n :: \text{nat}$ **and**
 $x :: 'x$
assume $\bigwedge y. f \ (n\text{-app } n \ f \ y) = n\text{-app } n \ f \ (f \ y)$
thus $f \ (n\text{-app } (\text{Suc } n) \ f \ x) = n\text{-app } (\text{Suc } n) \ f \ (f \ x)$
by *simp*
qed

lemma *n-app-leaves-set*:
fixes
 $A :: 'x \text{ set}$ **and**
 $B :: 'x \text{ set}$ **and**
 $f :: 'x \Rightarrow 'x$ **and**
 $x :: 'x$
assumes
 $\text{fin-A: finite } A$ **and**
 $\text{fin-B: finite } B$ **and**
 $\text{x-el: } x \in A - B$ **and**
 $\text{bij: bij-betw } f \ A \ B$
obtains $n :: \text{nat}$ **where**
 $n > 0$ **and**
 $n\text{-app } n \ f \ x \in B - A$ **and**
 $\forall m > 0. m < n \longrightarrow n\text{-app } m \ f \ x \in A \cap B$
proof –
assume *existence-witness*:
 $\bigwedge n. 0 < n \implies n\text{-app } n \ f \ x \in B - A \implies \forall m > 0. m < n \longrightarrow n\text{-app } m \ f \ x \in A \cap B \implies ?thesis$
have $\text{ex-A: } \exists n > 0. n\text{-app } n \ f \ x \in B - A \wedge (\forall m > 0. m < n \longrightarrow n\text{-app } m \ f \ x \in A)$
proof (*rule ccontr, clarsimp*)
assume *nex*:
 $\forall n. n\text{-app } n \ f \ x \in B \longrightarrow n = 0 \vee n\text{-app } n \ f \ x \in A \vee (\exists m > 0. m < n \wedge n\text{-app } m \ f \ x \notin A)$
hence $\forall n > 0. n\text{-app } n \ f \ x \in B \longrightarrow n\text{-app } n \ f \ x \in A \vee (\exists m > 0. m < n \wedge n\text{-app } m \ f \ x \notin A)$
by *blast*
moreover **have** $(\forall n > 0. n\text{-app } n \ f \ x \in B \longrightarrow n\text{-app } n \ f \ x \in A) \longrightarrow \text{False}$
proof (*safe*)

```

assume in-A:  $\forall n > 0. n\text{-app } n f x \in B \longrightarrow n\text{-app } n f x \in A$ 
hence  $\forall n > 0. n\text{-app } n f x \in A \longrightarrow n\text{-app } (Suc\ n) f x \in A$ 
  using n-app.simps bij
  unfolding bij-betw-def
  by force
hence in-AB-imp-in-AB:
   $\forall n > 0. n\text{-app } n f x \in A \cap B \longrightarrow n\text{-app } (Suc\ n) f x \in A \cap B$ 
  using n-app.simps bij
  unfolding bij-betw-def
  by auto
have in-int:  $\forall n > 0. n\text{-app } n f x \in A \cap B$ 
proof (clarify)
  fix n :: nat
  assume  $n > 0$ 
  thus  $n\text{-app } n f x \in A \cap B$ 
  proof (induction n)
    case 0
    thus ?case
    by safe
  next
  case (Suc n)
  assume  $0 < n \implies n\text{-app } n f x \in A \cap B$ 
  moreover have  $n = 0 \longrightarrow n\text{-app } (Suc\ n) f x = f x$ 
    by simp
  ultimately show  $n\text{-app } (Suc\ n) f x \in A \cap B$ 
    using x-el bij in-A in-AB-imp-in-AB
    unfolding bij-betw-def
    by blast
  qed
qed
hence  $\{n\text{-app } n f x \mid n. n > 0\} \subseteq A \cap B$ 
  by blast
hence finite  $\{n\text{-app } n f x \mid n. n > 0\}$ 
  using fin-A fin-B rev-finite-subset
  by blast
moreover have
   $inj\text{-on } (\lambda n. n\text{-app } n f x) \{n. n > 0\} \longrightarrow infinite\ ((\lambda n. n\text{-app } n f x) \text{ ` } \{n. n > 0\})$ 
  using diff-is-0-eq' finite-imageD finite-nat-set-iff-bounded lessI
    less-imp-diff-less mem-Collect-eq nless-le
  by metis
moreover have  $(\lambda n. n\text{-app } n f x) \text{ ` } \{n. n > 0\} = \{n\text{-app } n f x \mid n. n > 0\}$ 
  by auto
ultimately have  $\neg inj\text{-on } (\lambda n. n\text{-app } n f x) \{n. n > 0\}$ 
  by metis
hence  $\exists n. n > 0 \wedge (\exists m > n. n\text{-app } n f x = n\text{-app } m f x)$ 
  using linorder-inj-onI' mem-Collect-eq
  by metis
hence  $\exists n\text{-min}. 0 < n\text{-min} \wedge (\exists m > n\text{-min}. n\text{-app } n\text{-min } f x = n\text{-app } m f$ 

```

$x) \wedge$
 $(\forall n < n\text{-min}. \neg (0 < n \wedge (\exists m > n. n\text{-app } n f x = n\text{-app } m f x)))$
using *exists-least-iff*[*of* $\lambda n. n > 0 \wedge (\exists m > n. n\text{-app } n f x = n\text{-app } m f$
 $x)$]
by *presburger*
then obtain $n\text{-min} :: \text{nat}$ **where**
 $n\text{-min-pos}: n\text{-min} > 0$ **and**
 $\exists m > n\text{-min}. n\text{-app } n\text{-min } f x = n\text{-app } m f x$ **and**
 $\text{neg}: \forall n < n\text{-min}. \neg (n > 0 \wedge (\exists m > n. n\text{-app } n f x = n\text{-app } m f x))$
by *blast*
then obtain $m :: \text{nat}$ **where**
 $m\text{-gt-}n\text{-min}: m > n\text{-min}$ **and**
 $n\text{-app } n\text{-min } f x = f (n\text{-app } (m - 1) f x)$
using *comp-apply diff-Suc-1 less-nat-zero-code n-app.elims*
by (*metis (mono-tags, lifting)*)
moreover have $n\text{-app } n\text{-min } f x = f (n\text{-app } (n\text{-min} - 1) f x)$
using *Suc-pred' n-min-pos comp-eq-id-dest id-comp diff-Suc-1*
 $\text{less-nat-zero-code } n\text{-app.elims}$
by (*metis (mono-tags, opaque-lifting)*)
moreover have $n\text{-app } (m - 1) f x \in A \wedge n\text{-app } (n\text{-min} - 1) f x \in A$
using *in-int x-el n-min-pos m-gt-n-min Diff-iff IntD1 diff-le-self id-apply*
 $n\text{less-le}$
 $\text{cancel-comm-monoid-add-class.diff-cancel } n\text{-app.simps}(1)$
by *metis*
ultimately have $\text{eq}: n\text{-app } (m - 1) f x = n\text{-app } (n\text{-min} - 1) f x$
using *bij*
unfolding *bij-betw-def inj-def inj-on-def*
by *simp*
moreover have $m - 1 > n\text{-min} - 1$
using *m-gt-n-min n-min-pos*
by *simp*
ultimately have *case-greater-0*: $n\text{-min} - 1 > 0 \longrightarrow \text{False}$
using *neg n-min-pos diff-less zero-less-one*
by *metis*
have $n\text{-app } (m - 1) f x \in B$
using *in-int m-gt-n-min n-min-pos*
by *simp*
thus *False*
using *x-el eq case-greater-0*
by *simp*
qed
ultimately have $\exists n > 0. \exists m > 0. m < n \wedge n\text{-app } m f x \notin A$
by *blast*
hence $\exists n. n > 0 \wedge n\text{-app } n f x \notin A \wedge (\forall m < n. \neg (m > 0 \wedge n\text{-app } m f x$
 $\notin A))$
using *exists-least-iff*[*of* $\lambda n. n > 0 \wedge n\text{-app } n f x \notin A$]
by *blast*
then obtain $n :: \text{nat}$ **where**
 $n\text{-pos}: n > 0$ **and**

```

    not-in-A: n-app n f x  $\notin$  A and
    less-in-A:  $\forall m. (0 < m \wedge m < n) \longrightarrow n\text{-app } m f x \in A$ 
    by blast
  moreover have n-app 0 f x  $\in$  A
    using x-el
    by simp
  ultimately have n-app (n - 1) f x  $\in$  A
    using bot-nat-0.not-eq-extremum diff-less less-numeral-extra(1)
    by metis
  moreover have n-app n f x = f (n-app (n - 1) f x)
    using n-app.simps(2) Suc-pred' n-pos comp-eq-id-dest fun.map-id
    by (metis (mono-tags, opaque-lifting))
  ultimately show False
    using bij nex not-in-A n-pos less-in-A
    unfolding bij-betw-def
    by blast
qed
moreover have n-app-f-x-in-A: n-app 0 f x  $\in$  A
  using x-el
  by simp
ultimately have
   $\forall n. (\forall m > 0. m < n \longrightarrow n\text{-app } m f x \in A) \longrightarrow (\forall m > 0. m < n \longrightarrow n\text{-app}$ 
   $(m - 1) f x \in A)$ 
  using bot-nat-0.not-eq-extremum less-imp-diff-less
  by metis
moreover have  $\forall m > 0. n\text{-app } m f x = f (n\text{-app } (m - 1) f x)$ 
  using bot-nat-0.not-eq-extremum comp-apply diff-Suc-1 n-app.elims
  by (metis (mono-tags, lifting))
ultimately have
   $\forall n. (\forall m > 0. m < n \longrightarrow n\text{-app } m f x \in A) \longrightarrow (\forall m > 0. m \leq n \longrightarrow n\text{-app}$ 
   $m f x \in B)$ 
  using bij n-app.simps(1) n-app-f-x-in-A diff-Suc-1 gr0-conv-Suc imageI
  linorder-not-le nless-le not-less-eq-eq
  unfolding bij-betw-def
  by metis
hence  $\exists n > 0. n\text{-app } n f x \in B - A \wedge (\forall m > 0. m < n \longrightarrow n\text{-app } m f x \in$ 
 $A \cap B)$ 
  using IntI nless-le ex-A
  by metis
thus ?thesis
  using existence-witness
  by blast
qed

lemma n-app-rev:
  fixes
    A :: 'x set and
    B :: 'x set and
    f :: 'x  $\Rightarrow$  'x and

```

```

  n :: nat and
  m :: nat and
  x :: 'x and
  y :: 'x
assumes
  x-in-A:  $x \in A$  and
  y-in-A:  $y \in A$  and
  n-geq-m:  $n \geq m$  and
  n-app-eq-m-n:  $n\text{-app } n \ f \ x = n\text{-app } m \ f \ y$  and
  n-app-x-in-A:  $\forall \ n' < n. \ n\text{-app } n' \ f \ x \in A$  and
  n-app-y-in-A:  $\forall \ m' < m. \ n\text{-app } m' \ f \ y \in A$  and
  fin-A: finite A and
  fin-B: finite B and
  bij-f-A-B: bij-betw f A B
shows  $n\text{-app } (n - m) \ f \ x = y$ 
using assms
proof (induction n f arbitrary: m x y rule: n-app.induct)
case (1 f)
fix
  f :: 'x  $\Rightarrow$  'x and
  m :: nat and
  x :: 'x and
  y :: 'x
assume
  m  $\leq$  0 and
  n-app 0 f x = n-app m f y
thus  $n\text{-app } (0 - m) \ f \ x = y$ 
by simp
next
case (2 n f)
fix
  f :: 'x  $\Rightarrow$  'x and
  n :: nat and
  m :: nat and
  x :: 'x and
  y :: 'x
assume
  bij: bij-betw f A B and
  x-in-A:  $x \in A$  and
  y-in-A:  $y \in A$  and
  m-leq-suc-n:  $m \leq \text{Suc } n$  and
  x-dom:  $\forall \ n' < \text{Suc } n. \ n\text{-app } n' \ f \ x \in A$  and
  y-dom:  $\forall \ m' < m. \ n\text{-app } m' \ f \ y \in A$  and
  eq:  $n\text{-app } (\text{Suc } n) \ f \ x = n\text{-app } m \ f \ y$  and
  hyp:
     $\bigwedge \ m \ x \ y. \ x \in A \Longrightarrow y \in A \Longrightarrow m \leq n \Longrightarrow$ 

```


$n\text{-app } n \ f \ x = n\text{-app } m \ f \ y \implies$
 $\forall \ n' < n. \ n\text{-app } n' \ f \ x \in A \implies$
 $\forall \ m' < m. \ n\text{-app } m' \ f \ y \in A \implies$
 $\text{finite } A \implies \text{finite } B \implies \text{bij-betw } f \ A \ B \implies n\text{-app } (n - m) \ f \ x = y$
hence $m > 0 \implies f \ (n\text{-app } n \ f \ x) = f \ (n\text{-app } (m - 1) \ f \ y)$
using *Suc-pred' comp-apply n-app.simps(2)*
by *(metis (mono-tags, opaque-lifting))*
moreover have $n\text{-app } n \ f \ x \in A$
using *x-in-A x-dom*
by *blast*
moreover have $m > 0 \implies n\text{-app } (m - 1) \ f \ y \in A$
using *y-dom*
by *simp*
ultimately have $m > 0 \implies n\text{-app } n \ f \ x = n\text{-app } (m - 1) \ f \ y$
using *bij*
unfolding *bij-betw-def inj-on-def*
by *blast*
moreover have $m - 1 \leq n$
using *m-leq-suc-n*
by *simp*
hence $m > 0 \implies n\text{-app } (n - (m - 1)) \ f \ x = y$
using *hyp x-in-A y-in-A x-dom y-dom Suc-pred fin-A fin-B*
bij calculation less-SucI
unfolding *One-nat-def*
by *metis*
hence $m > 0 \implies n\text{-app } (\text{Suc } n - m) \ f \ x = y$
using *Suc-diff-eq-diff-pred*
by *presburger*
moreover have $m = 0 \implies n\text{-app } (\text{Suc } n - m) \ f \ x = y$
using *eq*
by *simp*
ultimately show $n\text{-app } (\text{Suc } n - m) \ f \ x = y$
by *blast*
qed

lemma *n-app-inv*:

fixes

$A :: 'x \text{ set}$ **and**

$B :: 'x \text{ set}$ **and**

$f :: 'x \Rightarrow 'x$ **and**

$n :: \text{nat}$ **and**

$x :: 'x$

assumes

$x \in B$ **and**

$\forall \ m \geq 0. \ m < n \implies n\text{-app } m \ (\text{the-inv-into } A \ f) \ x \in B$ **and**

bij-betw f A B

shows $n\text{-app } n \ f \ (n\text{-app } n \ (\text{the-inv-into } A \ f) \ x) = x$

using *assms*

proof *(induction n f arbitrary: x rule: n-app.induct)*

```

case (1 f)
fix f :: 'x  $\Rightarrow$  'x
show ?case
  by simp
next
case (2 n f)
fix
  n :: nat and
  f :: 'x  $\Rightarrow$  'x and
  x :: 'x
assume
  x-in-B: x  $\in$  B and
  bij: bij-betw f A B and
  stays-in-B:  $\forall m \geq 0. m < \text{Suc } n \longrightarrow n\text{-app } m (\text{the-inv-into } A f) x \in B$  and
  hyp:  $\bigwedge x. x \in B \Longrightarrow$ 
     $\forall m \geq 0. m < n \longrightarrow n\text{-app } m (\text{the-inv-into } A f) x \in B \Longrightarrow$ 
    bij-betw f A B  $\Longrightarrow n\text{-app } n f (n\text{-app } n (\text{the-inv-into } A f) x) = x$ 
have n-app (Suc n) f (n-app (Suc n) (the-inv-into A f) x) =
  n-app n f (f (n-app (Suc n) (the-inv-into A f) x))
  using n-app-rewrite
  by simp
also have ... = n-app n f (n-app n (the-inv-into A f) x)
  using stays-in-B bij
  by (simp add: f-the-inv-into-f-bij-betw)
finally show n-app (Suc n) f (n-app (Suc n) (the-inv-into A f) x) = x
  using hyp bij stays-in-B x-in-B
  by simp
qed

```

lemma bij-betw-finite-ind-global-bij:

```

fixes
  A :: 'x set and
  B :: 'x set and
  f :: 'x  $\Rightarrow$  'x
assumes
  fin-A: finite A and
  fin-B: finite B and
  bij: bij-betw f A B
obtains g :: 'x  $\Rightarrow$  'x where
  bij g and
   $\forall a \in A. g a = f a$  and
   $\forall b \in B - A. g b \in A - B \wedge (\exists n > 0. n\text{-app } n f (g b) = b)$  and
   $\forall x \in \text{UNIV} - A - B. g x = x$ 

```

proof –

assume existence-witness:

```

 $\bigwedge g. \text{bij } g \Longrightarrow$ 
   $\forall a \in A. g a = f a \Longrightarrow$ 
   $\forall b \in B - A. g b \in A - B \wedge (\exists n > 0. n\text{-app } n f (g b) = b) \Longrightarrow$ 
   $\forall x \in \text{UNIV} - A - B. g x = x \Longrightarrow ?thesis$ 

```

have *bij-inv*: *bij-betw* (*the-inv-into* *A f*) *B A*
using *bij* *bij-betw-the-inv-into*
by *blast*
then obtain $g' :: 'x \Rightarrow \text{nat}$ **where**
greater-0: $\forall x \in B - A. g' x > 0$ **and**
in-set-diff: $\forall x \in B - A. n\text{-app } (g' x) (\text{the-inv-into } A f) x \in A - B$ **and**
minimal: $\forall x \in B - A. \forall n > 0. n < g' x \longrightarrow n\text{-app } n (\text{the-inv-into } A f) x$
 $\in B \cap A$
using *n-app-leaves-set*[*of* *B A - the-inv-into A f False*] *fin-A fin-B*
by *metis*
obtain $g :: 'x \Rightarrow 'x$ **where**
def-g:
 $g = (\lambda x. \text{if } x \in A \text{ then } f x \text{ else } (\text{if } x \in B - A \text{ then } n\text{-app } (g' x) (\text{the-inv-into } A f) x \text{ else } x))$
by *simp*
hence *coincide*: $\forall a \in A. g a = f a$
by *simp*
have *id*: $\forall x \in \text{UNIV} - A - B. g x = x$
using *def-g*
by *simp*
have $\forall x \in B - A. n\text{-app } 0 (\text{the-inv-into } A f) x \in B$
by *simp*
moreover have $\forall x \in B - A. \forall n > 0. n < g' x \longrightarrow n\text{-app } n (\text{the-inv-into } A f) x \in B$
using *minimal*
by *blast*
ultimately have $\forall x \in B - A. n\text{-app } (g' x) f (n\text{-app } (g' x) (\text{the-inv-into } A f) x) = x$
using *n-app-inv bij DiffD1 antisym-conv2*
by *metis*
hence $\forall x \in B - A. n\text{-app } (g' x) f (g x) = x$
using *def-g*
by *simp*
with *greater-0 in-set-diff*
have *reverse*: $\forall x \in B - A. g x \in A - B \wedge (\exists n > 0. n\text{-app } n f (g x) = x)$
using *def-g*
by *auto*
have $\forall x \in \text{UNIV} - A - B. g x = \text{id } x$
using *def-g*
by *simp*
hence $g \text{ ` } (\text{UNIV} - A - B) = \text{UNIV} - A - B$
by *simp*
moreover have $g \text{ ` } A = B$
using *def-g bij*
unfolding *bij-betw-def*
by *simp*
moreover have $A \cup (\text{UNIV} - A - B) = \text{UNIV} - (B - A) \wedge B \cup (\text{UNIV} - A - B) = \text{UNIV} - (A - B)$
by *blast*

```

ultimately have surj-cases-13:  $g \cdot (UNIV - (B - A)) = UNIV - (A - B)$ 
  using image-Un
  by metis
have inj-on  $g \ A \wedge \text{inj-on } g \ (UNIV - A - B)$ 
  using def-g bij
  unfolding bij-betw-def inj-on-def
  by simp
hence inj-cases-13:  $\text{inj-on } g \ (UNIV - (B - A))$ 
  unfolding inj-on-def
  using DiffD2 DiffI bij bij-betwE def-g
  by (metis (no-types, lifting))
have card  $A = \text{card } B$ 
  using fin-A fin-B bij bij-betw-same-card
  by blast
with fin-A fin-B
have finite  $(B - A) \wedge \text{finite } (A - B) \wedge \text{card } (B - A) = \text{card } (A - B)$ 
  using card-le-sym-Diff finite-Diff2 nle-le
  by metis
moreover have  $(\lambda x. n\text{-app } (g' x) \ (\text{the-inv-into } A \ f) \ x) \cdot (B - A) \subseteq A - B$ 
  using in-set-diff
  by blast
moreover have  $\text{inj-on } (\lambda x. n\text{-app } (g' x) \ (\text{the-inv-into } A \ f) \ x) \ (B - A)$ 
  proof (unfold inj-on-def, safe)
  fix
     $x :: 'x$  and
     $y :: 'x$ 
  assume
     $x\text{-in-}B: x \in B$  and
     $x\text{-not-in-}A: x \notin A$  and
     $y\text{-in-}B: y \in B$  and
     $y\text{-not-in-}A: y \notin A$  and
     $n\text{-app } (g' x) \ (\text{the-inv-into } A \ f) \ x = n\text{-app } (g' y) \ (\text{the-inv-into } A \ f) \ y$ 
  moreover from this have
     $\forall n < g' x. n\text{-app } n \ (\text{the-inv-into } A \ f) \ x \in B$  and
     $\forall n < g' y. n\text{-app } n \ (\text{the-inv-into } A \ f) \ y \in B$ 
  using minimal Diff-iff Int-iff bot-nat-0.not-eq-extremum eq-id-iff n-app.simps(1)
  by (metis, metis)
ultimately have  $x\text{-to-}y$ :
   $n\text{-app } (g' x - g' y) \ (\text{the-inv-into } A \ f) \ x = y \vee$ 
   $n\text{-app } (g' y - g' x) \ (\text{the-inv-into } A \ f) \ y = x$ 
  using  $x\text{-in-}B \ y\text{-in-}B \ \text{bij-inv } \text{fin-}A \ \text{fin-}B$ 
   $n\text{-app-rev}[of \ x] \ n\text{-app-rev}[of \ y \ B \ x \ g' x \ g' y]$ 
  by fastforce
hence  $g' x \neq g' y \longrightarrow$ 
   $((\exists n > 0. n < g' x \wedge n\text{-app } n \ (\text{the-inv-into } A \ f) \ x \in B - A) \vee$ 
   $(\exists n > 0. n < g' y \wedge n\text{-app } n \ (\text{the-inv-into } A \ f) \ y \in B - A))$ 
  using greater-0  $x\text{-in-}B \ x\text{-not-in-}A \ y\text{-in-}B \ y\text{-not-in-}A \ \text{Diff-iff } \text{diff-less-mono2}$ 
   $\text{diff-zero } \text{id-apply } \text{less-Suc-eq-0-disj } n\text{-app.elims}$ 
  by (metis (full-types))

```

thus $x = y$
 using *minimal x-in-B x-not-in-A y-in-B y-not-in-A x-to-y*
 by *force*
 qed
 ultimately have *bij-betw* $(\lambda x. n\text{-app } (g' x) (the\text{-inv-into } A f) x) (B - A) (A - B)$
 unfolding *bij-betw-def*
 by (*simp add: card-image card-subset-eq*)
 hence *bij-case2: bij-betw* $g (B - A) (A - B)$
 using *def-g*
 unfolding *bij-betw-def inj-on-def*
 by *simp*
 hence $g \text{ ' } UNIV = UNIV$
 using *surj-cases-13 Un-Diff-cancel2 image-Un sup-top-left*
 unfolding *bij-betw-def*
 by *metis*
 moreover have *inj g*
 using *inj-cases-13 bij-case2 DiffD2 DiffI imageI surj-cases-13*
 unfolding *bij-betw-def inj-def inj-on-def*
 by *metis*
 ultimately have *bij g*
 unfolding *bij-def*
 by *safe*
 thus *?thesis*
 using *coincide id reverse existence-witness*
 by *blast*
 qed

lemma *bij-betw-ext*:

fixes
 $f :: 'x \Rightarrow 'y$ and
 $X :: 'x \text{ set}$ and
 $Y :: 'y \text{ set}$
 assumes *bij-betw* $f X Y$
 shows *bij-betw* $(extensional\text{-continuation } f X) X Y$
 proof –
 have $\forall x \in X. extensional\text{-continuation } f X x = f x$
 by *simp*
 thus *?thesis*
 using *assms bij-betw-cong*
 by *metis*
 qed

1.9.3 Anonymity Lemmas

lemma *anon-rel-vote-count*:

fixes
 $\mathcal{E} :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election set}$ and
 $E :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election}$ and

$E' :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election}$
assumes
 $\text{finite } (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E)$ **and**
 $(E, E') \in \text{anonymity}_{\mathcal{R}} \ \mathcal{E}$
shows $\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E = \text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E' \wedge (E, E') \in \mathcal{E} \times \mathcal{E}$
 $\wedge (\forall p. \text{vote-count } p \ E = \text{vote-count } p \ E')$
proof –
have $E \in \mathcal{E}$
using *assms*
unfolding *anonymity_R.simps rel-induced-by-action.simps*
by *safe*
with *assms*
obtain $\pi :: 'v \Rightarrow 'v$ **where**
 $\text{bijection-}\pi$: *bij* π **and**
 renamed : $E' = \text{rename } \pi \ E$
unfolding *anonymity_R.simps anonymity_G-def*
using *universal-set-carrier-imp-bij-group*
by *auto*
have eq-alts : $\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E' = \text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E$
using *eq-fst-iff rename.simps alternatives- \mathcal{E} .elems renamed*
by *(metis (no-types))*
have $\forall v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E'. (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E') \ v = (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E) (\text{the-inv } \pi \ v)$
unfolding *profile- \mathcal{E} .simps*
using *renamed rename.simps comp-apply prod.collapse snd-conv*
by *(metis (no-types, lifting))*
hence *rewrite*:
 $\forall p. \{v \in (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E'). (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E') \ v = p\}$
 $= \{v \in (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E'). (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E) (\text{the-inv } \pi \ v) = p\}$
by *blast*
have $\forall v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E'. \text{the-inv } \pi \ v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E$
unfolding *voters- \mathcal{E} .simps*
using *renamed UNIV-I bijection- π bij-betw-imp-surj bij-is-inj f-the-inv-into-f*
 $\text{prod.sel inj-image-mem-iff prod.collapse rename.simps}$
by *(metis (no-types, lifting))*
hence
 $\forall p. \forall v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E'. (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E) (\text{the-inv } \pi \ v) = p \longrightarrow$
 $v \in \pi^{-1} \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ v = p\}$
using *bijection- π f-the-inv-into-f-bij-betw image-iff*
by *fastforce*
hence *subset*:
 $\forall p. \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E'. (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E) (\text{the-inv } \pi \ v) = p\} \subseteq$
 $\pi^{-1} \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ v = p\}$
by *blast*
from *renamed* **have** $\forall v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \pi \ v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E'$
unfolding *voters- \mathcal{E} .simps*
using *bijection- π bij-is-inj prod.sel inj-image-mem-iff prod.collapse rename.simps*
by *(metis (mono-tags, lifting))*
hence
 $\forall p. \pi^{-1} \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ v = p\} \subseteq$

$\{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E'. (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E) (\text{the-inv } \pi \ v) = p\}$
using *bijection- π bij-is-inj the-inv-f-f*
by *fastforce*
hence $\forall p. \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E'. (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E') v = p\} = \pi^{-1} \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E) v = p\}$
using *subset rewrite*
by *(simp add: subset-antisym)*
moreover have
 $\forall p. \text{card } (\pi^{-1} \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E) v = p\})$
 $= \text{card } \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E) v = p\}$
using *bijection- π bij-betw-same-card bij-betw-subset top-greatest*
by *(metis (no-types, lifting))*
ultimately show
 $\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E = \text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E' \wedge (E, E') \in \mathcal{E} \times \mathcal{E} \wedge (\forall p. \text{vote-count } p \ E = \text{vote-count } p \ E')$
using *eq-alts assms*
by *simp*
qed

lemma *vote-count-anon-rel:*

fixes

$\mathcal{E} :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election set}$ **and**

$E :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election}$ **and**

$E' :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election}$

assumes

fin-voters-E: finite (voters- $\mathcal{E} \ E)$ and

fin-voters-E': finite (voters- $\mathcal{E} \ E')$ and

default-non-v: $\forall v. v \notin \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E \longrightarrow \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = \{\}$ and

default-non-v': $\forall v. v \notin \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E' \longrightarrow \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E' \ v = \{\}$ and

eq: alternatives- $\mathcal{E} \ E = \text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E' \wedge (E, E') \in \mathcal{E} \times \mathcal{E}$

$\wedge (\forall p. \text{vote-count } p \ E = \text{vote-count } p \ E')$

shows $(E, E') \in \text{anonymity}_{\mathcal{R}} \ \mathcal{E}$

proof –

have $\forall p. \text{card } \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} = \text{card } \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E'. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E' \ v = p\}$

using *eq*

unfolding *vote-count.simps*

by *blast*

moreover have

$\forall p. \text{finite } \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\}$

$\wedge \text{finite } \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E'. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E' \ v = p\}$

using *assms*

by *simp*

ultimately have

$\forall p. \exists \pi_p. \text{bij-betw } \pi_p \ \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\}$

$\{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E'. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E' \ v = p\}$

using *bij-betw-iff-card*

by *blast*

then obtain $\pi :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation} \Rightarrow ('v \Rightarrow 'v) \text{ where}$

$\text{bij: } \forall p. \text{bij-betw } (\pi p) \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\}$
 $\{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E'. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E' \ v = p\}$
by (*metis* (*no-types*))
obtain $\pi' :: 'v \Rightarrow 'v$ **where**
 $\pi'\text{-def: } \forall v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \pi' v = \pi (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v) \ v$
by *fastforce*
hence $\forall v \ v'. v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E \wedge v' \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E \longrightarrow$
 $\pi' v = \pi' v' \longrightarrow \pi (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v) \ v = \pi (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v') \ v'$
by *simp*
moreover have
 $\forall w \ w'. w \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E \wedge w' \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E \longrightarrow \pi (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ w) \ w = \pi$
 $(\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ w') \ w' \longrightarrow$
 $\{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E'. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E' \ v = \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ w\}$
 $\cap \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E'. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E' \ v = \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ w'\} \neq \{\}$
using *bij*
unfolding *bij-betw-def*
by *blast*
moreover have
 $\forall w \ w'.$
 $\{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E'. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E' \ v = \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ w\}$
 $\cap \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E'. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E' \ v = \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ w'\} \neq \{\}$
 $\longrightarrow \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ w = \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ w'$
by *blast*
ultimately have *eq-prof*:
 $\forall v \ v'. v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E \wedge v' \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E \longrightarrow \pi' v = \pi' v' \longrightarrow \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v =$
 $\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v'$
by *presburger*
hence $\forall v \ v'. v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E \wedge v' \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E \longrightarrow \pi' v = \pi' v' \longrightarrow$
 $\pi (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v) \ v = \pi (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v') \ v'$
using $\pi'\text{-def}$
by *metis*
hence $\forall v \ v'. v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E \wedge v' \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E \longrightarrow \pi' v = \pi' v' \longrightarrow v = v'$
using *bij eq-prof*
unfolding *bij-betw-def inj-on-def*
by *simp*
hence *inj*: *inj-on* $\pi' (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E)$
unfolding *inj-on-def*
by *simp*
have $\pi' \text{ ` voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E = \{\pi (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v) \ v \mid v. v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E\}$
using $\pi'\text{-def}$
unfolding *Setcompr-eq-image*
by *simp*
also have
 $\dots = \bigcup \{\pi p \text{ ` } \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} \mid p. p \in \text{UNIV}\}$
unfolding *Union-eq*
by *blast*
also have
 $\dots = \bigcup \{\{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E'. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E' \ v = p\} \mid p. p \in \text{UNIV}\}$
using *bij*

unfolding *bij-betw-def*
by (*metis* (*mono-tags*, *lifting*))
finally have $\pi' \text{ ' voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E = \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E'$
by *blast*
with *inj* **have** *bij'*: $\text{bij-betw } \pi' (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E) (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E')$
using *bij*
unfolding *bij-betw-def*
by *blast*
then obtain $\pi\text{-global} :: 'v \Rightarrow 'v$ **where**
bijection- π_g : *bij* $\pi\text{-global}$ **and**
 $\pi\text{-global-def}$: $\forall v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \pi\text{-global } v = \pi' v$ **and**
 $\pi\text{-global-def}'$:
 $\forall v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E' - \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E.$
 $\pi\text{-global } v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E - \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E' \wedge$
 $(\exists n > 0. n\text{-app } n \ \pi' (\pi\text{-global } v) = v)$ **and**
 $\pi\text{-global-non-voters}$: $\forall v \in \text{UNIV} - \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E - \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E'. \pi\text{-global } v = v$
using *fin-voters-E fin-voters-E' bij-betw-finite-ind-global-bij*
by *blast*
hence *inv*: $\forall v \ v'. (\pi\text{-global } v' = v) = (v' = \text{the-inv } \pi\text{-global } v)$
using *UNIV-I bij-betw-imp-inj-on bij-betw-imp-surj-on f-the-inv-into-f the-inv-f-f*
by *metis*
moreover have
 $\forall v \in \text{UNIV} - (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E' - \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E). \pi\text{-global } v \in \text{UNIV} - (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E$
 $- \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E')$
using $\pi\text{-global-def } \pi\text{-global-non-voters } \text{bij}' \text{ bijection-}\pi_g \text{ DiffD1 DiffD2 DiffI}$
bij-betwE
by (*metis* (*no-types*, *lifting*))
ultimately have $\forall v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E - \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E'. \text{the-inv } \pi\text{-global } v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E}$
 $E' - \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E$
using *bijection- π_g $\pi\text{-global-def}' \text{ DiffD2 DiffI UNIV-I}$*
by *metis*
hence $\forall v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E - \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E'. \forall n > 0. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E (\text{the-inv } \pi\text{-global}$
 $v) = \{\}$
using *default-non-v*
by *simp*
moreover have $\forall v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E - \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E'. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E' v = \{\}$
using *default-non-v'*
by *simp*
ultimately have *case-1*:
 $\forall v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E - \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E'. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E' v = (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \circ \text{the-inv } \pi\text{-global})$
 v
by *auto*
have $\forall v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E'. \exists v' \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \pi\text{-global } v' = v \wedge \pi' v' = v$
using *bij' imageE $\pi\text{-global-def}$*
unfolding *bij-betw-def*
by (*metis* (*mono-tags*, *opaque-lifting*))
hence $\forall v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E'. \exists v' \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. v' = \text{the-inv } \pi\text{-global } v \wedge \pi' v' = v$
using *inv*
by *metis*

hence $\forall v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E'. \text{the-inv } \pi\text{-global } v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E \wedge \pi' (\text{the-inv } \pi\text{-global } v) = v$
by *blast*
moreover have $\forall v' \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E' (\pi' v') = \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v'$
using $\pi'\text{-def } \text{bij } \text{bij-betwE } \text{mem-Collect-eq}$
by *fastforce*
ultimately have *case-2*: $\forall v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E'. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E' v = (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \circ \text{the-inv } \pi\text{-global}) v$
unfolding *comp-def*
by *metis*
have $\forall v \in \text{UNIV} - \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E - \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E'. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E' v = (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \circ \text{the-inv } \pi\text{-global}) v$
using $\pi\text{-global-non-voters } \text{default-non-v } \text{default-non-v'} \text{ inv}$
by *simp*
hence $\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E' = \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \circ \text{the-inv } \pi\text{-global}$
using *case-1 case-2*
by *blast*
moreover have $\pi\text{-global} \text{ ' } (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E) = \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E'$
using $\pi\text{-global-def } \text{bij'} \text{ bij-betw-imp-surj-on}$
by *fastforce*
ultimately have $E' = \text{rename } \pi\text{-global } E$
using *rename.simps eq prod.collapse*
unfolding *voters-}\mathcal{E}.simps profile-}\mathcal{E}.simps alternatives-}\mathcal{E}.simps*
by *metis*
thus *?thesis*
unfolding *extensional-continuation.simps anonymity_R.simps*
rel-induced-by-action.simps φ -anon.simps anonymity_G-def
using *eq bijection- π_g case-prodI rewrite-carrier*
by *auto*
qed

lemma *rename-comp*:

fixes

$\pi :: 'v \Rightarrow 'v$ **and**

$\pi' :: 'v \Rightarrow 'v$

assumes

bij π **and**

bij π'

shows $\text{rename } \pi \circ \text{rename } \pi' = \text{rename } (\pi \circ \pi')$

proof

fix $E :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election}$

have $\text{rename } \pi' E = (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E, \pi' \text{ ' } (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E), (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \circ (\text{the-inv } \pi'))$

unfolding *alternatives-}\mathcal{E}.simps voters-}\mathcal{E}.simps profile-}\mathcal{E}.simps*

using *prod.collapse rename.simps*

by *metis*

hence

$(\text{rename } \pi \circ \text{rename } \pi') E =$

$\text{rename } \pi (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E, \pi' \text{ ' } (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E), (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \circ (\text{the-inv } \pi'))$

unfolding *comp-def*
by *presburger*
also have
 $\dots = (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E, \pi \text{ ' } \pi' \text{ ' } (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E), (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \circ (\text{the-inv } \pi') \circ (\text{the-inv } \pi))$
by *simp*
also have $\dots = (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E, (\pi \circ \pi') \text{ ' } (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E), (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \circ \text{the-inv } (\pi \circ \pi'))$
using *assms the-inv-comp[of π UNIV UNIV π']*
unfolding *comp-def image-image*
by *simp*
finally show $(\text{rename } \pi \circ \text{rename } \pi') \ E = \text{rename } (\pi \circ \pi') \ E$
unfolding *alternatives- \mathcal{E} .simps voters- \mathcal{E} .simps profile- \mathcal{E} .simps*
using *prod.collapse rename.simps*
by *metis*
qed

interpretation *anonymous-group-action:*

group-action anonymity_G valid-elections φ -anon valid-elections

proof (*unfold group-action-def group-hom-def anonymity_G-def group-hom-axioms-def hom-def,*

safe, (rule group-BijGroup)+)

show *bij-car-el:*

$\bigwedge \pi. \pi \in \text{carrier } (\text{BijGroup UNIV}) \implies$

$\varphi\text{-anon valid-elections } \pi \in \text{carrier } (\text{BijGroup valid-elections})$

proof –

fix $\pi :: 'v \Rightarrow 'v$

assume $\pi \in \text{carrier } (\text{BijGroup UNIV})$

hence *bij: bij π*

using *rewrite-carrier*

by *blast*

hence $\text{rename } \pi \text{ ' } \text{valid-elections} = \text{valid-elections}$

using *rename-surj bij*

by *blast*

moreover have *inj-on (rename π) valid-elections*

using *rename-inj bij subset-inj-on*

by *blast*

ultimately have *bij-betw (rename π) valid-elections valid-elections*

unfolding *bij-betw-def*

by *blast*

hence *bij-betw (φ -anon valid-elections π) valid-elections valid-elections*

unfolding *φ -anon.simps extensional-continuation.simps*

using *bij-betw-ext*

by *simp*

moreover have *φ -anon valid-elections $\pi \in \text{extensional valid-elections}$*

unfolding *extensional-def*

by *force*

ultimately show *φ -anon valid-elections $\pi \in \text{carrier } (\text{BijGroup valid-elections})$*

unfolding *BijGroup-def Bij-def*

```

    by simp
qed
fix
   $\pi :: 'v \Rightarrow 'v$  and
   $\pi' :: 'v \Rightarrow 'v$ 
assume
  bij:  $\pi \in \text{carrier } (\text{BijGroup UNIV})$  and
  bij':  $\pi' \in \text{carrier } (\text{BijGroup UNIV})$ 
hence car-els:  $\varphi\text{-anon valid-elections } \pi \in \text{carrier } (\text{BijGroup valid-elections}) \wedge$ 
   $\varphi\text{-anon valid-elections } \pi' \in \text{carrier } (\text{BijGroup valid-elections})$ 
  using bij-car-el
  by metis
hence bij-betw ( $\varphi\text{-anon valid-elections } \pi'$ ) valid-elections valid-elections
  unfolding BijGroup-def Bij-def extensional-def
  by auto
hence valid-closed':  $\varphi\text{-anon valid-elections } \pi' \text{ ' valid-elections } \subseteq \text{valid-elections}$ 
  using bij-betw-imp-surj-on
  by blast
from car-els
have  $\varphi\text{-anon valid-elections } \pi \otimes \text{BijGroup valid-elections } (\varphi\text{-anon valid-elections})$ 
 $\pi' =$ 
  extensional-continuation
  ( $\varphi\text{-anon valid-elections } \pi \circ \varphi\text{-anon valid-elections } \pi'$ ) valid-elections
  using rewrite-mult
  by blast
moreover have
   $\forall E. E \in \text{valid-elections} \longrightarrow$ 
  extensional-continuation
  ( $\varphi\text{-anon valid-elections } \pi \circ \varphi\text{-anon valid-elections } \pi'$ ) valid-elections  $E =$ 
  ( $\varphi\text{-anon valid-elections } \pi \circ \varphi\text{-anon valid-elections } \pi'$ )  $E$ 
  by simp
moreover have
   $\forall E. E \in \text{valid-elections} \longrightarrow$ 
  ( $\varphi\text{-anon valid-elections } \pi \circ \varphi\text{-anon valid-elections } \pi'$ )  $E = \text{rename } \pi$ 
  ( $\text{rename } \pi' E$ )
  unfolding  $\varphi\text{-anon.simps}$ 
  using valid-closed'
  by auto
moreover have  $\forall E. E \in \text{valid-elections} \longrightarrow \text{rename } \pi (\text{rename } \pi' E) = \text{rename}$ 
  ( $\pi \circ \pi'$ )  $E$ 
  using rename-comp bij bij' universal-set-carrier-imp-bij-group comp-apply
  by metis
moreover have
   $\forall E. E \in \text{valid-elections} \longrightarrow$ 
   $\text{rename } (\pi \circ \pi') E = \varphi\text{-anon valid-elections } (\pi \otimes \text{BijGroup UNIV } \pi') E$ 
  using rewrite-mult-univ bij bij'
  unfolding  $\varphi\text{-anon.simps}$ 
  by force
moreover have

```

$\forall E. E \notin \text{valid-elections} \longrightarrow$
extensional-continuation
 $(\varphi\text{-anon valid-elections } \pi \circ \varphi\text{-anon valid-elections } \pi') \text{ valid-elections } E =$
undefined
by simp
moreover have
 $\forall E. E \notin \text{valid-elections} \longrightarrow \varphi\text{-anon valid-elections } (\pi \otimes \text{BijGroup UNIV } \pi') E =$
undefined
by simp
ultimately have
 $\forall E. \varphi\text{-anon valid-elections } (\pi \otimes \text{BijGroup UNIV } \pi') E =$
 $(\varphi\text{-anon valid-elections } \pi \otimes \text{BijGroup valid-elections } \varphi\text{-anon valid-elections } \pi') E$
by metis
thus
 $\varphi\text{-anon valid-elections } (\pi \otimes \text{BijGroup UNIV } \pi') =$
 $\varphi\text{-anon valid-elections } \pi \otimes \text{BijGroup valid-elections } \varphi\text{-anon valid-elections } \pi'$
by blast
qed

lemma (in result) *well-formed-res-anon:*
satisfies $(\lambda E. \text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ \text{UNIV}) \ (\text{Invariance } (\text{anonymity}_{\mathcal{R}} \ \text{valid-elections}))$

proof (unfold anonymity_R.simps, clarsimp) **qed**

1.9.4 Neutrality Lemmas

lemma *rel-rename-helper:*

fixes
 $r :: 'a \text{ rel}$ **and**
 $\pi :: 'a \Rightarrow 'a$ **and**
 $a :: 'a$ **and**
 $b :: 'a$
assumes *bij* π
shows $(\pi a, \pi b) \in \{(\pi x, \pi y) \mid x y. (x, y) \in r\} \longleftrightarrow (a, b) \in \{(x, y) \mid x y. (x, y) \in r\}$
proof (*safe, simp*)
fix
 $x :: 'a$ **and**
 $y :: 'a$
assume
 $(x, y) \in r$ **and**
 $\pi a = \pi x$ **and**
 $\pi b = \pi y$
thus $(a, b) \in r$
using *assms bij-is-inj the-inv-f-f*
by metis
next
fix

```

    x :: 'a and
    y :: 'a
  assume (a, b) ∈ r
  thus ∃ x y. (π a, π b) = (π x, π y) ∧ (x, y) ∈ r
    by metis
qed

lemma rel-rename-comp:
  fixes
    π :: 'a ⇒ 'a and
    π' :: 'a ⇒ 'a
  shows rel-rename (π ∘ π') = rel-rename π ∘ rel-rename π'
proof
  fix r :: 'a rel
  have rel-rename (π ∘ π') r = {(π (π' a), π (π' b)) | a b. (a, b) ∈ r}
    by simp
  also have ... = {(π a, π b) | a b. (a, b) ∈ rel-rename π' r}
    unfolding rel-rename.simps
    by blast
  finally show rel-rename (π ∘ π') r = (rel-rename π ∘ rel-rename π') r
    unfolding comp-def
    by simp
qed

lemma rel-rename-sound:
  fixes
    π :: 'a ⇒ 'a and
    r :: 'a rel and
    A :: 'a set
  assumes inj π
  shows
    refl-on A r ⟶ refl-on (π ' A) (rel-rename π r) and
    antisym r ⟶ antisym (rel-rename π r) and
    total-on A r ⟶ total-on (π ' A) (rel-rename π r) and
    Relation.trans r ⟶ Relation.trans (rel-rename π r)
proof (unfold antisym-def total-on-def Relation.trans-def, safe)
  assume refl-on A r
  thus refl-on (π ' A) (rel-rename π r)
    unfolding refl-on-def rel-rename.simps
    by blast
next
  fix
    a :: 'a and
    b :: 'a
  assume
    (a, b) ∈ rel-rename π r and
    (b, a) ∈ rel-rename π r
  then obtain
    c :: 'a and

```

```

d :: 'a and
c' :: 'a and
d' :: 'a where
  c-rel-d: (c, d) ∈ r and
  d'-rel-c': (d', c') ∈ r and
  πc-eq-a: π c = a and
  πc'-eq-a: π c' = a and
  πd-eq-b: π d = b and
  πd'-eq-b: π d' = b
unfolding rel-rename.simps
by auto
hence c = c' ∧ d = d'
using assms
unfolding inj-def
by presburger
moreover assume ∀ a b. (a, b) ∈ r ⟶ (b, a) ∈ r ⟶ a = b
ultimately have c = d
  using d'-rel-c' c-rel-d
  by simp
thus a = b
  using πc-eq-a πd-eq-b
  by simp
next
fix
  a :: 'a and
  b :: 'a
assume
  total: ∀ x ∈ A. ∀ y ∈ A. x ≠ y ⟶ (x, y) ∈ r ∨ (y, x) ∈ r and
  a-in-A: a ∈ A and
  b-in-A: b ∈ A and
  πa-neq-πb: π a ≠ π b and
  πb-not-rel-πa: (π b, π a) ∉ rel-rename π r
hence (b, a) ∉ r ∧ a ≠ b
  unfolding rel-rename.simps
  by blast
hence (a, b) ∈ r
  using a-in-A b-in-A total
  by blast
thus (π a, π b) ∈ rel-rename π r
  unfolding rel-rename.simps
  by blast
next
fix
  a :: 'a and
  b :: 'a and
  c :: 'a
assume
  (a, b) ∈ rel-rename π r and
  (b, c) ∈ rel-rename π r

```

then obtain
 $d :: 'a$ **and**
 $e :: 'a$ **and**
 $s :: 'a$ **and**
 $t :: 'a$ **where**
 $d\text{-rel-}e: (d, e) \in r$ **and**
 $s\text{-rel-}t: (s, t) \in r$ **and**
 $\pi_d\text{-eq-}a: \pi d = a$ **and**
 $\pi_s\text{-eq-}b: \pi s = b$ **and**
 $\pi_t\text{-eq-}c: \pi t = c$ **and**
 $\pi_e\text{-eq-}b: \pi e = b$
unfolding *alternatives- \mathcal{E} .simps voters- \mathcal{E} .simps profile- \mathcal{E} .simps*
using *rel-rename.simps Pair-inject mem-Collect-eq*
by *auto*
hence $s = e$
using *assms rangeI range-ex1-eq*
by *metis*
hence $(d, e) \in r \wedge (e, t) \in r$
using *d-rel-e s-rel-t*
by *simp*
moreover assume $\forall x y z. (x, y) \in r \longrightarrow (y, z) \in r \longrightarrow (x, z) \in r$
ultimately have $(d, t) \in r$
by *blast*
thus $(a, c) \in \text{rel-rename } \pi r$
unfolding *rel-rename.simps*
using $\pi_d\text{-eq-}a \ \pi_t\text{-eq-}c$
by *blast*
qed

lemma *rel-rename-bij*:
fixes $\pi :: 'a \Rightarrow 'a$
assumes *bij- π : bij π*
shows *bij (rel-rename π)*
proof (*unfold bij-def inj-def surj-def, safe*)
show *subset*:
 $\bigwedge r s a b. \text{rel-rename } \pi r = \text{rel-rename } \pi s \implies (a, b) \in r \implies (a, b) \in s$
proof –
fix
 $r :: 'a \text{ rel}$ **and**
 $s :: 'a \text{ rel}$ **and**
 $a :: 'a$ **and**
 $b :: 'a$
assume
 $\text{rel-rename } \pi r = \text{rel-rename } \pi s$ **and**
 $(a, b) \in r$
hence $(\pi a, \pi b) \in \{(\pi a, \pi b) \mid a b. (a, b) \in s\}$
unfolding *rel-rename.simps*
by *blast*
hence $\exists c d. (c, d) \in s \wedge \pi c = \pi a \wedge \pi d = \pi b$


```

    by fastforce
  moreover have  $\forall c d. \pi c = \pi d \longrightarrow c = d$ 
    using bij- $\pi$  bij-pointE
    by metis
  ultimately show  $(a, b) \in s$ 
    by blast
qed
fix
  r :: 'a rel and
  s :: 'a rel and
  a :: 'a and
  b :: 'a
assume
  rel-rename  $\pi$  r = rel-rename  $\pi$  s and
   $(a, b) \in s$ 
thus  $(a, b) \in r$ 
  using subset
  by presburger
next
fix r :: 'a rel
have rel-rename  $\pi$   $\{((\text{the-inv } \pi) a, (\text{the-inv } \pi) b) \mid a b. (a, b) \in r\} =$ 
   $\{(\pi ((\text{the-inv } \pi) a), \pi ((\text{the-inv } \pi) b)) \mid a b. (a, b) \in r\}$ 
  by auto
also have  $\dots = \{(a, b) \mid a b. (a, b) \in r\}$ 
  using the-inv-f-f bij- $\pi$ 
  by (simp add: f-the-inv-into-f-bij-betw)
finally have rel-rename  $\pi$  (rel-rename (the-inv  $\pi$ ) r) = r
  by simp
thus  $\exists s. r = \text{rel-}i\text{rename } \pi s$ 
  by blast
qed

lemma alternatives-rename-comp:
  fixes
     $\pi :: 'a \Rightarrow 'a$  and
     $\pi' :: 'a \Rightarrow 'a$ 
  shows alternatives-rename  $\pi \circ \text{alternatives-}i\text{rename } \pi' = \text{alternatives-}i\text{rename } (\pi \circ \pi')$ 
proof
  fix  $\mathcal{E} :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election}$ 
  have (alternatives-rename  $\pi \circ \text{alternatives-}i\text{rename } \pi') \mathcal{E}$ 
    =  $(\pi \text{ ' } \pi' \text{ ' } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \mathcal{E}), \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \mathcal{E}, (\text{rel-}i\text{rename } \pi) \circ (\text{rel-}i\text{rename } \pi') \circ$ 
    (profile- $\mathcal{E} \mathcal{E}))$ 
    by (simp add: fun.map-comp)
  also have
     $\dots = ((\pi \circ \pi') \text{ ' } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \mathcal{E}), \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \mathcal{E}, (\text{rel-}i\text{rename } (\pi \circ \pi')) \circ (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \mathcal{E}))$ 
    using rel-rename-comp image-comp
    by metis

```

also have $\dots = \text{alternatives-rename } (\pi \circ \pi') \mathcal{E}$
by *simp*
finally show $(\text{alternatives-rename } \pi \circ \text{alternatives-rename } \pi') \mathcal{E} = \text{alternatives-rename } (\pi \circ \pi') \mathcal{E}$
by *blast*
qed

lemma *alternatives-rename-bij*:

fixes $\pi :: ('a \Rightarrow 'a)$
assumes *bij- π* : *bij π*
shows *bij-betw* $(\text{alternatives-rename } \pi)$ *valid-elections* *valid-elections*
proof $(\text{unfold } \text{bij-betw-def}, \text{ safe}, \text{ intro } \text{inj-onI}, \text{ clarsimp})$
fix
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $A' :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $V :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ **and**
 $p' :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$
assume
 $(A, V, p) \in \text{valid-elections}$ **and**
 $(A', V, p') \in \text{valid-elections}$ **and**
 $\pi\text{-eq-img-}A\text{-}A'$: $\pi \text{ ' } A = \pi \text{ ' } A'$ **and**
 $\text{rel-rename } \pi \circ p = \text{rel-rename } \pi \circ p'$
hence
 $(\text{the-inv } (\text{rel-rename } \pi)) \circ \text{rel-rename } \pi \circ p = (\text{the-inv } (\text{rel-rename } \pi)) \circ \text{rel-rename } \pi \circ p'$
using *fun.map-comp*
by *metis*
also have $(\text{the-inv } (\text{rel-rename } \pi)) \circ \text{rel-rename } \pi = \text{id}$
using *bij- π rel-rename-bij inv-o-cancel surj-imp-inv-eq the-inv-f-f*
unfolding *bij-betw-def*
by $(\text{metis } (\text{no-types}, \text{opaque-lifting}))$
finally have $p = p'$
by *simp*
thus $A = A' \wedge p = p'$
using *bij- π π -eq-img- A - A' bij-betw-imp-inj-on inj-image-eq-iff*
by *metis*
next
fix
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $V :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$
assume *valid-elects*: $(A, V, p) \in \text{valid-elections}$
have *valid-elects-closed*:
 $\bigwedge A' V' p' \pi.$
 $\text{bij } \pi \implies (A', V', p') = \text{alternatives-rename } \pi (A, V, p) \implies$
 $(A', V', p') \in \text{valid-elections}$
proof –
fix

$A' :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $V' :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**
 $p' :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ **and**
 $\pi :: 'a \Rightarrow 'a$
assume *renamed*: $(A', V', p') = \text{alternatives-rename } \pi (A, V, p)$
hence *rewr*: $V = V' \wedge A' = \pi \text{ ` } A$
by *simp*
hence $\forall v \in V'. \text{linear-order-on } A (p \ v)$
using *valid-elects*
unfolding *valid-elections-def profile-def*
by *simp*
moreover have $\forall v \in V'. p' \ v = \text{rel-rename } \pi (p \ v)$
using *renamed*
by *simp*
moreover assume *bij- π* : *bij* π
ultimately have $\forall v \in V'. \text{linear-order-on } A' (p' \ v)$
unfolding *linear-order-on-def partial-order-on-def preorder-on-def*
using *rewr rel-rename-sound bij-is-inj*
by *metis*
thus $(A', V', p') \in \text{valid-elections}$
unfolding *valid-elections-def profile-def*
by *simp*
qed
thus $\bigwedge A' V' p'. (A', V', p') = \text{alternatives-rename } \pi (A, V, p) \implies (A, V, p) \in \text{valid-elections} \implies (A', V', p') \in \text{valid-elections}$
using *bij- π valid-elects*
by *blast*
have $\text{alternatives-rename } (\text{the-inv } \pi) (A, V, p) = ((\text{the-inv } \pi) \text{ ` } A, V, \text{rel-rename } (\text{the-inv } \pi) \circ p)$
by *simp*
also have
 $\text{alternatives-rename } \pi ((\text{the-inv } \pi) \text{ ` } A, V, \text{rel-rename } (\text{the-inv } \pi) \circ p) = (\pi \text{ ` } (\text{the-inv } \pi) \text{ ` } A, V, \text{rel-rename } \pi \circ \text{rel-rename } (\text{the-inv } \pi) \circ p)$
by *auto*
also have $\dots = (A, V, \text{rel-rename } (\pi \circ \text{the-inv } \pi) \circ p)$
using *bij- π rel-rename-comp[of π] the-inv-f-f*
by (*simp add: bij-betw-imp-surj-on bij-is-inj f-the-inv-into-f image-comp*)
also have $(A, V, \text{rel-rename } (\pi \circ \text{the-inv } \pi) \circ p) = (A, V, \text{rel-rename } \text{id} \circ p)$
using *UNIV-I assms comp-apply f-the-inv-into-f-bij-betw id-apply*
by *metis*
finally have $\text{alternatives-rename } \pi (\text{alternatives-rename } (\text{the-inv } \pi) (A, V, p)) = (A, V, p)$
unfolding *rel-rename.simps*
by *auto*
moreover have $\text{alternatives-rename } (\text{the-inv } \pi) (A, V, p) \in \text{valid-elections}$
using *valid-elects-closed bij- π*
by (*simp add: bij-betw-the-inv-into valid-elects*)
ultimately show $(A, V, p) \in \text{alternatives-rename } \pi \text{ ` } \text{valid-elections}$

```

    using image-eqI
    by metis
qed

interpretation  $\varphi$ -neutr-act:
  group-action neutralityG valid-elections  $\varphi$ -neutr valid-elections
proof (unfold group-action-def group-hom-def group-hom-axioms-def hom-def neu-
  tralityG-def,
    safe, (rule group-BijGroup)+)
show bij-car-el:
   $\bigwedge \pi. \pi \in \text{carrier } (\text{BijGroup UNIV}) \implies$ 
   $\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } \pi \in \text{carrier } (\text{BijGroup valid-elections})$ 
proof –
  fix  $\pi :: 'c \Rightarrow 'c$ 
  assume  $\pi \in \text{carrier } (\text{BijGroup UNIV})$ 
  hence bij-betw ( $\varphi$ -neutr valid-elections  $\pi$ ) valid-elections valid-elections
    using universal-set-carrier-imp-bij-group
    unfolding  $\varphi$ -neutr.simps
    using alternatives-rewrite-bij bij-betw-ext
    by metis
  thus  $\varphi$ -neutr valid-elections  $\pi \in \text{carrier } (\text{BijGroup valid-elections})$ 
    unfolding  $\varphi$ -neutr.simps BijGroup-def Bij-def extensional-def
    by simp
qed
fix
   $\pi :: 'a \Rightarrow 'a$  and
   $\pi' :: 'a \Rightarrow 'a$ 
  assume
    bij:  $\pi \in \text{carrier } (\text{BijGroup UNIV})$  and
    bij':  $\pi' \in \text{carrier } (\text{BijGroup UNIV})$ 
  hence car-els:  $\varphi$ -neutr valid-elections  $\pi \in \text{carrier } (\text{BijGroup valid-elections}) \wedge$ 
     $\varphi$ -neutr valid-elections  $\pi' \in \text{carrier } (\text{BijGroup valid-elections})$ 
    using bij-car-el
    by metis
  hence bij-betw ( $\varphi$ -neutr valid-elections  $\pi'$ ) valid-elections valid-elections
    unfolding BijGroup-def Bij-def extensional-def
    by auto
  hence valid-closed':  $\varphi$ -neutr valid-elections  $\pi' \text{ ‘ valid-elections } \subseteq \text{ valid-elections}$ 
    using bij-betw-imp-surj-on
    by blast
  have  $\varphi$ -neutr valid-elections  $\pi \otimes \text{BijGroup valid-elections } \varphi$ -neutr valid-elections
   $\pi' =$ 
    extensional-continuation
    ( $\varphi$ -neutr valid-elections  $\pi \circ \varphi$ -neutr valid-elections  $\pi'$ ) valid-elections
    using car-els rewrite-mult
    by auto
  moreover have
     $\forall \mathcal{E}. \mathcal{E} \in \text{valid-elections} \longrightarrow$ 
    extensional-continuation

```

$(\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } \pi \circ \varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } \pi') \text{ valid-elections } \mathcal{E} =$
 $(\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } \pi \circ \varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } \pi') \mathcal{E}$
by *simp*
moreover have
 $\forall \mathcal{E}. \mathcal{E} \in \text{valid-elections} \longrightarrow$
 $(\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } \pi \circ \varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } \pi') \mathcal{E} =$
 $\text{alternatives-rename } \pi (\text{alternatives-rename } \pi' \mathcal{E})$
unfolding $\varphi\text{-neutr.simps}$
using *valid-closed'*
by *auto*
moreover have
 $\forall \mathcal{E}. \mathcal{E} \in \text{valid-elections}$
 $\longrightarrow \text{alternatives-rename } \pi (\text{alternatives-rename } \pi' \mathcal{E}) = \text{alternatives-rename}$
 $(\pi \circ \pi') \mathcal{E}$
using *alternatives-rename-comp bij bij' comp-apply*
by *metis*
moreover have
 $\forall \mathcal{E}. \mathcal{E} \in \text{valid-elections} \longrightarrow \text{alternatives-rename } (\pi \circ \pi') \mathcal{E} =$
 $\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } (\pi \otimes \text{BijGroup UNIV } \pi') \mathcal{E}$
using *rewrite-mult-univ bij bij'*
unfolding $\varphi\text{-anon.simps}$
by *force*
moreover have
 $\forall \mathcal{E}. \mathcal{E} \notin \text{valid-elections} \longrightarrow$
 $\text{extensional-continuation}$
 $(\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } \pi \circ \varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } \pi') \text{ valid-elections } \mathcal{E} =$
undefined
by *simp*
moreover have
 $\forall \mathcal{E}. \mathcal{E} \notin \text{valid-elections} \longrightarrow \varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } (\pi \otimes \text{BijGroup UNIV } \pi') \mathcal{E}$
 $= \text{undefined}$
by *simp*
ultimately have
 $\forall \mathcal{E}. \varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } (\pi \otimes \text{BijGroup UNIV } \pi') \mathcal{E} =$
 $(\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } \pi \otimes \text{BijGroup valid-elections } \varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } \pi')$
 \mathcal{E}
by *metis*
thus
 $\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } (\pi \otimes \text{BijGroup UNIV } \pi') =$
 $\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } \pi \otimes \text{BijGroup valid-elections } \varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } \pi'$
by *blast*
qed

interpretation $\psi\text{-neutr}_c\text{-act: group-action neutrality}_{\mathcal{G}} \text{ UNIV } \psi\text{-neutr}_c$
proof (*unfold group-action-def group-hom-def hom-def neutrality_G-def group-hom-axioms-def*,

$\text{safe, (rule group-BijGroup)+)$
fix $\pi :: 'a \Rightarrow 'a$
assume $\pi \in \text{carrier } (\text{BijGroup UNIV})$

```

hence bij  $\pi$ 
  unfolding BijGroup-def Bij-def
  by simp
thus  $\psi\text{-neutr}_c \pi \in \text{carrier } (BijGroup \text{ UNIV})$ 
  unfolding  $\psi\text{-neutr}_c.\text{simps}$ 
  using rewrite-carrier
  by blast
next
fix
   $\pi :: 'a \Rightarrow 'a$  and
   $\pi' :: 'a \Rightarrow 'a$ 
show  $\psi\text{-neutr}_c (\pi \otimes BijGroup \text{ UNIV } \pi') =$ 
   $\psi\text{-neutr}_c \pi \otimes BijGroup \text{ UNIV } \psi\text{-neutr}_c \pi'$ 
  unfolding  $\psi\text{-neutr}_c.\text{simps}$ 
  by simp
qed

interpretation  $\psi\text{-neutr}_w\text{-act}$ : group-action neutralityG UNIV  $\psi\text{-neutr}_w$ 
proof (unfold group-action-def group-hom-def hom-def neutralityG-def group-hom-axioms-def,
  safe, (rule group-BijGroup)+)
show group-elem:
   $\bigwedge \pi. \pi \in \text{carrier } (BijGroup \text{ UNIV}) \implies \psi\text{-neutr}_w \pi \in \text{carrier } (BijGroup \text{ UNIV})$ 
proof –
  fix  $\pi :: 'c \Rightarrow 'c$ 
  assume  $\pi \in \text{carrier } (BijGroup \text{ UNIV})$ 
  hence bij  $\pi$ 
    unfolding neutralityG-def BijGroup-def Bij-def
    by simp
  hence bij  $(\psi\text{-neutr}_w \pi)$ 
    unfolding neutralityG-def BijGroup-def Bij-def  $\psi\text{-neutr}_w.\text{simps}$ 
    using rel-rename-bij
    by blast
  thus  $\psi\text{-neutr}_w \pi \in \text{carrier } (BijGroup \text{ UNIV})$ 
    using rewrite-carrier
    by blast
qed
fix
   $\pi :: 'a \Rightarrow 'a$  and
   $\pi' :: 'a \Rightarrow 'a$ 
assume
   $\pi \in \text{carrier } (BijGroup \text{ UNIV})$  and
   $\pi' \in \text{carrier } (BijGroup \text{ UNIV})$ 
moreover from this have
   $\psi\text{-neutr}_w \pi \in \text{carrier } (BijGroup \text{ UNIV}) \wedge \psi\text{-neutr}_w \pi' \in \text{carrier } (BijGroup \text{ UNIV})$ 
  using group-elem
  by blast
ultimately show  $\psi\text{-neutr}_w (\pi \otimes BijGroup \text{ UNIV } \pi') = \psi\text{-neutr}_w \pi \otimes BijGroup \text{ UNIV } \psi\text{-neutr}_w \pi'$ 

```

$\psi\text{-neutr}_w \pi'$
unfolding $\psi\text{-neutr}_w.\text{sims}$
using rel-rename-comp rewrite-mult-univ
by metis
qed

lemma $\text{wf-res-neutr-social-choice}$:
satisfies $(\lambda \mathcal{E}. \text{limit-set-social-choice } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ \mathcal{E}) \ \text{UNIV})$
 $(\text{equivar-ind-by-act } (\text{carrier neutrality}_G) \ \text{valid-elections})$
 $(\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections}) \ (\text{set-action } \psi\text{-neutr}_c))$
proof $(\text{unfold rewrite-equivar-ind-by-act, safe, auto})$ **qed**

lemma $\text{wf-res-neutr-social-welfare}$:
satisfies $(\lambda \mathcal{E}. \text{limit-set-welfare } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ \mathcal{E}) \ \text{UNIV})$
 $(\text{equivar-ind-by-act } (\text{carrier neutrality}_G) \ \text{valid-elections})$
 $(\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections}) \ (\text{set-action } \psi\text{-neutr}_w))$
proof $(\text{unfold rewrite-equivar-ind-by-act voters-}\mathcal{E}.\text{sims profile-}\mathcal{E}.\text{sims set-action.sims, safe})$
show $\text{lim-el-}\pi$:
 $\bigwedge \pi \ A \ V \ p \ r. \ \pi \in \text{carrier neutrality}_G \implies (A, V, p) \in \text{valid-elections} \implies$
 $\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } \pi \ (A, V, p) \in \text{valid-elections} \implies$
 $r \in \text{limit-set-welfare } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ (\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } \pi \ (A, V, p)))$
 $\text{UNIV} \implies$
 $r \in \psi\text{-neutr}_w \ \pi \ ' \ \text{limit-set-welfare } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ (A, V, p)) \ \text{UNIV}$

proof –
fix
 $\pi :: 'c \Rightarrow 'c$ **and**
 $A :: 'c \ \text{set}$ **and**
 $V :: 'v \ \text{set}$ **and**
 $p :: ('c, 'v) \ \text{Profile}$ **and**
 $r :: 'c \ \text{rel}$
let $?r\text{-inv} = \psi\text{-neutr}_w \ (\text{the-inv } \pi) \ r$
assume
 $\text{carrier-}\pi: \pi \in \text{carrier neutrality}_G$ **and**
 $\text{prof}: (A, V, p) \in \text{valid-elections}$ **and**
 $\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } \pi \ (A, V, p) \in \text{valid-elections}$ **and**
 $\text{lim-el}: r \in \text{limit-set-welfare } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ (\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } \pi \ (A, V, p)))$ UNIV
hence $\text{inv-carrier}: \text{the-inv } \pi \in \text{carrier neutrality}_G$
unfolding $\text{neutrality}_G\text{-def}$ rewrite-carrier
using $\text{bij-betw-the-inv-into}$
by simp
moreover have $\text{the-inv } \pi \circ \pi = \text{id}$
using $\text{carrier-}\pi \ \text{universal-set-carrier-imp-bij-group}$ $\text{bij-is-inj the-inv-f-f}$
unfolding $\text{neutrality}_G\text{-def}$
by fastforce
moreover have $1 \ \text{neutrality}_G = \text{id}$
unfolding $\text{neutrality}_G\text{-def}$ BijGroup-def
by auto

```

ultimately have the-inv  $\pi \otimes \text{neutrality}_{\mathcal{G}} \pi = \mathbf{1}$   $\text{neutrality}_{\mathcal{G}}$ 
  using carrier- $\pi$ 
  unfolding  $\text{neutrality}_{\mathcal{G}}\text{-def}$ 
  using rewrite-mult-univ
  by metis
hence inv-eq: inv  $\text{neutrality}_{\mathcal{G}} \pi = \text{the-inv } \pi$ 
using carrier- $\pi$  inv-carrier  $\psi\text{-neutr}_{\mathcal{C}}\text{-act.group-hom group.inv-closed group.inv-solve-right}$ 
      group.l-inv group-BijGroup group-hom.hom-one group-hom.one-closed
  unfolding  $\text{neutrality}_{\mathcal{G}}\text{-def}$ 
  by metis
have  $r \in \text{limit-set-welfare } (\pi \text{ ' } A) \text{ UNIV}$ 
  unfolding  $\varphi\text{-neutr.simps}$ 
  using prof lim-el
  by simp
hence lin: linear-order-on  $(\pi \text{ ' } A) \ r$ 
  by auto
have bij-inv: bij  $(\text{the-inv } \pi)$ 
  using carrier- $\pi$  bij-betw-the-inv-into universal-set-carrier-imp-bij-group
  unfolding  $\text{neutrality}_{\mathcal{G}}\text{-def}$ 
  by blast
hence  $(\text{the-inv } \pi) \text{ ' } \pi \text{ ' } A = A$ 
  using carrier- $\pi$  UNIV-I bij-betw-imp-surj universal-set-carrier-imp-bij-group
      f-the-inv-into-f-bij-betw image-f-inv-f surj-imp-inv-eq
  unfolding  $\text{neutrality}_{\mathcal{G}}\text{-def}$ 
  by metis
hence lin-inv: linear-order-on  $A \ ?r\text{-inv}$ 
  using rel-rename-sound bij-inv lin bij-is-inj
  unfolding  $\psi\text{-neutr}_{\mathcal{W}}\text{-simps linear-order-on-def preorder-on-def partial-order-on-def}$ 
  by metis
hence  $\forall a \ b. (a, b) \in ?r\text{-inv} \longrightarrow a \in A \wedge b \in A$ 
  using linear-order-on-def partial-order-onD(1) refl-on-def
  by blast
hence limit  $A \ ?r\text{-inv} = \{(a, b). (a, b) \in ?r\text{-inv}\}$ 
  by auto
also have  $\dots = ?r\text{-inv}$ 
  by blast
finally have  $\dots = \text{limit } A \ ?r\text{-inv}$ 
  by blast
hence  $?r\text{-inv} \in \text{limit-set-welfare } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} (A, V, p)) \text{ UNIV}$ 
  unfolding limit-set-welfare.simps
  using lin-inv UNIV-I fst-conv mem-Collect-eq alternatives- $\mathcal{E}.\text{elims}$ 
      iso-tuple-UNIV-I CollectI
  by (metis (mono-tags, lifting))
moreover have  $r = \psi\text{-neutr}_{\mathcal{W}} \pi \ ?r\text{-inv}$ 
  using carrier- $\pi$  inv-eq inv-carrier iso-tuple-UNIV-I  $\psi\text{-neutr}_{\mathcal{W}}\text{-act.orbit-sym-aux}$ 
  by metis
ultimately show  $r \in \psi\text{-neutr}_{\mathcal{W}} \pi \text{ ' } \text{limit-set-welfare } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} (A, V, p))$ 
UNIV
  by blast

```


qed
fix
 $\pi :: 'a \Rightarrow 'a$ **and**
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $V :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ **and**
 $r :: 'a \text{ rel}$
let $?r\text{-inv} = \psi\text{-neutr}_w (\text{the-inv } \pi) \ r$
assume
 $\text{carrier-}\pi: \pi \in \text{carrier neutrality}_G$ **and**
 $\text{prof}: (A, V, p) \in \text{valid-elections}$ **and**
 $\text{prof-}\pi: \varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } \pi (A, V, p) \in \text{valid-elections}$ **and**
 $r \in \text{limit-set-welfare } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} (A, V, p)) \text{ UNIV}$
hence
 $r \in \text{limit-set-welfare } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} (\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } (\text{inv neutrality}_G \pi) (\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } \pi (A, V, p)))) \text{ UNIV}$
using $\varphi\text{-neutr-act.orbit-sym-aux}$
by *metis*
moreover have $\text{inv-group-elem: inv neutrality}_G \pi \in \text{carrier neutrality}_G$
using $\text{carrier-}\pi \ \psi\text{-neutr}_c\text{-act.group-hom}$
 $\text{group.inv-closed group-hom-def}$
by *metis*
moreover have
 $\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } (\text{inv neutrality}_G \pi)$
 $(\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } \pi (A, V, p)) \in \text{valid-elections}$
using $\text{prof } \varphi\text{-neutr-act.element-image inv-group-elem prof-}\pi$
by *metis*
ultimately have
 $r \in \psi\text{-neutr}_w (\text{inv neutrality}_G \pi) \text{ ‘}$
 $\text{limit-set-welfare } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} (\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } \pi (A, V, p)))$
UNIV
using $\text{prof-}\pi \ \text{lim-el-}\pi \ \text{prod.collapse}$
by *metis*
thus
 $\psi\text{-neutr}_w \pi \ r \in \text{limit-set-welfare } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} (\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } \pi (A, V, p))) \text{ UNIV}$
using $\text{carrier-}\pi \ \psi\text{-neutr}_w\text{-act.group-action-axioms}$
 $\psi\text{-neutr}_w\text{-act.inj-prop group-action.orbit-sym-aux}$
 $\text{inj-image-mem-iff inv-group-elem iso-tuple-UNIV-I}$
by *(metis (no-types, lifting))*
qed

1.9.5 Homogeneity Lemmas

lemma *refl-homogeneity $_{\mathcal{R}}$* :
fixes $\mathcal{E} :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election set}$
assumes $\mathcal{E} \subseteq \text{finite-voter-elections}$
shows *refl-on* \mathcal{E} *(homogeneity $_{\mathcal{R}}$ \mathcal{E})*
using *assms*

unfolding *refl-on-def finite-voter-elections-def*
by *auto*

lemma (**in** *result*) *well-formed-res-homogeneity*:
satisfies ($\lambda \mathcal{E}. \text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ \mathcal{E}) \text{ UNIV}$) (*Invariance* (*homogeneity* _{\mathcal{R}}
UNIV))
by *simp*

lemma *refl-homogeneity* _{\mathcal{R}'} :
fixes $\mathcal{E} :: ('a, 'v::\text{linorder}) \text{ Election set}$
assumes $\mathcal{E} \subseteq \text{finite-voter-elections}$
shows *refl-on* \mathcal{E} (*homogeneity* _{\mathcal{R}'} \mathcal{E})
using *assms*
unfolding *homogeneity* _{\mathcal{R}'} .*simps* *refl-on-def finite-voter-elections-def*
by *auto*

lemma (**in** *result*) *well-formed-res-homogeneity* _{\mathcal{R}'} :
satisfies ($\lambda \mathcal{E}. \text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ \mathcal{E}) \text{ UNIV}$) (*Invariance* (*homogeneity* _{\mathcal{R}'}
UNIV))
by *simp*

1.9.6 Reversal Symmetry Lemmas

lemma *rev-rev-id*: *rev-rel* \circ *rev-rel* = *id*
by *auto*

lemma *rev-rel-limit*:
fixes
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $r :: 'a \text{ rel}$
shows *rev-rel* (*limit* $A \ r$) = *limit* A (*rev-rel* r)
unfolding *rev-rel.simps* *limit.simps*
by *blast*

lemma *rev-rel-lin-ord*:
fixes
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $r :: 'a \text{ rel}$
assumes *linear-order-on* $A \ r$
shows *linear-order-on* A (*rev-rel* r)
using *assms*
unfolding *rev-rel.simps* *linear-order-on-def* *partial-order-on-def*
total-on-def *antisym-def* *preorder-on-def* *refl-on-def* *trans-def*
by *blast*

interpretation *reversal* _{\mathcal{G}} -*group*: *group* *reversal* _{\mathcal{G}}
proof
show **1** *reversal* _{\mathcal{G}} \in *carrier* *reversal* _{\mathcal{G}}
unfolding *reversal* _{\mathcal{G}} -*def*

```

    by simp
next
  show carrier reversalG ⊆ Units reversalG
    unfolding reversalG-def Units-def
    using rev-rev-id
    by auto
next
  fix α :: 'a rel ⇒ 'a rel
  show α ⊗ reversalG 1 reversalG = α
    unfolding reversalG-def
    by auto
  assume α-elem: α ∈ carrier reversalG
  thus 1 reversalG ⊗ reversalG α = α
    unfolding reversalG-def
    by auto
  fix α' :: 'a rel ⇒ 'a rel
  assume α'-elem: α' ∈ carrier reversalG
  thus α ⊗ reversalG α' ∈ carrier reversalG
    using α-elem rev-rev-id
    unfolding reversalG-def
    by auto
  fix z :: 'a rel ⇒ 'a rel
  assume z ∈ carrier reversalG
  thus α ⊗ reversalG α' ⊗ reversalG z = α ⊗ reversalG (α' ⊗ reversalG z)
    using α-elem α'-elem
    unfolding reversalG-def
    by auto
qed

interpretation φ-rev-act: group-action reversalG valid-elections φ-rev valid-elections
proof (unfold group-action-def group-hom-def group-hom-axioms-def hom-def,
  safe, rule group-BijGroup)
  show car-el:
    ⋀ π. π ∈ carrier reversalG ⇒ φ-rev valid-elections π ∈ carrier (BijGroup
    valid-elections)
  proof –
    fix π :: 'c rel ⇒ 'c rel
    assume π ∈ carrier reversalG
    hence π-cases: π ∈ {id, rev-rel}
      unfolding reversalG-def
      by auto
    hence inv-rel-app: rel-app π ∘ rel-app π = id
      using rev-rev-id
      by fastforce
    have id: ∀ E. rel-app π (rel-app π E) = E
      by (simp add: inv-rel-app pointfree-idE)
    have ∀ E ∈ valid-elections. rel-app π E ∈ valid-elections
      unfolding valid-elections-def profile-def
      using π-cases rev-rel-lin-ord rel-app.simps fun.map-id

```

```

    by fastforce
  hence rel-app  $\pi$  ' valid-elections  $\subseteq$  valid-elections
    by blast
  with id have bij-betw (rel-app  $\pi$ ) valid-elections valid-elections
    using bij-betw-byWitness[of valid-elections]
    by blast
  hence bij-betw ( $\varphi$ -rev valid-elections  $\pi$ ) valid-elections valid-elections
    unfolding  $\varphi$ -rev.simps
    using bij-betw-ext
    by blast
  moreover have  $\varphi$ -rev valid-elections  $\pi \in$  extensional valid-elections
    unfolding extensional-def
    by simp
  ultimately show  $\varphi$ -rev valid-elections  $\pi \in$  carrier (BijGroup valid-elections)
    unfolding BijGroup-def Bij-def
    by simp
qed
fix
 $\pi :: 'a \text{ rel} \Rightarrow 'a \text{ rel}$  and
 $\pi' :: 'a \text{ rel} \Rightarrow 'a \text{ rel}$ 
assume
  rev:  $\pi \in$  carrier reversalG and
  rev':  $\pi' \in$  carrier reversalG
hence  $\varphi$ -rev valid-elections ( $\pi \otimes \text{reversal}_G \pi'$ ) =
  extensional-continuation (rel-app ( $\pi \circ \pi'$ )) valid-elections
  unfolding reversalG-def
  by simp
also have rel-app ( $\pi \circ \pi'$ ) = rel-app  $\pi \circ$  rel-app  $\pi'$ 
  using rel-app.simps
  by fastforce
finally have rewrite:
   $\varphi$ -rev valid-elections ( $\pi \otimes \text{reversal}_G \pi'$ ) =
  extensional-continuation (rel-app  $\pi \circ$  rel-app  $\pi'$ ) valid-elections
  by blast
have  $\forall \mathcal{E} \in$  valid-elections.  $\varphi$ -rev valid-elections  $\pi' \mathcal{E} \in$  valid-elections
  using car-el rev'
  unfolding BijGroup-def Bij-def bij-betw-def
  by auto
hence extensional-continuation
  ( $\varphi$ -rev valid-elections  $\pi \circ \varphi$ -rev valid-elections  $\pi'$ ) valid-elections =
  extensional-continuation (rel-app  $\pi \circ$  rel-app  $\pi'$ ) valid-elections
  unfolding extensional-continuation.simps  $\varphi$ -rev.simps
  by fastforce
also have
  extensional-continuation ( $\varphi$ -rev valid-elections  $\pi \circ \varphi$ -rev valid-elections  $\pi'$ )
valid-elections
  =  $\varphi$ -rev valid-elections  $\pi \otimes$  BijGroup valid-elections  $\varphi$ -rev valid-elections  $\pi'$ 
  using car-el rewrite-mult rev rev'
  by metis

```

finally show
 $\varphi\text{-rev valid-elections } (\pi \otimes \text{reversal}_G \pi') =$
 $\varphi\text{-rev valid-elections } \pi \otimes \text{BijGroup valid-elections } \varphi\text{-rev valid-elections } \pi'$
using *rewrite*
by *metis*
qed

interpretation $\psi\text{-rev-act: group-action reversal}_G \text{ UNIV } \psi\text{-rev}$
proof (*unfold group-action-def group-hom-def group-hom-axioms-def hom-def $\psi\text{-rev.simps}$, safe, rule group-BijGroup*)
fix $\pi :: 'a \text{ rel} \Rightarrow 'a \text{ rel}$
show *bij: $\bigwedge \pi. \pi \in \text{carrier reversal}_G \implies \pi \in \text{carrier (BijGroup UNIV)}$*
proof –
fix $\pi :: 'b \text{ rel} \Rightarrow 'b \text{ rel}$
assume $\pi \in \text{carrier reversal}_G$
hence $\pi \in \{id, \text{rev-rel}\}$
unfolding *reversal_G-def*
by *auto*
hence *bij π*
using *rev-rev-id bij-id insertE o-bij singleton-iff*
by *metis*
thus $\pi \in \text{carrier (BijGroup UNIV)}$
using *rewrite-carrier*
by *blast*
qed

fix
 $\pi :: 'a \text{ rel} \Rightarrow 'a \text{ rel}$ **and**
 $\pi' :: 'a \text{ rel} \Rightarrow 'a \text{ rel}$
assume
 $\text{rev: } \pi \in \text{carrier reversal}_G$ **and**
 $\text{rev': } \pi' \in \text{carrier reversal}_G$
hence $\pi \otimes \text{BijGroup UNIV } \pi' = \pi \circ \pi'$
using *bij rewrite-mult-univ*
by *blast*
also from *rev rev' have* $\dots = \pi \otimes \text{reversal}_G \pi'$
unfolding *reversal_G-def*
by *simp*
finally show $\pi \otimes \text{reversal}_G \pi' = \pi \otimes \text{BijGroup UNIV } \pi'$
by *simp*
qed

lemma $\varphi\text{-}\psi\text{-rev-well-formed:}$
shows *satisfies $(\lambda \mathcal{E}. \text{limit-set-welfare (alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \mathcal{E}) \text{ UNIV})$*
(equivar-ind-by-act (carrier reversal_G) valid-elections
($\varphi\text{-rev valid-elections}$) (set-action $\psi\text{-rev}$))
proof (*unfold rewrite-equivar-ind-by-act, clarify*)
fix
 $\pi :: 'a \text{ rel} \Rightarrow 'a \text{ rel}$ **and**
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**

$V :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$
assume
 $\pi \in \text{carrier reversal}_{\mathcal{G}}$ **and**
 $(A, V, p) \in \text{valid-elections}$
moreover from this have cases: $\pi \in \{id, \text{rev-rel}\}$
unfolding $\text{reversal}_{\mathcal{G}}\text{-def}$
by auto
ultimately have $\text{eq-}A$: $\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} (\varphi\text{-rev valid-elections } \pi (A, V, p)) = A$
by simp
have
 $\forall r \in \{\text{limit } A \ r \mid r. r \in \text{UNIV} \wedge \text{linear-order-on } A (\text{limit } A \ r)\}. \exists r' \in \text{UNIV}.$
 $\text{rev-rel } r = \text{limit } A (\text{rev-rel } r') \wedge$
 $\text{rev-rel } r' \in \text{UNIV} \wedge \text{linear-order-on } A (\text{limit } A (\text{rev-rel } r'))$
using $\text{rev-rel-limit[of } A] \text{ rev-rel-lin-ord[of } A]$
by force
hence
 $\forall r \in \{\text{limit } A \ r \mid r. r \in \text{UNIV} \wedge \text{linear-order-on } A (\text{limit } A \ r)\}.$
 $\text{rev-rel } r \in$
 $\{\text{limit } A (\text{rev-rel } r') \mid r'. \text{rev-rel } r' \in \text{UNIV} \wedge \text{linear-order-on } A (\text{limit } A$
 $(\text{rev-rel } r'))\}$
by blast
moreover have
 $\{\text{limit } A (\text{rev-rel } r') \mid r'. \text{rev-rel } r' \in \text{UNIV} \wedge \text{linear-order-on } A (\text{limit } A (\text{rev-rel}$
 $r'))\} \subseteq$
 $\{\text{limit } A \ r \mid r. r \in \text{UNIV} \wedge \text{linear-order-on } A (\text{limit } A \ r)\}$
by blast
ultimately have $\forall r \in \text{limit-set-welfare } A \ \text{UNIV}. \text{rev-rel } r \in \text{limit-set-welfare}$
 $A \ \text{UNIV}$
unfolding $\text{limit-set-welfare.simps}$
by blast
hence subset: $\forall r \in \text{limit-set-welfare } A \ \text{UNIV}. \pi \ r \in \text{limit-set-welfare } A \ \text{UNIV}$
using cases
by fastforce
hence $\forall r \in \text{limit-set-welfare } A \ \text{UNIV}. r \in \pi \text{ ' limit-set-welfare } A \ \text{UNIV}$
using $\text{rev-rel-id comp-apply empty-iff id-apply image-eqI insert-iff cases}$
by metis
hence $\pi \text{ ' limit-set-welfare } A \ \text{UNIV} = \text{limit-set-welfare } A \ \text{UNIV}$
using subset
by blast
hence set-action $\psi\text{-rev } \pi (\text{limit-set-welfare } A \ \text{UNIV}) = \text{limit-set-welfare } A \ \text{UNIV}$
unfolding set-action.simps
by simp
also have
 $\dots = \text{limit-set-welfare } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} (\varphi\text{-rev valid-elections } \pi (A, V, p))) \ \text{UNIV}$
using $\text{eq-}A$
by simp
finally show
 $\text{limit-set-welfare } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} (\varphi\text{-rev valid-elections } \pi (A, V, p))) \ \text{UNIV} =$

```

      set-action  $\psi$ -rev  $\pi$  (limit-set-welfare (alternatives- $\mathcal{E}$  ( $A$ ,  $V$ ,  $p$ )) UNIV)
    by simp
qed

end

```

1.10 Result-Dependent Voting Rule Properties

```

theory Property-Interpretations
  imports Voting-Symmetry
          Result-Interpretations
begin

```

1.10.1 Properties Dependent on the Result Type

The interpretation of equivariance properties generally depends on the result type. For example, neutrality for social choice rules means that single winners are renamed when the candidates in the votes are consistently renamed. For social welfare results, the complete result rankings must be renamed. New result-type-dependent definitions for properties can be added here.

```

locale result-properties = result +
  fixes  $\psi$ -neutr :: ('a  $\Rightarrow$  'a, 'b) binary-fun and
         $\mathcal{E}$  :: ('a, 'v) Election
  assumes
    act-neutr: group-action neutralityG UNIV  $\psi$ -neutr and
    well-formed-res-neutr:
      satisfies ( $\lambda$   $\mathcal{E}$  :: ('a, 'v) Election. limit-set (alternatives- $\mathcal{E}$   $\mathcal{E}$ ) UNIV)
        (equivar-ind-by-act (carrier neutralityG)
          valid-elections ( $\varphi$ -neutr valid-elections) (set-action  $\psi$ -neutr))

sublocale result-properties  $\subseteq$  result
  using result-axioms
  by simp

```

1.10.2 Interpretations

```

global-interpretation social-choice-properties:
  result-properties well-formed-social-choice limit-set-social-choice  $\psi$ -neutrc
  unfolding result-properties-def result-properties-axioms-def
  using wf-res-neutr-social-choice  $\psi$ -neutrc-act.group-action-axioms
    social-choice-result.result-axioms
  by blast

```

```

global-interpretation social-welfare-properties:
  result-properties well-formed-welfare limit-set-welfare  $\psi$ -neutrw
  unfolding result-properties-def result-properties-axioms-def

```

```

using wf-res-neutr-social-welfare  $\psi$ -neutrw-act.group-action-axioms
      social-welfare-result.result-axioms
by blast

end

```

1.11 Preference List

```

theory Preference-List
  imports ../Preference-Relation
          HOL-Combinatorics.Multiset-Permutations
          List-Index.List-Index
begin

```

Preference lists derive from preference relations, ordered from most to least preferred alternative.

1.11.1 Well-Formedness

```

type-synonym 'a Preference-List = 'a list

```

```

abbreviation well-formed-l :: 'a Preference-List  $\Rightarrow$  bool where
  well-formed-l l  $\equiv$  distinct l

```

1.11.2 Auxiliary Lemmas About Lists

```

lemma is-arg-min-equal:
  fixes
    f :: 'a  $\Rightarrow$  'b::ord and
    g :: 'a  $\Rightarrow$  'b and
    S :: 'a set and
    x :: 'a
  assumes  $\forall x \in S. f\ x = g\ x$ 
  shows is-arg-min f ( $\lambda s. s \in S$ ) x = is-arg-min g ( $\lambda s. s \in S$ ) x
proof (unfold is-arg-min-def, cases x  $\notin$  S, clarsimp)
  case x-in-S: False
  thus ( $x \in S \wedge (\nexists y. y \in S \wedge f\ y < f\ x)$ ) = ( $x \in S \wedge (\nexists y. y \in S \wedge g\ y < g\ x)$ )
  proof (cases  $\exists y. (\lambda s. s \in S) y \wedge f\ y < f\ x$ )
  case y: True
  then obtain y :: 'a where
    ( $\lambda s. s \in S$ ) y  $\wedge$  f y < f x
  by metis
  hence ( $\lambda s. s \in S$ ) y  $\wedge$  g y < g x
  using x-in-S assms
  by metis
  thus ?thesis
  using y

```



```

    by metis
next
case not-y: False
have  $\neg (\exists y. (\lambda s. s \in S) y \wedge g y < g x)$ 
proof (safe)
  fix y :: 'a
  assume
    y-in-S:  $y \in S$  and
    g-y-lt-g-x:  $g y < g x$ 
  have f-eq-g-for-elems-in-S:  $\forall a. a \in S \longrightarrow f a = g a$ 
    using assms
    by simp
  hence  $g x = f x$ 
    using x-in-S
    by presburger
  thus False
    using f-eq-g-for-elems-in-S g-y-lt-g-x not-y y-in-S
    by (metis (no-types))
qed
thus ?thesis
  using x-in-S not-y
  by simp
qed
qed

```

lemma *list-cons-presv-finiteness*:

```

fixes
  A :: 'a set and
  S :: 'a list set
assumes
  fin-A: finite A and
  fin-B: finite S
shows finite {a#l | a l. a ∈ A ∧ l ∈ S}
proof -
  let ?P =  $\lambda A. \text{finite } \{a\#l \mid a l. a \in A \wedge l \in S\}$ 
  have  $\forall a A'. \text{finite } A' \longrightarrow a \notin A' \longrightarrow ?P A' \longrightarrow ?P (\text{insert } a A')$ 
  proof (safe)
    fix
      a :: 'a and
      A' :: 'a set
    assume finite {a#l | a l. a ∈ A' ∧ l ∈ S}
    moreover have
       $\{a'\#l \mid a' l. a' \in \text{insert } a A' \wedge l \in S\} =$ 
       $\{a\#l \mid a l. a \in A' \wedge l \in S\} \cup \{a\#l \mid l. l \in S\}$ 
    by blast
    moreover have finite {a#l | l. l ∈ S}
      using fin-B
      by simp
    ultimately have finite {a'#l | a' l. a' ∈ insert a A' ∧ l ∈ S}

```

```

    by simp
  thus ?P (insert a A')
    by simp
qed
moreover have ?P {}
  by simp
ultimately show ?P A
  using finite-induct[of A ?P] fin-A
  by simp
qed

lemma listset-finiteness:
  fixes l :: 'a set list
  assumes  $\forall i::nat. i < \text{length } l \longrightarrow \text{finite } (!i)$ 
  shows finite (listset l)
  using assms
proof (induct l, simp)
  case (Cons a l)
  fix
    a :: 'a set and
    l :: 'a set list
  assume
    elems-fin-then-set-fin:  $\forall i::nat < \text{length } l. \text{finite } (!i) \implies \text{finite } (\text{listset } l)$  and
    fin-all-elems:  $\forall i::nat < \text{length } (a\#l). \text{finite } ((a\#l)!i)$ 
  hence finite a
    by auto
  moreover from fin-all-elems
  have  $\forall i < \text{length } l. \text{finite } (!i)$ 
    by auto
  hence finite (listset l)
    using elems-fin-then-set-fin
    by simp
  ultimately have finite {a'#l' | a' l'. a'  $\in$  a  $\wedge$  l'  $\in$  (listset l)}
    using list-cons-presv-finiteness
    by auto
  thus finite (listset (a#l))
    by (simp add: set-Cons-def)
qed

lemma all-ls-elems-same-len:
  fixes l :: 'a set list
  shows  $\forall l':('a \text{ list}). l' \in \text{listset } l \longrightarrow \text{length } l' = \text{length } l$ 
proof (induct l, simp)
  case (Cons a l)
  fix
    a :: 'a set and
    l :: 'a set list
  assume  $\forall l'. l' \in \text{listset } l \longrightarrow \text{length } l' = \text{length } l$ 
  moreover have

```

$\forall a' l'::('a \text{ set list}). \text{listset } (a' \# l') = \{b \# m \mid b \in a' \wedge m \in \text{listset } l'\}$
 by (simp add: set-Cons-def)
 ultimately show $\forall l'. l' \in \text{listset } (a \# l) \longrightarrow \text{length } l' = \text{length } (a \# l)$
 using local.Cons
 by force
 qed

lemma *all-ls-elems-in-ls-set*:
 fixes $l :: 'a \text{ set list}$
 shows $\forall l' i::\text{nat}. l' \in \text{listset } l \wedge i < \text{length } l' \longrightarrow l'!i \in !i$
proof (induct l , simp, safe)
 case (Cons $a \ l$)
 fix
 $a :: 'a \text{ set}$ and
 $l :: 'a \text{ set list}$ and
 $l' :: 'a \text{ list}$ and
 $i :: \text{nat}$
 assume *elems-in-set-then-elems-pos*:
 $\forall l' i::\text{nat}. l' \in \text{listset } l \wedge i < \text{length } l' \longrightarrow l'!i \in !i$ and
l-prime-in-set-a-l: $l' \in \text{listset } (a \# l)$ and
i-lt-len-l-prime: $i < \text{length } l'$
 have $l' \in \text{set-Cons } a \ (\text{listset } l)$
 using *l-prime-in-set-a-l*
 by simp
 hence $l' \in \{m. \exists b m'. m = b \# m' \wedge b \in a \wedge m' \in (\text{listset } l)\}$
 unfolding *set-Cons-def*
 by simp
 hence $\exists b m. l' = b \# m \wedge b \in a \wedge m \in (\text{listset } l)$
 by simp
 thus $l'!i \in (a \# l)!i$
 using *elems-in-set-then-elems-pos* *i-lt-len-l-prime* *nth-Cons-Suc*
 $\text{Suc-less-eq gr0-conv-Suc length-Cons nth-non-equal-first-eq}$
 by metis
 qed

lemma *all-ls-in-ls-set*:
 fixes $l :: 'a \text{ set list}$
 shows $\forall l'. \text{length } l' = \text{length } l \wedge (\forall i < \text{length } l'. l'!i \in !i) \longrightarrow l' \in \text{listset } l$
proof (induction l , safe, simp)
 case (Cons $a \ l$)
 fix
 $l :: 'a \text{ set list}$ and
 $l' :: 'a \text{ list}$ and
 $s :: 'a \text{ set}$
 assume
all-ls-in-ls-set-induct:
 $\forall m. \text{length } m = \text{length } l \wedge (\forall i < \text{length } m. m!i \in !i) \longrightarrow m \in \text{listset } l$ and
len-eq: $\text{length } l' = \text{length } (s \# l)$ and
elems-pos-in-cons-ls-pos: $\forall i < \text{length } l'. l'!i \in (s \# l)!i$

```

then obtain  $t$  and  $x$  where
   $l'-cons: l' = x \# t$ 
  using  $length-Suc-conv$ 
  by  $metis$ 
hence  $x \in s$ 
  using  $elems-pos-in-cons-ls-pos$ 
  by  $force$ 
moreover have  $t \in listset\ l$ 
  using  $l'-cons\ all-ls-in-ls-set-induct\ len-eq\ diff-Suc-1\ diff-Suc-eq-diff-pred$ 
     $elems-pos-in-cons-ls-pos\ length-Cons\ nth-Cons-Suc\ zero-less-diff$ 
  by  $metis$ 
ultimately show  $l' \in listset\ (s \# l)$ 
  using  $l'-cons$ 
  unfolding  $listset-def\ set-Cons-def$ 
  by  $simp$ 
qed

```

1.11.3 Ranking

Rank 1 is the top preference, rank 2 the second, and so on. Rank 0 does not exist.

```

fun  $rank-l :: 'a\ Preference-List \Rightarrow 'a \Rightarrow nat$  where
   $rank-l\ l\ a = (if\ a \in set\ l\ then\ index\ l\ a + 1\ else\ 0)$ 

fun  $rank-l-idx :: 'a\ Preference-List \Rightarrow 'a \Rightarrow nat$  where
   $rank-l-idx\ l\ a =$ 
     $(let\ i = index\ l\ a\ in$ 
       $if\ i = length\ l\ then\ 0\ else\ i + 1)$ 

```

```

lemma  $rank-l-equiv: rank-l = rank-l-idx$ 
unfolding  $member-def$ 
by  $(simp\ add: ext\ index-size-conv)$ 

```

```

lemma  $rank-zero-imp-not-present:$ 
fixes
   $p :: 'a\ Preference-List$  and
   $a :: 'a$ 
assumes  $rank-l\ p\ a = 0$ 
shows  $a \notin set\ p$ 
using  $assms$ 
by  $force$ 

```

```

definition  $above-l :: 'a\ Preference-List \Rightarrow 'a \Rightarrow 'a\ Preference-List$  where
   $above-l\ r\ a \equiv take\ (rank-l\ r\ a)\ r$ 

```

1.11.4 Definition

```

fun  $is-less-preferred-than-l :: 'a \Rightarrow 'a\ Preference-List \Rightarrow 'a$ 
   $\Rightarrow bool\ (- \lesssim - [50, 1000, 51]\ 50)$  where

```

$$a \lesssim_l b = (a \in \text{set } l \wedge b \in \text{set } l \wedge \text{index } l \ a \geq \text{index } l \ b)$$

lemma *rank-gt-zero*:

fixes

$l :: 'a \text{ Preference-List}$ **and**

$a :: 'a$

assumes $a \lesssim_l a$

shows $\text{rank-}l \ l \ a \geq 1$

using *assms*

by *simp*

definition $pl-\alpha :: 'a \text{ Preference-List} \Rightarrow 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ **where**

$pl-\alpha \ l \equiv \{(a, b). a \lesssim_l b\}$

lemma *rel-trans*:

fixes $l :: 'a \text{ Preference-List}$

shows *Relation.trans* ($pl-\alpha \ l$)

unfolding *Relation.trans-def* $pl-\alpha\text{-def}$

by *simp*

lemma $pl-\alpha\text{-lin-order}$:

fixes

$A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**

$r :: 'a \text{ rel}$

assumes $el: r \in pl-\alpha \text{ ' permutations-of-set } A$

shows *linear-order-on* $A \ r$

proof (*cases* $A = \{\}$)

case *True*

hence *permutations-of-set* $A = \{\{\}\}$

by *simp*

hence $r = pl-\alpha \ \square$

using *assms*

by *simp*

hence $r = \{\}$

unfolding $pl-\alpha\text{-def is-less-preferred-than-}l\text{-sims}$

by *simp*

thus *?thesis*

using *True*

by *simp*

next

case *False*

thus *?thesis*

proof (*unfold linear-order-on-def total-on-def antisym-def partial-order-on-def preorder-on-def, safe*)

have $A \neq \{\}$

using *False*

by *simp*

hence $\forall l \in \text{permutations-of-set } A. l \neq \square$

using *assms permutations-of-setD(1)*

```

    by force
  hence  $\forall a \in A. \forall l \in \text{permutations-of-set } A. a \lesssim_l a$ 
    using is-less-preferred-than-l.simps
    unfolding permutations-of-set-def
    by simp
  hence  $\forall a \in A. \forall l \in \text{permutations-of-set } A. (a, a) \in \text{pl-}\alpha \ l$ 
    unfolding pl- $\alpha$ -def
    by simp
  hence  $\forall a \in A. (a, a) \in r$ 
    using el
    by auto
  moreover have  $r \subseteq A \times A$ 
    using el
    unfolding pl- $\alpha$ -def permutations-of-set-def
    by auto
  ultimately show refl-on  $A \ r$ 
    unfolding refl-on-def
    by simp
next
  show Relation.trans  $r$ 
    using el rel-trans
    by auto
next
  fix
     $x :: 'a$  and
     $y :: 'a$ 
  assume
     $x\text{-rel-}y: (x, y) \in r$  and
     $y\text{-rel-}x: (y, x) \in r$ 
  have  $\forall x \ y. \forall l \in \text{permutations-of-set } A. x \lesssim_l y \wedge y \lesssim_l x \longrightarrow x = y$ 
    using is-less-preferred-than-l.simps index-eq-index-conv nle-le
    unfolding permutations-of-set-def
    by metis
  hence  $\forall x \ y. \forall l \in \text{pl-}\alpha \ ' \text{permutations-of-set } A. (x, y) \in l \wedge (y, x) \in l \longrightarrow x$ 
    =  $y$ 
    unfolding pl- $\alpha$ -def permutations-of-set-def antisym-on-def
    by blast
  thus  $x = y$ 
    using  $y\text{-rel-}x \ x\text{-rel-}y$  el
    by auto
next
  fix
     $x :: 'a$  and
     $y :: 'a$ 
  assume
     $x\text{-in-}A: x \in A$  and
     $y\text{-in-}A: y \in A$  and
     $x\text{-neq-}y: x \neq y$  and
     $\text{not-}y\text{-rel-}x: (y, x) \notin r$ 

```

have $\forall x y. \forall l \in \text{permutations-of-set } A. x \in A \wedge y \in A \wedge x \neq y \wedge (\neg y \lesssim_l x) \longrightarrow x \lesssim_l y$
using *is-less-preferred-than-l.simps*
unfolding *permutations-of-set-def*
by *auto*
hence $\forall x y. \forall l \in \text{pl-}\alpha \text{ 'permutations-of-set } A.$
 $x \in A \wedge y \in A \wedge x \neq y \wedge (y, x) \notin l \longrightarrow (x, y) \in l$
unfolding *pl-}\alpha\text{-def permutations-of-set-def}*
by *blast*
thus $(x, y) \in r$
using *x-in-A y-in-A x-neq-y not-y-x-rel el*
by *auto*
qed
qed

lemma *lin-order-pl-}\alpha\text{:}*

fixes
 $r :: 'a \text{ rel}$ **and**
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$
assumes
 $\text{lin-order: linear-order-on } A \text{ } r$ **and**
 $\text{fin: finite } A$
shows $r \in \text{pl-}\alpha \text{ 'permutations-of-set } A$
proof –
let $? \varphi = \lambda a. \text{card } ((\text{underS } r \text{ } a) \cap A)$
let $? \text{inv} = \text{the-inv-into } A \text{ } ? \varphi$
let $? l = \text{map } (\lambda x. ? \text{inv } x) (\text{rev } [0 .. < \text{card } A])$
have *antisym*: $\forall a b. a \in ((\text{underS } r \text{ } b) \cap A) \wedge b \in ((\text{underS } r \text{ } a) \cap A) \longrightarrow \text{False}$
using *lin-order*
unfolding *underS-def linear-order-on-def partial-order-on-def antisym-def*
by *auto*
hence $\forall a b c. a \in (\text{underS } r \text{ } b) \cap A \longrightarrow b \in (\text{underS } r \text{ } c) \cap A \longrightarrow a \in (\text{underS } r \text{ } c) \cap A$
using *lin-order CollectD CollectI transD IntE IntI*
unfolding *underS-def linear-order-on-def partial-order-on-def preorder-on-def*
by *(metis (mono-tags, lifting))*
hence $\forall a b. a \in (\text{underS } r \text{ } b) \cap A \longrightarrow (\text{underS } r \text{ } a) \cap A \subset (\text{underS } r \text{ } b) \cap A$
using *antisym*
by *blast*
hence *mon*: $\forall a b. a \in (\text{underS } r \text{ } b) \cap A \longrightarrow ? \varphi \text{ } a < ? \varphi \text{ } b$
using *fin*
by *(simp add: psubset-card-mono)*
moreover **have** *total-underS*:
 $\forall a b. a \in A \wedge b \in A \wedge a \neq b \longrightarrow a \in ((\text{underS } r \text{ } b) \cap A) \vee b \in ((\text{underS } r \text{ } a) \cap A)$
using *lin-order totalp-onD totalp-on-total-on-eq*
unfolding *underS-def linear-order-on-def partial-order-on-def antisym-def*
by *fastforce*
ultimately **have** $\forall a b. a \in A \wedge b \in A \wedge a \neq b \longrightarrow ? \varphi \text{ } a \neq ? \varphi \text{ } b$

```

    using order-less-imp-not-eq2
    by metis
  hence inj: inj-on ? $\varphi$  A
    using inj-on-def
    by blast
  have in-bounds:  $\forall a \in A. ?\varphi a < \text{card } A$ 
    using CollectD IntD1 card-seteq fin inf-sup-ord(2) linorder-le-less-linear
    unfolding underS-def
    by (metis (mono-tags, lifting))
  hence ? $\varphi$  '  $A \subseteq \{0 \dots \text{card } A\}$ 
    using atLeast0LessThan
    by blast
  moreover have card (? $\varphi$  ' A) = card A
    using inj fin card-image
    by blast
  ultimately have ? $\varphi$  ' A =  $\{0 \dots \text{card } A\}$ 
    by (simp add: card-subset-eq)
  hence bij: bij-betw ? $\varphi$  A  $\{0 \dots \text{card } A\}$ 
    using inj
    unfolding bij-betw-def
    by safe
  hence bij-inv: bij-betw ?inv  $\{0 \dots \text{card } A\}$  A
    using bij-betw-the-inv-into
    by metis
  hence ?inv '  $\{0 \dots \text{card } A\} = A$ 
    unfolding bij-betw-def
    by metis
  hence set ?l = A
    by simp
  moreover have dist-l: distinct ?l
    using bij-inv
    unfolding distinct-map
    using bij-betw-imp-inj-on
    by simp
  ultimately have ?l  $\in$  permutations-of-set A
    by auto
  moreover have index-eq:  $\forall a \in A. \text{index } ?l a = \text{card } A - 1 - ?\varphi a$ 
  proof
    fix a :: 'a
    assume a-in-A:  $a \in A$ 
    have  $\forall xs. \forall i < \text{length } xs. (\text{rev } xs)!i = xs!(\text{length } xs - 1 - i)$ 
      using rev-nth
      by auto
    hence  $\forall i < \text{length } [0 \dots \text{card } A]. (\text{rev } [0 \dots \text{card } A])!i$ 
      =  $[0 \dots \text{card } A]!(\text{length } [0 \dots \text{card } A] - 1 - i)$ 
      by blast
    moreover have  $\forall i < \text{card } A. [0 \dots \text{card } A]!i = i$ 
      by simp
    moreover have card-A-len:  $\text{length } [0 \dots \text{card } A] = \text{card } A$ 

```



```

    by simp
  ultimately have  $\forall i < \text{card } A. (\text{rev } [0 ..< \text{card } A])!i = \text{card } A - 1 - i$ 
    using diff-Suc-eq-diff-pred diff-less diff-self-eq-0 less-imp-diff-less zero-less-Suc
    by metis
  moreover have  $\forall i < \text{card } A. ?!i = ?\text{inv } ((\text{rev } [0 ..< \text{card } A])!i)$ 
    by simp
  ultimately have  $\forall i < \text{card } A. ?!i = ?\text{inv } (\text{card } A - 1 - i)$ 
    by presburger
  moreover have  $\text{card } A - 1 - (\text{card } A - 1 - \text{card } (\text{underS } r \ a \cap A)) = \text{card } (\text{underS } r \ a \cap A)$ 
    using in-bounds a-in-A
    by auto
  moreover have  $?\text{inv } (\text{card } (\text{underS } r \ a \cap A)) = a$ 
    using a-in-A inj the-inv-into-f-f
    by fastforce
  ultimately have  $?!(\text{card } A - 1 - \text{card } (\text{underS } r \ a \cap A)) = a$ 
    using in-bounds a-in-A card-Diff-singleton card-Suc-Diff1 diff-less-Suc fin
    by metis
  thus  $\text{index } ?l \ a = \text{card } A - 1 - \text{card } (\text{underS } r \ a \cap A)$ 
    using bij-inv dist-l a-in-A card-A-len card-Diff-singleton card-Suc-Diff1
      diff-less-Suc fin index-nth-id length-map length-rev
    by metis
qed
moreover have  $\text{pl-}\alpha \ ?l = r$ 
proof
  show  $r \subseteq \text{pl-}\alpha \ ?l$ 
  proof (unfold pl- $\alpha$ -def, auto)
    fix
      a :: 'a and
      b :: 'a
    assume  $(a, b) \in r$ 
    hence  $a \in A$ 
      using lin-order
    unfolding linear-order-on-def partial-order-on-def preorder-on-def refl-on-def
    by auto
    thus  $a \in ?\text{inv } \{0 ..< \text{card } A\}$ 
      using bij-inv bij-betw-def
      by metis
  next
    fix
      a :: 'a and
      b :: 'a
    assume  $(a, b) \in r$ 
    hence  $b \in A$ 
      using lin-order
    unfolding linear-order-on-def partial-order-on-def preorder-on-def refl-on-def
    by auto
    thus  $b \in ?\text{inv } \{0 ..< \text{card } A\}$ 
      using bij-inv bij-betw-def

```

```

      by metis
next
fix
  a :: 'a and
  b :: 'a
assume rel: (a, b) ∈ r
hence el-A: a ∈ A ∧ b ∈ A
  using lin-order
unfolding linear-order-on-def partial-order-on-def preorder-on-def refl-on-def
  by auto
moreover have a ∈ underS r b ∨ a = b
  using lin-order rel
  unfolding underS-def
  by simp
ultimately have ?φ a ≤ ?φ b
  using mon le-eq-less-or-eq
  by auto
thus index ?l b ≤ index ?l a
  using index-eq el-A diff-le-mono2
  by metis
qed
next
show pl-α ?l ⊆ r
proof (unfold pl-α-def, auto)
fix
  a :: nat and
  b :: nat
assume
  in-bnds-a: a < card A and
  in-bnds-b: b < card A and
  index-rel: index ?l (?inv b) ≤ index ?l (?inv a)
have el-a: ?inv a ∈ A
  using bij-inv in-bnds-a atLeast0LessThan
  unfolding bij-betw-def
  by auto
moreover have el-b: ?inv b ∈ A
  using bij-inv in-bnds-b atLeast0LessThan
  unfolding bij-betw-def
  by auto
ultimately have leq-diff: card A - 1 - (?φ (?inv b)) ≤ card A - 1 - (?φ
(?inv a))
  using index-rel index-eq
  by metis
have ∀ a < card A. ?φ (?inv a) < card A
  using fin bij-inv bij
  unfolding bij-betw-def
  by fastforce
hence ?φ (?inv b) ≤ card A - 1 ∧ ?φ (?inv a) ≤ card A - 1
  using in-bnds-a in-bnds-b fin

```

by *fastforce*
 hence $? \varphi (?inv\ b) \geq ? \varphi (?inv\ a)$
 using *fin leq-diff le-diff-iff'*
 by *blast*
 hence cases: $? \varphi (?inv\ a) < ? \varphi (?inv\ b) \vee ? \varphi (?inv\ a) = ? \varphi (?inv\ b)$
 by *auto*
 have $\forall\ a\ b. a \in A \wedge b \in A \wedge ? \varphi\ a < ? \varphi\ b \longrightarrow a \in underS\ r\ b$
 using *mon total-underS antisym IntD1 order-less-not-sym*
 by *metis*
 hence $? \varphi (?inv\ a) < ? \varphi (?inv\ b) \longrightarrow ?inv\ a \in underS\ r\ (?inv\ b)$
 using *el-a el-b*
 by *blast*
 hence cases-less: $? \varphi (?inv\ a) < ? \varphi (?inv\ b) \longrightarrow (?inv\ a, ?inv\ b) \in r$
 unfolding *underS-def*
 by *simp*
 have $\forall\ a\ b. a \in A \wedge b \in A \wedge ? \varphi\ a = ? \varphi\ b \longrightarrow a = b$
 using *mon total-underS antisym order-less-not-sym*
 by *metis*
 hence $? \varphi (?inv\ a) = ? \varphi (?inv\ b) \longrightarrow ?inv\ a = ?inv\ b$
 using *el-a el-b*
 by *simp*
 hence cases-eq: $? \varphi (?inv\ a) = ? \varphi (?inv\ b) \longrightarrow (?inv\ a, ?inv\ b) \in r$
 using *lin-order el-a el-b*
 unfolding *linear-order-on-def partial-order-on-def preorder-on-def refl-on-def*
 by *auto*
 show $(?inv\ a, ?inv\ b) \in r$
 using *cases cases-less cases-eq*
 by *auto*
 qed
 qed
 ultimately show $r \in pl\text{-}\alpha\text{' permutations-of-set } A$
 by *auto*
 qed

lemma *index-helper*:

fixes
 $xs :: 'x\ list$ and
 $x :: 'x$
 assumes
 $fin\text{-}set\text{-}xs$: *finite (set xs)* and
 $dist\text{-}xs$: *distinct xs* and
 $x \in set\ xs$
 shows $index\ xs\ x = card\ \{y \in set\ xs. index\ xs\ y < index\ xs\ x\}$
 proof –
 have *bij*: $bij\text{-}betw\ (index\ xs)\ (set\ xs)\ \{0 ..< length\ xs\}$
 using *assms bij-betw-index*
 by *blast*
 hence $card\ \{y \in set\ xs. index\ xs\ y < index\ xs\ x\}$
 $= card\ (index\ xs\ \text{' } \{y \in set\ xs. index\ xs\ y < index\ xs\ x\})$

```

    using CollectD bij-betw-same-card bij-betw-subset subsetI
    by (metis (no-types, lifting))
  also have index xs ' {y ∈ set xs. index xs y < index xs x}
    = {m | m. m ∈ index xs ' (set xs) ∧ m < index xs x}
    by blast
  also have {m | m. m ∈ index xs ' (set xs) ∧ m < index xs x} = {m | m. m <
index xs x}
    using bij assms atLeastLessThan-iff bot-nat-0.extremum
      index-image index-less-size-conv order-less-trans
    by metis
  also have card {m | m. m < index xs x} = index xs x
    by simp
  finally show ?thesis
    by simp
qed

```

```

lemma pl-α-eq-imp-list-eq:
  fixes
    xs :: 'x list and
    ys :: 'x list
  assumes
    fin-set-xs: finite (set xs) and
    set-eq: set xs = set ys and
    dist-xs: distinct xs and
    dist-ys: distinct ys and
    pl-α-eq: pl-α xs = pl-α ys
  shows xs = ys
proof (rule ccontr)
  assume xs ≠ ys
  moreover with this
  have xs ≠ [] ∧ ys ≠ []
    using set-eq
    by auto
  ultimately obtain
    i :: nat and
    x :: 'x where
      i < length xs and
      xs!i ≠ ys!i and
      x = xs!i and
    x-in-xs: x ∈ set xs
  using dist-xs dist-ys distinct-remdups-id
    length-remdups-card-conv nth-equalityI nth-mem set-eq
  by metis
  moreover with this
  have neq-ind: index xs x ≠ index ys x
    using dist-xs index-nth-id nth-index set-eq
    by metis
  ultimately have
    card {y ∈ set xs. index xs y < index xs x} ≠ card {y ∈ set xs. index ys y <

```

```

index ys x}
  using dist-xs dist-ys set-eq index-helper fin-set-xs
  by (metis (mono-tags))
then obtain y :: 'x where
  y-in-set-xs: y ∈ set xs and
  y-neq-x: y ≠ x and
  neq-indices:
    (index xs y < index xs x ∧ index ys y > index ys x) ∨
    (index ys y < index ys x ∧ index xs y > index xs x)
  using index-eq-index-conv not-less-iff-gr-or-eq set-eq
  by (metis (mono-tags, lifting))
hence (is-less-preferred-than-l x xs y ∧ is-less-preferred-than-l y ys x)
      ∨ (is-less-preferred-than-l x ys y ∧ is-less-preferred-than-l y xs x)
  unfolding is-less-preferred-than-l.simps
  using y-in-set-xs less-imp-le-nat set-eq x-in-xs
  by blast
hence ((x, y) ∈ pl-α xs ∧ (x, y) ∉ pl-α ys) ∨ ((x, y) ∈ pl-α ys ∧ (x, y) ∉ pl-α
xs)
  unfolding pl-α-def
  using is-less-preferred-than-l.simps y-neq-x neq-indices
    case-prod-conv linorder-not-less mem-Collect-eq
  by metis
thus False
  using pl-α-eq
  by blast
qed

lemma pl-α-bij-betw:
  fixes X :: 'x set
  assumes finite X
  shows bij-betw pl-α (permutations-of-set X) {r. linear-order-on X r}
proof (unfold bij-betw-def, safe)
  show inj-on pl-α (permutations-of-set X)
    unfolding inj-on-def permutations-of-set-def
    using pl-α-eq-imp-list-eq assms
    by fastforce
next
  fix xs :: 'x list
  assume xs ∈ permutations-of-set X
  thus linear-order-on X (pl-α xs)
    using assms pl-α-lin-order
    by blast
next
  fix r :: 'x rel
  assume linear-order-on X r
  thus r ∈ pl-α 'permutations-of-set X
    using assms lin-order-pl-α
    by blast
qed

```

1.11.5 Limited Preference

definition *limited* :: 'a set \Rightarrow 'a Preference-List \Rightarrow bool **where**
limited A r $\equiv \forall a. a \in \text{set } r \longrightarrow a \in A$

fun *limit-l* :: 'a set \Rightarrow 'a Preference-List \Rightarrow 'a Preference-List **where**
limit-l A l = List.filter ($\lambda a. a \in A$) l

lemma *limited-dest*:

fixes
 A :: 'a set **and**
 l :: 'a Preference-List **and**
 a :: 'a **and**
 b :: 'a
assumes
 a \lesssim_l b **and**
 limited A l
shows $a \in A \wedge b \in A$
using *assms*
unfolding *limited-def*
by *simp*

lemma *limit-equiv*:

fixes
 A :: 'a set **and**
 l :: 'a list
assumes *well-formed-l* l
shows $\text{pl-}\alpha \ (\text{limit-l } A \ l) = \text{limit } A \ (\text{pl-}\alpha \ l)$
using *assms*
proof (*induction* l)
case Nil
thus $\text{pl-}\alpha \ (\text{limit-l } A \ []) = \text{limit } A \ (\text{pl-}\alpha \ [])$
unfolding *pl-}\alpha-def*
by *simp*
next
case (Cons a l)
fix
 a :: 'a **and**
 l :: 'a list
assume
 wf-imp-limit: *well-formed-l* l $\implies \text{pl-}\alpha \ (\text{limit-l } A \ l) = \text{limit } A \ (\text{pl-}\alpha \ l)$ **and**
 wf-a-l: *well-formed-l* (a#l)
show $\text{pl-}\alpha \ (\text{limit-l } A \ (a\#l)) = \text{limit } A \ (\text{pl-}\alpha \ (a\#l))$
using wf-imp-limit wf-a-l
proof (*clarsimp*, *safe*)
fix
 b :: 'a **and**
 c :: 'a
assume *b-less-c*: $(b, c) \in \text{pl-}\alpha \ (a\#(\text{filter } (\lambda a. a \in A) \ l))$
have *limit-preference-list-assoc*: $\text{pl-}\alpha \ (\text{limit-l } A \ l) = \text{limit } A \ (\text{pl-}\alpha \ l)$

```

using wf-a-l wf-imp-limit
by simp
thus (b, c) ∈ pl-α (a#l)
proof (unfold pl-α-def is-less-preferred-than-l.simps, safe)
  show b ∈ set (a#l)
    using b-less-c
    unfolding pl-α-def
    by fastforce
next
show c ∈ set (a#l)
  using b-less-c
  unfolding pl-α-def
  by fastforce
next
have ∀ a' l' a''. (a'::'a) ≲l' a'' =
  (a' ∈ set l' ∧ a'' ∈ set l' ∧ index l' a'' ≤ index l' a')
  using is-less-preferred-than-l.simps
  by blast
moreover from this
have {(a', b'). a' ≲(limit-l A l) b'} =
  {(a', a''). a' ∈ set (limit-l A l) ∧ a'' ∈ set (limit-l A l) ∧
    index (limit-l A l) a'' ≤ index (limit-l A l) a'}
  by presburger
moreover from this
have {(a', b'). a' ≲l b'} =
  {(a', a''). a' ∈ set l ∧ a'' ∈ set l ∧ index l a'' ≤ index l a'}
  using is-less-preferred-than-l.simps
  by auto
ultimately have {(a', b').
  a' ∈ set (limit-l A l) ∧ b' ∈ set (limit-l A l) ∧
  index (limit-l A l) b' ≤ index (limit-l A l) a'} =
  limit A {(a', b'). a' ∈ set l ∧ b' ∈ set l ∧ index l b' ≤ index l a'}
  using pl-α-def limit-preference-list-assoc
  by (metis (no-types))
hence idx-imp:
  b ∈ set (limit-l A l) ∧ c ∈ set (limit-l A l) ∧
  index (limit-l A l) c ≤ index (limit-l A l) b ⟶
  b ∈ set l ∧ c ∈ set l ∧ index l c ≤ index l b
  by auto
have b ≲(a#(filter (λ a. a ∈ A) l)) c
  using b-less-c case-prodD mem-Collect-eq
  unfolding pl-α-def
  by metis
moreover obtain
  f :: 'a ⇒ 'a list ⇒ 'a ⇒ 'a and
  g :: 'a ⇒ 'a list ⇒ 'a ⇒ 'a list and
  h :: 'a ⇒ 'a list ⇒ 'a ⇒ 'a where
  ∀ d s e. d ≲s e ⟶
  d = f e s d ∧ s = g e s d ∧ e = h e s d ∧ f e s d ∈ set (g e s d) ∧

```

```

      index (g e s d) (h e s d) ≤ index (g e s d) (f e s d) ∧
      h e s d ∈ set (g e s d)
    by fastforce
  ultimately have
    b = f c (a#(filter (λ a. a ∈ A) l)) b ∧
    a#(filter (λ a. a ∈ A) l) = g c (a#(filter (λ a. a ∈ A) l)) b ∧
    c = h c (a#(filter (λ a. a ∈ A) l)) b ∧
    f c (a#(filter (λ a. a ∈ A) l)) b ∈ set (g c (a#(filter (λ a. a ∈ A) l)) b) ∧
    h c (a#(filter (λ a. a ∈ A) l)) b ∈ set (g c (a#(filter (λ a. a ∈ A) l)) b) ∧
    index (g c (a#(filter (λ a. a ∈ A) l)) b)
      (h c (a#(filter (λ a. a ∈ A) l)) b) ≤
    index (g c (a#(filter (λ a. a ∈ A) l)) b)
      (f c (a#(filter (λ a. a ∈ A) l)) b)
    by blast
  moreover have filter (λ a. a ∈ A) l = limit-l A l
    by simp
  ultimately have a ≠ c ⟶ index (a#l) c ≤ index (a#l) b
    using idx-imp
    by force
  thus index (a#l) c ≤ index (a#l) b
    by force
qed
next
fix
  b :: 'a and
  c :: 'a
  assume
    a ∈ A and
    (b, c) ∈ pl-α (a#(filter (λ a. a ∈ A) l))
  thus c ∈ A
    unfolding pl-α-def
    by fastforce
next
fix
  b :: 'a and
  c :: 'a
  assume
    a ∈ A and
    (b, c) ∈ pl-α (a#(filter (λ a. a ∈ A) l))
  thus b ∈ A
    unfolding pl-α-def
    using case-prodD insert-iff mem-Collect-eq set-filter inter-set-filter IntE
    by auto
next
fix
  b :: 'a and
  c :: 'a
  assume
    b-less-c: (b, c) ∈ pl-α (a#l) and

```



```

    b-in-A:  $b \in A$  and
    c-in-A:  $c \in A$ 
  show  $(b, c) \in pl\text{-}\alpha (a\#(\text{filter } (\lambda a. a \in A) l))$ 
  proof (unfold pl- $\alpha$ -def is-less-preferred-than.simps, safe)
    show  $b \lesssim_{a\#(\text{filter } (\lambda a. a \in A) l)} c$ 
    proof (unfold is-less-preferred-than-l.simps, safe)
      show  $b \in \text{set } (a\#(\text{filter } (\lambda a. a \in A) l))$ 
      using b-less-c b-in-A
      unfolding pl- $\alpha$ -def
      by fastforce
    next
      show  $c \in \text{set } (a\#(\text{filter } (\lambda a. a \in A) l))$ 
      using b-less-c c-in-A
      unfolding pl- $\alpha$ -def
      by fastforce
    next
      have  $(b, c) \in pl\text{-}\alpha (a\#l)$ 
      by (simp add: b-less-c)
      hence  $b \lesssim_{a\#l} c$ 
      using case-prodD mem-Collect-eq
      unfolding pl- $\alpha$ -def
      by metis
    moreover have
       $pl\text{-}\alpha (\text{filter } (\lambda a. a \in A) l) = \{(a, b). (a, b) \in pl\text{-}\alpha l \wedge a \in A \wedge b \in A\}$ 
      using wf-a-l wf-imp-limit
      by simp
    ultimately show
       $\text{index } (a\#(\text{filter } (\lambda a. a \in A) l)) c \leq \text{index } (a\#(\text{filter } (\lambda a. a \in A) l)) b$ 
      unfolding pl- $\alpha$ -def
      using add-leE add-le-cancel-right case-prodI c-in-A b-in-A index-Cons
      set-ConsD
      in-rel-Collect-case-prod-eq linorder-le-cases mem-Collect-eq not-one-le-zero
      by fastforce
  qed
qed
next
  fix
    b :: 'a and
    c :: 'a
  assume
    a-not-in-A:  $a \notin A$  and
    b-less-c:  $(b, c) \in pl\text{-}\alpha l$ 
  show  $(b, c) \in pl\text{-}\alpha (a\#l)$ 
  proof (unfold pl- $\alpha$ -def is-less-preferred-than-l.simps, safe)
    show  $b \in \text{set } (a\#l)$ 
    using b-less-c
    unfolding pl- $\alpha$ -def
    by fastforce
  next

```

```

    show  $c \in \text{set } (a\#l)$ 
      using  $b\text{-less-}c$ 
      unfolding  $pl\text{-}\alpha\text{-def}$ 
      by fastforce
  next
  show  $\text{index } (a\#l) \ c \leq \text{index } (a\#l) \ b$ 
  proof (unfold  $\text{index-def}$ , simp, safe)
    assume  $a = b$ 
    thus False
      using  $a\text{-not-in-}A \ b\text{-less-}c \ \text{case-prod-conv} \ \text{is-less-preferred-than-}l.\text{elims}$ 
         $\text{mem-Collect-eq} \ \text{set-filter} \ \text{wf-}a\text{-}l$ 
      unfolding  $pl\text{-}\alpha\text{-def}$ 
      by simp
  next
  show  $\text{find-index } (\lambda x. x = c) \ l \leq \text{find-index } (\lambda x. x = b) \ l$ 
    using  $b\text{-less-}c \ \text{case-prodD} \ \text{mem-Collect-eq}$ 
    unfolding  $pl\text{-}\alpha\text{-def}$ 
    by (simp add:  $\text{index-def}$ )
  qed
qed
next
fix
   $b :: 'a$  and
   $c :: 'a$ 
  assume
     $a\text{-not-in-}l: a \notin \text{set } l$  and
     $a\text{-not-in-}A: a \notin A$  and
     $b\text{-in-}A: b \in A$  and
     $c\text{-in-}A: c \in A$  and
     $b\text{-less-}c: (b, c) \in pl\text{-}\alpha \ (a\#l)$ 
  thus  $(b, c) \in pl\text{-}\alpha \ l$ 
  proof (unfold  $pl\text{-}\alpha\text{-def} \ \text{is-less-preferred-than-}l.\text{sims}$ , safe)
    assume  $b \in \text{set } (a\#l)$ 
    thus  $b \in \text{set } l$ 
      using  $a\text{-not-in-}A \ b\text{-in-}A$ 
      by fastforce
  next
  assume  $c \in \text{set } (a\#l)$ 
  thus  $c \in \text{set } l$ 
    using  $a\text{-not-in-}A \ c\text{-in-}A$ 
    by fastforce
  next
  assume  $\text{index } (a\#l) \ c \leq \text{index } (a\#l) \ b$ 
  thus  $\text{index } l \ c \leq \text{index } l \ b$ 
    using  $a\text{-not-in-}l \ a\text{-not-in-}A \ c\text{-in-}A \ \text{add-le-cancel-right}$ 
       $\text{index-Cons} \ \text{index-le-size} \ \text{size-index-conv}$ 
    by (metis (no-types, lifting))
  qed
qed

```

qed

1.11.6 Auxiliary Definitions

definition *total-on-l* :: 'a set \Rightarrow 'a Preference-List \Rightarrow bool **where**
total-on-l A l $\equiv \forall a \in A. a \in \text{set } l$

definition *refl-on-l* :: 'a set \Rightarrow 'a Preference-List \Rightarrow bool **where**
refl-on-l A l $\equiv (\forall a. a \in \text{set } l \longrightarrow a \in A) \wedge (\forall a \in A. a \lesssim_l a)$

definition *trans* :: 'a Preference-List \Rightarrow bool **where**
trans l $\equiv \forall (a, b, c) \in \text{set } l \times \text{set } l \times \text{set } l. a \lesssim_l b \wedge b \lesssim_l c \longrightarrow a \lesssim_l c$

definition *preorder-on-l* :: 'a set \Rightarrow 'a Preference-List \Rightarrow bool **where**
preorder-on-l A l $\equiv \text{refl-on-l } A \ l \wedge \text{trans } l$

definition *antisym-l* :: 'a list \Rightarrow bool **where**
antisym-l l $\equiv \forall a \ b. a \lesssim_l b \wedge b \lesssim_l a \longrightarrow a = b$

definition *partial-order-on-l* :: 'a set \Rightarrow 'a Preference-List \Rightarrow bool **where**
partial-order-on-l A l $\equiv \text{preorder-on-l } A \ l \wedge \text{antisym-l } l$

definition *linear-order-on-l* :: 'a set \Rightarrow 'a Preference-List \Rightarrow bool **where**
linear-order-on-l A l $\equiv \text{partial-order-on-l } A \ l \wedge \text{total-on-l } A \ l$

definition *connex-l* :: 'a set \Rightarrow 'a Preference-List \Rightarrow bool **where**
connex-l A l $\equiv \text{limited } A \ l \wedge (\forall a \in A. \forall b \in A. a \lesssim_l b \vee b \lesssim_l a)$

abbreviation *ballot-on* :: 'a set \Rightarrow 'a Preference-List \Rightarrow bool **where**
ballot-on A l $\equiv \text{well-formed-l } l \wedge \text{linear-order-on-l } A \ l$

1.11.7 Auxiliary Lemmas

lemma *list-trans[simp]*:
 fixes l :: 'a Preference-List
 shows *trans* l
 unfolding *trans-def*
 by *simp*

lemma *list-antisym[simp]*:
 fixes l :: 'a Preference-List
 shows *antisym-l* l
 unfolding *antisym-l-def*
 by *auto*

lemma *lin-order-equiv-list-of-alts*:
 fixes
 A :: 'a set **and**
 l :: 'a Preference-List
 shows *linear-order-on-l* A l = (A = set l)

```

unfolding linear-order-on-l-def total-on-l-def partial-order-on-l-def preorder-on-l-def
  refl-on-l-def
by auto

lemma connex-imp-refl:
  fixes
    A :: 'a set and
    l :: 'a Preference-List
  assumes connex-l A l
  shows refl-on-l A l
  unfolding refl-on-l-def
  using assms connex-l-def Preference-List.limited-def
  by metis

lemma lin-ord-imp-connex-l:
  fixes
    A :: 'a set and
    l :: 'a Preference-List
  assumes linear-order-on-l A l
  shows connex-l A l
  using assms linorder-le-cases
  unfolding connex-l-def linear-order-on-l-def preorder-on-l-def limited-def refl-on-l-def
    partial-order-on-l-def is-less-preferred-than-l.simps
  by metis

lemma above-trans:
  fixes
    l :: 'a Preference-List and
    a :: 'a and
    b :: 'a
  assumes
    trans l and
    a  $\lesssim_l$  b
  shows set (above-l l b)  $\subseteq$  set (above-l l a)
  using assms set-take-subset-set-take rank-l.simps
    Suc-le-mono add.commute add-0 add-Suc
  unfolding above-l-def Preference-List.is-less-preferred-than-l.simps One-nat-def
  by metis

lemma less-preferred-l-rel-equiv:
  fixes
    l :: 'a Preference-List and
    a :: 'a and
    b :: 'a
  shows a  $\lesssim_l$  b = Preference-Relation.is-less-preferred-than a (pl- $\alpha$  l) b
  unfolding pl- $\alpha$ -def
  by simp

theorem above-equiv:

```

```

fixes
   $l :: 'a \text{ Preference-List}$  and
   $a :: 'a$ 
shows  $\text{set } (\text{above-}l \ l \ a) = \text{above } (pl-\alpha \ l) \ a$ 
proof (safe)
  fix  $b :: 'a$ 
  assume  $b \in \text{set } (\text{above-}l \ l \ a)$ 
  hence  $\text{index } l \ b \leq \text{index } l \ a$ 
    unfolding  $\text{rank-}l.\text{sims}$   $\text{above-}l.\text{def}$ 
    using  $\text{Suc-}eq.\text{plus1}$   $\text{Suc-}le.\text{eq}$   $\text{index-}take$   $\text{linorder-not-less}$ 
       $\text{bot-nat-0.extremum-strict}$ 
    by (metis (full-types))
  hence  $a \lesssim_l b$ 
    using  $\text{Suc-}le.\text{mono}$   $\text{add-Suc}$   $le.\text{antisym}$   $\text{take-0}$   $b.\text{member}$ 
       $\text{in-set-takeD}$   $\text{index-take}$   $le0$   $\text{rank-}l.\text{sims}$ 
    unfolding  $\text{above-}l.\text{def}$   $\text{is-less-preferred-than-}l.\text{sims}$ 
    by metis
  thus  $b \in \text{above } (pl-\alpha \ l) \ a$ 
    using  $\text{less-preferred-}l.\text{rel-equiv}$   $\text{pref-imp-in-above}$ 
    by metis
next
  fix  $b :: 'a$ 
  assume  $b \in \text{above } (pl-\alpha \ l) \ a$ 
  hence  $a \lesssim_l b$ 
    using  $\text{pref-imp-in-above}$   $\text{less-preferred-}l.\text{rel-equiv}$ 
    by metis
  thus  $b \in \text{set } (\text{above-}l \ l \ a)$ 
    unfolding  $\text{above-}l.\text{def}$   $\text{is-less-preferred-than-}l.\text{sims}$   $\text{rank-}l.\text{sims}$ 
    using  $\text{Suc-}eq.\text{plus1}$   $\text{Suc-}le.\text{eq}$   $\text{index-less-size-conv}$   $\text{set-take-if-index}$   $le.\text{imp-less-Suc}$ 
    by (metis (full-types))
qed

theorem  $\text{rank-equiv}$ :
  fixes
     $l :: 'a \text{ Preference-List}$  and
     $a :: 'a$ 
  assumes  $\text{well-formed-}l \ l$ 
  shows  $\text{rank-}l \ l \ a = \text{rank } (pl-\alpha \ l) \ a$ 
proof (simp, safe)
  assume  $a \in \text{set } l$ 
  moreover have  $\text{above } (pl-\alpha \ l) \ a = \text{set } (\text{above-}l \ l \ a)$ 
    unfolding  $\text{above-equiv}$ 
    by simp
  moreover have  $\text{distinct } (\text{above-}l \ l \ a)$ 
    unfolding  $\text{above-}l.\text{def}$ 
    using  $\text{assms}$   $\text{distinct-take}$ 
    by blast
  moreover from this
  have  $\text{card } (\text{set } (\text{above-}l \ l \ a)) = \text{length } (\text{above-}l \ l \ a)$ 

```

```

    using distinct-card
    by blast
  moreover have length (above-l l a) = rank-l l a
    unfolding above-l-def
    using Suc-le-eq
    by (simp add: in-set-member)
  ultimately show Suc (index l a) = card (above (pl-α l) a)
    by simp
next
  assume a ∉ set l
  hence above (pl-α l) a = {}
    unfolding above-def
    using less-preferred-l-rel-equiv
    by fastforce
  thus card (above (pl-α l) a) = 0
    by fastforce
qed

lemma lin-ord-equiv:
  fixes
    A :: 'a set and
    l :: 'a Preference-List
  shows linear-order-on-l A l = linear-order-on A (pl-α l)
  unfolding pl-α-def linear-order-on-l-def linear-order-on-def refl-on-l-def
    Relation.trans-def preorder-on-l-def partial-order-on-l-def partial-order-on-def
    total-on-l-def preorder-on-def refl-on-def antisym-def total-on-def
    is-less-preferred-than-l.simps
  by auto

```

1.11.8 First Occurrence Indices

```

lemma pos-in-list-yields-rank:
  fixes
    l :: 'a Preference-List and
    a :: 'a and
    n :: nat
  assumes
    ∀ (j::nat) ≤ n. l!j ≠ a and
    l!(n - 1) = a
  shows rank-l l a = n
  using assms
proof (induction l arbitrary: n, simp-all) qed

```

```

lemma ranked-alt-not-at-pos-before:
  fixes
    l :: 'a Preference-List and
    a :: 'a and
    n :: nat
  assumes

```

```

     $a \in \text{set } l$  and
     $n < (\text{rank-}l \ l \ a) - 1$ 
shows  $l!n \neq a$ 
using assms add-diff-cancel-right' index-first member-def rank-l.simps
by metis

lemma pos-in-list-yields-pos:
fixes
   $l :: 'a \text{ Preference-List}$  and
   $a :: 'a$ 
assumes  $a \in \text{set } l$ 
shows  $l!(\text{rank-}l \ l \ a - 1) = a$ 
using assms
proof (induction l, simp)
fix
   $l :: 'a \text{ Preference-List}$  and
   $b :: 'a$ 
case (Cons b l)
assume  $a \in \text{set } (b\#l)$ 
moreover from this
have  $\text{rank-}l \ (b\#l) \ a = 1 + \text{index } (b\#l) \ a$ 
  using Suc-eq-plus1 add-Suc add-cancel-left-left rank-l.simps
  by metis
ultimately show  $(b\#l)!(\text{rank-}l \ (b\#l) \ a - 1) = a$ 
  using diff-add-inverse nth-index
  by metis
qed

lemma rel-of-pref-pred-for-set-eq-list-to-rel:
fixes  $l :: 'a \text{ Preference-List}$ 
shows relation-of  $(\lambda y z. y \lesssim_l z)$   $(\text{set } l) = \text{pl-}\alpha \ l$ 
proof (unfold relation-of-def, safe)
fix
   $a :: 'a$  and
   $b :: 'a$ 
assume  $a \lesssim_l b$ 
moreover have  $(a \lesssim_l b) = (a \preceq_{(\text{pl-}\alpha \ l)} b)$ 
  using less-preferred-l-rel-equiv
  by (metis (no-types))
ultimately show  $(a, b) \in \text{pl-}\alpha \ l$ 
  by simp
next
fix
   $a :: 'a$  and
   $b :: 'a$ 
assume  $(a, b) \in \text{pl-}\alpha \ l$ 
thus  $a \lesssim_l b$ 
  using less-preferred-l-rel-equiv

```

```

    unfolding is-less-preferred-than.simps
  by metis
thus
  a ∈ set l and
  b ∈ set l
  by (simp, simp)
qed
end

```

1.12 Preference (List) Profile

```

theory Profile-List
  imports ../Profile
          Preference-List
begin

```

1.12.1 Definition

A profile (list) contains one ballot for each voter.

type-synonym 'a Profile-List = 'a Preference-List list

type-synonym 'a Election-List = 'a set × 'a Profile-List

Abstraction from profile list to profile.

```

fun pl-to-pr-α :: 'a Profile-List ⇒ ('a, nat) Profile where
  pl-to-pr-α pl = (λ n. if (n < length pl ∧ n ≥ 0)
    then (map (Preference-List.pl-α) pl)!n
    else {})

```

```

lemma prof-abstr-presv-size:
  fixes p :: 'a Profile-List
  shows length p = length (to-list {0 ..< length p} (pl-to-pr-α p))
  by simp

```

A profile on a finite set of alternatives A contains only ballots that are lists of linear orders on A.

```

definition profile-l :: 'a set ⇒ 'a Profile-List ⇒ bool where
  profile-l A p ≡ ∀ i < length p. ballot-on A (p!i)

```

```

lemma refinement:
  fixes
    A :: 'a set and
    p :: 'a Profile-List
  assumes profile-l A p
  shows profile {0 ..< length p} A (pl-to-pr-α p)

```



```

proof (unfold profile-def, safe)
  fix i :: nat
  assume in-range:  $i \in \{0 \dots \text{length } p\}$ 
  moreover have well-formed-l (p!i)
    using assms in-range
    unfolding profile-l-def
    by simp
  moreover have linear-order-on-l A (p!i)
    using assms in-range
    unfolding profile-l-def
    by simp
  ultimately show linear-order-on A (pl-to-pr- $\alpha$  p i)
    using lin-ord-equiv length-map nth-map
    by auto
qed

end

```

1.13 Ordered Relation Type

```

theory Ordered-Relation
  imports Preference-Relation
    ./Refined-Types/Preference-List
    HOL-Combinatorics.Multiset-Permutations
begin

lemma fin-ordered:
  fixes X :: 'x set
  assumes finite X
  obtains ord :: 'x rel where
    linear-order-on X ord
proof –
  assume
    ex:  $\bigwedge \text{ord. linear-order-on } X \text{ ord} \implies \text{?thesis}$ 
  obtain l :: 'x list where
    set-l:  $\text{set } l = X$ 
    using finite-list assms
    by blast
  let ?r = pl- $\alpha$  l
  have antisym ?r
    using set-l Collect-mono-iff antisym index-eq-index-conv pl- $\alpha$ -def
    unfolding antisym-def
    by fastforce
  moreover have refl-on X ?r
    using set-l
    unfolding refl-on-def pl- $\alpha$ -def is-less-preferred-than-l.simps
    by blast

```

```

moreover have Relation.trans ?r
  unfolding Relation.trans-def pl- $\alpha$ -def is-less-preferred-than-l.simps
  by auto
moreover have total-on X ?r
  using set-l
  unfolding total-on-def pl- $\alpha$ -def is-less-preferred-than-l.simps
  by force
ultimately have linear-order-on X ?r
  unfolding linear-order-on-def preorder-on-def partial-order-on-def
  by blast
thus ?thesis
  using ex
  by blast
qed

```

```

typedef 'a Ordered-Preference =
  {p :: 'a::finite Preference-Relation. linear-order-on (UNIV::'a set) p}
  morphisms ord2pref pref2ord
proof (simp)
  have finite (UNIV::'a set)
    by simp
  then obtain p :: 'a Preference-Relation where
    linear-order-on (UNIV::'a set) p
    using fin-ordered
    by metis
  thus  $\exists p::'a \text{ Preference-Relation. linear-order } p$ 
    by blast
qed

```

```

instance Ordered-Preference :: (finite) finite
proof
  have (UNIV::'a Ordered-Preference set) =
    pref2ord ' {p :: 'a Preference-Relation. linear-order-on (UNIV::'a set) p}
    using type-definition.Abs-image type-definition-Ordered-Preference
    by blast
  moreover have finite {p :: 'a Preference-Relation. linear-order-on (UNIV::'a
set) p}
    by simp
  ultimately show finite (UNIV::'a Ordered-Preference set)
    using finite-imageI
    by metis
qed

```

```

lemma range-ord2pref: range ord2pref = {p. linear-order p}
  using type-definition.Rep-range type-definition-Ordered-Preference
  by metis

```

```

lemma card-ord-pref: card (UNIV::'a::finite Ordered-Preference set) = fact (card
(UNIV::'a set))

```

```

proof –
  let ?n = card (UNIV::'a set) and
    ?perm = permutations-of-set (UNIV :: 'a set)
  have (UNIV::('a Ordered-Preference set)) =
    pref2ord ‘ {p :: 'a Preference-Relation. linear-order-on (UNIV::'a set) p}
  using type-definition-Ordered-Preference type-definition.Abs-image
  by blast
moreover have
  inj-on pref2ord {p :: 'a Preference-Relation. linear-order-on (UNIV::'a set) p}
  using inj-onCI pref2ord-inject
  by metis
ultimately have
  bij-betw pref2ord
  {p :: 'a Preference-Relation. linear-order-on (UNIV::'a set) p}
  (UNIV::('a Ordered-Preference set))
  using bij-betw-imageI
  by metis
hence card (UNIV::('a Ordered-Preference set)) =
  card {p :: 'a Preference-Relation. linear-order-on (UNIV::'a set) p}
  using bij-betw-same-card
  by metis
moreover have card ?perm = fact ?n
  by simp
ultimately show ?thesis
  using bij-betw-same-card pl-α-bij-betw finite
  by metis
qed

end

```

1.14 Alternative Election Type

```

theory Quotient-Type-Election
  imports Profile
begin

```

```

lemma election-equality-equiv:
  election-equality E E and
  election-equality E E'  $\implies$  election-equality E' E and
  election-equality E E'  $\implies$  election-equality E' F  $\implies$  election-equality E F
proof –
  have  $\forall$  E. E = (fst E, fst (snd E), snd (snd E))
  by simp
  thus
    election-equality E E and
    election-equality E E'  $\implies$  election-equality E' E and
    election-equality E E'  $\implies$  election-equality E' F  $\implies$  election-equality E F

```

```

using election-equality.simps[of fst E fst (snd E) snd (snd E)]
      election-equality.simps[of
        fst E' fst (snd E') snd (snd E') fst E fst (snd E) snd (snd E)]
      election-equality.simps[of
        fst E' fst (snd E') snd (snd E') fst F fst (snd F) snd (snd F)]
by (metis, metis, metis)
qed

quotient-type ('a, 'v) Election-Alt =
  'a set × 'v set × ('a, 'v) Profile / election-equality
unfolding equivp-reflp-symp-transp reflp-def symp-def transp-def
using election-equality-equiv
by simp

fun fst-alt :: ('a, 'v) Election-Alt ⇒ 'a set where
  fst-alt E = Product-Type.fst (rep-Election-Alt E)

fun snd-alt :: ('a, 'v) Election-Alt ⇒ 'v set × ('a, 'v) Profile where
  snd-alt E = Product-Type.snd (rep-Election-Alt E)

abbreviation alternatives- $\mathcal{E}$ -alt :: ('a, 'v) Election-Alt ⇒ 'a set where
  alternatives- $\mathcal{E}$ -alt E ≡ fst-alt E

abbreviation voters- $\mathcal{E}$ -alt :: ('a, 'v) Election-Alt ⇒ 'v set where
  voters- $\mathcal{E}$ -alt E ≡ Product-Type.fst (snd-alt E)

abbreviation profile- $\mathcal{E}$ -alt :: ('a, 'v) Election-Alt ⇒ ('a, 'v) Profile where
  profile- $\mathcal{E}$ -alt E ≡ Product-Type.snd (snd-alt E)

end

```

Chapter 2

Quotient Rules

2.1 Quotients of Equivalence Relations

```
theory Relation-Quotients
imports ../Social-Choice-Types/Symmetry-Of-Functions
begin
```

2.1.1 Definitions

```
fun singleton-set :: 'x set  $\Rightarrow$  'x where
  singleton-set s = (if (card s = 1) then (the-inv ( $\lambda$  x. {x}) s) else undefined)
— This is undefined if card s  $\neq$  1. Note that "undefined = undefined" is the only
provable equality for undefined.
```

For a given function, we define a function on sets that maps each set to the unique image under f of its elements, if one exists. Otherwise, the result is undefined.

```
fun  $\pi_Q$  :: ('x  $\Rightarrow$  'y)  $\Rightarrow$  ('x set  $\Rightarrow$  'y) where
   $\pi_Q$  f s = singleton-set (f ` s)
```

For a given function f on sets and a mapping from elements to sets, we define a function on the set element type that maps each element to the image of its corresponding set under f. A natural mapping is from elements to their classes under a relation.

```
fun inv- $\pi_Q$  :: ('x  $\Rightarrow$  'x set)  $\Rightarrow$  ('x set  $\Rightarrow$  'y)  $\Rightarrow$  ('x  $\Rightarrow$  'y) where
  inv- $\pi_Q$  cls f x = f (cls x)
```

```
fun relation-class :: 'x rel  $\Rightarrow$  'x  $\Rightarrow$  'x set where
  relation-class r x = r `` {x}
```

2.1.2 Well-Definedness

```
lemma singleton-set-undef-if-card-neq-one:
fixes s :: 'x set
```

```

assumes  $\text{card } s \neq 1$ 
shows  $\text{singleton-set } s = \text{undefined}$ 
using assms
by simp

```

```

lemma singleton-set-def-if-card-one:
  fixes  $s :: 'x \text{ set}$ 
  assumes  $\text{card } s = 1$ 
  shows  $\exists! x. x = \text{singleton-set } s \wedge \{x\} = s$ 
  using assms card-1-singletonE inj-def singleton-inject the-inv-f-f
  unfolding singleton-set.simps
  by (metis (mono-tags, lifting))

```

If the given function is invariant under an equivalence relation, the induced function on sets is well-defined for all equivalence classes of that relation.

```

theorem pass-to-quotient:
  fixes
     $f :: 'x \Rightarrow 'y$  and
     $r :: 'x \text{ rel}$  and
     $s :: 'x \text{ set}$ 
  assumes
     $f$  respects  $r$  and
    equiv  $s$   $r$ 
  shows  $\forall t \in s // r. \forall x \in t. \pi_Q f t = f x$ 
proof (safe)
  fix
     $t :: 'x \text{ set}$  and
     $x :: 'x$ 
  have  $\forall y \in r `` \{x\}. (x, y) \in r$ 
    unfolding Image-def
    by simp
  hence func-eq-x:  $\{f y \mid y. y \in r `` \{x\}\} = \{f x \mid y. y \in r `` \{x\}\}$ 
    using assms
    unfolding congruent-def
    by fastforce
  assume
     $t \in s // r$  and
     $x \text{-in-} t: x \in t$ 
  moreover from this have  $r `` \{x\} \in s // r$ 
    using assms quotient-eq-iff equiv-class-eq-iff quotientI
    by metis
  ultimately have r-img-elem-x-eq-t:  $r `` \{x\} = t$ 
    using assms quotient-eq-iff Image-singleton-iff
    by metis
  hence  $\{f x \mid y. y \in r `` \{x\}\} = \{f x\}$ 
    using x-in-t
    by blast
  hence  $f ` t = \{f x\}$ 
    using Setcompr-eq-image r-img-elem-x-eq-t func-eq-x

```

```

    by metis
  thus  $\pi_Q f t = f x$ 
    using singleton-set-def-if-card-one is-singletonI is-singleton-altdef the-elem-eq
    unfolding  $\pi_Q.simps$ 
    by metis
qed

```

A function on sets induces a function on the element type that is invariant under a given equivalence relation.

```

theorem pass-to-quotient-inv:
  fixes
     $f :: 'x \text{ set} \Rightarrow 'x$  and
     $r :: 'x \text{ rel}$  and
     $s :: 'x \text{ set}$ 
  assumes equiv s r
  defines induced-fun  $\equiv (inv\text{-}\pi_Q (relation\text{-}class\ r) f)$ 
  shows
    induced-fun respects r and
     $\forall A \in s // r. \pi_Q \text{ induced-fun } A = f A$ 
proof (safe)
  have  $\forall (a, b) \in r. relation\text{-}class\ r\ a = relation\text{-}class\ r\ b$ 
    using assms equiv-class-eq
    unfolding relation-class.simps
    by fastforce
  hence  $\forall (a, b) \in r. induced\text{-}fun\ a = induced\text{-}fun\ b$ 
    unfolding induced-fun-def inv- $\pi_Q.simps$ 
    by auto
  thus induced-fun respects r
    unfolding congruent-def
    by metis
  moreover fix  $A :: 'x \text{ set}$ 
  assume  $A \in s // r$ 
  moreover with assms
  obtain  $a :: 'x$  where
     $a \in A$  and
     $A\text{-eq-rel-class-r-a}: A = relation\text{-}class\ r\ a$ 
    using equiv-Eps-in proj-Eps
    unfolding proj-def relation-class.simps
    by metis
  ultimately have  $\pi_Q \text{ induced-fun } A = induced\text{-}fun\ a$ 
    using pass-to-quotient assms
    by blast
  thus  $\pi_Q \text{ induced-fun } A = f A$ 
    using A-eq-rel-class-r-a
    unfolding induced-fun-def
    by simp
qed

```

2.1.3 Equivalence Relations

lemma *equiv-rel-restr*:

```

fixes
   $s :: 'x \text{ set}$  and
   $t :: 'x \text{ set}$  and
   $r :: 'x \text{ rel}$ 
assumes
   $\text{equiv } s \text{ } r$  and
   $t \subseteq s$ 
shows  $\text{equiv } t \text{ } (\text{Restr } r \text{ } t)$ 
proof (unfold equiv-def refl-on-def, safe)
  fix  $x :: 'x$ 
  assume  $x \in t$ 
  thus  $(x, x) \in r$ 
    using assms
    unfolding equiv-def refl-on-def
    by blast
next
  show  $\text{sym } (\text{Restr } r \text{ } t)$ 
    using assms
    unfolding equiv-def sym-def
    by blast
next
  show  $\text{Relation.trans } (\text{Restr } r \text{ } t)$ 
    using assms
    unfolding equiv-def Relation.trans-def
    by blast
qed

```

lemma *rel-ind-by-group-act-equiv*:

```

fixes
   $m :: 'x \text{ monoid}$  and
   $s :: 'y \text{ set}$  and
   $\varphi :: ('x, 'y) \text{ binary-fun}$ 
assumes group-action  $m \text{ } s \text{ } \varphi$ 
shows  $\text{equiv } s \text{ } (\text{rel-induced-by-action } (\text{carrier } m) \text{ } s \text{ } \varphi)$ 
proof (unfold equiv-def refl-on-def sym-def Relation.trans-def rel-induced-by-action.simps,
  clarsimp, safe)
  fix  $y :: 'y$ 
  assume  $y \in s$ 
  hence  $\varphi \text{ } 1 \text{ } m \text{ } y = y$ 
    using assms group-action.id-eq-one restrict-apply'
    by metis
  thus  $\exists g \in \text{carrier } m. \varphi \text{ } g \text{ } y = y$ 
    using assms group.is-monoid group-hom.axioms
    unfolding group-action-def
    by blast
next
fix

```



```

    y :: 'y and
    g :: 'x
  assume
    y-in-s: y ∈ s and
    carrier-g: g ∈ carrier m
  hence y = φ (inv m g) (φ g y)
    using assms
    by (simp add: group-action.orbit-sym-aux)
  thus ∃ h ∈ carrier m. φ h (φ g y) = y
    using assms carrier-g group.inv-closed group-action.group-hom group-hom.axioms(1)
    by metis
next
fix
  y :: 'y and
  g :: 'x and
  h :: 'x
  assume
    y-in-s: y ∈ s and
    carrier-g: g ∈ carrier m and
    carrier-h: h ∈ carrier m
  hence φ (h ⊗ m g) y = φ h (φ g y)
    using assms
    by (simp add: group-action.composition-rule)
  thus ∃ f ∈ carrier m. φ f y = φ h (φ g y)
    using assms carrier-g carrier-h group-action.group-hom
      group-hom.axioms(1) monoid.m-closed
    unfolding group-def
    by metis
qed

end

```

2.2 Quotients of Equivalence Relations on Election Sets

```

theory Election-Quotients
  imports Relation-Quotients
    ../Social-Choice-Types/Voting-Symmetry
    ../Social-Choice-Types/Ordered-Relation
    HOL-Analysis.Convex
    HOL-Analysis.Cartesian-Space
begin

```

2.2.1 Auxiliary Lemmas

```

lemma obtain-partition:

```

```

fixes
   $X :: 'x \text{ set}$  and
   $N :: 'y \Rightarrow \text{nat}$  and
   $Y :: 'y \text{ set}$ 
assumes
   $\text{finite } X$  and
   $\text{finite } Y$  and
   $\text{sum } N \ Y = \text{card } X$ 
shows  $\exists \mathcal{X}. X = \bigcup \{ \mathcal{X} \ i \mid i. i \in Y \} \wedge (\forall i \in Y. \text{card } (\mathcal{X} \ i) = N \ i) \wedge$ 
   $(\forall i \ j. i \neq j \longrightarrow i \in Y \wedge j \in Y \longrightarrow \mathcal{X} \ i \cap \mathcal{X} \ j = \{\})$ 
using assms
proof (induction card Y arbitrary: X Y)
case 0
fix
   $X :: 'x \text{ set}$  and
   $Y :: 'y \text{ set}$ 
assume
   $\text{fin-}X$ :  $\text{finite } X$  and
   $\text{card-}X$ :  $\text{sum } N \ Y = \text{card } X$  and
   $\text{fin-}Y$ :  $\text{finite } Y$  and
   $\text{card-}Y$ :  $0 = \text{card } Y$ 
let  $?X = \lambda y. \{\}$ 
have  $Y\text{-empty}$ :  $Y = \{\}$ 
  using 0  $\text{fin-}Y$   $\text{card-}Y$ 
  by simp
hence  $\text{sum } N \ Y = 0$ 
  by simp
hence  $X = \{\}$ 
  using  $\text{fin-}X$   $\text{card-}X$ 
  by simp
hence  $X = \bigcup \{ ?X \ i \mid i. i \in Y \}$ 
  by blast
moreover have  $\forall i \ j. i \neq j \longrightarrow i \in Y \wedge j \in Y \longrightarrow ?X \ i \cap ?X \ j = \{\}$ 
  by blast
ultimately show
   $\exists \mathcal{X}. X = \bigcup \{ \mathcal{X} \ i \mid i. i \in Y \} \wedge$ 
   $(\forall i \in Y. \text{card } (\mathcal{X} \ i) = N \ i) \wedge$ 
   $(\forall i \ j. i \neq j \longrightarrow i \in Y \wedge j \in Y \longrightarrow \mathcal{X} \ i \cap \mathcal{X} \ j = \{\})$ 
  using  $Y\text{-empty}$ 
  by simp
next
case (Suc x)
fix
   $x :: \text{nat}$  and
   $X :: 'x \text{ set}$  and
   $Y :: 'y \text{ set}$ 
assume
   $\text{card-}Y$ :  $\text{Suc } x = \text{card } Y$  and
   $\text{fin-}Y$ :  $\text{finite } Y$  and

```

$\text{fin-}X$: *finite* X **and**
 $\text{card-}X$: $\text{sum } N \ Y = \text{card } X$ **and**
 hyp :
 $\bigwedge Y \ (X :: 'x \text{ set}).$
 $x = \text{card } Y \implies$
 $\text{finite } X \implies$
 $\text{finite } Y \implies$
 $\text{sum } N \ Y = \text{card } X \implies$
 $\exists \mathcal{X}.$
 $X = \bigcup \{ \mathcal{X} \ i \mid i. i \in Y \} \wedge$
 $(\forall i \in Y. \text{card } (\mathcal{X} \ i) = N \ i) \wedge$
 $(\forall i \ j. i \neq j \longrightarrow i \in Y \wedge j \in Y \longrightarrow \mathcal{X} \ i \cap \mathcal{X} \ j = \{ \})$

then obtain
 $Y' :: 'y \text{ set}$ **and**
 $y :: 'y$ **where**
 $\text{ins-}Y$: $Y = \text{insert } y \ Y'$ **and**
 $\text{card-}Y'$: $\text{card } Y' = x$ **and**
 $\text{fin-}Y'$: *finite* Y' **and**
 $y\text{-not-in-}Y'$: $y \notin Y'$
using $\text{card-Suc-eq-finite}$
by (*metis* (*no-types*, *lifting*))
hence $N \ y \leq \text{card } X$
using $\text{card-}X \ \text{card-}Y \ \text{fin-}Y \ \text{le-add1} \ n\text{-not-Suc-}n \ \text{sum.insert}$
by *metis*
then obtain $X' :: 'x \text{ set}$ **where**
 $X'\text{-in-}X$: $X' \subseteq X$ **and**
 $\text{card-}X'$: $\text{card } X' = N \ y$
using $\text{fin-}X \ \text{ex-card}$
by *metis*
hence $\text{finite } (X - X') \wedge \text{card } (X - X') = \text{sum } N \ Y'$
using $\text{card-}Y \ \text{card-}X \ \text{fin-}X \ \text{fin-}Y \ \text{ins-}Y \ \text{card-}Y' \ \text{fin-}Y'$
 $\text{Suc-}n\text{-not-}n \ \text{add-diff-cancel-left'} \ \text{card-Diff-subset} \ \text{card-insert-if}$
 $\text{finite-Diff} \ \text{finite-subset} \ \text{sum.insert}$
by *metis*
then obtain $\mathcal{X} :: 'y \Rightarrow 'x \text{ set}$ **where**
 part : $X - X' = \bigcup \{ \mathcal{X} \ i \mid i. i \in Y' \}$ **and**
 disj : $\forall i \ j. i \neq j \longrightarrow i \in Y' \wedge j \in Y' \longrightarrow \mathcal{X} \ i \cap \mathcal{X} \ j = \{ \}$ **and**
 card : $\forall i \in Y'. \text{card } (\mathcal{X} \ i) = N \ i$
using $\text{hyp}[of \ Y' \ X - X'] \ \text{fin-}Y' \ \text{card-}Y'$
by *auto*
then obtain $\mathcal{X}' :: 'y \Rightarrow 'x \text{ set}$ **where**
 map' : $\mathcal{X}' = (\lambda z. \text{if } (z = y) \text{ then } X' \text{ else } \mathcal{X} \ z)$
by *simp*
hence $\text{eq-}\mathcal{X}$: $\forall i \in Y'. \mathcal{X}' \ i = \mathcal{X} \ i$
using $y\text{-not-in-}Y'$
by *simp*
have $Y = \{y\} \cup Y'$
using $\text{ins-}Y$
by *simp*

hence $\forall f. \{f\ i \mid i. i \in Y\} = \{f\ y\} \cup \{f\ i \mid i. i \in Y'\}$
 by *blast*
 hence $\{\mathcal{X}'\ i \mid i. i \in Y\} = \{\mathcal{X}'\ y\} \cup \{\mathcal{X}'\ i \mid i. i \in Y'\}$
 by *metis*
 hence $\bigcup \{\mathcal{X}'\ i \mid i. i \in Y\} = \mathcal{X}'\ y \cup \bigcup \{\mathcal{X}'\ i \mid i. i \in Y'\}$
 by *simp*
 also have $\mathcal{X}'\ y = X'$
 using *map'*
 by *presburger*
 also have $\bigcup \{\mathcal{X}'\ i \mid i. i \in Y'\} = \bigcup \{\mathcal{X}\ i \mid i. i \in Y'\}$
 using *eq- \mathcal{X}*
 by *blast*
 finally have *part'*: $X = \bigcup \{\mathcal{X}'\ i \mid i. i \in Y\}$
 using *part Diff-partition X' -in- X*
 by *metis*
 have $\forall i \in Y'. \mathcal{X}'\ i \subseteq X - X'$
 using *part eq- \mathcal{X} Setcompr-eq-image UN-upper*
 by *metis*
 hence $\forall i \in Y'. \mathcal{X}'\ i \cap X' = \{\}$
 by *blast*
 hence $\forall i \in Y'. \mathcal{X}'\ i \cap \mathcal{X}'\ y = \{\}$
 using *map'*
 by *simp*
 hence $\forall i\ j. i \neq j \longrightarrow i \in Y \wedge j \in Y \longrightarrow \mathcal{X}'\ i \cap \mathcal{X}'\ j = \{\}$
 using *map' disj ins-Y inf.commute insertE*
 by (*metis (no-types, lifting)*)
 moreover have $\forall i \in Y. \text{card } (\mathcal{X}'\ i) = N\ i$
 using *map' card card- X' ins-Y*
 by *simp*
 ultimately show
 $\exists \mathcal{X}. X = \bigcup \{\mathcal{X}\ i \mid i. i \in Y\} \wedge$
 $(\forall i \in Y. \text{card } (\mathcal{X}\ i) = N\ i) \wedge$
 $(\forall i\ j. i \neq j \longrightarrow i \in Y \wedge j \in Y \longrightarrow \mathcal{X}\ i \cap \mathcal{X}\ j = \{\})$
 using *part'*
 by *blast*
 qed

2.2.2 Anonymity Quotient - Grid

fun *anonymity_Q* :: 'a set \Rightarrow ('a, 'v) Election set set **where**
anonymity_Q A = quotient (fixed-alt-elections A) (*anonymity_R* (fixed-alt-elections A))

— Counts the occurrences of a ballot per election in a set of elections if the occurrences of the ballot per election coincide for all elections in the set.

fun *vote-count_Q* :: 'a Preference-Relation \Rightarrow ('a, 'v) Election set \Rightarrow nat **where**
vote-count_Q p = π_Q (vote-count p)

fun *anon-class-to-vec* :: ('a::finite, 'v) Election set \Rightarrow (nat, 'a Ordered-Preference)

vec **where**

$$\text{anon-class-to-vec } X = (\chi \text{ p. vote-count}_{\mathcal{Q}} (\text{ord2pref } p) X)$$

We assume all our elections to consist of a fixed finite alternative set of size n and finite subsets of an infinite voter universe. Profiles are linear orders on the alternatives. Then we can work on the natural-number-vectors of dimension $n!$ instead of the equivalence classes of the anonymity relation: Each dimension corresponds to one possible linear order on the alternative set, i.e., the possible preferences. Each equivalence class of elections corresponds to a vector whose entries denote the amount of voters per election in that class who vote the respective corresponding preference.

theorem *anonymity_Q-iso*:

assumes *infinite* ($UNIV::('v \text{ set})$)

shows *bij-betw* ($\text{anon-class-to-vec}::('a::\text{finite}, 'v) \text{ Election set} \Rightarrow \text{nat}^{\sim}('a \text{ Ordered-Preference})$)

$(\text{anonymity}_{\mathcal{Q}} (UNIV::'a \text{ set})) (UNIV::(\text{nat}^{\sim}('a \text{ Ordered-Preference}) \text{ set}))$

proof (*unfold bij-betw-def inj-on-def, standard, standard, standard, standard*)

fix

$X::('a, 'v) \text{ Election set}$ **and**

$Y::('a, 'v) \text{ Election set}$

assume

class-X: $X \in \text{anonymity}_{\mathcal{Q}} UNIV$ **and**

class-Y: $Y \in \text{anonymity}_{\mathcal{Q}} UNIV$ **and**

eq-vec: $\text{anon-class-to-vec } X = \text{anon-class-to-vec } Y$

have $\forall E \in \text{fixed-alt-elections } UNIV. \text{finite} (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} E)$

by *simp*

hence $\forall (E, E') \in \text{anonymity}_{\mathcal{R}} (\text{fixed-alt-elections } UNIV). \text{finite} (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} E)$

by *simp*

moreover have *subset*: $\text{fixed-alt-elections } UNIV \subseteq \text{valid-elections}$

by *simp*

ultimately have

$\forall (E, E') \in \text{anonymity}_{\mathcal{R}} (\text{fixed-alt-elections } UNIV). \forall p. \text{vote-count } p E = \text{vote-count } p E'$

using *anon-rel-vote-count*

by *blast*

hence *vote-count-invar*: $\forall p. (\text{vote-count } p) \text{ respects } (\text{anonymity}_{\mathcal{R}} (\text{fixed-alt-elections } UNIV))$

unfolding *congruent-def*

by *blast*

have *foo*: *equiv valid-elections* ($\text{anonymity}_{\mathcal{R}} \text{ valid-elections}$)

using *rel-ind-by-group-act-equiv*[*of* $\text{anonymity}_{\mathcal{G}} \text{ valid-elections } \varphi\text{-anon valid-elections}$]
rel-ind-by-coinciding-action-on-subset-eq-restr

by (*simp add*: *anonymous-group-action.group-action-axioms*)

moreover have

$\forall \pi \in \text{carrier } \text{anonymity}_{\mathcal{G}}.$

$\forall E \in \text{fixed-alt-elections } UNIV.$

$\varphi\text{-anon } (\text{fixed-alt-elections } UNIV) \pi E = \varphi\text{-anon valid-elections } \pi E$

by *simp*
 ultimately have *equiv-rel*:
 equiv (*fixed-alt-elections UNIV*) (*anonymity_R* (*fixed-alt-elections UNIV*))
 using *subset rel-ind-by-coinciding-action-on-subset-eq-restr*[*of fixed-alt-elections UNIV*
 valid-elections carrier anonymity_G φ-anon (fixed-alt-elections UNIV)]
 equiv-rel-restr
 unfolding *anonymity_R.simps*
 by (*metis (no-types)*)
 with *vote-count-invar*
 have *quotient-count*: $\forall X \in \text{anonymity}_{\mathcal{Q}} \text{ UNIV}. \forall p. \forall E \in X. \text{vote-count}_{\mathcal{Q}} p$
 $X = \text{vote-count } p \ E$
 using *pass-to-quotient*[*of anonymity_R* (*fixed-alt-elections UNIV*)]
 unfolding *anonymity_Q.simps* *anonymity_R.simps* *vote-count_Q.simps*
 by *metis*
 moreover from *equiv-rel*
 obtain
 $E :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election}$ and
 $E' :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election}$ where
 $E\text{-in-}X: E \in X$ and
 $E'\text{-in-}Y: E' \in Y$
 using *class-X class-Y equiv-Eps-in*
 unfolding *anonymity_Q.simps*
 by *metis*
 ultimately have $\forall p. \text{vote-count}_{\mathcal{Q}} p \ X = \text{vote-count } p \ E \wedge \text{vote-count}_{\mathcal{Q}} p \ Y =$
 $\text{vote-count } p \ E'$
 using *class-X class-Y*
 by *blast*
 moreover with *eq-vec* have $\forall p. \text{vote-count}_{\mathcal{Q}} (\text{ord2pref } p) \ X = \text{vote-count}_{\mathcal{Q}}$
 $(\text{ord2pref } p) \ Y$
 unfolding *anon-class-to-vec.simps*
 using *UNIV-I vec-lambda-inverse*
 by *metis*
 ultimately have $\forall p. \text{vote-count } (\text{ord2pref } p) \ E = \text{vote-count } (\text{ord2pref } p) \ E'$
 by *simp*
 hence eq: $\forall p \in \{p. \text{linear-order-on } (\text{UNIV}::'a \text{ set}) \ p\}. \text{vote-count } p \ E =$
 $\text{vote-count } p \ E'$
 using *pref2ord-inverse*
 by *metis*
 from *equiv-rel class-X class-Y* have *subset-fixed-alts*:
 $X \subseteq \text{fixed-alt-elections UNIV} \wedge Y \subseteq \text{fixed-alt-elections UNIV}$
 unfolding *anonymity_Q.simps*
 using *in-quotient-imp-subset*
 by *blast*
 hence *eq-alts: alternatives- \mathcal{E}* $E = \text{UNIV} \wedge \text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E' = \text{UNIV}$
 using *E-in-X E'-in-Y*
 unfolding *fixed-alt-elections.simps*
 by *blast*
 with *subset-fixed-alts* have *eq-complement*:

$\forall p \in UNIV - \{p. \text{linear-order-on } (UNIV::'a \text{ set}) p\}.$
 $\{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = p\} = \{\} \wedge \{v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E'. \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E' \ v$
 $= p\} = \{\}$
using $E\text{-in-}X \ E'\text{-in-}Y$
unfolding $\text{fixed-alt-elections.simps valid-elections-def profile-def}$
by auto
hence $\forall p \in UNIV - \{p. \text{linear-order-on } (UNIV::'a \text{ set}) p\}.$
 $\text{vote-count } p \ E = 0 \wedge \text{vote-count } p \ E' = 0$
unfolding $\text{card-eq-0-iff vote-count.simps}$
by simp
with $\text{eq have eq-vote-count: } \forall p. \text{vote-count } p \ E = \text{vote-count } p \ E'$
using DiffI UNIV-I
by metis
moreover from $\text{subset-fixed-alt-s E-in-X E'-in-Y}$
have $\text{finite } (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \wedge \text{finite } (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E')$
unfolding $\text{fixed-alt-elections.simps}$
by blast
moreover from $\text{subset-fixed-alt-s E-in-X E'-in-Y}$
have $(E, E') \in (\text{fixed-alt-elections } UNIV) \times (\text{fixed-alt-elections } UNIV)$
by blast
moreover from this
have
 $(\forall v. v \notin \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E \longrightarrow \text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v = \{\}) \wedge (\forall v. v \notin \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E' \longrightarrow$
 $\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E' \ v = \{\})$
by simp
ultimately have $(E, E') \in \text{anonymity}_{\mathcal{R}} (\text{fixed-alt-elections } UNIV)$
using $\text{eq-alt-s vote-count-anon-rel}$
by metis
hence $\text{anonymity}_{\mathcal{R}} (\text{fixed-alt-elections } UNIV) \text{ “}\{E\} =$
 $\text{anonymity}_{\mathcal{R}} (\text{fixed-alt-elections } UNIV) \text{ “}\{E'\}$
using $\text{equiv-rel equiv-class-eq}$
by metis
also have $\text{anonymity}_{\mathcal{R}} (\text{fixed-alt-elections } UNIV) \text{ “}\{E\} = X$
using $E\text{-in-}X \ \text{class-}X \ \text{equiv-rel Image-singleton-iff equiv-class-eq quotientE}$
unfolding $\text{anonymity}_{\mathcal{Q}.simps}$
by $(\text{metis } (\text{no-types, lifting}))$
also have $\text{anonymity}_{\mathcal{R}} (\text{fixed-alt-elections } UNIV) \text{ “}\{E'\} = Y$
using $E'\text{-in-}Y \ \text{class-}Y \ \text{equiv-rel Image-singleton-iff equiv-class-eq quotientE}$
unfolding $\text{anonymity}_{\mathcal{Q}.simps}$
by $(\text{metis } (\text{no-types, lifting}))$
finally show $X = Y$
by simp
next
have $\text{subset: fixed-alt-elections } UNIV \subseteq \text{valid-elections}$
by simp
have $\text{equiv valid-elections } (\text{anonymity}_{\mathcal{R}} \ \text{valid-elections})$
using $\text{rel-ind-by-group-act-equiv[of anonymity}_{\mathcal{G}} \ \text{valid-elections } \varphi\text{-anon valid-elections]}$
 $\text{rel-ind-by-coinciding-action-on-subset-eq-restr}$
by $(\text{simp add: anonymous-group-action.group-action-axioms})$

moreover have
 $\forall \pi \in \text{carrier anonymity}_{\mathcal{G}}.$
 $\forall E \in \text{fixed-alt-elections UNIV}.$
 $\varphi\text{-anon (fixed-alt-elections UNIV)} \pi E = \varphi\text{-anon valid-elections } \pi E$
using *subset*
unfolding $\varphi\text{-anon.simps}$
by *simp*
ultimately have *equiv-rel*:
 $\text{equiv (fixed-alt-elections UNIV) (anonymity}_{\mathcal{R}} \text{ (fixed-alt-elections UNIV))}$
using *subset equiv-rel-restr rel-ind-by-coinciding-action-on-subset-eq-restr*[*of*
 $\text{fixed-alt-elections UNIV valid-elections carrier anonymity}_{\mathcal{G}}$
 $\varphi\text{-anon (fixed-alt-elections UNIV)}$]
unfolding $\text{anonymity}_{\mathcal{R}}.\text{simps}$
by (*metis (no-types)*)
have $(\text{UNIV}::(\text{nat}, 'a \text{ Ordered-Preference}) \text{ vec set})) \subseteq$
 $(\text{anon-class-to-vec}::('a, 'v) \text{ Election set} \Rightarrow (\text{nat}, 'a \text{ Ordered-Preference}) \text{ vec})$ ‘
 $\text{anonymity}_{\mathcal{Q}} \text{ UNIV}$
proof (*unfold anon-class-to-vec.simps, safe*)
fix $x :: (\text{nat}, 'a \text{ Ordered-Preference}) \text{ vec}$
have *finite* $(\text{UNIV}::('a \text{ Ordered-Preference} \text{ set}))$
by *simp*
hence *finite* $\{x\$i \mid i. i \in \text{UNIV}\}$
using *finite-Atleast-Atmost-nat*
by *blast*
hence $\text{sum } (\lambda i. x\$i) \text{ UNIV} < \infty$
using *enat-ord-code*
by *simp*
moreover have $0 \leq \text{sum } (\lambda i. x\$i) \text{ UNIV}$
by *blast*
ultimately obtain $V :: 'v \text{ set}$ **where**
 $\text{fin-}V$: *finite* V **and**
 $\text{card } V = \text{sum } (\lambda i. x\$i) \text{ UNIV}$
using *assms infinite-arbitrarily-large*
by *metis*
then obtain $X' :: 'a \text{ Ordered-Preference} \Rightarrow 'v \text{ set}$ **where**
 card' : $\forall i. \text{card } (X' i) = x\i **and**
 partition' : $V = \bigcup \{X' i \mid i. i \in \text{UNIV}\}$ **and**
 disjoint' : $\forall i j. i \neq j \longrightarrow X' i \cap X' j = \{\}$
using *obtain-partition*[*of* $V \text{ UNIV } (\$) x$]
by *auto*
obtain $X :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation} \Rightarrow 'v \text{ set}$ **where**
 $\text{def-}X$: $X = (\lambda i. \text{if } (i \in \{i. \text{linear-order } i\}) \text{ then } X' (\text{pref2ord } i) \text{ else } \{\})$
by *simp*
hence $\{X i \mid i. i \notin \{i. \text{linear-order } i\}\} \subseteq \{\{\}\}$
by *auto*
moreover have
 $\{X i \mid i. i \in \{i. \text{linear-order } i\}\} = \{X' (\text{pref2ord } i) \mid i. i \in \{i. \text{linear-order } i\}\}$

using *def-X*
 by *metis*
 moreover have
 $\{X\ i \mid i. i \in UNIV\} =$
 $\{X\ i \mid i. i \in \{i. linear\text{-}order\ i\}\} \cup \{X\ i \mid i. i \in UNIV - \{i. linear\text{-}order\}$
 $i\}\}$
 by *blast*
 ultimately have
 $\{X\ i \mid i. i \in UNIV\} = \{X' (pref2ord\ i) \mid i. i \in \{i. linear\text{-}order\ i\}\} \vee$
 $\{X\ i \mid i. i \in UNIV\} = \{X' (pref2ord\ i) \mid i. i \in \{i. linear\text{-}order\ i\}\} \cup \{\{\}\}$
 by *auto*
 also have $\{X' (pref2ord\ i) \mid i. i \in \{i. linear\text{-}order\ i\}\} = \{X' i \mid i. i \in UNIV\}$
 using *iso-tuple-UNIV-I pref2ord-cases*
 by *metis*
 finally have
 $\{X\ i \mid i. i \in UNIV\} = \{X' i \mid i. i \in UNIV\} \vee$
 $\{X\ i \mid i. i \in UNIV\} = \{X' i \mid i. i \in UNIV\} \cup \{\{\}\}$
 by *simp*
 hence $\bigcup \{X\ i \mid i. i \in UNIV\} = \bigcup \{X' i \mid i. i \in UNIV\}$
 using *Sup-union-distrib ccpo-Sup-singleton sup-bot.right-neutral*
 by (*metis (no-types, lifting)*)
 hence *partition*: $V = \bigcup \{X\ i \mid i. i \in UNIV\}$
 using *partition'*
 by *simp*
 moreover have $\forall\ i\ j. i \neq j \longrightarrow X\ i \cap X\ j = \{\}$
 using *disjoint' def-X pref2ord-inject*
 by *auto*
 ultimately have $\forall\ v \in V. \exists!\ i. v \in X\ i$
 by *auto*
 then obtain *p'* :: '*v* \Rightarrow '*a* *Preference-Relation* where
p-X: $\forall\ v \in V. v \in X\ (p'\ v)$ and
p-disj: $\forall\ v \in V. \forall\ i. i \neq p'\ v \longrightarrow v \notin X\ i$
 by *metis*
 then obtain *p* :: '*v* \Rightarrow '*a* *Preference-Relation* where
p-def: $p = (\lambda\ v. \text{if } v \in V \text{ then } p'\ v \text{ else } \{\})$
 by *simp*
 hence *lin-ord*: $\forall\ v \in V. linear\text{-}order\ (p\ v)$
 using *def-X p-X p-disj*
 by *fastforce*
 hence *valid*: $(UNIV, V, p) \in fixed\text{-}alt\text{-}elections\ UNIV$
 using *fin-V*
 unfolding *p-def fixed-alt-elections.simps valid-elections-def profile-def*
 by *auto*
 hence $\forall\ i. \forall\ E \in anonymity_{\mathcal{R}}\ (fixed\text{-}alt\text{-}elections\ UNIV) \text{ `` } \{(UNIV, V, p)\}.$
 $vote\text{-}count\ i\ E = vote\text{-}count\ i\ (UNIV, V, p)$
 using *anon-rel-vote-count[of (UNIV, V, p) - fixed-alt-elections UNIV]*
 $fin\text{-}V\ subset$
 by *simp*
 moreover have $(UNIV, V, p) \in anonymity_{\mathcal{R}}\ (fixed\text{-}alt\text{-}elections\ UNIV) \text{ `` }$

$\{(UNIV, V, p)\}$
using *equiv-rel valid*
unfolding *Image-def equiv-def refl-on-def*
by *blast*
ultimately have *eq-vote-count*:
 $\forall i. \text{vote-count } i \text{ ' (anonymity}_{\mathcal{R}} \text{ (fixed-alt-elections UNIV) " " } \{(UNIV, V, p)\}$
 $=$
 $\{ \text{vote-count } i \text{ (UNIV, V, p)} \}$
by *blast*
have $\forall i. \forall v \in V. p \ v = i \longleftrightarrow v \in X \ i$
using *p-X p-disj*
unfolding *p-def*
by *metis*
hence $\forall i. \{v \in V. p \ v = i\} = \{v \in V. v \in X \ i\}$
by *blast*
moreover have $\forall i. X \ i \subseteq V$
using *partition*
by *blast*
ultimately have *rewr-preimg*: $\forall i. \{v \in V. p \ v = i\} = X \ i$
by *auto*
hence $\forall i \in \{i. \text{linear-order } i\}. \text{vote-count } i \text{ (UNIV, V, p)} = x\$(\text{pref2ord } i)$
using *def-X card'*
by *simp*
hence $\forall i \in \{i. \text{linear-order } i\}.$
 $\text{vote-count } i \text{ ' (anonymity}_{\mathcal{R}} \text{ (fixed-alt-elections UNIV) " " } \{(UNIV, V, p)\} =$
 $\{x\$(\text{pref2ord } i)\}$
using *eq-vote-count*
by *metis*
hence
 $\forall i \in \{i. \text{linear-order } i\}.$
 $\text{vote-count}_{\mathcal{Q}} \ i \text{ (anonymity}_{\mathcal{R}} \text{ (fixed-alt-elections UNIV) " " } \{(UNIV, V, p)\}$
 $= x\$(\text{pref2ord } i)$
unfolding *vote-count_Q.simps $\pi_{\mathcal{Q}}$.simps singleton-set.simps*
using *is-singleton-altdef singleton-set-def-if-card-one*
by *fastforce*
hence $\forall i. \text{vote-count}_{\mathcal{Q}} \ (\text{ord2pref } i) \text{ (anonymity}_{\mathcal{R}} \text{ (fixed-alt-elections UNIV) " " } \{(UNIV, V, p)\}$
 $= x\$i$
using *ord2pref ord2pref-inverse*
by *metis*
hence *anon-class-to-vec* $\text{(anonymity}_{\mathcal{R}} \text{ (fixed-alt-elections UNIV) " " } \{(UNIV, V, p)\} = x$
using *anon-class-to-vec.simps vec-lambda-unique*
by $(\text{metis (no-types, lifting)})$
moreover have
 $\text{anonymity}_{\mathcal{R}} \text{ (fixed-alt-elections UNIV) " " } \{(UNIV, V, p)\} \in \text{anonymity}_{\mathcal{Q}}$
 $UNIV$
using *valid*
unfolding *anonymity_Q.simps quotient-def*

```

    by blast
  ultimately show
     $x \in (\lambda X::('a, 'v) \text{ Election set}). \chi p. \text{vote-count}_{\mathcal{Q}} (\text{ord2pref } p) X) \text{ 'anonymity}_{\mathcal{Q}}$ 
  UNIV
    using anon-class-to-vec.elims
    by blast
  qed
  thus (anon-class-to-vec::('a, 'v) Election set  $\Rightarrow$  (nat, 'a Ordered-Preference) vec)
  '
    anonymity $_{\mathcal{Q}}$  UNIV = (UNIV::(nat, 'a Ordered-Preference) vec set))
  by blast
qed

```

2.2.3 Homogeneity Quotient - Simplex

```

fun vote-fraction :: 'a Preference-Relation  $\Rightarrow$  ('a, 'v) Election  $\Rightarrow$  rat where
  vote-fraction r E =
    (if (finite (voters- $\mathcal{E}$  E)  $\wedge$  voters- $\mathcal{E}$  E  $\neq$  {})
      then (Fract (vote-count r E) (card (voters- $\mathcal{E}$  E))) else 0)

fun anon-hom $_{\mathcal{R}}$  :: ('a, 'v) Election set  $\Rightarrow$  ('a, 'v) Election rel where
  anon-hom $_{\mathcal{R}}$   $\mathcal{E}$  =
    {(E, E') | E E'. E  $\in$   $\mathcal{E}$   $\wedge$  E'  $\in$   $\mathcal{E}$   $\wedge$  (finite (voters- $\mathcal{E}$  E) = finite (voters- $\mathcal{E}$  E'))}
   $\wedge$ 
    ( $\forall$  r. vote-fraction r E = vote-fraction r E')

fun anon-hom $_{\mathcal{Q}}$  :: 'a set  $\Rightarrow$  ('a, 'v) Election set set where
  anon-hom $_{\mathcal{Q}}$  A = quotient (fixed-alt-elections A) (anon-hom $_{\mathcal{R}}$  (fixed-alt-elections A))

fun vote-fraction $_{\mathcal{Q}}$  :: 'a Preference-Relation  $\Rightarrow$  ('a, 'v) Election set  $\Rightarrow$  rat where
  vote-fraction $_{\mathcal{Q}}$  p =  $\pi_{\mathcal{Q}}$  (vote-fraction p)

fun anon-hom-class-to-vec :: ('a::finite, 'v) Election set
   $\Rightarrow$  (rat, 'a Ordered-Preference) vec where
  anon-hom-class-to-vec  $\mathcal{E}$  = ( $\chi$  p. vote-fraction $_{\mathcal{Q}}$  (ord2pref p)  $\mathcal{E}$ )

```

Maps each rational real vector entry to the corresponding rational. If the entry is not rational, the corresponding entry will be undefined.

```

fun rat-vec :: real $^b$   $\Rightarrow$  rat $^b$  where
  rat-vec v = ( $\chi$  p. the-inv of-rat (v$p))

fun rat-vec-set :: (real $^b$ ) set  $\Rightarrow$  (rat $^b$ ) set where
  rat-vec-set V = rat-vec ' {v  $\in$  V.  $\forall$  i. v$i  $\in$   $\mathbb{Q}$ }

```

```

definition standard-basis :: (real $^b$ ) set where
  standard-basis = {v.  $\exists$  b. v$b = 1  $\wedge$  ( $\forall$  c  $\neq$  b. v$c = 0)}

```

The rational points in the simplex.

definition *vote-simplex* :: (rat^b) set **where**
vote-simplex = insert 0 (rat-vec-set (convex hull (standard-basis :: (real^b) set)))

Auxiliary Lemmas

lemma *convex-combination-in-convex-hull*:

fixes

$X :: (\text{real}^b) \text{ set}$ **and**

$x :: \text{real}^b$

assumes $\exists f :: (\text{real}^b) \Rightarrow \text{real}.$

$\text{sum } f X = 1 \wedge (\forall x \in X. f x \geq 0) \wedge x = \text{sum } (\lambda x. (f x) *_R x) X$

shows $x \in \text{convex hull } X$

using *assms*

proof (induction card X arbitrary: $X x$)

case 0

fix

$X :: (\text{real}^b) \text{ set}$ **and**

$x :: \text{real}^b$

assume

$0 = \text{card } X$ **and**

$\exists f. \text{sum } f X = 1 \wedge (\forall x \in X. 0 \leq f x) \wedge x = (\sum x \in X. f x *_R x)$

hence $(\forall f. \text{sum } f X = 0) \wedge (\exists f. \text{sum } f X = 1)$

using *card-0-eq empty-iff sum.infinite sum.neutral zero-neq-one*

by *metis*

hence $\exists f. \text{sum } f X = 1 \wedge \text{sum } f X = 0$

by *metis*

hence *False*

using *zero-neq-one*

by *metis*

thus *?case*

by *simp*

next

case (*Suc n*)

fix

$X :: (\text{real}^b) \text{ set}$ **and**

$x :: \text{real}^b$ **and**

$n :: \text{nat}$

assume

card: $\text{Suc } n = \text{card } X$ **and**

$\exists f. \text{sum } f X = 1 \wedge (\forall x \in X. 0 \leq f x) \wedge x = (\sum x \in X. f x *_R x)$ **and**

hyp: $\bigwedge (X :: (\text{real}^b) \text{ set}) x.$

$n = \text{card } X \Rightarrow$

$\exists f. \text{sum } f X = 1 \wedge (\forall x \in X. 0 \leq f x) \wedge x = (\sum x \in X. f x *_R x) \Rightarrow$

$x \in \text{convex hull } X$

then obtain $f :: (\text{real}^b) \Rightarrow \text{real}$ **where**

sum: $\text{sum } f X = 1$ **and**

nonneg: $\forall x \in X. 0 \leq f x$ **and**

x-sum: $x = (\sum x \in X. f x *_R x)$

by *blast*

```

have card X > 0
  using card
  by linarith
hence fin: finite X
  using card-gt-0-iff
  by blast
have n = 0 → card X = 1
  using card
  by presburger
hence n = 0 → (∃ y. X = {y} ∧ f y = 1)
  using sum nonneg One-nat-def add.right-neutral card-1-singleton-iff
    empty-iff finite.emptyI sum.insert sum.neutral
  by (metis (no-types, opaque-lifting))
hence n = 0 → (∃ y. X = {y} ∧ x = y)
  using x-sum
  by fastforce
hence n = 0 → x ∈ X
  by blast
moreover have n > 0 → x ∈ convex hull X
proof (safe)
  assume 0 < n
  hence card-X-gt-1: card X > 1
    using card
    by simp
  have (∀ y ∈ X. f y ≥ 1) → sum f X ≥ sum (λ x. 1) X
    using fin sum-mono
    by metis
  moreover have sum (λ x. 1) X = card X
    by force
  ultimately have (∀ y ∈ X. f y ≥ 1) → card X ≤ sum f X
    by force
  hence (∀ y ∈ X. f y ≥ 1) → 1 < sum f X
    using card-X-gt-1
    by linarith
  then obtain y :: real^b where
    y-in-X: y ∈ X and
    f-y-lt-one: f y < 1
    using sum
    by auto
  hence 1 - f y ≠ 0 ∧ x = f y *R y + (∑ x ∈ X - {y}. f x *R x)
    using fin sum.remove x-sum
    by simp
  moreover have ∀ α ≠ 0. (∑ x ∈ X - {y}. f x *R x) = α *R (∑ x ∈ X -
{y}. (f x / α) *R x)
    unfolding scaleR-sum-right
    by simp
  ultimately have convex-comb:
    x = f y *R y + (1 - f y) *R (∑ x ∈ X - {y}. (f x / (1 - f y)) *R x)
    by simp

```

obtain $f' :: \text{real} \wedge b \Rightarrow \text{real}$ **where**
 $\text{def}' : f' = (\lambda x. f x / (1 - f y))$
by *simp*
hence $\forall x \in X - \{y\}. f' x \geq 0$
using *nonneg f-y-lt-one*
by *fastforce*
moreover have $\text{sum } f' (X - \{y\}) = (\text{sum } (\lambda x. f x) (X - \{y\})) / (1 - f y)$
unfolding *def' sum-divide-distrib*
by *simp*
moreover have $(\text{sum } (\lambda x. f x) (X - \{y\})) / (1 - f y) = (1 - f y) / (1 - f y)$
 $y)$
using *sum y-in-X*
by (*simp add: fin sum.remove*)
moreover have $(1 - f y) / (1 - f y) = 1$
using *f-y-lt-one*
by *simp*
ultimately have
 $\text{sum } f' (X - \{y\}) = 1 \wedge (\forall x \in X - \{y\}. 0 \leq f' x) \wedge$
 $(\sum x \in X - \{y\}. (f x / (1 - f y)) *_R x) = (\sum x \in X - \{y\}. f' x *_R x)$
using *def'*
by *metis*
hence $\exists f'. \text{sum } f' (X - \{y\}) = 1 \wedge (\forall x \in X - \{y\}. 0 \leq f' x) \wedge$
 $(\sum x \in X - \{y\}. (f x / (1 - f y)) *_R x) = (\sum x \in X - \{y\}. f' x *_R x)$
 $x)$
by *metis*
moreover have $\text{card } (X - \{y\}) = n$
using *card y-in-X*
by *simp*
ultimately have $(\sum x \in X - \{y\}. (f x / (1 - f y)) *_R x) \in \text{convex hull } (X - \{y\})$
using *hyp*
by *blast*
hence $(\sum x \in X - \{y\}. (f x / (1 - f y)) *_R x) \in \text{convex hull } X$
using *Diff-subset hull-mono in-mono*
by (*metis (no-types, lifting)*)
moreover have $f y \geq 0 \wedge 1 - f y \geq 0$
using *f-y-lt-one nonneg y-in-X*
by *simp*
moreover have $f y + (1 - f y) \geq 0$
by *simp*
moreover have $y \in \text{convex hull } X$
using *y-in-X*
by (*simp add: hull-inc*)
moreover have
 $\forall x y. x \in \text{convex hull } X \wedge y \in \text{convex hull } X \longrightarrow$
 $(\forall a \geq 0. \forall b \geq 0. a + b = 1 \longrightarrow a *_R x + b *_R y \in \text{convex hull } X)$
using *convex-def convex-convex-hull*
by (*metis (no-types, opaque-lifting)*)
ultimately show $x \in \text{convex hull } X$

```

    using convex-comb
    by simp
qed
ultimately show  $x \in \text{convex hull } X$ 
    using hull-inc
    by fastforce
qed

lemma standard-simplex-rewrite: convex hull standard-basis
  =  $\{v::(\text{real}^b). (\forall i. v\$i \geq 0) \wedge \text{sum } ((\$) v) \text{ UNIV} = 1\}$ 
proof (unfold convex-def hull-def, standard)
  let ?simplex =  $\{v::(\text{real}^b). (\forall i. v\$i \geq 0) \wedge \text{sum } ((\$) v) \text{ UNIV} = 1\}$ 
  have fin-dim: finite (UNIV::'b set)
    by simp
  have  $\forall x::(\text{real}^b). \forall y. \text{sum } ((\$) (x + y)) \text{ UNIV} = \text{sum } ((\$) x) \text{ UNIV} + \text{sum } ((\$) y) \text{ UNIV}$ 
    by (simp add: sum.distrib)
  hence  $\forall x::(\text{real}^b). \forall y. \forall u v. \text{sum } ((\$) (u *_R x + v *_R y)) \text{ UNIV} = \text{sum } ((\$) (u *_R x)) \text{ UNIV} + \text{sum } ((\$) (v *_R y)) \text{ UNIV}$ 
    by blast
  moreover have  $\forall x u. \text{sum } ((\$) (u *_R x)) \text{ UNIV} = u *_R (\text{sum } ((\$) x) \text{ UNIV})$ 
    using scaleR-right.sum sum.cong vector-scaleR-component
    by (metis (mono-tags, lifting))
  ultimately have  $\forall x::(\text{real}^b). \forall y. \forall u v. \text{sum } ((\$) (u *_R x + v *_R y)) \text{ UNIV} = u *_R (\text{sum } ((\$) x) \text{ UNIV}) + v *_R (\text{sum } ((\$) y) \text{ UNIV})$ 
    by (metis (no-types))
  moreover have  $\forall x \in ?\text{simplex}. \text{sum } ((\$) x) \text{ UNIV} = 1$ 
    by simp
  ultimately have
     $\forall x \in ?\text{simplex}. \forall y \in ?\text{simplex}. \forall u v. \text{sum } ((\$) (u *_R x + v *_R y)) \text{ UNIV} = u *_R 1 + v *_R 1$ 
    by (metis (no-types, lifting))
  hence  $\forall x \in ?\text{simplex}. \forall y \in ?\text{simplex}. \forall u v. \text{sum } ((\$) (u *_R x + v *_R y)) \text{ UNIV} = u + v$ 
    by simp
  moreover have
     $\forall x \in ?\text{simplex}. \forall y \in ?\text{simplex}. \forall u \geq 0. \forall v \geq 0. u + v = 1 \longrightarrow (\forall i. (u *_R x + v *_R y)\$i \geq 0)$ 
    by simp
  ultimately have simplex-convex:
     $\forall x \in ?\text{simplex}. \forall y \in ?\text{simplex}. \forall u \geq 0. \forall v \geq 0. u + v = 1 \longrightarrow u *_R x + v *_R y \in ?\text{simplex}$ 
    by simp
  have entries:  $\forall v::(\text{real}^b) \in \text{standard-basis}. \exists b. v\$b = 1 \wedge (\forall c. c \neq b \longrightarrow v\$c = 0)$ 
    unfolding standard-basis-def
    by simp

```

then obtain $one :: real^b \Rightarrow 'b$ **where**
 $def: \forall v \in standard-basis. v\$ (one\ v) = 1 \wedge (\forall i \neq one\ v. v\$i = 0)$
by *metis*
hence $\forall v::(real^b) \in standard-basis. \forall b. v\$b = 0 \vee v\$b = 1$
by *metis*
hence $geq-0: \forall v::(real^b) \in standard-basis. \forall b. v\$b \geq 0$
using *dual-order.refl zero-less-one-class.zero-le-one*
by *metis*
moreover have $\forall v::(real^b) \in standard-basis.$
 $sum\ ((\$)\ v)\ UNIV = sum\ ((\$)\ v)\ (UNIV - \{one\ v\}) + v\$ (one\ v)$
unfolding *def*
using *add.commute finite insert-UNIV sum.insert-remove*
by *metis*
moreover have $\forall v \in standard-basis. sum\ ((\$)\ v)\ (UNIV - \{one\ v\}) + v\$ (one\ v) = 1$
using *def*
by *simp*
ultimately have $standard-basis \subseteq ?simplex$
by *force*
with *simplex-convex*
have $?simplex \in$
 $\{t. (\forall x \in t. \forall y \in t. \forall u \geq 0. \forall v \geq 0. u + v = 1 \longrightarrow u *_R x + v *_R y \in t) \wedge$
 $standard-basis \subseteq t\}$
by *blast*
thus $\bigcap \{t. (\forall x \in t. \forall y \in t. \forall u \geq 0. \forall v \geq 0. u + v = 1 \longrightarrow u *_R x + v *_R y \in t) \wedge$
 $standard-basis \subseteq t\} \subseteq ?simplex$
by *blast*
next
show $\{v. (\forall i. 0 \leq v\ \$\ i) \wedge sum\ ((\$)\ v)\ UNIV = 1\} \subseteq$
 $\bigcap \{t. (\forall x \in t. \forall y \in t. \forall u \geq 0. \forall v \geq 0. u + v = 1 \longrightarrow u *_R x + v *_R y \in t) \wedge$
 $(standard-basis::(real^b\ set)) \subseteq t\}$
proof
fix
 $x :: real^b$ **and**
 $X :: (real^b)\ set$
assume *convex-comb*: $x \in \{v. (\forall i. 0 \leq v\ \$\ i) \wedge sum\ ((\$)\ v)\ UNIV = 1\}$
have $\forall v \in standard-basis. \exists b. v\$b = 1 \wedge (\forall b' \neq b. v\$b' = 0)$
unfolding *standard-basis-def*
by *simp*
then obtain $ind :: (real^b) \Rightarrow 'b$ **where**
 $ind-1: \forall v \in standard-basis. v\$ (ind\ v) = 1$ **and**
 $ind-0: \forall v \in standard-basis. \forall b \neq (ind\ v). v\$b = 0$
by *metis*
hence $\forall v\ v'. v \in standard-basis \wedge v' \in standard-basis \longrightarrow ind\ v = ind\ v' \longrightarrow$
 $(\forall b. v\$b = v'\$b)$
by *metis*

hence *inj-ind*:
 $\forall v v'. v \in \text{standard-basis} \wedge v' \in \text{standard-basis} \longrightarrow \text{ind } v = \text{ind } v' \longrightarrow v = v'$
unfolding *vec-eq-iff*
by *simp*
hence *inj-on ind standard-basis*
unfolding *inj-on-def*
by *blast*
hence *bij: bij-betw ind standard-basis (ind ‘ standard-basis)*
unfolding *bij-betw-def*
by *simp*
obtain *ind-inv* :: 'b \Rightarrow (real[^]b) **where**
char-vec: *ind-inv* = ($\lambda b. (\chi i. \text{if } i = b \text{ then } 1 \text{ else } 0)$)
by *blast*
hence *in-basis*: $\forall b. \text{ind-inv } b \in \text{standard-basis}$
unfolding *standard-basis-def*
by *simp*
moreover from this
have *ind-inv-map*: $\forall b. \text{ind } (\text{ind-inv } b) = b$
using *char-vec ind-0 ind-1 axis-def axis-nth zero-neg-one*
by *metis*
ultimately have $\forall b. \exists v. v \in \text{standard-basis} \wedge b = \text{ind } v$
by *metis*
hence *univ*: *ind ‘ standard-basis* = *UNIV*
by *blast*
have *bij-inv*: *bij-betw ind-inv UNIV standard-basis*
using *ind-inv-map bij bij-betw-byWitness[of UNIV ind] in-basis inj-ind*
unfolding *image-subset-iff*
by *simp*
obtain *f* :: (real[^]b) \Rightarrow real **where**
def: *f* = ($\lambda v. \text{if } v \in \text{standard-basis} \text{ then } x\$(\text{ind } v) \text{ else } 0$)
by *blast*
hence *sum f standard-basis* = *sum* ($\lambda v. x\$(\text{ind } v)$) *standard-basis*
by *simp*
also have *sum* ($\lambda v. x\$(\text{ind } v)$) *standard-basis* = *sum* (($\$$) *x* \circ *ind*) *standard-basis*
unfolding *comp-def*
by *simp*
also have ... = *sum* (($\$$) *x*) (*ind ‘ standard-basis*)
using *sum-comp[of ind standard-basis ind ‘ standard-basis ($\$$) x] bij*
by *simp*
also have ... = *sum* (($\$$) *x*) *UNIV*
using *univ*
by *simp*
finally have *sum f standard-basis* = *sum* (($\$$) *x*) *UNIV*
using *univ*
by *simp*
hence *sum-1*: *sum f standard-basis* = 1
using *convex-comb*
by *simp*

have *nonneg*: $\forall v \in \text{standard-basis}. f\ v \geq 0$
using *def convex-comb*
by *simp*
have $\forall v \in \text{standard-basis}. \forall i. v\$i = (\text{if } i = \text{ind } v \text{ then } 1 \text{ else } 0)$
using *ind-1 ind-0*
by *fastforce*
hence $\forall v \in \text{standard-basis}. \forall i. x\$(\text{ind } v) * v\$i = (\text{if } i = \text{ind } v \text{ then } x\$(\text{ind } v) \text{ else } 0)$
by *auto*
hence $\forall v \in \text{standard-basis}. (\chi\ i. x\$(\text{ind } v) * v\$i) = (\chi\ i. \text{if } i = \text{ind } v \text{ then } x\$(\text{ind } v) \text{ else } 0)$
by *fastforce*
moreover have $\forall v. (x\$(\text{ind } v)) *_R v = (\chi\ i. x\$(\text{ind } v) * v\$i)$
unfolding *scaleR-vec-def*
by *simp*
ultimately have
 $\forall v \in \text{standard-basis}. (x\$(\text{ind } v)) *_R v = (\chi\ i. \text{if } i = \text{ind } v \text{ then } x\$(\text{ind } v) \text{ else } 0)$
by *simp*
moreover have $\text{sum } (\lambda x. (f\ x) *_R x) \text{ standard-basis} = \text{sum } (\lambda v. (x\$(\text{ind } v)) *_R v) \text{ standard-basis}$
unfolding *def*
by *simp*
ultimately have $\text{sum } (\lambda x. (f\ x) *_R x) \text{ standard-basis} = \text{sum } (\lambda v. (\chi\ i. \text{if } i = \text{ind } v \text{ then } x\$(\text{ind } v) \text{ else } 0)) \text{ standard-basis}$
by *force*
also have $\dots = \text{sum } (\lambda b. (\chi\ i. \text{if } i = \text{ind } (\text{ind-inv } b) \text{ then } x\$(\text{ind } (\text{ind-inv } b)) \text{ else } 0)) \text{ UNIV}$
using *bij-inv sum-comp*
unfolding *comp-def*
by *blast*
also have $\dots = \text{sum } (\lambda b. (\chi\ i. \text{if } i = b \text{ then } x\$b \text{ else } 0)) \text{ UNIV}$
using *ind-inv-map*
by *presburger*
finally have $\text{sum } (\lambda x. (f\ x) *_R x) \text{ standard-basis} = \text{sum } (\lambda b. (\chi\ i. \text{if } i = b \text{ then } x\$b \text{ else } 0)) \text{ UNIV}$
by *simp*
moreover have $\forall b. (\text{sum } (\lambda b'. (\chi\ i. \text{if } i = b \text{ then } x\$b \text{ else } 0)) \text{ UNIV})\$b = \text{sum } (\lambda b'. (\chi\ i. \text{if } i = b' \text{ then } x\$b' \text{ else } 0)\$b) \text{ UNIV}$
using *sum-component*
by *blast*
moreover have $\forall b. (\lambda b'. (\chi\ i. \text{if } i = b' \text{ then } x\$b' \text{ else } 0)\$b) = (\lambda b'. \text{if } b' = b \text{ then } x\$b \text{ else } 0)$
by *force*
moreover have $\forall b. \text{sum } (\lambda b'. \text{if } b' = b \text{ then } x\$b \text{ else } 0) \text{ UNIV} = x\$b + \text{sum } (\lambda b'. 0) (\text{UNIV} - \{b\})$
by *simp*
ultimately have $\forall b. (\text{sum } (\lambda x. (f\ x) *_R x) \text{ standard-basis})\$b = x\$b$
by *simp*

```

hence  $\text{sum } (\lambda x. (f x) *_R x) \text{ standard-basis} = x$ 
unfolding vec-eq-iff
by simp
hence  $\exists f::(\text{real}^b) \Rightarrow \text{real}.$ 
 $\text{sum } f \text{ standard-basis} = 1 \wedge$ 
 $(\forall x \in \text{standard-basis}. f x \geq 0) \wedge$ 
 $x = \text{sum } (\lambda x. (f x) *_R x) \text{ standard-basis}$ 
using sum-1 nonneg
by blast
hence  $x \in \text{convex hull } (\text{standard-basis}::(\text{real}^b \text{ set}))$ 
using convex-combination-in-convex-hull
by blast
thus  $x \in \bigcap \{t. (\forall x \in t. \forall y \in t. \forall u \geq 0. \forall v \geq 0. u + v = 1 \longrightarrow u *_R x$ 
 $+ v *_R y \in t) \wedge$ 
 $(\text{standard-basis}::(\text{real}^b \text{ set})) \subseteq t\}$ 
unfolding convex-def hull-def
by blast
qed
qed

```

```

lemma fract-distr-helper:
fixes
 $a :: \text{int}$  and
 $b :: \text{int}$  and
 $c :: \text{int}$ 
assumes  $c \neq 0$ 
shows  $\text{Fract } a \ c + \text{Fract } b \ c = \text{Fract } (a + b) \ c$ 
using add-rat assms mult.commute mult-rat-cancel distrib-right
by metis

```

```

lemma anon-hom-equiv-rel:
fixes  $X :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election set}$ 
assumes  $\forall E \in X. \text{finite } (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E)$ 
shows  $\text{equiv } X \ (\text{anon-hom}_{\mathcal{R}} \ X)$ 
proof (unfold equiv-def, safe)
show  $\text{refl-on } X \ (\text{anon-hom}_{\mathcal{R}} \ X)$ 
unfolding refl-on-def anon-hom_{\mathcal{R}}.simps
by blast
next
show  $\text{sym } (\text{anon-hom}_{\mathcal{R}} \ X)$ 
unfolding sym-def anon-hom_{\mathcal{R}}.simps
using sup-commute
by simp
next
show  $\text{Relation.trans } (\text{anon-hom}_{\mathcal{R}} \ X)$ 
proof
fix
 $E :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election}$  and
 $E' :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election}$  and

```

```

    F :: ('a, 'v) Election
  assume
    rel: (E, E') ∈ anon-homℛ X and
    rel': (E', F) ∈ anon-homℛ X
  hence fin: finite (voters-ℰ E')
  unfolding anon-homℛ.simps
  using assms
  by fastforce
  from rel rel' have eq-frac:
    (∀ r. vote-fraction r E = vote-fraction r E') ∧
    (∀ r. vote-fraction r E' = vote-fraction r F)
  unfolding anon-homℛ.simps
  by blast
  hence ∀ r. vote-fraction r E = vote-fraction r F
  by metis
  thus (E, F) ∈ anon-homℛ X
  using rel rel' snd-conv
  unfolding anon-homℛ.simps
  by blast
qed
qed

lemma fract-distr:
  fixes
    A :: 'x set and
    f :: 'x ⇒ int and
    b :: int
  assumes
    finite A and
    b ≠ 0
  shows sum (λ a. Fract (f a) b) A = Fract (sum f A) b
  using assms
proof (induction card A arbitrary: A f b)
  case 0
  fix
    A :: 'x set and
    f :: 'x ⇒ int and
    b :: int
  assume
    0 = card A and
    finite A and
    b ≠ 0
  hence sum (λ a. Fract (f a) b) A = 0 ∧ sum f A = 0
  by simp
  thus ?case
  using 0 rat-number-collapse
  by simp
next
  case (Suc n)

```

```

fix
   $A :: 'x \text{ set}$  and
   $f :: 'x \Rightarrow \text{int}$  and
   $b :: \text{int}$  and
   $n :: \text{nat}$ 
assume
   $\text{card-}A: \text{Suc } n = \text{card } A$  and
   $\text{fin-}A: \text{finite } A$  and
   $b\text{-non-zero}: b \neq 0$  and
   $\text{hyp}: \bigwedge A f b. \quad n = \text{card } (A::'x \text{ set}) \implies$ 
     $\text{finite } A \implies b \neq 0 \implies (\sum a \in A. \text{Fract } (f a) b) = \text{Fract } (\text{sum } f A) b$ 
hence  $A \neq \{\}$ 
by auto
then obtain  $c :: 'x$  where
   $c\text{-in-}A: c \in A$ 
by blast
hence  $(\sum a \in A. \text{Fract } (f a) b) = (\sum a \in A - \{c\}. \text{Fract } (f a) b) + \text{Fract } (f c) b$ 
using  $\text{fin-}A$ 
by (simp add: sum-diff1)
also have  $\dots = \text{Fract } (\text{sum } f (A - \{c\})) b + \text{Fract } (f c) b$ 
using  $\text{hyp card-}A \text{ fin-}A b\text{-non-zero } c\text{-in-}A \text{ Diff-empty card-Diff-singleton}$ 
   $\text{diff-Suc-1 finite-Diff-insert}$ 
by metis
also have  $\dots = \text{Fract } (\text{sum } f (A - \{c\}) + f c) b$ 
using  $c\text{-in-}A b\text{-non-zero fract-distr-helper}$ 
by metis
also have  $\dots = \text{Fract } (\text{sum } f A) b$ 
using  $c\text{-in-}A \text{ fin-}A$ 
by (simp add: sum-diff1)
finally show  $(\sum a \in A. \text{Fract } (f a) b) = \text{Fract } (\text{sum } f A) b$ 
by blast
qed

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Simplex Bijection

We assume all our elections to consist of a fixed finite alternative set of size n and finite subsets of an infinite voter universe. Profiles are linear orders on the alternatives. Then we can work on the standard simplex of dimension $n!$ instead of the equivalence classes of the equivalence relation for anonymous + homogeneous voting rules (anon hom): Each dimension corresponds to one possible linear order on the alternative set, i.e., the possible preferences. Each equivalence class of elections corresponds to a vector whose entries denote the fraction of voters per election in that class who vote the respective corresponding preference.

theorem *anon-hom_Q-iso:*
assumes *infinite* ($UNIV::('v \text{ set})$)

shows

$$\text{bij-betw } (\text{anon-hom-class-to-vec}::('a::\text{finite}, 'v) \text{ Election set} \Rightarrow \text{rat } \sim ('a \text{ Ordered-Preference}))$$

$$(\text{anon-hom}_{\mathcal{Q}} (\text{UNIV}::'a \text{ set})) (\text{vote-simplex}::(\text{rat } \sim ('a \text{ Ordered-Preference}))$$

$$\text{set})$$
proof (*unfold bij-betw-def inj-on-def, standard, standard, standard, standard*)
fix

$$X::('a, 'v) \text{ Election set and}$$

$$Y::('a, 'v) \text{ Election set}$$
assume

$$\text{class-}X: X \in \text{anon-hom}_{\mathcal{Q}} \text{ UNIV and}$$

$$\text{class-}Y: Y \in \text{anon-hom}_{\mathcal{Q}} \text{ UNIV and}$$

$$\text{eq-vec: anon-hom-class-to-vec } X = \text{anon-hom-class-to-vec } Y$$
have *equiv*: $\text{equiv } (\text{fixed-alt-elections UNIV}) (\text{anon-hom}_{\mathcal{R}} (\text{fixed-alt-elections UNIV}))$
using *anon-hom-equiv-rel CollectD IntD1 inf-commute*
unfolding *fixed-alt-elections.simps*
by (*metis (no-types, lifting)*)
hence *subset*: $X \neq \{\} \wedge X \subseteq \text{fixed-alt-elections UNIV} \wedge Y \neq \{\} \wedge Y \subseteq$

$$\text{fixed-alt-elections UNIV}$$
using *class-X class-Y in-quotient-imp-non-empty in-quotient-imp-subset*
unfolding *anon-hom_Q.simps*
by *blast*
then obtain $E::('a, 'v) \text{ Election and}$

$$E'::('a, 'v) \text{ Election where}$$

$$E\text{-in-}X: E \in X \text{ and}$$

$$E'\text{-in-}Y: E' \in Y$$
by *blast*
hence *class-X-E*: $\text{anon-hom}_{\mathcal{R}} (\text{fixed-alt-elections UNIV}) \text{ “ } \{E\} = X$
using *class-X equiv Image-singleton-iff equiv-class-eq quotientE*
unfolding *anon-hom_Q.simps*
by (*metis (no-types, opaque-lifting)*)
hence $\forall F \in X. (E, F) \in \text{anon-hom}_{\mathcal{R}} (\text{fixed-alt-elections UNIV})$
unfolding *Image-def*
by *blast*
hence $\forall F \in X. \forall p. \text{vote-fraction } p \ F = \text{vote-fraction } p \ E$
unfolding *anon-hom_R.simps*
by *fastforce*
hence $\forall p. \text{vote-fraction } p \text{ ‘ } X = \{\text{vote-fraction } p \ E\}$
using *E-in-X*
by *blast*
hence $\forall p. \text{vote-fraction}_{\mathcal{Q}} \ p \ X = \text{vote-fraction } p \ E$
using *is-singletonI singleton-set-def-if-card-one the-elem-eq*
unfolding *is-singleton-altdef vote-fraction_Q.simps $\pi_{\mathcal{Q}}$.simps singleton-set.simps*
by *metis*
hence *eq-X-E*: $\forall p. (\text{anon-hom-class-to-vec } X) \$ p = \text{vote-fraction } (\text{ord2pref } p) \ E$
unfolding *anon-hom-class-to-vec.simps*
using *vec-lambda-beta*
by *metis*
have *class-Y-E'*: $\text{anon-hom}_{\mathcal{R}} (\text{fixed-alt-elections UNIV}) \text{ “ } \{E'\} = Y$
using *class-Y equiv E'-in-Y Image-singleton-iff equiv-class-eq quotientE*

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    unfolding anon-homQ.simps
    by (metis (no-types, opaque-lifting))
  hence  $\forall F \in Y. (E', F) \in \text{anon-hom}_{\mathcal{R}}$  (fixed-alt-elections UNIV)
    unfolding Image-def
    by blast
  hence  $\forall F \in Y. \forall p. \text{vote-fraction } p \ E' = \text{vote-fraction } p \ F$ 
    unfolding anon-homR.simps
    by blast
  hence  $\forall p. \text{vote-fraction } p \ 'Y = \{\text{vote-fraction } p \ E'\}$ 
    using E'-in-Y
    by fastforce
  hence  $\forall p. \text{vote-fraction}_Q \ p \ Y = \text{vote-fraction } p \ E'$ 
    using is-singletonI singleton-set-def-if-card-one the-elem-eq
    unfolding is-singleton-altdef vote-fractionQ.simps  $\pi_Q$ .simps singleton-set.simps
    by metis
  hence eq-Y-E':  $\forall p. (\text{anon-hom-class-to-vec } Y)\$p = \text{vote-fraction } (\text{ord2pref } p)$ 
E'
    unfolding anon-hom-class-to-vec.simps
    using vec-lambda-beta
    by metis
  with eq-X-E eq-vec
  have  $\forall p. \text{vote-fraction } (\text{ord2pref } p) \ E = \text{vote-fraction } (\text{ord2pref } p) \ E'$ 
    by metis
  hence eq-ord:  $\forall p. \text{linear-order } p \longrightarrow \text{vote-fraction } p \ E = \text{vote-fraction } p \ E'$ 
    using mem-Collect-eq pref2ord-inverse
    by metis
  have  $(\forall v. v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E \longrightarrow \text{linear-order } (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E \ v)) \wedge$ 
     $(\forall v. v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E' \longrightarrow \text{linear-order } (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E' \ v))$ 
    using subset E-in-X E'-in-Y
    unfolding fixed-alt-elections.simps valid-elections-def profile-def
    by fastforce
  hence  $\forall p. \neg \text{linear-order } p \longrightarrow \text{vote-count } p \ E = 0 \wedge \text{vote-count } p \ E' = 0$ 
    unfolding vote-count.simps
    using card.infinite card-0-eq Collect-empty-eq
    by (metis (mono-tags, lifting))
  hence  $\forall p. \neg \text{linear-order } p \longrightarrow \text{vote-fraction } p \ E = 0 \wedge \text{vote-fraction } p \ E' = 0$ 
    using int-ops rat-number-collapse
    by simp
  with eq-ord have  $\forall p. \text{vote-fraction } p \ E = \text{vote-fraction } p \ E'$ 
    by metis
  hence  $(E, E') \in \text{anon-hom}_{\mathcal{R}}$  (fixed-alt-elections UNIV)
    using subset E-in-X E'-in-Y fixed-alt-elections.simps
    unfolding anon-homR.simps
    by blast
  thus  $X = Y$ 
    using class-X-E class-Y-E' equiv equiv-class-eq
    by (metis (no-types, lifting))
next
show  $(\text{anon-hom-class-to-vec}::('a, 'v) \text{ Election set} \Rightarrow \text{rat}^{\wedge}('a \text{ Ordered-Preference}))$ 

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    'anon-homQ UNIV = vote-simplex
proof (unfold vote-simplex-def, safe)
  fix X :: ('a, 'v) Election set
  assume
    quot: X ∈ anon-homQ UNIV and
    not-simplex: anon-hom-class-to-vec X ∉ rat-vec-set (convex hull standard-basis)
  have equiv-rel:
    equiv (fixed-alt-elections UNIV) (anon-homR (fixed-alt-elections UNIV))
  using anon-hom-equiv-rel[of fixed-alt-elections UNIV] fixed-alt-elections.simps
  by blast
  then obtain E :: ('a, 'v) Election where
    E-in-X: E ∈ X and
    X = anon-homR (fixed-alt-elections UNIV) “{E}”
  using quot anon-homQ.simps equiv-Eps-in proj-Eps
  unfolding proj-def
  by metis
  hence rel: ∀ E' ∈ X. (E, E') ∈ anon-homR (fixed-alt-elections UNIV)
  by simp
  hence ∀ p. ∀ E' ∈ X. vote-fraction (ord2pref p) E' = vote-fraction (ord2pref
p) E
  unfolding anon-homR.simps
  by fastforce
  hence ∀ p. vote-fraction (ord2pref p) “X = {vote-fraction (ord2pref p) E}”
  using E-in-X
  by blast
  hence repr: ∀ p. vote-fractionQ (ord2pref p) X = vote-fraction (ord2pref p) E
  using is-singletonI singleton-set-def-if-card-one the-elem-eq
  unfolding vote-fractionQ.simps πQ.simps is-singleton-altdef
  by metis
  have ∀ p. vote-count (ord2pref p) E ≥ 0
  by simp
  hence ∀ p. card (voters- $\mathcal{E}$  E) > 0  $\longrightarrow$ 
    Fract (int (vote-count (ord2pref p) E)) (int (card (voters- $\mathcal{E}$  E))) ≥ 0
  using zero-le-Fract-iff
  by simp
  hence ∀ p. vote-fraction (ord2pref p) E ≥ 0
  unfolding vote-fraction.simps card-gt-0-iff
  by simp
  hence ∀ p. vote-fractionQ (ord2pref p) X ≥ 0
  using repr
  by simp
  hence geq-0: ∀ p. real-of-rat (vote-fractionQ (ord2pref p) X) ≥ 0
  using zero-le-of-rat-iff
  by blast
  have voters- $\mathcal{E}$  E = {} ∨ infinite (voters- $\mathcal{E}$  E)  $\longrightarrow$ 
    (∀ p. real-of-rat (vote-fraction p E) = 0)
  by simp
  hence zero-case:
    voters- $\mathcal{E}$  E = {} ∨ infinite (voters- $\mathcal{E}$  E)  $\longrightarrow$ 

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    (χ p. real-of-rat (vote-fractionQ (ord2pref p) X)) = 0
  using repr
  unfolding zero-vec-def
  by simp
let ?sum = sum (λ p. vote-count p E) UNIV
have finite (UNIV::('a × 'a) set)
  by simp
hence eq-card: finite (voters- $\mathcal{E}$  E)  $\longrightarrow$  card (voters- $\mathcal{E}$  E) = ?sum
  using vote-count-sum
  by metis
hence finite (voters- $\mathcal{E}$  E)  $\wedge$  voters- $\mathcal{E}$  E  $\neq$  {}  $\longrightarrow$ 
  sum (λ p. vote-fraction p E) UNIV =
  sum (λ p. Fract (vote-count p E) ?sum) UNIV
  unfolding vote-fraction.simps
  by presburger
moreover have gt-0: finite (voters- $\mathcal{E}$  E)  $\wedge$  voters- $\mathcal{E}$  E  $\neq$  {}  $\longrightarrow$  ?sum > 0
  using eq-card
  by fastforce
hence finite (voters- $\mathcal{E}$  E)  $\wedge$  voters- $\mathcal{E}$  E  $\neq$  {}  $\longrightarrow$ 
  sum (λ p. Fract (vote-count p E) ?sum) UNIV = Fract ?sum ?sum
  using fract-distr[of UNIV ?sum λ p. int (vote-count p E)]
  card-0-eq eq-card finite-class.finite-UNIV
  of-nat-eq-0-iff of-nat-sum sum.cong
  by (metis (no-types, lifting))
moreover have finite (voters- $\mathcal{E}$  E)  $\wedge$  voters- $\mathcal{E}$  E  $\neq$  {}  $\longrightarrow$  Fract ?sum ?sum
= 1
  using gt-0 One-rat-def eq-rat(1)[of ?sum 1 ?sum 1]
  by linarith
ultimately have sum-1:
  finite (voters- $\mathcal{E}$  E)  $\wedge$  voters- $\mathcal{E}$  E  $\neq$  {}  $\longrightarrow$  sum (λ p. vote-fraction p E) UNIV
= 1
  by presburger
have inv-of-rat:  $\forall x \in \mathbb{Q}. \text{the-inv of-rat (of-rat } x) = x$ 
  unfolding Rats-def
  using the-inv-f-f injI of-rat-eq-iff
  by metis
have E  $\in$  fixed-alt-elections UNIV
  using quot E-in-X equiv-class-eq-iff equiv-rel rel
  unfolding anon-homQ.simps quotient-def
  by fastforce
hence  $\forall v \in \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} E. \text{linear-order (profile-}\mathcal{E} E v)$ 
  unfolding fixed-alt-elections.simps valid-elections-def profile-def
  by fastforce
hence  $\forall p. \neg \text{linear-order } p \longrightarrow \text{vote-count } p E = 0$ 
  unfolding vote-count.simps
  using card.infinite card-0-eq
  by blast
hence  $\forall p. \neg \text{linear-order } p \longrightarrow \text{vote-fraction } p E = 0$ 
  using rat-number-collapse

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by *simp*
moreover have $\text{sum } (\lambda p. \text{vote-fraction } p \ E) \ UNIV =$
 $\text{sum } (\lambda p. \text{vote-fraction } p \ E) \ \{p. \text{linear-order } p\} +$
 $\text{sum } (\lambda p. \text{vote-fraction } p \ E) \ (UNIV - \{p. \text{linear-order } p\})$
 using *finite CollectD Collect-mono UNIV-I add commute sum.subset-diff*
top-set-def
 by *metis*
ultimately have $\text{sum } (\lambda p. \text{vote-fraction } p \ E) \ UNIV =$
 $\text{sum } (\lambda p. \text{vote-fraction } p \ E) \ \{p. \text{linear-order } p\}$
 by *simp*
moreover have $\text{bij-betw } \text{ord2pref } UNIV \ \{p. \text{linear-order } p\}$
 using *inj-def ord2pref-inject range-ord2pref*
 unfolding *bij-betw-def*
 by *blast*
ultimately have
 $\text{sum } (\lambda p. \text{vote-fraction } p \ E) \ UNIV = \text{sum } (\lambda p. \text{vote-fraction } (\text{ord2pref } p) \ E)$
UNIV
 using *comp-def[of $\lambda p. \text{vote-fraction } p \ E \ \text{ord2pref}$]*
 $\text{sum-comp}[of \ \text{ord2pref } UNIV \ \{p. \text{linear-order } p\} \ \lambda p. \text{vote-fraction } p \ E]$
 by *auto*
hence finite $(\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \wedge \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E \neq \{\}$ \longrightarrow
 $\text{sum } (\lambda p. \text{vote-fraction } (\text{ord2pref } p) \ E) \ UNIV = 1$
 using *sum-1*
 by *presburger*
hence finite $(\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \wedge \text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E \neq \{\}$ \longrightarrow
 $\text{sum } (\lambda p. \text{real-of-rat } (\text{vote-fraction } (\text{ord2pref } p) \ E)) \ UNIV = 1$
 using *of-rat-1 of-rat-sum*
 by *metis*
with zero-case
have $(\chi \ p. \text{real-of-rat } (\text{vote-fraction}_{\mathcal{Q}} (\text{ord2pref } p) \ X)) = 0 \vee$
 $\text{sum } (\lambda p. \text{real-of-rat } (\text{vote-fraction}_{\mathcal{Q}} (\text{ord2pref } p) \ X)) \ UNIV = 1$
 using *repr*
 by *force*
hence $(\chi \ p. \text{real-of-rat } (\text{vote-fraction}_{\mathcal{Q}} (\text{ord2pref } p) \ X)) = 0 \vee$
 $((\forall \ p. (\chi \ p. \text{real-of-rat } (\text{vote-fraction}_{\mathcal{Q}} (\text{ord2pref } p) \ X))) \$ p \geq 0) \wedge$
 $\text{sum } ((\$) (\chi \ p. \text{real-of-rat } (\text{vote-fraction}_{\mathcal{Q}} (\text{ord2pref } p) \ X))) \ UNIV = 1$
 using *geq-0*
 by *force*
moreover have $\text{rat-entries: } \forall \ p. (\chi \ p. \text{real-of-rat } (\text{vote-fraction}_{\mathcal{Q}} (\text{ord2pref } p) \ X)) \$ p \in \mathbb{Q}$
 by *simp*
ultimately have *simplex-el:*
 $(\chi \ p. \text{real-of-rat } (\text{vote-fraction}_{\mathcal{Q}} (\text{ord2pref } p) \ X)) \in$
 $\{x \in \text{insert } 0 \ (\text{convex hull standard-basis}). \forall \ i. x \$ i \in \mathbb{Q}\}$
 using *standard-simplex-rewrite*
 by *blast*
moreover have
 $\forall \ p. (\text{rat-vec } (\chi \ p. \text{of-rat } (\text{vote-fraction}_{\mathcal{Q}} (\text{ord2pref } p) \ X))) \$ p$
 $= \text{the-inv real-of-rat } ((\chi \ p. \text{real-of-rat } (\text{vote-fraction}_{\mathcal{Q}} (\text{ord2pref } p) \ X)) \$ p)$

unfolding *rat-vec.simps*
using *vec-lambda-beta*
by *blast*
moreover have
 $\forall p. \text{the-inv real-of-rat } ((\chi p. \text{real-of-rat } (\text{vote-fraction}_{\mathbb{Q}} (\text{ord2pref } p) X)) \$ p)$
 $=$
 $\text{the-inv real-of-rat } (\text{real-of-rat } (\text{vote-fraction}_{\mathbb{Q}} (\text{ord2pref } p) X))$
by *simp*
moreover have
 $\forall p. \text{the-inv real-of-rat } (\text{real-of-rat } (\text{vote-fraction}_{\mathbb{Q}} (\text{ord2pref } p) X)) =$
 $\text{vote-fraction}_{\mathbb{Q}} (\text{ord2pref } p) X$
using *rat-entries inv-of-rat Rats-eq-range-nat-to-rat-surj surj-nat-to-rat-surj*
by *blast*
moreover have $\forall p. \text{vote-fraction}_{\mathbb{Q}} (\text{ord2pref } p) X = (\text{anon-hom-class-to-vec } X) \$ p$
by *simp*
ultimately have
 $\forall p. (\text{rat-vec } (\chi p. \text{of-rat } (\text{vote-fraction}_{\mathbb{Q}} (\text{ord2pref } p) X))) \$ p =$
 $(\text{anon-hom-class-to-vec } X) \$ p$
by *metis*
hence $\text{rat-vec } (\chi p. \text{of-rat } (\text{vote-fraction}_{\mathbb{Q}} (\text{ord2pref } p) X)) = \text{anon-hom-class-to-vec } X$
by *simp*
with *simplex-el*
have $\exists x \in \{x \in \text{insert } 0 (\text{convex hull standard-basis}). \forall i. x \$ i \in \mathbb{Q}\}.$
 $\text{rat-vec } x = \text{anon-hom-class-to-vec } X$
by *blast*
with *not-simplex*
have $\text{rat-vec } 0 = \text{anon-hom-class-to-vec } X$
using *image-iff insertE mem-Collect-eq*
unfolding *rat-vec-set.simps*
by *(metis (mono-tags, lifting))*
thus $\text{anon-hom-class-to-vec } X = 0$
unfolding *rat-vec.simps*
using *Rats-0 inv-of-rat of-rat-0 vec-lambda-unique zero-index*
by *(metis (no-types, lifting))*
next
have *non-empty:*
 $(UNIV, \{\}, \lambda v. \{\}) \in (\text{anon-hom}_{\mathcal{R}} (\text{fixed-alt-elections } UNIV)) \text{ “ } \{(\text{UNIV}, \{\},$
 $\lambda v. \{\})\}$
unfolding *anon-hom_R.simps Image-def fixed-alt-elections.simps*
 $\text{valid-elections-def profile-def}$
by *simp*
have *in-els:* $(UNIV, \{\}, \lambda v. \{\}) \in \text{fixed-alt-elections } UNIV$
unfolding *fixed-alt-elections.simps valid-elections-def profile-def*
by *simp*
have $\forall r::('a \text{ Preference-Relation}). \text{vote-fraction } r (UNIV, \{\}, (\lambda v. \{\})) = 0$
by *simp*
hence

$\forall E \in (\text{anon-hom}_{\mathcal{R}} (\text{fixed-alt-elections UNIV})) \text{ “ } \{(UNIV, \{\}, (\lambda v. \{\}))\}.$
 $\forall r. \text{vote-fraction } r E = 0$
unfolding *anon-hom_R.simps*
by *auto*
moreover have
 $\forall E \in (\text{anon-hom}_{\mathcal{R}} (\text{fixed-alt-elections UNIV})) \text{ “ } \{(UNIV, \{\}, (\lambda v. \{\}))\}.$
 $\text{finite } (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} E)$
unfolding *Image-def anon-hom_R.simps*
by *fastforce*
ultimately have *all-zero*:
 $\forall r. \forall E \in (\text{anon-hom}_{\mathcal{R}} (\text{fixed-alt-elections UNIV})) \text{ “ } \{(UNIV, \{\}, (\lambda v. \{\}))\}.$
 $\text{vote-fraction } r E = 0$
by *blast*
hence $\forall r. 0 \in$
 $\text{vote-fraction } r \text{ ‘ } (\text{anon-hom}_{\mathcal{R}} (\text{fixed-alt-elections UNIV})) \text{ “ } \{(UNIV, \{\}, (\lambda v. \{\}))\}$
using *non-empty image-eqI*
by *(metis (mono-tags, lifting))*
hence $\forall r. \{0\} \subseteq \text{vote-fraction } r \text{ ‘}$
 $(\text{anon-hom}_{\mathcal{R}} (\text{fixed-alt-elections UNIV})) \text{ “ } \{(UNIV, \{\}, \lambda v. \{\})\}$
by *blast*
moreover have $\forall r. \{0\} \supseteq \text{vote-fraction } r \text{ ‘}$
 $(\text{anon-hom}_{\mathcal{R}} (\text{fixed-alt-elections UNIV})) \text{ “ } \{(UNIV, \{\}, \lambda v. \{\})\}$
using *all-zero*
by *blast*
ultimately have $\forall r.$
 $\text{vote-fraction } r \text{ ‘ } (\text{anon-hom}_{\mathcal{R}} (\text{fixed-alt-elections UNIV})) \text{ “ } \{(UNIV, \{\}, \lambda v. \{\})\} = \{0\}$
by *blast*
hence
 $\forall r.$
 $\text{card } (\text{vote-fraction } r \text{ ‘ } (\text{anon-hom}_{\mathcal{R}} (\text{fixed-alt-elections UNIV})) \text{ “ } \{(UNIV, \{\}, \lambda v. \{\})\}) = 1$
 $\wedge \text{the-inv } (\lambda x. \{x\})$
 $(\text{vote-fraction } r \text{ ‘ } (\text{anon-hom}_{\mathcal{R}} (\text{fixed-alt-elections UNIV})) \text{ “ } \{(UNIV, \{\}, \lambda v. \{\})\}) = 0$
using *is-singletonI singleton-insert-inj-eq' singleton-set-def-if-card-one*
unfolding *is-singleton-altdef singleton-set.simps*
by *metis*
hence
 $\forall r. \text{vote-fraction}_{\mathcal{Q}} r (\text{anon-hom}_{\mathcal{R}} (\text{fixed-alt-elections UNIV})) \text{ “ } \{(UNIV, \{\}, \lambda v. \{\})\} = 0$
unfolding *vote-fraction_Q.simps $\pi_{\mathcal{Q}}$.simps singleton-set.simps*
by *metis*
hence $\forall r::('a \text{ Ordered-Preference}). \text{vote-fraction}_{\mathcal{Q}} (\text{ord2pref } r)$
 $(\text{anon-hom}_{\mathcal{R}} (\text{fixed-alt-elections UNIV})) \text{ “ } \{(UNIV, \{\}, \lambda v. \{\})\} = 0$
by *metis*
hence $\forall r::('a \text{ Ordered-Preference}).$

(anon-hom-class-to-vec ((anon-hom_R (fixed-alt-elections UNIV)
 “{(UNIV, {}, λ v. {})}))\$r = 0
 unfolding anon-hom-class-to-vec.simps
 using vec-lambda-beta
 by (metis (no-types))
 moreover have ∀ r::('a Ordered-Preference). 0\$r = 0
 by simp
 ultimately have ∀ r::('a Ordered-Preference).
 (anon-hom-class-to-vec
 ((anon-hom_R (fixed-alt-elections UNIV) “{(UNIV, {}, λ v. {})}))\$r
 = (0::(rat ^('a Ordered-Preference)))\$r
 by (metis (no-types))
 hence anon-hom-class-to-vec
 ((anon-hom_R (fixed-alt-elections UNIV) “{(UNIV, {}, λ v. {})}))
 = (0::(rat ^('a Ordered-Preference)))
 using vec-eq-iff
 by blast
 moreover have
 (anon-hom_R (fixed-alt-elections UNIV) “{(UNIV, {}, λ v. {})})) ∈ anon-hom_Q
 UNIV
 unfolding anon-hom_Q.simps quotient-def
 using in-els
 by blast
 ultimately show (0::(rat ^('a Ordered-Preference))) ∈ anon-hom-class-to-vec ‘
 anon-hom_Q UNIV
 using image-eqI
 by (metis (no-types))
 next
 fix x :: rat ^('a Ordered-Preference)
 assume x ∈ rat-vec-set (convex hull standard-basis)
 — Convert rat vector x to real vector x'.
 then obtain x' :: real ^('a Ordered-Preference) where
 conv: x' ∈ convex hull standard-basis and
 inv: ∀ p. x\$p = the-inv real-of-rat (x'\$p) and
 rat: ∀ p. x'\$p ∈ Q
 unfolding rat-vec-set.simps rat-vec.simps
 by force
 hence convex: (∀ p. 0 ≤ x'\$p) ∧ sum ((\$) x') UNIV = 1
 using standard-simplex-rewrite
 by blast
 have map: ∀ p. real-of-rat (x\$p) = x'\$p
 using inv rat the-inv-f-f[of real-of-rat] f-the-inv-into-f inj-onCI of-rat-eq-iff
 unfolding Rats-def
 by metis
 have ∀ p. ∃ fract. Fract (fst fract) (snd fract) = x\$p ∧ 0 < snd fract
 using quotient-of-unique
 by metis
 then obtain fraction' :: 'a Ordered-Preference ⇒ (int × int) where
 ∀ p. x\$p = Fract (fst (fraction' p)) (snd (fraction' p)) and

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    pos':  $\forall p. 0 < \text{snd } (\text{fraction}' p)$ 
  by metis
with map
have fract':  $\forall p. x' \$ p = (\text{fst } (\text{fraction}' p)) / (\text{snd } (\text{fraction}' p))$ 
  using div-by-0 divide-less-cancel of-int-0 of-int-pos of-rat-rat
  by metis
with convex
have  $\forall p. (\text{fst } (\text{fraction}' p)) / (\text{snd } (\text{fraction}' p)) \geq 0$ 
  by fastforce
with pos'
have  $\forall p. \text{fst } (\text{fraction}' p) \geq 0$ 
  using not-less of-int-0-le-iff of-int-pos zero-le-divide-iff
  by metis
with pos'
have  $\forall p. \text{fst } (\text{fraction}' p) \in \mathbb{N} \wedge \text{snd } (\text{fraction}' p) \in \mathbb{N}$ 
  using nonneg-int-cases of-nat-in-Nats order-less-le
  by metis
hence  $\forall p. \exists (n::\text{nat}) (m::\text{nat}). \text{fst } (\text{fraction}' p) = n \wedge \text{snd } (\text{fraction}' p) = m$ 
  using Nats-cases
  by metis
hence  $\forall p. \exists m::\text{nat} \times \text{nat}. \text{fst } (\text{fraction}' p) = \text{int } (\text{fst } m) \wedge \text{snd } (\text{fraction}' p)$ 
 $= \text{int } (\text{snd } m)$ 
  by simp
then obtain fraction :: 'a Ordered-Preference  $\Rightarrow (\text{nat} \times \text{nat})$  where
  eq:  $\forall p. \text{fst } (\text{fraction}' p) = \text{int } (\text{fst } (\text{fraction } p)) \wedge$ 
 $\text{snd } (\text{fraction}' p) = \text{int } (\text{snd } (\text{fraction } p))$ 
  by metis
with fract'
have fract:  $\forall p. x' \$ p = (\text{fst } (\text{fraction } p)) / (\text{snd } (\text{fraction } p))$ 
  by simp
from eq pos'
have pos:  $\forall p. 0 < \text{snd } (\text{fraction } p)$ 
  by simp
let ?prod = prod ( $\lambda p. \text{snd } (\text{fraction } p)$ ) UNIV
have fin: finite (UNIV::('a Ordered-Preference set))
  by simp
hence finite {snd (fraction p) | p. p  $\in$  UNIV}
  using finite-Atleast-Atmost-nat
  by simp
have pos-prod: ?prod > 0
  using pos
  by simp
hence  $\forall p. ?prod \bmod (\text{snd } (\text{fraction } p)) = 0$ 
  using pos finite UNIV-I bits-mod-0 mod-prod-eq mod-self prod-zero
  by (metis (mono-tags, lifting))
hence div:  $\forall p. (?prod \text{ div } (\text{snd } (\text{fraction } p))) * (\text{snd } (\text{fraction } p)) = ?prod$ 
  using add.commute add-0 div-mult-mod-eq
  by metis
obtain voter-amount :: 'a Ordered-Preference  $\Rightarrow \text{nat}$  where

```

```

def: voter-amount = (λ p. (fst (fraction p)) * (?prod div (snd (fraction p))))
by blast
have rewrite-div: ∀ p. ?prod div (snd (fraction p)) = ?prod / (snd (fraction p))
using div less-imp-of-nat-less nonzero-mult-div-cancel-right
of-nat-less-0-iff of-nat-mult pos
by metis
hence sum voter-amount UNIV =
  sum (λ p. (fst (fraction p)) * (?prod / (snd (fraction p)))) UNIV
using def
by simp
hence sum voter-amount UNIV =
  ?prod * (sum (λ p. (fst (fraction p)) / (snd (fraction p)))) UNIV
using mult-of-nat-commute sum.cong times-divide-eq-right
vector-space-over-itself.scale-sum-right
by (metis (mono-tags, lifting))
hence rewrite-sum: sum voter-amount UNIV = ?prod
using fract convex mult-cancel-left1 of-nat-eq-iff sum.cong
by (metis (mono-tags, lifting))
obtain V :: 'v set where
  fin-V: finite V and
  card-V-eq-sum: card V = sum voter-amount UNIV
using assms infinite-arbitrarily-large
by metis
then obtain part :: 'a Ordered-Preference ⇒ 'v set where
  partition: V = ⋃ {part p | p. p ∈ UNIV} and
  disjoint: ∀ p p'. p ≠ p' ⟶ part p ∩ part p' = {} and
  card: ∀ p. card (part p) = voter-amount p
using obtain-partition[of V UNIV voter-amount]
by auto
hence exactly-one-prof: ∀ v ∈ V. ∃!p. v ∈ part p
by blast
then obtain prof' :: 'v ⇒ 'a Ordered-Preference where
  maps-to-prof': ∀ v ∈ V. v ∈ part (prof' v)
by metis
then obtain prof :: 'v ⇒ 'a Preference-Relation where
  prof: prof = (λ v. if v ∈ V then ord2pref (prof' v) else {})
by blast
hence election: (UNIV, V, prof) ∈ fixed-alt-elections UNIV
unfolding fixed-alt-elections.simps valid-elections-def profile-def
using fin-V ord2pref
by auto
have ∀ p. {v ∈ V. prof' v = p} = {v ∈ V. v ∈ part p}
using maps-to-prof' exactly-one-prof
by blast
hence ∀ p. {v ∈ V. prof' v = p} = part p
using partition
by fastforce
hence ∀ p. card {v ∈ V. prof' v = p} = voter-amount p
using card

```

by *presburger*
moreover have $\forall p. \forall v. (v \in \{v \in V. \text{prof}' v = p\}) = (v \in \{v \in V. \text{prof } v = (\text{ord2pref } p)\})$
 using *prof*
 by (*simp add: ord2pref-inject*)
ultimately have $\forall p. \text{card } \{v \in V. \text{prof } v = (\text{ord2pref } p)\} = \text{voter-amount } p$
 by *simp*
hence $\forall p :: 'a \text{ Ordered-Preference. } \text{vote-fraction } (\text{ord2pref } p) (\text{UNIV}, V, \text{prof}) = \text{Fract } (\text{voter-amount } p) (\text{card } V)$
 using *rat-number-collapse fin-V*
 by *simp*
moreover have $\forall p. \text{Fract } (\text{voter-amount } p) (\text{card } V) = (\text{voter-amount } p) / (\text{card } V)$
 unfolding *Fract-of-int-quotient of-rat-divide*
 by *simp*
moreover have
 $\forall p. (\text{voter-amount } p) / (\text{card } V) = ((\text{fst } (\text{fraction } p)) * (?prod \text{ div } (\text{snd } (\text{fraction } p)))) / ?prod$
 using *card def card-V-eq-sum rewrite-sum*
 by *presburger*
moreover have
 $\forall p. ((\text{fst } (\text{fraction } p)) * (?prod \text{ div } (\text{snd } (\text{fraction } p)))) / ?prod = (\text{fst } (\text{fraction } p)) / (\text{snd } (\text{fraction } p))$
 using *rewrite-div pos-prod*
 by *auto*
 — The percentages of voters voting for each linearly ordered profile in (UNIV, V, prof) equal the entries of the given vector.
ultimately have *eq-vec*:
 $\forall p :: 'a \text{ Ordered-Preference. } \text{vote-fraction } (\text{ord2pref } p) (\text{UNIV}, V, \text{prof}) = x' \$ p$
 using *fract*
 by *presburger*
moreover have $\forall E \in \text{anon-hom}_{\mathcal{R}} (\text{fixed-alt-elections UNIV}) \text{ “ } \{(UNIV, V, \text{prof})\}.$
 $\forall p. \text{vote-fraction } (\text{ord2pref } p) E = \text{vote-fraction } (\text{ord2pref } p) (UNIV, V, \text{prof})$
 unfolding *anon-hom_R.sims*
 by *fastforce*
ultimately have $\forall E \in \text{anon-hom}_{\mathcal{R}} (\text{fixed-alt-elections UNIV}) \text{ “ } \{(UNIV, V, \text{prof})\}.$
 $\forall p. \text{vote-fraction } (\text{ord2pref } p) E = x' \$ p$
 by *simp*
hence $\forall E \in \text{anon-hom}_{\mathcal{R}} (\text{fixed-alt-elections UNIV}) \text{ “ } \{(UNIV, V, \text{prof})\}.$
 $\forall p. \text{vote-fraction } (\text{ord2pref } p) E = x' \$ p$
 using *eq-vec*
 by *metis*
hence *vec-entries-match-E-vote-frac*:
 $\forall p. \forall E \in \text{anon-hom}_{\mathcal{R}} (\text{fixed-alt-elections UNIV}) \text{ “ } \{(UNIV, V, \text{prof})\}.$

$\text{vote-fraction } (\text{ord2pref } p) \ E = x\p
by *blast*
have $\forall x \in \mathbb{Q}. \forall y. \text{complex-of-rat } y = \text{complex-of-real } x \longrightarrow \text{real-of-rat } y = x$
using *Re-complex-of-real Re-divide-of-real of-rat.rep-eq of-real-of-int-eq*
by *metis*
hence $\forall x \in \mathbb{Q}. \forall y. \text{complex-of-rat } y = \text{complex-of-real } x \longrightarrow y = \text{the-inv}$
real-of-rat x
using *injI of-rat-eq-iff the-inv-f-f*
by *metis*
with *vec-entries-match-E-vote-frac*
have *all-eq-vec*:
 $\forall p. \forall E \in \text{anon-hom}_{\mathcal{R}} (\text{fixed-alt-elections } \text{UNIV}) \text{ “ } \{(UNIV, V, \text{prof})\}.$
 $\text{vote-fraction } (\text{ord2pref } p) \ E = x\p
using *rat inv*
by *metis*
moreover **have** $(UNIV, V, \text{prof}) \in \text{anon-hom}_{\mathcal{R}} (\text{fixed-alt-elections } \text{UNIV}) \text{ “}$
 $\{(UNIV, V, \text{prof})\}$
using *anon-hom_R.simps election*
by *blast*
ultimately **have** $\forall p. \text{vote-fraction } (\text{ord2pref } p) \text{ “}$
 $\text{anon-hom}_{\mathcal{R}} (\text{fixed-alt-elections } \text{UNIV}) \text{ “ } \{(UNIV, V, \text{prof})\} \supseteq \{x\$p\}$
using *image-insert insert-iff mk-disjoint-insert singletonD subsetI*
by *(metis (no-types, lifting))*
with *all-eq-vec*
have $\forall p. \text{vote-fraction } (\text{ord2pref } p) \text{ “}$
 $\text{anon-hom}_{\mathcal{R}} (\text{fixed-alt-elections } \text{UNIV}) \text{ “ } \{(UNIV, V, \text{prof})\} = \{x\$p\}$
by *blast*
hence $\forall p. \text{vote-fraction}_{\mathcal{Q}} (\text{ord2pref } p)$
 $(\text{anon-hom}_{\mathcal{R}} (\text{fixed-alt-elections } \text{UNIV}) \text{ “ } \{(UNIV, V, \text{prof})\}) = x\p
using *is-singletonI singleton-inject singleton-set-def-if-card-one*
unfolding *is-singleton-altdef vote-fraction_Q.simps $\pi_{\mathcal{Q}}$.simps*
by *metis*
hence $x = \text{anon-hom-class-to-vec } (\text{anon-hom}_{\mathcal{R}} (\text{fixed-alt-elections } \text{UNIV}) \text{ “}$
 $\{(UNIV, V, \text{prof})\})$
unfolding *anon-hom-class-to-vec.simps*
using *vec-lambda-unique*
by *(metis (no-types, lifting))*
moreover **have** $(\text{anon-hom}_{\mathcal{R}} (\text{fixed-alt-elections } \text{UNIV})) \text{ “ } \{(UNIV, V, \text{prof})\}$
 $\in \text{anon-hom}_{\mathcal{Q}} \text{ UNIV}$
unfolding *anon-hom_Q.simps quotient-def*
using *election*
by *blast*
ultimately **show**
 $x \in (\text{anon-hom-class-to-vec} :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election set} \Rightarrow \text{rat}^{\sim}('a \text{ Ordered-Preference}))$
 $\text{“ anon-hom}_{\mathcal{Q}} \text{ UNIV}$
by *blast*
qed
qed

end

2.3 Distance

```
theory Distance
  imports HOL-Library.Extended-Real
         Social-Choice-Types/Voting-Symmetry
begin
```

A general distance on a set X is a mapping $d: X \times X \mapsto R \cup \{+\infty\}$ such that for every x, y, z in X , the following four conditions are satisfied:

- $d(x, y) \geq 0$ (non-negativity);
- $d(x, y) = 0$ if and only if $x = y$ (identity of indiscernibles);
- $d(x, y) = d(y, x)$ (symmetry);
- $d(x, y) \leq d(x, z) + d(z, y)$ (triangle inequality).

Moreover, a mapping that satisfies all but the second conditions is called a pseudo-distance, whereas a quasi-distance needs to satisfy the first three conditions (and not necessarily the last one).

2.3.1 Definition

```
type-synonym 'a Distance = 'a  $\Rightarrow$  'a  $\Rightarrow$  ereal
```

The un-curried version of a distance is defined on tuples.

```
fun tup :: 'a Distance  $\Rightarrow$  ('a * 'a  $\Rightarrow$  ereal) where
  tup d = ( $\lambda$  pair. d (fst pair) (snd pair))
```

```
definition distance :: 'a set  $\Rightarrow$  'a Distance  $\Rightarrow$  bool where
  distance S d  $\equiv \forall x y. x \in S \wedge y \in S \longrightarrow d x x = 0 \wedge 0 \leq d x y$ 
```

2.3.2 Conditions

```
definition symmetric :: 'a set  $\Rightarrow$  'a Distance  $\Rightarrow$  bool where
  symmetric S d  $\equiv \forall x y. x \in S \wedge y \in S \longrightarrow d x y = d y x$ 
```

```
definition triangle-ineq :: 'a set  $\Rightarrow$  'a Distance  $\Rightarrow$  bool where
  triangle-ineq S d  $\equiv \forall x y z. x \in S \wedge y \in S \wedge z \in S \longrightarrow d x z \leq d x y + d y z$ 
```

```
definition eq-if-zero :: 'a set  $\Rightarrow$  'a Distance  $\Rightarrow$  bool where
  eq-if-zero S d  $\equiv \forall x y. x \in S \wedge y \in S \longrightarrow d x y = 0 \longrightarrow x = y$ 
```

$$\text{definition } \textit{vote-distance} :: ('a \textit{ Vote set} \Rightarrow 'a \textit{ Vote Distance} \Rightarrow \textit{bool}) \Rightarrow \\ 'a \textit{ Vote Distance} \Rightarrow \textit{bool} \textbf{ where} \\ \textit{vote-distance} \pi d \equiv \pi \{ (A, p). \textit{linear-order-on } A \ p \wedge \textit{finite } A \} d$$

definition *election-distance* :: ((*a*, *v*) Election set \Rightarrow (*a*, *v*) Election Distance \Rightarrow bool) \Rightarrow
 (*a*, *v*) Election Distance \Rightarrow bool **where**
 election-distance π *d* $\equiv \pi$ {(*A*, *V*, *p*). *finite-profile* *V A p*} *d*

2.3.3 Standard Distance Property

definition *standard* :: (*'a*, *'v*) Election Distance \Rightarrow bool **where**
standard *d* $\equiv \forall A A' V V' p p'. A \neq A' \vee V \neq V' \longrightarrow d(A, V, p)(A', V', p')$
 $= \infty$

2.3.4 Auxiliary Lemmas

$$\text{fun } \textit{arg-min-set} :: ('b \Rightarrow 'a :: \textit{ord}) \Rightarrow 'b \textit{ set} \Rightarrow 'b \textit{ set} \textbf{ where}$$

$$\textit{arg-min-set } f \ A = \textit{Collect } (\textit{is-arg-min } f \ (\lambda \ a. \ a \in A))$$

```

lemma arg-min-subset:
  fixes
     $B :: 'b \text{ set}$  and
     $f :: 'b \Rightarrow 'a :: \text{ord}$ 
  shows arg-min-set  $f \ B \subseteq B$ 
proof (auto, unfold is-arg-min-def, simp)
qed

```

```

lemma sum-monotone:
  fixes
     $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $f :: 'a \Rightarrow \text{int}$  and
     $g :: 'a \Rightarrow \text{int}$ 
  assumes  $\forall a \in A. f\ a \leq g\ a$ 
  shows  $(\sum a \in A. f\ a) \leq (\sum a \in A. g\ a)$ 
  using assms
  by (induction A rule: infinite-finite-induct, simp-all)

```

```

lemma distrib:
  fixes
     $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $f :: 'a \Rightarrow \text{int}$  and
     $g :: 'a \Rightarrow \text{int}$ 
  shows  $(\sum a \in A. f\ a) + (\sum a \in A. g\ a) = (\sum a \in A. f\ a + g\ a)$ 
  using sum.distrib
  by metis

```

lemma *distrib-ereal*:
fixes

```

  A :: 'a set and
  f :: 'a ⇒ int and
  g :: 'a ⇒ int
shows ereal (real-of-int ((∑ a ∈ A. (f::'a ⇒ int) a) + (∑ a ∈ A. g a))) =
  ereal (real-of-int ((∑ a ∈ A. (f a) + (g a))))
using distrib[of f]
by simp

```

```

lemma uneq-ereal:
  fixes
    x :: int and
    y :: int
  assumes x ≤ y
  shows ereal (real-of-int x) ≤ ereal (real-of-int y)
  using assms
  by simp

```

2.3.5 Swap Distance

```

fun neq-ord :: 'a Preference-Relation ⇒ 'a Preference-Relation ⇒
  'a ⇒ 'a ⇒ bool where
  neq-ord r s a b = ((a ≤r b ∧ b ≤s a) ∨ (b ≤r a ∧ a ≤s b))

fun pairwise-disagreements :: 'a set ⇒ 'a Preference-Relation ⇒
  'a Preference-Relation ⇒ ('a × 'a) set where
  pairwise-disagreements A r s = {(a, b) ∈ A × A. a ≠ b ∧ neq-ord r s a b}

fun pairwise-disagreements' :: 'a set ⇒ 'a Preference-Relation ⇒
  'a Preference-Relation ⇒ ('a × 'a) set where
  pairwise-disagreements' A r s =
    Set.filter (λ (a, b). a ≠ b ∧ neq-ord r s a b) (A × A)

lemma set-eq-filter:
  fixes
    X :: 'a set and
    P :: 'a ⇒ bool
  shows {x ∈ X. P x} = Set.filter P X
  by auto

lemma pairwise-disagreements-eq[code]: pairwise-disagreements = pairwise-disagreements'
  unfolding pairwise-disagreements.simps pairwise-disagreements'.simps
  by fastforce

fun swap :: 'a Vote Distance where
  swap (A, r) (A', r') =
    (if A = A'
     then card (pairwise-disagreements A r r')
     else ∞)

```

lemma *swap-case-infinity*:
fixes
 $x :: 'a \text{ Vote}$ **and**
 $y :: 'a \text{ Vote}$
assumes $\text{alts-}\mathcal{V} \ x \neq \text{alts-}\mathcal{V} \ y$
shows $\text{swap} \ x \ y = \infty$
using *assms*
by (*induction rule: swap.induct, simp*)

lemma *swap-case-fin*:
fixes
 $x :: 'a \text{ Vote}$ **and**
 $y :: 'a \text{ Vote}$
assumes $\text{alts-}\mathcal{V} \ x = \text{alts-}\mathcal{V} \ y$
shows $\text{swap} \ x \ y = \text{card} \ (\text{pairwise-disagreements} \ (\text{alts-}\mathcal{V} \ x) \ (\text{pref-}\mathcal{V} \ x) \ (\text{pref-}\mathcal{V} \ y))$
using *assms*
by (*induction rule: swap.induct, simp*)

2.3.6 Spearman Distance

fun *spearman* :: $'a \text{ Vote Distance}$ **where**
 $\text{spearman} \ (A, x) \ (A', y) =$
 $\quad (\text{if } A = A'$
 $\quad \text{then } \sum_{a \in A} \text{abs} \ (\text{int} \ (\text{rank} \ x \ a) - \text{int} \ (\text{rank} \ y \ a))$
 $\quad \text{else } \infty)$

lemma *spearman-case-inf*:
fixes
 $x :: 'a \text{ Vote}$ **and**
 $y :: 'a \text{ Vote}$
assumes $\text{alts-}\mathcal{V} \ x \neq \text{alts-}\mathcal{V} \ y$
shows $\text{spearman} \ x \ y = \infty$
using *assms*
by (*induction rule: spearman.induct, simp*)

lemma *spearman-case-fin*:
fixes
 $x :: 'a \text{ Vote}$ **and**
 $y :: 'a \text{ Vote}$
assumes $\text{alts-}\mathcal{V} \ x = \text{alts-}\mathcal{V} \ y$
shows $\text{spearman} \ x \ y =$
 $\quad (\sum_{a \in \text{alts-}\mathcal{V} \ x} \text{abs} \ (\text{int} \ (\text{rank} \ (\text{pref-}\mathcal{V} \ x) \ a) - \text{int} \ (\text{rank} \ (\text{pref-}\mathcal{V} \ y) \ a)))$
using *assms*
by (*induction rule: spearman.induct, simp*)

2.3.7 Properties

Distances that are invariant under specific relations induce symmetry properties in distance rationalized voting rules.

Definitions

fun *totally-invariant-dist* :: 'x Distance \Rightarrow 'x rel \Rightarrow bool **where**
totally-invariant-dist d rel = satisfies (tup d) (Invariance (product-rel rel))

fun *invariant-dist* :: 'y Distance \Rightarrow 'x set \Rightarrow 'y set \Rightarrow ('x, 'y) binary-fun \Rightarrow bool
where
invariant-dist d X Y φ = satisfies (tup d) (Invariance (equivariance-rel X Y φ))

definition *distance-anonymity* :: ('a, 'v) Election Distance \Rightarrow bool **where**
distance-anonymity d \equiv
 $\forall A A' V V' p p' \pi :: ('v \Rightarrow 'v).$
 $(bij \pi \longrightarrow$
 $(d (A, V, p) (A', V', p')) =$
 $(d (rename \pi (A, V, p)) (rename \pi (A', V', p'))))$

fun *distance-anonymity'* :: ('a, 'v) Election set \Rightarrow ('a, 'v) Election Distance \Rightarrow bool
where
distance-anonymity' X d = *invariant-dist* d (carrier anonymity_G) X (φ -anon X)

fun *distance-neutrality* :: ('a, 'v) Election set \Rightarrow ('a, 'v) Election Distance \Rightarrow bool
where
distance-neutrality X d = *invariant-dist* d (carrier neutrality_G) X (φ -neutr X)

fun *distance-reversal-symmetry* :: ('a, 'v) Election set \Rightarrow ('a, 'v) Election Distance
 \Rightarrow bool **where**
distance-reversal-symmetry X d = *invariant-dist* d (carrier reversal_G) X (φ -rev X)

definition *distance-homogeneity'* :: ('a, 'v::linorder) Election set
 \Rightarrow ('a, 'v) Election Distance \Rightarrow bool **where**
distance-homogeneity' X d = *totally-invariant-dist* d (homogeneity_R' X)

definition *distance-homogeneity* :: ('a, 'v) Election set \Rightarrow ('a, 'v) Election Distance
 \Rightarrow bool **where**
distance-homogeneity X d = *totally-invariant-dist* d (homogeneity_R X)

Auxiliary Lemmas

lemma *rewrite-totally-invariant-dist*:

fixes

d :: 'x Distance **and**

r :: 'x rel

shows *totally-invariant-dist* d r = ($\forall (x, y) \in r. \forall (a, b) \in r. d a x = d b y$)

proof (*safe*)

fix

a :: 'x **and**

b :: 'x **and**

x :: 'x **and**

y :: 'x

```

assume
  inv: totally-invariant-dist d r and
   $(a, b) \in r$  and
   $(x, y) \in r$ 
hence rel:  $((a, x), (b, y)) \in \text{product-rel } r$ 
by simp
hence tup d  $(a, x) = \text{tup } d \ (b, y)$ 
using inv
unfolding totally-invariant-dist.simps satisfies.simps
by simp
thus  $d \ a \ x = d \ b \ y$ 
by simp
next
show  $\forall (x, y) \in r. \forall (a, b) \in r. d \ a \ x = d \ b \ y \implies \text{totally-invariant-dist } d \ r$ 
proof (unfold totally-invariant-dist.simps satisfies.simps product-rel.simps, safe)
  fix
     $a :: 'x$  and
     $b :: 'x$  and
     $x :: 'x$  and
     $y :: 'x$ 
  assume
     $\forall (x, y) \in r. \forall (a, b) \in r. d \ a \ x = d \ b \ y$  and
     $(fst \ (x, a), fst \ (y, b)) \in r$  and
     $(snd \ (x, a), snd \ (y, b)) \in r$ 
  hence  $d \ x \ a = d \ y \ b$ 
  by auto
  thus tup d  $(x, a) = \text{tup } d \ (y, b)$ 
  by simp
qed
qed

lemma rewrite-invariant-dist:
  fixes
     $d :: 'y \text{ Distance}$  and
     $X :: 'x \text{ set}$  and
     $Y :: 'y \text{ set}$  and
     $\varphi :: ('x, 'y) \text{ binary-fun}$ 
  shows invariant-dist d X Y  $\varphi = (\forall x \in X. \forall y \in Y. \forall z \in Y. d \ y \ z = d \ (\varphi \ x \ y) \ (\varphi \ x \ z))$ 
proof (safe)
  fix
     $x :: 'x$  and
     $y :: 'y$  and
     $z :: 'y$ 
  assume
     $x \in X$  and
     $y \in Y$  and
     $z \in Y$  and
    invariant-dist d X Y  $\varphi$ 

```

```

thus  $d\ y\ z = d\ (\varphi\ x\ y)\ (\varphi\ x\ z)$ 
by fastforce
next
show  $\forall\ x \in X. \forall\ y \in Y. \forall\ z \in Y. d\ y\ z = d\ (\varphi\ x\ y)\ (\varphi\ x\ z) \implies invariant-dist$ 
 $d\ X\ Y\ \varphi$ 
proof (unfold invariant-dist.simps satisfies.simps equivariance-rel.simps, safe)
fix
 $x :: 'x$  and
 $a :: 'y$  and
 $b :: 'y$ 
assume
 $\forall\ x \in X. \forall\ y \in Y. \forall\ z \in Y. d\ y\ z = d\ (\varphi\ x\ y)\ (\varphi\ x\ z)$  and
 $x \in X$  and
 $a \in Y$  and
 $b \in Y$ 
hence  $d\ a\ b = d\ (\varphi\ x\ a)\ (\varphi\ x\ b)$ 
by blast
thus  $tup\ d\ (a, b) = tup\ d\ (\varphi\ x\ a, \varphi\ x\ b)$ 
by simp
qed
qed

lemma invar-dist-image:
fixes
 $d :: 'y\ Distance$  and
 $G :: 'x\ monoid$  and
 $Y :: 'y\ set$  and
 $Y' :: 'y\ set$  and
 $\varphi :: ('x, 'y)\ binary-fun$  and
 $y :: 'y$  and
 $g :: 'x$ 
assumes
 $invar-d$ :  $invariant-dist\ d\ (carrier\ G)\ Y\ \varphi$  and
 $Y'-in-Y$ :  $Y' \subseteq Y$  and
 $action-\varphi$ :  $group-action\ G\ Y\ \varphi$  and
 $g-carrier$ :  $g \in carrier\ G$  and
 $y-in-Y$ :  $y \in Y$ 
shows  $d\ (\varphi\ g\ y)\ '(\varphi\ g)\ 'Y' = d\ y\ 'Y'$ 
proof (safe)
fix  $y' :: 'y$ 
assume  $y'-in-Y'$ :  $y' \in Y'$ 
hence  $((y, y'), ((\varphi\ g\ y), (\varphi\ g\ y')))) \in equivariance-rel\ (carrier\ G)\ Y\ \varphi$ 
using  $Y'-in-Y\ y-in-Y\ g-carrier$ 
unfolding equivariance-rel.simps
by blast
hence  $eq-dist$ :  $tup\ d\ ((\varphi\ g\ y), (\varphi\ g\ y')) = tup\ d\ (y, y')$ 
using invar-d
unfolding invariant-dist.simps
by fastforce

```



```

thus  $d (\varphi g y) (\varphi g y') \in d y \text{ ' } Y'$ 
  using  $y'\text{-in-}Y'$ 
  by simp
have  $\varphi g y' \in \varphi g \text{ ' } Y'$ 
  using  $y'\text{-in-}Y'$ 
  by simp
thus  $d y y' \in d (\varphi g y) \text{ ' } \varphi g \text{ ' } Y'$ 
  using eq-dist
  by (simp add: rev-image-eqI)
qed

lemma swap-neutral: invariant-dist swap (carrier neutralityG)
  UNIV  $(\lambda \pi (A, q). (\pi \text{ ' } A, \text{rel-rename } \pi q))$ 
proof (simp only: rewrite-invariant-dist, safe)
  fix
     $\pi :: 'a \Rightarrow 'a$  and
     $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $q :: 'a \text{ rel}$  and
     $A' :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $q' :: 'a \text{ rel}$ 
  assume  $\pi \in \text{carrier neutrality}_G$ 
  hence bij: bij  $\pi$ 
    unfolding neutralityG-def
    using rewrite-carrier
    by blast
  show  $\text{swap } (A, q) (A', q') = \text{swap } (\pi \text{ ' } A, \text{rel-rename } \pi q) (\pi \text{ ' } A', \text{rel-rename } \pi q')$ 
  proof (cases  $A = A'$ )
    let  $?f = (\lambda (a, b). (\pi a, \pi b))$ 
    let  $?swap\text{-set} = \{(a, b) \in A \times A. a \neq b \wedge \text{neq-ord } q q' a b\}$ 
    let  $?swap\text{-set}' =$ 
       $\{(a, b) \in \pi \text{ ' } A \times \pi \text{ ' } A. a \neq b \wedge \text{neq-ord } (\text{rel-rename } \pi q) (\text{rel-rename } \pi q') a b\}$ 
    let  $?rel = \{(a, b) \in A \times A. a \neq b \wedge \text{neq-ord } q q' a b\}$ 
    case True
    hence  $\pi \text{ ' } A = \pi \text{ ' } A'$ 
    by simp
    hence  $\text{swap } (\pi \text{ ' } A, \text{rel-rename } \pi q) (\pi \text{ ' } A', \text{rel-rename } \pi q') = \text{card } ?swap\text{-set}'$ 
    by simp
    moreover have bij-betw  $?f ?swap\text{-set} ?swap\text{-set}'$ 
  proof (unfold bij-betw-def inj-on-def, standard, standard, standard, standard)
    fix
       $x :: 'a \times 'a$  and
       $y :: 'a \times 'a$ 
    assume
       $x \in ?swap\text{-set}$  and
       $y \in ?swap\text{-set}$  and
       $?f x = ?f y$ 
    hence  $\pi (fst x) = \pi (fst y) \wedge \pi (snd x) = \pi (snd y)$ 

```

```

    by auto
  hence  $\text{fst } x = \text{fst } y \wedge \text{snd } x = \text{snd } y$ 
    using bij bij-pointE
    by metis
  thus  $x = y$ 
    using prod.expand
    by metis
next
show  $?f \text{ ' } ?\text{swap-set} = ?\text{swap-set}'$ 
proof
  have  $\forall a b. (a, b) \in A \times A \longrightarrow (\pi a, \pi b) \in \pi \text{ ' } A \times \pi \text{ ' } A$ 
    by simp
  moreover have  $\forall a b. a \neq b \longrightarrow \pi a \neq \pi b$ 
    using bij bij-pointE
    by metis
  moreover have
     $\forall a b. \text{neg-ord } q \text{ ' } a b \longrightarrow \text{neg-ord } (\text{rel-rename } \pi \text{ ' } q) (\text{rel-rename } \pi \text{ ' } q') (\pi$ 
a)  $(\pi b)$ 
    unfolding neg-ord.simps rel-rename.simps
    by auto
  ultimately show  $?f \text{ ' } ?\text{swap-set} \subseteq ?\text{swap-set}'$ 
    by auto
next
  have  $\forall a b. (a, b) \in (\text{rel-rename } \pi \text{ ' } q) \longrightarrow (\text{the-inv } \pi a, \text{the-inv } \pi b) \in q$ 
    unfolding rel-rename.simps
    using bij bij-is-inj the-inv-f-f
    by fastforce
  moreover have  $\forall a b. (a, b) \in (\text{rel-rename } \pi \text{ ' } q') \longrightarrow (\text{the-inv } \pi a, \text{the-inv}$ 
 $\pi b) \in q'$ 
    unfolding rel-rename.simps
    using bij bij-is-inj the-inv-f-f
    by fastforce
  ultimately have  $\forall a b. \text{neg-ord } (\text{rel-rename } \pi \text{ ' } q) (\text{rel-rename } \pi \text{ ' } q') a b \longrightarrow$ 
 $\text{neg-ord } q \text{ ' } (\text{the-inv } \pi a) (\text{the-inv } \pi b)$ 
    by simp
  moreover have  $\forall a b. (a, b) \in \pi \text{ ' } A \times \pi \text{ ' } A \longrightarrow (\text{the-inv } \pi a, \text{the-inv } \pi$ 
b)  $\in A \times A$ 
    using bij bij-is-inj f-the-inv-into-f inj-image-mem-iff
    by fastforce
  moreover have  $\forall a b. a \neq b \longrightarrow \text{the-inv } \pi a \neq \text{the-inv } \pi b$ 
    using bij UNIV-I bij-betw-imp-surj bij-is-inj f-the-inv-into-f
    by metis
  ultimately have
     $\forall a b. (a, b) \in ?\text{swap-set}' \longrightarrow (\text{the-inv } \pi a, \text{the-inv } \pi b) \in ?\text{swap-set}$ 
    by blast
  moreover have  $\forall a b. (a, b) = ?f (\text{the-inv } \pi a, \text{the-inv } \pi b)$ 
    using f-the-inv-into-f-bij-betw bij
    by fastforce
  ultimately show  $?\text{swap-set}' \subseteq ?f \text{ ' } ?\text{swap-set}$ 

```

```

      by blast
    qed
  qed
  moreover have card ?swap-set = swap (A, q) (A', q')
    using True
    by simp
  ultimately show ?thesis
    by (simp add: bij-betw-same-card)
next
case False
hence  $\pi \text{ ` } A \neq \pi \text{ ` } A'$ 
  using bij bij-is-inj inj-image-eq-iff
  by metis
hence  $\text{swap } (A, q) (A', q') = \infty \wedge$ 
 $\text{swap } (\pi \text{ ` } A, \text{rel-rename } \pi \text{ } q) (\pi \text{ ` } A', \text{rel-rename } \pi \text{ } q') = \infty$ 
  using False
  by simp
thus ?thesis
  by simp
qed
qed
end

```

2.4 Votewise Distance

```

theory Votewise-Distance
  imports Social-Choice-Types/Norm
          Distance
begin

```

Votewise distances are a natural class of distances on elections which depend on the submitted votes in a simple and transparent manner. They are formed by using any distance d on individual orders and combining the components with a norm on \mathbb{R}^n .

2.4.1 Definition

```

fun votewise-distance :: 'a Vote Distance  $\Rightarrow$  Norm
 $\Rightarrow$  ('a, 'v::linorder) Election Distance where
votewise-distance d n (A, V, p) (A', V', p') =
  (if (finite V)  $\wedge$  V = V'  $\wedge$  (V  $\neq$  {})  $\vee$  A = A')
  then n (map2 ( $\lambda$  q q'. d (A, q) (A', q')) (to-list V p) (to-list V' p'))
  else  $\infty$ )

```

2.4.2 Inference Rules

lemma *symmetric-norm-inv-under-map2-permute*:

fixes
 $d :: 'a \text{ Vote Distance}$ **and**
 $n :: \text{Norm}$ **and**
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $A' :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $\varphi :: \text{nat} \Rightarrow \text{nat}$ **and**
 $p :: ('a \text{ Preference-Relation}) \text{ list}$ **and**
 $p' :: ('a \text{ Preference-Relation}) \text{ list}$
assumes
 $\text{perm}: \varphi \text{ permutes } \{0 \dots \text{length } p\}$ **and**
 $\text{len-eq}: \text{length } p = \text{length } p'$ **and**
 $\text{sym-n}: \text{symmetry } n$
shows $n (\text{map2 } (\lambda q q'. d (A, q) (A', q')) p p')$
 $= n (\text{map2 } (\lambda q q'. d (A, q) (A', q')) (\text{permute-list } \varphi p) (\text{permute-list } \varphi p'))$
proof –
let $?z = \text{zip } p p'$ **and**
 $?lt\text{-len} = \lambda i. \{.. < \text{length } i\}$ **and**
 $?c\text{-prod} = \text{case-prod } (\lambda q q'. d (A, q) (A', q'))$
let $?listpi = \lambda q. \text{permute-list } \varphi q$
let $?q = ?listpi p$ **and**
 $?q' = ?listpi p'$
have $\text{listpi-sym}: \forall l. (\text{length } l = \text{length } p \longrightarrow ?listpi l <\sim\sim> l)$
using $\text{mset-permute-list perm atLeast-upt}$
by *simp*
moreover have $\text{length } (\text{map2 } (\lambda x y. d (A, x) (A', y)) p p') = \text{length } p$
using len-eq
by *simp*
ultimately have $(\text{map2 } (\lambda q q'. d (A, q) (A', q')) p p')$
 $<\sim\sim> (?listpi (\text{map2 } (\lambda x y. d (A, x) (A', y)) p p'))$
by *metis*
hence $n (\text{map2 } (\lambda q q'. d (A, q) (A', q')) p p')$
 $= n (?listpi (\text{map2 } (\lambda x y. d (A, x) (A', y)) p p'))$
using sym-n
unfolding symmetry-def
by *blast*
also have $\dots = n (\text{map } (\text{case-prod } (\lambda x y. d (A, x) (A', y)))$
 $(?listpi (\text{zip } p p')))$
using $\text{permute-list-map}[of \ \varphi \ ?z \ ?c\text{-prod}] \text{ perm len-eq atLeast-upt}$
by *simp*
also have $\dots = n (\text{map2 } (\lambda x y. d (A, x) (A', y)) (?listpi p) (?listpi p'))$
using $\text{len-eq perm atLeast-upt}$
by $(\text{simp add: permute-list-zip})$
finally show $?thesis$
by *simp*
qed

lemma *permute-invariant-under-map*:

```

fixes
   $l :: 'a \text{ list}$  and
   $ls :: 'a \text{ list}$ 
assumes  $l <^{\sim\sim} ls$ 
shows  $\text{map } f \, l <^{\sim\sim} \text{map } f \, ls$ 
using assms
by simp

lemma linorder-rank-injective:
fixes
   $V :: 'v::\text{linorder set}$  and
   $v :: 'v$  and
   $v' :: 'v$ 
assumes
   $v\text{-in-}V: v \in V$  and
   $v'\text{-in-}V: v' \in V$  and
   $v'\text{-neq-}v: v' \neq v$  and
   $\text{fin-}V: \text{finite } V$ 

shows  $\text{card } \{x \in V. x < v\} \neq \text{card } \{x \in V. x < v'\}$ 
proof –
have  $v < v' \vee v' < v$ 
using  $v'\text{-neq-}v$  linorder-less-linear
by metis
hence  $\{x \in V. x < v\} \subset \{x \in V. x < v'\} \vee \{x \in V. x < v'\} \subset \{x \in V. x < v\}$ 
using  $v\text{-in-}V$   $v'\text{-in-}V$  dual-order.strict-trans
by blast
thus ?thesis
using assms sorted-list-of-set-nth-equals-card
by (metis (full-types))
qed

lemma permute-invariant-under-coinciding-funs:
fixes
   $l :: 'v \text{ list}$  and
   $\pi\text{-1} :: \text{nat} \Rightarrow \text{nat}$  and
   $\pi\text{-2} :: \text{nat} \Rightarrow \text{nat}$ 
assumes  $\forall i < \text{length } l. \pi\text{-1 } i = \pi\text{-2 } i$ 
shows  $\text{permute-list } \pi\text{-1 } l = \text{permute-list } \pi\text{-2 } l$ 
using assms
unfolding permute-list-def
by simp

lemma symmetric-norm-imp-distance-anonymous:
fixes
   $d :: 'a \text{ Vote Distance}$  and
   $n :: \text{Norm}$ 
assumes symmetry n
shows distance-anonymity (votewise-distance d n)

```

```

proof (unfold distance-anonymity-def, safe)
  fix
    A :: 'a set and
    A' :: 'a set and
    V :: 'v::linorder set and
    V' :: 'v set and
    p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    p' :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
     $\pi :: 'v \Rightarrow 'v$ 
  let ?rn1 = rename  $\pi$  (A, V, p) and
    ?rn2 = rename  $\pi$  (A', V', p') and
    ?rn-V =  $\pi$  ' V and
    ?rn-V' =  $\pi$  ' V' and
    ?rn-p =  $p \circ (\text{the-inv } \pi)$  and
    ?rn-p' =  $p' \circ (\text{the-inv } \pi)$  and
    ?len = length (to-list V p) and
    ?sl-V = sorted-list-of-set V
  let ?perm =  $\lambda i. (\text{card } (\{v \in ?rn-V. v < \pi (?sl-V!i)\}))$  and
    ?perm-total = ( $\lambda i. (\text{if } (i < ?len)$ 
      then  $\text{card } (\{v \in ?rn-V. v < \pi (?sl-V!i)\})$ 
      else  $i$ ))
  assume bij: bij  $\pi$ 
  show votewise-distance d n (A, V, p) (A', V', p') = votewise-distance d n ?rn1
?rn2
proof –
  have rn-A-eq-A: fst ?rn1 = A
    by simp
  have rn-A'-eq-A': fst ?rn2 = A'
    by simp
  have rn-V-eq-pi-V: fst (snd ?rn1) = ?rn-V
    by simp
  have rn-V'-eq-pi-V': fst (snd ?rn2) = ?rn-V'
    by simp
  have rn-p-eq-pi-p: snd (snd ?rn1) = ?rn-p
    by simp
  have rn-p'-eq-pi-p': snd (snd ?rn2) = ?rn-p'
    by simp
  show ?thesis
proof (cases finite V  $\wedge$  V = V'  $\wedge$  (V  $\neq \{\}$   $\vee$  A = A'))
  case False
    hence inf-dist: votewise-distance d n (A, V, p) (A', V', p') =  $\infty$ 
      by auto
    moreover have infinite V  $\implies$  infinite ?rn-V
      using False bij bij-betw-finite bij-betw-subset False subset-UNIV
      by metis
    moreover have V  $\neq$  V'  $\implies$  ?rn-V  $\neq$  ?rn-V'
      using bij bij-def inj-image-mem-iff subsetI subset-antisym
      by metis

```

```

moreover have  $V = \{\} \implies ?rn-V = \{\}$ 
  using bij
  by simp
ultimately have inf-dist-rename: votewise-distance d n ?rn1 ?rn2 = ∞
  using False
  by auto
thus votewise-distance d n (A, V, p) (A', V', p') = votewise-distance d n
?rn1 ?rn2
  using inf-dist
  by simp
next
case True

have perm-funs-coincide:  $\forall i < ?len. ?perm\ i = ?perm-total\ i$ 
  by presburger

have lengths-eq:  $?len = length\ (to-list\ V'\ p')$ 
  using True
  by simp

have rn-V-permutes:  $(to-list\ V\ p) = permute-list\ ?perm\ (to-list\ ?rn-V\ ?rn-p)$ 
  using assms to-list-permutes-under-bij bij to-list-permutes-under-bij
  unfolding comp-def
  by (metis (no-types))
hence len-V-rn-V-eq:  $?len = length\ (to-list\ ?rn-V\ ?rn-p)$ 
  by simp
hence permute-list ?perm (to-list ?rn-V ?rn-p)
   $= permute-list\ ?perm-total\ (to-list\ ?rn-V\ ?rn-p)$ 
  using permute-invariant-under-coinciding-funs[of (to-list ?rn-V ?rn-p)]
  perm-funs-coincide
  by presburger
hence rn-list-perm-list-V:  $(to-list\ V\ p) = permute-list\ ?perm-total\ (to-list$ 
?rn-V\ ?rn-p)
  using rn-V-permutes
  by metis

have rn-V'-permutes:  $(to-list\ V'\ p') = permute-list\ ?perm\ (to-list\ ?rn-V'$ 
?rn-p')
  unfolding comp-def
  using True bij to-list-permutes-under-bij
  by (metis (no-types))
hence permute-list ?perm (to-list ?rn-V' ?rn-p')
   $= permute-list\ ?perm-total\ (to-list\ ?rn-V'\ ?rn-p')$ 
  using permute-invariant-under-coinciding-funs[of (to-list ?rn-V' ?rn-p')]
  perm-funs-coincide lengths-eq
  by fastforce
hence rn-list-perm-list-V':
   $(to-list\ V'\ p') = permute-list\ ?perm-total\ (to-list\ ?rn-V'\ ?rn-p')$ 

```

```

using rn-V'-permutes
by metis

have rn-lengths-eq: length (to-list ?rn-V ?rn-p) = length (to-list ?rn-V' ?rn-p')
using len-V-rn-V-eq lengths-eq rn-V'-permutes
by simp
have perm: ?perm-total permutes {0 ..< ?len}
proof –

  have  $\forall i j. (i < ?len \wedge j < ?len \wedge i \neq j$ 
     $\longrightarrow \pi ((\text{sorted-list-of-set } V)!i) \neq \pi ((\text{sorted-list-of-set } V)!j))$ 
    using bij bij-pointE True nth-eq-iff-index-eq length-map
    sorted-list-of-set.distinct-sorted-key-list-of-set to-list.elims
    by (metis (mono-tags, opaque-lifting))
  moreover have in-bnds-imp-img-el:  $\forall i. i < ?len \longrightarrow \pi ((\text{sorted-list-of-set } V)!i) \in \pi ' V$ 
    using True image-eqI nth-mem sorted-list-of-set(1) to-list.simps length-map
    by metis
  ultimately have  $\forall i < ?len. \forall j < ?len. (?perm-total i = ?perm-total j \longrightarrow i = j)$ 
    using linorder-rank-injective Collect-cong True finite-imageI
    by (metis (no-types, lifting))
  moreover have  $\forall i. i < ?len \longrightarrow i \in \{0 ..< ?len\}$ 
    by simp
  ultimately have  $\forall i \in \{0 ..< ?len\}. \forall j \in \{0 ..< ?len\}. (?perm-total i = ?perm-total j \longrightarrow i = j)$ 
    by simp
  hence inj: inj-on ?perm-total {0 ..< ?len}
    unfolding inj-on-def
    by simp
  have  $\forall v' \in (\pi ' V). (\text{card } (\{v \in (\pi ' V). v < v'\})) < \text{card } (\pi ' V)$ 
    using card-seteq True finite-imageI less-irrefl linorder-not-le mem-Collect-eq
    subsetI
    by (metis (no-types, lifting))
  moreover have  $\forall i < ?len. \pi ((\text{sorted-list-of-set } V)!i) \in \pi ' V$ 
    using in-bnds-imp-img-el
    by simp
  moreover have card ( $\pi ' V$ ) = card V
    using bij bij-betw-same-card bij-betw-subset top-greatest
    by metis
  moreover have card V = ?len
    by simp
  ultimately have bounded-img:  $\forall i. (i < ?len \longrightarrow ?perm-total i \in \{0 ..< ?len\})$ 
    using atLeast0LessThan lessThan-iff
    by (metis (full-types))
  hence  $\forall i. i < ?len \longrightarrow ?perm-total i \in \{0 ..< ?len\}$ 
    by simp
  moreover have  $\forall i. i \in \{0 ..< ?len\} \longrightarrow i < ?len$ 

```



```

    using atLeastLessThan-iff
    by blast
  ultimately have  $\forall i. i \in \{0 \dots ?len\} \longrightarrow ?perm-total\ i \in \{0 \dots ?len\}$ 
    by fastforce
  hence  $?perm-total\ \{0 \dots ?len\} \subseteq \{0 \dots ?len\}$ 
    using bounded-img
    by force
  hence  $?perm-total\ \{0 \dots ?len\} = \{0 \dots ?len\}$ 
    using inj card-image card-subset-eq finite-atLeastLessThan
    by blast
  hence bij-perm: bij-betw  $?perm-total\ \{0 \dots ?len\}\ \{0 \dots ?len\}$ 
    using inj bij-betw-def atLeast0LessThan
    by blast
  thus ?thesis
    using atLeast0LessThan bij-imp-permutes
    by fastforce
qed
have votewise-distance  $d\ n\ ?rn1\ ?rn2$ 
  =  $n\ (map2\ (\lambda\ q\ q'.\ d\ (A,\ q)\ (A',\ q'))\ (to-list\ ?rn-V\ ?rn-p)\ (to-list\ ?rn-V'\ ?rn-p'))$ 
  using True rn-A-eq-A rn-A'-eq-A' rn-V-eq-pi-V rn-V'-eq-pi-V' rn-p-eq-pi-p rn-p'-eq-pi-p'
  by force
  also have ... =  $n\ (map2\ (\lambda\ q\ q'.\ d\ (A,\ q)\ (A',\ q'))\ (permute-list\ ?perm-total\ (to-list\ ?rn-V\ ?rn-p))\ (permute-list\ ?perm-total\ (to-list\ ?rn-V'\ ?rn-p')))$ 
  using symmetric-norm-inv-under-map2-permute[of ?perm-total to-list ?rn-V ?rn-p]
  as ssms perm rn-lengths-eq len-V-rn-V-eq
  by simp
  also have ... =  $n\ (map2\ (\lambda\ q\ q'.\ d\ (A,\ q)\ (A',\ q'))\ (to-list\ V\ p)\ (to-list\ V'\ p'))$ 
  using rn-list-perm-list-V rn-list-perm-list-V'
  by presburger
  also have votewise-distance  $d\ n\ (A,\ V,\ p)\ (A',\ V',\ p')$ 
    =  $n\ (map2\ (\lambda\ q\ q'.\ d\ (A,\ q)\ (A',\ q'))\ (to-list\ V\ p)\ (to-list\ V'\ p'))$ 
    using True
    by force
  finally show votewise-distance  $d\ n\ (A,\ V,\ p)\ (A',\ V',\ p')$ 
    = votewise-distance  $d\ n\ ?rn1\ ?rn2$ 
    by linarith
qed
qed
qed

lemma neutral-dist-imp-neutral-votewise-dist:
  fixes
     $d :: 'a\ Vote\ Distance$  and
     $n :: Norm$ 

```

```

defines vote-action  $\equiv (\lambda \pi (A, q). (\pi \text{ ' } A, \text{rel-rename } \pi q))$ 
assumes invar: invariant-dist d (carrier neutralityG) UNIV vote-action
shows distance-neutrality valid-elections (votewise-distance d n)
proof (unfold distance-neutrality.simps,
        simp only: rewrite-invariant-dist,
        safe)
fix
  A :: 'a set and
  A' :: 'a set and
  V :: 'v::linorder set and
  V' :: 'v set and
  p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
  p' :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
   $\pi :: 'a \Rightarrow 'a$ 
assume
  carrier:  $\pi \in \text{carrier neutrality}_G$  and
  valid:  $(A, V, p) \in \text{valid-elections}$  and
  valid':  $(A', V', p') \in \text{valid-elections}$ 
hence bij: bij  $\pi$ 
unfolding neutralityG-def
using rewrite-carrier
by blast
thus votewise-distance d n  $(A, V, p) (A', V', p') =$ 
  votewise-distance d n
   $(\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } \pi (A, V, p)) (\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } \pi (A', V',$ 
p'))
proof (cases finite  $V \wedge V = V' \wedge (V \neq \{\} \vee A = A')$ )
case True
hence finite  $V \wedge V = V' \wedge (V \neq \{\} \vee \pi \text{ ' } A = \pi \text{ ' } A')$ 
by metis
hence votewise-distance d n
   $(\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } \pi (A, V, p)) (\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } \pi (A', V',$ 
p'))
   $= n (\text{map2 } (\lambda q q'. d (\pi \text{ ' } A, q) (\pi \text{ ' } A', q'))$ 
     $(\text{to-list } V (\text{rel-rename } \pi \circ p)) (\text{to-list } V' (\text{rel-rename } \pi \circ p'))))$ 
using valid valid'
by auto
also have  $(\text{map2 } (\lambda q q'. d (\pi \text{ ' } A, q) (\pi \text{ ' } A', q'))$ 
   $(\text{to-list } V (\text{rel-rename } \pi \circ p)) (\text{to-list } V' (\text{rel-rename } \pi \circ p'))))$ 
   $= (\text{map2 } (\lambda q q'. d (\pi \text{ ' } A, q) (\pi \text{ ' } A', q'))$ 
     $(\text{map } (\text{rel-rename } \pi) (\text{to-list } V p)) (\text{map } (\text{rel-rename } \pi) (\text{to-list } V' p'))))$ 
using to-list-comp
by metis
also have  $(\text{map2 } (\lambda q q'. d (\pi \text{ ' } A, q) (\pi \text{ ' } A', q'))$ 
   $(\text{map } (\text{rel-rename } \pi) (\text{to-list } V p)) (\text{map } (\text{rel-rename } \pi) (\text{to-list } V' p'))))$ 
   $= (\text{map2 } (\lambda q q'. d (\pi \text{ ' } A, \text{rel-rename } \pi q) (\pi \text{ ' } A', \text{rel-rename } \pi q'))$ 
     $(\text{to-list } V p) (\text{to-list } V' p'))$ 
using map2-helper
by blast

```

```

also have ( $\lambda q q'. d (\pi \text{ ` } A, \text{rel-rename } \pi q) (\pi \text{ ` } A', \text{rel-rename } \pi q')$ )
  = ( $\lambda q q'. d (A, q) (A', q')$ )
using rewrite-invariant-dist[of d carrier neutralityG UNIV vote-action]
  invar carrier UNIV-I case-prod-conv
unfolding vote-action-def
by (metis (no-types, lifting))
finally have votewise-distance d n
  ( $\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } \pi (A, V, p)$ ) ( $\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } \pi (A', V', p')$ )
  =  $n (\text{map2 } (\lambda q q'. d (A, q) (A', q')) (\text{to-list } V p) (\text{to-list } V' p'))$ 
by simp
also have votewise-distance d n (A, V, p) (A', V', p')
  =  $n (\text{map2 } (\lambda q q'. d (A, q) (A', q')) (\text{to-list } V p) (\text{to-list } V' p'))$ 
using True
by auto
finally show ?thesis
by simp
next
case False
hence  $\neg (\text{finite } V \wedge V = V' \wedge (V \neq \{\} \vee \pi \text{ ` } A = \pi \text{ ` } A'))$ 
using bij bij-is-inj inj-image-eq-iff
by metis
hence votewise-distance d n
  ( $\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } \pi (A, V, p)$ ) ( $\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } \pi (A', V', p')$ )
=  $\infty$ 
using valid valid'
by auto
also have votewise-distance d n (A, V, p) (A', V', p') =  $\infty$ 
using False
by auto
finally show ?thesis
by simp
qed
qed
end

```

2.5 Consensus

```

theory Consensus
imports Social-Choice-Types/Voting-Symmetry
begin

```

An election consisting of a set of alternatives and preferential votes for each voter (a profile) is a consensus if it has an undisputed winner reflecting a certain concept of fairness in the society.

2.5.1 Definition

type-synonym $(\text{'a}, \text{'v}) \text{ Consensus} = (\text{'a}, \text{'v}) \text{ Election} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$

2.5.2 Consensus Conditions

Nonempty alternative set.

fun $\text{nonempty-set}_C :: (\text{'a}, \text{'v}) \text{ Consensus} \text{ where}$
 $\text{nonempty-set}_C (A, V, p) = (A \neq \{\})$

Nonempty profile, i.e., nonempty voter set. Note that this is also true if $p \text{ v} =$ for all voters v in V .

fun $\text{nonempty-profile}_C :: (\text{'a}, \text{'v}) \text{ Consensus} \text{ where}$
 $\text{nonempty-profile}_C (A, V, p) = (V \neq \{\})$

Equal top ranked alternatives.

fun $\text{equal-top}_C' :: \text{'a} \Rightarrow (\text{'a}, \text{'v}) \text{ Consensus} \text{ where}$
 $\text{equal-top}_C' a (A, V, p) = (a \in A \wedge (\forall v \in V. \text{above } (p \text{ v}) a = \{a\}))$

fun $\text{equal-top}_C :: (\text{'a}, \text{'v}) \text{ Consensus} \text{ where}$
 $\text{equal-top}_C c = (\exists a. \text{equal-top}_C' a c)$

Equal votes.

fun $\text{equal-vote}_C' :: \text{'a} \text{ Preference-Relation} \Rightarrow (\text{'a}, \text{'v}) \text{ Consensus} \text{ where}$
 $\text{equal-vote}_C' r (A, V, p) = (\forall v \in V. (p \text{ v}) = r)$

fun $\text{equal-vote}_C :: (\text{'a}, \text{'v}) \text{ Consensus} \text{ where}$
 $\text{equal-vote}_C c = (\exists r. \text{equal-vote}_C' r c)$

Unanimity condition.

fun $\text{unanimity}_C :: (\text{'a}, \text{'v}) \text{ Consensus} \text{ where}$
 $\text{unanimity}_C c = (\text{nonempty-set}_C c \wedge \text{nonempty-profile}_C c \wedge \text{equal-top}_C c)$

Strong unanimity condition.

fun $\text{strong-unanimity}_C :: (\text{'a}, \text{'v}) \text{ Consensus} \text{ where}$
 $\text{strong-unanimity}_C c = (\text{nonempty-set}_C c \wedge \text{nonempty-profile}_C c \wedge \text{equal-vote}_C c)$

2.5.3 Properties

definition $\text{consensus-anonymity} :: (\text{'a}, \text{'v}) \text{ Consensus} \Rightarrow \text{bool} \text{ where}$

$\text{consensus-anonymity } c \equiv$
 $(\forall A \ V \ p \ \pi :: (\text{'v} \Rightarrow \text{'v}).$
 $\text{bij } \pi \longrightarrow$
 $(\text{let } (A', V', q) = (\text{rename } \pi (A, V, p)) \text{ in}$
 $\text{profile } V \ A \ p \longrightarrow \text{profile } V' \ A' \ q$
 $\longrightarrow c (A, V, p) \longrightarrow c (A', V', q)))$

fun $\text{consensus-neutrality} :: (\text{'a}, \text{'v}) \text{ Election set} \Rightarrow (\text{'a}, \text{'v}) \text{ Consensus} \Rightarrow \text{bool} \text{ where}$
 $\text{consensus-neutrality } X \ c = \text{satisfies } c (\text{Invariance } (\text{neutrality}_{\mathcal{R}} \ X))$

2.5.4 Auxiliary Lemmas

lemma *cons-anon-conj*:

fixes

$c1 :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Consensus}$ **and**

$c2 :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Consensus}$

assumes

$anon1: \text{consensus-anonymity } c1$ **and**

$anon2: \text{consensus-anonymity } c2$

shows $\text{consensus-anonymity } (\lambda e. c1\ e \wedge c2\ e)$

proof (*unfold consensus-anonymity-def Let-def, clarify*)

fix

$A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**

$A' :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**

$V :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**

$V' :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**

$p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ **and**

$q :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ **and**

$\pi :: 'v \Rightarrow 'v$

assume

$bij: \text{bij } \pi$ **and**

$prof: \text{profile } V\ A\ p$ **and**

$renamed: \text{rename } \pi\ (A, V, p) = (A', V', q)$ **and**

$c1: c1\ (A, V, p)$ **and**

$c2: c2\ (A, V, p)$

hence $\text{profile } V'\ A'\ q$

using *rename-sound renamed bij fst-conv rename.simps*

by *metis*

thus $c1\ (A', V', q) \wedge c2\ (A', V', q)$

using *bij renamed c1 c2 assms prof*

unfolding *consensus-anonymity-def*

by *auto*

qed

theorem *cons-conjunction-invariant*:

fixes

$\mathfrak{C} :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Consensus set}$ **and**

$rel :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election rel}$

defines $C \equiv (\lambda E. (\forall C' \in \mathfrak{C}. C' E))$

assumes $\bigwedge C'. C' \in \mathfrak{C} \implies \text{satisfies } C' (\text{Invariance } rel)$

shows $\text{satisfies } C (\text{Invariance } rel)$

proof (*unfold satisfies.simps, standard, standard, standard*)

fix

$E :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election}$ **and**

$E' :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election}$

assume $(E, E') \in rel$

hence $\forall C' \in \mathfrak{C}. C' E = C' E'$

using *assms*

unfolding *satisfies.simps*

by *blast*

thus $C\ E = C\ E'$
 unfolding $C\text{-def}$
 by *blast*
 qed

lemma *cons-anon-invariant*:

fixes
 $c :: ('a, 'v)\ Consensus$ **and**
 $A :: 'a\ set$ **and**
 $A' :: 'a\ set$ **and**
 $V :: 'v\ set$ **and**
 $V' :: 'v\ set$ **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v)\ Profile$ **and**
 $q :: ('a, 'v)\ Profile$ **and**
 $\pi :: 'v \Rightarrow 'v$
assumes
 $anon: consensus\text{-}anonymity\ c$ **and**
 $bij: bij\ \pi$ **and**
 $prof\text{-}p: profile\ V\ A\ p$ **and**
 $renamed: rename\ \pi\ (A, V, p) = (A', V', q)$ **and**
 $cond\text{-}c: c\ (A, V, p)$
shows $c\ (A', V', q)$
proof –
 have $profile\ V'\ A'\ q$
 using *rename-sound* $bij\ renamed\ prof\text{-}p$
 by *fastforce*
 thus ?thesis
 using *anon cond-c renamed rename-finite bij prof-p*
 unfolding *consensus-anonymity-def Let-def*
 by *auto*
 qed

lemma *ex-anon-cons-imp-cons-anonymous*:

fixes
 $b :: ('a, 'v)\ Consensus$ **and**
 $b' :: 'b \Rightarrow ('a, 'v)\ Consensus$
assumes
 $general\text{-}cond\text{-}b: b = (\lambda\ E. \exists\ x. b'\ x\ E)$ **and**
 $all\text{-}cond\text{-}anon: \forall\ x. consensus\text{-}anonymity\ (b'\ x)$
shows $consensus\text{-}anonymity\ b$
proof (*unfold consensus-anonymity-def Let-def, safe*)
fix
 $A :: 'a\ set$ **and**
 $A' :: 'a\ set$ **and**
 $V :: 'v\ set$ **and**
 $V' :: 'v\ set$ **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v)\ Profile$ **and**
 $q :: ('a, 'v)\ Profile$ **and**
 $\pi :: 'v \Rightarrow 'v$

```

assume
  bij: bij  $\pi$  and
  cond-b:  $b(A, V, p)$  and
  prof-p: profile  $V A p$  and
  renamed: rename  $\pi(A, V, p) = (A', V', q)$ 
have  $\exists x. b' x(A, V, p)$ 
  using cond-b general-cond-b
  by simp
then obtain  $x :: 'b$  where
   $b' x(A, V, p)$ 
  by blast
moreover have consensus-anonymity  $(b' x)$ 
  using all-cond-anon
  by simp
moreover have profile  $V' A' q$ 
  using prof-p renamed bij rename-sound
  by fastforce
ultimately have  $b' x(A', V', q)$ 
  using all-cond-anon bij prof-p renamed
  unfolding consensus-anonymity-def
  by auto
hence  $\exists x. b' x(A', V', q)$ 
  by metis
thus  $b(A', V', q)$ 
  using general-cond-b
  by simp
qed

```

2.5.5 Theorems

Anonymity

lemma *nonempty-set-cons-anonymous: consensus-anonymity nonempty-set_C*
unfolding *consensus-anonymity-def*
by *simp*

lemma *nonempty-profile-cons-anonymous: consensus-anonymity nonempty-profile_C*

proof (*unfold consensus-anonymity-def Let-def, clarify*)

fix

```

   $A :: 'a$  set and
   $A' :: 'a$  set and
   $V :: 'v$  set and
   $V' :: 'v$  set and
   $p :: ('a, 'v)$  Profile and
   $q :: ('a, 'v)$  Profile and
   $\pi :: 'v \Rightarrow 'v$ 

```

assume

```

  bij: bij  $\pi$  and
  prof-p: profile  $V A p$  and
  renamed: rename  $\pi(A, V, p) = (A', V', q)$  and

```

```

    not-empty-p: nonempty-profileC (A, V, p)
  have card V = card V'
    using renamed bij rename.simps Pair-inject
      bij-betw-same-card bij-betw-subset top-greatest
    by (metis (mono-tags, lifting))
  thus nonempty-profileC (A', V', q)
    using not-empty-p length-0-conv renamed
    unfolding nonempty-profileC.simps
    by auto
qed

lemma equal-top-cons'-anonymous:
  fixes a :: 'a
  shows consensus-anonymity (equal-topC' a)
proof (unfold consensus-anonymity-def Let-def, clarify)
  fix
    A :: 'a set and
    A' :: 'a set and
    V :: 'v set and
    V' :: 'v set and
    p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    q :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    π :: 'v ⇒ 'v
  assume
    bij: bij π and
    prof-p: profile V A p and
    renamed: rename π (A, V, p) = (A', V', q) and
    top-cons-a: equal-topC' a (A, V, p)
  have ∀ v' ∈ V'. q v' = p ((the-inv π) v')
    using renamed
    by auto
  moreover have ∀ v' ∈ V'. (the-inv π) v' ∈ V
    using bij renamed rename.simps bij-is-inj
      f-the-inv-into-f-bij-betw inj-image-mem-iff
    by fastforce
  moreover have winner: ∀ v ∈ V. above (p v) a = {a}
    using top-cons-a
    by simp
  ultimately have ∀ v' ∈ V'. above (q v') a = {a}
    by simp
  moreover have a ∈ A
    using top-cons-a
    by simp
  ultimately show equal-topC' a (A', V', q)
    using renamed
    unfolding equal-topC'.simps
    by simp
qed

```


lemma *eq-top-cons-anon: consensus-anonymity equal-top_C*
using *equal-top-cons'-anonymous*
*ex-anon-cons-imp-cons-anonymous[*of equal-top_C equal-top_C*]*
by *fastforce*

lemma *eq-vote-cons'-anonymous:*
fixes *r :: 'a Preference-Relation*
shows *consensus-anonymity (equal-vote_C' r)*
proof (*unfold consensus-anonymity-def Let-def, clarify*)
fix
A :: 'a set and
A' :: 'a set and
V :: 'v set and
V' :: 'v set and
p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
q :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
π :: 'v ⇒ 'v
assume
bij: bij π and
prof-p: profile V A p and
renamed: rename π (A, V, p) = (A', V', q) and
eq-vote: equal-vote_C' r (A, V, p)
have $\forall v' \in V'. q\ v' = p\ ((the_inv\ \pi)\ v')$
using *renamed*
by *auto*
moreover have $\forall v' \in V'. (the_inv\ \pi)\ v' \in V$
using *bij renamed rename.simps bij-is-inj*
f-the-inv-into-f-bij-betw inj-image-mem-iff
by *fastforce*
moreover have *winner: $\forall v \in V. p\ v = r$*
using *eq-vote*
by *simp*
ultimately have $\forall v' \in V'. q\ v' = r$
by *simp*
thus *equal-vote_C' r (A', V', q)*
unfolding *equal-vote_C'.simps*
by *metis*
qed

lemma *eq-vote-cons-anonymous: consensus-anonymity equal-vote_C*
unfolding *equal-vote_C.simps*
using *eq-vote-cons'-anonymous ex-anon-cons-imp-cons-anonymous*
by *blast*

Neutrality

lemma *nonempty-set_C-neutral: consensus-neutrality valid-elections nonempty-set_C*
proof (*simp, unfold valid-elections-def, safe*) **qed**

lemma *nonempty-profile_C-neutral: consensus-neutrality valid-elections nonempty-profile_C*
proof (*simp, unfold valid-elections-def, safe*) **qed**

lemma *equal-vote_C-neutral: consensus-neutrality valid-elections equal-vote_C*
proof (*simp, unfold valid-elections-def, clarsimp, safe*)

fix

$A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**

$V :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**

$p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ **and**

$\pi :: 'a \Rightarrow 'a$ **and**

$r :: 'a \text{ rel}$

show $\forall v \in V. p \ v = r \implies \exists r. \forall v \in V. \{(\pi \ a, \pi \ b) \mid a \ b. (a, b) \in p \ v\} = r$

by *simp*

assume *bij*: $\pi \in \text{carrier neutrality}_G$

hence *bij* π

unfolding *neutrality_G-def*

using *rewrite-carrier*

by *blast*

hence $\forall a. \text{the-inv } \pi (\pi \ a) = a$

using *bij-is-inj the-inv-f-f*

by *metis*

moreover have

$\forall v \in V. \{(\pi \ a, \pi \ b) \mid a \ b. (a, b) \in p \ v\} = r \implies$

$\forall v \in V. \{(\text{the-inv } \pi (\pi \ a), \text{the-inv } \pi (\pi \ b)) \mid a \ b. (a, b) \in p \ v\} =$
 $\{(\text{the-inv } \pi \ a, \text{the-inv } \pi \ b) \mid a \ b. (a, b) \in r\}$

by *fastforce*

ultimately have

$\forall v \in V. \{(\pi \ a, \pi \ b) \mid a \ b. (a, b) \in p \ v\} = r \implies$

$\forall v \in V. \{(a, b) \mid a \ b. (a, b) \in p \ v\} =$
 $\{(\text{the-inv } \pi \ a, \text{the-inv } \pi \ b) \mid a \ b. (a, b) \in r\}$

by *auto*

hence $\forall v \in V. \{(\pi \ a, \pi \ b) \mid a \ b. (a, b) \in p \ v\} = r \implies$

$\forall v \in V. p \ v = \{(\text{the-inv } \pi \ a, \text{the-inv } \pi \ b) \mid a \ b. (a, b) \in r\}$

by *simp*

thus $\forall v \in V. \{(\pi \ a, \pi \ b) \mid a \ b. (a, b) \in p \ v\} = r \implies \exists r. \forall v \in V. p \ v = r$

by *simp*

qed

lemma *strong-unanimity_C-neutral:*

consensus-neutrality valid-elections strong-unanimity_C

using *nonempty-set_C-neutral equal-vote_C-neutral nonempty-profile_C-neutral*

cons-conjunction-invariant[*of*

$\{\text{nonempty-set}_C, \text{nonempty-profile}_C, \text{equal-vote}_C\}$ *neutrality_R valid-elections*]

unfolding *strong-unanimity_C.simps*

by *fastforce*

end

Chapter 3

Component Types

3.1 Electoral Module

```
theory Electoral-Module
imports Social-Choice-Types/Property-Interpretations
begin
```

Electoral modules are the principal component type of the composable modules voting framework, as they are a generalization of voting rules in the sense of social choice functions. These are only the types used for electoral modules. Further restrictions are encompassed by the electoral-module predicate.

An electoral module does not need to make final decisions for all alternatives, but can instead defer the decision for some or all of them to other modules. Hence, electoral modules partition the received (possibly empty) set of alternatives into elected, rejected and deferred alternatives. In particular, any of those sets, e.g., the set of winning (elected) alternatives, may also be left empty, as long as they collectively still hold all the received alternatives. Just like a voting rule, an electoral module also receives a profile which holds the voters preferences, which, unlike a voting rule, consider only the (sub-)set of alternatives that the module receives.

3.1.1 Definition

An electoral module maps an election to a result. To enable currying, the Election type is not used here because that would require tuples.

```
type-synonym ('a, 'v, 'r) Electoral-Module = 'v set  $\Rightarrow$  'a set  $\Rightarrow$  ('a, 'v) Profile  $\Rightarrow$  'r
```

```
fun fun $\mathcal{E}$  :: ('v set  $\Rightarrow$  'a set  $\Rightarrow$  ('a, 'v) Profile  $\Rightarrow$  'r)  $\Rightarrow$  (('a, 'v) Election  $\Rightarrow$  'r)
where
```

```
  fun $\mathcal{E}$  m = ( $\lambda$  E. m (voters- $\mathcal{E}$  E) (alternatives- $\mathcal{E}$  E) (profile- $\mathcal{E}$  E))
```

The next three functions take an electoral module and turn it into a function only outputting the elect, reject, or defer set respectively.

abbreviation $elect :: ('a, 'v, 'r \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module} \Rightarrow 'v \text{ set} \Rightarrow 'a \text{ set}$
 $\Rightarrow ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile} \Rightarrow 'r \text{ set} \textbf{ where}$
 $elect\ m\ V\ A\ p \equiv elect\text{-}r\ (m\ V\ A\ p)$

abbreviation $reject :: ('a, 'v, 'r \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module} \Rightarrow 'v \text{ set} \Rightarrow 'a \text{ set}$
 $\Rightarrow ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile} \Rightarrow 'r \text{ set} \textbf{ where}$
 $reject\ m\ V\ A\ p \equiv reject\text{-}r\ (m\ V\ A\ p)$

abbreviation $defer :: ('a, 'v, 'r \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module} \Rightarrow 'v \text{ set} \Rightarrow 'a \text{ set}$
 $\Rightarrow ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile} \Rightarrow 'r \text{ set} \textbf{ where}$
 $defer\ m\ V\ A\ p \equiv defer\text{-}r\ (m\ V\ A\ p)$

3.1.2 Auxiliary Definitions

Electoral modules partition a given set of alternatives A into a set of elected alternatives e , a set of rejected alternatives r , and a set of deferred alternatives d , using a profile. e , r , and d partition A . Electoral modules can be used as voting rules. They can also be composed in multiple structures to create more complex electoral modules.

definition (*in result*) $electoral\text{-}module :: ('a, 'v, ('r \text{ Result})) \text{ Electoral-Module} \Rightarrow \text{bool} \textbf{ where}$
 $electoral\text{-}module\ m \equiv \forall\ A\ V\ p. \text{ profile}\ V\ A\ p \longrightarrow \text{well-formed}\ A\ (m\ V\ A\ p)$

definition $only\text{-}voters\text{-}vote :: ('a, 'v, ('r \text{ Result})) \text{ Electoral-Module} \Rightarrow \text{bool} \textbf{ where}$
 $only\text{-}voters\text{-}vote\ m \equiv \forall\ A\ V\ p\ p'. (\forall\ v \in V. p\ v = p'\ v) \longrightarrow m\ V\ A\ p = m\ V\ A\ p'$

lemma (*in result*) $electoral\text{-}modI$:
fixes $m :: ('a, 'v, ('r \text{ Result})) \text{ Electoral-Module}$
assumes $\bigwedge\ A\ V\ p. \text{ profile}\ V\ A\ p \Longrightarrow \text{well-formed}\ A\ (m\ V\ A\ p)$
shows $electoral\text{-}module\ m$
unfolding $electoral\text{-}module\text{-}def$
using $assms$
by $simp$

3.1.3 Properties

We only require voting rules to behave a specific way on admissible elections, i.e., elections that are valid profiles (= votes are linear orders on the alternatives). Note that we do not assume finiteness of voter or alternative sets by default.

Anonymity

An electoral module is anonymous iff the result is invariant under renamings of voters, i.e., any permutation of the voter set that does not change the preferences leads to an identical result.

definition (in result) *anonymity* :: ('a, 'v, ('r Result)) Electoral-Module \Rightarrow bool **where**

anonymity *m* \equiv
electoral-module *m* \wedge
 $(\forall A V p \pi :: ('v \Rightarrow 'v).$
 $\text{bij } \pi \longrightarrow (\text{let } (A', V', q) = (\text{rename } \pi (A, V, p)) \text{ in}$
 $\text{finite-profile } V A p \wedge \text{finite-profile } V' A' q \longrightarrow m V A p = m V' A' q))$

Anonymity can alternatively be described as invariance under the voter permutation group acting on elections via the rename function.

fun *anonymity'* :: ('a, 'v) Election set \Rightarrow ('a, 'v, 'r) Electoral-Module \Rightarrow bool **where**
anonymity' *X* *m* = satisfies (fun _{\mathcal{E}} *m*) (Invariance (anonymity _{\mathcal{R}} *X*))

Homogeneity

A voting rule is homogeneous if copying an election does not change the result. For ordered voter types and finite elections, we use the notion of copying ballot lists to define copying an election. The more general definition of homogeneity for unordered voter types already implies anonymity.

fun (in result) *homogeneity* :: ('a, 'v) Election set \Rightarrow ('a, 'v, ('r Result)) Electoral-Module \Rightarrow bool **where**

homogeneity *X* *m* = satisfies (fun _{\mathcal{E}} *m*) (Invariance (homogeneity _{\mathcal{R}} *X*))

— This does not require any specific behaviour on infinite voter sets ... Might make sense to extend the definition to that case somehow.

fun *homogeneity'* :: ('a, 'v::linorder) Election set \Rightarrow ('a, 'v, 'b Result) Electoral-Module \Rightarrow bool **where**

homogeneity' *X* *m* = satisfies (fun _{\mathcal{E}} *m*) (Invariance (homogeneity _{\mathcal{R}} ' *X*))

lemma (in result) *hom-imp-anon*:

fixes *X* :: ('a, 'v) Election set

assumes

homogeneity *X* *m* **and**

$\forall E \in X. \text{finite } (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} E)$

shows *anonymity'* *X* *m*

proof (unfold *anonymity'*.simps satisfies.simps, standard, standard, standard)

fix

E :: ('a, 'v) Election **and**

E' :: ('a, 'v) Election

assume *rel*: (*E*, *E'*) \in anonymity _{\mathcal{R}} *X*

hence *E* \in *X* \wedge *E'* \in *X*

```

    unfolding anonymity $\mathcal{R}$ .simps rel-induced-by-action.simps
  by blast
moreover with this
  have fin: finite (voters- $\mathcal{E}$  E)  $\wedge$  finite (voters- $\mathcal{E}$  E')
  using assms
  by simp
moreover with this
  have  $\forall r. \text{vote-count } r \ E = 1 * (\text{vote-count } r \ E')$ 
  using anon-rel-vote-count rel mult-1
  by metis
moreover with fin
  have alternatives- $\mathcal{E}$  E = alternatives- $\mathcal{E}$  E'
  using anon-rel-vote-count rel
  by blast
ultimately show  $\text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} m \ E = \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} m \ E'$ 
  using assms zero-less-one
  unfolding homogeneity.simps satisfies.simps homogeneity $\mathcal{R}$ .simps
  by blast
qed

```

Neutrality

Neutrality is equivariance under consistent renaming of candidates in the candidate set and election results.

```

fun (in result-properties) neutrality :: ('a, 'v) Election set
   $\Rightarrow$  ('a, 'v, 'b Result) Electoral-Module  $\Rightarrow$  bool where
  neutrality X m = satisfies (fun $\mathcal{E}$  m)
    (equivar-ind-by-act (carrier neutrality $\mathcal{G}$ ) X ( $\varphi$ -neutr X) (result-action  $\psi$ -neutr))

```

3.1.4 Reversal Symmetry of Social Welfare Rules

A social welfare rule is reversal symmetric if reversing all voters' preferences reverses the result rankings as well.

```

definition reversal-symmetry :: ('a, 'v) Election set  $\Rightarrow$  ('a, 'v, 'a rel Result) Elec-
  toral-Module
   $\Rightarrow$  bool where
  reversal-symmetry X m = satisfies (fun $\mathcal{E}$  m)
    (equivar-ind-by-act (carrier reversal $\mathcal{G}$ ) X ( $\varphi$ -rev X) (result-action  $\psi$ -rev))

```

3.1.5 Social Choice Modules

The following results require electoral modules to return social choice results, i.e., sets of elected, rejected and deferred alternatives. In order to export code, we use the hack provided by Locale-Code.

"defers n" is true for all electoral modules that defer exactly n alternatives, whenever there are n or more alternatives.

definition $\text{defers} :: \text{nat} \Rightarrow ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$ **where**
 $\text{defers } n \ m \equiv$
 $\text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m \wedge$
 $(\forall A \ V \ p. (\text{card } A \geq n \wedge \text{finite } A \wedge \text{profile } V \ A \ p) \longrightarrow \text{card } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) = n)$

"rejects n" is true for all electoral modules that reject exactly n alternatives, whenever there are n or more alternatives.

definition $\text{rejects} :: \text{nat} \Rightarrow ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$ **where**
 $\text{rejects } n \ m \equiv$
 $\text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m \wedge$
 $(\forall A \ V \ p. (\text{card } A \geq n \wedge \text{finite } A \wedge \text{profile } V \ A \ p) \longrightarrow \text{card } (\text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p) = n)$

As opposed to "rejects", "eliminates" allows to stop rejecting if no alternatives were to remain.

definition $\text{eliminates} :: \text{nat} \Rightarrow ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$ **where**
 $\text{eliminates } n \ m \equiv$
 $\text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m \wedge$
 $(\forall A \ V \ p. (\text{card } A > n \wedge \text{profile } V \ A \ p) \longrightarrow \text{card } (\text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p) = n)$

"elects n" is true for all electoral modules that elect exactly n alternatives, whenever there are n or more alternatives.

definition $\text{elects} :: \text{nat} \Rightarrow ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$ **where**
 $\text{elects } n \ m \equiv$
 $\text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m \wedge$
 $(\forall A \ V \ p. (\text{card } A \geq n \wedge \text{profile } V \ A \ p) \longrightarrow \text{card } (\text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p) = n)$

An electoral module is independent of an alternative a iff a's ranking does not influence the outcome.

definition $\text{indep-of-alt} :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module} \Rightarrow 'v \text{ set} \Rightarrow 'a \text{ set} \Rightarrow 'a$
 $\Rightarrow \text{bool}$ **where**
 $\text{indep-of-alt } m \ V \ A \ a \equiv$
 $\text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m$
 $\wedge (\forall p \ q. \text{equiv-prof-except-a } V \ A \ p \ q \ a \longrightarrow m \ V \ A \ p = m \ V \ A \ q)$

definition $\text{unique-winner-if-profile-non-empty} :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$ **where**
 $\text{unique-winner-if-profile-non-empty } m \equiv$
 $\text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m \wedge$
 $(\forall A \ V \ p. (A \neq \{\} \wedge V \neq \{\} \wedge \text{profile } V \ A \ p) \longrightarrow$
 $(\exists a \in A. m \ V \ A \ p = (\{a\}, A - \{a\}, \{\})))$

3.1.6 Equivalence Definitions

definition $\text{prof-contains-result} :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module} \Rightarrow 'v \text{ set} \Rightarrow 'a \text{ set}$

$$\Rightarrow ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile} \Rightarrow ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile} \Rightarrow 'a \Rightarrow \text{bool}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \text{prof-contains-result } m \ V \ A \ p \ q \ a \equiv & \\ & \text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m \wedge \\ & \text{profile } V \ A \ p \wedge \text{profile } V \ A \ q \wedge a \in A \wedge \\ & (a \in \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p \longrightarrow a \in \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ q) \wedge \\ & (a \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p \longrightarrow a \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ q) \wedge \\ & (a \in \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p \longrightarrow a \in \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ q) \end{aligned}$$

definition $\text{prof-leq-result} :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module} \Rightarrow 'v \text{ set} \Rightarrow 'a \text{ set}$
 $\Rightarrow ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile} \Rightarrow ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile} \Rightarrow 'a \Rightarrow \text{bool}$ **where**

$$\begin{aligned} \text{prof-leq-result } m \ V \ A \ p \ q \ a \equiv & \\ & \text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m \wedge \\ & \text{profile } V \ A \ p \wedge \text{profile } V \ A \ q \wedge a \in A \wedge \\ & (a \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p \longrightarrow a \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ q) \wedge \\ & (a \in \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p \longrightarrow a \notin \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ q) \end{aligned}$$

definition $\text{prof-geq-result} :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module} \Rightarrow 'v \text{ set} \Rightarrow 'a \text{ set}$
 $\Rightarrow ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile} \Rightarrow ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile} \Rightarrow 'a \Rightarrow \text{bool}$ **where**

$$\begin{aligned} \text{prof-geq-result } m \ V \ A \ p \ q \ a \equiv & \\ & \text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m \wedge \\ & \text{profile } V \ A \ p \wedge \text{profile } V \ A \ q \wedge a \in A \wedge \\ & (a \in \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p \longrightarrow a \in \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ q) \wedge \\ & (a \in \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p \longrightarrow a \notin \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ q) \end{aligned}$$

definition $\text{mod-contains-result} :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$
 $\Rightarrow ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module} \Rightarrow 'v \text{ set} \Rightarrow 'a \text{ set}$
 $\Rightarrow ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile} \Rightarrow 'a \Rightarrow \text{bool}$ **where**

$$\begin{aligned} \text{mod-contains-result } m \ n \ V \ A \ p \ a \equiv & \\ & \text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m \wedge \\ & \text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } n \wedge \\ & \text{profile } V \ A \ p \wedge a \in A \wedge \\ & (a \in \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p \longrightarrow a \in \text{elect } n \ V \ A \ p) \wedge \\ & (a \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p \longrightarrow a \in \text{reject } n \ V \ A \ p) \wedge \\ & (a \in \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p \longrightarrow a \in \text{defer } n \ V \ A \ p) \end{aligned}$$

definition $\text{mod-contains-result-sym} :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$
 $\Rightarrow ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module} \Rightarrow 'v \text{ set} \Rightarrow 'a \text{ set}$
 $\Rightarrow ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile} \Rightarrow 'a \Rightarrow \text{bool}$ **where**

$$\begin{aligned} \text{mod-contains-result-sym } m \ n \ V \ A \ p \ a \equiv & \\ & \text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m \wedge \\ & \text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } n \wedge \\ & \text{profile } V \ A \ p \wedge a \in A \wedge \\ & (a \in \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p \longleftrightarrow a \in \text{elect } n \ V \ A \ p) \wedge \\ & (a \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p \longleftrightarrow a \in \text{reject } n \ V \ A \ p) \wedge \\ & (a \in \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p \longleftrightarrow a \in \text{defer } n \ V \ A \ p) \end{aligned}$$

3.1.7 Auxiliary Lemmas

lemma *elect-rej-def-combination*:

fixes

$m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**
 $V :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ **and**
 $e :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $r :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $d :: 'a \text{ set}$

assumes

$\text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p = e$ **and**
 $\text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p = r$ **and**
 $\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p = d$

shows $m \ V \ A \ p = (e, r, d)$

using *assms*

by *auto*

lemma *par-comp-result-sound*:

fixes

$m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$

assumes

$\text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m$ **and**
 $\text{profile } V \ A \ p$

shows $\text{well-formed-social-choice } A \ (m \ V \ A \ p)$

using *assms*

unfolding $\text{social-choice-result.electoral-module-def}$

by *simp*

lemma *result-presv-alts*:

fixes

$m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $V :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$

assumes

$\text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m$ **and**
 $\text{profile } V \ A \ p$

shows $(\text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p) \cup (\text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p) \cup (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) = A$

proof (*safe*)

fix $a :: 'a$

assume $a \in \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p$

moreover have

$\forall p'. \text{set-equals-partition } A \ p' \longrightarrow$
 $(\exists E \ R \ D. p' = (E, R, D) \wedge E \cup R \cup D = A)$

by *simp*

moreover have $\text{set-equals-partition } A \ (m \ V \ A \ p)$

```

    using assms
    unfolding social-choice-result.electoral-module-def
    by simp
  ultimately show  $a \in A$ 
    using UnI1 fstI
    by (metis (no-types))
next
  fix  $a :: 'a$ 
  assume  $a \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p$ 
  moreover have
     $\forall p'. \text{set-equals-partition } A \ p' \longrightarrow$ 
     $(\exists E \ R \ D. p' = (E, R, D) \wedge E \cup R \cup D = A)$ 
    by simp
  moreover have set-equals-partition  $A \ (m \ V \ A \ p)$ 
    using assms
    unfolding social-choice-result.electoral-module-def
    by simp
  ultimately show  $a \in A$ 
    using UnI1 fstI sndI subsetD sup-ge2
    by metis
next
  fix  $a :: 'a$ 
  assume  $a \in \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p$ 
  moreover have
     $\forall p'. \text{set-equals-partition } A \ p' \longrightarrow$ 
     $(\exists E \ R \ D. p' = (E, R, D) \wedge E \cup R \cup D = A)$ 
    by simp
  moreover have set-equals-partition  $A \ (m \ V \ A \ p)$ 
    using assms
    unfolding social-choice-result.electoral-module-def
    by simp
  ultimately show  $a \in A$ 
    using sndI subsetD sup-ge2
    by metis
next
  fix  $a :: 'a$ 
  assume
     $a \in A$  and
     $a \notin \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p$  and
     $a \notin \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p$ 
  moreover have
     $\forall p'. \text{set-equals-partition } A \ p' \longrightarrow$ 
     $(\exists E \ R \ D. p' = (E, R, D) \wedge E \cup R \cup D = A)$ 
    by simp
  moreover have set-equals-partition  $A \ (m \ V \ A \ p)$ 
    using assms
    unfolding social-choice-result.electoral-module-def
    by simp
  ultimately show  $a \in \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p$ 

```

```

    using fst-conv snd-conv Un-iff
    by metis
qed

lemma result-disj:
  fixes
    m :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
    A :: 'a set and
    p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    V :: 'v set
  assumes
    social-choice-result.electoral-module m and
    profile V A p
  shows
    (elect m V A p)  $\cap$  (reject m V A p) = {}  $\wedge$ 
    (elect m V A p)  $\cap$  (defer m V A p) = {}  $\wedge$ 
    (reject m V A p)  $\cap$  (defer m V A p) = {}
proof (safe)
  fix a :: 'a
  assume
    a  $\in$  elect m V A p and
    a  $\in$  reject m V A p
  moreover have well-formed-social-choice A (m V A p)
    using assms
    unfolding social-choice-result.electoral-module-def
    by metis
  ultimately show a  $\in$  {}
    using prod.exhaust-sel DiffE UnCI result-imp-rej
    by (metis (no-types))
next
  fix a :: 'a
  assume
    elect-a: a  $\in$  elect m V A p and
    defer-a: a  $\in$  defer m V A p
  have disj:
     $\forall p'. \text{disjoint3 } p' \longrightarrow$ 
     $(\exists B\ C\ D. p' = (B, C, D) \wedge B \cap C = \{\} \wedge B \cap D = \{\} \wedge C \cap D = \{\})$ 
    by simp
  have well-formed-social-choice A (m V A p)
    using assms
    unfolding social-choice-result.electoral-module-def
    by metis
  hence disjoint3 (m V A p)
    by simp
  then obtain
    e :: 'a Result  $\Rightarrow$  'a set and
    r :: 'a Result  $\Rightarrow$  'a set and
    d :: 'a Result  $\Rightarrow$  'a set
  where

```

```

m V A p =
  (e (m V A p), r (m V A p), d (m V A p)) ∧
  e (m V A p) ∩ r (m V A p) = {} ∧
  e (m V A p) ∩ d (m V A p) = {} ∧
  r (m V A p) ∩ d (m V A p) = {}
using elect-a defer-a disj
by metis
hence ((elect m V A p) ∩ (reject m V A p) = {}) ∧
  ((elect m V A p) ∩ (defer m V A p) = {}) ∧
  ((reject m V A p) ∩ (defer m V A p) = {})
using eq-snd-iff fstI
by metis
thus a ∈ {}
using elect-a defer-a disjoint-iff-not-equal
by (metis (no-types))
next
fix a :: 'a
assume
  a ∈ reject m V A p and
  a ∈ defer m V A p
moreover have well-formed-social-choice A (m V A p)
using assms
unfolding social-choice-result.electoral-module-def
by simp
ultimately show a ∈ {}
using prod.exhaust-sel DiffE UnCI result-imp-rej
by (metis (no-types))
qed

```

```

lemma elect-in-alts:
fixes
  m :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
  A :: 'a set and
  p :: ('a, 'v) Profile
assumes
  social-choice-result.electoral-module m and
  profile V A p
shows elect m V A p ⊆ A
using le-supI1 assms result-presv-alts sup-ge1
by metis

```

```

lemma reject-in-alts:
fixes
  m :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
  A :: 'a set and
  V :: 'v set and
  p :: ('a, 'v) Profile
assumes
  social-choice-result.electoral-module m and

```

profile V A p
shows *reject m V A p* $\subseteq A$
using *le-supI1 assms result-presv-alts sup-ge2*
by *fastforce*

lemma *defer-in-alts:*

fixes
m :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
A :: 'a set and
V :: 'v set and
p :: ('a, 'v) Profile
assumes
social-choice-result.electoral-module m and
profile V A p
shows *defer m V A p* $\subseteq A$
using *assms result-presv-alts*
by *fastforce*

lemma *def-presv-prof:*

fixes
m :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
A :: 'a set and
p :: ('a, 'v) Profile
assumes
social-choice-result.electoral-module m and
profile V A p
shows *let new-A = defer m V A p in profile V new-A (limit-profile new-A p)*
using *defer-in-alts limit-profile-sound assms*
by *metis*

An electoral module can never reject, defer or elect more than $|A|$ alternatives.

lemma *upper-card-bounds-for-result:*

fixes
m :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
A :: 'a set and
V :: 'v set and
p :: ('a, 'v) Profile
assumes
social-choice-result.electoral-module m and
profile V A p and
finite A
shows
upper-card-bound-for-elect: card (elect m V A p) \leq card A and
upper-card-bound-for-reject: card (reject m V A p) \leq card A and
upper-card-bound-for-defer: card (defer m V A p) \leq card A

proof –

show *card (elect m V A p) \leq card A*
using *assms card-mono elect-in-alts*

```

    by metis
next
  show  $\text{card } (\text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p) \leq \text{card } A$ 
    using assms card-mono reject-in-alts
    by metis
next
  show  $\text{card } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \leq \text{card } A$ 
    using assms card-mono defer-in-alts
    by metis
qed

lemma reject-not-elec-or-def:
  fixes
     $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$  and
     $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $V :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
     $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ 
  assumes
    social-choice-result.electoral-module m and
    profile V A p
  shows  $\text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p = A - (\text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p) - (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p)$ 
proof -
  have well-formed-social-choice A (m V A p)
    using assms
    unfolding social-choice-result.electoral-module-def
    by simp
  hence  $(\text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p) \cup (\text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p) \cup (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) = A$ 
    using assms result-presv-alts
    by simp
  moreover have
     $(\text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p) \cap (\text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p) = \{\}$   $\wedge$   $(\text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p) \cap (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) = \{\}$ 
    using assms result-disj
    by blast
  ultimately show ?thesis
    by blast
qed

lemma elec-and-def-not-rej:
  fixes
     $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$  and
     $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $V :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
     $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ 
  assumes
    social-choice-result.electoral-module m and
    profile V A p
  shows  $\text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p \cup \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p = A - (\text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p)$ 
proof -

```

have $(\text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p) \cup (\text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p) \cup (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) = A$
using *assms result-presv-alts*
by *blast*
moreover have
 $(\text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p) \cap (\text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p) = \{\}$ \wedge $(\text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p) \cap (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) = \{\}$
using *assms result-disj*
by *blast*
ultimately show *?thesis*
by *blast*
qed

lemma *defer-not-elec-or-rej:*

fixes
 $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$
assumes
social-choice-result.electoral-module m **and**
profile V A p
shows $\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p = A - (\text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p) - (\text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p)$
proof –
have *well-formed-social-choice A (m V A p)*
using *assms*
unfolding *social-choice-result.electoral-module-def*
by *simp*
hence $(\text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p) \cup (\text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p) \cup (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) = A$
using *assms result-presv-alts*
by *simp*
moreover have
 $(\text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p) \cap (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) = \{\}$ \wedge $(\text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p) \cap (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) = \{\}$
using *assms result-disj*
by *blast*
ultimately show *?thesis*
by *blast*
qed

lemma *electoral-mod-defer-elem:*

fixes
 $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $V :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ **and**
 $a :: 'a$
assumes
social-choice-result.electoral-module m **and**
profile V A p **and**
 $a \in A$ **and**


```

    a ∉ elect m V A p and
    a ∉ reject m V A p
  shows a ∈ defer m V A p
  using DiffI assms reject-not-elec-or-def
  by metis

lemma mod-contains-result-comm:
  fixes
    m :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
    n :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
    A :: 'a set and
    V :: 'v set and
    p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    a :: 'a
  assumes mod-contains-result m n V A p a
  shows mod-contains-result n m V A p a
proof (unfold mod-contains-result-def, safe)
  from assms
  show social-choice-result.electoral-module n
    unfolding mod-contains-result-def
    by safe
next
  from assms
  show social-choice-result.electoral-module m
    unfolding mod-contains-result-def
    by safe
next
  from assms
  show profile V A p
    unfolding mod-contains-result-def
    by safe
next
  from assms
  show a ∈ A
    unfolding mod-contains-result-def
    by safe
next
  assume a ∈ elect n V A p
  thus a ∈ elect m V A p
    using IntI assms electoral-mod-defer-elem empty-iff result-disj
    unfolding mod-contains-result-def
    by (metis (mono-tags, lifting))
next
  assume a ∈ reject n V A p
  thus a ∈ reject m V A p
    using IntI assms electoral-mod-defer-elem empty-iff result-disj
    unfolding mod-contains-result-def
    by (metis (mono-tags, lifting))
next

```

```

assume  $a \in \text{defer } n \ V \ A \ p$ 
thus  $a \in \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p$ 
  using IntI assms electoral-mod-defer-elem empty-iff result-disj
  unfolding mod-contains-result-def
  by (metis (mono-tags, lifting))
qed

```

```

lemma not-rej-imp-elec-or-def:
fixes
   $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$  and
   $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
   $V :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
   $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$  and
   $a :: 'a$ 
assumes
  social-choice-result.electoral-module m and
  profile V A p and
   $a \in A$  and
   $a \notin \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p$ 
shows  $a \in \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p \vee a \in \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p$ 
using assms electoral-mod-defer-elem
by metis

```

```

lemma single-elim-imp-red-def-set:
fixes
   $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$  and
   $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
   $V :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
   $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ 
assumes
  eliminates 1 m and
  card A > 1 and
  profile V A p
shows  $\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p \subset A$ 
using Diff-eq-empty-iff Diff-subset card-eq-0-iff defer-in-alts eliminates-def
  eq-iff not-one-le-zero psubsetI reject-not-elec-or-def assms
by (metis (no-types, lifting))

```

```

lemma eq-alts-in-profs-imp-eq-results:
fixes
   $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$  and
   $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
   $V :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
   $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$  and
   $q :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ 
assumes
  eq:  $\forall a \in A. \text{prof-contains-result } m \ V \ A \ p \ q \ a$  and
  mod-m: social-choice-result.electoral-module m and
  prof-p: profile V A p and

```

prof-q: profile V A q
shows $m \ V \ A \ p = m \ V \ A \ q$
proof –
have *elected-in-A: elect m V A q \subseteq A*
using *elect-in-alts mod-m prof-q*
by *metis*
have *rejected-in-A: reject m V A q \subseteq A*
using *reject-in-alts mod-m prof-q*
by *metis*
have *deferred-in-A: defer m V A q \subseteq A*
using *defer-in-alts mod-m prof-q*
by *metis*
have $\forall a \in \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p. a \in \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ q$
using *elect-in-alts eq prof-contains-result-def mod-m prof-p in-mono*
by *metis*
moreover have $\forall a \in \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ q. a \in \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p$
proof
fix $a :: 'a$
assume *q-elect-a: $a \in \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ q$*
hence $a \in A$
using *elected-in-A*
by *blast*
moreover have $a \notin \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ q$
using *q-elect-a prof-q mod-m result-disj*
by *blast*
moreover have $a \notin \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ q$
using *q-elect-a disjoint-iff-not-equal prof-q mod-m result-disj*
by *metis*
ultimately show $a \in \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p$
using *electoral-mod-defer-elem eq prof-contains-result-def*
by *fastforce*
qed
moreover have $\forall a \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p. a \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ q$
using *reject-in-alts eq prof-contains-result-def mod-m prof-p*
by *fastforce*
moreover have $\forall a \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ q. a \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p$
proof
fix $a :: 'a$
assume *q-rejects-a: $a \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ q$*
hence $a \in A$
using *rejected-in-A*
by *blast*
moreover have $a \notin \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ q$
using *q-rejects-a prof-q mod-m result-disj*
by *blast*
moreover have $a \notin \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ q$
using *q-rejects-a disjoint-iff-not-equal prof-q mod-m result-disj*
by *metis*
ultimately show $a \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p$

```

    using electoral-mod-defer-elem eq prof-contains-result-def
    by fastforce
qed
moreover have  $\forall a \in \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p. a \in \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ q$ 
    using defer-in-alts eq prof-contains-result-def mod-m prof-p
    by fastforce
moreover have  $\forall a \in \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ q. a \in \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p$ 
proof
  fix a :: 'a
  assume q-defers-a:  $a \in \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ q$ 
  moreover have  $a \in A$ 
    using q-defers-a deferred-in-A
    by blast
  moreover have  $a \notin \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ q$ 
    using q-defers-a prof-q mod-m result-disj
    by blast
  moreover have  $a \notin \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ q$ 
    using q-defers-a prof-q disjoint-iff-not-equal mod-m result-disj
    by metis
  ultimately show  $a \in \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p$ 
    using electoral-mod-defer-elem eq prof-contains-result-def
    by fastforce
qed
ultimately show ?thesis
  using prod.collapse subsetI subset-antisym
  by (metis (no-types))
qed

lemma eq-def-and-elect-imp-eq:
  fixes
    m :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
    n :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
    A :: 'a set and
    V :: 'v set and
    p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    q :: ('a, 'v) Profile
  assumes
    mod-m: social-choice-result.electoral-module m and
    mod-n: social-choice-result.electoral-module n and
    fin-p: profile V A p and
    fin-q: profile V A q and
    elec-eq:  $\text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p = \text{elect } n \ V \ A \ q$  and
    def-eq:  $\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p = \text{defer } n \ V \ A \ q$ 
  shows  $m \ V \ A \ p = n \ V \ A \ q$ 
proof -
  have  $\text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p = A - ((\text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p) \cup (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p))$ 
    using mod-m fin-p elect-rej-def-combination result-imp-rej
    unfolding social-choice-result.electoral-module-def
    by metis

```

```

moreover have reject  $n \ V \ A \ q = A - ((elect \ n \ V \ A \ q) \cup (defer \ n \ V \ A \ q))$ 
using mod- $n$  fin- $q$  elect-rej-def-combination result-imp-rej
unfolding social-choice-result.electoral-module-def
by metis
ultimately show ?thesis
using elec-eq def-eq prod-eqI
by metis
qed

```

3.1.8 Non-Blocking

An electoral module is non-blocking iff this module never rejects all alternatives.

definition *non-blocking* :: ($'a$, $'v$, $'a$ Result) Electoral-Module \Rightarrow bool **where**
non-blocking $m \equiv$
 social-choice-result.electoral-module $m \wedge$
 $(\forall \ A \ V \ p. ((A \neq \{\} \wedge \text{finite } A \wedge \text{profile } V \ A \ p) \longrightarrow \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p \neq A))$

3.1.9 Electing

An electoral module is electing iff it always elects at least one alternative.

definition *electing* :: ($'a$, $'v$, $'a$ Result) Electoral-Module \Rightarrow bool **where**
electing $m \equiv$
 social-choice-result.electoral-module $m \wedge$
 $(\forall \ A \ V \ p. (A \neq \{\} \wedge \text{finite } A \wedge \text{profile } V \ A \ p) \longrightarrow \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p \neq \{\})$

lemma *electing-for-only-alt*:

```

fixes
   $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$  and
   $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
   $V :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
   $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ 
assumes
  one-alt:  $\text{card } A = 1$  and
  electing: electing  $m$  and
  prof:  $\text{profile } V \ A \ p$ 
shows  $\text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p = A$ 
proof (safe)
  fix  $a :: 'a$ 
  assume elect-a:  $a \in \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p$ 
  have social-choice-result.electoral-module  $m \longrightarrow \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p \subseteq A$ 
  using prof elect-in-alts
  by blast
  hence  $\text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p \subseteq A$ 
  using electing
  unfolding electing-def
  by metis
  thus  $a \in A$ 

```

```

    using elect-a
    by blast
next
  fix a :: 'a
  assume a ∈ A
  thus a ∈ elect m V A p
    using electing prof one-alt One-nat-def Suc-leI card-seteq card-gt-0-iff
      elect-in-alts infinite-super lessI
    unfolding electing-def
    by metis
qed

theorem electing-imp-non-blocking:
  fixes m :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module
  assumes electing m
  shows non-blocking m
proof (unfold non-blocking-def, safe)
  from assms
  show social-choice-result.electoral-module m
    unfolding electing-def
    by simp
next
  fix
    A :: 'a set and
    V :: 'v set and
    p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    a :: 'a
  assume
    profile V A p and
    finite A and
    reject m V A p = A and
    a ∈ A
  moreover have
    social-choice-result.electoral-module m ∧
    (∀ A V q. A ≠ {} ∧ finite A ∧ profile V A q ⟶ elect m V A q ≠ {})
  using assms
  unfolding electing-def
  by metis
  ultimately show a ∈ {}
    using Diff-cancel Un-empty elec-and-def-not-rej
    by metis
qed

```

3.1.10 Properties

An electoral module is non-electing iff it never elects an alternative.

definition *non-electing* :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module \Rightarrow bool **where**
non-electing m \equiv
 social-choice-result.electoral-module m \wedge

$$(\forall A V p. \text{profile } V A p \longrightarrow \text{elect } m V A p = \{\})$$

lemma *single-rej-decr-def-card*:

fixes

$m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**

$A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**

$V :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**

$p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$

assumes

rejecting: *rejects 1 m* **and**

non-electing: *non-electing m* **and**

f-prof: *finite-profile V A p*

shows $\text{card } (\text{defer } m V A p) = \text{card } A - 1$

proof –

have *no-elect*:

$\text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m \wedge (\forall V A q. \text{profile } V A q \longrightarrow \text{elect } m V A q = \{\})$

using *non-electing*

unfolding *non-electing-def*

by (*metis (no-types)*)

hence $\text{reject } m V A p \subseteq A$

using *f-prof reject-in-alts*

by *metis*

moreover have $A = A - \text{elect } m V A p$

using *no-elect f-prof*

by *blast*

ultimately show *?thesis*

using *f-prof no-elect rejecting card-Diff-subset card-gt-0-iff*

defer-not-elec-or-rej less-one order-less-imp-le Suc-leI

bot.extremum-unique card.empty diff-is-0-eq' One-nat-def

unfolding *rejects-def*

by *metis*

qed

lemma *single-elim-decr-def-card-2*:

fixes

$m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**

$A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**

$V :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**

$p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$

assumes

eliminating: *eliminates 1 m* **and**

non-electing: *non-electing m* **and**

not-empty: $\text{card } A > 1$ **and**

prof-p: *profile V A p*

shows $\text{card } (\text{defer } m V A p) = \text{card } A - 1$

proof –

have *no-elect*:

$\text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m \wedge (\forall A V q. \text{profile } V A q \longrightarrow \text{elect } m$

```

V A q = {}
  using non-electing
  unfolding non-electing-def
  by (metis (no-types))
hence reject m V A p  $\subseteq$  A
  using prof-p reject-in-alts
  by metis
moreover have A = A - elect m V A p
  using no-elect prof-p
  by blast
ultimately show ?thesis
  using prof-p not-empty no-elect eliminating card-ge-0-finite
    card-Diff-subset defer-not-elec-or-rej zero-less-one
  unfolding eliminates-def
  by (metis (no-types, lifting))
qed

```

An electoral module is defer-deciding iff this module chooses exactly 1 alternative to defer and rejects any other alternative. Note that ‘rejects n-1 m’ can be omitted due to the well-formedness property.

definition *defer-deciding* :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module \Rightarrow bool **where**
defer-deciding m \equiv
 social-choice-result.electoral-module m \wedge non-electing m \wedge defers 1 m

An electoral module decrements iff this module rejects at least one alternative whenever possible ($|A| > 1$).

definition *decrementing* :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module \Rightarrow bool **where**
decrementing m \equiv
 social-choice-result.electoral-module m \wedge
 $(\forall A V p a. \text{profile } V A p \wedge \text{card } A > 1 \longrightarrow \text{card } (\text{reject } m V A p) \geq 1)$

definition *defer-condorcet-consistency* :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module \Rightarrow bool **where**
defer-condorcet-consistency m \equiv
 social-choice-result.electoral-module m \wedge
 $(\forall A V p a. \text{condorcet-winner } V A p a \longrightarrow$
 $(m V A p = (\{\}, A - (\text{defer } m V A p), \{d \in A. \text{condorcet-winner } V A p d\})))$

definition *condorcet-compatibility* :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module \Rightarrow bool **where**
condorcet-compatibility m \equiv
 social-choice-result.electoral-module m \wedge
 $(\forall A V p a. \text{condorcet-winner } V A p a \longrightarrow$
 $(a \notin \text{reject } m V A p \wedge$
 $(\forall b. \neg \text{condorcet-winner } V A p b \longrightarrow b \notin \text{elect } m V A p) \wedge$
 $(a \in \text{elect } m V A p \longrightarrow$
 $(\forall b \in A. \neg \text{condorcet-winner } V A p b \longrightarrow b \in \text{reject } m V A p))))$

An electoral module is defer-monotone iff, when a deferred alternative is

lifted, this alternative remains deferred.

definition *defer-monotonicity* :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module \Rightarrow bool **where**
defer-monotonicity m \equiv
social-choice-result.electoral-module m \wedge
 $(\forall A V p q a.$
 $(a \in \text{defer } m \ V A \ p \wedge \text{lifted } V A \ p \ q \ a) \longrightarrow a \in \text{defer } m \ V A \ q)$

An electoral module is defer-lift-invariant iff lifting a deferred alternative does not affect the outcome.

definition *defer-lift-invariance* :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module \Rightarrow bool **where**
defer-lift-invariance m \equiv
social-choice-result.electoral-module m \wedge
 $(\forall A V p q a. (a \in (\text{defer } m \ V A \ p) \wedge \text{lifted } V A \ p \ q \ a) \longrightarrow m \ V A \ p = m \ V A \ q)$

Two electoral modules are disjoint-compatible if they only make decisions over disjoint sets of alternatives. Electoral modules reject alternatives for which they make no decision.

definition *disjoint-compatibility* :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module \Rightarrow
('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module \Rightarrow bool **where**
disjoint-compatibility m n \equiv
social-choice-result.electoral-module m \wedge *social-choice-result.electoral-module* n
 \wedge
 $(\forall V.$
 $(\forall A.$
 $(\exists B \subseteq A.$
 $(\forall a \in B. \text{indep-of-alt } m \ V A \ a \wedge$
 $(\forall p. \text{profile } V A \ p \longrightarrow a \in \text{reject } m \ V A \ p)) \wedge$
 $(\forall a \in A - B. \text{indep-of-alt } n \ V A \ a \wedge$
 $(\forall p. \text{profile } V A \ p \longrightarrow a \in \text{reject } n \ V A \ p))))))$

Lifting an elected alternative a from an invariant-monotone electoral module either does not change the elect set, or makes a the only elected alternative.

definition *invariant-monotonicity* :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module \Rightarrow bool **where**
invariant-monotonicity m \equiv
social-choice-result.electoral-module m \wedge
 $(\forall A V p q a. (a \in \text{elect } m \ V A \ p \wedge \text{lifted } V A \ p \ q \ a) \longrightarrow$
 $(\text{elect } m \ V A \ q = \text{elect } m \ V A \ p \vee \text{elect } m \ V A \ q = \{a\}))$

Lifting a deferred alternative a from a defer-invariant-monotone electoral module either does not change the defer set, or makes a the only deferred alternative.

definition *defer-invariant-monotonicity* :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module \Rightarrow bool **where**
defer-invariant-monotonicity m \equiv
social-choice-result.electoral-module m \wedge *non-electing* m \wedge

$$(\forall A V p q a. (a \in \text{defer } m \ V A \ p \wedge \text{lifted } V A \ p \ q \ a) \longrightarrow \\ (\text{defer } m \ V A \ q = \text{defer } m \ V A \ p \vee \text{defer } m \ V A \ q = \{a\}))$$

3.1.11 Inference Rules

lemma *ccomp-and-dd-imp-def-only-winner*:

fixes

$m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**

$A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**

$V :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**

$p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ **and**

$a :: 'a$

assumes

ccomp: *condorcet-compatibility* m **and**

dd: *defer-deciding* m **and**

winner: *condorcet-winner* $V \ A \ p \ a$

shows $\text{defer } m \ V A \ p = \{a\}$

proof (*rule ccontr*)

assume *not-w*: $\text{defer } m \ V A \ p \neq \{a\}$

have *def-one*: *defers* 1 m

using *dd*

unfolding *defer-deciding-def*

by *metis*

hence *c-win*: *finite-profile* $V \ A \ p \wedge a \in A \wedge (\forall b \in A - \{a\}. \text{wins } V \ a \ p \ b)$

using *winner*

by *auto*

hence *card* ($\text{defer } m \ V A \ p$) = 1

using *Suc-leI card-gt-0-iff def-one equals0D*

unfolding *One-nat-def defers-def*

by *metis*

hence $\exists b \in A. \text{defer } m \ V A \ p = \{b\}$

using *card-1-singletonE dd defer-in-alts insert-subset c-win*

unfolding *defer-deciding-def*

by *metis*

hence $\exists b \in A. b \neq a \wedge \text{defer } m \ V A \ p = \{b\}$

using *not-w*

by *metis*

hence *not-in-defer*: $a \notin \text{defer } m \ V A \ p$

by *auto*

have *non-electing* m

using *dd*

unfolding *defer-deciding-def*

by *simp*

hence $a \notin \text{elect } m \ V A \ p$

using *c-win equals0D*

unfolding *non-electing-def*

by *simp*

hence $a \in \text{reject } m \ V A \ p$

using *not-in-defer ccomp c-win electoral-mod-defer-elem*

```

    unfolding condorcet-compatibility-def
    by metis
  moreover have  $a \notin \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p$ 
    using ccomp c-win winner
    unfolding condorcet-compatibility-def
    by simp
  ultimately show False
    by simp
qed

theorem ccomp-and-dd-imp-dcc[simp]:
  fixes  $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ 
  assumes
    ccomp: condorcet-compatibility  $m$  and
    dd: defer-deciding  $m$ 
  shows defer-condorcet-consistency  $m$ 
proof (unfold defer-condorcet-consistency-def, simp, safe)
  show social-choice-result.electoral-module  $m$ 
    using dd
    unfolding defer-deciding-def
    by metis
next
fix
   $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
   $V :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
   $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$  and
   $a :: 'a$ 
  assume
    prof-A: profile  $V \ A \ p$  and
    a-in-A:  $a \in A$  and
    fin-A: finite  $A$  and
    fin-V: finite  $V$  and
    c-winner:
       $\forall x \in A - \{a\}. (finite \ V \longrightarrow card \{v \in V. (a, x) \in p \ v\} < card \{v \in V. (x, a) \in p \ v\})$ 
 $\wedge \text{finite } V$ 
  hence winner: condorcet-winner  $V \ A \ p \ a$ 
    by simp
  hence elect-empty: elect  $m \ V \ A \ p = \{\}$ 
    using dd
    unfolding defer-deciding-def non-electing-def
    by simp
  have cond-winner-a:  $\{a\} = \{c \in A. \text{condorcet-winner } V \ A \ p \ c\}$ 
    using cond-winner-unique winner
    by metis
  have defer-a: defer  $m \ V \ A \ p = \{a\}$ 
    using winner dd ccomp ccomp-and-dd-imp-def-only-winner winner
    by simp
  hence reject  $m \ V \ A \ p = A - \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p$ 

```

```

using Diff-empty dd reject-not-elec-or-def winner elect-empty
unfolding defer-deciding-def
by fastforce
hence  $m \ V \ A \ p = (\{\}, A - \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p, \{a\})$ 
using elect-empty defer-a elect-rej-def-combination
by metis
hence  $m \ V \ A \ p = (\{\}, A - \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p, \{c \in A. \text{condorcet-winner } V \ A \ p \ c\})$ 
using cond-winner-a
by simp
thus  $m \ V \ A \ p =$ 

$$(\{\}, A - \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p,$$


$$\{d \in A. \forall x \in A - \{d\}. \text{card } \{v \in V. (d, x) \in p \ v\} < \text{card } \{v \in V. (x,$$


$$d) \in p \ v\}\})$$

using fin-A fin-V prof-A winner Collect-cong
by simp
qed

```

If m and n are disjoint compatible, so are n and m .

```

theorem disj-compat-comm[simp]:
fixes
 $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$  and
 $n :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ 
assumes disjoint-compatibility m n
shows disjoint-compatibility n m
proof (unfold disjoint-compatibility-def, safe)
show social-choice-result.electoral-module m
using assms
unfolding disjoint-compatibility-def
by simp
next
show social-choice-result.electoral-module n
using assms
unfolding disjoint-compatibility-def
by simp
next
fix
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
 $V :: 'v \text{ set}$ 
obtain  $B$  where
 $B \subseteq A \wedge$ 
 $(\forall a \in B.$ 
 $\text{indep-of-alt } m \ V \ A \ a \wedge (\forall p. \text{profile } V \ A \ p \longrightarrow a \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p)) \wedge$ 
 $(\forall a \in A - B.$ 
 $\text{indep-of-alt } n \ V \ A \ a \wedge (\forall p. \text{profile } V \ A \ p \longrightarrow a \in \text{reject } n \ V \ A \ p))$ 
using assms
unfolding disjoint-compatibility-def
by metis
hence
 $\exists B \subseteq A.$ 

```

$(\forall a \in A - B.$
 $\text{indep-of-alt } n \ V \ A \ a \wedge (\forall p. \text{profile } V \ A \ p \longrightarrow a \in \text{reject } n \ V \ A \ p)) \wedge$
 $(\forall a \in B.$
 $\text{indep-of-alt } m \ V \ A \ a \wedge (\forall p. \text{profile } V \ A \ p \longrightarrow a \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p))$
by *auto*
hence $\exists B \subseteq A.$
 $(\forall a \in A - B.$
 $\text{indep-of-alt } n \ V \ A \ a \wedge (\forall p. \text{profile } V \ A \ p \longrightarrow a \in \text{reject } n \ V \ A \ p)) \wedge$
 $(\forall a \in A - (A - B).$
 $\text{indep-of-alt } m \ V \ A \ a \wedge (\forall p. \text{profile } V \ A \ p \longrightarrow a \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p))$
using *double-diff order-refl*
by *metis*
thus $\exists B \subseteq A.$
 $(\forall a \in B.$
 $\text{indep-of-alt } n \ V \ A \ a \wedge (\forall p. \text{profile } V \ A \ p \longrightarrow a \in \text{reject } n \ V \ A \ p)) \wedge$
 $(\forall a \in A - B.$
 $\text{indep-of-alt } m \ V \ A \ a \wedge (\forall p. \text{profile } V \ A \ p \longrightarrow a \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p))$
by *fastforce*
qed

Every electoral module which is defer-lift-invariant is also defer-monotone.

theorem *dl-inv-imp-def-mono[simp]*:
fixes $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$
assumes *defer-lift-invariance* m
shows *defer-monotonicity* m
using *assms*
unfolding *defer-monotonicity-def defer-lift-invariance-def*
by *metis*

3.1.12 Social Choice Properties

Condorcet Consistency

definition *condorcet-consistency* $:: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$
where

$\text{condorcet-consistency } m \equiv$
 $\text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m \wedge$
 $(\forall A \ V \ p \ a. \text{condorcet-winner } V \ A \ p \ a \longrightarrow$
 $(m \ V \ A \ p = (\{e \in A. \text{condorcet-winner } V \ A \ p \ e\}, A - (\text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p), \{\})))$

lemma *condorcet-consistency'*:
fixes $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$
shows *condorcet-consistency* $m =$
 $(\text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m \wedge$
 $(\forall A \ V \ p \ a. \text{condorcet-winner } V \ A \ p \ a \longrightarrow$
 $(m \ V \ A \ p = (\{a\}, A - (\text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p), \{\}))))$

proof (*safe*)
assume *condorcet-consistency* m
thus *social-choice-result.electoral-module* m
unfolding *condorcet-consistency-def*

```

    by metis
next
fix
  A :: 'a set and
  V :: 'v set and
  p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
  a :: 'a
assume
  condorcet-consistency m and
  condorcet-winner V A p a
thus m V A p = ({a}, A - elect m V A p, {})
  using cond-winner-unique
  unfolding condorcet-consistency-def
  by (metis (mono-tags, lifting))
next
assume
  social-choice-result.electoral-module m and
   $\forall A V p a. \text{condorcet-winner } V A p a \longrightarrow m V A p = (\{a\}, A - \text{elect } m V A p, \{a\})$ 
p, {}
moreover have
   $\forall A V p a. \text{condorcet-winner } V A p (a::'a) \longrightarrow$ 
   $\{b \in A. \text{condorcet-winner } V A p b\} = \{a\}$ 
  using cond-winner-unique
  by (metis (full-types))
ultimately show condorcet-consistency m
  unfolding condorcet-consistency-def
  by (metis (mono-tags, lifting))
qed

lemma condorcet-consistency'':
  fixes m :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module
  shows condorcet-consistency m =
    (social-choice-result.electoral-module m  $\wedge$ 
     ( $\forall A V p a. \text{condorcet-winner } V A p a \longrightarrow m V A p = (\{a\}, A - \{a\}, \{a\})$ ))
proof (simp only: condorcet-consistency', safe)
  fix
    A :: 'a set and
    V :: 'v set and
    p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    a :: 'a
  assume
    e-mod: social-choice-result.electoral-module m and
    cc:  $\forall A V p a'. \text{condorcet-winner } V A p a' \longrightarrow$ 
     $m V A p = (\{a'\}, A - \text{elect } m V A p, \{a'\})$  and
    c-win: condorcet-winner V A p a
  show m V A p = ({a}, A - {a}, {})
    using cc c-win fst-conv
    by metis

```

```

next
  fix
     $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $V :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
     $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$  and
     $a :: 'a$ 
  assume
     $e\text{-mod} :: \text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m$  and
     $cc :: \forall A V p a'. \text{condorcet-winner } V A p a' \longrightarrow m V A p = (\{a'\}, A - \{a'\}, \{\})$ 
  and
     $c\text{-win} :: \text{condorcet-winner } V A p a$ 
  show  $m V A p = (\{a\}, A - \text{elect } m V A p, \{\})$ 
  using  $cc \ c\text{-win} \ fst\text{-conv}$ 
  by metis
qed

```

(Weak) Monotonicity

An electoral module is monotone iff when an elected alternative is lifted, this alternative remains elected.

```

definition monotonicity ::  $('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$  where
  monotonicity  $m \equiv$ 
     $\text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m \wedge$ 
     $(\forall A V p q a. a \in \text{elect } m V A p \wedge \text{lifted } V A p q a \longrightarrow a \in \text{elect } m V A q)$ 
end

```

3.2 Electoral Module on Election Quotients

```

theory Quotient-Module
  imports Quotients/Relation-Quotients
    Electoral-Module
begin

lemma invariance-is-congruence:
  fixes
     $m :: ('a, 'v, 'r) \text{ Electoral-Module}$  and
     $r :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election rel}$ 
  shows  $(\text{satisfies } (\text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} m) (\text{Invariance } r)) = (\text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} m \text{ respects } r)$ 
  unfolding satisfies.simps congruent-def
  by blast

lemma invariance-is-congruence':
  fixes
     $f :: 'x \Rightarrow 'y$  and
     $r :: 'x \text{ rel}$ 

```

```

shows (satisfies  $f$  (Invariance  $r$ )) = ( $f$  respects  $r$ )
unfolding satisfies.simps congruent-def
by blast

theorem pass-to-election-quotient:
  fixes
     $m :: ('a, 'v, 'r)$  Electoral-Module and
     $r :: ('a, 'v)$  Election rel and
     $X :: ('a, 'v)$  Election set
  assumes
    equiv  $X$   $r$  and
    satisfies ( $\text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}}$   $m$ ) (Invariance  $r$ )
  shows  $\forall A \in X // r. \forall E \in A. \pi_Q (\text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} m) A = \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} m E$ 
  using invariance-is-congruence pass-to-quotient assms
  by blast

end

```

3.3 Evaluation Function

```

theory Evaluation-Function
  imports Social-Choice-Types/Profile
begin

```

This is the evaluation function. From a set of currently eligible alternatives, the evaluation function computes a numerical value that is then to be used for further (s)election, e.g., by the elimination module.

3.3.1 Definition

```

type-synonym ( $'a, 'v$ ) Evaluation-Function =
   $'v \text{ set} \Rightarrow 'a \Rightarrow 'a \text{ set} \Rightarrow ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile} \Rightarrow \text{enat}$ 

```

3.3.2 Property

An Evaluation function is a Condorcet-rating iff the following holds: If a Condorcet Winner w exists, w and only w has the highest value.

```

definition condorcet-rating :: ( $'a, 'v$ ) Evaluation-Function  $\Rightarrow$  bool where
  condorcet-rating  $f \equiv$ 
     $\forall A V p w . \text{condorcet-winner } V A p w \longrightarrow$ 
       $(\forall l \in A . l \neq w \longrightarrow f V l A p < f V w A p)$ 

```

An Evaluation function is dependent only on the participating voters iff it is invariant under profile changes that only impact non-voters.

definition *only-voters-count* :: ('a, 'v) *Evaluation-Function* \Rightarrow bool **where**

only-voters-count $f \equiv$
 $\forall A V p p'. (\forall v \in V. p v = p' v) \longrightarrow$
 $(\forall a \in A. f V a A p = f V a A p')$

3.3.3 Theorems

If e is Condorcet-rating, the following holds: If a Condorcet winner w exists, w has the maximum evaluation value.

theorem *cond-winner-imp-max-eval-val*:

fixes

$e :: ('a, 'v)$ *Evaluation-Function* **and**
 $A :: 'a$ *set* **and**
 $V :: 'v$ *set* **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v)$ *Profile* **and**
 $a :: 'a$

assumes

rating: *condorcet-rating* e **and**
f-prof: *finite-profile* $V A p$ **and**
winner: *condorcet-winner* $V A p a$

shows $e V a A p = \text{Max } \{e V b A p \mid b. b \in A\}$

proof –

let $?set = \{e V b A p \mid b. b \in A\}$ **and**
 $?eMax = \text{Max } \{e V b A p \mid b. b \in A\}$ **and**
 $?eW = e V a A p$

have $?eW \in ?set$

using *CollectI condorcet-winner.simps winner*
by (*metis (mono-tags, lifting)*)

moreover have $\forall e \in ?set. e \leq ?eW$

proof (*safe*)

fix $b :: 'a$

assume $b \in A$

moreover have $\forall n n'. (n::nat) = n' \longrightarrow n \leq n'$

by *simp*

ultimately show $e V b A p \leq e V a A p$

using *less-imp-le rating winner order-refl*

unfolding *condorcet-rating-def*

by *metis*

qed

ultimately have $?eW \in ?set \wedge (\forall e \in ?set. e \leq ?eW)$

by *blast*

moreover have *finite* $?set$

using *f-prof*

by *simp*

moreover have $?set \neq \{\}$

using *condorcet-winner.simps winner*

by *fastforce*

ultimately show *?thesis*

using *Max-eq-iff*

by (*metis* (*no-types*, *lifting*))
qed

If e is Condorcet-rating, the following holds: If a Condorcet Winner w exists, a non-Condorcet winner has a value lower than the maximum evaluation value.

theorem *non-cond-winner-not-max-eval*:

fixes

$e :: ('a, 'v)$ *Evaluation-Function* **and**
 $A :: 'a$ *set* **and**
 $V :: 'v$ *set* **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v)$ *Profile* **and**
 $a :: 'a$ **and**
 $b :: 'a$

assumes

rating: *condorcet-rating* e **and**
f-prof: *finite-profile* V A p **and**
winner: *condorcet-winner* V A p a **and**
lin-A: $b \in A$ **and**
loser: $a \neq b$

shows e V b A p $<$ $Max \{e$ V c A p $\mid c. c \in A\}$

proof –

have e V b A p $<$ e V a A p
using *lin-A* *loser* *rating* *winner*
unfolding *condorcet-rating-def*
by *metis*

also have e V a A p $=$ $Max \{e$ V c A p $\mid c. c \in A\}$
using *cond-winner-imp-max-eval-val* *f-prof* *rating* *winner*
by *fastforce*

finally show *?thesis*

by *simp*

qed

end

3.4 Elimination Module

theory *Elimination-Module*

imports *Evaluation-Function*

Electoral-Module

begin

This is the elimination module. It rejects a set of alternatives only if these are not all alternatives. The alternatives potentially to be rejected are put in a so-called elimination set. These are all alternatives that score below a

preset threshold value that depends on the specific voting rule.

3.4.1 General Definitions

type-synonym *Threshold-Value* = *enat*

type-synonym *Threshold-Relation* = *enat* \Rightarrow *enat* \Rightarrow *bool*

type-synonym (*'a*, *'v*) *Electoral-Set* = *'v set* \Rightarrow *'a set* \Rightarrow (*'a*, *'v*) *Profile* \Rightarrow *'a set*

fun *elimination-set* :: (*'a*, *'v*) *Evaluation-Function* \Rightarrow *Threshold-Value* \Rightarrow
Threshold-Relation \Rightarrow (*'a*, *'v*) *Electoral-Set* **where**
elimination-set *e t r V A p* = $\{a \in A . r (e \ V \ a \ A \ p) \ t\}$

fun *average* :: (*'a*, *'v*) *Evaluation-Function* \Rightarrow *'v set* \Rightarrow
'a set \Rightarrow (*'a*, *'v*) *Profile* \Rightarrow *Threshold-Value* **where**
average *e V A p* = (let *sum* = $(\sum x \in A. e \ V \ x \ A \ p)$ in
 (if (*sum* = *infinity*) then (*infinity*)
 else ((*the-enat sum*) div (*card A*))))

3.4.2 Social Choice Definitions

fun *elimination-module* :: (*'a*, *'v*) *Evaluation-Function* \Rightarrow
Threshold-Value \Rightarrow *Threshold-Relation* \Rightarrow (*'a*, *'v*, *'a Result*) *Electoral-Module*
where
elimination-module *e t r V A p* =
 (if (*elimination-set* *e t r V A p*) \neq *A*
 then ($\{\}$, (*elimination-set* *e t r V A p*), *A* - (*elimination-set* *e t r V A p*))
 else ($\{\}$, $\{\}$, *A*))

3.4.3 Common Social Choice Eliminators

fun *less-eliminator* :: (*'a*, *'v*) *Evaluation-Function* \Rightarrow
Threshold-Value \Rightarrow (*'a*, *'v*, *'a Result*) *Electoral-Module* **where**
less-eliminator *e t V A p* = *elimination-module* *e t* (*<*) *V A p*

fun *max-eliminator* ::
 (*'a*, *'v*) *Evaluation-Function* \Rightarrow (*'a*, *'v*, *'a Result*) *Electoral-Module* **where**
max-eliminator *e V A p* =
less-eliminator *e* (*Max* $\{e \ V \ x \ A \ p \mid x. x \in A\}$) *V A p*
find-theorems *max-eliminator*

fun *leq-eliminator* ::
 (*'a*, *'v*) *Evaluation-Function* \Rightarrow *Threshold-Value* \Rightarrow
 (*'a*, *'v*, *'a Result*) *Electoral-Module* **where**
leq-eliminator *e t V A p* = *elimination-module* *e t* (*\leq*) *V A p*

fun *min-eliminator* ::
 (*'a*, *'v*) *Evaluation-Function* \Rightarrow (*'a*, *'v*, *'a Result*) *Electoral-Module* **where**

min-eliminator $e \ V \ A \ p =$
leq-eliminator $e \ (\text{Min } \{e \ V \ x \ A \ p \mid x. x \in A\}) \ V \ A \ p$

fun *less-average-eliminator* ::
 ($'a, 'v$) *Evaluation-Function* \Rightarrow ($'a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}$) *Electoral-Module* **where**
less-average-eliminator $e \ V \ A \ p = \text{less-eliminator } e \ (\text{average } e \ V \ A \ p) \ V \ A \ p$

fun *leq-average-eliminator* ::
 ($'a, 'v$) *Evaluation-Function* \Rightarrow ($'a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}$) *Electoral-Module* **where**
leq-average-eliminator $e \ V \ A \ p = \text{leq-eliminator } e \ (\text{average } e \ V \ A \ p) \ V \ A \ p$

3.4.4 Soundness

lemma *elim-mod-sound[simp]*:
fixes
 $e :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Evaluation-Function}$ **and**
 $t :: \text{Threshold-Value}$ **and**
 $r :: \text{Threshold-Relation}$
shows *social-choice-result.electoral-module* (*elimination-module* $e \ t \ r$)
unfolding *social-choice-result.electoral-module-def*
by *auto*

lemma *less-elim-sound[simp]*:
fixes
 $e :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Evaluation-Function}$ **and**
 $t :: \text{Threshold-Value}$
shows *social-choice-result.electoral-module* (*less-eliminator* $e \ t$)
unfolding *social-choice-result.electoral-module-def*
by *auto*

lemma *leq-elim-sound[simp]*:
fixes
 $e :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Evaluation-Function}$ **and**
 $t :: \text{Threshold-Value}$
shows *social-choice-result.electoral-module* (*leq-eliminator* $e \ t$)
unfolding *social-choice-result.electoral-module-def*
by *auto*

lemma *max-elim-sound[simp]*:
fixes $e :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Evaluation-Function}$
shows *social-choice-result.electoral-module* (*max-eliminator* e)
unfolding *social-choice-result.electoral-module-def*
by *auto*

lemma *min-elim-sound[simp]*:
fixes $e :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Evaluation-Function}$
shows *social-choice-result.electoral-module* (*min-eliminator* e)
unfolding *social-choice-result.electoral-module-def*
by *auto*

```

lemma less-avg-elim-sound[simp]:
  fixes  $e :: ('a, 'v)$  Evaluation-Function
  shows social-choice-result.electoral-module (less-average-eliminator  $e$ )
  unfolding social-choice-result.electoral-module-def
  by auto

```

```

lemma leq-avg-elim-sound[simp]:
  fixes  $e :: ('a, 'v)$  Evaluation-Function
  shows social-choice-result.electoral-module (leq-average-eliminator  $e$ )
  unfolding social-choice-result.electoral-module-def
  by auto

```

3.4.5 Only participating voters impact the result

```

lemma elim-mod-only-voters[simp]:
  fixes
     $e :: ('a, 'v)$  Evaluation-Function and
     $t :: \text{Threshold-Value}$  and
     $r :: \text{Threshold-Relation}$ 
  assumes only-voters-count  $e$ 
  shows only-voters-vote (elimination-module  $e$   $t$   $r$ )
proof (unfold only-voters-vote-def elimination-module.simps, safe)
  fix
     $A :: 'a$  set and
     $V :: 'v$  set and
     $p :: ('a, 'v)$  Profile and
     $p' :: ('a, 'v)$  Profile
  assume  $\forall v \in V. p\ v = p'\ v$ 
  hence  $\forall a \in A. (e\ V\ a\ A\ p) = (e\ V\ a\ A\ p')$ 
  using assms
  unfolding only-voters-count-def
  by simp
  hence  $\{a \in A. r\ (e\ V\ a\ A\ p)\ t\} = \{a \in A. r\ (e\ V\ a\ A\ p')\ t\}$ 
  by metis
  hence elimination-set  $e\ t\ r\ V\ A\ p = \text{elimination-set}\ e\ t\ r\ V\ A\ p'$ 
  unfolding elimination-set.simps
  by presburger
  thus (if elimination-set  $e\ t\ r\ V\ A\ p \neq A$ 
    then  $(\{\}, \text{elimination-set}\ e\ t\ r\ V\ A\ p, A - \text{elimination-set}\ e\ t\ r\ V\ A\ p)$  else
 $(\{\}, \{\}, A)$ ) =
    (if elimination-set  $e\ t\ r\ V\ A\ p' \neq A$ 
      then  $(\{\}, \text{elimination-set}\ e\ t\ r\ V\ A\ p', A - \text{elimination-set}\ e\ t\ r\ V\ A\ p')$  else
 $(\{\}, \{\}, A)$ )
  by presburger
qed

```

```

lemma less-elim-only-voters[simp]:
  fixes

```

```

    e :: ('a, 'v) Evaluation-Function and
    t :: Threshold-Value
  assumes only-voters-count e
  shows only-voters-vote (less-eliminator e t)
  unfolding less-eliminator.simps
  using only-voters-vote-def elim-mod-only-voters assms
  by simp

lemma leq-elim-only-voters[simp]:
  fixes
    e :: ('a, 'v) Evaluation-Function and
    t :: Threshold-Value
  assumes only-voters-count e
  shows only-voters-vote (leq-eliminator e t)
  unfolding leq-eliminator.simps
  using only-voters-vote-def elim-mod-only-voters assms
  by simp

lemma max-elim-only-voters[simp]:
  fixes e :: ('a, 'v) Evaluation-Function
  assumes only-voters-count e
  shows only-voters-vote (max-eliminator e)
proof (unfold max-eliminator.simps only-voters-vote-def, safe)
  fix
    A :: 'a set and
    V :: 'v set and
    p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    p' :: ('a, 'v) Profile
  assume coinciding:  $\forall v \in V. p\ v = p'\ v$ 
  hence  $\forall x \in A. e\ V\ x\ A\ p = e\ V\ x\ A\ p'$ 
  using assms
  unfolding only-voters-count-def
  by simp
  hence  $Max\ \{e\ V\ x\ A\ p \mid x. x \in A\} = Max\ \{e\ V\ x\ A\ p' \mid x. x \in A\}$ 
  by metis
  thus less-eliminator e (Max  $\{e\ V\ x\ A\ p \mid x. x \in A\}$ ) V A p =
    less-eliminator e (Max  $\{e\ V\ x\ A\ p' \mid x. x \in A\}$ ) V A p'
  using coinciding assms less-elim-only-voters
  unfolding only-voters-vote-def
  by (metis (no-types, lifting))
qed

lemma min-elim-only-voters[simp]:
  fixes e :: ('a, 'v) Evaluation-Function
  assumes only-voters-count e
  shows only-voters-vote (min-eliminator e)
proof (unfold min-eliminator.simps only-voters-vote-def, safe)
  fix
    A :: 'a set and

```

```

  V :: 'v set and
  p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
  p' :: ('a, 'v) Profile
assume
  coinciding:  $\forall v \in V. p\ v = p'\ v$ 
hence  $\forall x \in A. e\ V\ x\ A\ p = e\ V\ x\ A\ p'$ 
  using assms
  unfolding only-voters-count-def
  by simp
hence  $\text{Min } \{e\ V\ x\ A\ p \mid x. x \in A\} = \text{Min } \{e\ V\ x\ A\ p' \mid x. x \in A\}$ 
  by metis
thus  $\text{leq-eliminator } e\ (\text{Min } \{e\ V\ x\ A\ p \mid x. x \in A\})\ V\ A\ p =$ 
   $\text{leq-eliminator } e\ (\text{Min } \{e\ V\ x\ A\ p' \mid x. x \in A\})\ V\ A\ p'$ 
  using coinciding assms leq-elim-only-voters
  unfolding only-voters-vote-def
  by (metis (no-types, lifting))
qed

lemma less-avg-only-voters[simp]:
  fixes e :: ('a, 'v) Evaluation-Function
  assumes only-voters-count e
  shows only-voters-vote (less-average-eliminator e)
proof (unfold less-average-eliminator.simps only-voters-vote-def, safe)
  fix
    A :: 'a set and
    V :: 'v set and
    p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    p' :: ('a, 'v) Profile
  assume coinciding:  $\forall v \in V. p\ v = p'\ v$ 
  hence  $\forall x \in A. e\ V\ x\ A\ p = e\ V\ x\ A\ p'$ 
    using assms
    unfolding only-voters-count-def
    by simp
  hence  $\text{average } e\ V\ A\ p = \text{average } e\ V\ A\ p'$ 
    unfolding average.simps
    by auto
  thus  $\text{less-eliminator } e\ (\text{average } e\ V\ A\ p)\ V\ A\ p =$ 
     $\text{less-eliminator } e\ (\text{average } e\ V\ A\ p')\ V\ A\ p'$ 
    using coinciding assms less-elim-only-voters
    unfolding only-voters-vote-def
    by (metis (no-types, lifting))
qed

lemma leq-avg-only-voters[simp]:
  fixes e :: ('a, 'v) Evaluation-Function
  assumes only-voters-count e
  shows only-voters-vote (leq-average-eliminator e)
proof (unfold leq-average-eliminator.simps only-voters-vote-def, safe)
  fix

```

```

  A :: 'a set and
  V :: 'v set and
  p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
  p' :: ('a, 'v) Profile
assume coinciding:  $\forall v \in V. p\ v = p'\ v$ 
hence  $\forall x \in A. e\ V\ x\ A\ p = e\ V\ x\ A\ p'$ 
  using assms
  unfolding only-voters-count-def
  by simp
hence  $average\ e\ V\ A\ p = average\ e\ V\ A\ p'$ 
  unfolding average.simps
  by auto
thus  $leq\_eliminator\ e\ (average\ e\ V\ A\ p)\ V\ A\ p =$ 
   $leq\_eliminator\ e\ (average\ e\ V\ A\ p')\ V\ A\ p'$ 
  using coinciding assms leq-elim-only-voters
  unfolding only-voters-vote-def
  by (metis (no-types, lifting))
qed

```

3.4.6 Non-Blocking

```

lemma elim-mod-non-blocking:
  fixes
    e :: ('a, 'v) Evaluation-Function and
    t :: Threshold-Value and
    r :: Threshold-Relation
  shows non-blocking (elimination-module e t r)
  unfolding non-blocking-def
  by auto

```

```

lemma less-elim-non-blocking:
  fixes
    e :: ('a, 'v) Evaluation-Function and
    t :: Threshold-Value
  shows non-blocking (less-eliminator e t)
  unfolding less-eliminator.simps
  using elim-mod-non-blocking
  by auto

```

```

lemma leq-elim-non-blocking:
  fixes
    e :: ('a, 'v) Evaluation-Function and
    t :: Threshold-Value
  shows non-blocking (leq-eliminator e t)
  unfolding leq-eliminator.simps
  using elim-mod-non-blocking
  by auto

```

```

lemma max-elim-non-blocking:

```



```

fixes  $e :: ('a, 'v) \text{Evaluation-Function}$ 
shows non-blocking (max-eliminator  $e$ )
unfolding non-blocking-def
using social-choice-result.electoral-module-def
by auto

```

```

lemma min-elim-non-blocking:
  fixes  $e :: ('a, 'v) \text{Evaluation-Function}$ 
  shows non-blocking (min-eliminator  $e$ )
  unfolding non-blocking-def
  using social-choice-result.electoral-module-def
  by auto

```

```

lemma less-avg-elim-non-blocking:
  fixes  $e :: ('a, 'v) \text{Evaluation-Function}$ 
  shows non-blocking (less-average-eliminator  $e$ )
  unfolding non-blocking-def
  using social-choice-result.electoral-module-def
  by auto

```

```

lemma leq-avg-elim-non-blocking:
  fixes  $e :: ('a, 'v) \text{Evaluation-Function}$ 
  shows non-blocking (leq-average-eliminator  $e$ )
  unfolding non-blocking-def
  using social-choice-result.electoral-module-def
  by auto

```

3.4.7 Non-Electing

```

lemma elim-mod-non-electing:
  fixes
     $e :: ('a, 'v) \text{Evaluation-Function}$  and
     $t :: \text{Threshold-Value}$  and
     $r :: \text{Threshold-Relation}$ 
  shows non-electing (elimination-module  $e$   $t$   $r$ )
  unfolding non-electing-def
  by simp

```

```

lemma less-elim-non-electing:
  fixes
     $e :: ('a, 'v) \text{Evaluation-Function}$  and
     $t :: \text{Threshold-Value}$ 
  shows non-electing (less-eliminator  $e$   $t$ )
  using elim-mod-non-electing less-elim-sound
  unfolding non-electing-def
  by simp

```

```

lemma leq-elim-non-electing:
  fixes

```

```

    e :: ('a, 'v) Evaluation-Function and
    t :: Threshold-Value
  shows non-electing (leq-eliminator e t)
  unfolding non-electing-def
  by simp

lemma max-elim-non-electing:
  fixes e :: ('a, 'v) Evaluation-Function
  shows non-electing (max-eliminator e)
  unfolding non-electing-def
  by simp

lemma min-elim-non-electing:
  fixes e :: ('a, 'v) Evaluation-Function
  shows non-electing (min-eliminator e)
  unfolding non-electing-def
  by simp

lemma less-avg-elim-non-electing:
  fixes e :: ('a, 'v) Evaluation-Function
  shows non-electing (less-average-eliminator e)
  unfolding non-electing-def
  by auto

lemma leq-avg-elim-non-electing:
  fixes e :: ('a, 'v) Evaluation-Function
  shows non-electing (leq-average-eliminator e)
  unfolding non-electing-def
  by simp

```

3.4.8 Inference Rules

If the used evaluation function is Condorcet rating, max-eliminator is Condorcet compatible.

```

theorem cr-eval-imp-ccomp-max-elim[simp]:
  fixes e :: ('a, 'v) Evaluation-Function
  assumes condorcet-rating e
  shows condorcet-compatibility (max-eliminator e)
proof (unfold condorcet-compatibility-def, safe)
  show social-choice-result.electoral-module (max-eliminator e)
  by simp
next
fix
  A :: 'a set and
  V :: 'v set and
  p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
  a :: 'a
assume
  c-win: condorcet-winner V A p a and

```

```

    rej-a:  $a \in \text{reject } (\text{max-eliminator } e) \ V \ A \ p$ 
  have  $e \ V \ a \ A \ p = \text{Max } \{e \ V \ b \ A \ p \mid b. b \in A\}$ 
    using c-win cond-winner-imp-max-eval-val assms
    by fastforce
  hence  $a \notin \text{reject } (\text{max-eliminator } e) \ V \ A \ p$ 
    by simp
  thus False
    using rej-a
    by linarith
next
fix
  A :: 'a set and
  V :: 'v set and
  p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
  a :: 'a
  assume  $a \in \text{elect } (\text{max-eliminator } e) \ V \ A \ p$ 
  moreover have  $a \notin \text{elect } (\text{max-eliminator } e) \ V \ A \ p$ 
    by simp
  ultimately show False
    by linarith
next
fix
  A :: 'a set and
  V :: 'v set and
  p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
  a :: 'a and
  a' :: 'a
  assume
    condorcet-winner V A p a and
     $a \in \text{elect } (\text{max-eliminator } e) \ V \ A \ p$ 
  thus  $a' \in \text{reject } (\text{max-eliminator } e) \ V \ A \ p$ 
    using condorcet-winner.elims(2) empty-iff max-elim-non-electing
    unfolding non-electing-def
    by metis
qed

```

If the used evaluation function is Condorcet rating, max-eliminator is defer-Condorcet-consistent.

```

theorem cr-eval-imp-dcc-max-elim[simp]:
  fixes  $e :: ('a, 'v) \text{Evaluation-Function}$ 
  assumes condorcet-rating e
  shows defer-condorcet-consistency (max-eliminator e)
proof (unfold defer-condorcet-consistency-def, safe, simp)
  fix
    A :: 'a set and
    V :: 'v set and
    p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    a :: 'a
  assume

```

```

  winner: condorcet-winner V A p a
hence f-prof: finite-profile V A p
  by simp
let ?trsh = Max {e V b A p | b. b ∈ A}
show
  max-eliminator e V A p =
    ({},
      A - defer (max-eliminator e) V A p,
      {b ∈ A. condorcet-winner V A p b})
proof (cases elimination-set e (?trsh) (<) V A p ≠ A)
  have e V a A p = Max {e V x A p | x. x ∈ A}
  using winner assms cond-winner-imp-max-eval-val
  by fastforce
  hence ∀ b ∈ A. b ≠ a ⟷ b ∈ {c ∈ A. e V c A p < Max {e V b A p | b. b ∈
A}}
  using winner assms mem-Collect-eq linorder-neq-iff
  unfolding condorcet-rating-def
  by (metis (mono-tags, lifting))
hence elim-set: (elimination-set e ?trsh (<) V A p) = A - {a}
  unfolding elimination-set.simps
  by blast
case True
hence
  max-eliminator e V A p =
    ({},
      (elimination-set e ?trsh (<) V A p),
      A - (elimination-set e ?trsh (<) V A p))
  by simp
also have ... = ({}, A - {a}, {a})
  using elim-set winner
  by auto
also have ... = ({}, A - defer (max-eliminator e) V A p, {a})
  using calculation
  by simp
also have
  ... = ({},
    A - defer (max-eliminator e) V A p,
    {b ∈ A. condorcet-winner V A p b})
  using cond-winner-unique winner Collect-cong
  by (metis (no-types, lifting))
finally show ?thesis
  using winner
  by metis
next
case False
moreover have ?trsh = e V a A p
  using assms winner cond-winner-imp-max-eval-val
  by fastforce
ultimately show ?thesis

```

```

    using winner
    by auto
qed
qed
end

```

3.5 Aggregator

```

theory Aggregator
  imports Social-Choice-Types/Social-Choice-Result
begin

```

An aggregator gets two partitions (results of electoral modules) as input and output another partition. They are used to aggregate results of parallel composed electoral modules. They are commutative, i.e., the order of the aggregated modules does not affect the resulting aggregation. Moreover, they are conservative in the sense that the resulting decisions are subsets of the two given partitions' decisions.

3.5.1 Definition

```

type-synonym 'a Aggregator = 'a set  $\Rightarrow$  'a Result  $\Rightarrow$  'a Result  $\Rightarrow$  'a Result

```

```

definition aggregator :: 'a Aggregator  $\Rightarrow$  bool where
  aggregator agg  $\equiv$ 
     $\forall A e e' d d' r r'.$ 
      (well-formed-social-choice A (e, r, d)  $\wedge$  well-formed-social-choice A (e', r',
d'))  $\longrightarrow$ 
      well-formed-social-choice A (agg A (e, r, d) (e', r', d'))

```

3.5.2 Properties

```

definition agg-commutative :: 'a Aggregator  $\Rightarrow$  bool where
  agg-commutative agg  $\equiv$ 
    aggregator agg  $\wedge$  ( $\forall A e e' d d' r r'.$ 
      agg A (e, r, d) (e', r', d') = agg A (e', r', d') (e, r, d))

```

```

definition agg-conservative :: 'a Aggregator  $\Rightarrow$  bool where
  agg-conservative agg  $\equiv$ 
    aggregator agg  $\wedge$ 
      ( $\forall A e e' d d' r r'.$ 

```

```

    ((well-formed-social-choice  $A(e, r, d) \wedge \text{well-formed-social-choice } A(e', r', d')$ )  $\longrightarrow$ 
       $\text{elect-}r(\text{agg } A(e, r, d)(e', r', d')) \subseteq (e \cup e') \wedge$ 
       $\text{reject-}r(\text{agg } A(e, r, d)(e', r', d')) \subseteq (r \cup r') \wedge$ 
       $\text{defer-}r(\text{agg } A(e, r, d)(e', r', d')) \subseteq (d \cup d'))$ )
  end

```

3.6 Maximum Aggregator

```

theory Maximum-Aggregator
  imports Aggregator
begin

```

The max(imum) aggregator takes two partitions of an alternative set A as input. It returns a partition where every alternative receives the maximum result of the two input partitions.

3.6.1 Definition

```

fun max-aggregator :: 'a Aggregator where
  max-aggregator  $A(e, r, d)(e', r', d') =$ 
    ( $e \cup e'$ ,
      $A - (e \cup e' \cup d \cup d')$ ,
      $(d \cup d') - (e \cup e')$ )

```

3.6.2 Auxiliary Lemma

```

lemma max-agg-rej-set:
  fixes
     $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $e :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $e' :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $d :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $d' :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $r :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $r' :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $a :: 'a$ 
  assumes
    wf-first-mod: well-formed-social-choice  $A(e, r, d)$  and
    wf-second-mod: well-formed-social-choice  $A(e', r', d')$ 
  shows  $\text{reject-}r(\text{max-aggregator } A(e, r, d)(e', r', d')) = r \cap r'$ 
proof -
  have  $A - (e \cup d) = r$ 
    using wf-first-mod result-imp-rej

```

by *metis*
 moreover have $A - (e' \cup d') = r'$
 using *wf-second-mod result-imp-rej*
 by *metis*
 ultimately have $A - (e \cup e' \cup d \cup d') = r \cap r'$
 by *blast*
 moreover have $\{l \in A. l \notin e \cup e' \cup d \cup d'\} = A - (e \cup e' \cup d \cup d')$
 unfolding *set-diff-eq*
 by *simp*
 ultimately show *reject-r* (*max-aggregator* A (e, r, d) (e', r', d')) = $r \cap r'$
 by *simp*
 qed

3.6.3 Soundness

theorem *max-agg-sound[simp]*: *aggregator max-aggregator*

proof (*unfold aggregator-def, simp, safe*)

fix
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ and
 $e :: 'a \text{ set}$ and
 $e' :: 'a \text{ set}$ and
 $d :: 'a \text{ set}$ and
 $d' :: 'a \text{ set}$ and
 $r :: 'a \text{ set}$ and
 $r' :: 'a \text{ set}$ and
 $a :: 'a$
 assume
 $e' \cup r' \cup d' = e \cup r \cup d$ and
 $a \notin d$ and
 $a \notin r$ and
 $a \in e'$
 thus $a \in e$
 by *auto*
 next
 fix
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ and
 $e :: 'a \text{ set}$ and
 $e' :: 'a \text{ set}$ and
 $d :: 'a \text{ set}$ and
 $d' :: 'a \text{ set}$ and
 $r :: 'a \text{ set}$ and
 $r' :: 'a \text{ set}$ and
 $a :: 'a$
 assume
 $e' \cup r' \cup d' = e \cup r \cup d$ and
 $a \notin d$ and
 $a \notin r$ and
 $a \in d'$
 thus $a \in e$

by *auto*
qed

3.6.4 Properties

The max-aggregator is conservative.

theorem *max-agg-consv[simp]: agg-conservative max-aggregator*

proof (*unfold agg-conservative-def, safe*)

show *aggregator max-aggregator*

using *max-agg-sound*

by *metis*

next

fix

$A :: 'a \text{ set}$ and

$e :: 'a \text{ set}$ and

$e' :: 'a \text{ set}$ and

$d :: 'a \text{ set}$ and

$d' :: 'a \text{ set}$ and

$r :: 'a \text{ set}$ and

$r' :: 'a \text{ set}$ and

$a :: 'a$

assume

elect-a: $a \in \text{elect-}r \text{ (max-aggregator } A \text{ (} e, r, d \text{) (} e', r', d' \text{))}$ and

a-not-in-e': $a \notin e'$

have $a \in e \cup e'$

using *elect-a*

by *simp*

thus $a \in e$

using *a-not-in-e'*

by *simp*

next

fix

$A :: 'a \text{ set}$ and

$e :: 'a \text{ set}$ and

$e' :: 'a \text{ set}$ and

$d :: 'a \text{ set}$ and

$d' :: 'a \text{ set}$ and

$r :: 'a \text{ set}$ and

$r' :: 'a \text{ set}$ and

$a :: 'a$

assume

wf-result: *well-formed-social-choice* $A \text{ (} e', r', d' \text{)}$ and

reject-a: $a \in \text{reject-}r \text{ (max-aggregator } A \text{ (} e, r, d \text{) (} e', r', d' \text{))}$ and

a-not-in-r': $a \notin r'$

have $a \in r \cup r'$

using *wf-result reject-a*

by *force*

thus $a \in r$

using *a-not-in-r'*


```

    by simp
next
fix
  A :: 'a set and
  e :: 'a set and
  e' :: 'a set and
  d :: 'a set and
  d' :: 'a set and
  r :: 'a set and
  r' :: 'a set and
  a :: 'a
assume
  defer-a: a ∈ defer-r (max-aggregator A (e, r, d) (e', r', d')) and
  a-not-in-d': a ∉ d'
have a ∈ d ∪ d'
  using defer-a
  by force
thus a ∈ d
  using a-not-in-d'
  by simp
qed

The max-aggregator is commutative.

theorem max-agg-comm[simp]: agg-commutative max-aggregator
  unfolding agg-commutative-def
  by auto

end

```

3.7 Termination Condition

```

theory Termination-Condition
  imports Social-Choice-Types/Result
begin

```

The termination condition is used in loops. It decides whether or not to terminate the loop after each iteration, depending on the current state of the loop.

3.7.1 Definition

```

type-synonym 'r Termination-Condition = 'r Result ⇒ bool

end

```

3.8 Defer Equal Condition

```
theory Defer-Equal-Condition  
  imports Termination-Condition  
begin
```

This is a family of termination conditions. For a natural number n , the according defer-equal condition is true if and only if the given result's defer-set contains exactly n elements.

3.8.1 Definition

```
fun defer-equal-condition ::  
   $\text{nat} \Rightarrow 'a \text{ Termination-Condition}$  where  
  defer-equal-condition  $n$  ( $e, r, d$ ) = ( $\text{card } d = n$ )  
  
end
```

Chapter 4

Basic Modules

4.1 Defer Module

```
theory Defer-Module
  imports Component-Types/Electoral-Module
begin
```

The defer module is not concerned about the voter's ballots, and simply defers all alternatives. It is primarily used for defining an empty loop.

4.1.1 Definition

```
fun defer-module :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module where
  defer-module V A p = ({}, {}, A)
```

4.1.2 Soundness

```
theorem def-mod-sound[simp]: social-choice-result.electoral-module defer-module
  unfolding social-choice-result.electoral-module-def
  by simp
```

4.1.3 Properties

```
theorem def-mod-non-electing: non-electing defer-module
  unfolding non-electing-def
  by simp
```

```
theorem def-mod-def-lift-inv: defer-lift-invariance defer-module
  unfolding defer-lift-invariance-def
  by simp
```

```
end
```

4.2 Elect First Module

```

theory Elect-First-Module
  imports Component-Types/Electoral-Module
begin

```

The elect first module elects the alternative that is most preferred on the first ballot and rejects all other alternatives.

4.2.1 Definition

```

fun least :: 'v::wellorder set  $\Rightarrow$  'v where
  least V = (Least ( $\lambda$  v. v  $\in$  V))

```

```

fun elect-first-module :: ('a, 'v::wellorder, 'a Result) Electoral-Module where
  elect-first-module V A p =
    ({a  $\in$  A. above (p (least V)) a = {a}},
     {a  $\in$  A. above (p (least V)) a  $\neq$  {a}},
     {})

```

4.2.2 Soundness

theorem *elect-first-mod-sound: social-choice-result.electoral-module elect-first-module*

proof (*intro social-choice-result.electoral-modI*)

```

  fix
    A :: 'a set and
    V :: 'v::wellorder set and
    p :: ('a, 'v) Profile
  have {a  $\in$  A. above (p (least V)) a = {a}}  $\cup$  {a  $\in$  A. above (p (least V)) a  $\neq$  {a}} = A
  by blast
  hence set-equals-partition A (elect-first-module V A p)
  by simp
  moreover have
     $\forall$  a  $\in$  A. (a  $\notin$  {a'  $\in$  A. above (p (least V)) a' = {a'}}  $\vee$ 
              a  $\notin$  {a'  $\in$  A. above (p (least V)) a'  $\neq$  {a'}})
  by simp
  hence {a  $\in$  A. above (p (least V)) a = {a}}  $\cap$  {a  $\in$  A. above (p (least V)) a  $\neq$  {a}} = {}
  by blast
  hence disjoint3 (elect-first-module V A p)
  by simp
  ultimately show well-formed-social-choice A (elect-first-module V A p)
  by simp
qed
end

```

4.3 Consensus Class

```

theory Consensus-Class
  imports Consensus
           ../Defer-Module
           ../Elect-First-Module
begin

```

A consensus class is a pair of a set of elections and a mapping that assigns a unique alternative to each election in that set (of elections). This alternative is then called the consensus alternative (winner). Here, we model the mapping by an electoral module that defers alternatives which are not in the consensus.

4.3.1 Definition

```

type-synonym ('a, 'v, 'r) Consensus-Class = ('a, 'v) Consensus × ('a, 'v, 'r)
Electoral-Module

```

```

fun consensus-K :: ('a, 'v, 'r) Consensus-Class ⇒ ('a, 'v) Consensus
  where consensus-K K = fst K

```

```

fun rule-K :: ('a, 'v, 'r) Consensus-Class ⇒ ('a, 'v, 'r) Electoral-Module
  where rule-K K = snd K

```

4.3.2 Consensus Choice

Returns those consensus elections on a given alternative and voter set from a given consensus that are mapped to the given unique winner by a given consensus rule.

```

fun KE :: ('a, 'v, 'r Result) Consensus-Class ⇒ 'r ⇒ ('a, 'v) Election set where
  KE K w =
    {(A, V, p) | A V p. (consensus-K K) (A, V, p) ∧ finite-profile V A p
      ∧ elect (rule-K K) V A p = {w}}

```

```

fun elections-K :: ('a, 'v, 'r Result) Consensus-Class ⇒ ('a, 'v) Election set where
  elections-K K = ⋃ ((KE K) ' UNIV)

```

A consensus class is deemed well-formed if the result of its mapping is completely determined by its consensus, the elected set of the electoral module's result.

```

definition well-formed :: ('a, 'v) Consensus ⇒ ('a, 'v, 'r) Electoral-Module ⇒ bool
where
  well-formed c m ≡
    ∀ A V V' p p'. profile V A p ∧ profile V' A p' ∧ c (A, V, p) ∧ c (A, V', p')
    ⟶
      m V A p = m V' A p'

```

A sensible social choice rule for a given arbitrary consensus and social choice rule r is the one that chooses the result of r for all consensus elections and defers all candidates otherwise.

```
fun consensus-choice :: ('a, 'v) Consensus  $\Rightarrow$  ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module
   $\Rightarrow$  ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Consensus-Class where
  consensus-choice c m =
    (let
      w = ( $\lambda$  V A p. if c (A, V, p) then m V A p else defer-module V A p)
    in (c, w))
```

4.3.3 Auxiliary Lemmas

lemma unanimity'-consensus-imp-elect-fst-mod-well-formed:

fixes a :: 'a

shows well-formed (λ c. nonempty-set_C c \wedge nonempty-profile_C c \wedge equal-top_C' a c)

elect-first-module

proof (unfold well-formed-def, safe)

fix

a :: 'a **and**

A :: 'a set **and**

V :: 'v::wellorder set **and**

V' :: 'v set **and**

p :: ('a, 'v) Profile **and**

p' :: ('a, 'v) Profile

let ?cond = λ c. nonempty-set_C c \wedge nonempty-profile_C c \wedge equal-top_C' a c

assume

prof-p: profile V A p **and**

prof-p': profile V' A p' **and**

eq-top-p: equal-top_C' a (A, V, p) **and**

eq-top-p': equal-top_C' a (A, V', p') **and**

not-empty-A: nonempty-set_C (A, V, p) **and**

not-empty-A': nonempty-set_C (A, V', p') **and**

not-empty-p: nonempty-profile_C (A, V, p) **and**

not-empty-p': nonempty-profile_C (A, V', p')

hence

cond-Ap: ?cond (A, V, p) **and**

cond-Ap': ?cond (A, V', p')

by simp-all

have $\forall a' \in A. ((\text{above } (p \text{ (least } V)) \ a' = \{a'\}) = (\text{above } (p' \text{ (least } V')) \ a' = \{a'\}))$

proof

fix a' :: 'a

assume a'-in-A: a' \in A

show (above (p (least V)) a' = {a'}) = (above (p' (least V')) a' = {a'})

proof (cases)

assume a' = a

thus ?thesis

using cond-Ap cond-Ap' Collect-mem-eq LeastI empty-Collect-eq equal-top_C'.simps

```

      nonempty-profileC.simps least.simps
    by (metis (no-types, lifting))
  next
  assume a'-neq-a: a' ≠ a
  have non-empty: V ≠ {} ∧ V' ≠ {}
    using not-empty-p not-empty-p'
    by simp
  hence A ≠ {} ∧ linear-order-on A (p (least V))
    ∧ linear-order-on A (p' (least V'))
    using not-empty-A not-empty-A' prof-p prof-p'
    a'-in-A card.remove enumerate.simps(1)
    enumerate-in-set finite-enumerate-in-set
    least.elims all-not-in-conv
    zero-less-Suc
  unfolding profile-def
  by metis
  hence (a ∈ above (p (least V)) a' ∨ a' ∈ above (p (least V)) a) ∧
    (a ∈ above (p' (least V')) a' ∨ a' ∈ above (p' (least V')) a)
    using a'-in-A a'-neq-a eq-top-p
  unfolding above-def linear-order-on-def total-on-def
  by auto
  hence (above (p (least V)) a = {a} ∧ above (p (least V)) a' = {a'}) → a =
a') ∧
    (above (p' (least V')) a = {a} ∧ above (p' (least V')) a' = {a'}) → a
= a')
    by auto
  thus ?thesis
    using bot-nat-0.not-eq-extremum card-0-eq cond-Ap cond-Ap'
    enumerate.simps(1) enumerate-in-set equal-topC'.simps
    finite-enumerate-in-set non-empty least.simps
    by metis
  qed
qed
thus elect-first-module V A p = elect-first-module V' A p'
  by auto
qed

```

lemma *strong-unanimity'consensus-imp-elect-fst-mod-completely-determined:*

fixes $r :: 'a$ *Preference-Relation*

shows *well-formed*

($\lambda c. \text{nonempty-set}_C c \wedge \text{nonempty-profile}_C c \wedge \text{equal-vote}_C' r c$) *elect-first-module*

proof (*unfold well-formed-def, clarify*)

fix

$a :: 'a$ **and**

$A :: 'a$ *set* **and**

$V :: 'v::\text{wellorder set}$ **and**

$V' :: 'v$ *set* **and**

$p :: ('a, 'v)$ *Profile* **and**

$p' :: ('a, 'v)$ *Profile*

```

let ?cond =  $\lambda$  c. nonempty-setC c  $\wedge$  nonempty-profileC c  $\wedge$  equal-voteC' r c
assume
  prof-p: profile V A p and
  prof-p': profile V' A p' and
  eq-vote-p: equal-voteC' r (A, V, p) and
  eq-vote-p': equal-voteC' r (A, V', p') and
  not-empty-A: nonempty-setC (A, V, p) and
  not-empty-A': nonempty-setC (A, V', p') and
  not-empty-p: nonempty-profileC (A, V, p) and
  not-empty-p': nonempty-profileC (A, V', p')
hence
  cond-Ap: ?cond (A, V, p) and
  cond-Ap': ?cond (A, V', p')
by simp-all
have p (least V) = r  $\wedge$  p' (least V') = r
using eq-vote-p eq-vote-p' not-empty-p not-empty-p'
  bot-nat-0.not-eq-extremum card-0-eq enumerate.simps(1)
  enumerate-in-set equal-voteC'.simps finite-enumerate-in-set
  nonempty-profileC.simps least.elims
by (metis (no-types, lifting))
thus elect-first-module V A p = elect-first-module V' A p'
by auto
qed

lemma strong-unanimity'consensus-imp-elect-fst-mod-well-formed:
  fixes r :: 'a Preference-Relation
  shows well-formed ( $\lambda$  c. nonempty-setC c  $\wedge$  nonempty-profileC c  $\wedge$  equal-voteC'
    r c)
    elect-first-module
using strong-unanimity'consensus-imp-elect-fst-mod-completely-determined
by blast

lemma cons-domain-valid:
  fixes C :: ('a, 'v, 'r Result) Consensus-Class
  shows elections- $\mathcal{K}$  C  $\subseteq$  valid-elections
proof
  fix E :: ('a, 'v) Election
  assume E  $\in$  elections- $\mathcal{K}$  C
  hence funE profile E
    unfolding  $\mathcal{K}_E$ .simps
    by force
  thus E  $\in$  valid-elections
    unfolding valid-elections-def
    by simp
qed

lemma cons-domain-finite:
  fixes C :: ('a, 'v, 'r Result) Consensus-Class
  shows

```


finite: elections- \mathcal{K} $C \subseteq \text{finite-elections}$ and
finite-voters: elections- \mathcal{K} $C \subseteq \text{finite-voter-elections}$
proof –
have $\forall E \in \text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C. \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} \text{ profile } E \wedge \text{finite} (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \wedge \text{finite} (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E)$
unfolding $\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}}.\text{sims}$
by force
thus $\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C \subseteq \text{finite-elections}$
unfolding $\text{finite-elections-def fun}_{\mathcal{E}}.\text{sims}$
by blast
thus $\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C \subseteq \text{finite-voter-elections}$
unfolding $\text{finite-elections-def finite-voter-elections-def}$
by blast
qed

4.3.4 Consensus Rules

definition $\text{non-empty-set} :: ('a, 'v, 'r) \text{Consensus-Class} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$ **where**
 $\text{non-empty-set } c \equiv \exists K. \text{consensus-}\mathcal{K} \ c \ K$

Unanimity condition.

definition $\text{unanimity} :: ('a, 'v::\text{wellorder}, 'a \text{Result}) \text{Consensus-Class}$ **where**
 $\text{unanimity} = \text{consensus-choice unanimity}_{\mathcal{C}} \text{elect-first-module}$

Strong unanimity condition.

definition $\text{strong-unanimity} :: ('a, 'v::\text{wellorder}, 'a \text{Result}) \text{Consensus-Class}$ **where**
 $\text{strong-unanimity} = \text{consensus-choice strong-unanimity}_{\mathcal{C}} \text{elect-first-module}$

4.3.5 Properties

definition $\text{consensus-rule-anonymity} :: ('a, 'v, 'r) \text{Consensus-Class} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$ **where**
 $\text{consensus-rule-anonymity } c \equiv$
 $(\forall A \ V \ p \ \pi::('v \Rightarrow 'v)).$
 $\text{bij } \pi \longrightarrow$
 $(\text{let } (A', V', q) = (\text{rename } \pi \ (A, V, p)) \text{ in}$
 $\text{profile } V \ A \ p \longrightarrow \text{profile } V' \ A' \ q$
 $\longrightarrow \text{consensus-}\mathcal{K} \ c \ (A, V, p)$
 $\longrightarrow (\text{consensus-}\mathcal{K} \ c \ (A', V', q) \wedge (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ c \ V \ A \ p = \text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ c \ V' \ A' \ q))))$

fun $\text{consensus-rule-anonymity}' :: ('a, 'v) \text{Election set} \Rightarrow ('a, 'v, 'r \text{Result}) \text{Consensus-Class}$
 $\Rightarrow \text{bool}$ **where**
 $\text{consensus-rule-anonymity}' \ X \ C =$
 $\text{satisfies } (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} \ (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) \ (\text{Invariance } (\text{anonymity}_{\mathcal{R}} \ X))$

fun **(in result-properties)** $\text{consensus-rule-neutrality} :: ('a, 'v) \text{Election set}$
 $\Rightarrow ('a, 'v, 'b \text{Result}) \text{Consensus-Class} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$ **where**
 $\text{consensus-rule-neutrality } X \ C = \text{satisfies } (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} \ (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C))$
 $(\text{equivar-ind-by-act } (\text{carrier neutrality}_{\mathcal{G}}) \ X \ (\varphi\text{-neutr } X) \ (\text{set-action } \psi\text{-neutr}))$

```

fun consensus-rule-reversal-symmetry :: ('a, 'v) Election set
  ⇒ ('a, 'v, 'a rel Result) Consensus-Class ⇒ bool where
  consensus-rule-reversal-symmetry X C = satisfies (elect-r ◦ funE (rule- $\mathcal{K}$  C))
    (equivar-ind-by-act (carrier reversalG) X (φ-rev X) (set-action ψ-rev))

```

4.3.6 Inference Rules

lemma consensus-choice-equivar:

```

fixes
  m :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
  c :: ('a, 'v) Consensus and
  G :: 'x set and
  X :: ('a, 'v) Election set and
  φ :: ('x, ('a, 'v) Election) binary-fun and
  ψ :: ('x, 'a) binary-fun and
  f :: 'a Result ⇒ 'a set
defines equivar ≡ equivar-ind-by-act G X φ (set-action ψ)
assumes
  equivar-m: satisfies (f ◦ funE m) equivar and
  equivar-defer: satisfies (f ◦ funE defer-module) equivar and
  — Could be generalized to arbitrary modules instead of defer-module
  invar-cons: satisfies c (Invariance (rel-induced-by-action G X φ))
shows satisfies (f ◦ funE (rule- $\mathcal{K}$  (consensus-choice c m)))
  (equivar-ind-by-act G X φ (set-action ψ))
proof (simp only: rewrite-equivar-ind-by-act, standard, standard, standard)
fix
  E :: ('a, 'v) Election and
  g :: 'x
assume
  g-in-G: g ∈ G and
  E-in-X: E ∈ X and
  φ-g-E-in-X: φ g E ∈ X
show (f ◦ funE (rule- $\mathcal{K}$  (consensus-choice c m))) (φ g E) =
  set-action ψ g ((f ◦ funE (rule- $\mathcal{K}$  (consensus-choice c m))) E)
proof (cases c E)
case True
hence c (φ g E)
using invar-cons rewrite-invar-ind-by-act g-in-G φ-g-E-in-X E-in-X
by metis
hence (f ◦ funE (rule- $\mathcal{K}$  (consensus-choice c m))) (φ g E) = (f ◦ funE m) (φ
g E)
by simp
also have (f ◦ funE m) (φ g E) =
  set-action ψ g ((f ◦ funE m) E)
using equivar-m E-in-X φ-g-E-in-X g-in-G rewrite-equivar-ind-by-act
unfolding equivar-def
by (metis (mono-tags, lifting))
also have (f ◦ funE m) E =

```

```

    (f ∘ funε (rule- $\mathcal{K}$  (consensus-choice c m))) E
  using True E-in-X g-in-G invar-cons
  by simp
  finally show ?thesis
  by simp
next
case False
hence ¬ c (φ g E)
  using invar-cons rewrite-invar-ind-by-act g-in-G φ-g-E-in-X E-in-X
  by metis
hence (f ∘ funε (rule- $\mathcal{K}$  (consensus-choice c m))) (φ g E) =
  (f ∘ funε defer-module) (φ g E)
  by simp
also have (f ∘ funε defer-module) (φ g E) =
  set-action ψ g ((f ∘ funε defer-module) E)
  using equivar-defer E-in-X g-in-G φ-g-E-in-X rewrite-equivar-ind-by-act
  unfolding equivar-def
  by (metis (mono-tags, lifting))
also have (f ∘ funε defer-module) E =
  (f ∘ funε (rule- $\mathcal{K}$  (consensus-choice c m))) E
  using False E-in-X g-in-G invar-cons
  by simp
  finally show ?thesis
  by simp
qed
qed

lemma consensus-choice-anonymous:
  fixes
    α :: ('a, 'v) Consensus and
    β :: ('a, 'v) Consensus and
    m :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
    β' :: 'b ⇒ ('a, 'v) Consensus
  assumes
    beta-sat: β = (λ E. ∃ a. β' a E) and
    beta'-anon: ∀ x. consensus-anonymity (β' x) and
    anon-cons-cond: consensus-anonymity α and
    conditions-univ: ∀ x. well-formed (λ E. α E ∧ β' x E) m
  shows consensus-rule-anonymity (consensus-choice (λ E. α E ∧ β E) m)
proof (unfold consensus-rule-anonymity-def Let-def, safe)
  fix
    A :: 'a set and
    A' :: 'a set and
    V :: 'v set and
    V' :: 'v set and
    p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    q :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    π :: 'v ⇒ 'v
  assume

```

bij: *bij* π **and**
prof-p: *profile* $V\ A\ p$ **and**
prof-q: *profile* $V'\ A'\ q$ **and**
renamed: *rename* $\pi\ (A,\ V,\ p) = (A',\ V',\ q)$ **and**
consensus-cond: *consensus- \mathcal{K}* (*consensus-choice* $(\lambda\ E.\ \alpha\ E \wedge \beta\ E)\ m$) $(A,\ V,$
 $p)$
hence $(\lambda\ E.\ \alpha\ E \wedge \beta\ E)\ (A,\ V,\ p)$
by *simp*
hence
alpha-Ap: $\alpha\ (A,\ V,\ p)$ **and**
beta-Ap: $\beta\ (A,\ V,\ p)$
by *simp-all*
have *alpha-A-perm-p*: $\alpha\ (A',\ V',\ q)$
using *anon-cons-cond* *alpha-Ap* *bij* *prof-p* *prof-q* *renamed*
unfolding *consensus-anonymity-def*
by *fastforce*
moreover **have** $\beta\ (A',\ V',\ q)$
using *beta'-anon* *beta-Ap* *beta-sat* *ex-anon-cons-imp-cons-anonymous* [*of* $\beta\ \beta'$]
bij
prof-p *renamed* *beta'-anon* *cons-anon-invariant* [*of* β]
unfolding *consensus-anonymity-def*
by *blast*
ultimately show *em-cond-perm*:
consensus- \mathcal{K} (*consensus-choice* $(\lambda\ E.\ \alpha\ E \wedge \beta\ E)\ m$) $(A',\ V',\ q)$
using *beta-Ap* *beta-sat* *ex-anon-cons-imp-cons-anonymous* *bij*
prof-p *prof-q*
by *simp*
have $\exists\ x.\ \beta'\ x\ (A,\ V,\ p)$
using *beta-Ap* *beta-sat*
by *simp*
then obtain x **where**
beta'-x-Ap: $\beta'\ x\ (A,\ V,\ p)$
by *metis*
hence *beta'-x-A-perm-p*: $\beta'\ x\ (A',\ V',\ q)$
using *beta'-anon* *bij* *prof-p* *renamed*
cons-anon-invariant *prof-q*
unfolding *consensus-anonymity-def*
by *auto*
have $m\ V\ A\ p = m\ V'\ A'\ q$
using *alpha-Ap* *alpha-A-perm-p* *beta'-x-Ap* *beta'-x-A-perm-p*
conditions-univ *prof-p* *prof-q* *rename.simps* *prod.inject* *renamed*
unfolding *well-formed-def*
by *metis*
thus *rule- \mathcal{K}* (*consensus-choice* $(\lambda\ E.\ \alpha\ E \wedge \beta\ E)\ m$) $V\ A\ p =$
 $\text{rule-}\mathcal{K}\ (\text{consensus-choice}\ (\lambda\ E.\ \alpha\ E \wedge \beta\ E)\ m)\ V'\ A'\ q$
using *consensus-cond* *em-cond-perm*
by *simp*
qed

4.3.7 Theorems

Anonymity

lemma *unanimity-anonymous: consensus-rule-anonymity unanimity*

proof (*unfold unanimity-def*)

let *?ne-cond* = ($\lambda c. \text{nonempty-set}_C c \wedge \text{nonempty-profile}_C c$)

have *consensus-anonymity ?ne-cond*

using *nonempty-set-cons-anonymous nonempty-profile-cons-anonymous cons-anon-conj*
by *auto*

moreover have *equal-top_C* = ($\lambda c. \exists a. \text{equal-top}_C' a c$)

by *fastforce*

ultimately have *consensus-rule-anonymity*

(*consensus-choice*

($\lambda c. \text{nonempty-set}_C c \wedge \text{nonempty-profile}_C c \wedge \text{equal-top}_C c$) *elect-first-module*)

using *consensus-choice-anonymous[of equal-top_C]*

equal-top-cons'-anonymous unanimity'-consensus-imp-elect-fst-mod-well-formed

by *fastforce*

moreover have *consensus-choice*

($\lambda c. \text{nonempty-set}_C c \wedge \text{nonempty-profile}_C c \wedge \text{equal-top}_C c$)

elect-first-module =

consensus-choice unanimity_C elect-first-module

using *unanimity_C.simps*

by *metis*

ultimately show *consensus-rule-anonymity (consensus-choice unanimity_C elect-first-module)*

by (*metis (no-types)*)

qed

lemma *strong-unanimity-anonymous: consensus-rule-anonymity strong-unanimity*

proof (*unfold strong-unanimity-def*)

have *consensus-anonymity* ($\lambda c. \text{nonempty-set}_C c \wedge \text{nonempty-profile}_C c$)

using *nonempty-set-cons-anonymous nonempty-profile-cons-anonymous cons-anon-conj*

unfolding *consensus-anonymity-def*

by *simp*

moreover have *equal-vote_C* = ($\lambda c. \exists v. \text{equal-vote}_C' v c$)

by *fastforce*

ultimately have *consensus-rule-anonymity*

(*consensus-choice*

($\lambda c. \text{nonempty-set}_C c \wedge \text{nonempty-profile}_C c \wedge \text{equal-vote}_C c$) *elect-first-module*)

using *consensus-choice-anonymous[of equal-vote_C]*

nonempty-set-cons-anonymous nonempty-profile-cons-anonymous eq-vote-cons'-anonymous

strong-unanimity'consensus-imp-elect-fst-mod-well-formed

by *fastforce*

moreover have *consensus-choice* ($\lambda c. \text{nonempty-set}_C c \wedge \text{nonempty-profile}_C c$

$\wedge \text{equal-vote}_C c$)

elect-first-module =

consensus-choice strong-unanimity_C elect-first-module

using *strong-unanimity_C.elims(2, 3)*

by *metis*

ultimately show

$\text{consensus-rule-anonymity } (\text{consensus-choice strong-unanimity}_C \text{ elect-first-module})$
 by (metis (no-types))
 qed

Neutrality

lemma *defer-winners-equivar:*

fixes
 $G :: 'x \text{ set}$ **and**
 $X :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election set}$ **and**
 $\varphi :: ('x, ('a, 'v) \text{ Election}) \text{ binary-fun}$ **and**
 $\psi :: ('x, 'a) \text{ binary-fun}$
shows *satisfies (elect-r \circ fun_E defer-module)*
(equivar-ind-by-act G X φ (set-action ψ))
using *rewrite-equivar-ind-by-act*
by *fastforce*

lemma *elect-first-winners-neutral: satisfies (elect-r \circ fun_E elect-first-module)*
(equivar-ind-by-act (carrier neutrality_G)
valid-elections (φ -neutr valid-elections) (set-action ψ -neutr_C))

proof (*simp only: rewrite-equivar-ind-by-act, clarify*)

fix
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $V :: 'v::\text{wellorder set}$ **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ **and**
 $\pi :: 'a \Rightarrow 'a$
assume
bij: $\pi \in \text{carrier neutrality}_G$ and
valid: $(A, V, p) \in \text{valid-elections}$

hence *bijective- π : bij π*
unfolding *neutrality_G-def*
using *rewrite-carrier*
by *blast*

hence *inv: $\forall a. a = \pi (\text{the-inv } \pi a)$*
by (*simp add: f-the-inv-into-f-bij-betw*)

from *bij valid* **have**

$(\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_E \text{ elect-first-module}) (\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } \pi (A, V, p)) =$
 $\{a \in \pi \text{ 'A. above (rel-rename } \pi (p (\text{least } V))) a = \{a\}\}$

by *simp*

moreover **have**

$\{a \in \pi \text{ 'A. above (rel-rename } \pi (p (\text{least } V))) a = \{a\}\} =$
 $\{a \in \pi \text{ 'A. } \{b. (a, b) \in \{(\pi a, \pi b) \mid a b. (a, b) \in p (\text{least } V)\}\} = \{a\}\}$

unfolding *above-def*

by *simp*

ultimately **have** *elect-simp:*

$(\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_E \text{ elect-first-module}) (\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } \pi (A, V, p)) =$
 $\{a \in \pi \text{ 'A. } \{b. (a, b) \in \{(\pi a, \pi b) \mid a b. (a, b) \in p (\text{least } V)\}\} = \{a\}\}$

by *simp*

have $\forall a \in \pi \text{ 'A. } \{b. (a, b) \in \{(\pi x, \pi y) \mid x y. (x, y) \in p (\text{least } V)\}\} =$

$\{\pi b \mid b. (a, \pi b) \in \{(\pi x, \pi y) \mid x y. (x, y) \in p \text{ (least } V)\}\}$
by *blast*
moreover have $\forall a \in \pi ' A.$
 $\{\pi b \mid b. (a, \pi b) \in \{(\pi x, \pi y) \mid x y. (x, y) \in p \text{ (least } V)\}\} =$
 $\{\pi b \mid b. (\pi (\text{the-inv } \pi a), \pi b) \in \{(\pi x, \pi y) \mid x y. (x, y) \in p \text{ (least } V)\}\}$
using *bijjective- π*
by (*simp add: f-the-inv-into-f-bij-betw*)
moreover have $\forall a \in \pi ' A. \forall b.$
 $((\pi (\text{the-inv } \pi a), \pi b) \in \{(\pi x, \pi y) \mid x y. (x, y) \in p \text{ (least } V)\}) =$
 $((\text{the-inv } \pi a, b) \in \{(x, y) \mid x y. (x, y) \in p \text{ (least } V)\})$
using *bijjective- π rel-rename-helper[*of* π]*
by *auto*
moreover have $\{(x, y) \mid x y. (x, y) \in p \text{ (least } V)\} = p \text{ (least } V)$
by *simp*
ultimately have
 $\forall a \in \pi ' A. (\{b. (a, b) \in \{(\pi a, \pi b) \mid a b. (a, b) \in p \text{ (least } V)\}\} = \{a\}) =$
 $(\{\pi b \mid b. (\text{the-inv } \pi a, b) \in p \text{ (least } V)\} = \{a\})$
by *force*
hence $\{a \in \pi ' A. \{b. (a, b) \in \{(\pi a, \pi b) \mid a b. (a, b) \in p \text{ (least } V)\}\} = \{a\}\}$
 $=$
 $\{a \in \pi ' A. \{\pi b \mid b. (\text{the-inv } \pi a, b) \in p \text{ (least } V)\} = \{a\}\}$
by *auto*
hence (*elect-r* \circ *fun_E elect-first-module*) (*φ -neutr valid-elections* $\pi (A, V, p)$) =
 $\{a \in \pi ' A. \{\pi b \mid b. (\text{the-inv } \pi a, b) \in p \text{ (least } V)\} = \{a\}\}$
using *elect-simp*
by *simp*
also have $\{a \in \pi ' A. \{\pi b \mid b. (\text{the-inv } \pi a, b) \in p \text{ (least } V)\} = \{a\}\} =$
 $\{\pi a \mid a. a \in A \wedge \{\pi b \mid b. (a, b) \in p \text{ (least } V)\} = \{\pi a\}\}$
using *bijjective- π inv bij-is-inj the-inv-f-f*
by *fastforce*
also have $\{\pi a \mid a. a \in A \wedge \{\pi b \mid b. (a, b) \in p \text{ (least } V)\} = \{\pi a\}\} =$
 $\pi ' \{a \in A. \{\pi b \mid b. (a, b) \in p \text{ (least } V)\} = \{\pi a\}\}$
by *blast*
also have $\pi ' \{a \in A. \{\pi b \mid b. (a, b) \in p \text{ (least } V)\} = \{\pi a\}\} =$
 $\pi ' \{a \in A. \pi ' \{b \mid b. (a, b) \in p \text{ (least } V)\} = \pi ' \{a\}\}$
by *blast*
finally have
 $(\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_E \text{ elect-first-module}) (\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } \pi (A, V, p)) =$
 $\pi ' \{a \in A. \pi ' (\text{above } (p \text{ (least } V)) a) = \pi ' \{a\}\}$
unfolding *above-def*
by *simp*
moreover have
 $\forall a. (\pi ' (\text{above } (p \text{ (least } V)) a) = \pi ' \{a\}) =$
 $(\text{the-inv } \pi ' \pi ' \text{above } (p \text{ (least } V)) a = \text{the-inv } \pi ' \pi ' \{a\})$
using *$\langle \text{bij } \pi \rangle$ bij-betw-the-inv-into bij-def inj-image-eq-iff*
by *metis*
moreover have $\forall a. (\text{the-inv } \pi ' \pi ' \text{above } (p \text{ (least } V)) a = \text{the-inv } \pi ' \pi ' \{a\}) =$
 $(\text{above } (p \text{ (least } V)) a = \{a\})$

using *bijjective- π bij-betw-imp-inj-on bij-betw-the-inv-into inj-image-eq-iff*
by *metis*
ultimately have $(\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} \text{elect-first-module}) (\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } \pi (A, V, p)) =$
 $\pi \text{ ' } \{a \in A. \text{above } (p \text{ (least } V)) \ a = \{a\}\}$
by *presburger*
moreover have $\text{elect elect-first-module } V \ A \ p = \{a \in A. \text{above } (p \text{ (least } V)) \ a = \{a\}\}$
by *simp*
moreover have *set-action $\psi\text{-neutr}_c \pi$*
 $((\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} \text{elect-first-module}) (A, V, p)) =$
 $\pi \text{ ' } (\text{elect elect-first-module } V \ A \ p)$
by *auto*
ultimately show
 $(\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} \text{elect-first-module}) (\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } \pi (A, V, p)) =$
 $\text{set-action } \psi\text{-neutr}_c \pi$
 $((\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} \text{elect-first-module}) (A, V, p))$
by *blast*
qed

lemma *strong-unanimity-neutral:*

defines $\text{domain} \equiv \text{valid-elections} \cap \text{Collect strong-unanimity}_c$
 — We want to show neutrality on a set as general as possible, as it implies subset neutrality.
shows *social-choice-properties.consensus-rule-neutrality domain strong-unanimity*
proof —
have *coincides: $\forall \pi. \forall E \in \text{domain}. \varphi\text{-neutr domain } \pi \ E = \varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } \pi \ E$*
unfolding *domain-def $\varphi\text{-neutr.simps}$*
by *auto*
have *consensus-neutrality domain strong-unanimity_c*
using *strong-unanimity_c-neutral invar-under-subset-rel*
unfolding *domain-def*
by *simp*
hence *satisfies strong-unanimity_c*
 $(\text{Invariance } (\text{rel-induced-by-action } (\text{carrier neutrality}_{\mathcal{G}}) \text{domain } (\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections})))$
unfolding *consensus-neutrality.simps neutrality_R.simps*
using *coincides coinciding-actions-ind-equal-rel*
by *metis*
moreover have *satisfies $(\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} \text{elect-first-module})$*
 $(\text{equivar-ind-by-act } (\text{carrier neutrality}_{\mathcal{G}})$
 $\text{domain } (\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections}) (\text{set-action } \psi\text{-neutr}_c))$
using *elect-first-winners-neutral*
unfolding *domain-def equivar-ind-by-act-def*
using *equivar-under-subset*
by *blast*
ultimately have *satisfies $(\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \text{ strong-unanimity}))$*
 $(\text{equivar-ind-by-act } (\text{carrier neutrality}_{\mathcal{G}}) \text{domain}$
 $(\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections}) (\text{set-action } \psi\text{-neutr}_c))$


```

using defer-winners-equivar[of
  carrier neutralityG domain  $\varphi$ -neutr valid-elections  $\psi$ -neutrc]
  consensus-choice-equivar[of
    elect-r elect-first-module carrier neutralityG domain
     $\varphi$ -neutr valid-elections  $\psi$ -neutrc strong-unanimityC]
unfolding strong-unanimity-def
by metis
thus ?thesis
  unfolding social-choice-properties.consensus-rule-neutrality.simps
  using coincides equivar-ind-by-act-coincide
  by (metis (no-types, lifting))
qed

lemma strong-unanimity-neutral': social-choice-properties.consensus-rule-neutrality
  (elections- $\mathcal{K}$  strong-unanimity) strong-unanimity
proof –
  have elections- $\mathcal{K}$  strong-unanimity  $\subseteq$  valid-elections  $\cap$  Collect strong-unanimityC
  unfolding valid-elections-def  $\mathcal{K}_E$ .simps strong-unanimity-def
  by force
  moreover from this have coincide:
     $\forall \pi. \forall E \in \text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \text{ strong-unanimity.}$ 
     $\varphi$ -neutr (valid-elections  $\cap$  Collect strong-unanimityC)  $\pi$   $E$  =
     $\varphi$ -neutr (elections- $\mathcal{K}$  strong-unanimity)  $\pi$   $E$ 
  unfolding  $\varphi$ -neutr.simps
  using extensional-continuation-subset
  by (metis (no-types, lifting))
  ultimately have
    satisfies (elect-r  $\circ$  funE (rule- $\mathcal{K}$  strong-unanimity))
    (equivar-ind-by-act (carrier neutralityG) (elections- $\mathcal{K}$  strong-unanimity)
    ( $\varphi$ -neutr (valid-elections  $\cap$  Collect strong-unanimityC)) (set-action  $\psi$ -neutrc))
  using strong-unanimity-neutral
    equivar-under-subset[of
      elect-r  $\circ$  funE (rule- $\mathcal{K}$  strong-unanimity)
      valid-elections  $\cap$  Collect strong-unanimityC
       $\{(\varphi$ -neutr (valid-elections  $\cap$  Collect strong-unanimityC)  $g$ , set-action
 $\psi$ -neutrc  $g$ )  $\mid g$ .
       $g \in \text{carrier neutrality}_G\}$  elections- $\mathcal{K}$  strong-unanimity]
  unfolding equivar-ind-by-act-def social-choice-properties.consensus-rule-neutrality.simps
  by blast
  thus ?thesis
  unfolding social-choice-properties.consensus-rule-neutrality.simps
  using coincide
    equivar-ind-by-act-coincide[of
      carrier neutralityG elections- $\mathcal{K}$  strong-unanimity
       $\varphi$ -neutr (elections- $\mathcal{K}$  strong-unanimity)
       $\varphi$ -neutr (valid-elections  $\cap$  Collect strong-unanimityC)
      elect-r  $\circ$  funE (rule- $\mathcal{K}$  strong-unanimity) set-action  $\psi$ -neutrc]
  by (metis (no-types))
qed

```

lemma *strong-unanimity-closed-under-neutrality: closed-under-restr-rel*
(neutrality_R valid-elections) valid-elections (elections-K strong-unanimity)

proof *(unfold closed-under-restr-rel.simps restr-rel.simps neutrality_R.simps*
rel-induced-by-action.simps elections-K.simps, safe)

fix
A :: 'a set and
V :: 'b set and
p :: ('a, 'b) Profile and
A' :: 'a set and
V' :: 'b set and
p' :: ('a, 'b) Profile and
π :: 'a ⇒ 'a and
a :: 'a

assume
prof: (A, V, p) ∈ valid-elections and
cons: (A, V, p) ∈ K_E strong-unanimity a and
bij: π ∈ carrier neutrality_G and
img: φ-neutr valid-elections π (A, V, p) = (A', V', p')

hence *fin: (A, V, p) ∈ finite-elections*
unfolding K_E.simps finite-elections-def
by simp

hence *valid': (A', V', p') ∈ valid-elections*
using bij img φ-neutr-act.group-action-axioms group-action.element-image prof
unfolding finite-elections-def
by (metis (mono-tags, lifting))

moreover *have V' = V ∧ A' = π ' A*
using img fin alternatives-rewrite.elims fstI prof sndI
unfolding extensional-continuation.simps φ-neutr.simps alternatives-E.simps
voters-E.simps
by (metis (no-types, lifting))

ultimately *have prof': finite-profile V' A' p'*
using fin bij CollectD finite-imageI fst-eqD snd-eqD
unfolding finite-elections-def valid-elections-def alternatives-E.simps
voters-E.simps profile-E.simps
by (metis (no-types, lifting))

let *?domain = valid-elections ∩ Collect strong-unanimity_C*
have *((A, V, p), (A', V', p')) ∈ neutrality_R valid-elections*
using bij img fin valid'
unfolding neutrality_R.simps rel-induced-by-action.simps
finite-elections-def valid-elections-def
by blast

moreover *have unanimous: (A, V, p) ∈ ?domain*
using cons fin
unfolding K_E.simps strong-unanimity-def valid-elections-def
by simp

ultimately *have unanimous': (A', V', p') ∈ ?domain*
using strong-unanimity_C-neutral
by force

have *rewrite*: $\forall \pi \in \text{carrier neutrality}_{\mathcal{G}}$.
 $\varphi\text{-neutr } ?\text{domain } \pi (A, V, p) \in ?\text{domain} \longrightarrow$
 $(\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \text{ strong-unanimity})) (\varphi\text{-neutr } ?\text{domain } \pi (A, V, p))$
 $=$
 $\text{set-action } \psi\text{-neutr}_c \pi ((\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \text{ strong-unanimity})) (A, V,$
 $p))$
using *strong-unanimity-neutral unanimous*
 $\text{rewrite-equivar-ind-by-act[of}$
 $\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \text{ strong-unanimity})$
 $\text{carrier neutrality}_{\mathcal{G}} ?\text{domain}$
 $\varphi\text{-neutr } ?\text{domain set-action } \psi\text{-neutr}_c]$
unfolding *social-choice-properties.consensus-rule-neutrality.simps*
by *blast*
have *img'*: $\varphi\text{-neutr } ?\text{domain } \pi (A, V, p) = (A', V', p')$
using *img unanimous*
by *simp*
hence $\text{elect } (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \text{ strong-unanimity}) V' A' p' =$
 $(\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \text{ strong-unanimity})) (\varphi\text{-neutr } ?\text{domain } \pi (A, V, p))$
by *simp*
also have $(\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \text{ strong-unanimity})) (\varphi\text{-neutr } ?\text{domain } \pi (A, V,$
 $p)) =$
 $\text{set-action } \psi\text{-neutr}_c \pi$
 $((\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \text{ strong-unanimity})) (A, V, p))$
using *bij img' unanimous' rewrite*
by *fastforce*
also have $(\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \text{ strong-unanimity})) (A, V, p) = \{a\}$
using *cons*
unfolding *$\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}}$.simps*
by *simp*
finally have $\text{elect } (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \text{ strong-unanimity}) V' A' p' = \{\psi\text{-neutr}_c \pi a\}$
by *simp*
hence $(A', V', p') \in \mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}} \text{ strong-unanimity } (\psi\text{-neutr}_c \pi a)$
unfolding *$\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}}$.simps strong-unanimity-def consensus-choice.simps*
using *unanimous' prof'*
by *simp*
hence $(A', V', p') \in \text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \text{ strong-unanimity}$
by *simp*
hence $((A, V, p), (A', V', p'))$
 $\in \bigcup (\text{range } (\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}} \text{ strong-unanimity})) \times \bigcup (\text{range } (\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}} \text{ strong-unanimity}))$
unfolding *elections- \mathcal{K} .simps*
using *cons*
by *blast*
moreover have $\exists \pi \in \text{carrier neutrality}_{\mathcal{G}}. \varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections } \pi (A, V, p)$
 $= (A', V', p')$
using *img bij*
unfolding *neutrality \mathcal{G} -def*
by *blast*
ultimately show $(A', V', p') \in \bigcup (\text{range } (\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}} \text{ strong-unanimity}))$
by *blast*

qed

end

4.4 Distance Rationalization

theory *Distance-Rationalization*

imports *Social-Choice-Types/Refined-Types/Preference-List*
Consensus-Class
Distance

begin

A distance rationalization of a voting rule is its interpretation as a procedure that elects an uncontroversial winner if there is one, and otherwise elects the alternatives that are as close to becoming an uncontroversial winner as possible. Within general distance rationalization, a voting rule is characterized by a distance on profiles and a consensus class.

4.4.1 Definitions

Returns the distance of an election to the preimage of a unique winner under the given consensus elections and consensus rule.

fun *score* ::

$('a, 'v) \text{ Election Distance} \Rightarrow ('a, 'v, 'r \text{ Result}) \text{ Consensus-Class} \Rightarrow ('a, 'v) \text{ Election} \Rightarrow$

$'r \Rightarrow \text{ereal}$ **where**

$\text{score } d \ K \ E \ w = \text{Inf } (d \ E \ ' (\mathcal{K}_E \ K \ w))$

fun **(in result)** $\mathcal{R}_W :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election Distance} \Rightarrow ('a, 'v, 'r \text{ Result}) \text{ Consensus-Class} \Rightarrow$

$'v \text{ set} \Rightarrow 'a \text{ set} \Rightarrow ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile} \Rightarrow 'r \text{ set}$ **where**

$\mathcal{R}_W \ d \ K \ V \ A \ p = \text{arg-min-set } (\text{score } d \ K \ (A, V, p)) \ (\text{limit-set } A \ \text{UNIV})$

fun **(in result)** *distance- \mathcal{R}* :: $('a, 'v) \text{ Election Distance} \Rightarrow ('a, 'v, 'r \text{ Result}) \text{ Consensus-Class} \Rightarrow$

$('a, 'v, 'r \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **where**

$\text{distance-}\mathcal{R} \ d \ K \ V \ A \ p = (\mathcal{R}_W \ d \ K \ V \ A \ p, (\text{limit-set } A \ \text{UNIV}) - \mathcal{R}_W \ d \ K \ V \ A \ p, \{\})$

4.4.2 Standard Definitions

definition *standard* :: $('a, 'v) \text{ Election Distance} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$ **where**

$\text{standard } d \equiv \forall \ A \ A' \ V \ V' \ p \ p'. (V \neq V' \vee A \neq A') \longrightarrow d \ (A, V, p) \ (A', V', p') = \infty$

definition *non-voters-irrelevant* :: ('a, 'v) Election Distance \Rightarrow bool **where**
non-voters-irrelevant $d \equiv \forall A A' V V' p q p'.$
 $(\forall v \in V. p v = q v) \longrightarrow (d (A, V, p) (A', V', p') = d (A, V, q) (A', V', p'))$
 $\wedge (d (A', V', p') (A, V, p) = d (A', V', p') (A, V, q))$

Creates a set of all possible profiles on a finite alternative set that are empty everywhere outside of a given finite voter set.

fun *all-profiles* :: 'v set \Rightarrow 'a set \Rightarrow (('a, 'v) Profile) set **where**
all-profiles $V A =$
 (if (infinite A \vee infinite V)
 then {} else {p. p ' V \subseteq (pl- α ' permutations-of-set A)})

fun $\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}}\text{-std}$:: ('a, 'v, 'r Result) Consensus-Class \Rightarrow 'r \Rightarrow 'a set \Rightarrow 'v set
 \Rightarrow ('a, 'v) Election set **where**
 $\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}}\text{-std}$ $K w A V =$
 $(\lambda p. (A, V, p))$ ' (Set.filter
 $(\lambda p. (\text{consensus-}\mathcal{K} K) (A, V, p) \wedge \text{elect} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} K) V A p =$
 $\{w\})$
 $(\text{all-profiles } V A))$

Returns those consensus elections on a given alternative and voter set from a given consensus that are mapped to the given unique winner by a given consensus rule.

fun *score-std* :: ('a, 'v) Election Distance \Rightarrow ('a, 'v, 'r Result) Consensus-Class \Rightarrow
 ('a, 'v) Election \Rightarrow 'r \Rightarrow ereal **where**
score-std $d K E w =$
 (if $\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}}\text{-std}$ $K w (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} E) (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} E) = \{\}$
 then ∞ else Min ($d E$ ' ($\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}}\text{-std}$ $K w (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} E) (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} E)$)))

fun (in result) $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}}\text{-std}$:: ('a, 'v) Election Distance \Rightarrow ('a, 'v, 'r Result) Consensus-Class \Rightarrow
 'v set \Rightarrow 'a set \Rightarrow ('a, 'v) Profile \Rightarrow 'r set **where**
 $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}}\text{-std}$ $d K V A p = \text{arg-min-set} (\text{score-std } d K (A, V, p)) (\text{limit-set } A \text{ UNIV})$

fun (in result) *distance- \mathcal{R} -std* :: ('a, 'v) Election Distance \Rightarrow
 ('a, 'v, 'r Result) Consensus-Class \Rightarrow ('a, 'v, 'r Result) Electoral-Module
where
distance- \mathcal{R} -std $d K V A p = (\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}}\text{-std } d K V A p, (\text{limit-set } A \text{ UNIV}) - \mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}}\text{-std } d K V A p, \{\})$

4.4.3 Auxiliary Lemmas

lemma *K-els-fin*:
fixes $C :: ('a, 'v, 'r Result) \text{ Consensus-Class}$
shows *elections- \mathcal{K}* $C \subseteq \text{finite-elections}$
proof
fix $E :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election}$
assume $E \in \text{elections-}\mathcal{K} C$
hence *finite-election* E

```

    unfolding  $\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}}.simps$ 
    by force
  thus  $E \in \text{finite-elections}$ 
    unfolding  $\text{finite-elections-def}$ 
    by simp
qed

lemma  $\mathcal{K}\text{-els-univ}$ :
  fixes  $C :: ('a, 'v, 'r \text{ Result}) \text{ Consensus-Class}$ 
  shows  $\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C \subseteq \text{UNIV}$ 
  by simp

lemma  $\text{list-cons-presv-finiteness}$ :
  fixes
     $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $S :: 'a \text{ list set}$ 
  assumes
     $\text{fin-A: finite } A$  and
     $\text{fin-B: finite } S$ 
  shows  $\text{finite } \{a \# l \mid a \ l. a \in A \wedge l \in S\}$ 
proof -
  let  $?P = \lambda A. \text{finite } \{a \# l \mid a \ l. a \in A \wedge l \in S\}$ 
  have  $\bigwedge a \ A'. \text{finite } A' \implies a \notin A' \implies ?P \ A' \implies ?P \ (\text{insert } a \ A')$ 
  proof -
    fix
       $a :: 'a$  and
       $A' :: 'a \text{ set}$ 
    assume
       $\text{fin: finite } A'$  and
       $\text{not-in: } a \notin A'$  and
       $\text{fin-set: finite } \{a \# l \mid a \ l. a \in A' \wedge l \in S\}$ 
    have  $\{a' \# l \mid a' \ l. a' \in \text{insert } a \ A' \wedge l \in S\}$ 
       $= \{a \# l \mid a \ l. a \in A' \wedge l \in S\} \cup \{a' \# l \mid l. l \in S\}$ 
    by auto
    moreover have  $\text{finite } \{a \# l \mid l. l \in S\}$ 
    using  $\text{fin-B}$ 
    by simp
    ultimately have  $\text{finite } \{a' \# l \mid a' \ l. a' \in \text{insert } a \ A' \wedge l \in S\}$ 
    using  $\text{fin-set}$ 
    by simp
    thus  $?P \ (\text{insert } a \ A')$ 
    by simp
  qed
  moreover have  $?P \ \{\}$ 
  by simp
  ultimately show  $?P \ A$ 
  using  $\text{finite-induct}[of \ A \ ?P] \ \text{fin-A}$ 
  by simp
qed

```

```

lemma listset-finiteness:
  fixes  $l :: 'a \text{ set list}$ 
  assumes  $\forall i :: \text{nat}. i < \text{length } l \longrightarrow \text{finite } (!i)$ 
  shows  $\text{finite } (\text{listset } l)$ 
  using assms
proof (induct l, simp)
  case (Cons a l)
  fix
     $a :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $l :: 'a \text{ set list}$ 
  assume
    elems-fin-then-set-fin:  $\forall i :: \text{nat} < \text{length } l. \text{finite } (!i) \implies \text{finite } (\text{listset } l)$  and
    fin-all-elems:  $\forall i :: \text{nat} < \text{length } (a \# l). \text{finite } ((a \# l) ! i)$ 
  hence  $\text{finite } a$ 
    by auto
  moreover from fin-all-elems
  have  $\forall i < \text{length } l. \text{finite } (!i)$ 
    by auto
  hence  $\text{finite } (\text{listset } l)$ 
    using elems-fin-then-set-fin
    by simp
  ultimately have  $\text{finite } \{a' \# l' \mid a' l'. a' \in a \wedge l' \in (\text{listset } l)\}$ 
    using list-cons-presv-finiteness
    by auto
  thus  $\text{finite } (\text{listset } (a \# l))$ 
    by (simp add: set-Cons-def)
qed

```

```

lemma ls-entries-empty-imp-ls-set-empty:
  fixes  $l :: 'a \text{ set list}$ 
  assumes
     $0 < \text{length } l$  and
     $\forall i :: \text{nat}. i < \text{length } l \longrightarrow !i = \{\}$ 
  shows  $\text{listset } l = \{\}$ 
  using assms
proof (induct l, simp)
  case (Cons a l)
  fix
     $a :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $l :: 'a \text{ set list}$ 
  assume all-elems-empty:  $\forall i :: \text{nat} < \text{length } (a \# l). (a \# l) ! i = \{\}$ 
  hence  $a = \{\}$ 
    by auto
  moreover from all-elems-empty
  have  $\forall i < \text{length } l. !i = \{\}$ 
    by auto
  ultimately have  $\{a' \# l' \mid a' l'. a' \in a \wedge l' \in (\text{listset } l)\} = \{\}$ 
    by simp

```

thus $\text{listset } (a\#l) = \{\}$
 by (*simp add: set-Cons-def*)
 qed

lemma *all-ls-elems-same-len*:
 fixes $l :: 'a \text{ set list}$
 shows $\forall l'::('a \text{ list}). l' \in \text{listset } l \longrightarrow \text{length } l' = \text{length } l$
proof (*induct l, simp*)
 case (*Cons a l*)
 fix
 $a :: 'a \text{ set}$ and
 $l :: 'a \text{ set list}$
 assume $\forall l'. l' \in \text{listset } l \longrightarrow \text{length } l' = \text{length } l$
 moreover have
 $\forall a' l'::('a \text{ set list}). \text{listset } (a'\#l') = \{b\#m \mid b \text{ m. } b \in a' \wedge m \in \text{listset } l'\}$
 by (*simp add: set-Cons-def*)
 ultimately show $\forall l'. l' \in \text{listset } (a\#l) \longrightarrow \text{length } l' = \text{length } (a\#l)$
 using *local.Cons*
 by *fastforce*
 qed

lemma *all-ls-elems-in-ls-set*:
 fixes $l :: 'a \text{ set list}$
 shows $\forall l' i::\text{nat}. l' \in \text{listset } l \wedge i < \text{length } l' \longrightarrow l'!i \in l!i$
proof (*induct l, simp, safe*)
 case (*Cons a l*)
 fix
 $a :: 'a \text{ set}$ and
 $l :: 'a \text{ set list}$ and
 $l' :: 'a \text{ list}$ and
 $i :: \text{nat}$
 assume *elems-in-set-then-elems-pos*:
 $\forall l' i::\text{nat}. l' \in \text{listset } l \wedge i < \text{length } l' \longrightarrow l'!i \in l!i$ and
 l-prime-in-set-a-l: $l' \in \text{listset } (a\#l)$ and
 i-lt-len-l-prime: $i < \text{length } l'$
 have $l' \in \text{set-Cons } a (\text{listset } l)$
 using *l-prime-in-set-a-l*
 by *simp*
 hence $l' \in \{m. \exists b m'. m = b\#m' \wedge b \in a \wedge m' \in (\text{listset } l)\}$
 unfolding *set-Cons-def*
 by *simp*
 hence $\exists b m. l' = b\#m \wedge b \in a \wedge m \in (\text{listset } l)$
 by *simp*
 thus $l'!i \in (a\#l)!i$
 using *elems-in-set-then-elems-pos i-lt-len-l-prime nth-Cons-Suc*
 Suc-less-eq gr0-conv-Suc length-Cons nth-non-equal-first-eq
 by *metis*
 qed


```

lemma fin-all-profs:
  fixes
    A :: 'a set and
    V :: 'v set and
    x :: 'a Preference-Relation
  assumes
    fin-A: finite A and
    fin-V: finite V
  shows finite (all-profiles V A  $\cap \{p. \forall v. v \notin V \longrightarrow p\ v = x\}$ )
proof (cases A =  $\{\}$ )
  let ?profs = all-profiles V A  $\cap \{p. \forall v. v \notin V \longrightarrow p\ v = x\}$ 
  case True
  hence permutations-of-set A =  $\{\}$ 
    unfolding permutations-of-set-def
    by fastforce
  hence pl- $\alpha$  ' permutations-of-set A =  $\{\{\}\}$ 
    unfolding pl- $\alpha$ -def
    by simp
  hence  $\forall p \in \text{all-profiles } V\ A. \forall v. v \in V \longrightarrow p\ v = \{\}$ 
    by (simp add: image-subset-iff)
  hence  $\forall p \in ?\text{profs}. (\forall v. v \in V \longrightarrow p\ v = \{\}) \wedge (\forall v. v \notin V \longrightarrow p\ v = x)$ 
    by simp
  hence  $\forall p \in ?\text{profs}. p = (\lambda v. \text{if } v \in V \text{ then } \{\} \text{ else } x)$ 
    by (metis (no-types, lifting))
  hence  $?profs \subseteq \{\lambda v. \text{if } v \in V \text{ then } \{\} \text{ else } x\}$ 
    by blast
  thus finite ?profs
    using finite.emptyI finite-insert finite-subset
    by (metis (no-types, lifting))
next
  let ?profs = (all-profiles V A  $\cap \{p. \forall v. v \notin V \longrightarrow p\ v = x\}$ )
  case False
  from fin-V obtain ord where linear-order-on V ord
    using finite-list lin-ord-equiv lin-order-equiv-list-of-alts
    by metis
  then obtain list-V where
    len: length list-V = card V and
    pl: ord = pl- $\alpha$  list-V and
    perm: list-V  $\in$  permutations-of-set V
    using lin-order-pl- $\alpha$  fin-V image-iff length-finite-permutations-of-set
    by metis
  let ?map =  $\lambda p. (('a, 'v)\ \text{Profile}. \text{map } p\ \text{list-}V)$ 
  have  $\forall p \in \text{all-profiles } V\ A. \forall v \in V. p\ v \in (\text{pl-}\alpha\ \text{' permutations-of-set } A)$ 
    by (simp add: image-subset-iff)
  hence  $\forall p \in \text{all-profiles } V\ A. (\forall v \in V. \text{linear-order-on } A\ (p\ v))$ 
    using pl- $\alpha$ -lin-order fin-A False
    by metis
  moreover have  $\forall p \in ?\text{profs}. \forall i < \text{length } (?map\ p). (?map\ p)!i = p\ (\text{list-}V!i)$ 
    by simp

```

moreover have $\forall i < \text{length list-}V. \text{list-}V!i \in V$
using *perm nth-mem permutations-of-setD(1)*
by *metis*
moreover have *lens-eq*: $\forall p \in ?\text{profs}. \text{length } (?map p) = \text{length list-}V$
by *simp*
ultimately have $\forall p \in ?\text{profs}. \forall i < \text{length } (?map p). \text{linear-order-on } A ((?map p)!i)$
by *simp*
hence *subset*: $?map \text{ ' } ?\text{profs} \subseteq \{xs. \text{length } xs = \text{card } V \wedge (\forall i < \text{length } xs. \text{linear-order-on } A (xs!i))\}$
using *len lens-eq*
by *fastforce*
have $\forall p1 p2. p1 \in ?\text{profs} \wedge p2 \in ?\text{profs} \wedge p1 \neq p2 \longrightarrow (\exists v \in V. p1 v \neq p2 v)$
by *fastforce*
hence $\forall p1 p2. p1 \in ?\text{profs} \wedge p2 \in ?\text{profs} \wedge p1 \neq p2 \longrightarrow (\exists v \in \text{set list-}V. p1 v \neq p2 v)$
using *perm*
unfolding *permutations-of-set-def*
by *simp*
hence $\forall p1 p2. p1 \in ?\text{profs} \wedge p2 \in ?\text{profs} \wedge p1 \neq p2 \longrightarrow ?map p1 \neq ?map p2$
by *simp*
hence *inj-on* $?map ?\text{profs}$
unfolding *inj-on-def*
by *blast*
moreover have *finite* $\{xs. \text{length } xs = \text{card } V \wedge (\forall i < \text{length } xs. \text{linear-order-on } A (xs!i))\}$
proof –
have *finite* $\{r. \text{linear-order-on } A r\}$
using *fin-A*
unfolding *linear-order-on-def partial-order-on-def preorder-on-def refl-on-def*
by *simp*
hence *finSupset*: $\forall n. \text{finite } \{xs. \text{length } xs = n \wedge \text{set } xs \subseteq \{r. \text{linear-order-on } A r\}\}$
using *Collect-mono finite-lists-length-eq rev-finite-subset*
by (*metis (no-types, lifting)*)
have $\forall l \in \{xs. \text{length } xs = \text{card } V \wedge (\forall i < \text{length } xs. \text{linear-order-on } A (xs!i))\}. \text{set } l \subseteq \{r. \text{linear-order-on } A r\}$
using *in-set-conv-nth mem-Collect-eq subsetI*
by (*metis (no-types, lifting)*)
hence $\{xs. \text{length } xs = \text{card } V \wedge (\forall i < \text{length } xs. \text{linear-order-on } A (xs!i))\} \subseteq \{xs. \text{length } xs = \text{card } V \wedge \text{set } xs \subseteq \{r. \text{linear-order-on } A r\}\}$
by *blast*
thus *?thesis*
using *finSupset rev-finite-subset*
by *blast*
qed

moreover have $\forall f X Y. \text{inj-on } f X \wedge \text{finite } Y \wedge f ' X \subseteq Y \longrightarrow \text{finite } X$
using *finite-imageD finite-subset*
by *metis*
ultimately show *finite ?profs*
using *subset*
by *blast*
qed

lemma *profile-permutation-set:*

fixes
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $V :: 'v \text{ set}$
shows *all-profiles* $V A =$
 $\{p' :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}. \text{finite-profile } V A p'\}$
proof (*cases finite A ∧ finite V ∧ A ≠ {}, clarsimp*)
assume
 $\text{fin-}A: \text{finite } A$ **and**
 $\text{fin-}V: \text{finite } V$ **and**
 $\text{non-empty}: A \neq \{\}$
show $\{\pi. \pi ' V \subseteq \text{pl-}\alpha ' \text{permutations-of-set } A\} = \{p'. \text{profile } V A p'\}$
proof
show $\{\pi. \pi ' V \subseteq \text{pl-}\alpha ' \text{permutations-of-set } A\} \subseteq \{p'. \text{profile } V A p'\}$
proof (*rule, clarify*)
fix $p' :: 'v \Rightarrow 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$
assume
 $\text{subset}: p' ' V \subseteq \text{pl-}\alpha ' \text{permutations-of-set } A$
hence $\forall v \in V. p' v \in \text{pl-}\alpha ' \text{permutations-of-set } A$
by *blast*
hence $\forall v \in V. \text{linear-order-on } A (p' v)$
using *fin-A pl-α-lin-order non-empty*
by *metis*
thus $\text{profile } V A p'$
unfolding *profile-def*
by *simp*
qed
next
show $\{p'. \text{profile } V A p'\} \subseteq \{\pi. \pi ' V \subseteq \text{pl-}\alpha ' \text{permutations-of-set } A\}$
proof (*rule, clarify*)
fix
 $p' :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ **and**
 $v :: 'v$
assume
 $\text{prof}: \text{profile } V A p'$ **and**
 $\text{el}: v \in V$
hence $\text{linear-order-on } A (p' v)$
unfolding *profile-def*
by *simp*
thus $(p' v) \in \text{pl-}\alpha ' \text{permutations-of-set } A$
using *fin-A lin-order-pl-α*

```

      by simp
    qed
  qed
next
  assume not-fin-empty:  $\neg (\text{finite } A \wedge \text{finite } V \wedge A \neq \{\})$ 
  have  $\text{finite } A \wedge \text{finite } V \wedge A = \{\} \implies \text{permutations-of-set } A = \{\emptyset\}$ 
    unfolding permutations-of-set-def
    by fastforce
  hence pl-empty:  $\text{finite } A \wedge \text{finite } V \wedge A = \{\} \implies \text{pl-}\alpha \text{ 'permutations-of-set } A$ 
    =  $\{\{\}\}$ 
    unfolding pl-}\alpha\text{-def}
    by simp
  hence  $\text{finite } A \wedge \text{finite } V \wedge A = \{\} \implies$ 
 $\forall \pi \in \{\pi. \pi \text{ ' } V \subseteq (\text{pl-}\alpha \text{ 'permutations-of-set } A)\}. \forall v \in V. \pi v = \{\}$ 
    by fastforce
  hence  $\text{finite } A \wedge \text{finite } V \wedge A = \{\} \implies$ 
 $\{\pi. \pi \text{ ' } V \subseteq (\text{pl-}\alpha \text{ 'permutations-of-set } A)\} = \{\pi. \forall v \in V. \pi v = \{\}\}$ 
    using image-subset-iff singletonD singletonI pl-empty

    by fastforce
  moreover have  $\text{finite } A \wedge \text{finite } V \wedge A = \{\}$ 
 $\implies \text{all-profiles } V A = \{\pi. \pi \text{ ' } V \subseteq (\text{pl-}\alpha \text{ 'permutations-of-set } A)\}$ 
    by simp
  ultimately have all-prof-eq:  $\text{finite } A \wedge \text{finite } V \wedge A = \{\}$ 
 $\implies \text{all-profiles } V A = \{\pi. \forall v \in V. \pi v = \{\}\}$ 
    by simp
  have  $\text{finite } A \wedge \text{finite } V \wedge A = \{\}$ 
 $\implies \forall p' \in \{p'. \text{finite-profile } V A p' \wedge (\forall v'. v' \notin V \longrightarrow p' v' = \{\})\}.$ 
 $(\forall v \in V. \text{linear-order-on } \{\} (p' v))$ 
    unfolding profile-def
    by simp
  moreover have  $\forall r. \text{linear-order-on } \{\} r \longrightarrow r = \{\}$ 
    using lin-ord-not-empty
    by metis
  ultimately have  $\text{finite } A \wedge \text{finite } V \wedge A = \{\}$ 
 $\implies \forall p' \in \{p'. \text{finite-profile } V A p' \wedge (\forall v'. v' \notin V \longrightarrow p' v' = \{\})\}.$ 
 $\forall v. p' v = \{\}$ 
    by blast
  hence  $\text{finite } A \wedge \text{finite } V \wedge A = \{\}$ 
 $\implies \{p'. \text{finite-profile } V A p'\} = \{p'. \forall v \in V. p' v = \{\}\}$ 
    using lin-ord-not-empty linear-order-on-empty
    unfolding profile-def
    by (metis (no-types, opaque-lifting))
  hence  $\text{finite } A \wedge \text{finite } V \wedge A = \{\}$ 
 $\implies \text{all-profiles } V A = \{p'. \text{finite-profile } V A p'\}$ 
    using all-prof-eq
    by simp
  moreover have  $\text{infinite } A \vee \text{infinite } V \implies \text{all-profiles } V A = \{\}$ 
    by simp

```

moreover have $\text{infinite } A \vee \text{infinite } V \implies$
 $\{p'. \text{finite-profile } V \ A \ p' \wedge (\forall v'. v' \notin V \longrightarrow p' \ v' = \{\})\} = \{\}$
by *auto*
moreover have $\text{infinite } A \vee \text{infinite } V \vee A = \{\}$
using *not-fin-empty*
by *simp*
ultimately show $\text{all-profiles } V \ A = \{p'. \text{finite-profile } V \ A \ p'\}$
by *blast*
qed

4.4.4 Soundness

lemma (*in result*) \mathcal{R} -*sound*:
fixes
 $K :: ('a, 'v, 'r \text{ Result}) \text{ Consensus-Class}$ **and**
 $d :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election Distance}$
shows *electoral-module* ($\text{distance-}\mathcal{R} \ d \ K$)
proof (*unfold electoral-module-def, safe*)
fix
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $V :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$
have $\mathcal{R}_W \ d \ K \ V \ A \ p \subseteq (\text{limit-set } A \ UNIV)$
using $\mathcal{R}_W.\text{sims arg-min-subset}$
by *metis*
hence *set-equals-partition* ($\text{limit-set } A \ UNIV$) ($\text{distance-}\mathcal{R} \ d \ K \ V \ A \ p$)
by *auto*
moreover have *disjoint3* ($\text{distance-}\mathcal{R} \ d \ K \ V \ A \ p$)
by *simp*
ultimately show *well-formed* A ($\text{distance-}\mathcal{R} \ d \ K \ V \ A \ p$)
using *result-axioms*
unfolding *result-def*
by *simp*
qed

4.4.5 Inference Rules

lemma *is-arg-min-equal*:
fixes
 $f :: 'a \Rightarrow 'b::\text{ord}$ **and**
 $g :: 'a \Rightarrow 'b$ **and**
 $S :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $x :: 'a$
assumes $\forall x \in S. f \ x = g \ x$
shows $\text{is-arg-min } f \ (\lambda s. s \in S) \ x = \text{is-arg-min } g \ (\lambda s. s \in S) \ x$
proof (*unfold is-arg-min-def, cases* $x \in S$)
case *False*
thus $(x \in S \wedge (\nexists y. y \in S \wedge f \ y < f \ x)) = (x \in S \wedge (\nexists y. y \in S \wedge g \ y < g \ x))$
by *simp*
next

```

case x-in-S: True
thus  $(x \in S \wedge (\nexists y. y \in S \wedge f y < f x)) = (x \in S \wedge (\nexists y. y \in S \wedge g y < g x))$ 
proof (cases  $\exists y. (\lambda s. s \in S) y \wedge f y < f x$ )
  case y: True
  then obtain y :: 'a where
     $(\lambda s. s \in S) y \wedge f y < f x$ 
  by metis
  hence  $(\lambda s. s \in S) y \wedge g y < g x$ 
  using x-in-S assms
  by metis
thus ?thesis
  using y
  by metis
next
case not-y: False
have  $\neg (\exists y. (\lambda s. s \in S) y \wedge g y < g x)$ 
proof (safe)
  fix y :: 'a
  assume
    y-in-S:  $y \in S$  and
    g-y-lt-g-x:  $g y < g x$ 
  have f-eq-g-for-elems-in-S:  $\forall a. a \in S \longrightarrow f a = g a$ 
  using assms
  by simp
  hence  $g x = f x$ 
  using x-in-S
  by presburger
thus False
  using f-eq-g-for-elems-in-S g-y-lt-g-x not-y y-in-S
  by (metis (no-types))
qed
thus ?thesis
using x-in-S not-y
by simp
qed
qed

```

```

lemma (in result) standard-distance-imp-equal-score:
fixes
  d :: ('a, 'v) Election Distance and
  K :: ('a, 'v, 'r Result) Consensus-Class and
  A :: 'a set and
  V :: 'v set and
  p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
  w :: 'r
assumes
  irr-non-V: non-voters-irrelevant d and
  std: standard d
shows score d K (A, V, p) w = score-std d K (A, V, p) w

```

```

proof –
  have profile-perm-set:
    all-profiles  $V\ A =$ 
       $\{p' :: ('a, 'v)\ \text{Profile. finite-profile } V\ A\ p'\}$ 
    using profile-permutation-set
    by metis
  hence eq-intersect:  $\mathcal{K}_\mathcal{E}\text{-std } K\ w\ A\ V =$ 
     $\mathcal{K}_\mathcal{E}\ K\ w \cap \text{Pair } A\ ' \text{Pair } V\ ' \{p' :: ('a, 'v)\ \text{Profile. finite-profile } V\ A\ p'\}$ 
    by force
  have inf-eq-inf-for-std-cons:
     $\text{Inf } (d\ (A, V, p)\ ' (\mathcal{K}_\mathcal{E}\ K\ w)) =$ 
       $\text{Inf } (d\ (A, V, p)\ ' (\mathcal{K}_\mathcal{E}\ K\ w \cap$ 
         $\text{Pair } A\ ' \text{Pair } V\ ' \{p' :: ('a, 'v)\ \text{Profile. finite-profile } V\ A\ p'\}))$ 
  proof –
    have  $(\mathcal{K}_\mathcal{E}\ K\ w \cap \text{Pair } A\ ' \text{Pair } V\ ' \{p' :: ('a, 'v)\ \text{Profile. finite-profile } V\ A\ p'\})$ 
       $\subseteq (\mathcal{K}_\mathcal{E}\ K\ w)$ 
    by simp
    hence  $\text{Inf } (d\ (A, V, p)\ ' (\mathcal{K}_\mathcal{E}\ K\ w)) \leq$ 
       $\text{Inf } (d\ (A, V, p)\ ' (\mathcal{K}_\mathcal{E}\ K\ w \cap$ 
         $\text{Pair } A\ ' \text{Pair } V\ ' \{p' :: ('a, 'v)\ \text{Profile. finite-profile } V\ A\ p'\}))$ 
    using INF-superset-mono dual-order.refl
    by metis
  moreover have  $\text{Inf } (d\ (A, V, p)\ ' (\mathcal{K}_\mathcal{E}\ K\ w)) \geq$ 
     $\text{Inf } (d\ (A, V, p)\ ' (\mathcal{K}_\mathcal{E}\ K\ w \cap$ 
       $\text{Pair } A\ ' \text{Pair } V\ ' \{p' :: ('a, 'v)\ \text{Profile. finite-profile } V\ A\ p'\}))$ 
  proof (rule INF-greatest)
    let  $?inf = \text{Inf } (d\ (A, V, p)\ ' (\mathcal{K}_\mathcal{E}\ K\ w \cap \text{Pair } A\ ' \text{Pair } V\ ' \{p'. \text{finite-profile } V\ A\ p'\}))$ 
    let  $?compl = (\mathcal{K}_\mathcal{E}\ K\ w) - (\mathcal{K}_\mathcal{E}\ K\ w \cap \text{Pair } A\ ' \text{Pair } V\ ' \{p'. \text{finite-profile } V\ A\ p'\})$ 
    fix  $i :: ('a, 'v)\ \text{Election}$ 
    assume  $el: i \in \mathcal{K}_\mathcal{E}\ K\ w$ 
    have in-intersect:  $i \in (\mathcal{K}_\mathcal{E}\ K\ w \cap \text{Pair } A\ ' \text{Pair } V\ ' \{p'. \text{finite-profile } V\ A\ p'\})$ 
   $p'\}$ 
     $\implies ?inf \leq d\ (A, V, p)\ i$ 
    using Complete-Lattices.complete-lattice-class.INF-lower
    by metis
    have  $i \in ?compl \implies (V \neq \text{fst } (\text{snd } i)$ 
       $\vee A \neq \text{fst } i$ 
       $\vee \neg \text{finite-profile } V\ A\ (\text{snd } (\text{snd } i)))$ 
    by fastforce
    moreover have  $V \neq \text{fst } (\text{snd } i) \implies d\ (A, V, p)\ i = \infty$ 
    using std prod.collapse
    unfolding standard-def
    by metis
    moreover have  $A \neq \text{fst } i \implies d\ (A, V, p)\ i = \infty$ 
    using std prod.collapse
    unfolding standard-def
    by metis

```

```

moreover have  $V = \text{fst } (\text{snd } i) \wedge A = \text{fst } i$ 
 $\wedge \neg \text{finite-profile } V \ A \ (\text{snd } (\text{snd } i)) \longrightarrow \text{False}$ 
using el
by fastforce
ultimately have
 $i \in ?\text{compl} \implies \text{Inf } (d \ (A, V, p) \ ' \$ 
 $(\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}} \ K \ w \cap \text{Pair } A \ ' \ \text{Pair } V \ ' \ \{p'. \text{finite-profile } V \ A \ p'\}))$ 
 $\leq d \ (A, V, p) \ i$ 
using ereal-less-eq
by metis
thus  $\text{Inf } (d \ (A, V, p) \ ' \$ 
 $(\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}} \ K \ w \cap$ 
 $\text{Pair } A \ ' \ \text{Pair } V \ ' \ \{p'. \text{finite-profile } V \ A \ p'\}))$ 
 $\leq d \ (A, V, p) \ i$ 
using in-intersect el
by blast
qed
ultimately show
 $\text{Inf } (d \ (A, V, p) \ ' \ \mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}} \ K \ w) =$ 
 $\text{Inf } (d \ (A, V, p) \ ' \$ 
 $(\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}} \ K \ w \cap \text{Pair } A \ ' \ \text{Pair } V \ ' \ \{p'. \text{finite-profile } V \ A \ p'\}))$ 
by simp
qed
also have inf-eq-min-for-std-cons:
 $\dots = \text{score-std } d \ K \ (A, V, p) \ w$ 
proof (cases  $\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}}\text{-std } K \ w \ A \ V = \{\}$ )
case True
hence  $\text{Inf } (d \ (A, V, p) \ ' \$ 
 $(\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}} \ K \ w \cap \text{Pair } A \ ' \ \text{Pair } V \ ' \$ 
 $\{p'. \text{finite-profile } V \ A \ p'\})) = \infty$ 
using eq-intersect
using top-ereal-def
by simp
also have  $\text{score-std } d \ K \ (A, V, p) \ w = \infty$ 
using True
unfolding Let-def
by simp
finally show ?thesis
by simp
next
case False
hence fin:  $\text{finite } A \wedge \text{finite } V$ 
using eq-intersect
by blast
have  $\text{finite } (d \ (A, V, p) \ ' (\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}}\text{-std } K \ w \ A \ V))$ 
proof –
have  $\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}}\text{-std } K \ w \ A \ V = (\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}} \ K \ w) \cap$ 
 $\{(A, V, p') \mid p'. \text{finite-profile } V \ A \ p'\}$ 
using eq-intersect

```


by *blast*
 hence *subset*: $d(A, V, p) \text{ ' } (\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}}\text{-std } K \text{ w } A \text{ } V) \subseteq$
 $d(A, V, p) \text{ ' } \{(A, V, p') \mid p'. \text{ finite-profile } V \text{ } A \text{ } p'\}$
 by *blast*
 let $?finite\text{-}prof = \lambda p' v. (\text{if } (v \in V) \text{ then } p' v \text{ else } \{\})$
 have $\forall p'. \text{ finite-profile } V \text{ } A \text{ } p' \longrightarrow$
 $\text{ finite-profile } V \text{ } A \text{ } (?finite\text{-}prof p')$
 unfolding *If-def profile-def*
 by *simp*
 moreover have $\forall p'. (\forall v. v \notin V \longrightarrow ?finite\text{-}prof p' v = \{\})$
 by *simp*
 ultimately have
 $\forall (A', V', p') \in \{(A', V', p'). A' = A \wedge V' = V \wedge \text{ finite-profile } V \text{ } A \text{ } p'\}.$
 $(A', V', ?finite\text{-}prof p') \in \{(A, V, p') \mid p'. \text{ finite-profile } V \text{ } A \text{ } p'\}$
 by *force*
 moreover have $\forall p'. d(A, V, p) (A, V, p') = d(A, V, p) (A, V, ?finite\text{-}prof$
 $p')$
 using *irr-non-V*
 unfolding *non-voters-irrelevant-def*
 by *simp*
 ultimately have
 $\forall (A', V', p') \in \{(A, V, p') \mid p'. \text{ finite-profile } V \text{ } A \text{ } p'\}.$
 $(\exists (X, Y, z) \in \{(A, V, p') \mid p'. \text{ finite-profile } V \text{ } A \text{ } p'$
 $\wedge (\forall v. v \notin V \longrightarrow p' v = \{\})\}.$
 $d(A, V, p) (A', V', p') = d(A, V, p) (X, Y, z))$
 by *fastforce*
 hence $\forall (A', V', p') \in \{(A', V', p'). A' = A \wedge V' = V \wedge \text{ finite-profile } V \text{ } A$
 $p'\}.$
 $d(A, V, p) (A', V', p') \in$
 $d(A, V, p) \text{ ' } \{(A, V, p') \mid p'. \text{ finite-profile } V \text{ } A \text{ } p'$
 $\wedge (\forall v. v \notin V \longrightarrow p' v = \{\})\}$
 by *fastforce*
 hence *subset-2*: $d(A, V, p) \text{ ' } \{(A, V, p') \mid p'. \text{ finite-profile } V \text{ } A \text{ } p'\}$
 $\subseteq d(A, V, p) \text{ ' } \{(A, V, p') \mid p'. \text{ finite-profile } V \text{ } A \text{ } p'$
 $\wedge (\forall v. v \notin V \longrightarrow p' v = \{\})\}$
 by *fastforce*
 have $\forall (A', V', p') \in \{(A, V, p') \mid p'. \text{ finite-profile } V \text{ } A \text{ } p'$
 $\wedge (\forall v. v \notin V \longrightarrow p' v = \{\})\}.$
 $(\forall v \in V. \text{ linear-order-on } A (p' v))$
 $\wedge (\forall v. v \notin V \longrightarrow p' v = \{\})$
 using *fin*
 unfolding *profile-def*
 by *simp*
 hence $\{(A, V, p') \mid p'. \text{ finite-profile } V \text{ } A \text{ } p'$
 $\wedge (\forall v. v \notin V \longrightarrow p' v = \{\})\}$
 $\subseteq \{(A, V, p') \mid p'. p' \in \{p'. (\forall v \in V. \text{ linear-order-on } A (p' v))$
 $\wedge (\forall v. v \notin V \longrightarrow p' v = \{\})\}\}$
 by *blast*
 moreover have *finite* $\{(A, V, p') \mid p'. p' \in \{p'. (\forall v \in V. \text{ linear-order-on } A$

$(p' v))$
 $\wedge (\forall v. v \notin V \longrightarrow p' v = \{\})\}$
proof –
have $\{p'. (\forall v \in V. \text{linear-order-on } A (p' v)) \wedge (\forall v. v \notin V \longrightarrow p' v = \{\})\}$
 $\subseteq \text{all-profiles } V A \cap \{p. \forall v. v \notin V \longrightarrow p v = \{\}\}$
using *lin-order-pl- α fin*
by *fastforce*
moreover have *finite* $(\text{all-profiles } V A \cap \{p. \forall v. v \notin V \longrightarrow p v = \{\}\})$
using *fin fin-all-profs*
by *blast*
ultimately have *finite* $\{p'. (\forall v \in V. \text{linear-order-on } A (p' v)) \wedge (\forall v. v \notin V \longrightarrow p' v = \{\})\}$
using *rev-finite-subset*
by *blast*
thus *?thesis*
by *simp*
qed
ultimately have *finite* $\{(A, V, p') \mid p'. \text{finite-profile } V A p' \wedge (\forall v. v \notin V \longrightarrow p' v = \{\})\}$
using *rev-finite-subset*
by *simp*
hence *finite* $(d (A, V, p) \text{ ‘ } \{(A, V, p') \mid p'. \text{finite-profile } V A p' \wedge (\forall v. v \notin V \longrightarrow p' v = \{\})\})$
by *simp*
hence *finite* $(d (A, V, p) \text{ ‘ } \{(A, V, p') \mid p'. \text{finite-profile } V A p'\})$
using *subset-2 rev-finite-subset*
by *simp*
thus *?thesis*
using *subset rev-finite-subset*
by *blast*
qed
moreover have $d (A, V, p) \text{ ‘ } (\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}}\text{-std } K w A V) \neq \{\}$
using *False*
by *simp*
ultimately have $\text{Inf } (d (A, V, p) \text{ ‘ } (\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}}\text{-std } K w A V)) = \text{Min } (d (A, V, p) \text{ ‘ } (\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}}\text{-std } K w A V))$
using *Min-Inf False*
by *metis*
also have $\dots = \text{score-std } d K (A, V, p) w$
using *False*
by *simp*
also have $\text{Inf } (d (A, V, p) \text{ ‘ } (\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}}\text{-std } K w A V)) = \text{Inf } (d (A, V, p) \text{ ‘ } (\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}} K w \cap \text{Pair } A \text{ ‘ Pair } V \text{ ‘ } \{p'. \text{finite-profile } V A p'\}))$
using *eq-intersect*
by *simp*
ultimately show *?thesis*
by *simp*

```

qed
finally show  $\text{score } d \ K \ (A, V, p) \ w = \text{score-std } d \ K \ (A, V, p) \ w$ 
  by simp
qed

lemma (in result) anonymous-distance-and-consensus-imp-rule-anonymity:
  fixes
     $d :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election Distance}$  and
     $K :: ('a, 'v, 'r \text{ Result}) \text{ Consensus-Class}$ 
  assumes
     $d\text{-anon}$ : distance-anonymity  $d$  and
     $K\text{-anon}$ : consensus-rule-anonymity  $K$ 
  shows anonymity ( $\text{distance-}\mathcal{R} \ d \ K$ )
proof (unfold anonymity-def Let-def, safe)
  show electoral-module ( $\text{distance-}\mathcal{R} \ d \ K$ )
    using  $\mathcal{R}\text{-sound}$ 
    by metis
next
fix
   $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
   $A' :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
   $V :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
   $V' :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
   $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$  and
   $q :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$  and
   $\pi :: 'v \Rightarrow 'v$ 
assume
   $\text{fin-}A$ : finite  $A$  and
   $\text{fin-}V$ : finite  $V$  and
   $\text{profile-}p$ : profile  $V \ A \ p$  and
   $\text{profile-}q$ : profile  $V' \ A' \ q$  and
   $\text{bij}$ : bij  $\pi$  and
   $\text{renamed}$ :  $\text{rename } \pi \ (A, V, p) = (A', V', q)$ 
have  $A = A'$ 
  using  $\text{bij renamed}$ 
  by simp
hence  $\text{eq-univ}$ :  $\text{limit-set } A \ \text{UNIV} = \text{limit-set } A' \ \text{UNIV}$ 
  by simp
hence  $\mathcal{R}_W \ d \ K \ V \ A \ p = \mathcal{R}_W \ d \ K \ V' \ A' \ q$ 
proof –
  have  $\text{dist-rename-inv}$ :
     $\forall E :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election. } d \ (A, V, p) \ E = d \ (A', V', q) \ (\text{rename } \pi \ E)$ 
    using  $d\text{-anon bij renamed surj-pair}$ 
    unfolding  $\text{distance-anonymity-def}$ 
    by metis
  hence  $\forall S :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election set.}$ 
     $(d \ (A, V, p) \ `S) \subseteq (d \ (A', V', q) \ `(\text{rename } \pi \ `S))$ 
    by blast
  moreover have  $\forall S :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election set.}$ 

```

$((d(A', V', q) \text{ ' } (\text{rename } \pi \text{ ' } S)) \subseteq (d(A, V, p) \text{ ' } S))$
proof (*clarify*)
fix
 $S :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election set}$ **and**
 $X :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $X' :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $Y :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**
 $Y' :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**
 $z :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ **and**
 $z' :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$
assume
 $(X', Y', z') = \text{rename } \pi (X, Y, z)$ **and**
 $el: (X, Y, z) \in S$
hence $d(A', V', q) (X', Y', z') = d(A, V, p) (X, Y, z)$
using *dist-rename-inv*
by *simp*
thus $d(A', V', q) (X', Y', z') \in d(A, V, p) \text{ ' } S$
using *el*
by *simp*
qed
ultimately have *eq-range*: $\forall S::('a, 'v) \text{ Election set.}$
 $(d(A, V, p) \text{ ' } S) = (d(A', V', q) \text{ ' } (\text{rename } \pi \text{ ' } S))$
by *blast*
have $\forall w. \text{rename } \pi \text{ ' } (\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}} K w) \subseteq (\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}} K w)$
proof (*clarify*)
fix
 $w :: 'r$ **and**
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $A' :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $V :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**
 $V' :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ **and**
 $p' :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$
assume
 $\text{renamed}: (A', V', p') = \text{rename } \pi (A, V, p)$ **and**
 $\text{consensus}: (A, V, p) \in \mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}} K w$
hence *cons*:
 $(\text{consensus-}\mathcal{K} K) (A, V, p) \wedge \text{finite-profile } V A p \wedge \text{elect } (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} K) V A p$
 $= \{w\}$
by *simp*
hence *fin-img*: $\text{finite-profile } V' A' p'$
using *renamed bij rename.simps fst-conv rename-finite*
by *metis*
hence *cons-img*: $\text{consensus-}\mathcal{K} K (A', V', p') \wedge (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} K V A p = \text{rule-}\mathcal{K} K V' A' p')$
using *K-anon renamed bij cons*
unfolding *consensus-rule-anonymity-def Let-def*
by *simp*
hence *elect* $(\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} K) V' A' p' = \{w\}$

```

    using cons
    by simp
  thus  $(A', V', p') \in \mathcal{K}_\mathcal{E} K w$ 
    using cons-img fin-img
    by simp
qed
moreover have  $\forall w. (\mathcal{K}_\mathcal{E} K w) \subseteq \text{rename } \pi \text{ ` } (\mathcal{K}_\mathcal{E} K w)$ 
proof (clarify)
  fix
    w :: 'r and
    A :: 'a set and
    V :: 'v set and
    p :: ('a, 'v) Profile
  assume consensus:  $(A, V, p) \in \mathcal{K}_\mathcal{E} K w$ 
  let ?inv = rename (the-inv  $\pi$ ) (A, V, p)
  have inv-inv-id: the-inv (the-inv  $\pi$ ) =  $\pi$ 
    using the-inv-f-f bij bij-betw-imp-inj-on bij-betw-imp-surj
      inj-on-the-inv-into surj-imp-inv-eq the-inv-into-onto
    by (metis (no-types, opaque-lifting))
  hence ?inv =  $(A, ((\text{the-inv } \pi) \text{ ` } V), p \circ (\text{the-inv } (\text{the-inv } \pi)))$ 
    by simp
  moreover have  $(p \circ (\text{the-inv } (\text{the-inv } \pi))) \circ (\text{the-inv } \pi) = p$ 
    using bij inv-inv-id
    unfolding bij-betw-def comp-def
    by (simp add: f-the-inv-into-f)
  moreover have  $\pi \text{ ` } (\text{the-inv } \pi) \text{ ` } V = V$ 
    using bij the-inv-f-f bij-betw-def image-inv-into-cancel
      surj-imp-inv-eq top-greatest
    by (metis (no-types, opaque-lifting))
  ultimately have preimg: rename  $\pi$  ?inv =  $(A, V, p)$ 
    unfolding Let-def
    by simp
  moreover have ?inv  $\in \mathcal{K}_\mathcal{E} K w$ 
proof -
  have cons:
     $(\text{consensus-}\mathcal{K} K) (A, V, p) \wedge \text{finite-profile } V A p \wedge \text{elect } (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} K) V A$ 
  p = {w}
    using consensus
    by simp
  moreover have bij-inv: bij (the-inv  $\pi$ )
    using bij bij-betw-the-inv-into
    by metis
  moreover have fin-preimg: finite-profile (fst (snd ?inv)) (fst ?inv) (snd
(snd ?inv))
    using bij-inv rename.simps fst-conv rename-finite cons
    by fastforce
  ultimately have cons-preimg:
     $\text{consensus-}\mathcal{K} K ?inv \wedge$ 
     $(\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} K V A p = \text{rule-}\mathcal{K} K (\text{fst } (\text{snd } ?inv)) (\text{fst } ?inv) (\text{snd } (\text{snd }$ 
```

```

?inv)))
  using K-anon renamed bij cons
  unfolding consensus-rule-anonymity-def Let-def
  by simp
  hence elect (rule- $\mathcal{K}$  K) (fst (snd ?inv)) (fst ?inv) (snd (snd ?inv)) = {w}
  using cons
  by simp
  thus ?thesis
  using cons-preimg fin-preimg
  by simp
qed
ultimately show (A, V, p)  $\in$  rename  $\pi$  '  $\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}}$  K w
  using image-eqI
  by metis
qed
ultimately have  $\forall w. (\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}}$  K w) = rename  $\pi$  ' ( $\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}}$  K w)
  by blast
  hence  $\forall w. \text{score } d \text{ K } (A, V, p) w = \text{score } d \text{ K } (A', V', q) w$ 
  using eq-range
  by simp
  hence arg-min-set (score d K (A, V, p)) (limit-set A UNIV)
    = arg-min-set (score d K (A', V', q)) (limit-set A' UNIV)
  using eq-univ
  by presburger
  thus  $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}} d \text{ K } V A p = \mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}} d \text{ K } V' A' q$ 
  by simp
qed
thus distance- $\mathcal{R} d \text{ K } V A p = \text{distance-}\mathcal{R} d \text{ K } V' A' q$ 
  using eq-univ
  by simp
qed
end

```

4.5 Votewise Distance Rationalization

```

theory Votewise-Distance-Rationalization
  imports Distance-Rationalization
    Votewise-Distance
begin

```

A votewise distance rationalization of a voting rule is its distance rationalization with a distance function that depends on the submitted votes in a simple and a transparent manner by using a distance on individual orders and combining the components with a norm on \mathbb{R} to \mathbb{N} .

4.5.1 Common Rationalizations

```

fun swap- $\mathcal{R}$  :: ('a, 'v::linorder, 'a Result) Consensus-Class  $\Rightarrow$ 
  ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module where
  swap- $\mathcal{R}$  K = social-choice-result.distance- $\mathcal{R}$  (votewise-distance swap l-one) K

```

4.5.2 Theorems

```

lemma votewise-non-voters-irrelevant:
  fixes
    d :: 'a Vote Distance and
    N :: Norm
  shows non-voters-irrelevant (votewise-distance d N)
proof (unfold non-voters-irrelevant-def, clarify)
  fix
    A :: 'a set and
    V :: 'v::linorder set and
    p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    A' :: 'a set and
    V' :: 'v set and
    p' :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    q :: ('a, 'v) Profile
  assume coincide:  $\forall v \in V. p\ v = q\ v$ 
  have  $\forall i < \text{length}(\text{sorted-list-of-set } V). (\text{sorted-list-of-set } V)!i \in V$ 
  using card-eq-0-iff not-less-zero nth-mem
    sorted-list-of-set.length-sorted-key-list-of-set
    sorted-list-of-set.set-sorted-key-list-of-set
  by metis
  hence (to-list V p) = (to-list V q)
  using coincide length-map nth-equalityI to-list.simps
  by auto
  thus votewise-distance d N (A, V, p) (A', V', p') =
    votewise-distance d N (A, V, q) (A', V', p')  $\wedge$ 
    votewise-distance d N (A', V', p') (A, V, p) =
    votewise-distance d N (A', V', p') (A, V, q)
  unfolding votewise-distance.simps
  by presburger
qed

```

lemma swap-standard: standard (votewise-distance swap l-one)

```

proof (unfold standard-def, clarify)
  fix
    A :: 'a set and
    V :: 'v::linorder set and
    p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    A' :: 'a set and
    V' :: 'v set and
    p' :: ('a, 'v) Profile
  assume assms:  $V \neq V' \vee A \neq A'$ 
  let ?l = ( $\lambda l1\ l2. (\text{map2 } (\lambda q\ q'. \text{swap } (A, q) (A', q'))\ l1\ l2)$ )

```

```

have  $A \neq A' \wedge V = V' \wedge V \neq \{\}$   $\wedge$  finite  $V \implies \forall q q'. \text{swap } (A, q) (A', q')$ 
=  $\infty$ 
  by simp
hence  $A \neq A' \wedge V = V' \wedge V \neq \{\}$   $\wedge$  finite  $V \implies$ 
 $\forall l1 l2. (l1 \neq [] \wedge l2 \neq [] \longrightarrow (\forall i < \text{length } (?l l1 l2). (?l l1 l2)!i = \infty))$ 
  by simp
moreover have  $V = V' \wedge V \neq \{\}$   $\wedge$  finite  $V \implies (\text{to-list } V p) \neq [] \wedge (\text{to-list } V' p') \neq []$ 
  using card-eq-0-iff length-map list.size(3) to-list.simps
  sorted-list-of-set.length-sorted-key-list-of-set
  by metis
moreover have  $\forall l. (\exists i < \text{length } l. !i = \infty) \longrightarrow \text{l-one } l = \infty$ 
proof (safe)
  fix
     $l :: \text{ereal list}$  and
     $i :: \text{nat}$ 
  assume
     $i < \text{length } l$  and
     $l ! i = \infty$ 
  hence  $(\sum j < \text{length } l. |l[j]|) = \infty$ 
    using sum-Pinfy abs-ereal.simps(3) finite-lessThan lessThan-iff
  by metis
  thus  $\text{l-one } l = \infty$ 
  by auto
qed
ultimately have  $A \neq A' \wedge V = V' \wedge V \neq \{\}$   $\wedge$  finite  $V \implies$ 
 $\text{l-one } (?l (\text{to-list } V p) (\text{to-list } V' p')) = \infty$ 
  using length-greater-0-conv map-is-Nil-conv zip-eq-Nil-iff
  by metis
hence  $A \neq A' \wedge V = V' \wedge V \neq \{\}$   $\wedge$  finite  $V \implies$ 
 $\text{votewise-distance swap l-one } (A, V, p) (A', V', p') = \infty$ 
  by simp
moreover have  $V \neq V' \implies \text{votewise-distance swap l-one } (A, V, p) (A', V', p') = \infty$ 
  by simp
moreover have  $A \neq A' \wedge V = \{\}$   $\implies \text{votewise-distance swap l-one } (A, V, p) (A', V', p') = \infty$ 
  by simp
moreover have infinite  $V \implies \text{votewise-distance swap l-one } (A, V, p) (A', V', p') = \infty$ 
  by simp
moreover have  $(A \neq A' \wedge V = V' \wedge V \neq \{\} \wedge \text{finite } V) \vee \text{infinite } V \vee (A \neq A' \wedge V = \{\}) \vee V \neq V'$ 
  using assms
  by blast
ultimately show  $\text{votewise-distance swap l-one } (A, V, p) (A', V', p') = \infty$ 
  by fastforce
qed

```


4.5.3 Equivalence Lemmas

type-synonym $(\text{'a}, \text{'v}) \text{ score-type} = (\text{'a}, \text{'v}) \text{ Election Distance} \Rightarrow$
 $(\text{'a}, \text{'v}, \text{'a Result}) \text{ Consensus-Class} \Rightarrow (\text{'a}, \text{'v}) \text{ Election} \Rightarrow \text{'a} \Rightarrow \text{ereal}$

type-synonym $(\text{'a}, \text{'v}) \text{ dist-rat-type} = (\text{'a}, \text{'v}) \text{ Election Distance} \Rightarrow$
 $(\text{'a}, \text{'v}, \text{'a Result}) \text{ Consensus-Class} \Rightarrow \text{'v set} \Rightarrow \text{'a set} \Rightarrow (\text{'a}, \text{'v}) \text{ Profile}$
 $\Rightarrow \text{'a set}$

type-synonym $(\text{'a}, \text{'v}) \text{ dist-rat-std-type} = (\text{'a}, \text{'v}) \text{ Election Distance} \Rightarrow$
 $(\text{'a}, \text{'v}, \text{'a Result}) \text{ Consensus-Class} \Rightarrow (\text{'a}, \text{'v}, \text{'a Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$

type-synonym $(\text{'a}, \text{'v}) \text{ dist-type} = (\text{'a}, \text{'v}) \text{ Election Distance} \Rightarrow$
 $(\text{'a}, \text{'v}, \text{'a Result}) \text{ Consensus-Class} \Rightarrow (\text{'a}, \text{'v}, \text{'a Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$

lemma *equal-score-swap*: $(\text{score}::((\text{'a}, \text{'v}::\text{linorder}) \text{ score-type})) (\text{votewise-distance}$
 $\text{swap l-one}) =$
 $\text{score-std } (\text{votewise-distance swap l-one})$
using *votewise-non-voters-irrelevant swap-standard*
 $\text{social-choice-result.standard-distance-imp-equal-score}$
by *fast*

lemma *swap- \mathcal{R} -code*[code]: $\text{swap-}\mathcal{R} =$
 $(\text{social-choice-result.distance-}\mathcal{R}\text{-std}::((\text{'a}, \text{'v}::\text{linorder}) \text{ dist-rat-std-type}))$
 $(\text{votewise-distance swap l-one})$

proof –

from *equal-score-swap*

have

$\forall K E a. (\text{score}::((\text{'a}, \text{'v}::\text{linorder}) \text{ score-type}))$
 $(\text{votewise-distance swap l-one}) K E a =$
 $\text{score-std } (\text{votewise-distance swap l-one}) K E a$

by *metis*

hence $\forall K V A p. (\text{social-choice-result.}\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{V}}::((\text{'a}, \text{'v}::\text{linorder}) \text{ dist-rat-type}))$
 $(\text{votewise-distance swap l-one}) K V A p =$
 $\text{social-choice-result.}\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{V}}\text{-std}$
 $(\text{votewise-distance swap l-one}) K V A p$

by *(simp add: equal-score-swap)*

hence $\forall K V A p. (\text{social-choice-result.distance-}\mathcal{R}::((\text{'a}, \text{'v}::\text{linorder}) \text{ dist-type}))$
 $(\text{votewise-distance swap l-one}) K V A p$
 $= \text{social-choice-result.distance-}\mathcal{R}\text{-std}$
 $(\text{votewise-distance swap l-one}) K V A p$

by *fastforce*

thus *?thesis*

unfolding *swap- \mathcal{R} .simps*

by *blast*

qed

end

4.6 Symmetry in Distance-Rationalizable Rules

```
theory Distance-Rationalization-Symmetry
  imports Distance-Rationalization
begin
```

4.6.1 Minimizer function

```
fun inf-dist :: 'x Distance  $\Rightarrow$  'x set  $\Rightarrow$  'x  $\Rightarrow$  ereal where
  inf-dist d X a = Inf (d a ' X)

fun closest-preimg-dist :: ('x  $\Rightarrow$  'y)  $\Rightarrow$  'x set  $\Rightarrow$  'x Distance  $\Rightarrow$  'x  $\Rightarrow$  'y  $\Rightarrow$  ereal
where
  closest-preimg-dist f domain_f d x y = inf-dist d (preimg f domain_f y) x

fun minimizer :: ('x  $\Rightarrow$  'y)  $\Rightarrow$  'x set  $\Rightarrow$  'x Distance  $\Rightarrow$  'y set  $\Rightarrow$  'x  $\Rightarrow$  'y set where
  minimizer f domain_f d Y x = arg-min-set (closest-preimg-dist f domain_f d x) Y
```

Auxiliary Lemmas

```
lemma rewrite-arg-min-set:
  fixes
    f :: 'x  $\Rightarrow$  'y::linorder and
    X :: 'x set
  shows arg-min-set f X =  $\bigcup$  (preimg f X ' {y  $\in$  (f ' X).  $\forall$  z  $\in$  f ' X. y  $\leq$  z})
proof (safe)
  fix x :: 'x
  assume arg-min: x  $\in$  arg-min-set f X
  hence is-arg-min f ( $\lambda$  a. a  $\in$  X) x
    by simp
  hence  $\forall$  x'  $\in$  X. f x'  $\geq$  f x
    by (simp add: is-arg-min-linorder)
  hence  $\forall$  z  $\in$  f ' X. f x  $\leq$  z
    by blast
  moreover have f x  $\in$  f ' X
    using arg-min
    by (simp add: is-arg-min-linorder)
  ultimately have f x  $\in$  {y  $\in$  f ' X.  $\forall$  z  $\in$  f ' X. y  $\leq$  z}
    by blast
  moreover have x  $\in$  preimg f X (f x)
    using arg-min
    by (simp add: is-arg-min-linorder)
  ultimately show x  $\in$   $\bigcup$  (preimg f X ' {y  $\in$  (f ' X).  $\forall$  z  $\in$  f ' X. y  $\leq$  z})
    by blast
next
fix
  x :: 'x and
  x' :: 'x and
  b :: 'x
assume
```

same-img: $x \in \text{preimg } f \ X \ (f \ x')$ **and**
min: $\forall \ z \in f \ ' \ X. \ f \ x' \leq z$
hence $f \ x = f \ x'$
by *simp*
hence $\forall \ z \in f \ ' \ X. \ f \ x \leq z$
using *min*
by *simp*
moreover have $x \in X$
using *same-img*
by *simp*
ultimately show $x \in \text{arg-min-set } f \ X$
by (*simp add: is-arg-min-linorder*)
qed

Equivariance

lemma *restr-induced-rel*:

fixes

$X :: 'x \text{ set}$ **and**

$Y :: 'y \text{ set}$ **and**

$Y' :: 'y \text{ set}$ **and**

$\varphi :: ('x, 'y) \text{ binary-fun}$

assumes $Y' \subseteq Y$

shows $\text{Restr } (\text{rel-induced-by-action } X \ Y \ \varphi) \ Y' = \text{rel-induced-by-action } X \ Y' \ \varphi$

using *assms*

by *auto*

theorem *group-act-invar-dist-and-equivar-f-imp-equivar-minimizer*:

fixes

$f :: 'x \Rightarrow 'y$ **and**

$\text{domain}_f :: 'x \text{ set}$ **and**

$d :: 'x \text{ Distance}$ **and**

$\text{valid-img} :: 'x \Rightarrow 'y \text{ set}$ **and**

$X :: 'x \text{ set}$ **and**

$G :: 'z \text{ monoid}$ **and**

$\varphi :: ('z, 'x) \text{ binary-fun}$ **and**

$\psi :: ('z, 'y) \text{ binary-fun}$

defines $\text{equivar-prop-set-valued} \equiv \text{equivar-ind-by-act } (\text{carrier } G) \ X \ \varphi \ (\text{set-action } \psi)$

assumes

action- φ : *group-action* $G \ X \ \varphi$ **and**

group-act-res: *group-action* $G \ \text{UNIV} \ \psi$ **and**

dom-in-X: $\text{domain}_f \subseteq X$ **and**

closed-domain:

closed-under-restr-rel $(\text{rel-induced-by-action } (\text{carrier } G) \ X \ \varphi) \ X \ \text{domain}_f$ **and**

equivar-img: *satisfies valid-img equivar-prop-set-valued* **and**

invar-d: *invariant-dist* $d \ (\text{carrier } G) \ X \ \varphi$ **and**

equivar-f: *satisfies* $f \ (\text{equivar-ind-by-act } (\text{carrier } G) \ \text{domain}_f \ \varphi \ \psi)$

shows *satisfies* $(\lambda \ x. \text{minimizer } f \ \text{domain}_f \ d \ (\text{valid-img } x) \ x) \ \text{equivar-prop-set-valued}$

proof (*unfold equivar-ind-by-act-def equivar-prop-set-valued-def,*
simp del: arg-min-set.simps, clarify)

fix
 $x :: 'x$ **and**
 $g :: 'z$

assume
group-elem: $g \in \text{carrier } G$ **and**
x-in-X: $x \in X$ **and**
img-X: $\varphi \ g \ x \in X$

let $?x' = \varphi \ g \ x$
let $?c = \text{closest-preimg-dist } f \ \text{domain}_f \ d \ x$ **and**
 $?c' = \text{closest-preimg-dist } f \ \text{domain}_f \ d \ ?x'$

have $\forall y. \text{preimg } f \ \text{domain}_f \ y \subseteq X$
using *dom-in-X*
by *fastforce*

hence *invar-dist-img*:
 $\forall y. d \ x \ ' (\text{preimg } f \ \text{domain}_f \ y) = d \ ?x' \ ' (\varphi \ g \ ' (\text{preimg } f \ \text{domain}_f \ y))$
using *x-in-X group-elem invar-dist-image invar-d action-φ*
by *metis*

have $\forall y. \text{preimg } f \ \text{domain}_f \ (\psi \ g \ y) = (\varphi \ g) \ ' (\text{preimg } f \ \text{domain}_f \ y)$
using *group-act-equivar-f-imp-equivar-preimg[of G X φ ψ domain_f f] assms*
group-elem
by *blast*

hence $\forall y. d \ ?x' \ ' \text{preimg } f \ \text{domain}_f \ (\psi \ g \ y) = d \ ?x' \ ' (\varphi \ g) \ ' (\text{preimg } f \ \text{domain}_f \ y)$
by *presburger*

hence $\forall y. \text{Inf } (d \ ?x' \ ' \text{preimg } f \ \text{domain}_f \ (\psi \ g \ y)) = \text{Inf } (d \ x \ ' \text{preimg } f \ \text{domain}_f \ y)$
using *invar-dist-img*
by *metis*

hence $\forall y. \text{inf-dist } d \ (\text{preimg } f \ \text{domain}_f \ (\psi \ g \ y)) \ ?x' = \text{inf-dist } d \ (\text{preimg } f \ \text{domain}_f \ y) \ x$
by *simp*

hence $\forall y. \text{closest-preimg-dist } f \ \text{domain}_f \ d \ ?x' \ (\psi \ g \ y) = \text{closest-preimg-dist } f \ \text{domain}_f \ d \ x \ y$
by *simp*

hence *comp*: $\text{closest-preimg-dist } f \ \text{domain}_f \ d \ x = (\text{closest-preimg-dist } f \ \text{domain}_f \ d \ ?x') \circ (\psi \ g)$
by *auto*

hence $\forall Y \ \alpha. \text{preimg } ?c' \ (\psi \ g \ ' Y) \ \alpha = \psi \ g \ ' \text{preimg } ?c \ Y \ \alpha$
using *preimg-comp*
by *auto*

hence $\forall Y \ A. \{\text{preimg } ?c' \ (\psi \ g \ ' Y) \ \alpha \mid \alpha. \alpha \in A\} = \{\psi \ g \ ' \text{preimg } ?c \ Y \ \alpha \mid \alpha. \alpha \in A\}$
by *simp*

moreover **have** $\forall Y \ A. \{\psi \ g \ ' \text{preimg } ?c \ Y \ \alpha \mid \alpha. \alpha \in A\} = \{\psi \ g \ ' \beta \mid \beta. \beta \in \text{preimg } ?c \ Y \ ' A\}$
by *blast*

moreover **have** $\forall Y \ A. \text{preimg } ?c' \ (\psi \ g \ ' Y) \ ' A = \{\text{preimg } ?c' \ (\psi \ g \ ' Y) \ \alpha \mid$

$\alpha. \alpha \in A\}$
 by *blast*
 ultimately have
 $\forall Y A. \text{preimg } ?c' (\psi g \text{ ` } Y) \text{ ` } A = \{\psi g \text{ ` } \alpha \mid \alpha. \alpha \in \text{preimg } ?c Y \text{ ` } A\}$
 by *simp*
 hence $\forall Y A. \bigcup (\text{preimg } ?c' (\psi g \text{ ` } Y) \text{ ` } A) = \bigcup \{\psi g \text{ ` } \alpha \mid \alpha. \alpha \in \text{preimg } ?c Y \text{ ` } A\}$
 by *simp*
 moreover have $\forall Y A. \bigcup \{\psi g \text{ ` } \alpha \mid \alpha. \alpha \in \text{preimg } ?c Y \text{ ` } A\} = \psi g \text{ ` } \bigcup (\text{preimg } ?c Y \text{ ` } A)$
 by *blast*
 ultimately have *eq-preimg-unions*:
 $\forall Y A. \bigcup (\text{preimg } ?c' (\psi g \text{ ` } Y) \text{ ` } A) = \psi g \text{ ` } \bigcup (\text{preimg } ?c Y \text{ ` } A)$
 by *simp*
 have $\forall Y. ?c' \text{ ` } \psi g \text{ ` } Y = ?c \text{ ` } Y$
 using *comp*
 unfolding *image-comp*
 by *simp*
 hence $\forall Y. \{\alpha \in ?c \text{ ` } Y. \forall \beta \in ?c \text{ ` } Y. \alpha \leq \beta\} =$
 $\{\alpha \in ?c' \text{ ` } \psi g \text{ ` } Y. \forall \beta \in ?c' \text{ ` } \psi g \text{ ` } Y. \alpha \leq \beta\}$
 by *simp*
 hence
 $\forall Y. \text{arg-min-set } (\text{closest-preimg-dist } f \text{ domain}_f d \text{ ` } x') (\psi g \text{ ` } Y) =$
 $(\psi g) \text{ ` } (\text{arg-min-set } (\text{closest-preimg-dist } f \text{ domain}_f d x) Y)$
 using *rewrite-arg-min-set[of ?c'] rewrite-arg-min-set[of ?c] eq-preimg-unions*
 by *presburger*
 moreover have *valid-img* $(\varphi g x) = \psi g \text{ ` } \text{valid-img } x$
 using *equivar-img x-in-X group-elem img-X rewrite-equivar-ind-by-act*
 unfolding *equivar-prop-set-valued-def set-action.simps*
 by *metis*
 ultimately show
 $\text{arg-min-set } (\text{closest-preimg-dist } f \text{ domain}_f d (\varphi g x)) (\text{valid-img } (\varphi g x)) =$
 $\psi g \text{ ` } \text{arg-min-set } (\text{closest-preimg-dist } f \text{ domain}_f d x) (\text{valid-img } x)$
 by *presburger*
 qed

Invariance

lemma *closest-dist-invar-under-refl-rel-and-tot-invar-dist*:

fixes

$f :: 'x \Rightarrow 'y$ **and**
 $\text{domain}_f :: 'x \text{ set}$ **and**
 $d :: 'x \text{ Distance}$ **and**
 $\text{rel} :: 'x \text{ rel}$

assumes

r-refl: *refl-on domain_f (Restr rel domain_f)* **and**
tot-invar-d: *totally-invariant-dist d rel*

shows *satisfies (closest-preimg-dist f domain_f d) (Invariance rel)*

proof (*simp, safe, standard*)

```

fix
   $a :: 'x$  and
   $b :: 'x$  and
   $y :: 'y$ 
assume  $rel: (a, b) \in rel$ 
have  $\forall c \in domain_f. (c, c) \in rel$ 
  using  $r-refl$ 
  unfolding  $refl-on-def$ 
  by  $simp$ 
hence  $\forall c \in domain_f. d\ a\ c = d\ b\ c$ 
  using  $rel\ tot-invar-d$ 
  unfolding  $rewrite-totally-invariant-dist$ 
  by  $blast$ 
thus  $closest-preimg-dist\ f\ domain_f\ d\ a\ y = closest-preimg-dist\ f\ domain_f\ d\ b\ y$ 
  by  $simp$ 
qed

```

lemma *refl-rel-and-tot-invar-dist-imp-invar-minimizer:*

```

fixes
   $f :: 'x \Rightarrow 'y$  and
   $domain_f :: 'x\ set$  and
   $d :: 'x\ Distance$  and
   $rel :: 'x\ rel$  and
   $img :: 'y\ set$ 
assumes
   $r-refl: refl-on\ domain_f\ (Restr\ rel\ domain_f)$  and
   $tot-invar-d: totally-invariant-dist\ d\ rel$ 
shows  $satisfies\ (minimizer\ f\ domain_f\ d\ img)\ (Invariance\ rel)$ 
proof –
  have  $satisfies\ (closest-preimg-dist\ f\ domain_f\ d)\ (Invariance\ rel)$ 
    using  $r-refl\ tot-invar-d\ closest-dist-invar-under-refl-rel-and-tot-invar-dist$ 
    by  $simp$ 
  moreover have  $minimizer\ f\ domain_f\ d\ img =$ 
     $(\lambda\ x. arg-min-set\ x\ img) \circ (closest-preimg-dist\ f\ domain_f\ d)$ 
    unfolding  $comp-def$ 
    by  $auto$ 
  ultimately show ?thesis
    using  $invar-comp$ 
    by  $simp$ 
qed

```

theorem *group-act-invar-dist-and-invar-f-imp-invar-minimizer:*

```

fixes
   $f :: 'x \Rightarrow 'y$  and
   $domain_f :: 'x\ set$  and
   $d :: 'x\ Distance$  and
   $img :: 'y\ set$  and
   $X :: 'x\ set$  and
   $G :: 'z\ monoid$  and

```

$\varphi :: ('z, 'x) \text{ binary-fun}$
defines
 $rel \equiv \text{rel-induced-by-action } (carrier\ G)\ X\ \varphi \text{ and}$
 $rel' \equiv \text{rel-induced-by-action } (carrier\ G)\ domain_f\ \varphi$
assumes
 $action\text{-}\varphi: \text{group-action } G\ X\ \varphi \text{ and}$
 $domain_f \subseteq X \text{ and}$
 $closed\text{-}domain: \text{closed-under-restr-rel } rel\ X\ domain_f \text{ and}$

 $invar\text{-}d: \text{invariant-dist } d\ (carrier\ G)\ X\ \varphi \text{ and}$
 $invar\text{-}f: \text{satisfies } f\ (\text{Invariance } rel')$
shows $\text{satisfies } (minimizer\ f\ domain_f\ d\ img)\ (\text{Invariance } rel)$
proof –
let
 $? \psi = \lambda\ g.\ id \text{ and}$
 $?img = \lambda\ x.\ img$
have $\text{satisfies } f\ (\text{equivar-ind-by-act } (carrier\ G)\ domain_f\ \varphi\ ? \psi)$
using $invar\text{-}f\ \text{rewrite-invar-as-equivar}$
unfolding $rel'\text{-}def$
by $blast$
moreover have $\text{group-action } G\ UNIV\ ? \psi$
using $const\text{-}id\text{-is-group-act } action\text{-}\varphi$
unfolding $\text{group-action-def } \text{group-hom-def}$
by $blast$
moreover have $\text{satisfies } ?img\ (\text{equivar-ind-by-act } (carrier\ G)\ X\ \varphi\ (\text{set-action } ? \psi))$
unfolding $\text{equivar-ind-by-act-def}$
by $fastforce$
ultimately have
 $\text{satisfies } (\lambda\ x.\ minimizer\ f\ domain_f\ d\ (?img\ x)\ x)$
 $(\text{equivar-ind-by-act } (carrier\ G)\ X\ \varphi\ (\text{set-action } ? \psi))$
using $assms\ \text{group-act-invar-dist-and-equivar-f-imp-equivar-minimizer[of } G\ X\ \varphi\ ? \psi\ domain_f\ ?img\ d\ f]$
by $blast$
hence $\text{satisfies } (minimizer\ f\ domain_f\ d\ img)$
 $(\text{equivar-ind-by-act } (carrier\ G)\ X\ \varphi\ (\text{set-action } ? \psi))$
by $blast$
thus $?thesis$
unfolding $rel\text{-}def\ \text{set-action.simps}$
using $\text{rewrite-invar-as-equivar } image\text{-}id$
by $metis$
qed

4.6.2 Distance Rationalization as Minimizer

lemma $\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}}\text{-is-preimg}:$

fixes

$d :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election Distance and}$

$C :: ('a, 'v, 'r \text{ Result}) \text{ Consensus-Class and}$

$E :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election}$ **and**
 $w :: 'r$
shows $\text{preimg } (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \{w\} = \mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}} \ C \ w$
proof –
have $\text{preimg } (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \{w\} =$
 $\{E \in \text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C. (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) \ E = \{w\}\}$
by *simp*
also have $\{E \in \text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C. (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) \ E = \{w\}\} =$
 $\{E \in \text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C. \text{elect } (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C) (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E) (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E) = \{w\}\}$
by *simp*
also have
 $\{E \in \text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C. \text{elect } (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C) (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E) (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E) = \{w\}\} =$
 $\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C \cap \{E. \text{elect } (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C) (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E) (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E) = \{w\}\}$
by *blast*
also have
 $\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C \cap \{E. \text{elect } (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C) (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E) (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E) = \{w\}\}$
 $= \mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}} \ C \ w$
proof
show
 $\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C \cap \{E. \text{elect } (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C) (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E) (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E) = \{w\}\}$
 $\subseteq \mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}} \ C \ w$
unfolding $\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}}.\text{sims}$
by *force*
next
have
 $\forall E \in \mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}} \ C \ w. E \in \{E. \text{elect } (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C) (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E)$
 $(\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E) = \{w\}\}$
unfolding $\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}}.\text{sims}$
by *force*
hence $\forall E \in \mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}} \ C \ w. E \in$
 $\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C \cap \{E. \text{elect } (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C) (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E) (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E) = \{w\}\}$
by *simp*
thus $\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}} \ C \ w \subseteq \text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C \cap \{E. \text{elect } (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C) (\text{voters-}\mathcal{E} \ E)$
 $(\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) (\text{profile-}\mathcal{E} \ E) = \{w\}\}$
by *blast*
qed
finally show $\text{preimg } (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \{w\} = \mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}} \ C \ w$
by *simp*
qed

lemma *score-is-closest-preimg-dist:*
fixes
 $d :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election Distance}$ **and**

$C :: ('a, 'v, 'r \text{ Result}) \text{ Consensus-Class}$ **and**
 $E :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election}$ **and**
 $w :: 'r$
shows $\text{score } d \ C \ E \ w = \text{closest-preimg-dist } (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ d \ E \ \{w\}$
proof –
have $\text{score } d \ C \ E \ w = \text{Inf } (d \ E \ ' (\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}} \ C \ w))$
by *simp*
also have $\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}} \ C \ w = \text{preimg } (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ \{w\}$
using $\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{E}}\text{-is-preimg}$
by *metis*
also have $\text{Inf } (d \ E \ ' (\text{preimg } (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ \{w\}))$
 $= \text{closest-preimg-dist } (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ d \ E \ \{w\}$
by *simp*
finally show *?thesis*
by *simp*
qed

lemma (*in result*) $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}}\text{-is-minimizer}$:
fixes
 $d :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election Distance}$ **and**
 $C :: ('a, 'v, 'r \text{ Result}) \text{ Consensus-Class}$
shows $\text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}} \ d \ C) =$
 $(\lambda \ E. \bigcup (\text{minimizer } (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ d$
 $(\text{singleton-set-system } (\text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ \text{UNIV})) \ E))$
proof
fix $E :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election}$
let $?min = (\text{minimizer } (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ d$
 $(\text{singleton-set-system } (\text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ \text{UNIV})) \ E)$
have $?min = \text{arg-min-set}$
 $(\text{closest-preimg-dist } (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ d \ E)$
 $(\text{singleton-set-system } (\text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ \text{UNIV}))$
by *simp*
also have
 $\dots = \text{singleton-set-system } (\text{arg-min-set } (\text{score } d \ C \ E) (\text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ \text{UNIV}))$
proof (*safe*)
fix $R :: 'r \text{ set}$
assume
 $\text{min: } R \in \text{arg-min-set}$
 $(\text{closest-preimg-dist } (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ d \ E)$
 $(\text{singleton-set-system } (\text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ \text{UNIV}))$
hence $R \in \text{singleton-set-system } (\text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ \text{UNIV})$
using *arg-min-subset subsetD*
by (*metis* *(no-types, lifting)*)
then obtain $r :: 'r$ **where**
 $\text{res-singleton: } R = \{r\}$ **and**
 $\text{r-in-lim-set: } r \in \text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ \text{UNIV}$

```

    by auto
  have  $\nexists R'. R' \in \text{singleton-set-system } (\text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ \text{UNIV}) \wedge$ 
     $\text{closest-preimg-dist } (\text{elect-}r \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} \ (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) \ (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ d \ E \ R'$ 
     $< \text{closest-preimg-dist } (\text{elect-}r \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} \ (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) \ (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ d \ E \ R$ 
  using min arg-min-set.simps is-arg-min-def CollectD
  by (metis (mono-tags, lifting))
  hence  $\nexists r'. r' \in \text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ \text{UNIV} \wedge$ 
     $\text{closest-preimg-dist } (\text{elect-}r \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} \ (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) \ (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ d \ E \ \{r'\}$ 
     $< \text{closest-preimg-dist } (\text{elect-}r \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} \ (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) \ (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ d \ E$ 
 $\{r\}$ 
    using res-singleton
    by auto
  hence  $\nexists r'. r' \in \text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ \text{UNIV} \wedge \text{score } d \ C \ E \ r' < \text{score}$ 
 $d \ C \ E \ r$ 
    using score-is-closest-preimg-dist
    by metis
  hence  $r \in \text{arg-min-set } (\text{score } d \ C \ E) \ (\text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ \text{UNIV})$ 
    using r-in-lim-set arg-min-set.simps is-arg-min-def CollectI
    by metis
  thus  $R \in \text{singleton-set-system } (\text{arg-min-set } (\text{score } d \ C \ E) \ (\text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ \text{UNIV}))$ 
    using res-singleton
    by simp
  next
  fix  $R :: 'r \ \text{set}$ 
  assume
     $R \in \text{singleton-set-system } (\text{arg-min-set } (\text{score } d \ C \ E) \ (\text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ \text{UNIV}))$ 
  then obtain  $r :: 'r$  where
    res-singleton:  $R = \{r\}$  and
    r-min-lim-set:  $r \in \text{arg-min-set } (\text{score } d \ C \ E) \ (\text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ \text{UNIV})$ 
    by auto
  hence  $\nexists r'. r' \in \text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ \text{UNIV} \wedge \text{score } d \ C \ E \ r' < \text{score}$ 
 $d \ C \ E \ r$ 
    using CollectD arg-min-set.simps is-arg-min-def
    by metis
  hence  $\nexists r'. r' \in \text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ \text{UNIV} \wedge$ 
     $\text{closest-preimg-dist } (\text{elect-}r \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} \ (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) \ (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ d \ E \ \{r'\}$ 
     $< \text{closest-preimg-dist } (\text{elect-}r \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} \ (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) \ (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ d \ E$ 
 $\{r\}$ 
    using score-is-closest-preimg-dist
    by metis
  moreover have  $\forall R' \in \text{singleton-set-system } (\text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ \text{UNIV}).$ 
 $\exists r' \in \text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ \text{UNIV}. R' = \{r'\}$ 
    by auto
  ultimately have  $\nexists R'. R' \in \text{singleton-set-system } (\text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ \text{UNIV}) \wedge$ 

```

$\text{closest-preimg-dist } (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ d \ E \ R'$
 $< \text{closest-preimg-dist } (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ d \ E \ R$
using *res-singleton*
by *auto*
moreover have $R \in \text{singleton-set-system } (\text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ \text{UNIV})$
using *r-min-lim-set res-singleton arg-min-subset*
by *fastforce*
ultimately show $R \in \text{arg-min-set}$
 $(\text{closest-preimg-dist } (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ d \ E)$
 $(\text{singleton-set-system } (\text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ \text{UNIV}))$
using *arg-min-set.simps is-arg-min-def CollectI*
by *(metis (mono-tags, lifting))*
qed
also have $(\text{arg-min-set } (\text{score } d \ C \ E) (\text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ \text{UNIV})) =$
 $\text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}} \ d \ C) \ E$
by *simp*
finally have $\bigcup \ ?min = \bigcup (\text{singleton-set-system } (\text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}} \ d \ C) \ E))$
by *presburger*
thus $\text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}} \ d \ C) \ E = \bigcup \ ?min$
using *un-left-inv-singleton-set-system*
by *auto*
qed

Invariance

theorem (*in result*) *tot-invar-dist-imp-invar-dr-rule:*

fixes

$d :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election Distance}$ **and**

$C :: ('a, 'v, 'r) \text{ Result Consensus-Class}$ **and**

$\text{rel} :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election rel}$

assumes

r-refl: *refl-on* $(\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) (\text{Restr rel } (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C))$ **and**

tot-invar-d: *totally-invariant-dist* $d \ \text{rel}$ **and**

invar-res: *satisfies* $(\lambda E. \text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ \text{UNIV}) (\text{Invariance rel})$

shows *satisfies* $(\text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{distance-}\mathcal{R} \ d \ C)) (\text{Invariance rel})$

proof –

let $?min = \lambda E. \bigcup \circ (\text{minimizer } (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ d$
 $(\text{singleton-set-system } (\text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E)$

$\text{UNIV}))$

have $\forall E. \text{satisfies } (?min \ E) (\text{Invariance rel})$

using *r-refl tot-invar-d invar-comp*

refl-rel-and-tot-invar-dist-imp-invar-minimizer[*of*
 $\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C \ \text{rel } d \ \text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)]$

by *blast*

moreover have *satisfies* $?min (\text{Invariance rel})$

using *invar-res*

by *auto*

ultimately have *satisfies* $(\lambda E. ?min \ E \ E) (\text{Invariance rel})$

using *invar-parameterized-fun*[*of* $?min \ \text{rel}$]

by *blast*
 also have $(\lambda E. ?min E E) = fun_{\mathcal{E}} (\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}} d C)$
 using *$\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}}$ -is-minimizer*
 unfolding *comp-def $fun_{\mathcal{E}}.simps$*
 by *metis*
 finally have *invar- $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}}$: satisfies $(fun_{\mathcal{E}} (\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}} d C))$ (Invariance rel)*
 by *simp*
 hence *satisfies $(\lambda E. limit-set (alternatives-\mathcal{E} E) UNIV - fun_{\mathcal{E}} (\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}} d C) E)$*
 (Invariance rel)
 using *invar-res*
 by *fastforce*
 thus *satisfies $(fun_{\mathcal{E}} (distance-\mathcal{R} d C))$ (Invariance rel)*
 using *invar- $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}}$*
 by *auto*
 qed

theorem (in *result*) *invar-dist-cons-imp-invar-dr-rule:*

fixes

d :: ('a, 'v) Election Distance and
C :: ('a, 'v, 'r Result) Consensus-Class and
G :: 'x monoid and
 $\varphi :: ('x, ('a, 'v) Election) binary-fun$ and
B :: ('a, 'v) Election set

defines

rel \equiv rel-induced-by-action (carrier G) B φ and
rel' \equiv rel-induced-by-action (carrier G) (elections- \mathcal{K} C) φ

assumes

action- φ : group-action G B φ and
consensus-C-in-B: elections- \mathcal{K} C \subseteq B and
closed-domain:
closed-under-restr-rel rel B (elections- \mathcal{K} C) and
invar-res: satisfies $(\lambda E. limit-set (alternatives-\mathcal{E} E) UNIV)$ (Invariance rel)

and

invar-d: invariant-dist d (carrier G) B φ and
invar-C-winners: satisfies $(elect-r \circ fun_{\mathcal{E}} (rule-\mathcal{K} C))$ (Invariance rel')
shows satisfies $(fun_{\mathcal{E}} (distance-\mathcal{R} d C))$ (Invariance rel)

proof –

let *?min = $\lambda E. \bigcup \circ (minimizer (elect-r \circ fun_{\mathcal{E}} (rule-\mathcal{K} C)) (elections-\mathcal{K} C) d$*
(singleton-set-system (limit-set (alternatives- $\mathcal{E} E)$
UNIV)))

have $\forall E. satisfies (?min E) (Invariance rel)$

using *action- φ closed-domain consensus-C-in-B invar-d invar-C-winners*
group-act-invar-dist-and-invar-f-imp-invar-minimizer rel-def
rel'-def invar-comp

by (metis (no-types, lifting))

moreover have *satisfies ?min (Invariance rel)*

using *invar-res*

by *auto*

ultimately have *satisfies $(\lambda E. ?min E E)$ (Invariance rel)*

using *invar-parameterized-fun*[*of ?min rel*]
by *blast*
also have $(\lambda E. ?min E E) = fun_{\mathcal{E}} (\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}} d C)$
using *$\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}}$ -is-minimizer*
unfolding *comp-def fun $_{\mathcal{E}}$.simps*
by *metis*
finally have *invar- $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}}$: satisfies (fun $_{\mathcal{E}}$ ($\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}}$ d C)) (Invariance rel)*
by *simp*
hence satisfies $(\lambda E. limit-set (alternatives-\mathcal{E} E) UNIV -$
 $fun_{\mathcal{E}} (\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}} d C) E) (Invariance rel)$
using *invar-res*
by *fastforce*
thus satisfies $(fun_{\mathcal{E}} (distance-\mathcal{R} d C)) (Invariance rel)$
using *invar- $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}}$*
by *simp*
qed

Equivariance

theorem (*in result*) *invar-dist-equivar-cons-imp-equivar-dr-rule:*

fixes

d :: (*'a*, *'v*) *Election Distance* **and**
C :: (*'a*, *'v*, *'r*) *Consensus-Class* **and**
G :: *'x monoid* **and**
 φ :: (*'x*, (*'a*, *'v*) *Election*) *binary-fun* **and**
 ψ :: (*'x*, *'r*) *binary-fun* **and**
B :: (*'a*, *'v*) *Election set*

defines

rel \equiv *rel-induced-by-action* (*carrier G*) *B* φ **and**
rel' \equiv *rel-induced-by-action* (*carrier G*) (*elections-K C*) φ **and**
equivar-prop \equiv
equivar-ind-by-act (*carrier G*) (*elections-K C*) φ (*set-action* ψ) **and**
equivar-prop-global-set-valued \equiv
equivar-ind-by-act (*carrier G*) *B* φ (*set-action* ψ) **and**
equivar-prop-global-result-valued \equiv
equivar-ind-by-act (*carrier G*) *B* φ (*result-action* ψ)

assumes

action- φ : *group-action G B* φ **and**
group-act-res: *group-action G UNIV* ψ **and**
cons-elect-set: *elections-K C* $\subseteq B$ **and**
closed-domain: *closed-under-restr-rel rel B* (*elections-K C*) **and**
equivar-res:
satisfies $(\lambda E. limit-set (alternatives-\mathcal{E} E) UNIV) equivar-prop-global-set-valued$

and

invar-d: *invariant-dist d* (*carrier G*) *B* φ **and**
equivar-C-winners: *satisfies* (*elect-r* \circ *fun $_{\mathcal{E}}$ (rule-K C)*) *equivar-prop*
shows *satisfies* (*fun $_{\mathcal{E}}$ (distance- \mathcal{R} d C)*) *equivar-prop-global-result-valued*

proof –

let *?min-E* = $\lambda E. minimizer (elect-r \circ fun_{\mathcal{E}} (rule-K C)) (elections-K C) d$

(*singleton-set-system* (*limit-set* (*alternatives- \mathcal{E}* E) *UNIV*))

E

let $?min = \lambda E. \bigcup \circ (\text{minimizer } (\text{elect-}r \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ d$
(*singleton-set-system* (*limit-set* (*alternatives- \mathcal{E}* E)
UNIV)))

let $? \psi' = \text{set-action } (\text{set-action } \psi)$

let $? \text{equivar-prop-global-set-valued}' = \text{equivar-ind-by-act } (\text{carrier } G) \ B \ \varphi \ ? \psi'$

have $\forall E \ g. g \in \text{carrier } G \longrightarrow E \in B \longrightarrow$
singleton-set-system (*limit-set* (*alternatives- \mathcal{E}* ($\varphi \ g \ E$)) *UNIV*) =
 $\{\{r\} \mid r. r \in \text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ (\varphi \ g \ E)) \ \text{UNIV}\}$

by *simp*

moreover have

$\forall E \ g. g \in \text{carrier } G \longrightarrow E \in B \longrightarrow$
limit-set (*alternatives- \mathcal{E}* ($\varphi \ g \ E$)) *UNIV* = $\psi \ g \ ' (\text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E}$
 $E) \ \text{UNIV})$

using *equivar-res action- φ group-action.element-image*

unfolding *equivar-prop-global-set-valued-def equivar-ind-by-act-def*

by *fastforce*

ultimately have $\forall E \ g. g \in \text{carrier } G \longrightarrow E \in B \longrightarrow$
singleton-set-system (*limit-set* (*alternatives- \mathcal{E}* ($\varphi \ g \ E$)) *UNIV*) =
 $\{\{r\} \mid r. r \in \psi \ g \ ' (\text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ \text{UNIV})\}$

by *simp*

moreover have $\forall E \ g. \{\{r\} \mid r. r \in \psi \ g \ ' (\text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ \text{UNIV})\}$
 $= \{\psi \ g \ ' \{r\} \mid r. r \in \text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ \text{UNIV}\}$

by *blast*

moreover have $\forall E \ g. \{\psi \ g \ ' \{r\} \mid r. r \in \text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ \text{UNIV}\}$

=

$? \psi' \ g \ \{\{r\} \mid r. r \in \text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ \text{UNIV}\}$

unfolding *set-action.simps*

by *blast*

ultimately have *satisfies* ($\lambda E. \text{singleton-set-system } (\text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ \text{UNIV})$)

$? \text{equivar-prop-global-set-valued}'$

using *rewrite-equivar-ind-by-act[of*
 $\lambda E. \text{singleton-set-system } (\text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ \text{UNIV}) \ \text{carrier } G$

$B \ \varphi \ ? \psi']$

by *force*

moreover have *group-action* $G \ \text{UNIV} \ (\text{set-action } \psi)$

unfolding *set-action.simps*

using *group-act-induces-set-group-act[of* $G \ \text{UNIV} \ \psi]$ *group-act-res*

by *simp*

ultimately have *satisfies* $?min-E \ ? \text{equivar-prop-global-set-valued}'$

using *action- φ invar-d cons-elect-set closed-domain equivar-C-winners*
group-act-invar-dist-and-equivar-f-imp-equivar-minimizer[of
 $G \ B \ \varphi \ \text{set-action } \psi \ \text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C$
 $\lambda E. \text{singleton-set-system } (\text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ \text{UNIV})$
 $d \ \text{elect-}r \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)]$

unfolding *rel'-def rel-def equivar-prop-def*

by *metis*

moreover have *satisfies* \bigcup (*equivar-ind-by-act* (*carrier* G) *UNIV* $? \psi'$ (*set-action* ψ))
using *equivar-union-under-img-act*[*of carrier* G ψ]
by *simp*
ultimately have *satisfies* $(\bigcup \circ ?min-E)$ *equivar-prop-global-set-valued*
unfolding *equivar-prop-global-set-valued-def*
using *equivar-ind-by-act-comp*[*of* $?min-E$ B *UNIV*]
by *simp*
moreover have $(\lambda E. ?min E E) = \bigcup \circ ?min-E$
unfolding *comp-def*
by *simp*
ultimately have *satisfies* $(\lambda E. ?min E E)$ *equivar-prop-global-set-valued*
by *simp*
moreover have $(\lambda E. ?min E E) = fun_{\mathcal{E}} (\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}} d C)$
using *$\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}}$ -is-minimizer*
unfolding *comp-def* *fun _{\mathcal{E}} .simps*
by *metis*
ultimately have *equivar- $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}}$: satisfies* $(fun_{\mathcal{E}} (\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}} d C))$ *equivar-prop-global-set-valued*
by *simp*
moreover have $\forall g \in carrier G. bij (\psi g)$
using *group-act-res*
unfolding *bij-betw-def*
by (*simp add: group-action.inj-prop group-action.surj-prop*)
ultimately have
satisfies $(\lambda E. limit-set (alternatives-\mathcal{E} E) UNIV - fun_{\mathcal{E}} (\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}} d C) E)$
equivar-prop-global-set-valued
using *equivar-res equivar-set-minus*
unfolding *equivar-prop-global-set-valued-def equivar-ind-by-act-def set-action.simps*
by *blast*
thus *satisfies* $(fun_{\mathcal{E}} (distance-\mathcal{R} d C))$ *equivar-prop-global-result-valued*
using *equivar- $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}}$*
unfolding *equivar-prop-global-result-valued-def equivar-prop-global-set-valued-def*
rewrite-equivar-ind-by-act
by *simp*
qed

4.6.3 Symmetry Property Inference Rules

theorem (*in result*) *anon-dist-and-cons-imp-anon-dr*:
fixes
 $d :: ('a, 'v) Election Distance$ **and**
 $C :: ('a, 'v, 'r Result) Consensus-Class$
assumes
anon-d: distance-anonymity' valid-elections d **and**
anon-C: consensus-rule-anonymity' (elections- \mathcal{K} C) C **and**
closed-C: closed-under-restr-rel (anonymity $_{\mathcal{R}}$ valid-elections) valid-elections
(elections- \mathcal{K} C)
shows *anonymity' valid-elections (distance- \mathcal{R} d C)*
proof –

have $\forall \pi. \forall E \in \text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C. \varphi\text{-anon} (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ \pi \ E = \varphi\text{-anon valid-elections}$
 $\pi \ E$
using *cons-domain-valid extensional-continuation-subset*
unfolding $\varphi\text{-anon.simps}$
by *metis*
hence *rel-induced-by-action (carrier anonymity_G) (elections- \mathcal{K} C) ($\varphi\text{-anon valid-elections}$)*
 $=$
rel-induced-by-action (carrier anonymity_G) (elections- \mathcal{K} C) ($\varphi\text{-anon (elections-}\mathcal{K}$
C))
using *coinciding-actions-ind-equal-rel[of carrier anonymity_G elections- \mathcal{K} C]*
by *metis*
hence *satisfies (elect-r \circ fun_E (rule- \mathcal{K} C))*
(Invariance (rel-induced-by-action
(carrier anonymity_G) (elections- \mathcal{K} C) ($\varphi\text{-anon valid-elections}$)))
using *anon-C*
unfolding *consensus-rule-anonymity'.simps anonymity_R.simps*
by *presburger*
thus *?thesis*
using *cons-domain-valid[of C] assms anonymous-group-action.group-action-axioms*
well-formed-res-anon invar-dist-cons-imp-invar-dr-rule[of anonymity_G]
unfolding *distance-anonymity'.simps anonymity_R.simps anonymity'.simps*
consensus-rule-anonymity'.simps
by *blast*
qed

theorem (in result-properties) neutr-dist-and-cons-imp-neutr-dr:
fixes
 $d :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election Distance}$ **and**
 $C :: ('a, 'v, 'b \text{ Result}) \text{ Consensus-Class}$
assumes
neutr-d: distance-neutrality valid-elections d and
neutr-C: consensus-rule-neutrality (elections- \mathcal{K} C) C and
closed-C:
closed-under-restr-rel (neutrality_R valid-elections) valid-elections (elections- \mathcal{K}
C)
shows *neutrality valid-elections (distance- \mathcal{R} d C)*
proof –
have $\forall \pi. \forall E \in \text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C. \varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections} \ \pi \ E = \varphi\text{-neutr} (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K}$
 $C) \ \pi \ E$
using *cons-domain-valid extensional-continuation-subset*
unfolding $\varphi\text{-neutr.simps}$
by *metis*
hence *satisfies (elect-r \circ fun_E (rule- \mathcal{K} C))*
(equivar-ind-by-act (carrier neutrality_G) (elections- \mathcal{K} C)
($\varphi\text{-neutr valid-elections}$) (set-action $\psi\text{-neutr}$))
using *neutr-C equivar-ind-by-act-coincide[of carrier neutrality_G]*
unfolding *consensus-rule-neutrality.simps*
by *(metis (no-types, lifting))*
thus *?thesis*

using *neutr-d closed-C φ -neutr-act.group-action-axioms well-formed-res-neutr act-neutr*
cons-domain-valid[of C] invar-dist-equivar-cons-imp-equivar-dr-rule[of
neutrality_G
valid-elections φ -neutr valid-elections]
by *simp*
qed

theorem *reversal-sym-dist-and-cons-imp-reversal-sym-dr:*
fixes
d :: ('a, 'c) Election Distance and
C :: ('a, 'c, 'a rel Result) Consensus-Class
assumes
rev-sym-d: distance-reversal-symmetry valid-elections d and
rev-sym-C: consensus-rule-reversal-symmetry (elections- \mathcal{K} C) C and
closed-C: closed-under-restr-rel (reversal_R valid-elections) valid-elections (elections- \mathcal{K}
C)
shows *reversal-symmetry valid-elections (social-welfare-result.distance- \mathcal{R} d C)*
proof –
have $\forall \pi. \forall E \in \text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C. \varphi\text{-rev valid-elections } \pi \ E = \varphi\text{-rev (elections-}\mathcal{K}$
C) π E
using *cons-domain-valid extensional-continuation-subset*
unfolding *φ -rev.simps*
by *metis*
hence *satisfies (elect-r \circ fun_E (rule- \mathcal{K} C))*
(equivar-ind-by-act (carrier reversal_G) (elections- \mathcal{K} C)
(φ -rev valid-elections) (set-action ψ -rev))
using *rev-sym-C equivar-ind-by-act-coincide[of carrier reversal_G]*
unfolding *consensus-rule-reversal-symmetry.simps*
by *(metis (no-types, lifting))*
thus *?thesis*
using *cons-domain-valid rev-sym-d closed-C φ -rev-act.group-action-axioms*
 ψ -rev-act.group-action-axioms φ - ψ -rev-well-formed
social-welfare-result.invar-dist-equivar-cons-imp-equivar-dr-rule[of
reversal_G valid-elections φ -rev valid-elections ψ -rev C d]
unfolding *distance-reversal-symmetry.simps reversal-symmetry-def reversal_R.simps*
by *metis*
qed

theorem *(in result) tot-hom-dist-imp-hom-dr:*
fixes
d :: ('a, nat) Election Distance and
C :: ('a, nat, 'r Result) Consensus-Class
assumes *distance-homogeneity finite-voter-elections d*
shows *homogeneity finite-voter-elections (distance- \mathcal{R} d C)*
proof –
have *Restr (homogeneity_R finite-voter-elections) (elections- \mathcal{K} C) = homogene-*
ity_R (elections- \mathcal{K} C)
using *cons-domain-finite[of C]*

```

    unfolding homogeneityR.simps finite-voter-elections-def
  by blast
  hence refl-on (elections- $\mathcal{K}$  C) (Restr (homogeneityR finite-voter-elections) (elections- $\mathcal{K}$ 
C))
    using refl-homogeneityR[of elections- $\mathcal{K}$  C] cons-domain-finite[of C]
  by presburger
  moreover have
    satisfies ( $\lambda$  E. limit-set (alternatives- $\mathcal{E}$  E) UNIV)
      (Invariance (homogeneityR finite-voter-elections))
    using well-formed-res-homogeneity
  by simp
  ultimately show ?thesis
    using assms tot-invar-dist-imp-invar-dr-rule [of C homogeneityR finite-voter-elections
d]
    unfolding distance-homogeneity-def homogeneity.simps
  by metis
qed

```

```

theorem (in result) tot-hom-dist-imp-hom-dr':
  fixes
    d :: ('a, 'v::linorder) Election Distance and
    C :: ('a, 'v, 'r Result) Consensus-Class
  assumes distance-homogeneity' finite-voter-elections d
  shows homogeneity' finite-voter-elections (distance- $\mathcal{R}$  d C)
proof -
  have Restr (homogeneityR' finite-voter-elections) (elections- $\mathcal{K}$  C)
    = homogeneityR' (elections- $\mathcal{K}$  C)
  using cons-domain-finite
  unfolding homogeneityR'.simps finite-voter-elections-def
  by blast
  hence refl-on (elections- $\mathcal{K}$  C) (Restr (homogeneityR' finite-voter-elections) (elections- $\mathcal{K}$ 
C))
    using refl-homogeneityR'[of elections- $\mathcal{K}$  C] cons-domain-finite[of C]
  by presburger
  moreover have
    satisfies ( $\lambda$  E. limit-set (alternatives- $\mathcal{E}$  E) UNIV)
      (Invariance (homogeneityR' finite-voter-elections))
    using well-formed-res-homogeneity'
  by simp
  ultimately show ?thesis
    using assms tot-invar-dist-imp-invar-dr-rule
    unfolding distance-homogeneity'-def homogeneity'.simps
  by blast
qed

```

4.6.4 Further Properties

```

fun decisiveness :: ('a, 'v) Election set  $\Rightarrow$  ('a, 'v) Election Distance  $\Rightarrow$ 
  ('a, 'v, 'r Result) Electoral-Module  $\Rightarrow$  bool where

```

```

    decisiveness  $X$   $d$   $m$  =
      ( $\nexists$   $E$ .  $E \in X \wedge (\exists \delta > 0$ .  $\forall E' \in X$ .  $d \ E \ E' < \delta \longrightarrow \text{card}(\text{elect-r}(\text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} \ m \ E')) > 1$ ))
  end

```

4.7 Distance Rationalization on Election Quotients

```

theory Quotient-Distance-Rationalization
  imports Quotient-Module
          Distance-Rationalization-Symmetry
begin

```

4.7.1 Quotient Distances

```

fun distQ :: 'x Distance  $\Rightarrow$  'x set Distance where
  distQ  $d$   $A$   $B$  = (if ( $A = \{\}$   $\wedge$   $B = \{\}$ ) then 0 else
    (if ( $A = \{\}$   $\vee$   $B = \{\}$ ) then  $\infty$  else
       $\pi_Q(\text{tup } d) (A \times B)$ ))

```

```

fun relation-paths :: 'x rel  $\Rightarrow$  'x list set where
  relation-paths  $r$  = { $p$ .  $\exists k$ . ( $\text{length } p = 2 * k \wedge (\forall i < k$ . ( $p!(2 * i)$ ,  $p!(2 * i + 1)) \in r$ ))}

```

```

fun admissible-paths :: 'x rel  $\Rightarrow$  'x set  $\Rightarrow$  'x set  $\Rightarrow$  'x list set where
  admissible-paths  $r$   $X$   $Y$  = { $x \# p @ [y]$  |  $x \ y \ p$ .  $x \in X \wedge y \in Y \wedge p \in \text{relation-paths } r$ }

```

```

fun path-length :: 'x list  $\Rightarrow$  'x Distance  $\Rightarrow$  ereal where
  path-length []  $d$  = 0 |
  path-length [ $x$ ]  $d$  = 0 |
  path-length ( $x \# y \# xs$ )  $d$  =  $d \ x \ y + \text{path-length } xs \ d$ 

```

```

fun quotient-dist :: 'x rel  $\Rightarrow$  'x Distance  $\Rightarrow$  'x set Distance where
  quotient-dist  $r$   $d$   $A$   $B$  = Inf ( $\bigcup \{\{\text{path-length } p \ d \mid p. p \in \text{admissible-paths } r \ A \ B\}\}$ )

```

```

fun inf-distQ :: 'x Distance  $\Rightarrow$  'x set Distance where
  inf-distQ  $d$   $A$   $B$  = Inf { $d \ a \ b \mid a \ b$ .  $a \in A \wedge b \in B$ }

```

```

fun simple :: 'x rel  $\Rightarrow$  'x set  $\Rightarrow$  'x Distance  $\Rightarrow$  bool where
  simple  $r$   $X$   $d$  =
    ( $\forall A \in X // r$ . ( $\exists a \in A$ .  $\forall B \in X // r$ .  $\text{inf-dist}_Q \ d \ A \ B = \text{Inf } \{d \ a \ b \mid b. b \in B\}$ ))

```

— We call a distance simple with respect to a relation if for all relation classes, there is an a in A minimizing the infimum distance between A and all B so that the infimum distance between these sets coincides with the infimum distance over

all b in B for fixed a .

```
fun product-rel' :: 'x rel  $\Rightarrow$  ('x * 'x) rel where
  product-rel' r = {(p1, p2). ((fst p1, fst p2)  $\in$  r  $\wedge$  snd p1 = snd p2)  $\vee$ 
    ((snd p1, snd p2)  $\in$  r  $\wedge$  fst p1 = fst p2)}
```

Auxiliary Lemmas

lemma *tot-dist-invariance-is-congruence*:

fixes

$d :: 'x$ Distance **and**

$r :: 'x$ rel

shows (totally-invariant-dist d r) = (tup d respects (product-rel r))

unfolding totally-invariant-dist.simps satisfies.simps congruent-def

by blast

lemma *product-rel-helper*:

fixes

$r :: 'x$ rel **and**

$X :: 'x$ set

shows

trans-imp: Relation.trans $r \Longrightarrow$ Relation.trans (product-rel r) **and**

refl-imp: refl-on X $r \Longrightarrow$ refl-on $(X \times X)$ (product-rel r) **and**

sym: sym-on X $r \Longrightarrow$ sym-on $(X \times X)$ (product-rel r)

unfolding Relation.trans-def refl-on-def sym-on-def product-rel.simps

by auto

theorem *dist-pass-to-quotient*:

fixes

$d :: 'x$ Distance **and**

$r :: 'x$ rel **and**

$X :: 'x$ set

assumes

equiv-X-r: equiv X r **and**

tot-inv-dist-d-r: totally-invariant-dist d r

shows $\forall A B. A \in X // r \wedge B \in X // r \longrightarrow (\forall a b. a \in A \wedge b \in B \longrightarrow dist_Q$
 $d A B = d a b)$

proof (safe)

fix

$A :: 'x$ set **and**

$B :: 'x$ set **and**

$a :: 'x$ **and**

$b :: 'x$

assume

a -in- A : $a \in A$ **and**

$A \in X // r$

moreover with equiv-X-r quotient-eq-iff

```

have (a, a) ∈ r
  by metis
moreover with equiv-X-r
have a-in-X: a ∈ X
  using equiv-class-eq-iff
  by metis
ultimately have A-eq-r-a: A = r “ {a}
  using equiv-X-r quotient-eq-iff quotientI
  by fast
assume
  b-in-B: b ∈ B and
  B ∈ X // r
moreover with equiv-X-r quotient-eq-iff
have (b, b) ∈ r
  by metis
moreover with equiv-X-r
have b-in-X: b ∈ X
  using equiv-class-eq-iff
  by metis
ultimately have B-eq-r-b: B = r “ {b}
  using equiv-X-r quotient-eq-iff quotientI
  by fast
from A-eq-r-a B-eq-r-b a-in-X b-in-X
have A × B ∈ (X × X) // (product-rel r)
  unfolding quotient-def
  by fastforce
moreover have equiv (X × X) (product-rel r)
  using equiv-X-r product-rel-helper UNIV-Times-UNIV equivE equivI
  by metis
moreover have tup d respects (product-rel r)
  using tot-inv-dist-d-r tot-dist-invariance-is-congruence
  by metis
ultimately show distQ d A B = d a b
  unfolding distQ.simps
  using pass-to-quotient a-in-A b-in-B
  by fastforce
qed

lemma relation-paths-subset:
  fixes
    n :: nat and
    p :: 'x list and
    r :: 'x rel and
    X :: 'x set
  assumes r ⊆ X × X
  shows ∀ p. p ∈ relation-paths r ⟶ (∀ i < length p. p!i ∈ X)
proof (safe)
  fix
    p :: 'x list and

```

```

  i :: nat
assume
  p ∈ relation-paths r
then obtain k :: nat where
  length p = 2 * k and
  rel: ∀ i < k. (p!(2 * i), p!(2 * i + 1)) ∈ r
  by auto
moreover obtain k' :: nat where
  i-cases: i = 2 * k' ∨ i = 2 * k' + 1
  using diff-Suc-1 even-Suc oddE odd-two-times-div-two-nat
  by metis
moreover assume i < length p
ultimately have k' < k
  by linarith
thus p!i ∈ X
  using assms rel i-cases
  by blast
qed

lemma admissible-path-len:
  fixes
    d :: 'x Distance and
    r :: 'x rel and
    X :: 'x set and
    a :: 'x and
    b :: 'x and
    p :: 'x list
  assumes refl-on X r
  shows triangle-ineq X d ∧ p ∈ relation-paths r ∧ totally-invariant-dist d r ∧
    a ∈ X ∧ b ∈ X ⟶ path-length (a#p@[b]) d ≥ d a b
proof (clarify, induction p d arbitrary: a b rule: path-length.induct)
  case (1 d)
  show d a b ≤ path-length (a#[]@[b]) d
    by simp
next
  case (2 x d)
  thus d a b ≤ path-length (a#[x]@[b]) d
    by simp
next
  case (3 x y xs d)
  assume
    ineq: triangle-ineq X d and
    a-in-X: a ∈ X and
    b-in-X: b ∈ X and
    rel: x#y#xs ∈ relation-paths r and
    invar: totally-invariant-dist d r and
    hyp: ∧ a b. triangle-ineq X d ⟹ xs ∈ relation-paths r ⟹ totally-invariant-dist
    d r ⟹
    a ∈ X ⟹ b ∈ X ⟹ d a b ≤ path-length (a#xs@[b]) d

```

```

then obtain  $k :: \text{nat}$  where
  len:  $\text{length } (x\#y\#xs) = 2 * k$ 
  by auto
moreover have  $\forall i < k - 1. (xs!(2 * i), xs!(2 * i + 1)) =$ 
   $((x\#y\#xs)!(2 * (i + 1)), (x\#y\#xs)!(2 * (i + 1) + 1))$ 
  by simp
ultimately have  $\forall i < k - 1. (xs!(2 * i), xs!(2 * i + 1)) \in r$ 
  using rel less-diff-conv
  unfolding relation-paths.simps
  by fastforce
moreover have  $\text{length } xs = 2 * (k - 1)$ 
  using len
  by simp
ultimately have  $xs \in \text{relation-paths } r$ 
  by simp
hence  $\forall x y. x \in X \wedge y \in X \longrightarrow d \ x \ y \leq \text{path-length } (x\#xs@[y]) \ d$ 
  using ineq invar hyp
  by blast
moreover have  $\text{path-length } (a\#(x\#y\#xs)@[b]) \ d = d \ a \ x + \text{path-length } (y\#xs@[b]) \ d$ 
d
  by simp
moreover have  $x\text{-rel-}y: (x, y) \in r$ 
  using rel
  unfolding relation-paths.simps
  by fastforce
ultimately have  $\text{path-length } (a\#(x\#y\#xs)@[b]) \ d \geq d \ a \ x + d \ y \ b$ 
  using assms add-left-mono assms refl-onD2 b-in-X
  unfolding refl-on-def
  by metis
moreover have  $d \ a \ x + d \ y \ b = d \ a \ x + d \ x \ b$ 
  using invar x-rel-y rewrite-totally-invariant-dist assms b-in-X
  unfolding refl-on-def
  by fastforce
moreover have  $d \ a \ x + d \ x \ b \geq d \ a \ b$ 
  using a-in-X b-in-X x-rel-y assms ineq
  unfolding refl-on-def triangle-ineq-def
  by auto
ultimately show  $d \ a \ b \leq \text{path-length } (a\#(x\#y\#xs)@[b]) \ d$ 
  by simp
qed

```

lemma *quotient-dist-coincides-with-dist_Q*:

fixes

$d :: 'x \text{ Distance}$ **and**

$r :: 'x \text{ rel}$ **and**

$X :: 'x \text{ set}$

assumes

equiv: $\text{equiv } X \ r$ **and**

tri: $\text{triangle-ineq } X \ d$ **and**

$\text{invar: totally-invariant-dist } d \ r$
shows $\forall A \in X // r. \forall B \in X // r. \text{quotient-dist } r \ d \ A \ B = \text{dist}_{\mathcal{Q}} \ d \ A \ B$
proof (*clarify*)
fix
 $A :: 'x \text{ set}$ **and**
 $B :: 'x \text{ set}$
assume
 $A\text{-in-quot-}X: A \in X // r$ **and**
 $B\text{-in-quot-}X: B \in X // r$
then obtain
 $a :: 'x$ **and**
 $b :: 'x$ **where**
 $el: a \in A \wedge b \in B$ **and**
 $\text{def-dist: dist}_{\mathcal{Q}} \ d \ A \ B = d \ a \ b$
using $\text{dist-pass-to-quotient}$ assms $\text{in-quotient-imp-non-empty}$ ex-in-conv
by (*metis* (*full-types*))
hence $\text{equiv-class: } A = r \text{ `` } \{a\} \wedge B = r \text{ `` } \{b\}$
using $A\text{-in-quot-}X$ $B\text{-in-quot-}X$ assms $\text{equiv-class-eq-iff}$ equiv-class-self
 quotientI quotient-eq-iff
by *meson*
have $\text{subset-}X: r \subseteq X \times X \wedge A \subseteq X \wedge B \subseteq X$
using assms $A\text{-in-quot-}X$ $B\text{-in-quot-}X$ equiv-def refl-on-def Union-quotient
Union-upper
by *metis*
have $\forall p \in \text{admissible-paths } r \ A \ B.$
 $(\exists p' \ x \ y. x \in A \wedge y \in B \wedge p' \in \text{relation-paths } r \wedge p = x \# p' @ [y])$
unfolding $\text{admissible-paths.simps}$
by *blast*
moreover have $\forall x \ y. x \in A \wedge y \in B \longrightarrow d \ x \ y = d \ a \ b$
using invar equiv-class
by *auto*
moreover have $\text{refl-on } X \ r$
using equiv equiv-def
by *blast*
ultimately have $\forall p. p \in \text{admissible-paths } r \ A \ B \longrightarrow \text{path-length } p \ d \geq d \ a \ b$
using $\text{admissible-path-len[of } X \ r \ d]$ $\text{tri subset-}X \ el \ \text{invar}$ in-mono
by *metis*
hence $\forall l. l \in \bigcup \{ \{ \text{path-length } p \ d \mid p. p \in \text{admissible-paths } r \ A \ B \} \} \longrightarrow l \geq$
 $d \ a \ b$
by *blast*
hence $\text{geq: quotient-dist } r \ d \ A \ B \geq d \ a \ b$
unfolding $\text{quotient-dist.simps[of } r \ d \ A \ B]$ le-Inf-iff
by *simp*
with $el \ \text{def-dist}$
have $\text{geq: quotient-dist } r \ d \ A \ B \geq \text{dist}_{\mathcal{Q}} \ d \ A \ B$
by *presburger*
have $[a, b] \in \text{admissible-paths } r \ A \ B$
using el
by *simp*


```

moreover have path-length  $[a, b] \ d = d \ a \ b$ 
  by simp
ultimately have quotient-dist  $r \ d \ A \ B \leq d \ a \ b$ 
  using quotient-dist.simps[of  $r \ d \ A \ B$ ] CollectI Inf-lower ccpo-Sup-singleton
  by (metis (mono-tags, lifting))
thus quotient-dist  $r \ d \ A \ B = dist_Q \ d \ A \ B$ 
  using geq def-dist nle-le
  by metis
qed

lemma inf-dist-coincides-with-dist_Q:
  fixes
     $d :: 'x \ Distance$  and
     $r :: 'x \ rel$  and
     $X :: 'x \ set$ 
  assumes
    equiv-X-r: equiv  $X \ r$  and
    tot-inv-d-r: totally-invariant-dist  $d \ r$ 
  shows  $\forall \ A \in X \ // \ r. \ \forall \ B \in X \ // \ r. \ inf-dist_Q \ d \ A \ B = dist_Q \ d \ A \ B$ 
proof (clarify)
  fix
     $A :: 'x \ set$  and
     $B :: 'x \ set$ 
  assume
    A-in-quot-X:  $A \in X \ // \ r$  and
    B-in-quot-X:  $B \in X \ // \ r$ 
  then obtain
     $a :: 'x$  and
     $b :: 'x$  where
      el:  $a \in A \wedge b \in B$  and
      def-dist:  $dist_Q \ d \ A \ B = d \ a \ b$ 
      using dist-pass-to-quotient equiv-X-r tot-inv-d-r in-quotient-imp-non-empty
  ex-in-conv
    by (metis (full-types))
  from def-dist equiv-X-r tot-inv-d-r
  have  $\forall \ x \ y. \ x \in A \wedge y \in B \longrightarrow d \ x \ y = d \ a \ b$ 
    using dist-pass-to-quotient A-in-quot-X B-in-quot-X
    by force
  hence  $\{d \ x \ y \mid x \ y. \ x \in A \wedge y \in B\} = \{d \ a \ b\}$ 
    using el
    by blast
  thus inf-dist_Q  $d \ A \ B = dist_Q \ d \ A \ B$ 
    unfolding inf-dist_Q.simps
    using def-dist
    by simp
qed

lemma inf-helper:
  fixes

```

```

    A :: 'x set and
    B :: 'x set and
    d :: 'x Distance
  shows  $\text{Inf } \{d \ a \ b \mid a \ b. \ a \in A \wedge b \in B\} = \text{Inf } \{\text{Inf } \{d \ a \ b \mid b. \ b \in B\} \mid a. \ a \in A\}$ 
  proof -
    have  $\forall \ a \ b. \ a \in A \wedge b \in B \longrightarrow \text{Inf } \{d \ a \ b \mid b. \ b \in B\} \leq d \ a \ b$ 
      using INF-lower Setcompr-eq-image
    by metis
    hence  $\forall \ \alpha \in \{d \ a \ b \mid a \ b. \ a \in A \wedge b \in B\}. \ \exists \ \beta \in \{\text{Inf } \{d \ a \ b \mid b. \ b \in B\} \mid a. \ a \in A\}. \ \beta \leq \alpha$ 
    by blast
    hence  $\text{Inf } \{\text{Inf } \{d \ a \ b \mid b. \ b \in B\} \mid a. \ a \in A\} \leq \text{Inf } \{d \ a \ b \mid a \ b. \ a \in A \wedge b \in B\}$ 
    using Inf-mono
    by (metis (no-types, lifting))
    moreover have  $\neg (\text{Inf } \{\text{Inf } \{d \ a \ b \mid b. \ b \in B\} \mid a. \ a \in A\} < \text{Inf } \{d \ a \ b \mid a \ b. \ a \in A \wedge b \in B\})$ 
    proof (rule ccontr, simp)
      assume  $\text{Inf } \{\text{Inf } \{d \ a \ b \mid b. \ b \in B\} \mid a. \ a \in A\} < \text{Inf } \{d \ a \ b \mid a \ b. \ a \in A \wedge b \in B\}$ 
    then obtain  $\alpha :: \text{ereal}$  where
      inf:  $\alpha \in \{\text{Inf } \{d \ a \ b \mid b. \ b \in B\} \mid a. \ a \in A\}$  and
      less:  $\alpha < \text{Inf } \{d \ a \ b \mid a \ b. \ a \in A \wedge b \in B\}$ 
      using Inf-less-iff
      by (metis (no-types, lifting))
    then obtain  $a :: 'x$  where
      a-in-A:  $a \in A$  and
       $\alpha = \text{Inf } \{d \ a \ b \mid b. \ b \in B\}$ 
      by blast
    with less
    have inf-less:  $\text{Inf } \{d \ a \ b \mid b. \ b \in B\} < \text{Inf } \{d \ a \ b \mid a \ b. \ a \in A \wedge b \in B\}$ 
    by blast
    have  $\{d \ a \ b \mid b. \ b \in B\} \subseteq \{d \ a \ b \mid a \ b. \ a \in A \wedge b \in B\}$ 
    using a-in-A
    by blast
    hence  $\text{Inf } \{d \ a \ b \mid a \ b. \ a \in A \wedge b \in B\} \leq \text{Inf } \{d \ a \ b \mid b. \ b \in B\}$ 
    using Inf-superset-mono
    by (metis (no-types, lifting))
    with inf-less
    show False
    using linorder-not-less
    by simp
  qed
  ultimately show ?thesis
    by simp
  qed

```

lemma invar-dist-simple:

```

fixes
   $d :: 'y$  Distance and
   $G :: 'x$  monoid and
   $Y :: 'y$  set and
   $\varphi :: ('x, 'y)$  binary-fun
assumes
  action- $\varphi$ : group-action  $G$   $Y$   $\varphi$  and
  invar: invariant-dist  $d$  (carrier  $G$ )  $Y$   $\varphi$ 
shows simple (rel-induced-by-action (carrier  $G$ )  $Y$   $\varphi$ )  $Y$   $d$ 
proof (unfold simple.simps, safe)
  fix  $A :: 'y$  set
  assume class $_Y$ :  $A \in Y$  // rel-induced-by-action (carrier  $G$ )  $Y$   $\varphi$ 
  have equiv-rel: equiv  $Y$  (rel-induced-by-action (carrier  $G$ )  $Y$   $\varphi$ )
    using assms rel-ind-by-group-act-equiv
    by blast
  with class $_Y$  obtain  $a :: 'y$  where
    a-in- $A$ :  $a \in A$ 
    using equiv-Eps-in
    by blast
  have subset:  $\forall B \in Y$  // rel-induced-by-action (carrier  $G$ )  $Y$   $\varphi$ .  $B \subseteq Y$ 
    using equiv-rel in-quotient-imp-subset
    by blast
  hence  $\forall B \in Y$  // rel-induced-by-action (carrier  $G$ )  $Y$   $\varphi$ .
     $\forall B' \in Y$  // rel-induced-by-action (carrier  $G$ )  $Y$   $\varphi$ .
       $\forall b \in B. \forall c \in B'. b \in Y \wedge c \in Y$ 
    using class $_Y$ 
    by blast
  hence eq-dist:
     $\forall B \in Y$  // rel-induced-by-action (carrier  $G$ )  $Y$   $\varphi$ .
       $\forall B' \in Y$  // rel-induced-by-action (carrier  $G$ )  $Y$   $\varphi$ .
         $\forall b \in B. \forall c \in B'. \forall g \in \text{carrier } G.$ 
           $d(\varphi g c)(\varphi g b) = d c b$ 
        using invar rewrite-invariant-dist class $_Y$ 
        by metis
  have  $\forall b \in Y. \forall g \in \text{carrier } G. (b, \varphi g b) \in \text{rel-induced-by-action (carrier } G)$ 
 $Y \varphi$ 
    unfolding rel-induced-by-action.simps
    using group-action.element-image action- $\varphi$ 
    by fastforce
  hence  $\forall b \in Y. \forall g \in \text{carrier } G. \varphi g b \in \text{rel-induced-by-action (carrier } G)$   $Y \varphi$ 
  “ { $b$ }
    unfolding Image-def
    by blast
  moreover have equiv-class:
     $\forall B. B \in Y$  // rel-induced-by-action (carrier  $G$ )  $Y \varphi \longrightarrow$ 
       $(\forall b \in B. B = \text{rel-induced-by-action (carrier } G) Y \varphi \text{ “ } \{b\})$ 
    using Image-singleton-iff equiv-class-eq-iff equiv-rel quotientI quotient-eq-iff
    by meson
  ultimately have closed-class:

```

```

   $\forall B \in Y // \text{rel-induced-by-action } (\text{carrier } G) \ Y \ \varphi. \forall b \in B. \forall g \in \text{carrier } G.$ 
 $\varphi \ g \ b \in B$ 
  using equiv-rel subset
  by blast
with eq-dist classY
have a-subset-A:
   $\forall B \in Y // \text{rel-induced-by-action } (\text{carrier } G) \ Y \ \varphi.$ 
   $\{d \ a \ b \mid b. \ b \in B\} \subseteq \{d \ a \ b \mid a \ b. \ a \in A \wedge b \in B\}$ 
  using a-in-A
  by blast
have  $\forall a' \in A. A = \text{rel-induced-by-action } (\text{carrier } G) \ Y \ \varphi \ \text{“} \{a'\}$ 
  using classY equiv-rel equiv-class
  by presburger
hence  $\forall a' \in A. (a', a) \in \text{rel-induced-by-action } (\text{carrier } G) \ Y \ \varphi$ 
  using a-in-A
  by blast
hence  $\forall a' \in A. \exists g \in \text{carrier } G. \varphi \ g \ a' = a$ 
  by simp
hence  $\forall B \in Y // \text{rel-induced-by-action } (\text{carrier } G) \ Y \ \varphi.$ 
   $\forall a' \ b. a' \in A \wedge b \in B \longrightarrow (\exists g \in \text{carrier } G. d \ a' \ b = d \ a \ (\varphi \ g \ b))$ 
  using eq-dist classY
  by metis
hence  $\forall B \in Y // \text{rel-induced-by-action } (\text{carrier } G) \ Y \ \varphi.$ 
   $\forall a' \ b. a' \in A \wedge b \in B \longrightarrow d \ a' \ b \in \{d \ a \ b \mid b. \ b \in B\}$ 
  using closed-class mem-Collect-eq
  by fastforce
hence  $\forall B \in Y // \text{rel-induced-by-action } (\text{carrier } G) \ Y \ \varphi.$ 
   $\{d \ a \ b \mid b. \ b \in B\} \supseteq \{d \ a \ b \mid a \ b. \ a \in A \wedge b \in B\}$ 
  using closed-class
  by blast
with a-subset-A
have  $\forall B \in Y // \text{rel-induced-by-action } (\text{carrier } G) \ Y \ \varphi.$ 
   $\text{inf-dist}_{\mathcal{Q}} \ d \ A \ B = \text{Inf } \{d \ a \ b \mid b. \ b \in B\}$ 
  unfolding inf-distQ.simps
  by fastforce
thus  $\exists a \in A. \forall B \in Y // \text{rel-induced-by-action } (\text{carrier } G) \ Y \ \varphi.$ 
   $\text{inf-dist}_{\mathcal{Q}} \ d \ A \ B = \text{Inf } \{d \ a \ b \mid b. \ b \in B\}$ 
  using a-in-A
  by blast
qed

```

lemma *tot-invar-dist-simple:*

```

fixes
  d :: 'x Distance and
  r :: 'x rel and
  X :: 'x set
assumes
  equiv-on-X: equiv X r and
  invar: totally-invariant-dist d r

```

shows *simple* $r \ X \ d$
proof (*unfold simple.simps, safe*)
fix $A :: 'x \ set$
assume $A\text{-quot-}X: A \in X \ // \ r$
then obtain $a :: 'x$ **where**
 $a\text{-in-}A: a \in A$
using *equiv-on-X equiv-Eps-in*
by *blast*
have $\forall a \in A. A = r \ `` \ \{a\}$
using *A-quot-X equiv-on-X Image-singleton-iff equiv-class-eq-iff quotientI quotient-eq-iff*
by *meson*
hence $\forall a \ a'. a \in A \wedge a' \in A \longrightarrow (a, a') \in r$
by *blast*
moreover have $\forall B \in X \ // \ r. \forall b \in B. (b, b) \in r$
using *equiv-on-X quotient-eq-iff*
by *metis*
ultimately have $\forall B \in X \ // \ r. \forall a \ a' \ b. a \in A \wedge a' \in A \wedge b \in B \longrightarrow d \ a \ b$
 $= d \ a' \ b$
using *invar rewrite-totally-invariant-dist*
by *simp*
hence $\forall B \in X \ // \ r. \{d \ a \ b \mid a \ b. a \in A \wedge b \in B\} = \{d \ a \ b \mid a' \ b. a' \in A \wedge b \in B\}$
 $\in B\}$
using *a-in-A*
by *blast*
moreover have $\forall B \in X \ // \ r. \{d \ a \ b \mid a' \ b. a' \in A \wedge b \in B\} = \{d \ a \ b \mid b. b \in B\}$
 $\in B\}$
using *a-in-A*
by *blast*
ultimately have $\forall B \in X \ // \ r. \text{Inf } \{d \ a \ b \mid a \ b. a \in A \wedge b \in B\} = \text{Inf } \{d \ a \ b \mid b. b \in B\}$
 $\mid b. b \in B\}$
by *simp*
hence $\forall B \in X \ // \ r. \text{inf-dist}_Q \ d \ A \ B = \text{Inf } \{d \ a \ b \mid b. b \in B\}$
by *simp*
thus $\exists a \in A. \forall B \in X \ // \ r. \text{inf-dist}_Q \ d \ A \ B = \text{Inf } \{d \ a \ b \mid b. b \in B\}$
using *a-in-A*
by *blast*
qed

4.7.2 Quotient Consensus and Results

fun *elections- \mathcal{K}_Q* $:: ('a, 'v) \ Election \ rel \Rightarrow ('a, 'v, 'r \ Result) \ Consensus\text{-}Class \Rightarrow$
 $('a, 'v) \ Election \ set \ set \ \mathbf{where}$
 $\text{elections-}\mathcal{K}_Q \ r \ C = (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ // \ r$

fun (**in** *result*) *limit-set $_Q$* $:: ('a, 'v) \ Election \ set \Rightarrow 'r \ set \Rightarrow 'r \ set \ \mathbf{where}$
 $\text{limit-set}_Q \ X \ res = \bigcap \ \{\text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ res \mid E. E \in X\}$

Auxiliary Lemmas

lemma *closed-under-equiv-rel-subset*:

```

fixes
   $X :: 'x \text{ set}$  and
   $Y :: 'x \text{ set}$  and
   $Z :: 'x \text{ set}$  and
   $r :: 'x \text{ rel}$ 
assumes
  equiv  $X \ r$  and
   $Y \subseteq X$  and
   $Z \subseteq X$  and
   $Z \in Y \ // \ r$  and
  closed-under-restr-rel  $r \ X \ Y$ 
shows  $Z \subseteq Y$ 
proof (safe)
  fix  $z :: 'x$ 
  assume  $z \in Z$ 
  then obtain  $y :: 'x$  where
     $y \in Y$  and
     $(y, z) \in r$ 
  using assms
  unfolding quotient-def Image-def
  by blast
  hence  $(y, z) \in r \cap Y \times X$ 
  using assms
  unfolding equiv-def refl-on-def
  by blast
  hence  $z \in \{z. \exists y \in Y. (y, z) \in r \cap Y \times X\}$ 
  by blast
  thus  $z \in Y$ 
  using assms
  unfolding closed-under-restr-rel.simps restr-rel.simps
  by blast
qed

```

lemma (*in result*) *limit-set-invar*:

```

fixes
   $d :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election Distance}$  and
   $r :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election rel}$  and
   $C :: ('a, 'v, 'r \text{ Result}) \text{ Consensus-Class}$  and
   $X :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election set}$  and
   $A :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election set}$ 
assumes
  quot-class:  $A \in X \ // \ r$  and
  equiv-rel: equiv  $X \ r$  and
  cons-subset: elections- $\mathcal{K}$   $C \subseteq X$  and
  invar-res: satisfies  $(\lambda E. \text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ \text{UNIV}) \ (\text{Invariance } r)$ 
shows  $\forall a \in A. \text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ a) \ \text{UNIV} = \text{limit-set}_{\mathcal{Q}} \ A \ \text{UNIV}$ 
proof

```

```

fix  $a :: ('a, 'v)$  Election
assume  $a\text{-in-}A: a \in A$ 
hence  $\forall b \in A. (a, b) \in r$ 
  using quot-class equiv-rel quotient-eq-iff
  by metis
hence  $\forall b \in A. \text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ b) \ UNIV = \text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ a)$ 
UNIV
  using invar-res
  unfolding satisfies.simps
  by (metis (mono-tags, lifting))
hence  $\text{limit-set}_{\mathcal{Q}} \ A \ UNIV = \bigcap \{ \text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ a) \ UNIV \}$ 
  unfolding limit-set_{\mathcal{Q}}.simps
  using  $a\text{-in-}A$ 
  by blast
thus  $\text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ a) \ UNIV = \text{limit-set}_{\mathcal{Q}} \ A \ UNIV$ 
  by simp
qed

lemma (in result) preimg-invar:
fixes
   $f :: 'x \Rightarrow 'y$  and
   $\text{domain}_f :: 'x \text{ set}$  and
   $d :: 'x$  Distance and
   $r :: 'x \text{ rel}$  and
   $X :: 'x \text{ set}$ 
assumes
  equiv-rel:  $\text{equiv } X \ r$  and
  cons-subset:  $\text{domain}_f \subseteq X$  and
  closed-domain:  $\text{closed-under-restr-rel } r \ X \ \text{domain}_f$  and
  invar-f:  $\text{satisfies } f \ (\text{Invariance } (\text{Restr } r \ \text{domain}_f))$ 
shows  $\forall y. (\text{preimg } f \ \text{domain}_f \ y) // r = \text{preimg } (\pi_{\mathcal{Q}} \ f) \ (\text{domain}_f // r) \ y$ 
proof (safe)
fix
   $A :: 'x \text{ set}$  and
   $y :: 'y$ 
assume  $\text{preimg-quot}: A \in \text{preimg } f \ \text{domain}_f \ y // r$ 
hence  $A\text{-in-dom}: A \in \text{domain}_f // r$ 
  unfolding preimg.simps quotient-def
  by blast
obtain  $x :: 'x$  where
   $x \in \text{preimg } f \ \text{domain}_f \ y$  and
   $A\text{-eq-img-singleton-r}: A = r \ \{x\}$ 
  using equiv-rel preimg-quot quotientE
  unfolding quotient-def
  by blast
hence  $x\text{-in-dom-and-f-x-y}: x \in \text{domain}_f \wedge f \ x = y$ 
  unfolding preimg.simps
  by blast
moreover have  $r \ \{x\} \subseteq X$ 

```

```

    using equiv-rel equiv-type
    by fastforce
ultimately have  $r \text{ `` } \{x\} \subseteq \text{domain}_f$ 
    using closed-domain A-eq-img-singleton-r A-in-dom
    by fastforce
hence  $\forall x' \in r \text{ `` } \{x\}. (x, x') \in \text{Restr } r \text{ domain}_f$ 
    using x-in-dom-and-f-x-y in-mono
    by blast
hence  $\forall x' \in r \text{ `` } \{x\}. f x' = y$ 
    using invar-f x-in-dom-and-f-x-y
    unfolding satisfies.simps
    by metis
moreover have  $x \in A$ 
    using equiv-rel cons-subset equiv-class-self in-mono
    A-eq-img-singleton-r x-in-dom-and-f-x-y
    by metis
ultimately have  $f ` A = \{y\}$ 
    using A-eq-img-singleton-r
    by auto
hence  $\pi_Q f A = y$ 
    unfolding  $\pi_Q$ .simps singleton-set.simps
    using insert-absorb insert-iff insert-not-empty singleton-set-def-if-card-one
    is-singletonI is-singleton-altdef singleton-set.simps
    by metis
thus  $A \in \text{preimg } (\pi_Q f) (\text{domain}_f // r) y$ 
    using A-in-dom
    unfolding preimg.simps
    by blast
next
fix
  A :: 'x set and
  y :: 'y
assume quot-preimg:  $A \in \text{preimg } (\pi_Q f) (\text{domain}_f // r) y$ 
hence A-in-dom-rel-r:  $A \in \text{domain}_f // r$ 
    using cons-subset equiv-rel
    by auto
hence  $A \subseteq X$ 
    using equiv-rel cons-subset Image-subset equiv-type quotientE
    by metis
hence A-in-dom:  $A \subseteq \text{domain}_f$ 
    using closed-under-equiv-rel-subset[of X r domain_f A]
    closed-domain cons-subset A-in-dom-rel-r equiv-rel
    by blast
moreover obtain  $x :: 'x$  where
  x-in-A:  $x \in A$  and
  A-eq-r-img-single-x:  $A = r \text{ `` } \{x\}$ 
    using A-in-dom-rel-r equiv-rel cons-subset equiv-class-self in-mono quotientE
    by metis
ultimately have  $\forall x' \in A. (x, x') \in \text{Restr } r \text{ domain}_f$ 

```


by *blast*
 hence $\forall x' \in A. f x' = f x$
 using *invar-f*
 by *fastforce*
 hence $f \text{' } A = \{f x\}$
 using *x-in-A*
 by *blast*
 hence $\pi_Q f A = f x$
 unfolding *$\pi_Q.simps$ singleton-set.simps*
 using *is-singleton-altdef singleton-set-def-if-card-one*
 by *fastforce*
 also have $\pi_Q f A = y$
 using *quot-preimg*
 unfolding *preimg.simps*
 by *blast*
 finally have $f x = y$
 by *simp*
 moreover have $x \in \text{domain}_f$
 using *x-in-A A-in-dom*
 by *blast*
 ultimately have $x \in \text{preimg } f \text{ domain}_f y$
 by *simp*
 thus $A \in \text{preimg } f \text{ domain}_f y // r$
 using *A-eq-r-img-single-x*
 unfolding *quotient-def*
 by *blast*
 qed

lemma *minimizer-helper:*

fixes
 $f :: 'x \Rightarrow 'y$ and
 $\text{domain}_f :: 'x \text{ set}$ and
 $d :: 'x \text{ Distance}$ and
 $Y :: 'y \text{ set}$ and
 $x :: 'x$ and
 $y :: 'y$
 shows $y \in \text{minimizer } f \text{ domain}_f d Y \iff$
 $(y \in Y \wedge (\forall y' \in Y. \text{Inf } (d x \text{' } (\text{preimg } f \text{ domain}_f y)) \leq \text{Inf } (d x \text{' } (\text{preimg } f \text{ domain}_f y'))))$
 unfolding *is-arg-min-def minimizer.simps arg-min-set.simps*
 by *auto*

lemma *rewr-singleton-set-system-union:*

fixes
 $Y :: 'x \text{ set set}$ and
 $X :: 'x \text{ set}$
 assumes $Y \subseteq \text{singleton-set-system } X$
 shows
singleton-set-union: $x \in \bigcup Y \iff \{x\} \in Y$ and

$\text{obtain-singleton: } A \in \text{singleton-set-system } X \longleftrightarrow (\exists x \in X. A = \{x\})$
unfolding *singleton-set-system.simps*
using *assms*
by *auto*

lemma *union-inf*:
fixes $X :: \text{ereal set set}$
shows $\text{Inf } \{\text{Inf } A \mid A. A \in X\} = \text{Inf } (\bigcup X)$
proof –
let $?inf = \text{Inf } \{\text{Inf } A \mid A. A \in X\}$
have $\forall A \in X. \forall x \in A. ?inf \leq x$
using *INF-lower2 Inf-lower Setcompr-eq-image*
by *metis*
hence $\forall x \in \bigcup X. ?inf \leq x$
by *simp*
hence *le*: $?inf \leq \text{Inf } (\bigcup X)$
using *Inf-greatest*
by *blast*
have $\forall A \in X. \text{Inf } (\bigcup X) \leq \text{Inf } A$
using *Inf-superset-mono Union-upper*
by *metis*
hence $\text{Inf } (\bigcup X) \leq \text{Inf } \{\text{Inf } A \mid A. A \in X\}$
using *le-Inf-iff*
by *auto*
thus *?thesis*
using *le*
by *simp*
qed

4.7.3 Quotient Distance Rationalization

fun (in result) $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{Q}} :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election rel} \Rightarrow ('a, 'v) \text{ Election Distance}$
 $\Rightarrow ('a, 'v, 'r \text{ Result}) \text{ Consensus-Class} \Rightarrow ('a, 'v) \text{ Election set} \Rightarrow 'r \text{ set}$ **where**
 $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{Q}} r d C A = \bigcup (\text{minimizer } (\pi_{\mathcal{Q}} (\text{elect-}r \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} C))) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{Q}} r$
 $C)$
 $(\text{inf-dist}_{\mathcal{Q}} d) (\text{singleton-set-system } (\text{limit-set}_{\mathcal{Q}} A \text{ UNIV}))$
 $A)$

fun (in result) $\text{distance-}\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{Q}} :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election rel} \Rightarrow ('a, 'v) \text{ Election Distance}$
 $\Rightarrow ('a, 'v, 'r \text{ Result}) \text{ Consensus-Class} \Rightarrow ('a, 'v) \text{ Election set} \Rightarrow 'r \text{ Result}$
where
 $\text{distance-}\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{Q}} r d C A =$
 $(\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{Q}} r d C A, \pi_{\mathcal{Q}} (\lambda E. \text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} E) \text{ UNIV}) A - \mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{Q}} r d C A,$
 $\{\})$

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theorem (in result) *invar-dr-simple-dist-imp-quotient-dr-winners*:
fixes
 $d :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election Distance}$ **and**

$C :: ('a, 'v, 'r \text{ Result}) \text{ Consensus-Class and}$
 $r :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election rel and}$
 $X :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election set and}$
 $A :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election set}$
assumes
simple: $\text{simple } r \ X \ d \text{ and}$
closed-domain: $\text{closed-under-restr-rel } r \ X \ (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \text{ and}$
invar-res: $\text{satisfies } (\lambda E. \text{limit-set } (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \text{ UNIV}) \ (\text{Invariance } r) \text{ and}$
invar-C: $\text{satisfies } (\text{elect-}r \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} \ (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) \ (\text{Invariance } (\text{Restr } r \ (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C))) \text{ and}$
invar-dr: $\text{satisfies } (\text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} \ (\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}} \ d \ C)) \ (\text{Invariance } r) \text{ and}$
quot-class: $A \in X \ // \ r \text{ and}$
equiv-rel: $\text{equiv } X \ r \text{ and}$
cons-subset: $\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C \subseteq X$
shows $\pi_{\mathcal{Q}} \ (\text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} \ (\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}} \ d \ C)) \ A = \mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{Q}} \ r \ d \ C \ A$
proof –
have *preimg-img-imp-cls*:
 $\forall y \ B. B \in \text{preimg} \ (\pi_{\mathcal{Q}} \ (\text{elect-}r \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} \ (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C))) \ (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{Q}} \ r \ C) \ y$
 $\longrightarrow B \in (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ // \ r$
by *simp*
have $\forall y'. \forall E \in \text{preimg} \ (\text{elect-}r \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} \ (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) \ (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ y'. E \in r$
 $\text{“} \{E\}$
using *equiv-rel cons-subset equiv-class-self equiv-rel in-mono*
unfolding *equiv-def preimg.simps*
by *fastforce*
hence $\forall y'.$
 $\bigcup (\text{preimg} \ (\text{elect-}r \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} \ (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) \ (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ y' \ // \ r) \supseteq$
 $\text{preimg} \ (\text{elect-}r \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} \ (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) \ (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ y'$
unfolding *quotient-def*
by *blast*
moreover have $\forall y'.$
 $\bigcup (\text{preimg} \ (\text{elect-}r \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} \ (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) \ (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ y' \ // \ r) \subseteq$
 $\text{preimg} \ (\text{elect-}r \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} \ (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) \ (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ y'$
proof (*standard, standard*)
fix
 $Y' :: 'r \text{ set and}$
 $E :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election}$
assume $E \in \bigcup (\text{preimg} \ (\text{elect-}r \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} \ (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) \ (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ Y' \ // \ r)$
then obtain $B :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election set where}$
 $E\text{-in-}B: E \in B \text{ and}$
 $B \in \text{preimg} \ (\text{elect-}r \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} \ (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) \ (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ Y' \ // \ r$
by *blast*
then obtain $E' :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election where}$
 $B = r \text{ “} \{E'\} \text{ and}$
 $\text{map-to-}Y': E' \in \text{preimg} \ (\text{elect-}r \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} \ (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) \ (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ Y'$
using *quotientE*
by *blast*
hence *in-restr-rel*: $(E', E) \in r \cap (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \times X$
using *E-in-B equiv-rel*

unfolding *preimg.simps equiv-def refl-on-def*
by *blast*
hence $E \in \text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C$
using *closed-domain*
unfolding *closed-under-restr-rel.simps restr-rel.simps Image-def*
by *blast*
hence *rel-cons-els*: $(E', E) \in \text{Restr } r \ (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C)$
using *in-restr-rel*
by *blast*
hence $(\text{elect-}r \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} \ (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) \ E = (\text{elect-}r \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} \ (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) \ E'$
using *invar-C*
unfolding *satisfies.simps*
by *blast*
hence $(\text{elect-}r \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} \ (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) \ E = Y'$
using *map-to-Y'*
by *simp*
thus $E \in \text{preimg} \ (\text{elect-}r \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} \ (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) \ (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ Y'$
unfolding *preimg.simps*
using *rel-cons-els*
by *blast*
qed
ultimately have *preimg-partition*: $\forall \ y'.$

$$\bigcup \ (\text{preimg} \ (\text{elect-}r \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} \ (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) \ (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ y' // r) =$$

$$\text{preimg} \ (\text{elect-}r \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} \ (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) \ (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ y'$$
by *blast*
have *quot-classes-subset*: $(\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) // r \subseteq X // r$
using *cons-subset*
unfolding *quotient-def*
by *blast*
obtain $a :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Election where}$
 $a\text{-in-}A: a \in A$ **and**
 $a\text{-def-inf-dist}: \forall \ B \in X // r. \text{inf-dist}_{\mathcal{Q}} \ d \ A \ B = \text{Inf} \ \{d \ a \ b \mid b. b \in B\}$
using *simple quot-class*
unfolding *simple.simps*
by *blast*
hence *inf-dist-preimg-sets*:
 $\forall \ y' \ B. B \in \text{preimg} \ (\pi_{\mathcal{Q}} \ (\text{elect-}r \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} \ (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C))) \ (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{Q}} \ r \ C) \ y' \longrightarrow$

$$\text{inf-dist}_{\mathcal{Q}} \ d \ A \ B = \text{Inf} \ \{d \ a \ b \mid b. b \in B\}$$
using *preimg-img-imp-cls quot-classes-subset*
by *blast*
have *valid-res-eq*: $\text{singleton-set-system} \ (\text{limit-set} \ (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ a) \ \text{UNIV}) =$
 $\text{singleton-set-system} \ (\text{limit-set}_{\mathcal{Q}} \ A \ \text{UNIV})$
using *invar-res a-in-A quot-class cons-subset equiv-rel limit-set-invar*
by *metis*
have *inf-le-iff*: $\forall \ x.$

$$(\forall \ y' \in \text{singleton-set-system} \ (\text{limit-set} \ (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ a) \ \text{UNIV}).$$

$$\text{Inf} \ (d \ a \ ' \ \text{preimg} \ (\text{elect-}r \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} \ (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) \ (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ \{x\})$$

$$\leq \text{Inf} \ (d \ a \ ' \ \text{preimg} \ (\text{elect-}r \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} \ (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) \ (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ y')$$

$$= (\forall \ y' \in \text{singleton-set-system} \ (\text{limit-set}_{\mathcal{Q}} \ A \ \text{UNIV}).$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{Inf } (\text{inf-dist}_{\mathcal{Q}} \ d \ A \ ' \text{preimg } (\pi_{\mathcal{Q}} (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C))) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{Q}} \\ & r \ C) \ \{x\}) \\ & \leq \text{Inf } (\text{inf-dist}_{\mathcal{Q}} \ d \ A \ ' \text{preimg } (\pi_{\mathcal{Q}} (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C))) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{Q}} \\ & r \ C) \ y')) \\ & \text{proof -} \\ & \text{have preimg-partition-dist: } \forall \ y'. \\ & \text{Inf } \{d \ a \ b \mid b. \ b \in \bigcup (\text{preimg } (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \\ & y' // r)\} = \\ & \text{Inf } (d \ a \ ' \text{preimg } (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ y') \\ & \text{using Setcompr-eq-image preimg-partition} \\ & \text{by metis} \\ & \text{have } \forall \ y'. \\ & \{ \text{Inf } \{d \ a \ b \mid b. \ b \in B\} \\ & \mid B. \ B \in \text{preimg } (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ y' // r \} \\ & = \{ \text{Inf } E \mid E. \ E \in \{ \{d \ a \ b \mid b. \ b \in B\} \\ & \mid B. \ B \in \text{preimg } (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ y' // r \} \} \\ & \text{by blast} \\ & \text{hence } \forall \ y'. \\ & \text{Inf } \{ \text{Inf } \{d \ a \ b \mid b. \ b \in B\} \mid B. \\ & \ B \in \text{preimg } (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ y' // r \} = \\ & \text{Inf } (\bigcup \{ \{d \ a \ b \mid b. \ b \in B\} \mid B. \\ & \ B \in (\text{preimg } (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ y' // r) \}) \\ & \text{using union-inf} \\ & \text{by presburger} \\ & \text{moreover have} \\ & \forall \ y'. \{d \ a \ b \mid b. \ b \in \bigcup (\text{preimg } (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \\ & y' // r)\} = \\ & \bigcup \{ \{d \ a \ b \mid b. \ b \in B\} \mid B. \\ & \ B \in (\text{preimg } (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ y' // r) \} \\ & \text{by blast} \\ & \text{ultimately have rewrite-inf-dist:} \\ & \forall \ y'. \text{Inf } \{ \text{Inf } \{d \ a \ b \mid b. \ b \in B\} \\ & \mid B. \ B \in \text{preimg } (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ y' // r \} \\ & = \text{Inf } \{d \ a \ b \mid b. \ b \in \bigcup (\text{preimg } (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \\ & y' // r)\} \\ & \text{by presburger} \\ & \text{have } \forall \ y'. \text{inf-dist}_{\mathcal{Q}} \ d \ A \ ' \text{preimg } (\pi_{\mathcal{Q}} (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C))) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{Q}} \\ & r \ C) \ y' \\ & = \{ \text{Inf } \{d \ a \ b \mid b. \ b \in B\} \\ & \mid B. \ B \in \text{preimg } (\pi_{\mathcal{Q}} (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C))) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{Q}} \ r \ C) \ y' \} \\ & \text{using inf-dist-preimg-sets} \\ & \text{unfolding Image-def} \\ & \text{by auto} \\ & \text{moreover have } \forall \ y'. \\ & \{ \text{Inf } \{d \ a \ b \mid b. \ b \in B\} \mid B. \\ & \ B \in \text{preimg } (\pi_{\mathcal{Q}} (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C))) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{Q}} \ r \ C) \ y' \} = \\ & \{ \text{Inf } \{d \ a \ b \mid b. \ b \in B\} \mid B. \\ & \ B \in (\text{preimg } (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} \ C)) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} \ C) \ y') // r \} \\ & \text{unfolding elections-}\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{Q}}.\text{simps}
\end{aligned}$$

```

    using preimg-invar closed-domain cons-subset equiv-rel invar-C
    by blast
  ultimately have
     $\forall y'. \text{Inf} (\text{inf-dist}_{\mathcal{Q}} d A \text{ 'preimg } (\pi_{\mathcal{Q}} (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} C))) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{Q}} r C) y')$ 
    =  $\text{Inf} \{ \text{Inf} \{ d a b \mid b. b \in B \} \mid B. B \in \text{preimg} (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} C)) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} C) y' // r \}$ 
    by simp
  thus ?thesis
    using valid-res-eq rewrite-inf-dist preimg-partition-dist
    by presburger
qed
from a-in-A
have  $\pi_{\mathcal{Q}} (\text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}} d C)) A = \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}} d C) a$ 
  using invar-dr equiv-rel quot-class pass-to-quotient invariance-is-congruence
  by blast
moreover have  $\forall x. x \in \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}} d C) a \longleftrightarrow x \in \mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{Q}} r d C A$ 
proof
  fix x :: 'r
  have  $(x \in \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}} d C) a) =$ 
     $(x \in \bigcup (\text{minimizer} (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} C)) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} C) d$ 
       $(\text{singleton-set-system} (\text{limit-set} (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} a) \text{UNIV})) a))$ 
    using  $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}}$ -is-minimizer
    by metis
  also have  $\dots = (\{x\} \in \text{minimizer} (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} C)) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} C) d$ 
     $(\text{singleton-set-system} (\text{limit-set} (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} a) \text{UNIV})) a)$ 
    using singleton-set-union
    unfolding minimizer.simps arg-min-set.simps is-arg-min-def
    by auto
  also have  $\dots = (\{x\} \in \text{singleton-set-system} (\text{limit-set} (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} a) \text{UNIV})$ 
 $\wedge$ 
     $(\forall y' \in \text{singleton-set-system} (\text{limit-set} (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} a) \text{UNIV}).$ 
       $\text{Inf} (d a \text{ 'preimg } (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} C)) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} C) \{x\}) \leq$ 
       $\text{Inf} (d a \text{ 'preimg } (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} C)) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K} C) y'))$ 
    using minimizer-helper
    by (metis (no-types, lifting))
  also have  $\dots = (\{x\} \in \text{singleton-set-system} (\text{limit-set}_{\mathcal{Q}} A \text{UNIV}) \wedge$ 
     $(\forall y' \in \text{singleton-set-system} (\text{limit-set}_{\mathcal{Q}} A \text{UNIV}).$ 
       $\text{Inf} (\text{inf-dist}_{\mathcal{Q}} d A \text{ 'preimg } (\pi_{\mathcal{Q}} (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} C))) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{Q}} r C) \{x\})$ 
       $\leq \text{Inf} (\text{inf-dist}_{\mathcal{Q}} d A \text{ 'preimg } (\pi_{\mathcal{Q}} (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} C))) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{Q}} r C) y'))$ 
      using valid-res-eq inf-le-iff
      by blast
    also have  $\dots =$ 
       $(\{x\} \in \text{minimizer} (\pi_{\mathcal{Q}} (\text{elect-r} \circ \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{rule-}\mathcal{K} C))) (\text{elections-}\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{Q}} r C)$ 
         $(\text{inf-dist}_{\mathcal{Q}} d) (\text{singleton-set-system} (\text{limit-set}_{\mathcal{Q}} A \text{UNIV}))$ 
        A)

```

```

    using minimizer-helper
    by (metis (no-types, lifting))
  also have ... = (x ∈ ⋃ (minimizer (πQ (elect-r ∘ funE (rule- $\mathcal{K}$  C))) (elections- $\mathcal{K}_Q$ 
r C)
                                     (inf-distQ d) (singleton-set-system (limit-setQ A UNIV))
A))
    using singleton-set-union
    unfolding minimizer.simps arg-min-set.simps is-arg-min-def
    by auto
  finally show (x ∈ funE (RW d C) a) = (x ∈ RQ r d C A)
    unfolding RQ.simps
    by blast
qed
ultimately show πQ (funE (RW d C)) A = RQ r d C A
  by blast
qed

theorem (in result) invar-dr-simple-dist-imp-quotient-dr:
  fixes
    d :: ('a, 'v) Election Distance and
    C :: ('a, 'v, 'r Result) Consensus-Class and
    r :: ('a, 'v) Election rel and
    X :: ('a, 'v) Election set and
    A :: ('a, 'v) Election set
  assumes
    simple: simple r X d and
    closed-domain: closed-under-restr-rel r X (elections- $\mathcal{K}$  C) and
    invar-res: satisfies (λ E. limit-set (alternatives- $\mathcal{E}$  E) UNIV) (Invariance r) and
    invar-C: satisfies (elect-r ∘ funE (rule- $\mathcal{K}$  C)) (Invariance (Restr r (elections- $\mathcal{K}$ 
C))) and
    invar-dr: satisfies (funE (RW d C)) (Invariance r) and
    quot-class: A ∈ X // r and
    equiv-rel: equiv X r and
    cons-subset: elections- $\mathcal{K}$  C ⊆ X
  shows πQ (funE (distance-R d C)) A = distance-RQ r d C A
proof -
  have ∀ E. funE (distance-R d C) E =
    (funE (RW d C) E, limit-set (alternatives- $\mathcal{E}$  E) UNIV - funE (RW d C)
E, {})
    by simp
  moreover have ∀ E ∈ A. funE (RW d C) E = πQ (funE (RW d C)) A
    using invar-dr invariance-is-congruence pass-to-quotient quot-class equiv-rel
    by blast
  moreover have πQ (funE (RW d C)) A = RQ r d C A
    using invar-dr-simple-dist-imp-quotient-dr-winners assms
    by blast
  moreover have
    ∀ E ∈ A. limit-set (alternatives- $\mathcal{E}$  E) UNIV = πQ (λ E. limit-set (alternatives- $\mathcal{E}$ 
E) UNIV) A

```

```

    using invar-res invariance-is-congruence' pass-to-quotient quot-class equiv-rel
    by blast
  ultimately have all-eq:
     $\forall E \in A. \text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{distance-}\mathcal{R} \ d \ C) \ E =$ 
     $(\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{Q}} \ r \ d \ C \ A, \pi_{\mathcal{Q}} (\lambda E. \text{limit-set} (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ UNIV) \ A - \mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{Q}} \ r \ d \ C$ 
     $A, \{\})$ 
    by fastforce
  hence  $\{(\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{Q}} \ r \ d \ C \ A, \pi_{\mathcal{Q}} (\lambda E. \text{limit-set} (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ UNIV) \ A - \mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{Q}} \ r$ 
     $d \ C \ A, \{\})\} \supseteq$ 
     $\text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{distance-}\mathcal{R} \ d \ C) \ ' A$ 
    by blast
  moreover have  $A \neq \{\}$ 
    using quot-class equiv-rel in-quotient-imp-non-empty
    by metis
  ultimately have single-img:
     $\{(\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{Q}} \ r \ d \ C \ A, \pi_{\mathcal{Q}} (\lambda E. \text{limit-set} (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ UNIV) \ A - \mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{Q}} \ r \ d \ C \ A,$ 
     $\{\})\} =$ 
     $\text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{distance-}\mathcal{R} \ d \ C) \ ' A$ 
    using empty-is-image subset-singletonD
    by (metis (no-types, lifting))
  moreover from this
  have  $\text{card} (\text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{distance-}\mathcal{R} \ d \ C) \ ' A) = 1$ 
    using is-singleton-altdef is-singletonI
    by (metis (no-types, lifting))
  moreover from this single-img
  have  $\text{the-inv} (\lambda x. \{x\}) (\text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{distance-}\mathcal{R} \ d \ C) \ ' A) =$ 
     $(\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{Q}} \ r \ d \ C \ A, \pi_{\mathcal{Q}} (\lambda E. \text{limit-set} (\text{alternatives-}\mathcal{E} \ E) \ UNIV) \ A - \mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{Q}} \ r \ d$ 
     $C \ A, \{\})$ 
    using singleton-insert-inj-eq singleton-set.elims singleton-set-def-if-card-one
    by (metis (no-types))
  ultimately show ?thesis
    unfolding distance- $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{Q}}$ .simps
    using  $\pi_{\mathcal{Q}}$ .simps[of  $\text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{distance-}\mathcal{R} \ d \ C)$ ] singleton-set.simps[of  $\text{fun}_{\mathcal{E}} (\text{distance-}\mathcal{R}$ 
     $d \ C) \ ' A]$ 
    by presburger
qed

end

```

4.8 Result + Property Locale Code Generation

```

theory Interpretation-Code
  imports Electoral-Module
    Distance-Rationalization
begin
setup Locale-Code.open-block

```


Lemmas stating the explicit instantiations of interpreted abstract functions from locales.

lemma *electoral-module-social-choice-code-lemma*:

social-choice-result.electoral-module $m \equiv$

$\forall A V p. \text{profile } V A p \longrightarrow \text{well-formed-social-choice } A (m V A p)$

unfolding *social-choice-result.electoral-module-def*

by *simp*

lemma *$\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}}$ -social-choice-code-lemma*:

social-choice-result. $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}}$ $d K V A p =$

$\text{arg-min-set } (\text{score } d K (A, V, p)) (\text{limit-set-social-choice } A \text{ UNIV})$

unfolding *social-choice-result. $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}}$.simps*

by *safe*

lemma *distance- \mathcal{R} -social-choice-code-lemma*:

social-choice-result.distance- \mathcal{R} $d K V A p =$

$(\text{social-choice-result.}\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}} d K V A p,$

$(\text{limit-set-social-choice } A \text{ UNIV}) - \text{social-choice-result.}\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}} d K V A p, \{\})$

unfolding *social-choice-result.distance- \mathcal{R} .simps*

by *safe*

lemma *$\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}}$ -std-social-choice-code-lemma*:

social-choice-result. $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}}$ -std $d K V A p =$

$\text{arg-min-set } (\text{score-std } d K (A, V, p)) (\text{limit-set-social-choice } A \text{ UNIV})$

unfolding *social-choice-result. $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}}$ -std.simps*

by *safe*

lemma *distance- \mathcal{R} -std-social-choice-code-lemma*:

social-choice-result.distance- \mathcal{R} -std $d K V A p =$

$(\text{social-choice-result.}\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}}$ -std $d K V A p,$

$(\text{limit-set-social-choice } A \text{ UNIV}) - \text{social-choice-result.}\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}}$ -std $d K V A$

$p, \{\})$

unfolding *social-choice-result.distance- \mathcal{R} -std.simps*

by *safe*

lemma *anonymity-social-choice-code-lemma*:

social-choice-result.anonymity $=$

$(\lambda m. \text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m \wedge$

$(\forall A V p \pi::('v \Rightarrow 'v).$

$\text{bij } \pi \longrightarrow (\text{let } (A', V', q) = (\text{rename } \pi (A, V, p)) \text{ in}$

$\text{finite-profile } V A p \wedge \text{finite-profile } V' A' q \longrightarrow m V A p = m V' A' q)))$

unfolding *social-choice-result.anonymity-def*

by *simp*

Declarations for replacing interpreted abstract functions from locales by their explicit instantiations for code generation.

declare *[[lc-add social-choice-result.electoral-module electoral-module-social-choice-code-lemma]]*

declare *[[lc-add social-choice-result. $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}}$ $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}}$ -social-choice-code-lemma]]*

declare *[[lc-add social-choice-result. $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}}$ -std $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}}$ -std-social-choice-code-lemma]]*

```

declare [[lc-add social-choice-result.distance- $\mathcal{R}$  distance- $\mathcal{R}$ -social-choice-code-lemma]]
declare [[lc-add social-choice-result.distance- $\mathcal{R}$ -std distance- $\mathcal{R}$ -std-social-choice-code-lemma]]
declare [[lc-add social-choice-result.anonymity anonymity-social-choice-code-lemma]]

```

Constant aliases to use when exporting code instead of the interpreted functions

```

definition  $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}}$ -social-choice-code = social-choice-result. $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}}$ 
definition  $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}}$ -std-social-choice-code = social-choice-result. $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{W}}$ -std
definition distance- $\mathcal{R}$ -social-choice-code = social-choice-result.distance- $\mathcal{R}$ 
definition distance- $\mathcal{R}$ -std-social-choice-code = social-choice-result.distance- $\mathcal{R}$ -std
definition electoral-module-social-choice-code = social-choice-result.electoral-module
definition anonymity-social-choice-code = social-choice-result.anonymity

```

```

setup Locale-Code.close-block

```

```

end

```

4.9 Drop Module

```

theory Drop-Module
  imports Component-Types/Electoral-Module
           Component-Types/Social-Choice-Types/Result
begin

```

This is a family of electoral modules. For a natural number n and a lexicon (linear order) r of all alternatives, the according drop module rejects the lexicographically first n alternatives (from A) and defers the rest. It is primarily used as counterpart to the pass module in a parallel composition, in order to segment the alternatives into two groups.

4.9.1 Definition

```

fun drop-module :: nat  $\Rightarrow$  'a Preference-Relation  $\Rightarrow$  ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module
where
  drop-module  $n$   $r$   $V$   $A$   $p$  =
    ({},
     { $a \in A$ . rank (limit  $A$   $r$ )  $a \leq n$ },
     { $a \in A$ . rank (limit  $A$   $r$ )  $a > n$ })

```

4.9.2 Soundness

```

theorem drop-mod-sound[simp]:
  fixes
     $r$  :: 'a Preference-Relation and

```

```

    n :: nat
  shows social-choice-result.electoral-module (drop-module n r)
proof (unfold social-choice-result.electoral-module-def, safe)
  fix
    A :: 'a set and
    V :: 'v set and
    p :: ('a, 'v) Profile
  assume profile V A p
  let ?mod = drop-module n r
  have  $\forall a \in A. a \in \{x \in A. \text{rank } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ x \leq n\} \vee$ 
     $a \in \{x \in A. \text{rank } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ x > n\}$ 
    by auto
  hence  $\{a \in A. \text{rank } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ a \leq n\} \cup \{a \in A. \text{rank } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ a > n\} = A$ 
    by blast
  hence set-partition: set-equals-partition A (drop-module n r V A p)
    by simp
  have  $\forall a \in A.$ 
     $\neg (a \in \{x \in A. \text{rank } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ x \leq n\} \wedge$ 
     $a \in \{x \in A. \text{rank } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ x > n\})$ 
    by simp
  hence  $\{a \in A. \text{rank } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ a \leq n\} \cap \{a \in A. \text{rank } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ a > n\} = \{\}$ 
    by blast
  thus well-formed-social-choice A (?mod V A p)
    using set-partition
    by simp
qed

```

```

lemma drop-mod-only-voters:
  fixes
    r :: 'a Preference-Relation and
    n :: nat
  shows only-voters-vote (drop-module n r)
  unfolding only-voters-vote-def
  by simp

```

4.9.3 Non-Electing

The drop module is non-electing.

theorem *drop-mod-non-electing*[simp]:

```

  fixes
    r :: 'a Preference-Relation and
    n :: nat
  shows non-electing (drop-module n r)
  unfolding non-electing-def
  by simp

```

4.9.4 Properties

The drop module is strictly defer-monotone.

```

theorem drop-mod-def-lift-inv[simp]:
  fixes
    r :: 'a Preference-Relation and
    n :: nat
  shows defer-lift-invariance (drop-module n r)
  unfolding defer-lift-invariance-def
  by simp

end

```

4.10 Pass Module

```

theory Pass-Module
  imports Component-Types/Electoral-Module
begin

```

This is a family of electoral modules. For a natural number n and a lexicon (linear order) r of all alternatives, the according pass module defers the lexicographically first n alternatives (from A) and rejects the rest. It is primarily used as counterpart to the drop module in a parallel composition in order to segment the alternatives into two groups.

4.10.1 Definition

```

fun pass-module :: nat  $\Rightarrow$  'a Preference-Relation  $\Rightarrow$  ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module
where
  pass-module n r V A p =
    ({},
     {a  $\in$  A. rank (limit A r) a > n},
     {a  $\in$  A. rank (limit A r) a  $\leq$  n})

```

4.10.2 Soundness

```

theorem pass-mod-sound[simp]:
  fixes
    r :: 'a Preference-Relation and
    n :: nat
  shows social-choice-result.electoral-module (pass-module n r)
proof (unfold social-choice-result.electoral-module-def, safe)
fix
  A :: 'a set and
  V :: 'v set and
  p :: ('a, 'v) Profile
let ?mod = pass-module n r

```

```

have  $\forall a \in A. a \in \{x \in A. \text{rank } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ x > n\} \vee$ 
       $a \in \{x \in A. \text{rank } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ x \leq n\}$ 
using CollectI not-less
by metis
hence  $\{a \in A. \text{rank } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ a > n\} \cup \{a \in A. \text{rank } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ a \leq n\} = A$ 
by blast
hence set-equals-partition A (pass-module n r V A p)
by simp
moreover have
   $\forall a \in A.$ 
   $\neg (a \in \{x \in A. \text{rank } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ x > n\} \wedge$ 
     $a \in \{x \in A. \text{rank } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ x \leq n\})$ 
by simp
hence  $\{a \in A. \text{rank } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ a > n\} \cap \{a \in A. \text{rank } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ a \leq n\} = \{\}$ 
by blast
ultimately show well-formed-social-choice A (?mod V A p)
by simp
qed

```

```

lemma pass-mod-only-voters:
fixes
   $r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$  and
   $n :: \text{nat}$ 
shows only-voters-vote (pass-module n r)
unfolding only-voters-vote-def pass-module.simps
by blast

```

4.10.3 Non-Blocking

The pass module is non-blocking.

```

theorem pass-mod-non-blocking[simp]:
fixes
   $r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$  and
   $n :: \text{nat}$ 
assumes
  order: linear-order r and
  g0-n: n > 0
shows non-blocking (pass-module n r)
proof (unfold non-blocking-def, safe)
  show social-choice-result.electoral-module (pass-module n r)
  by simp
next
fix
   $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
   $V :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
   $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$  and
   $a :: 'a$ 
assume
  fin-A: finite A and

```

$\text{rej-pass-}A$: $\text{reject } (\text{pass-module } n \ r) \ \forall A \ p = A$ **and**
 $a\text{-in-}A$: $a \in A$
moreover have lin : $\text{linear-order-on } A \ (\text{limit } A \ r)$
using $\text{limit-presv-lin-ord}$ $\text{order top-greatest}$
by metis
moreover have
 $\exists b \in A. \text{above } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ b = \{b\}$
 $\wedge (\forall c \in A. \text{above } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ c = \{c\} \longrightarrow c = b)$
using $\text{fin-}A$ $a\text{-in-}A$ lin above-one
by blast
moreover have $\{b \in A. \text{rank } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ b > n\} \neq A$
using Suc-leI $g0\text{-}n$ leD mem-Collect-eq $\text{above-rank calculation}$
unfolding One-nat-def
by $(\text{metis } (\text{no-types}, \text{lifting}))$
hence $\text{reject } (\text{pass-module } n \ r) \ \forall A \ p \neq A$
by simp
thus $a \in \{\}$
using $\text{rej-pass-}A$
by simp
qed

4.10.4 Non-Electing

The pass module is non-electing.

theorem $\text{pass-mod-non-electing}[\text{simp}]$:
fixes
 $r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ **and**
 $n :: \text{nat}$
assumes $\text{linear-order } r$
shows $\text{non-electing } (\text{pass-module } n \ r)$
unfolding non-electing-def
using assms
by simp

4.10.5 Properties

The pass module is strictly defer-monotone.

theorem $\text{pass-mod-dl-inv}[\text{simp}]$:
fixes
 $r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ **and**
 $n :: \text{nat}$
assumes $\text{linear-order } r$
shows $\text{defer-lift-invariance } (\text{pass-module } n \ r)$
unfolding $\text{defer-lift-invariance-def}$
using assms
by simp

theorem $\text{pass-zero-mod-def-zero}[\text{simp}]$:

```

fixes  $r :: 'a$  Preference-Relation
assumes linear-order  $r$ 
shows defers 0 (pass-module 0  $r$ )
proof (unfold defers-def, safe)
  show social-choice-result.electoral-module (pass-module 0  $r$ )
    using pass-mod-sound assms
    by simp
next
fix
   $A :: 'a$  set and
   $V :: 'v$  set and
   $p :: ('a, 'v)$  Profile
assume
  card-pos:  $0 \leq \text{card } A$  and
  finite-A: finite  $A$  and
  prof-A: profile  $V$   $A$   $p$ 
have linear-order-on  $A$  (limit  $A$   $r$ )
  using assms limit-presv-lin-ord
  by blast
hence limit-is-connex: connex  $A$  (limit  $A$   $r$ )
  using lin-ord-imp-connex
  by simp
have  $\forall n. (n::\text{nat}) \leq 0 \longrightarrow n = 0$ 
  by blast
hence  $\forall a A'. a \in A' \wedge a \in A \longrightarrow \text{connex } A' (\text{limit } A \ r) \longrightarrow$ 
   $\neg \text{rank } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ a \leq 0$ 
  using above-connex above-presv-limit card-eq-0-iff equals0D finite-A
  assms rev-finite-subset
  unfolding rank.simps
  by (metis (no-types))
hence  $\{a \in A. \text{rank } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ a \leq 0\} = \{\}$ 
  using limit-is-connex
  by simp
hence  $\text{card } \{a \in A. \text{rank } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ a \leq 0\} = 0$ 
  using card.empty
  by metis
thus  $\text{card } (\text{defer } (\text{pass-module } 0 \ r) \ V \ A \ p) = 0$ 
  by simp
qed

```

For any natural number n and any linear order, the according pass module defers n alternatives (if there are n alternatives). NOTE: The induction proof is still missing. The following are the proofs for $n=1$ and $n=2$.

```

theorem pass-one-mod-def-one[simp]:
  fixes  $r :: 'a$  Preference-Relation
  assumes linear-order  $r$ 
  shows defers 1 (pass-module 1  $r$ )
proof (unfold defers-def, safe)
  show social-choice-result.electoral-module (pass-module 1  $r$ )

```

```

    using pass-mod-sound assms
    by simp
next
fix
  A :: 'a set and
  V :: 'v set and
  p :: ('a, 'v) Profile
assume
  card-pos: 1 ≤ card A and
  finite-A: finite A and
  prof-A: profile V A p
show card (defer (pass-module 1 r) V A p) = 1
proof -
  have A ≠ {}
    using card-pos
    by auto
  moreover have lin-ord-on-A: linear-order-on A (limit A r)
    using assms limit-presv-lin-ord
    by blast
  ultimately have winner-exists:
    ∃ a ∈ A. above (limit A r) a = {a} ∧
      (∀ b ∈ A. above (limit A r) b = {b} ⟶ b = a)
    using finite-A above-one
    by simp
  then obtain w where w-unique-top:
    above (limit A r) w = {w} ∧
      (∀ a ∈ A. above (limit A r) a = {a} ⟶ a = w)
    using above-one
    by auto
  hence {a ∈ A. rank (limit A r) a ≤ 1} = {w}
  proof
    assume
      w-top: above (limit A r) w = {w} and
      w-unique: ∀ a ∈ A. above (limit A r) a = {a} ⟶ a = w
    have rank (limit A r) w ≤ 1
      using w-top
      by auto
    hence {w} ⊆ {a ∈ A. rank (limit A r) a ≤ 1}
      using winner-exists w-unique-top
      by blast
    moreover have {a ∈ A. rank (limit A r) a ≤ 1} ⊆ {w}
    proof
      fix a :: 'a
      assume a-in-winner-set: a ∈ {b ∈ A. rank (limit A r) b ≤ 1}
      hence a-in-A: a ∈ A
        by auto
      hence connex-limit: connex A (limit A r)
        using lin-ord-imp-connex lin-ord-on-A
        by simp

```



```

hence let  $q = \text{limit } A \ r \text{ in } a \preceq_q a$ 
  using connex-limit above-connex pref-imp-in-above a-in-A
  by metis
hence  $(a, a) \in \text{limit } A \ r$ 
  by simp
hence a-above-a:  $a \in \text{above } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ a$ 
  unfolding above-def
  by simp
have  $\text{above } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ a \subseteq A$ 
  using above-presv-limit assms
  by fastforce
hence above-finite:  $\text{finite } (\text{above } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ a)$ 
  using finite-A finite-subset
  by simp
have  $\text{rank } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ a \leq 1$ 
  using a-in-winner-set
  by simp
moreover have  $\text{rank } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ a \geq 1$ 
  using Suc-leI above-finite card-eq-0-iff equals0D neq0-conv a-above-a
  unfolding rank.simps One-nat-def
  by metis
ultimately have  $\text{rank } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ a = 1$ 
  by simp
hence  $\{a\} = \text{above } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ a$ 
  using a-above-a lin-ord-on-A rank-one-imp-above-one
  by metis
hence  $a = w$ 
  using w-unique a-in-A
  by simp
thus  $a \in \{w\}$ 
  by simp
qed
ultimately have  $\{w\} = \{a \in A. \text{rank } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ a \leq 1\}$ 
  by auto
thus ?thesis
  by simp
qed
thus  $\text{card } (\text{defer } (\text{pass-module } 1 \ r) \ V \ A \ p) = 1$ 
  by simp
qed
qed

theorem pass-two-mod-def-two:
  fixes  $r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ 
  assumes linear-order r
  shows defers 2 (pass-module 2 r)
proof (unfold defers-def, safe)
  show social-choice-result.electoral-module (pass-module 2 r)
  using assms

```

```

    by simp
next
fix
  A :: 'a set and
  V :: 'v set and
  p :: ('a, 'v) Profile
assume
  min-card-two:  $2 \leq \text{card } A$  and
  fin-A: finite A and
  prof-A: profile V A p
from min-card-two
have not-empty-A:  $A \neq \{\}$ 
  by auto
moreover have limit-A-order: linear-order-on A (limit A r)
  using limit-presv-lin-ord assms
  by auto
ultimately obtain a where
  above (limit A r)  $a = \{a\}$ 
  using above-one min-card-two fin-A prof-A
  by blast
hence  $\forall b \in A. \text{let } q = \text{limit } A \text{ r in } (b \preceq_q a)$ 
  using limit-A-order pref-imp-in-above empty-iff lin-ord-imp-connex
    insert-iff insert-subset above-presv-limit assms
  unfolding connex-def
  by metis
hence a-best:  $\forall b \in A. (b, a) \in \text{limit } A \text{ r}$ 
  by simp
hence a-above:  $\forall b \in A. a \in \text{above } (\text{limit } A \text{ r}) \ b$ 
  unfolding above-def
  by simp
hence  $a \in \{a \in A. \text{rank } (\text{limit } A \text{ r}) \ a \leq 2\}$ 
  using CollectI not-empty-A empty-iff fin-A insert-iff limit-A-order
    above-one above-rank one-le-numeral
  by (metis (no-types, lifting))
hence a-in-defer:  $a \in \text{defer } (\text{pass-module } 2 \text{ r}) \ V \ A \ p$ 
  by simp
have finite (A - {a})
  using fin-A
  by simp
moreover have A-not-only-a:  $A - \{a\} \neq \{\}$ 
  using Diff-empty Diff-idemp Diff-insert0 not-empty-A insert-Diff finite.emptyI
    card.insert-remove card.empty min-card-two Suc-n-not-le-n numeral-2-eq-2
  by metis
moreover have limit-A-without-a-order:
  linear-order-on (A - {a}) (limit (A - {a}) r)
  using limit-presv-lin-ord assms top-greatest
  by blast
ultimately obtain b where
  b: above (limit (A - {a}) r)  $b = \{b\}$ 

```

using *above-one*
by *metis*
hence $\forall c \in A - \{a\}. \text{let } q = \text{limit } (A - \{a\}) \text{ } r \text{ in } (c \preceq_q b)$
using *limit-A-without-a-order pref-imp-in-above empty-iff lin-ord-imp-connex*
insert-iff insert-subset above-presv-limit assms
unfolding *connex-def*
by *metis*
hence *b-in-limit*: $\forall c \in A - \{a\}. (c, b) \in \text{limit } (A - \{a\}) \text{ } r$
by *simp*
hence *b-best*: $\forall c \in A - \{a\}. (c, b) \in \text{limit } A \text{ } r$
by *auto*
hence $\forall c \in A - \{a, b\}. c \notin \text{above } (\text{limit } A \text{ } r) \text{ } b$
using *b Diff-iff Diff-insert2 above-presv-limit insert-subset*
assms limit-presv-above limit-rel-presv-above
by *metis*
moreover have *above-subset*: $\text{above } (\text{limit } A \text{ } r) \text{ } b \subseteq A$
using *above-presv-limit assms*
by *metis*
moreover have *b-above-b*: $b \in \text{above } (\text{limit } A \text{ } r) \text{ } b$
using *b b-best above-presv-limit mem-Collect-eq assms insert-subset*
unfolding *above-def*
by *metis*
ultimately have *above-b-eq-ab*: $\text{above } (\text{limit } A \text{ } r) \text{ } b = \{a, b\}$
using *a-above*
by *auto*
hence *card-above-b-eq-two*: $\text{rank } (\text{limit } A \text{ } r) \text{ } b = 2$
using *A-not-only-a b-in-limit*
by *auto*
hence *b-in-defer*: $b \in \text{defer } (\text{pass-module } 2 \text{ } r) \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } p$
using *b-above-b above-subset*
by *auto*
have *b-above*: $\forall c \in A - \{a\}. b \in \text{above } (\text{limit } A \text{ } r) \text{ } c$
using *b-best mem-Collect-eq*
unfolding *above-def*
by *metis*
have *connex A (limit A r)*
using *limit-A-order lin-ord-imp-connex*
by *auto*
hence $\forall c \in A. c \in \text{above } (\text{limit } A \text{ } r) \text{ } c$
using *above-connex*
by *metis*
hence $\forall c \in A - \{a, b\}. \{a, b, c\} \subseteq \text{above } (\text{limit } A \text{ } r) \text{ } c$
using *a-above b-above*
by *auto*
moreover have $\forall c \in A - \{a, b\}. \text{card } \{a, b, c\} = 3$
using *DiffE Suc-1 above-b-eq-ab card-above-b-eq-two above-subset fin-A*
card-insert-disjoint finite-subset insert-commute numeral-3-eq-3
unfolding *One-nat-def rank.simps*
by *metis*

```

ultimately have  $\forall c \in A - \{a, b\}. \text{rank } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ c \geq 3$ 
  using card-mono fin-A finite-subset above-presv-limit assms
  unfolding rank.simps
  by metis
hence  $\forall c \in A - \{a, b\}. \text{rank } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ c > 2$ 
  using Suc-le-eq Suc-1 numeral-3-eq-3
  unfolding One-nat-def
  by metis
hence  $\forall c \in A - \{a, b\}. c \notin \text{defer } (\text{pass-module } 2 \ r) \ V \ A \ p$ 
  by (simp add: not-le)
moreover have  $\text{defer } (\text{pass-module } 2 \ r) \ V \ A \ p \subseteq A$ 
  by auto
ultimately have  $\text{defer } (\text{pass-module } 2 \ r) \ V \ A \ p \subseteq \{a, b\}$ 
  by blast
hence  $\text{defer } (\text{pass-module } 2 \ r) \ V \ A \ p = \{a, b\}$ 
  using a-in-defer b-in-defer
  by fastforce
thus  $\text{card } (\text{defer } (\text{pass-module } 2 \ r) \ V \ A \ p) = 2$ 
  using above-b-eq-ab card-above-b-eq-two
  unfolding rank.simps
  by presburger
qed

end

```

4.11 Elect Module

```

theory Elect-Module
  imports Component-Types/Electoral-Module
begin

```

The elect module is not concerned about the voter's ballots, and just elects all alternatives. It is primarily used in sequence after an electoral module that only defers alternatives to finalize the decision, thereby inducing a proper voting rule in the social choice sense.

4.11.1 Definition

```

fun elect-module :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module where
  elect-module  $V \ A \ p = (A, \{\}, \{\})$ 

```

4.11.2 Soundness

```

theorem elect-mod-sound[simp]: social-choice-result.electoral-module elect-module

```

```

unfolding social-choice-result.electoral-module-def
by simp

lemma elect-mod-only-voters: only-voters-vote elect-module
unfolding only-voters-vote-def
by simp

4.11.3 Electing

theorem elect-mod-electing[simp]: electing elect-module
unfolding electing-def
by simp

end

```

4.12 Plurality Module

```

theory Plurality-Module
imports Component-Types/Elimination-Module
begin

```

The plurality module implements the plurality voting rule. The plurality rule elects all modules with the maximum amount of top preferences among all alternatives, and rejects all the other alternatives. It is electing and induces the classical plurality (voting) rule from social-choice theory.

4.12.1 Definition

```

fun plurality-score :: ('a, 'v) Evaluation-Function where
  plurality-score V x A p = win-count V p x

fun plurality :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module where
  plurality V A p = max-eliminator plurality-score V A p

fun plurality' :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module where
  plurality' V A p =
    ({},
     {a ∈ A. ∃ x ∈ A. win-count V p x > win-count V p a},
     {a ∈ A. ∀ x ∈ A. win-count V p x ≤ win-count V p a})

lemma enat-leq-enat-set-max:
fixes
  x :: enat and
  X :: enat set

```

```

assumes
   $x \in X$  and
   $\text{finite } X$ 
shows  $x \leq \text{Max } X$ 
using assms
by simp

lemma plurality-mod-elim-equiv:
fixes
   $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
   $V :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
   $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ 
assumes
   $\text{non-empty-}A: A \neq \{\}$  and
   $\text{fin-}A: \text{finite } A$  and
   $\text{prof: profile } V \ A \ p$ 
shows  $\text{plurality } V \ A \ p = \text{plurality}' \ V \ A \ p$ 
proof (unfold plurality.simps plurality'.simps plurality-score.simps, standard)
have  $\text{fst } (\text{max-eliminator } (\lambda \ V \ x \ A \ p. \text{win-count } V \ p \ x) \ V \ A \ p) = \{\}$ 
by simp
also have  $\dots = \text{fst } (\{\},$ 
   $\{a \in A. \exists \ b \in A. \text{win-count } V \ p \ a < \text{win-count } V \ p \ b\},$ 
   $\{a \in A. \forall \ b \in A. \text{win-count } V \ p \ b \leq \text{win-count } V \ p \ a\})$ 
by simp
finally show
   $\text{fst } (\text{max-eliminator } (\lambda \ V \ x \ A \ p. \text{win-count } V \ p \ x) \ V \ A \ p) =$ 
   $\text{fst } (\{\},$ 
   $\{a \in A. \exists \ b \in A. \text{win-count } V \ p \ a < \text{win-count } V \ p \ b\},$ 
   $\{a \in A. \forall \ b \in A. \text{win-count } V \ p \ b \leq \text{win-count } V \ p \ a\})$ 
by simp
next
let  $?no\text{-max} = \{a \in A. \text{win-count } V \ p \ a < \text{Max } \{\text{win-count } V \ p \ x \mid x. x \in A\}\}$ 
 $= A$ 
have  $?no\text{-max} \implies \{\text{win-count } V \ p \ x \mid x. x \in A\} \neq \{\}$ 
using non-empty-A
by blast
moreover have  $\text{finite } \{\text{win-count } V \ p \ x \mid x. x \in A\}$ 
using fin-A
by simp
ultimately have  $\text{exists-max: } ?no\text{-max} \implies \text{False}$ 
using Max-in
by fastforce
have rej-eq:
   $\text{snd } (\text{max-eliminator } (\lambda \ V \ b \ A \ p. \text{win-count } V \ p \ b) \ V \ A \ p) =$ 
   $\text{snd } (\{\},$ 
   $\{a \in A. \exists \ x \in A. \text{win-count } V \ p \ a < \text{win-count } V \ p \ x\},$ 
   $\{a \in A. \forall \ x \in A. \text{win-count } V \ p \ x \leq \text{win-count } V \ p \ a\})$ 
proof (simp del: win-count.simps, safe)
fix

```

```

  a :: 'a and
  b :: 'a
assume
  b ∈ A and
  win-count V p a < Max {win-count V p a' | a'. a' ∈ A} and
  ¬ win-count V p b < Max {win-count V p a' | a'. a' ∈ A}
thus ∃ b ∈ A. win-count V p a < win-count V p b
  using dual-order.strict-trans1 not-le-imp-less
  by blast
next
fix
  a :: 'a and
  b :: 'a
assume
  a-in-A: a ∈ A and
  b-in-A: b ∈ A and
  wc-a-lt-wc-b: win-count V p a < win-count V p b
moreover have ∀ t. t b ≤ Max {n. ∃ a'. (n::enat) = t a' ∧ a' ∈ A}
proof (safe)
  fix
    t :: 'a ⇒ enat
  have t b ∈ {t a' | a'. a' ∈ A}
    using b-in-A
    by auto
  thus t b ≤ Max {t a' | a'. a' ∈ A}
    using enat-leq-enat-set-max fin-A
    by auto
qed
ultimately show win-count V p a < Max {win-count V p a' | a'. a' ∈ A}
  using dual-order.strict-trans1
  by blast
next
fix
  a :: 'a and
  b :: 'a
assume
  a-in-A: a ∈ A and
  b-in-A: b ∈ A and
  wc-a-max: ¬ win-count V p a < Max {win-count V p x | x. x ∈ A}
have win-count V p b ∈ {win-count V p x | x. x ∈ A}
  using b-in-A
  by auto
hence win-count V p b ≤ Max {win-count V p x | x. x ∈ A}
  using b-in-A fin-A enat-leq-enat-set-max
  by auto
thus win-count V p b ≤ win-count V p a
  using wc-a-max dual-order.strict-trans1 linorder-le-less-linear
  by simp
next

```

```

fix
  a :: 'a and
  b :: 'a
assume
  a-in-A: a ∈ A and
  b-in-A: b ∈ A and
  wc-a-max: ∀ x ∈ A. win-count V p x ≤ win-count V p a and
  wc-a-not-max: win-count V p a < Max {win-count V p x | x. x ∈ A}
have win-count V p b ≤ win-count V p a
  using b-in-A wc-a-max
  by auto
thus win-count V p b < Max {win-count V p x | x. x ∈ A}
  using wc-a-not-max
  by simp
next
  assume ?no-max
  thus False
    using exists-max
    by simp
next
  fix
    a :: 'a and
    b :: 'a
  assume ?no-max
  thus win-count V p a ≤ win-count V p b
    using exists-max
    by simp
qed
thus snd (max-eliminator (λ V b A p. win-count V p b) V A p) =
  snd ({},
    {a ∈ A. ∃ b ∈ A. win-count V p a < win-count V p b},
    {a ∈ A. ∀ b ∈ A. win-count V p b ≤ win-count V p a})
  using rej-eq snd-conv
  by metis
qed

```

4.12.2 Soundness

```

theorem plurality-sound[simp]: social-choice-result.electoral-module plurality
  unfolding plurality.simps
  using max-elim-sound
  by metis

```

```

theorem plurality'-sound[simp]: social-choice-result.electoral-module plurality'

```

```

proof (unfold social-choice-result.electoral-module-def, safe)

```

```

fix
  A :: 'a set and
  V :: 'v set and
  p :: ('a, 'v) Profile

```


have *disjoint3* (
 $\{\},$
 $\{a \in A. \exists a' \in A. \text{win-count } V p a < \text{win-count } V p a'\},$
 $\{a \in A. \forall a' \in A. \text{win-count } V p a' \leq \text{win-count } V p a\})$
by *auto*
moreover have
 $\{a \in A. \exists x \in A. \text{win-count } V p a < \text{win-count } V p x\} \cup$
 $\{a \in A. \forall x \in A. \text{win-count } V p x \leq \text{win-count } V p a\} = A$
using *not-le-imp-less*
by *blast*
ultimately show *well-formed-social-choice* A (*plurality'* $V A p$)
by *simp*
qed

lemma *plurality-score-only-voters: only-voters-count plurality-score*

proof (*unfold plurality-score.simps only-voters-count-def, safe*)

fix
 $A :: 'b \text{ set}$ **and**
 $V :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $p :: ('b, 'a) \text{ Profile}$ **and**
 $p' :: ('b, 'a) \text{ Profile}$ **and**
 $a :: 'b$
assume
 $\forall v \in V. p v = p' v$ **and**
 $a \in A$
hence *finite* $V \longrightarrow$
 $\text{card } \{v \in V. \text{above } (p v) a = \{a\}\} = \text{card } \{v \in V. \text{above } (p' v) a = \{a\}\}$
using *Collect-cong*
by (*metis (no-types, lifting)*)
thus $\text{win-count } V p a = \text{win-count } V p' a$
unfolding *win-count.simps*
by *presburger*
qed

lemma *plurality-only-voters: only-voters-vote plurality*

unfolding *plurality.simps*
using *max-elim-only-voters plurality-score-only-voters*
by *blast*

4.12.3 Non-Blocking

The plurality module is non-blocking.

theorem *plurality-mod-non-blocking[simp]: non-blocking plurality*

unfolding *plurality.simps*
using *max-elim-non-blocking*
by *metis*

4.12.4 Non-Electing

The plurality module is non-electing.

theorem *plurality-non-electing[simp]: non-electing plurality*
using *max-elim-non-electing*
unfolding *plurality.simps non-electing-def*
by *metis*

theorem *plurality'-non-electing[simp]: non-electing plurality'*
unfolding *non-electing-def*
by *simp*

4.12.5 Property

lemma *plurality-def-inv-mono-alts:*

fixes
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $V :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ **and**
 $q :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ **and**
 $a :: 'a$
assumes
defer-a: $a \in \text{defer plurality } V A p$ **and**
lift-a: $\text{lifted } V A p q a$
shows $\text{defer plurality } V A q = \text{defer plurality } V A p \vee \text{defer plurality } V A q = \{a\}$
proof –
have *set-disj: $\forall b c. (b :: 'a) \notin \{c\} \vee b = c$*
by *blast*
have *lifted-winner: $\forall b \in A. \forall i \in V. \text{above } (p \ i) \ b = \{b\} \longrightarrow (\text{above } (q \ i) \ b = \{b\} \vee \text{above } (q \ i) \ a = \{a\})$*
using *lift-a lifted-above-winner-alts*
unfolding *Profile.lifted-def*
by *metis*
hence $\forall i \in V. (\text{above } (p \ i) \ a = \{a\} \longrightarrow \text{above } (q \ i) \ a = \{a\})$
using *defer-a lift-a*
unfolding *Profile.lifted-def*
by *metis*
hence *a-win-subset: $\{i \in V. \text{above } (p \ i) \ a = \{a\}\} \subseteq \{i \in V. \text{above } (q \ i) \ a = \{a\}\}$*
by *blast*
moreover have *lifted-prof: $\text{profile } V A q$*
using *lift-a*
unfolding *Profile.lifted-def*
by *metis*
ultimately have *win-count-a: $\text{win-count } V p a \leq \text{win-count } V q a$*
by (*simp add: card-mono*)
have *fin-A: $\text{finite } A$*
using *lift-a*

unfolding *Profile.lifted-def*
by *blast*
hence $\forall b \in A - \{a\}.$
 $\quad \forall i \in V. (\text{above } (q \ i) \ a = \{a\} \longrightarrow \text{above } (q \ i) \ b \neq \{b\})$
using *DiffE above-one lift-a insertCI insert-absorb insert-not-empty*
unfolding *Profile.lifted-def profile-def*
by *metis*
with *lifted-winner*
have *above-QtoP*:
 $\quad \forall b \in A - \{a\}.$
 $\quad \quad \forall i \in V. (\text{above } (q \ i) \ b = \{b\} \longrightarrow \text{above } (p \ i) \ b = \{b\})$
using *lifted-above-winner-other lift-a*
unfolding *Profile.lifted-def*
by *metis*
hence $\forall b \in A - \{a\}.$
 $\quad \{i \in V. \text{above } (q \ i) \ b = \{b\}\} \subseteq \{i \in V. \text{above } (p \ i) \ b = \{b\}\}$
by (*simp add: Collect-mono*)
hence *win-count-other*: $\forall b \in A - \{a\}. \text{win-count } V \ p \ b \geq \text{win-count } V \ q \ b$
by (*simp add: card-mono*)
show *defer plurality* $V \ A \ q = \text{defer plurality } V \ A \ p \vee \text{defer plurality } V \ A \ q = \{a\}$
proof (*cases*)
assume *win-count* $V \ p \ a = \text{win-count } V \ q \ a$
hence $\text{card } \{i \in V. \text{above } (p \ i) \ a = \{a\}\} = \text{card } \{i \in V. \text{above } (q \ i) \ a = \{a\}\}$
using *win-count.simps Profile.lifted-def enat.inject lift-a*
by (*metis (mono-tags, lifting)*)
moreover have *finite* $\{i \in V. \text{above } (q \ i) \ a = \{a\}\}$
using *Collect-mem-eq Profile.lifted-def finite-Collect-conjI lift-a*
by (*metis (mono-tags)*)
ultimately have $\{i \in V. \text{above } (p \ i) \ a = \{a\}\} = \{i \in V. \text{above } (q \ i) \ a = \{a\}\}$
using *a-win-subset*
by (*simp add: card-subset-eq*)
hence *above-pq*: $\forall i \in V. (\text{above } (p \ i) \ a = \{a\}) = (\text{above } (q \ i) \ a = \{a\})$
by *blast*
moreover have
 $\quad \forall b \in A - \{a\}.$
 $\quad \quad \forall i \in V.$
 $\quad \quad (\text{above } (p \ i) \ b = \{b\} \longrightarrow (\text{above } (q \ i) \ b = \{b\} \vee \text{above } (q \ i) \ a = \{a\}))$
using *lifted-winner*
by *auto*
moreover have
 $\quad \forall b \in A - \{a\}.$
 $\quad \quad \forall i \in V. (\text{above } (p \ i) \ b = \{b\} \longrightarrow \text{above } (p \ i) \ a \neq \{a\})$
proof (*rule ccontr, simp, safe, simp*)
fix
 $\quad b :: 'a$ **and**
 $\quad i :: 'v$
assume
 $\quad b\text{-in-}A: b \in A$ **and**

```

i-is-voter:  $i \in V$  and
abv-b: above ( $p$   $i$ )  $b = \{b\}$  and
abv-a: above ( $p$   $i$ )  $a = \{a\}$ 
moreover from b-in-A
have  $A \neq \{\}$ 
  by auto
moreover from i-is-voter
have linear-order-on  $A$  ( $p$   $i$ )
  using lift-a
  unfolding Profile.lifted-def profile-def
  by simp
ultimately show  $b = a$ 
  using fin-A above-one-eq
  by metis
qed
ultimately have above-PtoQ:
 $\forall b \in A - \{a\}. \forall i \in V. (\text{above } (p \ i) \ b = \{b\} \longrightarrow \text{above } (q \ i) \ b = \{b\})$ 
  by simp
hence  $\forall b \in A.$ 
 $\text{card } \{i \in V. \text{above } (p \ i) \ b = \{b\}\} =$ 
 $\text{card } \{i \in V. \text{above } (q \ i) \ b = \{b\}\}$ 
proof (safe)
  fix  $b :: 'a$ 
  assume
    above-c:  $\forall c \in A - \{a\}. \forall i \in V. \text{above } (p \ i) \ c = \{c\} \longrightarrow \text{above } (q \ i) \ c =$ 
 $\{c\}$  and
    b-in-A:  $b \in A$ 
  show  $\text{card } \{i \in V. \text{above } (p \ i) \ b = \{b\}\} =$ 
 $\text{card } \{i \in V. \text{above } (q \ i) \ b = \{b\}\}$ 
    using DiffI b-in-A set-disj above-PtoQ above-QtoP above-pq
    by (metis (no-types, lifting))
  qed
hence  $\{b \in A. \forall c \in A. \text{win-count } V \ p \ c \leq \text{win-count } V \ p \ b\} =$ 
 $\{b \in A. \forall c \in A. \text{win-count } V \ q \ c \leq \text{win-count } V \ q \ b\}$ 
  by auto
hence defer plurality'  $V \ A \ q = \text{defer plurality}' \ V \ A \ p \vee \text{defer plurality}' \ V \ A \ q$ 
 $= \{a\}$ 
  by simp
hence defer plurality  $V \ A \ q = \text{defer plurality} \ V \ A \ p \vee \text{defer plurality} \ V \ A \ q =$ 
 $\{a\}$ 
  using plurality-mod-elim-equiv empty-not-insert insert-absorb lift-a
  unfolding Profile.lifted-def
  by (metis (no-types, opaque-lifting))
thus ?thesis
  by simp
next
assume  $\text{win-count } V \ p \ a \neq \text{win-count } V \ q \ a$ 
hence strict-less:  $\text{win-count } V \ p \ a < \text{win-count } V \ q \ a$ 
  using win-count-a

```

by *simp*
 have $a \in \text{defer plurality } V A p$
 using *defer-a plurality.elims*
 by (*metis* (*no-types*))
 moreover have *non-empty-A*: $A \neq \{\}$
 using *lift-a equals0D equiv-prof-except-a-def lifted-imp-equiv-prof-except-a*
 by *metis*
 moreover have *fin-A*: *finite-profile* $V A p$
 using *lift-a*
 unfolding *Profile.lifted-def*
 by *simp*
 ultimately have $a \in \text{defer plurality}' V A p$
 using *plurality-mod-elim-equiv*
 by *metis*
 hence *a-in-win-p*: $a \in \{b \in A. \forall c \in A. \text{win-count } V p c \leq \text{win-count } V p b\}$
 by *simp*
 hence $\forall b \in A. \text{win-count } V p b \leq \text{win-count } V p a$
 by *simp*
 hence *less*: $\forall b \in A - \{a\}. \text{win-count } V q b < \text{win-count } V q a$
 using *DiffD1 antisym dual-order.trans not-le-imp-less win-count-a strict-less win-count-other*
 by *metis*
 hence $\forall b \in A - \{a\}. \neg (\forall c \in A. \text{win-count } V q c \leq \text{win-count } V q b)$
 using *lift-a not-le*
 unfolding *Profile.lifted-def*
 by *metis*
 hence $\forall b \in A - \{a\}. b \notin \{c \in A. \forall b \in A. \text{win-count } V q b \leq \text{win-count } V q c\}$
 by *blast*
 hence $\forall b \in A - \{a\}. b \notin \text{defer plurality}' V A q$
 by *simp*
 hence $\forall b \in A - \{a\}. b \notin \text{defer plurality } V A q$
 using *lift-a non-empty-A plurality-mod-elim-equiv*
 unfolding *Profile.lifted-def*
 by (*metis* (*no-types*, *lifting*))
 hence $\forall b \in A - \{a\}. b \notin \text{defer plurality } V A q$
 by *simp*
 moreover have $a \in \text{defer plurality } V A q$
 proof –
 have $\forall b \in A - \{a\}. \text{win-count } V q b \leq \text{win-count } V q a$
 using *less less-imp-le*
 by *metis*
 moreover have $\text{win-count } V q a \leq \text{win-count } V q a$
 by *simp*
 ultimately have $\forall b \in A. \text{win-count } V q b \leq \text{win-count } V q a$
 by *auto*
 moreover have $a \in A$
 using *a-in-win-p*
 by *simp*

```

ultimately have  $a \in \{b \in A. \forall c \in A. \text{win-count } V \ q \ c \leq \text{win-count } V \ q \ b\}$ 
  by simp
hence  $a \in \text{defer plurality}' \ V \ A \ q$ 
  by simp
hence  $a \in \text{defer plurality } V \ A \ q$ 
  using plurality-mod-elim-equiv non-empty-A fin-A lift-a non-empty-A
  unfolding Profile.lifted-def
  by (metis (no-types))
thus ?thesis
  by simp
qed
moreover have  $\text{defer plurality } V \ A \ q \subseteq A$ 
  by simp
ultimately show ?thesis
  by blast
qed
qed

The plurality rule is invariant-monotone.

theorem plurality-mod-def-inv-mono[simp]: defer-invariant-monotonicity plurality
proof (unfold defer-invariant-monotonicity-def, intro conjI impI allI)
  show social-choice-result.electoral-module plurality
    by simp
next
  show non-electing plurality
    by simp
next
  fix
    A :: 'b set and
    V :: 'a set and
    p :: ('b, 'a) Profile and
    q :: ('b, 'a) Profile and
    a :: 'b
  assume  $a \in \text{defer plurality } V \ A \ p \wedge \text{Profile.lifted } V \ A \ p \ q \ a$ 
  hence  $\text{defer plurality } V \ A \ q = \text{defer plurality } V \ A \ p \vee \text{defer plurality } V \ A \ q =$ 
    {a}
    using plurality-def-inv-mono-alts
    by metis
  thus  $\text{defer plurality } V \ A \ q = \text{defer plurality } V \ A \ p \vee \text{defer plurality } V \ A \ q = \{a\}$ 
    by simp
qed

end

```

4.13 Borda Module

```
theory Borda-Module
imports Component-Types/Elimination-Module
begin
```

This is the Borda module used by the Borda rule. The Borda rule is a voting rule, where on each ballot, each alternative is assigned a score that depends on how many alternatives are ranked below. The sum of all such scores for an alternative is hence called their Borda score. The alternative with the highest Borda score is elected. The module implemented herein only rejects the alternatives not elected by the voting rule, and defers the alternatives that would be elected by the full voting rule.

4.13.1 Definition

```
fun borda-score :: ('a, 'v) Evaluation-Function where
  borda-score V x A p = ( $\sum$  y  $\in$  A. (prefer-count V p x y))

fun borda :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module where
  borda V A p = max-eliminator borda-score V A p
```

4.13.2 Soundness

```
theorem borda-sound: social-choice-result.electoral-module borda
unfolding borda.simps
using max-elim-sound
by metis
```

4.13.3 Non-Blocking

The Borda module is non-blocking.

```
theorem borda-mod-non-blocking[simp]: non-blocking borda
unfolding borda.simps
using max-elim-non-blocking
by metis
```

4.13.4 Non-Electing

The Borda module is non-electing.

```
theorem borda-mod-non-electing[simp]: non-electing borda
using max-elim-non-electing
unfolding borda.simps non-electing-def
by metis
```

```
end
```

4.14 Condorcet Module

```
theory Condorcet-Module
imports Component-Types/Elimination-Module
begin
```

This is the Condorcet module used by the Condorcet (voting) rule. The Condorcet rule is a voting rule that implements the Condorcet criterion, i.e., it elects the Condorcet winner if it exists, otherwise a tie remains between all alternatives. The module implemented herein only rejects the alternatives not elected by the voting rule, and defers the alternatives that would be elected by the full voting rule.

4.14.1 Definition

```
fun condorcet-score :: ('a, 'v) Evaluation-Function where
  condorcet-score V x A p =
    (if (condorcet-winner V A p x) then 1 else 0)

fun condorcet :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module where
  condorcet V A p = (max-eliminator condorcet-score) V A p
```

4.14.2 Soundness

```
theorem condorcet-sound: social-choice-result.electoral-module condorcet
unfolding condorcet.simps
using max-elim-sound
by metis
```

4.14.3 Property

```
theorem condorcet-score-is-condorcet-rating: condorcet-rating condorcet-score
proof (unfold condorcet-rating-def, safe)
fix
  A :: 'b set and
  V :: 'a set and
  p :: ('b, 'a) Profile and
  w :: 'b and
  l :: 'b
assume
  c-win: condorcet-winner V A p w and
  l-neq-w: l ≠ w
have ¬ condorcet-winner V A p l
using cond-winner-unique-eq c-win l-neq-w
```



```

    by metis
  thus condorcet-score  $V \ l \ A \ p < \text{condorcet-score } V \ w \ A \ p$ 
    using c-win zero-less-one
    unfolding condorcet-score.simps
    by (metis (full-types))
qed

theorem condorcet-is-dcc: defer-condorcet-consistency condorcet
proof (unfold defer-condorcet-consistency-def social-choice-result.electoral-module-def,
safe)
  fix
     $A :: 'b \text{ set}$  and
     $V :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $p :: ('b, 'a) \text{ Profile}$ 
  assume
    profile  $V \ A \ p$ 
  hence well-formed-social-choice  $A \ (\text{max-eliminator condorcet-score } V \ A \ p)$ 
    using max-elim-sound
    unfolding social-choice-result.electoral-module-def
    by metis
  thus well-formed-social-choice  $A \ (\text{condorcet } V \ A \ p)$ 
    by simp
next
  fix
     $A :: 'b \text{ set}$  and
     $V :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $p :: ('b, 'a) \text{ Profile}$  and
     $a :: 'b$ 
  assume
    c-win-w: condorcet-winner  $V \ A \ p \ a$ 
  let  $?m = (\text{max-eliminator condorcet-score})::(('b, 'a, 'b \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module})$ 
  have defer-condorcet-consistency  $?m$ 
    using cr-eval-imp-dcc-max-elim condorcet-score-is-condorcet-rating
    by metis
  hence  $?m \ V \ A \ p =$ 
    ( $\{\}, A - \text{defer } ?m \ V \ A \ p, \{b \in A. \text{condorcet-winner } V \ A \ p \ b\}$ )
    using c-win-w
    unfolding defer-condorcet-consistency-def
    by (metis (no-types))
  thus condorcet  $V \ A \ p =$ 
    ( $\{\},$ 
     $A - \text{defer condorcet } V \ A \ p,$ 
     $\{d \in A. \text{condorcet-winner } V \ A \ p \ d\}$ )
    by simp
qed

end

```

4.15 Copeland Module

```
theory Copeland-Module
  imports Component-Types/Elimination-Module
begin
```

This is the Copeland module used by the Copeland voting rule. The Copeland rule elects the alternatives with the highest difference between the amount of simple-majority wins and the amount of simple-majority losses. The module implemented herein only rejects the alternatives not elected by the voting rule, and defers the alternatives that would be elected by the full voting rule.

4.15.1 Definition

```
fun copeland-score :: ('a, 'v) Evaluation-Function where
  copeland-score V x A p =
    card {y ∈ A . wins V x p y} - card {y ∈ A . wins V y p x}

fun copeland :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module where
  copeland V A p = max-eliminator copeland-score V A p
```

4.15.2 Soundness

```
theorem copeland-sound: social-choice-result.electoral-module copeland
  unfolding copeland.simps
  using max-elim-sound
  by metis
```

4.15.3 Only participating voters impact the result

```
lemma copeland-score-only-voters-count: only-voters-count copeland-score
proof (unfold copeland-score.simps only-voters-count-def, safe)
  fix
    A :: 'b set and
    V :: 'a set and
    p :: ('b, 'a) Profile and
    p' :: ('b, 'a) Profile and
    a :: 'b
  assume
    ∀ v ∈ V. p v = p' v and
    a ∈ A
  hence ∀ x y. {v ∈ V. (x, y) ∈ p v} = {v ∈ V. (x, y) ∈ p' v}
    by blast
  hence ∀ x y. card {y ∈ A. wins V x p y} = card {y ∈ A. wins V x p' y} ∧
    card {x ∈ A. wins V x p y} = card {x ∈ A. wins V x p' y}
```

by *simp*
 thus $\text{card } \{y \in A. \text{ wins } V a p y\} - \text{card } \{y \in A. \text{ wins } V y p a\} =$
 $\text{card } \{y \in A. \text{ wins } V a p' y\} - \text{card } \{y \in A. \text{ wins } V y p' a\}$
 by *presburger*
 qed

theorem *copeland-only-voters-vote: only-voters-vote copeland*
 unfolding *copeland.simps*
 using *max-elim-only-voters only-voters-vote-def*
 copeland-score-only-voters-count
 by *blast*

4.15.4 Lemmas

For a Condorcet winner w , we have: " $\{\text{card } y \in A . \text{ wins } x p y\} = |A| - 1$ ".

lemma *cond-winner-imp-win-count:*

fixes
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $V :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ **and**
 $w :: 'a$
assumes *condorcet-winner* $V A p w$
shows $\text{card } \{a \in A. \text{ wins } V w p a\} = \text{card } A - 1$
proof –
 have $\forall a \in A - \{w\}. \text{ wins } V w p a$
 using *assms*
 by *auto*
 hence $\{a \in A - \{w\}. \text{ wins } V w p a\} = A - \{w\}$
 by *blast*
 hence *winner-wins-against-all-others:*
 $\text{card } \{a \in A - \{w\}. \text{ wins } V w p a\} = \text{card } (A - \{w\})$
 by *simp*
 have $w \in A$
 using *assms*
 by *simp*
 hence $\text{card } (A - \{w\}) = \text{card } A - 1$
 using *card-Diff-singleton assms*
 by *metis*
 hence *winner-amount-one:* $\text{card } \{a \in A - \{w\}. \text{ wins } V w p a\} = \text{card } (A) - 1$
 using *winner-wins-against-all-others*
 by *linarith*
 have *win-for-winner-not-reflexive:* $\forall a \in \{w\}. \neg \text{ wins } V a p a$
 by (*simp add: wins-irreflex*)
 hence $\{a \in \{w\}. \text{ wins } V w p a\} = \{\}$
 by *blast*
 hence *winner-amount-zero:* $\text{card } \{a \in \{w\}. \text{ wins } V w p a\} = 0$
 by *simp*
 have *union:*
 $\{a \in A - \{w\}. \text{ wins } V w p a\} \cup \{x \in \{w\}. \text{ wins } V w p x\} = \{a \in A. \text{ wins } V$

```

w p a}
  using win-for-winner-not-reflexive
  by blast
have finite-defeated: finite {a ∈ A - {w}. wins V w p a}
  using assms
  by simp
have finite {a ∈ {w}. wins V w p a}
  by simp
hence card ({a ∈ A - {w}. wins V w p a} ∪ {a ∈ {w}. wins V w p a}) =
  card {a ∈ A - {w}. wins V w p a} + card {a ∈ {w}. wins V w p a}
  using finite-defeated card-Un-disjoint
  by blast
hence card {a ∈ A. wins V w p a} =
  card {a ∈ A - {w}. wins V w p a} + card {a ∈ {w}. wins V w p a}
  using union
  by simp
thus ?thesis
  using winner-amount-one winner-amount-zero
  by linarith
qed

```

For a Condorcet winner w , we have: " $\text{card } \{y \in A . \text{wins } y \text{ } p \text{ } x = 0\}$ ".

lemma *cond-winner-imp-loss-count*:

```

fixes
  A :: 'a set and
  V :: 'v set and
  p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
  w :: 'a
assumes condorcet-winner V A p w
shows card {a ∈ A. wins V a p w} = 0
using Collect-empty-eq card-eq-0-iff insert-Diff insert-iff wins-antisym assms
unfolding condorcet-winner.simps
by (metis (no-types, lifting))

```

Copeland score of a Condorcet winner.

lemma *cond-winner-imp-copeland-score*:

```

fixes
  A :: 'a set and
  V :: 'v set and
  p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
  w :: 'a
assumes condorcet-winner V A p w
shows copeland-score V w A p = card A - 1
proof (unfold copeland-score.simps)
  have card {a ∈ A. wins V w p a} = card A - 1
    using cond-winner-imp-win-count assms
    by metis
  moreover have card {a ∈ A. wins V a p w} = 0
    using cond-winner-imp-loss-count assms

```

```

    by (metis (no-types))
  ultimately show
    enat (card {a ∈ A. wins V w p a} - card {a ∈ A. wins V a p w}) = enat (card
A - 1)
    by simp
  qed

```

For a non-Condorcet winner l , we have: " $\text{card } \{y \in A . \text{wins } x \text{ } p \text{ } y\} = |A| - 2$ ".

lemma *non-cond-winner-imp-win-count*:

```

  fixes
    A :: 'a set and
    V :: 'v set and
    p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    w :: 'a and
    l :: 'a
  assumes
    winner: condorcet-winner V A p w and
    loser: l ≠ w and
    l-in-A: l ∈ A
  shows card {a ∈ A . wins V l p a} ≤ card A - 2
proof -
  have wins V w p l
    using assms
    by auto
  hence ¬ wins V l p w
    using wins-antisym
    by simp
  moreover have ¬ wins V l p l
    using wins-irreflex
    by simp
  ultimately have wins-of-loser-eq-without-winner:
    {y ∈ A . wins V l p y} = {y ∈ A - {l, w} . wins V l p y}
    by blast
  have ∀ M f. finite M ⟶ card {x ∈ M . f x} ≤ card M
    by (simp add: card-mono)
  moreover have finite (A - {l, w})
    using finite-Diff winner
    by simp
  ultimately have card {y ∈ A - {l, w} . wins V l p y} ≤ card (A - {l, w})
    using winner
    by (metis (full-types))
  thus ?thesis
    using assms wins-of-loser-eq-without-winner
    by simp
qed

```

4.15.5 Property

The Copeland score is Condorcet rating.

theorem *copeland-score-is-cr: condorcet-rating copeland-score*

proof (*unfold condorcet-rating-def, unfold copeland-score.simps, safe*)

fix

$A :: 'b$ set **and**

$V :: 'v$ set **and**

$p :: ('b, 'v)$ Profile **and**

$w :: 'b$ **and**

$l :: 'b$

assume

winner: condorcet-winner V A p w **and**

l-in-A: $l \in A$ **and**

l-neq-w: $l \neq w$

hence $\text{card } \{y \in A. \text{wins } V \ l \ p \ y\} \leq \text{card } A - 2$

using *non-cond-winner-imp-win-count*

by (*metis (mono-tags, lifting)*)

hence $\text{card } \{y \in A. \text{wins } V \ l \ p \ y\} - \text{card } \{y \in A. \text{wins } V \ y \ p \ l\} \leq \text{card } A - 2$

using *diff-le-self order.trans*

by *simp*

moreover have $\text{card } A - 2 < \text{card } A - 1$

using *card-0-eq diff-less-mono2 empty-iff l-in-A l-neq-w neq0-conv less-one*

Suc-1 zero-less-diff add-diff-cancel-left' diff-is-0-eq Suc-eq-plus1

card-1-singleton-iff order-less-le singletonD le-zero-eq winner

unfolding *condorcet-winner.simps*

by *metis*

ultimately have

$\text{card } \{y \in A. \text{wins } V \ l \ p \ y\} - \text{card } \{y \in A. \text{wins } V \ y \ p \ l\} < \text{card } A - 1$

using *order-le-less-trans*

by *fastforce*

moreover have $\text{card } \{a \in A. \text{wins } V \ a \ p \ w\} = 0$

using *cond-winner-imp-loss-count winner*

by *metis*

moreover have $\text{card } A - 1 = \text{card } \{a \in A. \text{wins } V \ w \ p \ a\}$

using *cond-winner-imp-win-count winner*

by (*metis (full-types)*)

ultimately show

$\text{enat } (\text{card } \{y \in A. \text{wins } V \ l \ p \ y\} - \text{card } \{y \in A. \text{wins } V \ y \ p \ l\}) <$

$\text{enat } (\text{card } \{y \in A. \text{wins } V \ w \ p \ y\} - \text{card } \{y \in A. \text{wins } V \ y \ p \ w\})$

using *enat-ord-simps*

by *simp*

qed

theorem *copeland-is-dcc: defer-condorcet-consistency copeland*

proof (*unfold defer-condorcet-consistency-def social-choice-result.electoral-module-def, safe*)

fix

$A :: 'b$ set **and**

```

    V :: 'a set and
    p :: ('b, 'a) Profile
  assume profile V A p
  hence well-formed-social-choice A (max-eliminator copeland-score V A p)
    using max-elim-sound
    unfolding social-choice-result.electoral-module-def
    by metis
  thus well-formed-social-choice A (copeland V A p)
    by auto
next
fix
  A :: 'b set and
  V :: 'v set and
  p :: ('b, 'v) Profile and
  w :: 'b
  assume condorcet-winner V A p w
  moreover have defer-condorcet-consistency (max-eliminator copeland-score)
    by (simp add: copeland-score-is-cr)
  ultimately have max-eliminator copeland-score V A p =
    ({}, A - defer (max-eliminator copeland-score) V A p, {d ∈ A. condorcet-winner
V A p d})
    unfolding defer-condorcet-consistency-def
    by (metis (no-types))
  moreover have copeland V A p = max-eliminator copeland-score V A p
    by simp
  ultimately show
    copeland V A p = ({}, A - defer copeland V A p, {d ∈ A. condorcet-winner V
A p d})
    by metis
qed
end

```

4.16 Minimax Module

```

theory Minimax-Module
  imports Component-Types/Elimination-Module
begin

```

This is the Minimax module used by the Minimax voting rule. The Minimax rule elects the alternatives with the highest Minimax score. The module implemented herein only rejects the alternatives not elected by the voting rule, and defers the alternatives that would be elected by the full voting rule.

4.16.1 Definition

fun *minimax-score* :: ('a, 'v) *Evaluation-Function* **where**
minimax-score $V\ x\ A\ p =$
 $\text{Min } \{\text{prefer-count } V\ p\ x\ y \mid y. y \in A - \{x\}\}$

fun *minimax* :: ('a, 'v, 'a *Result*) *Electoral-Module* **where**
minimax $A\ p = \text{max-eliminator } \text{minimax-score } A\ p$

4.16.2 Soundness

theorem *minimax-sound: social-choice-result.electoral-module minimax*
unfolding *minimax.simps*
using *max-elim-sound*
by *metis*

4.16.3 Lemma

lemma *non-cond-winner-minimax-score:*
fixes
 $A :: 'a\ \text{set}$ **and**
 $V :: 'v\ \text{set}$ **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v)\ \text{Profile}$ **and**
 $w :: 'a$ **and**
 $l :: 'a$
assumes
 $\text{prof: profile } V\ A\ p$ **and**
 $\text{winner: condorcet-winner } V\ A\ p\ w$ **and**
 $\text{l-in-A: } l \in A$ **and**
 $\text{l-neq-w: } l \neq w$
shows $\text{minimax-score } V\ l\ A\ p \leq \text{prefer-count } V\ p\ l\ w$
proof (*simp, clarify*)
assume $\text{fin-V: finite } V$
have $w \in A$
using *winner*
by *simp*
hence $\text{el: card } \{v \in V. (w, l) \in p\ v\} \in \{(\text{card } \{v \in V. (y, l) \in p\ v\}) \mid y. y \in A \wedge y \neq l\}$
using *l-neq-w*
by *auto*
moreover **have** $\text{fin: finite } \{(\text{card } \{v \in V. (y, l) \in p\ v\}) \mid y. y \in A \wedge y \neq l\}$
proof –
have $\forall y \in A. \text{card } \{v \in V. (y, l) \in p\ v\} \leq \text{card } V$
using *fin-V*
by (*simp add: card-mono*)
hence $\forall y \in A. \text{card } \{v \in V. (y, l) \in p\ v\} \in \{.. \text{card } V\}$
unfolding *less-Suc-eq-le*
by *simp*
hence $\{(\text{card } \{v \in V. (y, l) \in p\ v\}) \mid y. y \in A \wedge y \neq l\} \subseteq \{0.. \text{card } V\}$
by *auto*

thus ?thesis
 by (simp add: finite-subset)
 qed
 ultimately have $\text{Min } \{(\text{card } \{v \in V. (y, l) \in p \ v\}) \mid y. y \in A \wedge y \neq l\}$
 $\leq \text{card } \{v \in V. (w, l) \in p \ v\}$
 using Min-le
 by blast
 hence enat-leq: $\text{enat } (\text{Min } \{(\text{card } \{v \in V. (y, l) \in p \ v\}) \mid y. y \in A \wedge y \neq l\})$
 $\leq \text{enat } (\text{card } \{v \in V. (w, l) \in p \ v\})$
 using enat-ord-simps
 by simp
 have $\forall S::(\text{nat set}). \text{finite } S \longrightarrow (\forall m. (\forall x \in S. m \leq x) \longrightarrow (\forall x \in S. \text{enat } m \leq \text{enat } x))$
 using enat-ord-simps
 by simp
 hence $\forall S::(\text{nat set}). \text{finite } S \wedge S \neq \{\} \longrightarrow (\forall x. x \in S \longrightarrow \text{enat } (\text{Min } S) \leq \text{enat } x)$
 by simp
 hence $\forall S::(\text{nat set}). \text{finite } S \wedge S \neq \{\} \longrightarrow$
 $(\forall x. x \in \{\text{enat } x \mid x. x \in S\} \longrightarrow \text{enat } (\text{Min } S) \leq x)$
 by auto
 moreover have $\forall S::(\text{nat set}). \text{finite } S \wedge S \neq \{\} \longrightarrow \text{enat } (\text{Min } S) \in \{\text{enat } x \mid x. x \in S\}$
 by simp
 moreover have $\forall S::(\text{nat set}). \text{finite } S \wedge S \neq \{\} \longrightarrow \text{finite } \{\text{enat } x \mid x. x \in S\}$
 $\wedge \{\text{enat } x \mid x. x \in S\} \neq \{\}$
 by simp
 ultimately have $\forall S::(\text{nat set}). \text{finite } S \wedge S \neq \{\} \longrightarrow$
 $\text{enat } (\text{Min } S) = \text{Min } \{\text{enat } x \mid x. x \in S\}$
 using Min-eqI
 by (metis (no-types, lifting))
 moreover have $\{(\text{card } \{v \in V. (y, l) \in p \ v\}) \mid y. y \in A \wedge y \neq l\} \neq \{\}$
 using el
 by auto
 moreover have $\{\text{enat } x \mid x. x \in \{(\text{card } \{v \in V. (y, l) \in p \ v\}) \mid y. y \in A \wedge y \neq l\}\}$
 $\neq \{\}$
 $= \{\text{enat } (\text{card } \{v \in V. (y, l) \in p \ v\}) \mid y. y \in A \wedge y \neq l\}$
 by auto
 ultimately have $\text{enat } (\text{Min } \{(\text{card } \{v \in V. (y, l) \in p \ v\}) \mid y. y \in A \wedge y \neq l\})$
 $=$
 $\text{Min } \{\text{enat } (\text{card } \{v \in V. (y, l) \in p \ v\}) \mid y. y \in A \wedge y \neq l\}$
 using fn
 by presburger
 thus $\text{Min } \{\text{enat } (\text{card } \{v \in V. (y, l) \in p \ v\}) \mid y. y \in A \wedge y \neq l\}$
 $\leq \text{enat } (\text{card } \{v \in V. (w, l) \in p \ v\})$
 using enat-leq
 by simp
 qed

4.16.4 Property

theorem *minimax-score-cond-rating: condorcet-rating minimax-score*

proof (*unfold condorcet-rating-def minimax-score.simps prefer-count.simps, safe, rule ccontr*)

fix

$A :: 'b$ set **and**
 $V :: 'a$ set **and**
 $p :: ('b, 'a)$ Profile **and**
 $w :: 'b$ **and**
 $l :: 'b$

assume

winner: condorcet-winner $V A p w$ **and**

l-in-A: $l \in A$ **and**

l-neq-w: $l \neq w$ **and**

min-leq:

$\neg \text{Min } \{ \text{if finite } V \text{ then enat } (\text{card } \{v \in V. \text{ let } r = p \ v \text{ in } y \preceq_r l\}) \text{ else } \infty \mid$
 $y. y \in A - \{l\}\}$
 $< \text{Min } \{ \text{if finite } V \text{ then}$
 $\text{enat } (\text{card } \{v \in V. \text{ let } r = p \ v \text{ in } y \preceq_r w\}) \text{ else}$
 $\infty \mid y. y \in A - \{w\}\}$

hence *min-count-ineq:*

$\text{Min } \{ \text{prefer-count } V p l y \mid y. y \in A - \{l\} \} \geq$
 $\text{Min } \{ \text{prefer-count } V p w y \mid y. y \in A - \{w\} \}$

by *simp*

have *pref-count-gte-min:*

$\text{prefer-count } V p l w \geq \text{Min } \{ \text{prefer-count } V p l y \mid y. y \in A - \{l\} \}$

using *l-in-A l-neq-w condorcet-winner.simps winner non-cond-winner-minimax-score minimax-score.simps*

by *metis*

have *l-in-A-without-w: $l \in A - \{w\}$*

using *l-in-A l-neq-w*

by *simp*

hence *pref-counts-non-empty: $\{ \text{prefer-count } V p w y \mid y. y \in A - \{w\} \} \neq \{ \}$*

by *blast*

have *finite $(A - \{w\})$*

using *condorcet-winner.simps winner finite-Diff*

by *metis*

hence *finite $\{ \text{prefer-count } V p w y \mid y. y \in A - \{w\} \}$*

by *simp*

hence $\exists n \in A - \{w\}. \text{prefer-count } V p w n =$

$\text{Min } \{ \text{prefer-count } V p w y \mid y. y \in A - \{w\} \}$

using *pref-counts-non-empty Min-in*

by *fastforce*

then obtain n **where** *pref-count-eq-min:*

$\text{prefer-count } V p w n =$

$\text{Min } \{ \text{prefer-count } V p w y \mid y. y \in A - \{w\} \}$ **and**

n-not-w: $n \in A - \{w\}$

by *metis*

hence *n-in-A: $n \in A$*

```

    using DiffE
    by metis
  have n-neq-w:  $n \neq w$ 
    using n-not-w
    by simp
  have w-in-A:  $w \in A$ 
    using winner
    by simp
  have pref-count-n-w-ineq:  $\text{prefer-count } V \ p \ w \ n > \text{prefer-count } V \ p \ n \ w$ 
    using n-not-w winner
    by auto
  have pref-count-l-w-n-ineq:  $\text{prefer-count } V \ p \ l \ w \geq \text{prefer-count } V \ p \ w \ n$ 
    using pref-count-gte-min min-count-ineq pref-count-eq-min
    by auto
  hence  $\text{prefer-count } V \ p \ n \ w \geq \text{prefer-count } V \ p \ w \ l$ 
    using n-in-A w-in-A l-in-A n-neq-w l-neq-w pref-count-sym winner
    unfolding condorcet-winner.simps
    by metis
  hence  $\text{prefer-count } V \ p \ l \ w > \text{prefer-count } V \ p \ w \ l$ 
    using n-in-A w-in-A l-in-A n-neq-w l-neq-w pref-count-sym winner
    pref-count-n-w-ineq pref-count-l-w-n-ineq
    unfolding condorcet-winner.simps
    by auto
  hence wins  $V \ l \ p \ w$ 
    by simp
  thus False
    using l-in-A-without-w wins-antisym winner
    unfolding condorcet-winner.simps
    by metis
qed

theorem minimax-is-dcc: defer-condorcet-consistency minimax
proof (unfold defer-condorcet-consistency-def social-choice-result.electoral-module-def,
safe)
  fix
    A :: 'b set and
    V :: 'a set and
    p :: ('b, 'a) Profile
  assume profile V A p
  hence well-formed-social-choice A (max-eliminator minimax-score V A p)
    using max-elim-sound par-comp-result-sound
    by metis
  thus well-formed-social-choice A (minimax V A p)
    by simp
next
  fix
    A :: 'b set and
    V :: 'a set and
    p :: ('b, 'a) Profile and

```

```

    w :: 'b
assume cwin-w: condorcet-winner V A p w
have max-mmaxscore-dcc:
    defer-condorcet-consistency ((max-eliminator minimax-score)
                                ::('b, 'a, 'b Result) Electoral-Module)
using cr-eval-imp-dcc-max-elim minimax-score-cond-rating
by metis
hence
    max-eliminator minimax-score V A p =
    ({} ,
     A - defer (max-eliminator minimax-score) V A p ,
     {a ∈ A. condorcet-winner V A p a})
using cwin-w
unfolding defer-condorcet-consistency-def
by blast
thus
    minimax V A p =
    ({} ,
     A - defer minimax V A p ,
     {d ∈ A. condorcet-winner V A p d})
by simp
qed

end

```

Chapter 5

Compositional Structures

5.1 Drop And Pass Compatibility

```
theory Drop-And-Pass-Compatibility
  imports Basic-Modules/Drop-Module
           Basic-Modules/Pass-Module
begin
```

This is a collection of properties about the interplay and compatibility of both the drop module and the pass module.

5.1.1 Properties

```
theorem drop-zero-mod-rej-zero[simp]:
  fixes  $r :: 'a \text{ Preference-Relation}$ 
  assumes linear-order  $r$ 
  shows rejects 0 (drop-module 0 r)
proof (unfold rejects-def, safe)
  show social-choice-result.electoral-module (drop-module 0 r)
    using assms
    by simp
next
  fix
     $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $V :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
     $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ 
  assume
    fin-A: finite A and
    prof-A: profile V A p
  have connex UNIV r
    using assms lin-ord-imp-connex
    by auto
  hence connex: connex A (limit A r)
    using limit-presv-connex subset-UNIV
    by metis
```

```

have  $\forall B a. B \neq \{\} \vee (a::'a) \notin B$ 
  by simp
hence  $\forall a B. a \in A \wedge a \in B \longrightarrow \text{connex } B \ (limit\ A\ r) \longrightarrow$ 
   $\neg \text{card } (\text{above } (limit\ A\ r)\ a) \leq 0$ 
  using above-connex above-presv-limit card-eq-0-iff
  fin-A finite-subset le-0-eq assms
  by (metis (no-types))
hence  $\{a \in A. \text{card } (\text{above } (limit\ A\ r)\ a) \leq 0\} = \{\}$ 
  using connex
  by auto
hence  $\text{card } \{a \in A. \text{card } (\text{above } (limit\ A\ r)\ a) \leq 0\} = 0$ 
  using card.empty
  by (metis (full-types))
thus  $\text{card } (\text{reject } (\text{drop-module } 0\ r)\ V\ A\ p) = 0$ 
  by simp
qed

```

The drop module rejects n alternatives (if there are at least n alternatives).

```

theorem drop-two-mod-rej-n[simp]:
  fixes  $r :: 'a\ \text{Preference-Relation}$ 
  assumes linear-order  $r$ 
  shows rejects  $n$  (drop-module  $n\ r$ )
proof (unfold rejects-def, safe)
  show social-choice-result.electoral-module (drop-module  $n\ r$ )
    by simp
next
fix
   $A :: 'a\ \text{set}$  and
   $V :: 'v\ \text{set}$  and
   $p :: ('a, 'v)\ \text{Profile}$ 
assume
  card-n:  $n \leq \text{card } A$  and
  fin-A: finite  $A$  and
  prof: profile  $V\ A\ p$ 
let ?inv-rank = the-inv-into  $A$  (rank (limit  $A\ r$ ))
have lin-ord-limit: linear-order-on  $A$  (limit  $A\ r$ )
  using assms limit-presv-lin-ord
  by auto
hence  $(limit\ A\ r) \subseteq A \times A$ 
  unfolding linear-order-on-def partial-order-on-def preorder-on-def refl-on-def
  by simp
hence  $\forall a \in A. (\text{above } (limit\ A\ r)\ a) \subseteq A$ 
  unfolding above-def
  by auto
hence leq:  $\forall a \in A. \text{rank } (limit\ A\ r)\ a \leq \text{card } A$ 
  using fin-A
  by (simp add: card-mono)
have  $\forall a \in A. \{a\} \subseteq (\text{above } (limit\ A\ r)\ a)$ 
  using lin-ord-limit

```

```

unfolding linear-order-on-def partial-order-on-def
  preorder-on-def refl-on-def above-def
by auto
hence  $\forall a \in A. \text{card } \{a\} \leq \text{card } (\text{above } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ a)$ 
  using card-mono fin-A rev-finite-subset above-presv-limit
by metis
hence  $\text{geq-1}: \forall a \in A. 1 \leq \text{rank } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ a$ 
  by simp
with leq have  $\forall a \in A. \text{rank } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ a \in \{1 \ .. \ \text{card } A\}$ 
  by simp
hence  $\text{rank } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ 'A \subseteq \{1 \ .. \ \text{card } A\}$ 
  by auto
moreover have inj: inj-on (rank (limit A r)) A
  using fin-A inj-onI rank-unique lin-ord-limit
  by metis
ultimately have bij: bij-betw (rank (limit A r)) A {1 .. card A}
  using bij-betw-def bij-betw-finite bij-betw-iff-card card-seteq
    dual-order.refl ex-bij-betw-nat-finite-1 fin-A
  by metis
hence  $\text{bij-inv}: \text{bij-betw } ?\text{inv-rank } \{1 \ .. \ \text{card } A\} \ A$ 
  using bij-betw-the-inv-into
  by blast
hence  $\forall S \subseteq \{1..\text{card } A\}. \text{card } (?\text{inv-rank } 'S) = \text{card } S$ 
  using fin-A bij-betw-same-card bij-betw-subset
  by metis
moreover have subset:  $\{1 \ .. \ n\} \subseteq \{1 \ .. \ \text{card } A\}$ 
  using card-n
  by simp
ultimately have  $\text{card } (?\text{inv-rank } ' \{1 \ .. \ n\}) = n$ 
  using numeral-One numeral-eq-iff semiring-norm(85) card-atLeastAtMost
  by presburger
also have  $?\text{inv-rank } ' \{1..n\} = \{a \in A. \text{rank } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ a \in \{1 \ .. \ n\}\}$ 
proof
  show  $?\text{inv-rank } ' \{1..n\} \subseteq \{a \in A. \text{rank } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ a \in \{1 \ .. \ n\}\}$ 
  proof
    fix  $a :: 'a$ 
    assume  $a \in ?\text{inv-rank } ' \{1..n\}$ 
    then obtain  $b$  where  $b\text{-img}: b \in \{1 \ .. \ n\} \wedge ?\text{inv-rank } b = a$ 
    by auto
    hence  $\text{rank } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ a = b$ 
    using subset f-the-inv-into-f-bij-betw subsetD bij
    by metis
    hence  $\text{rank } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ a \in \{1 \ .. \ n\}$ 
    using b-img
    by simp
    moreover have  $a \in A$ 
    using b-img bij-inv bij-betwE subset
    by blast
    ultimately show  $a \in \{a \in A. \text{rank } (\text{limit } A \ r) \ a \in \{1 \ .. \ n\}\}$ 

```

```

      by blast
    qed
  next
    show  $\{a \in A. \text{rank} (\text{limit } A \ r) \ a \in \{1 \ .. \ n\}\} \subseteq \text{the-inv-into } A \ (\text{rank} (\text{limit } A \ r)) \ ' \{1 \ .. \ n\}$ 
    proof
      fix a :: 'a
      assume el:  $a \in \{a \in A. \text{rank} (\text{limit } A \ r) \ a \in \{1 \ .. \ n\}\}$ 
      then obtain b where b-img:  $b \in \{1..n\} \wedge \text{rank} (\text{limit } A \ r) \ a = b$ 
      by auto
      moreover have  $a \in A$ 
      using el
      by simp
      ultimately have ?inv-rank b = a
      using inj the-inv-into-f-f
      by metis
      thus  $a \in ?inv\text{-rank} \ ' \{1 \ .. \ n\}$ 
      using b-img
      by auto
    qed
  qed
  finally have  $\text{card} \{a \in A. \text{rank} (\text{limit } A \ r) \ a \in \{1..n\}\} = n$ 
  by blast
  also have  $\{a \in A. \text{rank} (\text{limit } A \ r) \ a \in \{1 \ .. \ n\}\} = \{a \in A. \text{rank} (\text{limit } A \ r) \ a \leq n\}$ 
  using geq-1
  by auto
  also have  $\dots = \text{reject} (\text{drop-module } n \ r) \ V \ A \ p$ 
  by simp
  finally show  $\text{card} (\text{reject} (\text{drop-module } n \ r) \ V \ A \ p) = n$ 
  by blast
qed

```

The pass and drop module are (disjoint-)compatible.

```

theorem drop-pass-disj-compat[simp]:
  fixes
    r :: 'a Preference-Relation and
    n :: nat
  assumes linear-order r
  shows disjoint-compatibility (drop-module n r) (pass-module n r)
proof (unfold disjoint-compatibility-def, safe)
  show social-choice-result.electoral-module (drop-module n r)
    using assms
    by simp
next
  show social-choice-result.electoral-module (pass-module n r)
    using assms
    by simp
next

```



```

fix
   $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
   $V :: 'b \text{ set}$ 
have  $\text{linear-order-on } A \text{ (limit } A \text{ } r)$ 
  using  $\text{assms limit-presv-lin-ord}$ 
  by  $\text{blast}$ 
hence  $\text{profile } V \text{ } A \text{ } (\lambda v. (\text{limit } A \text{ } r))$ 
  using  $\text{profile-def}$ 
  by  $\text{blast}$ 
then obtain  $p :: ('a, 'b) \text{ Profile}$  where
   $\text{profile } V \text{ } A \text{ } p$ 
  by  $\text{blast}$ 
show  $\exists B \subseteq A. (\forall a \in B. \text{indep-of-alt } (\text{drop-module } n \text{ } r) \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } a \wedge$ 
   $(\forall p. \text{profile } V \text{ } A \text{ } p \longrightarrow a \in \text{reject } (\text{drop-module } n \text{ } r) \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } p)) \wedge$ 
   $(\forall a \in A - B. \text{indep-of-alt } (\text{pass-module } n \text{ } r) \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } a \wedge$ 
   $(\forall p. \text{profile } V \text{ } A \text{ } p \longrightarrow a \in \text{reject } (\text{pass-module } n \text{ } r) \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } p))$ 
proof
  have  $\text{same-A:}$ 
   $\forall p \text{ } q. (\text{profile } V \text{ } A \text{ } p \wedge \text{profile } V \text{ } A \text{ } q) \longrightarrow$ 
   $\text{reject } (\text{drop-module } n \text{ } r) \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } p = \text{reject } (\text{drop-module } n \text{ } r) \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } q$ 
  by  $\text{auto}$ 
  let  $?A = \text{reject } (\text{drop-module } n \text{ } r) \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } p$ 
  have  $?A \subseteq A$ 
  by  $\text{auto}$ 
  moreover have  $\forall a \in ?A. \text{indep-of-alt } (\text{drop-module } n \text{ } r) \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } a$ 
  using  $\text{assms}$ 
  unfolding  $\text{indep-of-alt-def}$ 
  by  $\text{simp}$ 
  moreover have  $\forall a \in ?A. \forall p. \text{profile } V \text{ } A \text{ } p \longrightarrow a \in \text{reject } (\text{drop-module } n$ 
 $r) \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } p$ 
  by  $\text{auto}$ 
  moreover have  $\forall a \in A - ?A. \text{indep-of-alt } (\text{pass-module } n \text{ } r) \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } a$ 
  using  $\text{assms}$ 
  unfolding  $\text{indep-of-alt-def}$ 
  by  $\text{simp}$ 
  moreover have  $\forall a \in A - ?A. \forall p. \text{profile } V \text{ } A \text{ } p \longrightarrow a \in \text{reject } (\text{pass-module}$ 
 $n \text{ } r) \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } p$ 
  by  $\text{auto}$ 
  ultimately show  $?A \subseteq A \wedge$ 
   $(\forall a \in ?A. \text{indep-of-alt } (\text{drop-module } n \text{ } r) \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } a \wedge$ 
   $(\forall p. \text{profile } V \text{ } A \text{ } p \longrightarrow a \in \text{reject } (\text{drop-module } n \text{ } r) \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } p)) \wedge$ 
   $(\forall a \in A - ?A. \text{indep-of-alt } (\text{pass-module } n \text{ } r) \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } a \wedge$ 
   $(\forall p. \text{profile } V \text{ } A \text{ } p \longrightarrow a \in \text{reject } (\text{pass-module } n \text{ } r) \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } p))$ 
  by  $\text{simp}$ 
qed
qed
end

```

5.2 Revision Composition

theory *Revision-Composition*
imports *Basic-Modules/Component-Types/Electoral-Module*
begin

A revised electoral module rejects all originally rejected or deferred alternatives, and defers the originally elected alternatives. It does not elect any alternatives.

5.2.1 Definition

fun *revision-composition* :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module
 \Rightarrow ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module **where**
revision-composition m V A p = ({}, A - elect m V A p, elect m V A p)

abbreviation *rev* :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module
 \Rightarrow ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module (\downarrow 50) **where**
m \downarrow == *revision-composition* m

5.2.2 Soundness

theorem *rev-comp-sound[simp]*:
fixes m :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module
assumes *social-choice-result.electoral-module* m
shows *social-choice-result.electoral-module* (*revision-composition* m)
proof –
from *assms*
have \forall A V p. *profile* V A p \longrightarrow *elect* m V A p \subseteq A
using *elect-in-alts*
by *metis*
hence \forall A V p. *profile* V A p \longrightarrow (A - *elect* m V A p) \cup *elect* m V A p = A
by *blast*
hence *unity*:
 \forall A V p. *profile* V A p \longrightarrow
set-equals-partition A (*revision-composition* m V A p)
by *simp*
have \forall A V p. *profile* V A p \longrightarrow (A - *elect* m V A p) \cap *elect* m V A p = {}
by *blast*
hence *disjoint*:
 \forall A V p. *profile* V A p \longrightarrow *disjoint3* (*revision-composition* m V A p)
by *simp*
from *unity disjoint*
show *?thesis*
unfolding *social-choice-result.electoral-module-def*

by simp
qed

lemma *rev-comp-only-voters*:
fixes $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$
assumes *only-voters-vote* m
shows *only-voters-vote* (*revision-composition* m)
using *assms*
unfolding *only-voters-vote-def* *revision-composition.simps*
by *presburger*

5.2.3 Composition Rules

An electoral module received by revision is never electing.

theorem *rev-comp-non-electing*[*simp*]:
fixes $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$
assumes *social-choice-result.electoral-module* m
shows *non-electing* ($m \downarrow$)
using *assms*
unfolding *non-electing-def*
by *simp*

Revising an electing electoral module results in a non-blocking electoral module.

theorem *rev-comp-non-blocking*[*simp*]:
fixes $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$
assumes *electing* m
shows *non-blocking* ($m \downarrow$)
proof (*unfold non-blocking-def, safe, simp-all*)
show *social-choice-result.electoral-module* ($m \downarrow$)
using *assms rev-comp-sound*
unfolding *electing-def*
by (*metis (no-types, lifting)*)
next
fix
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $V :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ **and**
 $x :: 'a$
assume
 $\text{fin-}A$: *finite* A **and**
 $\text{prof-}A$: *profile* $V A p$ **and**
 no-elect : $A - \text{elect } m V A p = A$ **and**
 $\text{x-in-}A$: $x \in A$
from no-elect **have** non-elect :
 $\text{non-electing } m$
using *assms prof-A x-in-A fin-A empty-iff*
Diff-disjoint Int-absorb2 elect-in-alts

```

    unfolding electing-def
    by (metis (no-types, lifting))
show False
    using non-elect assms empty-iff fin-A prof-A x-in-A
    unfolding electing-def non-electing-def
    by (metis (no-types, lifting))
qed

```

Revising an invariant monotone electoral module results in a defer-invariant-monotone electoral module.

```

theorem rev-comp-def-inv-mono[simp]:
  fixes m :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module
  assumes invariant-monotonicity m
  shows defer-invariant-monotonicity (m↓)
proof (unfold defer-invariant-monotonicity-def, safe)
  show social-choice-result.electoral-module (m↓)
    using assms rev-comp-sound
    unfolding invariant-monotonicity-def
    by simp
next
  show non-electing (m↓)
    using assms rev-comp-non-electing
    unfolding invariant-monotonicity-def
    by simp
next
  fix
    A :: 'a set and
    V :: 'v set and
    p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    q :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    a :: 'a and
    x :: 'a and
    x' :: 'a
  assume
    rev-p-defer-a: a ∈ defer (m↓) V A p and
    a-lifted: lifted V A p q a and
    rev-q-defer-x: x ∈ defer (m↓) V A q and
    x-non-eq-a: x ≠ a and
    rev-q-defer-x': x' ∈ defer (m↓) V A q
  from rev-p-defer-a
  have elect-a-in-p: a ∈ elect m V A p
    by simp
  from rev-q-defer-x x-non-eq-a
  have elect-no-unique-a-in-q: elect m V A q ≠ {a}
    by force
  from assms
  have elect m V A q = elect m V A p
    using a-lifted elect-a-in-p elect-no-unique-a-in-q
    unfolding invariant-monotonicity-def

```

```

    by (metis (no-types))
  thus  $x' \in \text{defer } (m \downarrow) V A p$ 
    using rev-q-defer- $x'$ 
    by simp
next
fix
   $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
   $V :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
   $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$  and
   $q :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$  and
   $a :: 'a$  and
   $x :: 'a$  and
   $x' :: 'a$ 
assume
  rev-p-defer- $a$ :  $a \in \text{defer } (m \downarrow) V A p$  and
  a-lifted:  $\text{lifted } V A p q a$  and
  rev-q-defer- $x$ :  $x \in \text{defer } (m \downarrow) V A q$  and
  x-non-eq- $a$ :  $x \neq a$  and
  rev-p-defer- $x'$ :  $x' \in \text{defer } (m \downarrow) V A p$ 
have reject-and-defer:
   $(A - \text{elect } m V A q, \text{elect } m V A q) = \text{snd } ((m \downarrow) V A q)$ 
  by force
have elect-p-eq-defer-rev-p:  $\text{elect } m V A p = \text{defer } (m \downarrow) V A p$ 
  by simp
hence elect-a-in-p:  $a \in \text{elect } m V A p$ 
  using rev-p-defer- $a$ 
  by presburger
have  $\text{elect } m V A q \neq \{a\}$ 
  using rev-q-defer- $x$  x-non-eq- $a$ 
  by force
with assms
show  $x' \in \text{defer } (m \downarrow) V A q$ 
  using a-lifted rev-p-defer- $x'$  snd-conv elect-a-in-p
    elect-p-eq-defer-rev-p reject-and-defer
  unfolding invariant-monotonicity-def
  by (metis (no-types))
next
fix
   $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
   $V :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
   $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$  and
   $q :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$  and
   $a :: 'a$  and
   $x :: 'a$  and
   $x' :: 'a$ 
assume
   $a \in \text{defer } (m \downarrow) V A p$  and
   $\text{lifted } V A p q a$  and
   $x' \in \text{defer } (m \downarrow) V A q$ 

```

```

with assms
show  $x' \in \text{defer } (m \downarrow) \ V \ A \ p$ 
  using empty-iff insertE snd-conv revision-composition.elims
  unfolding invariant-monotonicity-def
  by metis
next
fix
   $A :: 'a \ \text{set}$  and
   $V :: 'v \ \text{set}$  and
   $p :: ('a, 'v) \ \text{Profile}$  and
   $q :: ('a, 'v) \ \text{Profile}$  and
   $a :: 'a$  and
   $x :: 'a$  and
   $x' :: 'a$ 
assume
  rev-p-defer-a:  $a \in \text{defer } (m \downarrow) \ V \ A \ p$  and
  a-lifted:  $\text{lifted } V \ A \ p \ q \ a$  and
  rev-q-not-defer-a:  $a \notin \text{defer } (m \downarrow) \ V \ A \ q$ 
from assms
have lifted-inv:
   $\forall \ A \ V \ p \ q \ a. \ a \in \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p \wedge \text{lifted } V \ A \ p \ q \ a \longrightarrow$ 
   $\text{elect } m \ V \ A \ q = \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p \vee \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ q = \{a\}$ 
  unfolding invariant-monotonicity-def
  by (metis (no-types))
have p-defer-rev-eq-elect:  $\text{defer } (m \downarrow) \ V \ A \ p = \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p$ 
  by simp
have q-defer-rev-eq-elect:  $\text{defer } (m \downarrow) \ V \ A \ q = \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ q$ 
  by simp
thus  $x' \in \text{defer } (m \downarrow) \ V \ A \ q$ 
  using p-defer-rev-eq-elect lifted-inv a-lifted rev-p-defer-a rev-q-not-defer-a
  by blast
qed

end

```

5.3 Sequential Composition

```

theory Sequential-Composition
  imports Basic-Modules/Component-Types/Electoral-Module
begin

```

The sequential composition creates a new electoral module from two electoral modules. In a sequential composition, the second electoral module makes decisions over alternatives deferred by the first electoral module.

$$\text{fun } \textit{sequential-composition} :: ('a, 'v, 'a \textit{Result}) \textit{Electoral-Module} \Rightarrow$$

$$('a, 'v, 'a \textit{Result}) \textit{Electoral-Module} \Rightarrow$$

$$('a, 'v, 'a \textit{Result}) \textit{Electoral-Module} \textbf{ where}$$
$$\text{fun } \textit{sequential-composition}' :: ('a, 'v, 'a \textit{Result}) \textit{Electoral-Module} \Rightarrow \\ ('a, 'v, 'a \textit{Result}) \textit{Electoral-Module} \Rightarrow ('a, 'v, 'a \textit{Result}) \textit{Electoral-Module}$$

where

lemma *seq-comp-only-voters*:
fixes
 $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**
 $n :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$
assumes
 $\text{only-voters-vote } m \wedge \text{only-voters-vote } n$
shows $\text{only-voters-vote } (m \triangleright n)$
proof (*unfold only-voters-vote-def, clarify*)

hence coincide-limit:
 $\forall v \in V. \text{limit-profile}(\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ p \ v = \text{limit-profile}(\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p') \ p' \ v$
using *coincide*
by *simp*
moreover have

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p \cup \text{elect } n \ V \ (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ (\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ p) \\ &= \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p' \cup \text{elect } n \ V \ (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p') \ (\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \\ p') \ p') \\ & \text{using } \text{assms eq coincide-limit} \\ & \text{unfolding } \text{only-voters-vote-def} \\ & \text{by } \text{metis} \\ & \text{moreover have} \\ & \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p \cup \text{reject } n \ V \ (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ (\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ p) \\ &= \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p' \cup \text{reject } n \ V \ (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p') \ (\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \\ p') \ p') \\ & \text{using } \text{assms eq coincide-limit} \\ & \text{unfolding } \text{only-voters-vote-def} \\ & \text{by } \text{metis} \\ & \text{moreover have} \\ & \text{defer } n \ V \ (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ (\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ p) \\ &= \text{defer } n \ V \ (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p') \ (\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p') \ p') \\ & \text{using } \text{assms eq coincide-limit} \\ & \text{unfolding } \text{only-voters-vote-def} \\ & \text{by } \text{metis} \\ & \text{ultimately show } (m \triangleright n) \ V \ A \ p = (m \triangleright n) \ V \ A \ p' \\ & \text{unfolding } \text{sequential-composition.simps} \\ & \text{by } \text{metis} \\ & \text{qed} \end{aligned}$$

lemma *seq-comp-presv-disj*:

fixes

$m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**

$n :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**

$A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**

$V :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**

$p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$

assumes *module-m*: *social-choice-result.electoral-module m* **and**

module-n: *social-choice-result.electoral-module n* **and**

prof: *profile V A p*

shows *disjoint3* $((m \triangleright n) \ V \ A \ p)$

proof –

let $?new-A = \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p$

let $?new-p = \text{limit-profile } ?new-A \ p$

have *prof-def-lim*: *profile V (defer m V A p) (limit-profile (defer m V A p) p)*

using *def-presv-prof prof module-m*

by *metis*

have *defer-in-A*:

$\forall A' V' p' m' a.$

$(\text{profile } V' A' p' \wedge$

$\text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m' \wedge$

$(a :: 'a) \in \text{defer } m' \ V' \ A' \ p') \longrightarrow$

$a \in A'$

using *UnCI result-presv-alts*

by *fastforce*


```

from module-m prof
have disjoint-m: disjoint3 (m V A p)
unfolding social-choice-result.electoral-module-def well-formed-social-choice.simps
by blast
from module-m module-n def-presv-prof prof
have disjoint-n: disjoint3 (n V ?new-A ?new-p)
unfolding social-choice-result.electoral-module-def well-formed-social-choice.simps
by metis
have disj-n:
  elect m V A p  $\cap$  reject m V A p = {}  $\wedge$ 
  elect m V A p  $\cap$  defer m V A p = {}  $\wedge$ 
  reject m V A p  $\cap$  defer m V A p = {}
using prof module-m
by (simp add: result-disj)
have reject n V (defer m V A p) (limit-profile (defer m V A p) p)  $\subseteq$  defer m V
A p
using def-presv-prof reject-in-alts prof module-m module-n
by metis
with disjoint-m module-m module-n prof
have elect-reject-diff: elect m V A p  $\cap$  reject n V ?new-A ?new-p = {}
using disj-n
by blast
from prof module-m module-n
have elec-n-in-def-m:
  elect n V (defer m V A p) (limit-profile (defer m V A p) p)  $\subseteq$  defer m V A p
using def-presv-prof elect-in-alts
by metis
have elect-defer-diff: elect m V A p  $\cap$  defer n V ?new-A ?new-p = {}
proof -
obtain f :: 'a set  $\Rightarrow$  'a set  $\Rightarrow$  'a where
   $\forall B B'. (\exists a b. a \in B' \wedge b \in B \wedge a = b) =$ 
   $(f B B' \in B' \wedge (\exists a. a \in B \wedge f B B' = a))$ 
using disjoint-iff
by metis
then obtain g :: 'a set  $\Rightarrow$  'a set  $\Rightarrow$  'a where
   $\forall B B'. (B \cap B' = \{\} \longrightarrow (\forall a b. a \in B \wedge b \in B' \longrightarrow a \neq b)) \wedge$ 
   $(B \cap B' \neq \{\} \longrightarrow f B B' \in B \wedge g B B' \in B' \wedge f B B' = g B B')$ 
by auto
thus ?thesis
using defer-in-A disj-n module-n prof-def-lim prof
by fastforce
qed
have rej-intersect-new-elect-empty: reject m V A p  $\cap$  elect n V ?new-A ?new-p
= {}
using disj-n disjoint-m disjoint-n def-presv-prof prof
  module-m module-n elec-n-in-def-m
by blast

```

```

have ( $\text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p \cup \text{elect } n \ V \ ?\text{new-A } ?\text{new-p}$ )  $\cap$ 
      ( $\text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p \cup \text{reject } n \ V \ ?\text{new-A } ?\text{new-p}$ ) = {}
proof (safe)
  fix  $x :: 'a$ 
  assume
     $x \in \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p$  and
     $x \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p$ 
  hence  $x \in \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p \cap \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p$ 
  by simp
thus  $x \in \{\}$ 
  using disj-n
  by simp
next
  fix  $x :: 'a$ 
  assume
     $x \in \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p$  and
     $x \in \text{reject } n \ V \ (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p)$ 
    ( $\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ p$ )
  thus  $x \in \{\}$ 
  using elect-reject-diff
  by blast
next
  fix  $x :: 'a$ 
  assume
     $x \in \text{elect } n \ V \ (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ (\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ p)$  and
     $x \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p$ 
  thus  $x \in \{\}$ 
  using rej-intersect-new-elect-empty
  by blast
next
  fix  $x :: 'a$ 
  assume
     $x \in \text{elect } n \ V \ (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ (\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ p)$  and
     $x \in \text{reject } n \ V \ (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ (\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ p)$ 
  thus  $x \in \{\}$ 
  using disjoint-iff-not-equal module-n prof-def-lim result-disj prof
  by metis
qed
moreover have
  ( $\text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p \cup \text{elect } n \ V \ ?\text{new-A } ?\text{new-p}$ )  $\cap$  ( $\text{defer } n \ V \ ?\text{new-A } ?\text{new-p}$ ) = {}
  using Int-Un-distrib2 Un-empty elect-defer-diff module-n
    prof-def-lim result-disj prof
  by (metis (no-types))
moreover have
  ( $\text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p \cup \text{reject } n \ V \ ?\text{new-A } ?\text{new-p}$ )  $\cap$  ( $\text{defer } n \ V \ ?\text{new-A } ?\text{new-p}$ ) =
{}
proof (safe)
  fix  $x :: 'a$ 
  assume

```

```

    x-in-def:  $x \in \text{defer } n \ V \ (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ (\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ p)$  and
    x-in-rej:  $x \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p$ 
from x-in-def
have  $x \in \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p$ 
    using defer-in-A module-n prof-def-lim prof
    by blast
with x-in-rej
have  $x \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p \cap \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p$ 
    by fastforce
thus  $x \in \{\}$ 
    using disj-n
    by blast
next
fix  $x :: 'a$ 
assume
     $x \in \text{defer } n \ V \ (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ (\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ p)$  and
     $x \in \text{reject } n \ V \ (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ (\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ p)$ 
thus  $x \in \{\}$ 
    using module-n prof-def-lim reject-not-elec-or-def
    by fastforce
qed
ultimately have
    disjoint3 ( $\text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p \cup \text{elect } n \ V \ ?\text{new-A } ?\text{new-p},$ 
     $\text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p \cup \text{reject } n \ V \ ?\text{new-A } ?\text{new-p},$ 
     $\text{defer } n \ V \ ?\text{new-A } ?\text{new-p}$ )
    by simp
thus ?thesis
    unfolding sequential-composition.simps
    by metis
qed

lemma seq-comp-presv-alts:
fixes
     $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$  and
     $n :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$  and
     $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $V :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
     $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ 
assumes module-m: social-choice-result.electoral-module m and
    module-n: social-choice-result.electoral-module n and
    prof: profile V A p
shows set-equals-partition A ((m  $\triangleright$  n) V A p)
proof –
let  $?new-A = \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p$ 
let  $?new-p = \text{limit-profile } ?new-A \ p$ 
have elect-reject-diff:  $\text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p \cup \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p \cup ?new-A = A$ 
    using module-m prof
    by (simp add: result-presv-alts)
have  $\text{elect } n \ V \ ?new-A \ ?new-p \cup$ 

```

```

      reject n V ?new-A ?new-p  $\cup$ 
      defer n V ?new-A ?new-p = ?new-A
    using module-m module-n prof def-presv-prof result-presv-alts
    by metis
  hence (elect m V A p  $\cup$  elect n V ?new-A ?new-p)  $\cup$ 
        (reject m V A p  $\cup$  reject n V ?new-A ?new-p)  $\cup$ 
        defer n V ?new-A ?new-p = A
    using elect-reject-diff
    by blast
  hence set-equals-partition A
        (elect m V A p  $\cup$  elect n V ?new-A ?new-p,
         reject m V A p  $\cup$  reject n V ?new-A ?new-p,
         defer n V ?new-A ?new-p)
    by simp
  thus ?thesis
    unfolding sequential-composition.simps
    by metis
qed

lemma seq-comp-alt-eq[code]: sequential-composition = sequential-composition'
proof (unfold sequential-composition'.simps sequential-composition.simps)
  have  $\forall m n V A E$ .
    (case m V A E of (e, r, d)  $\Rightarrow$ 
      case n V d (limit-profile d E) of (e', r', d')  $\Rightarrow$ 
        (e  $\cup$  e', r  $\cup$  r', d')) =
        (elect m V A E  $\cup$  elect n V (defer m V A E) (limit-profile (defer m V A
E) E),
         reject m V A E  $\cup$  reject n V (defer m V A E) (limit-profile (defer m V
A E) E),
         defer n V (defer m V A E) (limit-profile (defer m V A E) E))
    using case-prod-beta'
    by (metis (no-types, lifting))
  thus
    ( $\lambda m n V A p$ .
      let A' = defer m V A p; p' = limit-profile A' p in
      (elect m V A p  $\cup$  elect n V A' p', reject m V A p  $\cup$  reject n V A' p', defer n
V A' p')) =
    ( $\lambda m n V A pr$ .
      let (e, r, d) = m V A pr; A' = d; p' = limit-profile A' pr;
      (e', r', d') = n V A' p' in
      (e  $\cup$  e', r  $\cup$  r', d'))
    by metis
qed

```

5.3.2 Soundness

theorem seq-comp-sound[simp]:
fixes
 $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**

```

  n :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module
assumes
  social-choice-result.electoral-module m and
  social-choice-result.electoral-module n
shows social-choice-result.electoral-module (m  $\triangleright$  n)
proof (unfold social-choice-result.electoral-module-def, safe)
fix
  A :: 'a set and
  V :: 'v set and
  p :: ('a, 'v) Profile
assume
  prof-A: profile V A p
have  $\forall r. \text{well-formed-social-choice } (A::'a \text{ set}) \ r =$ 
  (disjoint3 r  $\wedge$  set-equals-partition A r)
by simp
thus well-formed-social-choice A ((m  $\triangleright$  n) V A p)
using assms seq-comp-presv-disj seq-comp-presv-alts prof-A
by metis
qed

```

5.3.3 Lemmas

lemma seq-comp-dec-only-def:

```

fixes
  m :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
  n :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
  A :: 'a set and
  V :: 'v set and
  p :: ('a, 'v) Profile
assumes
  module-m: social-choice-result.electoral-module m and
  module-n: social-choice-result.electoral-module n and
  prof: profile V A p and
  empty-defer: defer m V A p = {}
shows (m  $\triangleright$  n) V A p = m V A p
proof -
have  $\forall m' A' V' p'. \text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m' \wedge \text{profile } V' A' p' \longrightarrow$ 
  profile V' (defer m' V' A' p') (limit-profile (defer m' V' A' p') p')
using def-presv-prof prof
by metis
hence prof-no-alt: profile V {} (limit-profile (defer m V A p) p)
using empty-defer prof module-m
by metis
show ?thesis
proof
have
  (elect m V A p)  $\cup$  (elect n V (defer m V A p) (limit-profile (defer m V A p)
p)) =

```

```

      elect m V A p
    using elect-in-alts[of n V defer m V A p (limit-profile (defer m V A p) p)]
      empty-defer module-n prof prof-no-alt
    by auto
  thus elect (m ▷ n) V A p = elect m V A p
    using fst-conv
    unfolding sequential-composition.simps
    by metis
next
have rej-empty:
  ∀ m' V' p'.
    (social-choice-result.electoral-module m'
     ∧ profile V' ({::'a set} p') → reject m' V' {} p' = {})
  using bot.extremum-uniqueI reject-in-alts
  by metis
have (reject m V A p, defer n V {} (limit-profile {} p)) = snd (m V A p)
  using bot.extremum-uniqueI defer-in-alts empty-defer
    module-n prod.collapse prof-no-alt
  by (metis (no-types))
thus snd ((m ▷ n) V A p) = snd (m V A p)
  using rej-empty empty-defer module-n prof-no-alt prof
  by fastforce
qed
qed

lemma seq-comp-def-then-elect:
  fixes
    m :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
    n :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
    A :: 'a set and
    V :: 'v set and
    p :: ('a, 'v) Profile
  assumes
    n-electing-m: non-electing m and
    def-one-m: defers 1 m and
    electing-n: electing n and
    f-prof: finite-profile V A p
  shows elect (m ▷ n) V A p = defer m V A p
proof (cases)
  assume A = {}
  with electing-n n-electing-m f-prof
  show ?thesis
    using bot.extremum-uniqueI defer-in-alts elect-in-alts seq-comp-sound
    unfolding electing-def non-electing-def
    by metis
next
  assume non-empty-A: A ≠ {}
  from n-electing-m f-prof
  have ele: elect m V A p = {}

```

```

    unfolding non-electing-def
  by simp
from non-empty-A def-one-m f-prof finite
have def-card: card (defer m V A p) = 1
  unfolding defers-def
  by (simp add: Suc-leI card-gt-0-iff)
with n-electing-m f-prof
have def:  $\exists a \in A. \text{defer } m \text{ V } A \text{ } p = \{a\}$ 
  using card-1-singletonE defer-in-alts singletonI subsetCE
  unfolding non-electing-def
  by metis
from ele def n-electing-m
have rej:  $\exists a \in A. \text{reject } m \text{ V } A \text{ } p = A - \{a\}$ 
  using Diff-empty def-one-m f-prof reject-not-elec-or-def
  unfolding defers-def
  by metis
from ele rej def n-electing-m f-prof
have res-m:  $\exists a \in A. m \text{ V } A \text{ } p = (\{\}, A - \{a\}, \{a\})$ 
  using Diff-empty elect-rej-def-combination reject-not-elec-or-def
  unfolding non-electing-def
  by metis
hence  $\exists a \in A. \text{elect } (m \triangleright n) \text{ V } A \text{ } p = \text{elect } n \text{ V } \{a\} \text{ (limit-profile } \{a\} \text{ } p)$ 
  using prod.sel sup-bot.left-neutral
  unfolding sequential-composition.simps
  by metis
with def-card def electing-n n-electing-m f-prof
have  $\exists a \in A. \text{elect } (m \triangleright n) \text{ V } A \text{ } p = \{a\}$ 
  using electing-for-only-alt fst-conv def-presv-prof sup-bot.left-neutral
  unfolding non-electing-def sequential-composition.simps
  by metis
with def def-card electing-n n-electing-m f-prof res-m
show ?thesis
  using def-presv-prof electing-for-only-alt fst-conv sup-bot.left-neutral
  unfolding non-electing-def sequential-composition.simps
  by metis
qed

```

lemma seq-comp-def-card-bounded:

fixes

$m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**

$n :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**

$A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**

$V :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**

$p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$

assumes

$\text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m$ **and**

$\text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } n$ **and**

$\text{finite-profile } V \text{ } A \text{ } p$

shows $\text{card } (\text{defer } (m \triangleright n) \text{ V } A \text{ } p) \leq \text{card } (\text{defer } m \text{ V } A \text{ } p)$

using *card-mono defer-in-alts assms def-presv-prof snd-conv finite-subset*
unfolding *sequential-composition.simps*
by *metis*

lemma *seq-comp-def-set-bounded:*

fixes
 $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**
 $n :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $V :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$
assumes
social-choice-result.electoral-module m **and**
social-choice-result.electoral-module n **and**
profile V A p
shows $\text{defer } (m \triangleright n) \ V \ A \ p \subseteq \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p$
using *defer-in-alts assms snd-conv def-presv-prof*
unfolding *sequential-composition.simps*
by *metis*

lemma *seq-comp-defers-def-set:*

fixes
 $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**
 $n :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $V :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$
shows $\text{defer } (m \triangleright n) \ V \ A \ p = \text{defer } n \ V \ (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ (\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ p)$
using *snd-conv*
unfolding *sequential-composition.simps*
by *metis*

lemma *seq-comp-def-then-elect-elec-set:*

fixes
 $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**
 $n :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $V :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$
shows $\text{elect } (m \triangleright n) \ V \ A \ p =$
 $\text{elect } n \ V \ (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ (\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ p) \cup (\text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p)$
using *Un-commute fst-conv*
unfolding *sequential-composition.simps*
by *metis*

lemma *seq-comp-elim-one-red-def-set:*

fixes


```

  m :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
  n :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
  A :: 'a set and
  V :: 'v set and
  p :: ('a, 'v) Profile
assumes
  social-choice-result.electoral-module m and
  eliminates 1 n and
  profile V A p and
  card (defer m V A p) > 1
shows defer (m ▷ n) V A p ⊆ defer m V A p
using assms snd-conv def-presv-prof single-elim-imp-red-def-set
unfolding sequential-composition.simps
by metis

```

lemma *seq-comp-def-set-trans*:

```

fixes
  m :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
  n :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
  A :: 'a set and
  V :: 'v set and
  p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
  a :: 'a
assumes
  a ∈ (defer (m ▷ n) V A p) and
  social-choice-result.electoral-module m ∧ social-choice-result.electoral-module n
and
  profile V A p
shows a ∈ defer n V (defer m V A p) (limit-profile (defer m V A p) p) ∧
  a ∈ defer m V A p
using seq-comp-def-set-bounded assms in-mono seq-comp-defers-def-set
by (metis (no-types, opaque-lifting))

```

5.3.4 Composition Rules

The sequential composition preserves the non-blocking property.

theorem *seq-comp-presv-non-blocking[simp]*:

```

fixes
  m :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
  n :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module
assumes
  non-blocking-m: non-blocking m and
  non-blocking-n: non-blocking n
shows non-blocking (m ▷ n)
proof –
fix
  A :: 'a set and
  V :: 'v set and
  p :: ('a, 'v) Profile

```

```

let ?input-sound =  $A \neq \{\}$   $\wedge$  finite-profile  $V A p$ 
from non-blocking-m
have ?input-sound  $\longrightarrow$  reject  $m V A p \neq A$ 
  unfolding non-blocking-def
  by simp
with non-blocking-m
have A-reject-diff: ?input-sound  $\longrightarrow A - \text{reject } m V A p \neq \{\}$ 
  using Diff-eq-empty-iff reject-in-alts subset-antisym
  unfolding non-blocking-def
  by metis
from non-blocking-m
have ?input-sound  $\longrightarrow$  well-formed-social-choice  $A (m V A p)$ 
  unfolding social-choice-result.electoral-module-def non-blocking-def
  by simp
hence ?input-sound  $\longrightarrow$  elect  $m V A p \cup$  defer  $m V A p = A - \text{reject } m V A p$ 
  using non-blocking-m elec-and-def-not-rej
  unfolding non-blocking-def
  by metis
with A-reject-diff
have ?input-sound  $\longrightarrow$  elect  $m V A p \cup$  defer  $m V A p \neq \{\}$ 
  by simp
hence ?input-sound  $\longrightarrow$  (elect  $m V A p \neq \{\}$   $\vee$  defer  $m V A p \neq \{\}$ )
  by simp
with non-blocking-m non-blocking-n
show ?thesis
proof (unfold non-blocking-def)
  assume
    emod-reject-m:
    social-choice-result.electoral-module  $m \wedge$ 
    ( $\forall A V p. A \neq \{\} \wedge$  finite  $A \wedge$  profile  $V A p \longrightarrow$  reject  $m V A p \neq A$ ) and
    emod-reject-n:
    social-choice-result.electoral-module  $n \wedge$ 
    ( $\forall A V p. A \neq \{\} \wedge$  finite  $A \wedge$  profile  $V A p \longrightarrow$  reject  $n V A p \neq A$ )
  show
    social-choice-result.electoral-module  $(m \triangleright n) \wedge$ 
    ( $\forall A V p. A \neq \{\} \wedge$  finite  $A \wedge$  profile  $V A p \longrightarrow$  reject  $(m \triangleright n) V A p \neq A$ )
  proof (safe)
    show social-choice-result.electoral-module  $(m \triangleright n)$ 
      using emod-reject-m emod-reject-n
      by simp
  next
  fix
     $A :: 'a$  set and
     $V :: 'v$  set and
     $p :: ('a, 'v)$  Profile and
     $x :: 'a$ 
  assume
    fin-A: finite  $A$  and
    prof-A: profile  $V A p$  and

```

$rej-mn$: $reject\ (m \triangleright n)\ V\ A\ p = A$ **and**
 $x-in-A$: $x \in A$
from $emod-reject-m\ fin-A\ prof-A$
have $fin-defer$:
 $finite\ (defer\ m\ V\ A\ p) \wedge profile\ V\ (defer\ m\ V\ A\ p)\ (limit-profile\ (defer\ m\ V\ A\ p)\ p)$
using $def-presv-prof\ defer-in-alts\ finite-subset$
by $(metis\ (no-types))$
from $emod-reject-m\ emod-reject-n\ fin-A\ prof-A$
have $seq-elect$:
 $elect\ (m \triangleright n)\ V\ A\ p =$
 $elect\ n\ V\ (defer\ m\ V\ A\ p)\ (limit-profile\ (defer\ m\ V\ A\ p)\ p) \cup elect\ m\ V$
 $A\ p$
using $seq-comp-def-then-elect-elec-set$
by $metis$
from $emod-reject-n\ emod-reject-m\ fin-A\ prof-A$
have $def-limit$:
 $defer\ (m \triangleright n)\ V\ A\ p = defer\ n\ V\ (defer\ m\ V\ A\ p)\ (limit-profile\ (defer\ m\ V\ A\ p)\ p)$
 $A\ p\ p)$
using $seq-comp-defers-def-set$
by $metis$
from $emod-reject-n\ emod-reject-m\ fin-A\ prof-A$
have $elect\ (m \triangleright n)\ V\ A\ p \cup defer\ (m \triangleright n)\ V\ A\ p = A - reject\ (m \triangleright n)\ V\ A$
 p
using $elec-and-def-not-rej\ seq-comp-sound$
by $metis$
hence $elect-def-disj$:
 $elect\ n\ V\ (defer\ m\ V\ A\ p)\ (limit-profile\ (defer\ m\ V\ A\ p)\ p) \cup$
 $elect\ m\ V\ A\ p \cup$
 $defer\ n\ V\ (defer\ m\ V\ A\ p)\ (limit-profile\ (defer\ m\ V\ A\ p)\ p) = \{\}$
using $def-limit\ seq-elect\ Diff-cancel\ rej-mn$
by $auto$
have $rej-def-eq-set$:
 $defer\ n\ V\ (defer\ m\ V\ A\ p)\ (limit-profile\ (defer\ m\ V\ A\ p)\ p) -$
 $defer\ n\ V\ (defer\ m\ V\ A\ p)\ (limit-profile\ (defer\ m\ V\ A\ p)\ p) = \{\} \longrightarrow$
 $reject\ n\ V\ (defer\ m\ V\ A\ p)\ (limit-profile\ (defer\ m\ V\ A\ p)\ p) =$
 $defer\ m\ V\ A\ p$
using $elect-def-disj\ emod-reject-n\ fin-defer$
by $(simp\ add:\ reject-not-elec-or-def)$
have
 $defer\ n\ V\ (defer\ m\ V\ A\ p)\ (limit-profile\ (defer\ m\ V\ A\ p)\ p) -$
 $defer\ n\ V\ (defer\ m\ V\ A\ p)\ (limit-profile\ (defer\ m\ V\ A\ p)\ p) = \{\} \longrightarrow$
 $elect\ m\ V\ A\ p = elect\ m\ V\ A\ p \cap defer\ m\ V\ A\ p$
using $elect-def-disj$
by $blast$
thus $x \in \{\}$
using $rej-def-eq-set\ result-disj\ fin-defer\ Diff-cancel\ Diff-empty\ fin-A\ prof-A$
 $emod-reject-m\ emod-reject-n\ reject-not-elec-or-def\ x-in-A$
by $metis$

qed
qed
qed

Sequential composition preserves the non-electing property.

theorem *seq-comp-presv-non-electing[simp]*:
fixes
 $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**
 $n :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$
assumes
 $\text{non-electing } m$ **and**
 $\text{non-electing } n$
shows $\text{non-electing } (m \triangleright n)$
proof (*unfold non-electing-def, safe*)
have $\text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m \wedge \text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } n$
using *assms*
unfolding *non-electing-def*
by *blast*
thus $\text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } (m \triangleright n)$
by *simp*
next
fix
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $V :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ **and**
 $x :: 'a$
assume
 $\text{profile } V \ A \ p$ **and**
 $x \in \text{elect } (m \triangleright n) \ V \ A \ p$
thus $x \in \{\}$
using *assms*
unfolding *non-electing-def*
using *seq-comp-def-then-elect-elec-set def-presv-prof Diff-empty Diff-partition empty-subsetI*
by *metis*
qed

Composing an electoral module that defers exactly 1 alternative in sequence after an electoral module that is electing results (still) in an electing electoral module.

theorem *seq-comp-electing[simp]*:
fixes
 $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**
 $n :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$
assumes
 $\text{def-one-}m: \text{ defers } 1 \ m$ **and**
 $\text{electing-}n: \text{ electing } n$
shows $\text{electing } (m \triangleright n)$

proof –
have *defer-card-eq-one*:
 $\forall A V p. (\text{card } A \geq 1 \wedge \text{finite } A \wedge \text{profile } V A p) \longrightarrow \text{card } (\text{defer } m V A p) =$
1
using *def-one-m*
unfolding *defers-def*
by *metis*
hence *def-m1-not-empty*:
 $\forall A V p. (A \neq \{\} \wedge \text{finite } A \wedge \text{profile } V A p) \longrightarrow \text{defer } m V A p \neq \{\}$
using *One-nat-def Suc-leI card-eq-0-iff card-gt-0-iff zero-neq-one*
by *metis*
thus *?thesis*
proof –
have $\forall m'.$
 $(\neg \text{electing } m' \vee \text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m' \wedge$
 $(\forall A' V' p'. (A' \neq \{\} \wedge \text{finite } A' \wedge \text{profile } V' A' p') \longrightarrow \text{elect } m' V'$
 $A' p' \neq \{\})) \wedge$
 $(\text{electing } m' \vee \neg \text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m' \vee$
 $(\exists A V p. (A \neq \{\} \wedge \text{finite } A \wedge \text{profile } V A p \wedge \text{elect } m' V A p = \{\})))$
unfolding *electing-def*
by *blast*
hence $\forall m'.$
 $(\neg \text{electing } m' \vee \text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m' \wedge$
 $(\forall A' V' p'. (A' \neq \{\} \wedge \text{finite } A' \wedge \text{profile } V' A' p') \longrightarrow \text{elect } m' V'$
 $A' p' \neq \{\})) \wedge$
 $(\exists A V p. (\text{electing } m' \vee \neg \text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m' \vee A \neq$
 $\{\} \wedge$
 $\text{finite } A \wedge \text{profile } V A p \wedge \text{elect } m' V A p = \{\})))$
by *simp*
then obtain
 $A :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module} \Rightarrow 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $V :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module} \Rightarrow 'v \text{ set}$ **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module} \Rightarrow ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ **where**
f-mod:
 $\forall m'::('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}.$
 $(\neg \text{electing } m' \vee \text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m' \wedge$
 $(\forall A' V' p'. (A' \neq \{\} \wedge \text{finite } A' \wedge \text{profile } V' A' p') \longrightarrow \text{elect } m' V' A' p' \neq \{\})) \wedge$
 $(\text{electing } m' \vee \neg \text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m' \vee A m' \neq \{\} \wedge$
 $\text{finite } (A m') \wedge \text{profile } (V m') (A m') (p m') \wedge \text{elect } m' (V m') (A m') (p$
 $m') = \{\})$
by *metis*
hence *f-elect*:
 $\text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } n \wedge$
 $(\forall A V p. (A \neq \{\} \wedge \text{finite } A \wedge \text{profile } V A p) \longrightarrow \text{elect } n V A p \neq \{\})$
using *electing-n*
unfolding *electing-def*
by *metis*
have *def-card-one*:

```

    social-choice-result.electoral-module m  $\wedge$ 
    ( $\forall A V p. (1 \leq \text{card } A \wedge \text{finite } A \wedge \text{profile } V A p) \longrightarrow \text{card } (\text{defer } m V A p) = 1$ )
  using def-one-m defer-card-eq-one
  unfolding defers-def
  by blast
hence social-choice-result.electoral-module ( $m \triangleright n$ )
  using f-elect seq-comp-sound
  by metis
with f-mod f-elect def-card-one
show ?thesis
  using seq-comp-def-then-elect-elec-set def-presv-prof defer-in-alts
    def-m1-not-empty bot-eq-sup-iff finite-subset
  unfolding electing-def
  by metis
qed
qed

lemma def-lift-inv-seq-comp-help:
  fixes
    m :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
    n :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
    A :: 'a set and
    V :: 'v set and
    p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    q :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    a :: 'a
  assumes
    monotone-m: defer-lift-invariance m and
    monotone-n: defer-lift-invariance n and
    only-voters-n: only-voters-vote n and
    def-and-lifted:  $a \in (\text{defer } (m \triangleright n) V A p) \wedge \text{lifted } V A p q a$ 
  shows  $(m \triangleright n) V A p = (m \triangleright n) V A q$ 
proof -
  let ?new-Ap = defer m V A p
  let ?new-Aq = defer m V A q
  let ?new-p = limit-profile ?new-Ap p
  let ?new-q = limit-profile ?new-Aq q
  from monotone-m monotone-n
  have modules: social-choice-result.electoral-module m
     $\wedge$  social-choice-result.electoral-module n
  unfolding defer-lift-invariance-def
  by simp
hence profile V A p  $\longrightarrow$  defer ( $m \triangleright n$ ) V A p  $\subseteq$  defer m V A p
  using seq-comp-def-set-bounded
  by metis
moreover have profile-p: lifted V A p q a  $\longrightarrow$  finite-profile V A p
  unfolding lifted-def
  by simp

```

```

ultimately have defer-subset: defer (m ▷ n) V A p ⊆ defer m V A p
  using def-and-lifted
  by blast
hence mono-m: m V A p = m V A q
  using monotone-m def-and-lifted modules profile-p
    seq-comp-def-set-trans
  unfolding defer-lift-invariance-def
  by metis
hence new-A-eq: ?new-Ap = ?new-Aq
  by presburger
have defer-eq: defer (m ▷ n) V A p = defer n V ?new-Ap ?new-p
  using snd-conv
  unfolding sequential-composition.simps
  by metis
have mono-n: n V ?new-Ap ?new-p = n V ?new-Aq ?new-q
proof (cases)
  assume lifted V ?new-Ap ?new-p ?new-q a
  thus ?thesis
    using defer-eq mono-m monotone-n def-and-lifted
    unfolding defer-lift-invariance-def
    by (metis (no-types, lifting))
next
  assume unlifted-a: ¬lifted V ?new-Ap ?new-p ?new-q a
  from def-and-lifted
  have finite-profile V A q
    unfolding lifted-def
    by simp
  with modules new-A-eq
  have prof-p: profile V ?new-Ap ?new-q
    using def-presv-prof
    by (metis (no-types))
  moreover from modules profile-p def-and-lifted
  have prof-q: profile V ?new-Ap ?new-p
    using def-presv-prof
    by (metis (no-types))
  moreover from defer-subset def-and-lifted
  have a ∈ ?new-Ap
    by blast
  ultimately have lifted-stmt:
    (∃ v ∈ V.
      Preference-Relation.lifted ?new-Ap (?new-p v) (?new-q v) a) ⟶
    (∃ v ∈ V.
      ¬ Preference-Relation.lifted ?new-Ap (?new-p v) (?new-q v) a ∧
      (?new-p v) ≠ (?new-q v))
    using unlifted-a def-and-lifted defer-in-alts infinite-super modules profile-p
    unfolding lifted-def
    by metis
  from def-and-lifted modules
  have ∀ v ∈ V. (Preference-Relation.lifted A (p v) (q v) a) ∨ (p v) = (q v)

```

```

    unfolding Profile.lifted-def
  by metis
with def-and-lifted modules mono-m
have  $\forall v \in V.$ 
  (Preference-Relation.lifted ?new-Ap (?new-p v) (?new-q v) a  $\vee$ 
   (?new-p v) = (?new-q v))
  using limit-lifted-imp-eq-or-lifted defer-in-alts
  unfolding Profile.lifted-def limit-profile.simps
  by (metis (no-types, lifting))
with lifted-stmt
have  $\forall v \in V. (\text{?new-p } v) = (\text{?new-q } v)$ 
  by blast
with mono-m
show ?thesis
  using leI not-less-zero nth-equalityI only-voters-n
  unfolding only-voters-vote-def
  by presburger
qed
from mono-m mono-n
show ?thesis
  unfolding sequential-composition.simps
  by (metis (full-types))
qed

```

Sequential composition preserves the property defer-lift-invariance.

```

theorem seq-comp-presv-def-lift-inv[simp]:
  fixes
    m :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
    n :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module
  assumes
    defer-lift-invariance m and
    defer-lift-invariance n and
    only-voters-vote n
  shows defer-lift-invariance (m  $\triangleright$  n)
proof (unfold defer-lift-invariance-def, safe)
  show social-choice-result.electoral-module (m  $\triangleright$  n)
    using assms seq-comp-sound
    unfolding defer-lift-invariance-def
    by blast
next
fix
  A :: 'a set and
  V :: 'v set and
  p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
  q :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
  a :: 'a
assume
  a  $\in$  defer (m  $\triangleright$  n) V A p and
  Profile.lifted V A p q a

```



```

thus  $(m \triangleright n) \ V \ A \ p = (m \triangleright n) \ V \ A \ q$ 
  unfolding defer-lift-invariance-def
  using assms def-lift-inv-seq-comp-help
  by metis
qed

```

Composing a non-blocking, non-electing electoral module in sequence with an electoral module that defers exactly one alternative results in an electoral module that defers exactly one alternative.

```

theorem seq-comp-def-one[simp]:
  fixes
     $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$  and
     $n :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ 
  assumes
    non-blocking-m: non-blocking m and
    non-electing-m: non-electing m and
    def-one-n: defers 1 n
  shows defers 1 (m  $\triangleright$  n)
proof (unfold defers-def, safe)
  have social-choice-result.electoral-module m
    using non-electing-m
    unfolding non-electing-def
    by simp
  moreover have social-choice-result.electoral-module n
    using def-one-n
    unfolding defers-def
    by simp
  ultimately show social-choice-result.electoral-module (m  $\triangleright$  n)
    by simp
next
  fix
     $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $V :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
     $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ 
  assume
    pos-card: 1  $\leq$  card A and
    fin-A: finite A and
    prof-A: profile V A p
  from pos-card
  have  $A \neq \{\}$ 
    by auto
  with fin-A prof-A
  have reject m V A p  $\neq$  A
    using non-blocking-m
    unfolding non-blocking-def
    by simp
  hence  $\exists a. a \in A \wedge a \notin \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p$ 
    using non-electing-m reject-in-alts fin-A prof-A
    card-seteq infinite-super subsetI upper-card-bound-for-reject

```

```

    unfolding non-electing-def
  by metis
hence defer m V A p ≠ {}
  using electoral-mod-defer-elem empty-iff non-electing-m fin-A prof-A
  unfolding non-electing-def
  by (metis (no-types))
hence card (defer m V A p) ≥ 1
  using Suc-leI card-gt-0-iff fin-A prof-A
    non-blocking-m defer-in-alts infinite-super
  unfolding One-nat-def non-blocking-def
  by metis
moreover have
  ∀ i m'. defers i m' =
    (social-choice-result.electoral-module m' ∧
     (∀ A' V' p'. (i ≤ card A' ∧ finite A' ∧ profile V' A' p') ⟶
      card (defer m' V' A' p') = i))
  unfolding defers-def
  by simp
ultimately have
  card (defer n V (defer m V A p) (limit-profile (defer m V A p) p)) = 1
  using def-one-n fin-A prof-A non-blocking-m def-presv-prof
    card.infinite not-one-le-zero
  unfolding non-blocking-def
  by metis
moreover have
  defer (m ▷ n) V A p = defer n V (defer m V A p) (limit-profile (defer m V A
p) p)
  using seq-comp-defers-def-set
  by (metis (no-types, opaque-lifting))
ultimately show card (defer (m ▷ n) V A p) = 1
  by simp
qed

```

Composing a defer-lift invariant and a non-electing electoral module that defers exactly one alternative in sequence with an electing electoral module results in a monotone electoral module.

```

theorem disj-compat-seq[simp]:
  fixes
    m :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
    m' :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
    n :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module
  assumes
    compatible: disjoint-compatibility m n and
    module-m': social-choice-result.electoral-module m' and
    only-voters: only-voters-vote m'
  shows disjoint-compatibility (m ▷ m') n
proof (unfold disjoint-compatibility-def, safe)
  show social-choice-result.electoral-module (m ▷ m')
    using compatible module-m' seq-comp-sound

```

```

    unfolding disjoint-compatibility-def
    by metis
next
  show social-choice-result.electoral-module n
    using compatible
    unfolding disjoint-compatibility-def
    by metis
next
  fix
    S :: 'a set and
    V :: 'v set
  have modules:
    social-choice-result.electoral-module (m ▷ m') ∧ social-choice-result.electoral-module
n
    using compatible module-m' seq-comp-sound
    unfolding disjoint-compatibility-def
    by metis
  obtain A where rej-A:
    A ⊆ S ∧
    (∀ a ∈ A.
      indep-of-alt m V S a ∧ (∀ p. profile V S p ⟶ a ∈ reject m V S p)) ∧
    (∀ a ∈ S - A.
      indep-of-alt n V S a ∧ (∀ p. profile V S p ⟶ a ∈ reject n V S p))
  using compatible
  unfolding disjoint-compatibility-def
  by (metis (no-types, lifting))
show
  ∃ A ⊆ S.
    (∀ a ∈ A. indep-of-alt (m ▷ m') V S a ∧
      (∀ p. profile V S p ⟶ a ∈ reject (m ▷ m') V S p)) ∧
    (∀ a ∈ S - A.
      indep-of-alt n V S a ∧ (∀ p. profile V S p ⟶ a ∈ reject n V S p))
proof
  have ∀ a p q. a ∈ A ∧ equiv-prof-except-a V S p q a ⟶
    (m ▷ m') V S p = (m ▷ m') V S q
  proof (safe)
    fix
      a :: 'a and
      p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
      q :: ('a, 'v) Profile
    assume
      a-in-A: a ∈ A and
      lifting-equiv-p-q: equiv-prof-except-a V S p q a
    hence eq-def: defer m V S p = defer m V S q
    using rej-A
    unfolding indep-of-alt-def
    by metis
  from lifting-equiv-p-q
  have profiles: profile V S p ∧ profile V S q

```

unfolding *equiv-prof-except-a-def*
by *simp*
hence $(\text{defer } m \ V \ S \ p) \subseteq S$
using *compatible defer-in-alts*
unfolding *disjoint-compatibility-def*
by *metis*
moreover have $a \notin \text{defer } m \ V \ S \ q$
using *a-in-A compatible defer-not-elec-or-rej[of m V A p]*
profiles rej-A IntI emptyE result-disj
unfolding *disjoint-compatibility-def*
by *metis*
ultimately have
 $\forall v \in V. \text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ S \ p) \ p \ v = \text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ S \ q) \ q$
using *lifting-equiv-p-q negl-diff-imp-eq-limit-prof[of V S p q a defer m V S q]*
unfolding *eq-def limit-profile.simps*
by *blast*
with *eq-def*
have $m' \ V \ (\text{defer } m \ V \ S \ p) \ (\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ S \ p) \ p) =$
 $m' \ V \ (\text{defer } m \ V \ S \ q) \ (\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ S \ q) \ q)$
using *only-voters*
unfolding *only-voters-vote-def*
by *simp*
moreover have $m \ V \ S \ p = m \ V \ S \ q$
using *rej-A a-in-A lifting-equiv-p-q*
unfolding *indep-of-alt-def*
by *metis*
ultimately show $(m \triangleright m') \ V \ S \ p = (m \triangleright m') \ V \ S \ q$
unfolding *sequential-composition.simps*
by *(metis (full-types))*
qed
moreover have $\forall a' \in A. \forall p'. \text{profile } V \ S \ p' \longrightarrow a' \in \text{reject } (m \triangleright m') \ V \ S \ p'$
using *rej-A UnI1 prod.sel*
unfolding *sequential-composition.simps*
by *metis*
ultimately show $A \subseteq S \wedge$
 $(\forall a' \in A. \text{indep-of-alt } (m \triangleright m') \ V \ S \ a' \wedge$
 $(\forall p'. \text{profile } V \ S \ p' \longrightarrow a' \in \text{reject } (m \triangleright m') \ V \ S \ p')) \wedge$
 $(\forall a' \in S - A. \text{indep-of-alt } n \ V \ S \ a' \wedge$
 $(\forall p'. \text{profile } V \ S \ p' \longrightarrow a' \in \text{reject } n \ V \ S \ p'))$
using *rej-A indep-of-alt-def modules*
by *(metis (no-types, lifting))*
qed
qed
theorem *seq-comp-cond-compat[simp]:*
fixes
 $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{Electoral-Module}$ **and**

```

  n :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module
assumes
  dcc-m: defer-condorcet-consistency m and
  nb-n: non-blocking n and
  ne-n: non-electing n
shows condorcet-compatibility (m ▷ n)
proof (unfold condorcet-compatibility-def, safe)
have social-choice-result.electoral-module m
  using dcc-m
  unfolding defer-condorcet-consistency-def
  by presburger
moreover have social-choice-result.electoral-module n
  using nb-n
  unfolding non-blocking-def
  by presburger
ultimately have social-choice-result.electoral-module (m ▷ n)
  by simp
thus social-choice-result.electoral-module (m ▷ n)
  by presburger
next
fix
  A :: 'a set and
  V :: 'v set and
  p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
  a :: 'a
assume
  cw-a: condorcet-winner V A p a and
  a-in-rej-seq-m-n: a ∈ reject (m ▷ n) V A p
hence ∃ a'. defer-condorcet-consistency m ∧ condorcet-winner V A p a'
  using dcc-m
  by blast
hence m V A p = ({}, A - (defer m V A p), {a})
  using defer-condorcet-consistency-def cw-a cond-winner-unique
  by (metis (no-types, lifting))
have sound-m: social-choice-result.electoral-module m
  using dcc-m
  unfolding defer-condorcet-consistency-def
  by presburger
moreover have social-choice-result.electoral-module n
  using nb-n
  unfolding non-blocking-def
  by presburger
ultimately have sound-seq-m-n: social-choice-result.electoral-module (m ▷ n)
  by simp
have def-m: defer m V A p = {a}
  using cw-a cond-winner-unique dcc-m snd-conv
  unfolding defer-condorcet-consistency-def
  by (metis (mono-tags, lifting))
have rej-m: reject m V A p = A - {a}

```

using *cw-a cond-winner-unique dcc-m prod.sel(1) snd-conv*
unfolding *defer-condorcet-consistency-def*
by (*metis (mono-tags, lifting)*)
have *elect m V A p = {}*
using *cw-a def-m rej-m dcc-m prod.sel(1)*
unfolding *defer-condorcet-consistency-def*
by (*metis (mono-tags, lifting)*)
hence *diff-elect-m: A - elect m V A p = A*
using *Diff-empty*
by (*metis (full-types)*)
have *cond-win:*
finite A ∧ finite V ∧ profile V A p ∧ a ∈ A ∧ (∀ a'. a' ∈ A - {a'} → wins
V a p a')
using *cw-a condorcet-winner.simps DiffD2 singletonI*
by (*metis (no-types)*)
have $\forall a' A'. (a'::'a) \in A' \longrightarrow \text{insert } a' (A' - \{a'\}) = A'$
by *blast*
have *nb-n-full:*
social-choice-result.electoral-module n ∧
(∀ A' V' p'. A' ≠ {} ∧ finite A' ∧ finite V' ∧ profile V' A' p' → reject n
V' A' p' ≠ A')
using *nb-n non-blocking-def*
by *metis*
have *def-seq-diff: defer (m ▷ n) V A p = A - elect (m ▷ n) V A p - reject (m*
▷ n) V A p
using *defer-not-elec-or-rej cond-win sound-seq-m-n*
by *metis*
have *set-ins: ∀ a' A'. (a'::'a) ∈ A' → insert a' (A' - {a'}) = A'*
by *fastforce*
have $\forall p' A' p''. p' = (A'::'a \text{ set}, p''::'a \text{ set} \times 'a \text{ set}) \longrightarrow \text{snd } p' = p''$
by *simp*
hence *snd (elect m V A p ∪ elect n V (defer m V A p) (limit-profile (defer m V*
A p) p),
reject m V A p ∪ reject n V (defer m V A p) (limit-profile (defer m V A
p) p),
defer n V (defer m V A p) (limit-profile (defer m V A p) p)) =
(reject m V A p ∪ reject n V (defer m V A p) (limit-profile (defer m V
A p) p),
defer n V (defer m V A p) (limit-profile (defer m V A p) p))
by *blast*
hence *seq-snd-simplified:*
snd ((m ▷ n) V A p) =
(reject m V A p ∪ reject n V (defer m V A p) (limit-profile (defer m V A p)
p),
defer n V (defer m V A p) (limit-profile (defer m V A p) p))
using *sequential-composition.simps*
by *metis*
hence *seq-rej-union-eq-rej:*
reject m V A p ∪ reject n V (defer m V A p) (limit-profile (defer m V A p) p)

```

=
  reject (m ▷ n) V A p
  by simp
  hence seq-rej-union-subset-A:
    reject m V A p ∪ reject n V (defer m V A p) (limit-profile (defer m V A p) p)
  ⊆ A
  using sound-seq-m-n cond-win reject-in-alts
  by (metis (no-types))
  hence A - {a} = reject (m ▷ n) V A p - {a}
  using seq-rej-union-eq-rej defer-not-elec-or-rej cond-win def-m diff-elect-m
    double-diff rej-m sound-m sup-ge1
  by (metis (no-types))
  hence reject (m ▷ n) V A p ⊆ A - {a}
  using seq-rej-union-subset-A seq-snd-simplified set-ins def-seq-diff nb-n-full
    cond-win fst-conv Diff-empty Diff-eq-empty-iff a-in-rej-seq-m-n def-m
    def-presv-prof sound-m ne-n diff-elect-m insert-not-empty defer-in-alts
    reject-not-elec-or-def seq-comp-def-then-elect-elec-set finite-subset
    seq-comp-defers-def-set sup-bot.left-neutral
  unfolding non-electing-def
  by (metis (no-types, lifting))
  thus False
  using a-in-rej-seq-m-n
  by blast
next
fix
  A :: 'a set and
  V :: 'v set and
  p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
  a :: 'a and
  a' :: 'a
  assume
    cw-a: condorcet-winner V A p a and
    not-cw-a': ¬ condorcet-winner V A p a' and
    a'-in-elect-seq-m-n: a' ∈ elect (m ▷ n) V A p
  hence ∃ a''. defer-condorcet-consistency m ∧ condorcet-winner V A p a''
  using dcc-m
  by blast
  hence result-m: m V A p = ({}, A - (defer m V A p), {a})
  using defer-condorcet-consistency-def cw-a cond-winner-unique
  by (metis (no-types, lifting))
  have sound-m: social-choice-result.electoral-module m
  using dcc-m
  unfolding defer-condorcet-consistency-def
  by presburger
  moreover have social-choice-result.electoral-module n
  using nb-n
  unfolding non-blocking-def
  by presburger
  ultimately have sound-seq-m-n: social-choice-result.electoral-module (m ▷ n)

```

by *simp*
 have $\text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p = A - \{a\}$
 using *cw-a dcc-m prod.sel(1) snd-conv result-m*
 unfolding *defer-condorcet-consistency-def*
 by (*metis (mono-tags, lifting)*)
 hence $a' \text{-in-rej}: a' \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p$
 using *Diff-iff cw-a not-cw-a' a'-in-elect-seq-m-n condorcet-winner.elims(1)*
 elect-in-alts singleton-iff sound-seq-m-n subset-iff
 by (*metis (no-types, lifting)*)
 have $\forall \ p' \ A' \ p''. \ p' = (A'::'a \text{ set}, p''::'a \text{ set} \times 'a \text{ set}) \longrightarrow \text{snd } p' = p''$
 by *simp*
 hence *m-seq-n*:
 $\text{snd } (\text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p \cup \text{elect } n \ V \ (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ (\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p)$
 $p),$
 $\text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p \cup \text{reject } n \ V \ (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ (\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p)$
 $p),$
 $\text{defer } n \ V \ (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ (\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ p)) =$
 $(\text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p \cup \text{reject } n \ V \ (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ (\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A$
 $p) \ p),$
 $\text{defer } n \ V \ (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ (\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ p))$
 by *blast*
 have $a' \in \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p$
 using *a'-in-elect-seq-m-n condorcet-winner.simps cw-a def-presv-prof ne-n*
 seq-comp-def-then-elect-elec-set sound-m sup-bot.left-neutral
 unfolding *non-electing-def*
 by (*metis (no-types)*)
 hence *a-in-rej-union*:
 $a \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p \cup \text{reject } n \ V \ (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ (\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A$
 $p) \ p)$
 using *Diff-iff a'-in-rej condorcet-winner.simps cw-a*
 reject-not-elec-or-def sound-m
 by (*metis (no-types)*)
 have *m-seq-n-full*:
 $(m \triangleright n) \ V \ A \ p =$
 $(\text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p \cup \text{elect } n \ V \ (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ (\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ p),$
 $\text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p \cup \text{reject } n \ V \ (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ (\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p)$
 $p),$
 $\text{defer } n \ V \ (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ (\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ p))$
 unfolding *sequential-composition.simps*
 by *metis*
 have $\forall \ A' \ A''. \ (A'::'a \text{ set}) = \text{fst } (A', A''::'a \text{ set})$
 by *simp*
 hence $a \in \text{reject } (m \triangleright n) \ V \ A \ p$
 using *a-in-rej-union m-seq-n m-seq-n-full*
 by *presburger*
 moreover have
 $\text{finite } A \wedge \text{finite } V \wedge \text{profile } V \ A \ p \wedge a \in A \wedge (\forall \ a''. \ a'' \in A - \{a\} \longrightarrow \text{wins}$
 $V \ a \ p \ a'')$
 using *cw-a m-seq-n-full a'-in-elect-seq-m-n a'-in-rej ne-n sound-m*


```

    unfolding condorcet-winner.simps
    by metis
  ultimately show False
  using a'-in-elect-seq-m-n IntI empty-iff result-disj sound-seq-m-n a'-in-rej def-presv-prof
    fst-conv m-seq-n-full ne-n non-electing-def sound-m sup-bot.right-neutral
    by metis
next
fix
  A :: 'a set and
  V :: 'v set and
  p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
  a :: 'a and
  a' :: 'a
assume
  cw-a: condorcet-winner V A p a and
  a'-in-A: a' ∈ A and
  not-cw-a': ¬ condorcet-winner V A p a'
have reject m V A p = A - {a}
  using cw-a cond-winner-unique dcc-m prod.sel(1) snd-conv
  unfolding defer-condorcet-consistency-def
  by (metis (mono-tags, lifting))
moreover have a ≠ a'
  using cw-a not-cw-a'
  by safe
ultimately have a' ∈ reject m V A p
  using DiffI a'-in-A singletonD
  by (metis (no-types))
hence a' ∈ reject m V A p ∪ reject n V (defer m V A p) (limit-profile (defer m
V A p) p)
  by blast
moreover have
  (m ▷ n) V A p =
    (elect m V A p ∪ elect n V (defer m V A p) (limit-profile (defer m V A p) p),
    reject m V A p ∪ reject n V (defer m V A p) (limit-profile (defer m V A p)
p)),
    defer n V (defer m V A p) (limit-profile (defer m V A p) p))
  unfolding sequential-composition.simps
  by metis
moreover have
  snd (elect m V A p ∪ elect n V (defer m V A p) (limit-profile (defer m V A p)
p)),
    reject m V A p ∪ reject n V (defer m V A p) (limit-profile (defer m V A p)
p)),
    defer n V (defer m V A p) (limit-profile (defer m V A p) p)) =
    (reject m V A p ∪ reject n V (defer m V A p) (limit-profile (defer m V A
p) p)),
    defer n V (defer m V A p) (limit-profile (defer m V A p) p))
  using snd-conv
  by metis

```

```

ultimately show  $a' \in \text{reject } (m \triangleright n) \vee A p$ 
  using fst-eqD
  by (metis (no-types))
qed

```

Composing a defer-condorcet-consistent electoral module in sequence with a non-blocking and non-electing electoral module results in a defer-condorcet-consistent module.

```

theorem seq-comp-dcc[simp]:
  fixes
     $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$  and
     $n :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ 
  assumes
    dcc-m: defer-condorcet-consistency m and
    nb-n: non-blocking n and
    ne-n: non-electing n
  shows defer-condorcet-consistency (m  $\triangleright$  n)
proof (unfold defer-condorcet-consistency-def, safe)
  have social-choice-result.electoral-module m
    using dcc-m
    unfolding defer-condorcet-consistency-def
    by metis
  thus social-choice-result.electoral-module (m  $\triangleright$  n)
    using ne-n
    unfolding non-electing-def
    by simp
next
  fix
     $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $V :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
     $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$  and
     $a :: 'a$ 
  assume cw-a: condorcet-winner V A p a
  hence  $\exists a'. \text{defer-condorcet-consistency } m \wedge \text{condorcet-winner } V A p a'$ 
    using dcc-m
    by blast
  hence result-m:  $m \vee A p = (\{\}, A - (\text{defer } m \vee A p), \{a\})$ 
    using defer-condorcet-consistency-def cw-a cond-winner-unique
    by (metis (no-types, lifting))
  hence elect-m-empty:  $\text{elect } m \vee A p = \{\}$ 
    using eq-fst-iff
    by metis
  have sound-m: social-choice-result.electoral-module m
    using dcc-m
    unfolding defer-condorcet-consistency-def
    by metis
  hence sound-seq-m-n: social-choice-result.electoral-module (m  $\triangleright$  n)
    using ne-n
    unfolding non-electing-def

```

```

  by simp
have defer-eq-a: defer (m ▷ n) V A p = {a}
proof (safe)
  fix a' :: 'a
  assume a'-in-def-seq-m-n: a' ∈ defer (m ▷ n) V A p
  have {a} = {a ∈ A. condorcet-winner V A p a}
    using cond-winner-unique cw-a
  by metis
moreover have defer-condorcet-consistency m ⟶
  m V A p = ({}, A - defer m V A p, {a ∈ A. condorcet-winner V A p a})
  using cw-a defer-condorcet-consistency-def
  by (metis (no-types))
ultimately have defer m V A p = {a}
  using dcc-m snd-conv
  by (metis (no-types, lifting))
hence defer (m ▷ n) V A p = {a}
  using cw-a a'-in-def-seq-m-n condorcet-winner.elims(2) empty-iff
    seq-comp-def-set-bounded sound-m subset-singletonD nb-n
  unfolding non-blocking-def
  by metis
thus a' = a
  using a'-in-def-seq-m-n
  by blast
next
have ∃ a'. defer-condorcet-consistency m ∧ condorcet-winner V A p a'
  using cw-a dcc-m
  by blast
hence m V A p = ({}, A - (defer m V A p), {a})
  using defer-condorcet-consistency-def cw-a cond-winner-unique
  by (metis (no-types, lifting))
hence elect-m-empty: elect m V A p = {}
  using eq-fst-iff
  by metis
have profile V (defer m V A p) (limit-profile (defer m V A p) p)
  using condorcet-winner.simps cw-a def-presv-prof sound-m
  by (metis (no-types))
hence elect n V (defer m V A p) (limit-profile (defer m V A p) p) = {}
  using ne-n non-electing-def
  by metis
hence elect (m ▷ n) V A p = {}
  using elect-m-empty seq-comp-def-then-elect-elec-set sup-bot.right-neutral
  by (metis (no-types))
moreover have condorcet-compatibility (m ▷ n)
  using dcc-m nb-n ne-n
  by simp
hence a ∉ reject (m ▷ n) V A p
  unfolding condorcet-compatibility-def
  using cw-a
  by metis

```

```

ultimately show  $a \in \text{defer } (m \triangleright n) \ V \ A \ p$ 
  using cw-a electoral-mod-defer-elem empty-iff
        sound-seq-m-n condorcet-winner.simps
  by metis
qed
have profile  $V \ (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ (\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ p)$ 
  using condorcet-winner.simps cw-a def-presv-prof sound-m
  by (metis (no-types))
hence elect  $n \ V \ (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ (\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ p) = \{\}$ 
  using ne-n
  unfolding non-electing-def
  by metis
hence elect  $(m \triangleright n) \ V \ A \ p = \{\}$ 
  using elect-m-empty seq-comp-def-then-elect-elec-set sup-bot.right-neutral
  by (metis (no-types))
moreover have def-seq-m-n-eq-a:  $\text{defer } (m \triangleright n) \ V \ A \ p = \{a\}$ 
  using cw-a defer-eq-a
  by (metis (no-types))
ultimately have  $(m \triangleright n) \ V \ A \ p = (\{\}, A - \{a\}, \{a\})$ 
  using Diff-empty cw-a elect-rej-def-combination
        reject-not-elec-or-def sound-seq-m-n condorcet-winner.simps
  by (metis (no-types))
moreover have  $\{a' \in A. \text{condorcet-winner } V \ A \ p \ a'\} = \{a\}$ 
  using cw-a cond-winner-unique
  by metis
ultimately show  $(m \triangleright n) \ V \ A \ p$ 
  =  $(\{\}, A - \text{defer } (m \triangleright n) \ V \ A \ p, \{a' \in A. \text{condorcet-winner } V \ A \ p \ a'\})$ 
  using def-seq-m-n-eq-a
  by metis
qed

```

Composing a defer-lift invariant and a non-electing electoral module that defers exactly one alternative in sequence with an electing electoral module results in a monotone electoral module.

```

theorem seq-comp-mono[simp]:
  fixes
     $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{Electoral-Module}$  and
     $n :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{Electoral-Module}$ 
  assumes
    def-monotone-m: defer-lift-invariance  $m$  and
    non-ele-m: non-electing  $m$  and
    def-one-m: defers 1  $m$  and
    electing-n: electing  $n$ 
  shows monotonicity  $(m \triangleright n)$ 
proof (unfold monotonicity-def, safe)
  have social-choice-result.electoral-module  $m$ 
  using non-ele-m
  unfolding non-electing-def
  by simp

```

```

moreover have social-choice-result.electoral-module  $n$ 
  using electing-n
  unfolding electing-def
  by simp
ultimately show social-choice-result.electoral-module  $(m \triangleright n)$ 
  by simp
next
fix
   $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
   $V :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
   $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$  and
   $q :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$  and
   $w :: 'a$ 
assume
  elect-w-in-p:  $w \in \text{elect } (m \triangleright n) \ V \ A \ p$  and
  lifted-w: Profile.lifted  $V \ A \ p \ q \ w$ 
thus  $w \in \text{elect } (m \triangleright n) \ V \ A \ q$ 
  unfolding lifted-def
  using seq-comp-def-then-elect lifted-w assms
  unfolding defer-lift-invariance-def
  by metis
qed

```

Composing a defer-invariant-monotone electoral module in sequence before a non-electing, defer-monotone electoral module that defers exactly 1 alternative results in a defer-lift-invariant electoral module.

```

theorem def-inv-mono-imp-def-lift-inv[simp]:
  fixes
     $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$  and
     $n :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ 
  assumes
    strong-def-mon-m: defer-invariant-monotonicity  $m$  and
    non-electing-n: non-electing  $n$  and
    defers-one: defers  $1 \ n$  and
    defer-monotone-n: defer-monotonicity  $n$  and
    only-voters: only-voters-vote  $n$ 
  shows defer-lift-invariance  $(m \triangleright n)$ 
proof (unfold defer-lift-invariance-def, safe)
  have social-choice-result.electoral-module  $m$ 
    using strong-def-mon-m
    unfolding defer-invariant-monotonicity-def
    by metis
  moreover have social-choice-result.electoral-module  $n$ 
    using defers-one
    unfolding defers-def
    by metis
  ultimately show social-choice-result.electoral-module  $(m \triangleright n)$ 
    by simp
next

```

```

fix
   $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
   $V :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
   $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$  and
   $q :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$  and
   $a :: 'a$ 
assume
   $\text{defer-}a\text{-}p: a \in \text{defer } (m \triangleright n) \ V \ A \ p$  and
   $\text{lifted-}a: \text{Profile.lifted } V \ A \ p \ q \ a$ 
have  $\text{non-electing-}m: \text{non-electing } m$ 
using  $\text{strong-def-mon-}m$ 
unfolding  $\text{defer-invariant-monotonicity-def}$ 
by  $\text{simp}$ 
have  $\text{electoral-mod-}m: \text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m$ 
using  $\text{strong-def-mon-}m$ 
unfolding  $\text{defer-invariant-monotonicity-def}$ 
by  $\text{metis}$ 
have  $\text{electoral-mod-}n: \text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } n$ 
using  $\text{defers-one}$ 
unfolding  $\text{defers-def}$ 
by  $\text{metis}$ 
have  $\text{finite-profile-}p: \text{finite-profile } V \ A \ p$ 
using  $\text{lifted-}a$ 
unfolding  $\text{Profile.lifted-def}$ 
by  $\text{simp}$ 
have  $\text{finite-profile-}q: \text{finite-profile } V \ A \ q$ 
using  $\text{lifted-}a$ 
unfolding  $\text{Profile.lifted-def}$ 
by  $\text{simp}$ 
have  $1 \leq \text{card } A$ 
using  $\text{Profile.lifted-def card-eq-0-iff emptyE less-one lifted-}a \text{ linorder-le-less-linear}$ 
by  $\text{metis}$ 
hence  $n\text{-defers-exactly-one-}p: \text{card } (\text{defer } n \ V \ A \ p) = 1$ 
using  $\text{finite-profile-}p \ \text{defers-one}$ 
unfolding  $\text{defers-def}$ 
by  $(\text{metis } (\text{no-types}))$ 
have  $\text{fin-prof-def-}m\text{-}q: \text{profile } V \ (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ q) \ (\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ q)$ 
 $q)$ 
using  $\text{def-presv-prof electoral-mod-}m \ \text{finite-profile-}q$ 
by  $(\text{metis } (\text{no-types}))$ 
have  $\text{def-seq-}m\text{-}n\text{-}q:$ 
 $\text{defer } (m \triangleright n) \ V \ A \ q = \text{defer } n \ V \ (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ q) \ (\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A$ 
 $q) \ q)$ 
using  $\text{seq-comp-defers-def-set}$ 
by  $\text{simp}$ 
have  $\text{prof-def-}m: \text{profile } V \ (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ (\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ p)$ 
using  $\text{def-presv-prof electoral-mod-}m \ \text{finite-profile-}p$ 
by  $(\text{metis } (\text{no-types}))$ 
hence  $\text{prof-seq-comp-}m\text{-}n:$ 

```

```

    profile V (defer n V (defer m V A p) (limit-profile (defer m V A p) p))
      (limit-profile (defer n V (defer m V A p) (limit-profile (defer m V A p) p))
        (limit-profile (defer m V A p) p))
    using def-presv-prof electoral-mod-n
    by (metis (no-types))
    have a-non-empty:  $a \notin \{\}$ 
    by simp
    have def-seq-m-n:
      defer (m  $\triangleright$  n) V A p = defer n V (defer m V A p) (limit-profile (defer m V A
p) p)
    using seq-comp-defers-def-set
    by simp
    have 1  $\leq$  card (defer n V (defer m V A p) (limit-profile (defer m V A p) p))
    using a-non-empty card-gt-0-iff defer-a-p electoral-mod-n prof-def-m
      seq-comp-defers-def-set One-nat-def Suc-leI defer-in-alts
      electoral-mod-m finite-profile-p finite-subset
    by (metis (mono-tags))
    hence card (defer n V (defer n V (defer m V A p) (limit-profile (defer m V A
p) p))
      (limit-profile (defer n V (defer m V A p) (limit-profile (defer m V A p) p))
        (limit-profile (defer m V A p) p))) = 1
    using n-defers-exactly-one-p prof-seq-comp-m-n defers-one defer-in-alts
      electoral-mod-m finite-profile-p finite-subset prof-def-m
    unfolding defers-def
    by metis
    hence defer-seq-m-n-eq-one: card (defer (m  $\triangleright$  n) V A p) = 1
    using One-nat-def Suc-leI a-non-empty card-gt-0-iff def-seq-m-n defer-a-p
      defers-one electoral-mod-m prof-def-m finite-profile-p
      seq-comp-def-set-trans defer-in-alts rev-finite-subset
    unfolding defers-def
    by metis
    hence def-seq-m-n-eq-a: defer (m  $\triangleright$  n) V A p = {a}
    using defer-a-p is-singleton-altdef is-singleton-the-elem singletonD
    by (metis (no-types))
    show (m  $\triangleright$  n) V A p = (m  $\triangleright$  n) V A q
    proof (cases)
      assume defer m V A q  $\neq$  defer m V A p
      hence defer m V A q = {a}
      using defer-a-p electoral-mod-n finite-profile-p lifted-a seq-comp-def-set-trans
        strong-def-mon-m
      unfolding defer-invariant-monotonicity-def
      by (metis (no-types))
    moreover from this
    have (a  $\in$  defer m V A p)  $\longrightarrow$  card (defer (m  $\triangleright$  n) V A q) = 1
    using card-eq-0-iff card-insert-disjoint defers-one electoral-mod-m empty-iff
      order-refl finite.emptyI seq-comp-defers-def-set def-presv-prof
      finite-profile-q finite.insertI
    unfolding One-nat-def defers-def
    by metis

```

moreover have $a \in \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p$
using *electoral-mod-m electoral-mod-n defer-a-p seq-comp-def-set-bounded*
finite-profile-p finite-profile-q
by *blast*
ultimately have $\text{defer } (m \triangleright n) \ V \ A \ q = \{a\}$
using *Collect-mem-eq card-1-singletonE empty-Collect-eq insertCI subset-singletonD*
def-seq-m-n-q defer-in-alts electoral-mod-n fin-prof-def-m-q
by *(metis (no-types, lifting))*
hence $\text{defer } (m \triangleright n) \ V \ A \ p = \text{defer } (m \triangleright n) \ V \ A \ q$
using *def-seq-m-n-eq-a*
by *presburger*
moreover have $\text{elect } (m \triangleright n) \ V \ A \ p = \text{elect } (m \triangleright n) \ V \ A \ q$
using *prof-def-m fin-prof-def-m-q finite-profile-p finite-profile-q non-electing-def*
non-electing-m non-electing-n seq-comp-def-then-elect-elec-set
by *metis*
ultimately show *?thesis*
using *electoral-mod-m electoral-mod-n eq-def-and-elect-imp-eq*
finite-profile-p finite-profile-q seq-comp-sound
by *(metis (no-types))*
next
assume $\neg (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ q \neq \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p)$
hence *def-eq: defer m V A q = defer m V A p*
by *presburger*
have $\text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p = \{\}$
using *finite-profile-p non-electing-m*
unfolding *non-electing-def*
by *simp*
moreover have $\text{elect } m \ V \ A \ q = \{\}$
using *finite-profile-q non-electing-m*
unfolding *non-electing-def*
by *simp*
ultimately have *elect-m-equal: elect m V A p = elect m V A q*
by *simp*
have $(\forall v \in V. (\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ p) \ v = (\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ q) \ v)$
 $\vee \text{lifted } V \ (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ q) \ (\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ p)$
 $(\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ q) \ a$
using *def-eq defer-in-alts electoral-mod-m lifted-a finite-profile-q*
limit-prof-eq-or-lifted
by *metis*
moreover have
 $(\forall v \in V. (\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ p) \ v = (\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ q) \ v)$
 $\implies n \ V \ (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ (\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ p)$
 $= n \ V \ (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ q) \ (\text{limit-profile } (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ q) \ q)$
using *only-voters def-eq*
unfolding *only-voters-vote-def*
by *presburger*
moreover have

$\text{lifted } V \text{ (defer } m \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } q) \text{ (limit-profile (defer } m \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } p) \text{ } p)$
 $\quad \text{(limit-profile (defer } m \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } p) \text{ } q) \text{ } a$
 $\implies \text{defer } n \text{ } V \text{ (defer } m \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } p) \text{ (limit-profile (defer } m \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } p) \text{ } p)$
 $\quad = \text{defer } n \text{ } V \text{ (defer } m \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } q) \text{ (limit-profile (defer } m \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } q) \text{ } q)$

proof –

assume *lifted*:

$\text{Profile.lifted } V \text{ (defer } m \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } q) \text{ (limit-profile (defer } m \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } p) \text{ } p)$
 $\quad \text{(limit-profile (defer } m \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } p) \text{ } q) \text{ } a$

hence $a \in \text{defer } n \text{ } V \text{ (defer } m \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } q) \text{ (limit-profile (defer } m \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } q) \text{ } q)$

using *lifted-a def-seq-m-n defer-a-p defer-monotone-n*
fin-prof-def-m-q def-eq

unfolding *defer-monotonicity-def*

by *metis*

hence $a \in \text{defer } (m \triangleright n) \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } q$

using *def-seq-m-n-q*

by *simp*

moreover have $\text{card (defer } (m \triangleright n) \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } q) = 1$

using *def-seq-m-n-q defers-one def-eq defer-seq-m-n-eq-one defers-def lifted*
electoral-mod-m fin-prof-def-m-q finite-profile-p seq-comp-def-card-bounded
Profile.lifted-def

by *metis*

ultimately have $\text{defer } (m \triangleright n) \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } q = \{a\}$

using *a-non-empty card-1-singletonE insertE*

by *metis*

thus $\text{defer } n \text{ } V \text{ (defer } m \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } p) \text{ (limit-profile (defer } m \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } p) \text{ } p)$
 $\quad = \text{defer } n \text{ } V \text{ (defer } m \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } q) \text{ (limit-profile (defer } m \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } q) \text{ } q)$

using *def-seq-m-n-eq-a def-seq-m-n-q def-seq-m-n*

by *presburger*

qed

ultimately have $\text{defer } (m \triangleright n) \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } p = \text{defer } (m \triangleright n) \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } q$

using *def-seq-m-n def-seq-m-n-q*

by *presburger*

hence $\text{defer } (m \triangleright n) \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } p = \text{defer } (m \triangleright n) \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } q$

using *a-non-empty def-eq def-seq-m-n def-seq-m-n-q*
defer-a-p defer-monotone-n finite-profile-p
defer-seq-m-n-eq-one defers-one electoral-mod-m
fin-prof-def-m-q

unfolding *defers-def*

by *(metis (no-types, lifting))*

moreover from this

have $\text{reject } (m \triangleright n) \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } p = \text{reject } (m \triangleright n) \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } q$

using *electoral-mod-m electoral-mod-n finite-profile-p finite-profile-q non-electing-def*
non-electing-m non-electing-n eq-def-and-elect-imp-eq seq-comp-presv-non-electing

by *(metis (no-types))*

ultimately have $\text{snd } ((m \triangleright n) \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } p) = \text{snd } ((m \triangleright n) \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } q)$

using *prod-eqI*

by *metis*

moreover have $\text{elect } (m \triangleright n) \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } p = \text{elect } (m \triangleright n) \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } q$

using *prof-def-m fin-prof-def-m-q non-electing-n finite-profile-p finite-profile-q*

```

      non-electing-def def-eq elect-m-equal fst-conv
    unfolding sequential-composition.simps
    by (metis (no-types))
  ultimately show (m ▷ n) V A p = (m ▷ n) V A q
    using prod-eqI
    by metis
qed
qed
end

```

5.4 Parallel Composition

```

theory Parallel-Composition
imports Basic-Modules/Component-Types/Aggregator
        Basic-Modules/Component-Types/Electoral-Module
begin

```

The parallel composition composes a new electoral module from two electoral modules combined with an aggregator. Therein, the two modules each make a decision and the aggregator combines them to a single (aggregated) result.

5.4.1 Definition

```

fun parallel-composition :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module ⇒
    ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module ⇒
    'a Aggregator ⇒ ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module where
    parallel-composition m n agg V A p = agg A (m V A p) (n V A p)

```

```

abbreviation parallel :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module ⇒ 'a Aggregator ⇒
    ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module ⇒ ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module
    (- ||- - [50, 1000, 51] 50) where
    m ||a n == parallel-composition m n a

```

5.4.2 Soundness

```

theorem par-comp-sound[simp]:
fixes
    m :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
    n :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
    a :: 'a Aggregator
assumes
    social-choice-result.electoral-module m and
    social-choice-result.electoral-module n and
    aggregator a

```

shows *social-choice-result.electoral-module* ($m \parallel_a n$)
proof (*unfold social-choice-result.electoral-module-def, safe*)
fix
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $V :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$
assume
 $\text{profile } V \ A \ p$
moreover have
 $\forall a'. \text{ aggregator } a' =$
 $(\forall A' e \ r \ d \ e' \ r' \ d'.$
 $(\text{well-formed-social-choice } (A'::'a \text{ set}) \ (e, r', d)$
 $\wedge \text{ well-formed-social-choice } A' \ (r, d', e'))$
 $\longrightarrow \text{ well-formed-social-choice } A' \ (a' \ A' \ (e, r', d) \ (r, d', e')))$
unfolding *aggregator-def*
by *blast*
moreover have
 $\forall m' \ V' \ A' \ p'.$
 $(\text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m' \wedge \text{ finite } (A'::'a \text{ set})$
 $\wedge \text{ finite } (V'::'v \text{ set}) \wedge \text{ profile } V' \ A' \ p') \longrightarrow \text{ well-formed-social-choice } A' \ (m'$
 $V' \ A' \ p')$
using *par-comp-result-sound*
by (*metis (no-types)*)
ultimately have $\text{well-formed-social-choice } A \ (a \ A \ (m \ V \ A \ p) \ (n \ V \ A \ p))$
using *elect-rej-def-combination assms*
by (*metis par-comp-result-sound*)
thus $\text{well-formed-social-choice } A \ ((m \parallel_a n) \ V \ A \ p)$
by *simp*
qed

5.4.3 Composition Rule

Using a conservative aggregator, the parallel composition preserves the property non-electing.

theorem *conserv-agg-presv-non-electing[simp]*:

fixes

$m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**

$n :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**

$a :: 'a \text{ Aggregator}$

assumes

non-electing-m: *non-electing* m **and**

non-electing-n: *non-electing* n **and**

conservative: *agg-conservative* a

shows *non-electing* ($m \parallel_a n$)

proof (*unfold non-electing-def, safe*)

have *social-choice-result.electoral-module* m

using *non-electing-m*

unfolding *non-electing-def*

by *simp*

```

moreover have social-choice-result.electoral-module n
  using non-electing-n
  unfolding non-electing-def
  by simp
moreover have aggregator a
  using conservative
  unfolding agg-conservative-def
  by simp
ultimately show social-choice-result.electoral-module (m  $\parallel_a$  n)
  using par-comp-sound
  by simp
next
fix
  A :: 'a set and
  V :: 'v set and
  p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
  w :: 'a
assume
  prof-A: profile V A p and
  w-wins: w  $\in$  elect (m  $\parallel_a$  n) V A p
have emod-m: social-choice-result.electoral-module m
  using non-electing-m
  unfolding non-electing-def
  by simp
have emod-n: social-choice-result.electoral-module n
  using non-electing-n
  unfolding non-electing-def
  by simp
have  $\forall$  r r' d d' e e' A' f.
  ((well-formed-social-choice (A'::'a set) (e', r', d')  $\wedge$ 
   well-formed-social-choice A' (e, r, d))  $\longrightarrow$ 
   elect-r (f A' (e', r', d') (e, r, d))  $\subseteq$  e'  $\cup$  e  $\wedge$ 
   reject-r (f A' (e', r', d') (e, r, d))  $\subseteq$  r'  $\cup$  r  $\wedge$ 
   defer-r (f A' (e', r', d') (e, r, d))  $\subseteq$  d'  $\cup$  d) =
   ((well-formed-social-choice A' (e', r', d')  $\wedge$ 
    well-formed-social-choice A' (e, r, d))  $\longrightarrow$ 
    elect-r (f A' (e', r', d') (e, r, d))  $\subseteq$  e'  $\cup$  e  $\wedge$ 
    reject-r (f A' (e', r', d') (e, r, d))  $\subseteq$  r'  $\cup$  r  $\wedge$ 
    defer-r (f A' (e', r', d') (e, r, d))  $\subseteq$  d'  $\cup$  d)
  by linarith
hence  $\forall$  a'. agg-conservative a' =
  (aggregator a'  $\wedge$ 
   ( $\forall$  A' e e' d d' r r'.
    (well-formed-social-choice (A'::'a set) (e, r, d)  $\wedge$ 
     well-formed-social-choice A' (e', r', d'))  $\longrightarrow$ 
     elect-r (a' A' (e, r, d) (e', r', d'))  $\subseteq$  e  $\cup$  e'  $\wedge$ 
     reject-r (a' A' (e, r, d) (e', r', d'))  $\subseteq$  r  $\cup$  r'  $\wedge$ 
     defer-r (a' A' (e, r, d) (e', r', d'))  $\subseteq$  d  $\cup$  d'))
  unfolding agg-conservative-def

```

```

by simp
hence aggregator a  $\wedge$ 
  ( $\forall A' e e' d d' r r'.$ 
    (well-formed-social-choice  $A' (e, r, d) \wedge$ 
      well-formed-social-choice  $A' (e', r', d')$ )  $\longrightarrow$ 
      elect-r ( $a A' (e, r, d) (e', r', d')$ )  $\subseteq e \cup e' \wedge$ 
      reject-r ( $a A' (e, r, d) (e', r', d')$ )  $\subseteq r \cup r' \wedge$ 
      defer-r ( $a A' (e, r, d) (e', r', d')$ )  $\subseteq d \cup d'$ )
  )
using conservative
by presburger
hence let  $c = (a A (m V A p) (n V A p))$  in
  (elect-r  $c \subseteq ((\text{elect } m V A p) \cup (\text{elect } n V A p))$ )
using emod-m emod-n par-comp-result-sound
  prod.collapse prof-A
by metis
hence  $w \in ((\text{elect } m V A p) \cup (\text{elect } n V A p))$ 
using w-wins
by auto
thus  $w \in \{\}$ 
using sup-bot-right prof-A
  non-electing-m non-electing-n
unfolding non-electing-def
by (metis (no-types, lifting))
qed

end

```

5.5 Loop Composition

```

theory Loop-Composition
imports Basic-Modules/Component-Types/Termination-Condition
  Basic-Modules/Defer-Module
  Sequential-Composition
begin

```

The loop composition uses the same module in sequence, combined with a termination condition, until either

- the termination condition is met or
- no new decisions are made (i.e., a fixed point is reached).

5.5.1 Definition

lemma *loop-termination-helper*:

fixes

$m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**
 $t :: 'a \text{ Termination-Condition}$ **and**
 $acc :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $V :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$

assumes

$\neg t (acc \ V \ A \ p)$ **and**
 $defer (acc \triangleright m) \ V \ A \ p \subset defer \ acc \ V \ A \ p$ **and**
 $finite (defer \ acc \ V \ A \ p)$

shows $((acc \triangleright m, m, t, V, A, p), (acc, m, t, V, A, p)) \in$
 $measure (\lambda (acc, m, t, V, A, p). card (defer \ acc \ V \ A \ p))$

using *assms psubset-card-mono*

by *simp*

This function handles the accumulator for the following loop composition function.

function *loop-comp-helper* ::

$('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module} \Rightarrow ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module} \Rightarrow$
 $'a \text{ Termination-Condition} \Rightarrow ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **where**
 $finite (defer \ acc \ V \ A \ p) \wedge (defer (acc \triangleright m) \ V \ A \ p) \subset (defer \ acc \ V \ A \ p)$
 $\longrightarrow t (acc \ V \ A \ p) \Longrightarrow$
 $loop\text{-}comp\text{-}helper \ acc \ m \ t \ V \ A \ p = acc \ V \ A \ p \mid$
 $\neg (finite (defer \ acc \ V \ A \ p) \wedge (defer (acc \triangleright m) \ V \ A \ p) \subset (defer \ acc \ V \ A \ p))$
 $\longrightarrow t (acc \ V \ A \ p) \Longrightarrow$
 $loop\text{-}comp\text{-}helper \ acc \ m \ t \ V \ A \ p = loop\text{-}comp\text{-}helper (acc \triangleright m) \ m \ t \ V \ A \ p$

proof –

fix

$P :: bool$ **and**

$accum ::$

$('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module} \times ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$
 $\times 'a \text{ Termination-Condition} \times 'v \text{ set} \times 'a \text{ set} \times ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$

have *accum-exists*: $\exists m \ n \ t \ V \ A \ p. (m, n, t, V, A, p) = accum$

using *prod-cases5*

by *metis*

assume

$\bigwedge acc \ V \ A \ p \ m \ t.$
 $finite (defer \ acc \ V \ A \ p) \wedge defer (acc \triangleright m) \ V \ A \ p \subset defer \ acc \ V \ A \ p$
 $\longrightarrow t (acc \ V \ A \ p) \Longrightarrow accum = (acc, m, t, V, A, p) \Longrightarrow P$ **and**

$\bigwedge acc \ V \ A \ p \ m \ t.$
 $\neg (finite (defer \ acc \ V \ A \ p) \wedge defer (acc \triangleright m) \ V \ A \ p \subset defer \ acc \ V \ A \ p)$
 $\longrightarrow t (acc \ V \ A \ p) \Longrightarrow accum = (acc, m, t, V, A, p) \Longrightarrow P$

thus P

using *accum-exists*

by *metis*

next

```

fix
   $t :: 'a \text{ Termination-Condition}$  and
   $acc :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$  and
   $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
   $V :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
   $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$  and
   $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$  and
   $t' :: 'a \text{ Termination-Condition}$  and
   $acc' :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$  and
   $A' :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
   $V' :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
   $p' :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$  and
   $m' :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ 
assume
   $finite (defer\ acc\ V\ A\ p) \wedge defer (acc \triangleright m)\ V\ A\ p \subset defer\ acc\ V\ A\ p$ 
     $\longrightarrow t (acc\ V\ A\ p)$  and
   $finite (defer\ acc'\ V'\ A'\ p') \wedge defer (acc' \triangleright m')\ V'\ A'\ p' \subset defer\ acc'\ V'\ A'\ p'$ 
     $\longrightarrow t' (acc'\ V'\ A'\ p')$  and
   $(acc, m, t, V, A, p) = (acc', m', t', V', A', p')$ 
thus  $acc\ V\ A\ p = acc'\ V'\ A'\ p'$ 
by fastforce
next
fix
   $t :: 'a \text{ Termination-Condition}$  and
   $acc :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$  and
   $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
   $V :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
   $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$  and
   $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$  and
   $t' :: 'a \text{ Termination-Condition}$  and
   $acc' :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$  and
   $A' :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
   $V' :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
   $p' :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$  and
   $m' :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ 
assume
   $finite (defer\ acc\ V\ A\ p) \wedge defer (acc \triangleright m)\ V\ A\ p \subset defer\ acc\ V\ A\ p$ 
     $\longrightarrow t (acc\ V\ A\ p)$  and
   $\neg (finite (defer\ acc'\ V'\ A'\ p') \wedge defer (acc' \triangleright m')\ V'\ A'\ p' \subset defer\ acc'\ V'\ A'$ 
 $p'$ 
     $\longrightarrow t' (acc'\ V'\ A'\ p'))$  and
   $(acc, m, t, V, A, p) = (acc', m', t', V', A', p')$ 
thus  $acc\ V\ A\ p = loop\text{-}comp\text{-}helper\text{-}sumC (acc' \triangleright m', m', t', V', A', p')$ 
by force
next
fix
   $t :: 'a \text{ Termination-Condition}$  and
   $acc :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$  and
   $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and

```

```

V :: 'v set and
p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
m :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
t' :: 'a Termination-Condition and
acc' :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
A' :: 'a set and
V' :: 'v set and
p' :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
m' :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module
assume
  ¬ (finite (defer acc V A p) ∧ defer (acc ▷ m) V A p ⊂ defer acc V A p
    → t (acc V A p)) and
  ¬ (finite (defer acc' V' A' p') ∧ defer (acc' ▷ m') V' A' p' ⊂ defer acc' V' A'
p'
    → t' (acc' V' A' p')) and
  (acc, m, t, V, A, p) = (acc', m', t', V', A', p')
thus loop-comp-helper-sumC (acc ▷ m, m, t, V, A, p) =
  loop-comp-helper-sumC (acc' ▷ m', m', t', V', A', p')
by force
qed
termination
proof (safe)
fix
  m :: ('b, 'a, 'b Result) Electoral-Module and
  n :: ('b, 'a, 'b Result) Electoral-Module and
  t :: 'b Termination-Condition and
  A :: 'b set and
  V :: 'a set and
  p :: ('b, 'a) Profile
have term-rel:
  ∃ R. wf R ∧
    (finite (defer m V A p) ∧ defer (m ▷ n) V A p ⊂ defer m V A p → t (m
V A p) ∨
    ((m ▷ n, n, t, V, A, p), (m, n, t, V, A, p)) ∈ R)
using loop-termination-helper wf-measure termination
by (metis (no-types))
obtain
  R :: (((('b, 'a, 'b Result) Electoral-Module × ('b, 'a, 'b Result) Electoral-Module
×
  ('b Termination-Condition) × 'a set × 'b set × ('b, 'a) Profile) ×
  ('b, 'a, 'b Result) Electoral-Module × ('b, 'a, 'b Result) Electoral-Module
×
  ('b Termination-Condition) × 'a set × 'b set × ('b, 'a) Profile) set where
wf R ∧
  (finite (defer m V A p) ∧ defer (m ▷ n) V A p ⊂ defer m V A p → t (m V
A p) ∨
  ((m ▷ n, n, t, V, A, p), m, n, t, V, A, p) ∈ R)
using term-rel
by presburger

```



```

have  $\forall R'$ .
  All (loop-comp-helper-dom ::
    ('b, 'a, 'b Result) Electoral-Module  $\times$  ('b, 'a, 'b Result) Electoral-Module
     $\times$  'b Termination-Condition  $\times$  'a set  $\times$  'b set  $\times$  ('b, 'a) Profile  $\Rightarrow$  bool)  $\vee$ 
    ( $\exists t' m' A' V' p' n'. \text{wf } R' \longrightarrow$ 
       $((m' \triangleright n', n', t', V' :: 'a \text{ set}, A' :: 'b \text{ set}, p'), m', n', t', V', A', p') \notin R' \wedge$ 
       $\text{finite } (\text{defer } m' V' A' p') \wedge \text{defer } (m' \triangleright n') V' A' p' \subset \text{defer } m' V' A' p'$ 
    )
   $\wedge$ 
     $\neg t' (m' V' A' p')$ 
  using termination
  by metis
thus loop-comp-helper-dom (m, n, t, V, A, p)
  using loop-termination-helper wf-measure
  by metis
qed

lemma loop-comp-code-helper[code]:
  fixes
    m :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
    t :: 'a Termination-Condition and
    acc :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
    A :: 'a set and
    V :: 'v set and
    p :: ('a, 'v) Profile
  shows
    loop-comp-helper acc m t V A p =
      (if (t (acc V A p)  $\vee$   $\neg ((\text{defer } (\text{acc} \triangleright m) V A p) \subset (\text{defer } \text{acc } V A p)) \vee$ 
        infinite (defer acc V A p))
        then (acc V A p) else (loop-comp-helper (acc  $\triangleright$  m) m t V A p))
  using loop-comp-helper.simps
  by (metis (no-types))

function loop-composition ::
  ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module  $\Rightarrow$  'a Termination-Condition
   $\Rightarrow$  ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module where
    t ( $\{\}, \{\}, A$ )  $\Longrightarrow$  loop-composition m t V A p = defer-module V A p |
     $\neg(t (\{\}, \{\}, A)) \Longrightarrow$  loop-composition m t V A p = (loop-comp-helper m m t) V
    A p
  by (fastforce, simp-all)
termination
  using termination wf-empty
  by blast

abbreviation loop ::
  ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module  $\Rightarrow$  'a Termination-Condition
   $\Rightarrow$  ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module
  ( $- \odot_{50}$ ) where
     $m \odot_t \equiv \text{loop-composition } m \ t$ 

```

```

lemma loop-comp-code[code]:
  fixes
     $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$  and
     $t :: 'a \text{ Termination-Condition}$  and
     $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $V :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
     $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ 
  shows loop-composition  $m \ t \ V \ A \ p =$ 
    (if ( $t \ (\{\}, \{\}, A)$ )
      then (defer-module  $V \ A \ p$ ) else (loop-comp-helper  $m \ m \ t \ V \ A \ p$ )
    )
  by simp

lemma loop-comp-helper-imp-partit:
  fixes
     $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$  and
     $t :: 'a \text{ Termination-Condition}$  and
     $acc :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$  and
     $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $V :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
     $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$  and
     $n :: \text{nat}$ 
  assumes
    module-m: social-choice-result.electoral-module  $m$  and
    profile: profile  $V \ A \ p$  and
    module-acc: social-choice-result.electoral-module  $acc$  and
    defer-card-n:  $n = \text{card} \ (\text{defer } acc \ V \ A \ p)$ 
  shows well-formed-social-choice  $A \ (\text{loop-comp-helper } acc \ m \ t \ V \ A \ p)$ 
  using assms
proof (induct arbitrary: acc rule: less-induct)
  case (less)
  have  $\forall \ m' \ n'.$ 
    (social-choice-result.electoral-module  $m' \wedge \text{social-choice-result.electoral-module}$ 
      $n'$ )
     $\longrightarrow \text{social-choice-result.electoral-module} \ (m' \triangleright n')$ 
  by auto
  hence social-choice-result.electoral-module  $(acc \triangleright m)$ 
  using less.prems module-m
  by blast
  hence  $\neg t \ (acc \ V \ A \ p) \wedge \text{defer} \ (acc \triangleright m) \ V \ A \ p \subset \text{defer } acc \ V \ A \ p \wedge$ 
    finite (defer  $acc \ V \ A \ p$ )  $\longrightarrow$ 
    well-formed-social-choice  $A \ (\text{loop-comp-helper } acc \ m \ t \ V \ A \ p)$ 
  using less.hyps less.prems loop-comp-helper.simps(2)
    psubset-card-mono
  by metis
  moreover have well-formed-social-choice  $A \ (acc \ V \ A \ p)$ 
  using less.prems profile
  unfolding social-choice-result.electoral-module-def
  by blast
  ultimately show ?case

```

using *loop-comp-code-helper*
 by (*metis* (*no-types*))
 qed

5.5.2 Soundness

theorem *loop-comp-sound*:
 fixes
 $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**
 $t :: 'a \text{ Termination-Condition}$
assumes *social-choice-result.electoral-module* m
shows *social-choice-result.electoral-module* $(m \circlearrowright_t)$
using *def-mod-sound* *loop-composition.simps*
loop-comp-helper-imp-partit *assms*
unfolding *social-choice-result.electoral-module-def*
by *metis*

lemma *loop-comp-helper-imp-no-def-incr*:
 fixes
 $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**
 $t :: 'a \text{ Termination-Condition}$ **and**
 $acc :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $V :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ **and**
 $n :: \text{nat}$
assumes
module-m: *social-choice-result.electoral-module* m **and**
profile: *profile* $V A p$ **and**
mod-acc: *social-choice-result.electoral-module* acc **and**
card-n-defer-acc: $n = \text{card } (\text{defer } acc V A p)$
shows *defer* $(\text{loop-comp-helper } acc m t) V A p \subseteq \text{defer } acc V A p$
using *assms*
proof (*induct arbitrary: acc rule: less-induct*)
case (*less*)
have *emod-acc-m*: *social-choice-result.electoral-module* $(acc \triangleright m)$
using *less.premis* *module-m* *seq-comp-sound*
by *blast*
have $\forall A A'. (\text{finite } A \wedge A' \subset A) \longrightarrow \text{card } A' < \text{card } A$
using *psubset-card-mono*
by *metis*
hence $\neg t (acc V A p) \wedge \text{defer } (acc \triangleright m) V A p \subset \text{defer } acc V A p \wedge$
 $\text{finite } (\text{defer } acc V A p) \longrightarrow$
 $\text{defer } (\text{loop-comp-helper } (acc \triangleright m) m t) V A p \subseteq \text{defer } acc V A p$
using *emod-acc-m* *less.hyps* *less.premis*
by *blast*
hence $\neg t (acc V A p) \wedge \text{defer } (acc \triangleright m) V A p \subset \text{defer } acc V A p \wedge$
 $\text{finite } (\text{defer } acc V A p) \longrightarrow$
 $\text{defer } (\text{loop-comp-helper } acc m t) V A p \subseteq \text{defer } acc V A p$

```

    using loop-comp-helper.simps(2)
  by metis
thus ?case
  using eq-iff loop-comp-code-helper
  by (metis (no-types))
qed

```

5.5.3 Lemmas

lemma *loop-comp-helper-def-lift-inv-helper:*

fixes

```

  m :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
  t :: 'a Termination-Condition and
  acc :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
  A :: 'a set and
  V :: 'v set and
  p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
  n :: nat

```

assumes

```

  monotone-m: defer-lift-invariance m and
  prof: profile V A p and
  dli-acc: defer-lift-invariance acc and
  card-n-defer: n = card (defer acc V A p) and
  defer-finite: finite (defer acc V A p) and
  only-voters-m: only-voters-vote m

```

shows

```

  ∀ q a. a ∈ (defer (loop-comp-helper acc m t) V A p) ∧ lifted V A p q a ⟶
    (loop-comp-helper acc m t) V A p = (loop-comp-helper acc m t) V A q

```

using *assms*

proof (*induct n arbitrary: acc rule: less-induct*)

case (*less n*)

have *defer-card-comp:*

```

  defer-lift-invariance acc ⟶
    (∀ q a. a ∈ (defer (acc ▷ m) V A p) ∧ lifted V A p q a ⟶
      card (defer (acc ▷ m) V A p) = card (defer (acc ▷ m) V A q))

```

using *monotone-m def-lift-inv-seq-comp-help only-voters-m*

by *metis*

have *defer-lift-invariance acc ⟶*

```

  (∀ q a. a ∈ (defer acc V A p) ∧ lifted V A p q a ⟶
    card (defer acc V A p) = card (defer acc V A q))

```

unfolding *defer-lift-invariance-def*

by *simp*

hence *defer-card-acc:*

```

  defer-lift-invariance acc ⟶
    (∀ q a. (a ∈ (defer (acc ▷ m) V A p) ∧ lifted V A p q a) ⟶
      card (defer acc V A p) = card (defer acc V A q))

```

using *assms seq-comp-def-set-trans*

unfolding *defer-lift-invariance-def*

by *metis*

```

thus ?case
proof (cases)
  assume card-unchanged: card (defer (acc ▷ m) V A p) = card (defer acc V A
p)
  have defer-lift-invariance acc  $\longrightarrow$ 
    ( $\forall$  q a. a  $\in$  (defer acc V A p)  $\wedge$  lifted V A p q a  $\longrightarrow$ 
      (loop-comp-helper acc m t) V A q = acc V A q)
  proof (safe)
    fix
      q :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
      a :: 'a
    assume
      dli-acc: defer-lift-invariance acc and
      a-in-def-acc: a  $\in$  defer acc V A p and
      lifted-A: Profile.lifted V A p q a
    moreover have social-choice-result.electoral-module m
      using monotone-m
      unfolding defer-lift-invariance-def
      by simp
    moreover have emod-acc: social-choice-result.electoral-module acc
      using dli-acc
      unfolding defer-lift-invariance-def
      by simp
    moreover have acc-eq-pq: acc V A q = acc V A p
      using a-in-def-acc dli-acc lifted-A
      unfolding defer-lift-invariance-def
      by (metis (full-types))
    ultimately have finite (defer acc V A p)
       $\longrightarrow$  loop-comp-helper acc m t V A q = acc V A q
      using card-unchanged defer-card-comp prof loop-comp-code-helper
        psubset-card-mono dual-order.strict-iff-order
        seq-comp-def-set-bounded less
      by (metis (mono-tags, lifting))
    thus loop-comp-helper acc m t V A q = acc V A q
      using acc-eq-pq loop-comp-code-helper
      by (metis (full-types))
    qed
  moreover from card-unchanged
  have (loop-comp-helper acc m t) V A p = acc V A p
    using loop-comp-code-helper order.strict-iff-order psubset-card-mono
    by metis
  ultimately have
    defer-lift-invariance (acc ▷ m)  $\wedge$  defer-lift-invariance acc  $\longrightarrow$ 
      ( $\forall$  q a. a  $\in$  (defer (loop-comp-helper acc m t) V A p)  $\wedge$  lifted V A p q a
 $\longrightarrow$ 
        (loop-comp-helper acc m t) V A p = (loop-comp-helper acc m t) V
A q)
    unfolding defer-lift-invariance-def
    by metis

```

```

moreover have defer-lift-invariance ( $acc \triangleright m$ )
  using less monotone-m seq-comp-presv-def-lift-inv
  by simp
ultimately show ?thesis
  using less monotone-m
  by metis
next
assume card-changed:  $\neg (\text{card } (\text{defer } (acc \triangleright m) \ V \ A \ p) = \text{card } (\text{defer } acc \ V \ A \ p))$ 
with prof
have card-smaller-for-p:
  social-choice-result.electoral-module  $acc \wedge \text{finite } A \longrightarrow$ 
     $\text{card } (\text{defer } (acc \triangleright m) \ V \ A \ p) < \text{card } (\text{defer } acc \ V \ A \ p)$ 
  using monotone-m order.not-eq-order-implies-strict
    card-mono less.premis seq-comp-def-set-bounded
  unfolding defer-lift-invariance-def
  by metis
with defer-card-acc defer-card-comp
have card-changed-for-q:
  defer-lift-invariance  $acc \longrightarrow$ 
     $(\forall \ q \ a. a \in (\text{defer } (acc \triangleright m) \ V \ A \ p) \wedge \text{lifted } V \ A \ p \ q \ a \longrightarrow$ 
       $\text{card } (\text{defer } (acc \triangleright m) \ V \ A \ q) < \text{card } (\text{defer } acc \ V \ A \ q))$ 
  using lifted-def less
  unfolding defer-lift-invariance-def
  by (metis (no-types, lifting))
thus ?thesis
proof (cases)
  assume t-not-satisfied-for-p:  $\neg t \ (acc \ V \ A \ p)$ 
  hence t-not-satisfied-for-q:
    defer-lift-invariance  $acc \longrightarrow$ 
       $(\forall \ q \ a. a \in (\text{defer } (acc \triangleright m) \ V \ A \ p) \wedge \text{lifted } V \ A \ p \ q \ a \longrightarrow \neg t \ (acc \ V \ A \ q))$ 
  using monotone-m prof seq-comp-def-set-trans
  unfolding defer-lift-invariance-def
  by metis
  have dli-card-def:
    defer-lift-invariance ( $acc \triangleright m$ )  $\wedge$  defer-lift-invariance  $acc \longrightarrow$ 
       $(\forall \ q \ a. a \in (\text{defer } (acc \triangleright m) \ V \ A \ p) \wedge \text{Profile.lifted } V \ A \ p \ q \ a \longrightarrow$ 
         $\text{card } (\text{defer } (acc \triangleright m) \ V \ A \ q) \neq (\text{card } (\text{defer } acc \ V \ A \ q)))$ 
  proof –
  have
     $\forall \ m'.$ 
     $(\neg \text{defer-lift-invariance } m' \wedge \text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m' \longrightarrow$ 
       $(\exists \ V' \ A' \ p' \ q' \ a.$ 
         $m' \ V' \ A' \ p' \neq m' \ V' \ A' \ q' \wedge \text{lifted } V' \ A' \ p' \ q' \ a \wedge a \in \text{defer } m' \ V' \ A' \ p')) \wedge$ 
       $(\text{defer-lift-invariance } m' \longrightarrow$ 
         $\text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m' \wedge$ 
         $(\forall \ V' \ A' \ p' \ q' \ a.$ 

```

$m' V' A' p' \neq m' V' A' q' \longrightarrow \text{lifted } V' A' p' q' a \longrightarrow a \notin \text{defer}$
 $m' V' A' p')$
unfolding *defer-lift-invariance-def*
by *blast*
thus *?thesis*
using *card-changed monotone-m prof seq-comp-def-set-trans*
by (*metis (no-types, opaque-lifting)*)
qed
hence *dli-def-subset*:
 $\text{defer-lift-invariance } (acc \triangleright m) \wedge \text{defer-lift-invariance } acc \longrightarrow$
 $(\forall p' a. a \in (\text{defer } (acc \triangleright m) V A p) \wedge \text{lifted } V A p p' a \longrightarrow$
 $\text{defer } (acc \triangleright m) V A p' \subset \text{defer } acc V A p')$
using *Profile.lifted-def dli-card-def defer-lift-invariance-def*
 $\text{monotone-m psubsetI seq-comp-def-set-bounded}$
by (*metis (no-types, opaque-lifting)*)
with *t-not-satisfied-for-p*
have *rec-step-q*:
 $\text{defer-lift-invariance } (acc \triangleright m) \wedge \text{defer-lift-invariance } acc \longrightarrow$
 $(\forall q a. a \in (\text{defer } (acc \triangleright m) V A p) \wedge \text{lifted } V A p q a \longrightarrow$
 $\text{loop-comp-helper } acc m t V A q = \text{loop-comp-helper } (acc \triangleright m) m t V$
 $A q)$
proof (*safe*)
fix
 $q :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ **and**
 $a :: 'a$
assume
 $a\text{-in-def-impl-def-subset}$:
 $\forall q' a'. a' \in \text{defer } (acc \triangleright m) V A p \wedge \text{lifted } V A p q' a' \longrightarrow$
 $\text{defer } (acc \triangleright m) V A q' \subset \text{defer } acc V A q'$ **and**
 $dli\text{-acc}$: $\text{defer-lift-invariance } acc$ **and**
 $a\text{-in-def-seq-acc-m}$: $a \in \text{defer } (acc \triangleright m) V A p$ **and**
 lifted-pq-a : $\text{lifted } V A p q a$
hence $\text{defer } (acc \triangleright m) V A q \subset \text{defer } acc V A q$
by *metis*
moreover have *social-choice-result.electoral-module acc*
using *dli-acc*
unfolding *defer-lift-invariance-def*
by *simp*
moreover have $\neg t (acc V A q)$
using *dli-acc a-in-def-seq-acc-m lifted-pq-a t-not-satisfied-for-q*
by *metis*
ultimately show $\text{loop-comp-helper } acc m t V A q$
 $= \text{loop-comp-helper } (acc \triangleright m) m t V A q$
using *loop-comp-code-helper defer-in-alts finite-subset lifted-pq-a*
unfolding *lifted-def*
by (*metis (mono-tags, lifting)*)
qed
have *rec-step-p*:
 $\text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } acc \longrightarrow$

```

    loop-comp-helper acc m t V A p = loop-comp-helper (acc ▷ m) m t V A p
proof (safe)
  assume emod-acc: social-choice-result.electoral-module acc
  have sound-imp-defer-subset:
    social-choice-result.electoral-module m  $\longrightarrow$ 
    defer (acc ▷ m) V A p  $\subseteq$  defer acc V A p
  using emod-acc prof seq-comp-def-set-bounded
  by blast
hence card-ineq: card (defer (acc ▷ m) V A p) < card (defer acc V A p)
  using card-changed card-mono less order-neq-le-trans
  unfolding defer-lift-invariance-def
  by metis
have def-limited-acc:
  profile V (defer acc V A p) (limit-profile (defer acc V A p) p)
  using def-presv-prof emod-acc prof
  by metis
have defer (acc ▷ m) V A p  $\subseteq$  defer acc V A p
  using sound-imp-defer-subset defer-lift-invariance-def monotone-m
  by blast
hence defer (acc ▷ m) V A p  $\subset$  defer acc V A p
  using def-limited-acc card-ineq card-psubset less
  by metis
with def-limited-acc
show loop-comp-helper acc m t V A p = loop-comp-helper (acc ▷ m) m t V
A p
  using loop-comp-code-helper t-not-satisfied-for-p less
  by (metis (no-types))
qed
show ?thesis
proof (safe)
  fix
    q :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    a :: 'a
  assume
    a-in-defer-lch: a  $\in$  defer (loop-comp-helper acc m t) V A p and
    a-lifted: Profile.lifted V A p q a
  have mod-acc: social-choice-result.electoral-module acc
  using less.premis
  unfolding defer-lift-invariance-def
  by simp
hence loop-comp-equiv:
    loop-comp-helper acc m t V A p = loop-comp-helper (acc ▷ m) m t V A p
  using rec-step-p
  by blast
hence a  $\in$  defer (loop-comp-helper (acc ▷ m) m t) V A p
  using a-in-defer-lch
  by presburger
moreover have l-inv: defer-lift-invariance (acc ▷ m)
  using less.premis monotone-m only-voters-m seq-comp-presv-def-lift-inv[of

```



```

acc m]
  by blast
ultimately have a ∈ defer (acc ▷ m) V A p
  using prof monotone-m in-mono loop-comp-helper-imp-no-def-incr
  unfolding defer-lift-invariance-def
  by (metis (no-types, lifting))
with l-inv loop-comp-equiv show
  loop-comp-helper acc m t V A p = loop-comp-helper acc m t V A q
proof -
  assume
    dli-acc-seq-m: defer-lift-invariance (acc ▷ m) and
    a-in-def-seq: a ∈ defer (acc ▷ m) V A p
  moreover from this have social-choice-result.electoral-module (acc ▷ m)
  unfolding defer-lift-invariance-def
  by blast
  moreover have a ∈ defer (loop-comp-helper (acc ▷ m) m t) V A p
  using loop-comp-equiv a-in-defer-lch
  by presburger
  ultimately have
    loop-comp-helper (acc ▷ m) m t V A p
    = loop-comp-helper (acc ▷ m) m t V A q
  using monotone-m mod-acc less a-lifted card-smaller-for-p
    defer-in-alts infinite-super less
  unfolding lifted-def
  by (metis (no-types))
  moreover have loop-comp-helper acc m t V A q
    = loop-comp-helper (acc ▷ m) m t V A q
  using dli-acc-seq-m a-in-def-seq less a-lifted rec-step-q
  by blast
  ultimately show ?thesis
  using loop-comp-equiv
  by presburger
qed
qed
next
  assume ¬ ¬ t (acc V A p)
  thus ?thesis
  using loop-comp-code-helper less
  unfolding defer-lift-invariance-def
  by metis
qed
qed
qed

lemma loop-comp-helper-def-lift-inv:
  fixes
    m :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
    t :: 'a Termination-Condition and
    acc :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and

```

```

    A :: 'a set and
    V :: 'v set and
    p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    q :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    a :: 'a
  assumes
    defer-lift-invariance m and
    only-voters-vote m and
    defer-lift-invariance acc and
    profile V A p and
    lifted V A p q a and
    a ∈ defer (loop-comp-helper acc m t) V A p
  shows (loop-comp-helper acc m t) V A p = (loop-comp-helper acc m t) V A q
  using assms loop-comp-helper-def-lift-inv-helper lifted-def
    defer-in-alts defer-lift-invariance-def finite-subset
  by metis

lemma lifted-imp-fin-prof:
  fixes
    A :: 'a set and
    V :: 'v set and
    p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    q :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    a :: 'a
  assumes lifted V A p q a
  shows finite-profile V A p
  using assms
  unfolding lifted-def
  by simp

lemma loop-comp-helper-presv-def-lift-inv:
  fixes
    m :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
    t :: 'a Termination-Condition and
    acc :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module
  assumes
    defer-lift-invariance m and
    only-voters-vote m and
    defer-lift-invariance acc
  shows defer-lift-invariance (loop-comp-helper acc m t)
proof (unfold defer-lift-invariance-def, safe)
  show social-choice-result.electoral-module (loop-comp-helper acc m t)
  using loop-comp-helper-imp-partit assms
  unfolding social-choice-result.electoral-module-def
    defer-lift-invariance-def
  by metis
next
fix
  A :: 'a set and

```

```

  V :: 'v set and
  p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
  q :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
  a :: 'a
assume
  a ∈ defer (loop-comp-helper acc m t) V A p and
  lifted V A p q a
thus loop-comp-helper acc m t V A p = loop-comp-helper acc m t V A q
  using lifted-imp-fin-prof loop-comp-helper-def-lift-inv assms
  by metis
qed

lemma loop-comp-presv-non-electing-helper:
  fixes
    m :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
    t :: 'a Termination-Condition and
    acc :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
    A :: 'a set and
    V :: 'v set and
    p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    n :: nat
  assumes
    non-electing-m: non-electing m and
    non-electing-acc: non-electing acc and
    prof: profile V A p and
    acc-defer-card: n = card (defer acc V A p)
  shows elect (loop-comp-helper acc m t) V A p = {}
  using acc-defer-card non-electing-acc
proof (induct n arbitrary: acc rule: less-induct)
  case (less n)
  thus ?case
proof (safe)
  fix x :: 'a
  assume
    acc-no-elect:
      (∧ i acc'. i < card (defer acc V A p) ⇒
        i = card (defer acc' V A p) ⇒ non-electing acc' ⇒
        elect (loop-comp-helper acc' m t) V A p = {}) and
    acc-non-elect: non-electing acc and
    x-in-acc-elect: x ∈ elect (loop-comp-helper acc m t) V A p
  have ∀ m' n'. non-electing m' ∧ non-electing n' ⇒ non-electing (m' ▷ n')
  by simp
  hence seq-acc-m-non-elect: non-electing (acc ▷ m)
  using acc-non-elect non-electing-m
  by blast
  have ∀ i m'.
    i < card (defer acc V A p) ∧ i = card (defer m' V A p) ∧
    non-electing m' ⇒
    elect (loop-comp-helper m' m t) V A p = {}

```

```

    using acc-no-elect
    by blast
  hence  $\forall m'$ .
    finite (defer acc V A p)  $\wedge$  defer m' V A p  $\subset$  defer acc V A p  $\wedge$ 
      non-electing m'  $\longrightarrow$ 
      elect (loop-comp-helper m' m t) V A p = {}
    using psubset-card-mono
    by metis
  hence  $\neg t$  (acc V A p)  $\wedge$  defer (acc  $\triangleright$  m) V A p  $\subset$  defer acc V A p  $\wedge$ 
    finite (defer acc V A p)  $\longrightarrow$ 
    elect (loop-comp-helper acc m t) V A p = {}
    using loop-comp-code-helper seq-acc-m-non-elect
    by (metis (no-types))
  moreover have elect acc V A p = {}
    using acc-non-elect prof non-electing-def
    by blast
  ultimately show  $x \in \{\}$ 
    using loop-comp-code-helper x-in-acc-elect
    by (metis (no-types))
qed
qed

```

lemma *loop-comp-helper-iter-elim-def-n-helper:*

```

  fixes
    m :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
    t :: 'a Termination-Condition and
    acc :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
    A :: 'a set and
    V :: 'v set and
    p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    n :: nat and
    x :: nat
  assumes
    non-electing-m: non-electing m and
    single-elimination: eliminates 1 m and
    terminate-if-n-left:  $\forall r. t r = (\text{card } (\text{defer } r) = x)$  and
    x-greater-zero:  $x > 0$  and
    prof: profile V A p and
    n-acc-defer-card:  $n = \text{card } (\text{defer acc } V A p)$  and
    n-ge-x:  $n \geq x$  and
    def-card-gt-one:  $\text{card } (\text{defer acc } V A p) > 1$  and
    acc-nonelect: non-electing acc
  shows  $\text{card } (\text{defer } (\text{loop-comp-helper acc m t}) V A p) = x$ 
  using n-ge-x def-card-gt-one acc-nonelect n-acc-defer-card
  proof (induct n arbitrary: acc rule: less-induct)
    case (less n)
    have mod-acc: social-choice-result.electoral-module acc
    using less

```

```

    unfolding non-electing-def
  by metis
hence step-reduces-defer-set: defer (acc ▷ m) V A p ⊆ defer acc V A p
  using seq-comp-elim-one-red-def-set single-elimination prof less
  by metis
thus ?case
proof (cases t (acc V A p))
  case True
  assume term-satisfied: t (acc V A p)
  thus card (defer-r (loop-comp-helper acc m t V A p)) = x
    using loop-comp-code-helper term-satisfied terminate-if-n-left
    by metis
next
  case False
  hence card-not-eq-x: card (defer acc V A p) ≠ x
    using terminate-if-n-left
    by metis
  have fin-def-acc: finite (defer acc V A p)
    using prof mod-acc less card.infinite not-one-less-zero
    by metis
  hence rec-step:
    loop-comp-helper acc m t V A p = loop-comp-helper (acc ▷ m) m t V A p
    using False step-reduces-defer-set
    by simp
  have card-too-big: card (defer acc V A p) > x
    using card-not-eq-x dual-order.order-iff-strict less
    by simp
  hence enough-leftover: card (defer acc V A p) > 1
    using x-greater-zero
    by simp
  obtain k where
    new-card-k: k = card (defer (acc ▷ m) V A p)
    by metis
  have defer acc V A p ⊆ A
    using defer-in-alts prof mod-acc
    by metis
  hence step-profile: profile V (defer acc V A p) (limit-profile (defer acc V A p)
p)
    using prof limit-profile-sound
    by metis
  hence
    card (defer m V (defer acc V A p) (limit-profile (defer acc V A p) p)) =
      card (defer acc V A p) - 1
    using enough-leftover non-electing-m
      single-elimination single-elim-decr-def-card-2
    by blast
  hence k-card: k = card (defer acc V A p) - 1
    using mod-acc prof new-card-k non-electing-m seq-comp-defers-def-set
    by metis

```

```

hence new-card-still-big-enough:  $x \leq k$ 
  using card-too-big
  by linarith
show ?thesis
proof (cases  $x < k$ )
  case True
  hence  $1 < \text{card } (\text{defer } (acc \triangleright m) \ V \ A \ p)$ 
    using new-card-k x-greater-zero
    by linarith
  moreover have  $k < n$ 
    using step-reduces-defer-set step-profile psubset-card-mono
      new-card-k less fin-def-acc
    by metis
  moreover have social-choice-result.electoral-module  $(acc \triangleright m)$ 
    using mod-acc eliminates-def seq-comp-sound single-elimination
    by metis
  moreover have non-electing  $(acc \triangleright m)$ 
    using less non-electing-m
    by simp
  ultimately have  $\text{card } (\text{defer } (\text{loop-comp-helper } (acc \triangleright m) \ m \ t) \ V \ A \ p) = x$ 
    using new-card-k new-card-still-big-enough less
    by metis
  thus ?thesis
    using rec-step
    by presburger
next
  case False
  thus ?thesis
    using dual-order.strict-iff-order new-card-k
      new-card-still-big-enough rec-step
      terminate-if-n-left
    by simp
qed
qed
qed

```

```

lemma loop-comp-helper-iter-elim-def-n:
  fixes
     $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$  and
     $t :: 'a \text{ Termination-Condition}$  and
     $acc :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$  and
     $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $V :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
     $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$  and
     $x :: \text{nat}$ 
  assumes
    non-electing m and
    eliminates 1 m and
     $\forall r. (t \ r) = (\text{card } (\text{defer-r } r) = x)$  and

```

```

     $x > 0$  and
    profile  $V A p$  and
    card (defer acc  $V A p$ )  $\geq x$  and
    non-electing acc
  shows card (defer (loop-comp-helper acc  $m t$ )  $V A p$ ) =  $x$ 
  using assms gr-implies-not0 le-neq-implies-less less-one linorder-neqE-nat nat-neq-iff
    less-le loop-comp-helper-iter-elim-def-n-helper loop-comp-code-helper
  by (metis (no-types, lifting))

lemma iter-elim-def-n-helper:
  fixes
     $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$  and
     $t :: 'a \text{ Termination-Condition}$  and
     $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $V :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
     $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$  and
     $x :: \text{nat}$ 
  assumes
    non-electing-m: non-electing  $m$  and
    single-elimination: eliminates 1  $m$  and
    terminate-if-n-left:  $\forall r. (t r) = (\text{card} (\text{defer-} r r) = x)$  and
    x-greater-zero:  $x > 0$  and
    prof: profile  $V A p$  and
    enough-alternatives: card  $A \geq x$ 
  shows card (defer ( $m \circ_t$ )  $V A p$ ) =  $x$ 
proof (cases)
  assume card  $A = x$ 
  thus ?thesis
    using terminate-if-n-left
    by simp
next
  assume card-not-x:  $\neg \text{card } A = x$ 
  thus ?thesis
  proof (cases)
    assume card  $A < x$ 
    thus ?thesis
      using enough-alternatives not-le
      by blast
  next
    assume  $\neg \text{card } A < x$ 
    hence card  $A > x$ 
    using card-not-x
    by linarith
  moreover from this
  have card (defer  $m V A p$ ) = card  $A - 1$ 
    using non-electing-m single-elimination single-elim-decr-def-card-2
    prof x-greater-zero
    by fastforce
  ultimately have card (defer  $m V A p$ )  $\geq x$ 

```

```

    by linarith
  moreover have  $(m \circlearrowleft_t) \ V \ A \ p = (\text{loop-comp-helper } m \ m \ t) \ V \ A \ p$ 
    using card-not-x terminate-if-n-left
    by simp
  ultimately show ?thesis
    using non-electing-m prof single-elimination terminate-if-n-left x-greater-zero
      loop-comp-helper-iter-elim-def-n
    by metis
qed
qed

```

5.5.4 Composition Rules

The loop composition preserves defer-lift-invariance.

```

theorem loop-comp-presv-def-lift-inv[simp]:
  fixes
     $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$  and
     $t :: 'a \text{ Termination-Condition}$ 
  assumes defer-lift-invariance  $m$  and only-voters-vote  $m$ 
  shows defer-lift-invariance  $(m \circlearrowleft_t)$ 
proof (unfold defer-lift-invariance-def, safe)
  have social-choice-result.electoral-module  $m$ 
    using assms
    unfolding defer-lift-invariance-def
    by simp
  thus social-choice-result.electoral-module  $(m \circlearrowleft_t)$ 
    by (simp add: loop-comp-sound)
next
  fix
     $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $V :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
     $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$  and
     $q :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$  and
     $a :: 'a$ 
  assume
     $a \in \text{defer } (m \circlearrowleft_t) \ V \ A \ p$  and
    lifted  $V \ A \ p \ q \ a$ 
  moreover have
     $\forall \ p' \ q' \ a'. \ a' \in (\text{defer } (m \circlearrowleft_t) \ V \ A \ p') \wedge \text{lifted } V \ A \ p' \ q' \ a' \longrightarrow$ 
       $(m \circlearrowleft_t) \ V \ A \ p' = (m \circlearrowleft_t) \ V \ A \ q'$ 
    using assms lifted-imp-fin-prof loop-comp-helper-def-lift-inv
      loop-composition.simps defer-module.simps
    by (metis (full-types))
  ultimately show  $(m \circlearrowleft_t) \ V \ A \ p = (m \circlearrowleft_t) \ V \ A \ q$ 
    by metis
qed

```

The loop composition preserves the property non-electing.

theorem loop-comp-presv-non-electing[simp]:


```

fixes
   $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$  and
   $t :: 'a \text{ Termination-Condition}$ 
assumes  $\text{non-electing } m$ 
shows  $\text{non-electing } (m \circlearrowleft_t)$ 
proof ( $\text{unfold non-electing-def, safe}$ )
  show  $\text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } (m \circlearrowleft_t)$ 
    using  $\text{loop-comp-sound assms}$ 
    unfolding  $\text{non-electing-def}$ 
    by  $\text{metis}$ 
next
fix
   $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
   $V :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
   $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$  and
   $a :: 'a$ 
assume
   $\text{profile } V \ A \ p$  and
   $a \in \text{elect } (m \circlearrowleft_t) \ V \ A \ p$ 
thus  $a \in \{\}$ 
  using  $\text{def-mod-non-electing loop-comp-presv-non-electing-helper}$ 
     $\text{assms empty-iff loop-comp-code}$ 
  unfolding  $\text{non-electing-def}$ 
  by ( $\text{metis (no-types)}$ )
qed

theorem iter-elim-def-n[simp]:
fixes
   $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$  and
   $t :: 'a \text{ Termination-Condition}$  and
   $n :: \text{nat}$ 
assumes
   $\text{non-electing-m: non-electing } m$  and
   $\text{single-elimination: eliminates } 1 \ m$  and
   $\text{terminate-if-n-left: } \forall \ r. \ t \ r = (\text{card } (\text{defer-r } r) = n)$  and
   $\text{x-greater-zero: } n > 0$ 
shows  $\text{defers } n \ (m \circlearrowleft_t)$ 
proof ( $\text{unfold defers-def, safe}$ )
  show  $\text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } (m \circlearrowleft_t)$ 
    using  $\text{loop-comp-sound non-electing-m}$ 
    unfolding  $\text{non-electing-def}$ 
    by  $\text{metis}$ 
next
fix
   $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
   $V :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
   $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ 
assume
   $n \leq \text{card } A$  and

```

```

    finite A and
    profile V A p
  thus card (defer (m  $\circ_t$ ) V A p) = n
    using iter-elim-def-n-helper assms
    by metis
qed
end

```

5.6 Maximum Parallel Composition

```

theory Maximum-Parallel-Composition
imports Basic-Modules/Component-Types/Maximum-Aggregator
    Parallel-Composition
begin

```

This is a family of parallel compositions. It composes a new electoral module from two electoral modules combined with the maximum aggregator. Therein, the two modules each make a decision and then a partition is returned where every alternative receives the maximum result of the two input partitions. This means that, if any alternative is elected by at least one of the modules, then it gets elected, if any non-elected alternative is deferred by at least one of the modules, then it gets deferred, only alternatives rejected by both modules get rejected.

5.6.1 Definition

```

fun maximum-parallel-composition :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module  $\Rightarrow$ 
    ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module  $\Rightarrow$  ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module
where

```

```

    maximum-parallel-composition m n =
      (let a = max-aggregator in (m  $\parallel_a$  n))

```

```

abbreviation max-parallel :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module  $\Rightarrow$ 
    ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module  $\Rightarrow$ 
    ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module (infix  $\parallel_{\uparrow}$  50) where
    m  $\parallel_{\uparrow}$  n == maximum-parallel-composition m n

```

5.6.2 Soundness

```

theorem max-par-comp-sound:
fixes
    m :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
    n :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module

```

assumes
social-choice-result.electoral-module m **and**
social-choice-result.electoral-module n
shows *social-choice-result.electoral-module* $(m \parallel_{\uparrow} n)$
using *assms*
by *simp*

lemma *max-par-comp-only-voters*:
fixes
 $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**
 $n :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$
assumes
only-voters-vote m **and**
only-voters-vote n
shows *only-voters-vote* $(m \parallel_{\uparrow} n)$
using *max-aggregator.simps* *assms*
unfolding *Let-def maximum-parallel-composition.simps*
parallel-composition.simps
only-voters-vote-def
by *presburger*

5.6.3 Lemmas

lemma *max-agg-eq-result*:
fixes
 $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**
 $n :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $V :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ **and**
 $a :: 'a$
assumes
module-m: *social-choice-result.electoral-module* m **and**
module-n: *social-choice-result.electoral-module* n **and**
prof-p: *profile* $V A p$ **and**
a-in-A: $a \in A$
shows *mod-contains-result* $(m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) m V A p a \vee$
mod-contains-result $(m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) n V A p a$
proof (*cases*)
assume *a-elect*: $a \in \text{elect } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) V A p$
hence *let* $(e, r, d) = m V A p$;
 $(e', r', d') = n V A p$ *in*
 $a \in e \cup e'$
by *auto*
hence $a \in (\text{elect } m V A p) \cup (\text{elect } n V A p)$
by *auto*
moreover have
 $\forall m' n' V' A' p' a'. \text{mod-contains-result } m' n' V' A' p' (a'::'a) =$

```

    (social-choice-result.electoral-module m'
      ∧ social-choice-result.electoral-module n'
      ∧ profile V' A' p' ∧ a' ∈ A'
      ∧ (a' ∉ elect m' V' A' p' ∨ a' ∈ elect n' V' A' p')
      ∧ (a' ∉ reject m' V' A' p' ∨ a' ∈ reject n' V' A' p')
      ∧ (a' ∉ defer m' V' A' p' ∨ a' ∈ defer n' V' A' p'))
  unfolding mod-contains-result-def
  by simp
moreover have module-mn: social-choice-result.electoral-module (m ||↑ n)
  using module-m module-n
  by simp
moreover have a ∉ defer (m ||↑ n) V A p
  using module-mn IntI a-elect empty-iff prof-p result-disj
  by (metis (no-types))
moreover have a ∉ reject (m ||↑ n) V A p
  using module-mn IntI a-elect empty-iff prof-p result-disj
  by (metis (no-types))
ultimately show ?thesis
  using assms
  by blast
next
assume not-a-elect: a ∉ elect (m ||↑ n) V A p
thus ?thesis
proof (cases)
  assume a-in-def: a ∈ defer (m ||↑ n) V A p
  thus ?thesis
  proof (safe)
    assume not-mod-cont-mn: ¬ mod-contains-result (m ||↑ n) n V A p a
    have par-emod: ∀ m' n'.
      social-choice-result.electoral-module m' ∧
      social-choice-result.electoral-module n' ⟶
      social-choice-result.electoral-module (m' ||↑ n')
    using max-par-comp-sound
    by blast
    have set-intersect: ∀ a' A' A''. (a' ∈ A' ∩ A'') = (a' ∈ A' ∧ a' ∈ A'')
    by blast
    have wf-n: well-formed-social-choice A (n V A p)
    using prof-p module-n
    unfolding social-choice-result.electoral-module-def
    by blast
    have wf-m: well-formed-social-choice A (m V A p)
    using prof-p module-m
    unfolding social-choice-result.electoral-module-def
    by blast
    have e-mod-par: social-choice-result.electoral-module (m ||↑ n)
    using par-emod module-m module-n
    by blast
    hence social-choice-result.electoral-module (m ||m ax-aggregator n)
    by simp
  end
end

```

hence *result-disj-max*:
 $\text{elect } (m \parallel_{\text{max-aggregator}} n) \ V \ A \ p \cap$
 $\text{reject } (m \parallel_{\text{max-aggregator}} n) \ V \ A \ p = \{\} \wedge$
 $\text{elect } (m \parallel_{\text{max-aggregator}} n) \ V \ A \ p \cap$
 $\text{defer } (m \parallel_{\text{max-aggregator}} n) \ V \ A \ p = \{\} \wedge$
 $\text{reject } (m \parallel_{\text{max-aggregator}} n) \ V \ A \ p \cap$
 $\text{defer } (m \parallel_{\text{max-aggregator}} n) \ V \ A \ p = \{\}$
using *prof-p result-disj*
by *metis*
have *a-not-elect*: $a \notin \text{elect } (m \parallel_{\text{max-aggregator}} n) \ V \ A \ p$
using *result-disj-max a-in-def*
by *force*
have *result-m*: $(\text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p, \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p, \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) = m \ V \ A \ p$
by *auto*
have *result-n*: $(\text{elect } n \ V \ A \ p, \text{reject } n \ V \ A \ p, \text{defer } n \ V \ A \ p) = n \ V \ A \ p$
by *auto*
have *max-pq*:
 $\forall (A'::'a \text{ set}) \ m' \ n'.$
 $\text{elect-r } (\text{max-aggregator } A' \ m' \ n') = \text{elect-r } m' \cup \text{elect-r } n'$
by *force*
have $a \notin \text{elect } (m \parallel_{\text{max-aggregator}} n) \ V \ A \ p$
using *a-not-elect*
by *blast*
hence $a \notin \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p \cup \text{elect } n \ V \ A \ p$
using *max-pq*
by *simp*
hence *b-not-elect-mn*: $a \notin \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p \wedge a \notin \text{elect } n \ V \ A \ p$
by *blast*
have *b-not-mpar-rej*: $a \notin \text{reject } (m \parallel_{\text{max-aggregator}} n) \ V \ A \ p$
using *result-disj-max a-in-def*
by *fastforce*
have *mod-cont-res-fg*:
 $\forall \ m' \ n' \ A' \ V' \ p' \ (a'::'a).$
 $\text{mod-contains-result } m' \ n' \ V' \ A' \ p' \ a' =$
 $(\text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m'$
 $\wedge \text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } n'$
 $\wedge \text{profile } V' \ A' \ p' \wedge a' \in A'$
 $\wedge (a' \in \text{elect } m' \ V' \ A' \ p' \longrightarrow a' \in \text{elect } n' \ V' \ A' \ p')$
 $\wedge (a' \in \text{reject } m' \ V' \ A' \ p' \longrightarrow a' \in \text{reject } n' \ V' \ A' \ p')$
 $\wedge (a' \in \text{defer } m' \ V' \ A' \ p' \longrightarrow a' \in \text{defer } n' \ V' \ A' \ p'))$
unfolding *mod-contains-result-def*
by *simp*
have *max-agg-res*:
 $\text{max-aggregator } A \ (\text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p, \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p, \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p)$
 $(\text{elect } n \ V \ A \ p, \text{reject } n \ V \ A \ p, \text{defer } n \ V \ A \ p) = (m \parallel_{\text{max-aggregator}} n)$
 $V \ A \ p$
by *simp*
have *well-f-max*:
 $\forall \ r' \ r'' \ e' \ e'' \ d' \ d'' \ A'.$

$\text{well-formed-social-choice } A' (e', r', d') \wedge$
 $\text{well-formed-social-choice } A' (e'', r'', d'') \longrightarrow$
 $\text{reject-}r (\text{max-aggregator } A' (e', r', d') (e'', r'', d'')) = r' \cap r''$
using *max-agg-rej-set*
by *metis*
have *e-mod-disj*:
 $\forall m' (V::'v \text{ set}) (A::'a \text{ set}) p'.$
 $\text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m' \wedge \text{profile } V' A' p'$
 $\longrightarrow \text{elect } m' V' A' p' \cup \text{reject } m' V' A' p' \cup \text{defer } m' V' A' p' = A'$
using *result-presv-alts*
by *blast*
hence *e-mod-disj-n*: $\text{elect } n V A p \cup \text{reject } n V A p \cup \text{defer } n V A p = A$
using *prof-p module-n*
by *metis*
have $\forall m' n' A' V' p' (b::'a).$
 $\text{mod-contains-result } m' n' V' A' p' b =$
 $(\text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m'$
 $\wedge \text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } n'$
 $\wedge \text{profile } V' A' p' \wedge b \in A'$
 $\wedge (b \in \text{elect } m' V' A' p' \longrightarrow b \in \text{elect } n' V' A' p')$
 $\wedge (b \in \text{reject } m' V' A' p' \longrightarrow b \in \text{reject } n' V' A' p')$
 $\wedge (b \in \text{defer } m' V' A' p' \longrightarrow b \in \text{defer } n' V' A' p'))$
unfolding *mod-contains-result-def*
by *simp*
hence $a \in \text{reject } n V A p$
using *e-mod-disj-n e-mod-par prof-p a-in-A module-n not-mod-cont-mn*
 $a\text{-not-elect } b\text{-not-elect-mn } b\text{-not-mpar-rej}$
by *fastforce*
hence $a \notin \text{reject } m V A p$
using *well-f-max max-agg-res result-m result-n set-intersect*
 $wf\text{-}m \text{ } wf\text{-}n \text{ } b\text{-not-mpar-rej}$
by (*metis (no-types)*)
hence $a \notin \text{defer } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) V A p \vee a \in \text{defer } m V A p$
using *e-mod-disj prof-p a-in-A module-m b-not-elect-mn*
by *blast*
thus $\text{mod-contains-result } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) m V A p a$
using *b-not-mpar-rej mod-cont-res-fg e-mod-par prof-p a-in-A*
 $\text{module-}m \text{ } a\text{-not-elect}$
by *fastforce*
qed
next
assume *not-a-defer*: $a \notin \text{defer } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) V A p$
have *el-rej-defer*: $(\text{elect } m V A p, \text{reject } m V A p, \text{defer } m V A p) = m V A p$
by *auto*
from *not-a-elect not-a-defer*
have *a-reject*: $a \in \text{reject } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) V A p$
using *electoral-mod-defer-elem a-in-A module-m module-n prof-p max-par-comp-sound*
by *metis*
hence *case snd* $(m V A p)$ of $(r, d) \Rightarrow$

case $n \ V \ A \ p$ of $(e', r', d') \Rightarrow$
 $a \in \text{reject-}r \ (\text{max-aggregator } A \ (\text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p, r, d) \ (e', r', d'))$
 using *el-rej-defer*
 by *force*
 hence let $(e, r, d) = m \ V \ A \ p;$
 $(e', r', d') = n \ V \ A \ p$ in
 $a \in \text{reject-}r \ (\text{max-aggregator } A \ (e, r, d) \ (e', r', d'))$
 unfolding *case-prod-unfold*
 by *simp*
 hence let $(e, r, d) = m \ V \ A \ p;$
 $(e', r', d') = n \ V \ A \ p$ in
 $a \in A - (e \cup e' \cup d \cup d')$
 by *simp*
 hence $a \notin \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p \cup (\text{defer } n \ V \ A \ p \cup \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p)$
 by *force*
 thus *?thesis*
 using *mod-contains-result-comm mod-contains-result-def Un-iff*
 $a\text{-reject prof-}p \ a\text{-in-}A \ \text{module-}m \ \text{module-}n \ \text{max-par-comp-sound}$
 by (*metis (no-types)*)
 qed
 qed

lemma *max-agg-rej-iff-both-reject*:

fixes
 $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \ \text{Result}) \ \text{Electoral-Module}$ and
 $n :: ('a, 'v, 'a \ \text{Result}) \ \text{Electoral-Module}$ and
 $A :: 'a \ \text{set}$ and
 $V :: 'v \ \text{set}$ and
 $p :: ('a, 'v) \ \text{Profile}$ and
 $a :: 'a$
 assumes
 $\text{finite-profile } V \ A \ p$ and
 $\text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m$ and
 $\text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } n$
 shows $(a \in \text{reject } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ V \ A \ p) = (a \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p \wedge a \in \text{reject } n \ V \ A \ p)$
 proof
 assume *rej-a*: $a \in \text{reject } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ V \ A \ p$
 hence case $n \ V \ A \ p$ of $(e, r, d) \Rightarrow$
 $a \in \text{reject-}r \ (\text{max-aggregator } A$
 $(\text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p, \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p, \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \ (e, r, d))$
 by *auto*
 hence case $\text{snd } (m \ V \ A \ p)$ of $(r, d) \Rightarrow$
 case $n \ V \ A \ p$ of $(e', r', d') \Rightarrow$
 $a \in \text{reject-}r \ (\text{max-aggregator } A \ (\text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p, r, d) \ (e', r', d'))$
 by *force*
 with *rej-a*
 have let $(e, r, d) = m \ V \ A \ p;$
 $(e', r', d') = n \ V \ A \ p$ in

$a \in \text{reject-}r \text{ (max-aggregator } A \text{ (} e, r, d \text{) (} e', r', d' \text{))}$
unfolding *prod.case-eq-if*
by *simp*
hence $\text{let } (e, r, d) = m \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } p;$
 $(e', r', d') = n \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } p \text{ in}$
 $a \in A - (e \cup e' \cup d \cup d')$
by *simp*
hence $a \in A - (\text{elect } m \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } p \cup \text{elect } n \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } p \cup \text{defer } m \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } p \cup \text{defer } n \text{ } V \text{ } A$
 $p)$
by *auto*
thus $a \in \text{reject } m \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } p \wedge a \in \text{reject } n \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } p$
using *Diff-iff Un-iff electoral-mod-defer-elem assms*
by *metis*
next
assume $a \in \text{reject } m \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } p \wedge a \in \text{reject } n \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } p$
moreover from *this*
have $a \notin \text{elect } m \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } p \wedge a \notin \text{defer } m \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } p \wedge a \notin \text{elect } n \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } p \wedge a \notin \text{defer}$
 $n \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } p$
using *IntI empty-iff assms result-disj*
by *metis*
ultimately show $a \in \text{reject } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \text{ } V \text{ } A \text{ } p$
using *DiffD1 max-agg-eq-result mod-contains-result-comm mod-contains-result-def*
 $\text{reject-not-elec-or-def assms}$
by *(metis (no-types))*
qed

lemma *max-agg-rej-fst-imp-seq-contained:*

fixes

$m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**

$n :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**

$A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**

$V :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**

$p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ **and**

$a :: 'a$

assumes

f-prof: finite-profile $V \text{ } A \text{ } p$ **and**

module-m: social-choice-result.electoral-module m **and**

module-n: social-choice-result.electoral-module n **and**

rejected: a ∈ reject n V A p

shows *mod-contains-result* $m \text{ (} m \parallel_{\uparrow} n \text{) } V \text{ } A \text{ } p \text{ } a$

using *assms*

proof *(unfold mod-contains-result-def, safe)*

show *social-choice-result.electoral-module* $(m \parallel_{\uparrow} n)$

using *module-m module-n*

by *simp*

next

show $a \in A$

using *f-prof module-n rejected reject-in-alts*

by *blast*

next
assume $a\text{-in-elect}: a \in \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p$
hence $a\text{-not-reject}: a \notin \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p$
using $\text{disjoint-iff-not-equal } f\text{-prof } \text{module-}m \ \text{result-disj}$
by metis
have $\text{reject } n \ V \ A \ p \subseteq A$
using $f\text{-prof } \text{module-}n$
by $(\text{simp } \text{add: reject-in-alts})$
hence $a \in A$
using in-mono rejected
by metis
with $a\text{-in-elect } a\text{-not-reject}$
show $a \in \text{elect } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ V \ A \ p$
using $f\text{-prof } \text{max-agg-eq-result } \text{module-}m \ \text{module-}n \ \text{rejected}$
 $\text{max-agg-rej-iff-both-reject } \text{mod-contains-result-comm}$
 $\text{mod-contains-result-def}$
by metis
next
assume $a \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p$
hence $a \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p \wedge a \in \text{reject } n \ V \ A \ p$
using rejected
by simp
thus $a \in \text{reject } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ V \ A \ p$
using $f\text{-prof } \text{max-agg-rej-iff-both-reject } \text{module-}m \ \text{module-}n$
by $(\text{metis } (\text{no-types}))$
next
assume $a\text{-in-defer}: a \in \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p$
then obtain $d :: 'a$ **where**
 $\text{defer-}a: a = d \wedge d \in \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p$
by metis
have $a\text{-not-rej}: a \notin \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p$
using $\text{disjoint-iff-not-equal } f\text{-prof } \text{defer-}a \ \text{module-}m \ \text{result-disj}$
by $(\text{metis } (\text{no-types}))$
have
 $\forall m' A' V' p'. \\$
 $(\text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m' \wedge \text{finite } A' \wedge \text{finite } V' \wedge \text{profile } V' \\$
 $A' \ p') \longrightarrow \\$
 $\text{elect } m' \ V' \ A' \ p' \cup \text{reject } m' \ V' \ A' \ p' \cup \text{defer } m' \ V' \ A' \ p' = A'$
using result-presv-alts
by metis
hence $a \in A$
using $a\text{-in-defer } f\text{-prof } \text{module-}m$
by blast
with $\text{defer-}a \ a\text{-not-rej}$
show $a \in \text{defer } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ V \ A \ p$
using $f\text{-prof } \text{max-agg-eq-result } \text{max-agg-rej-iff-both-reject}$
 $\text{mod-contains-result-comm } \text{mod-contains-result-def}$
 $\text{module-}m \ \text{module-}n \ \text{rejected}$
by metis

qed

lemma *max-agg-rej-fst-equiv-seq-contained:*

fixes

$m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**

$n :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**

$A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**

$V :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**

$p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ **and**

$a :: 'a$

assumes

finite-profile $V \ A \ p$ **and**

social-choice-result.electoral-module m **and**

social-choice-result.electoral-module n **and**

$a \in \text{reject } n \ V \ A \ p$

shows *mod-contains-result-sym* $(m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ m \ V \ A \ p \ a$

using *assms*

proof (*unfold mod-contains-result-sym-def, safe*)

assume $a \in \text{reject } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ V \ A \ p$

thus $a \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p$

using *assms max-agg-rej-iff-both-reject*

by (*metis (no-types)*)

next

have *mod-contains-result* $m \ (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ V \ A \ p \ a$

using *assms max-agg-rej-fst-imp-seq-contained*

by (*metis (full-types)*)

thus

$a \in \text{elect } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ V \ A \ p \implies a \in \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p$ **and**

$a \in \text{defer } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ V \ A \ p \implies a \in \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p$

using *mod-contains-result-comm*

unfolding *mod-contains-result-def*

by (*metis (full-types), metis (full-types)*)

next

show

social-choice-result.electoral-module $(m \parallel_{\uparrow} n)$ **and**

$a \in A$

using *assms max-agg-rej-fst-imp-seq-contained*

unfolding *mod-contains-result-def*

by (*metis (full-types), metis (full-types)*)

next

show

$a \in \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p \implies a \in \text{elect } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ V \ A \ p$ **and**

$a \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p \implies a \in \text{reject } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ V \ A \ p$ **and**

$a \in \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p \implies a \in \text{defer } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ V \ A \ p$

using *assms max-agg-rej-fst-imp-seq-contained*

unfolding *mod-contains-result-def*

by (*metis (no-types), metis (no-types), metis (no-types)*)

qed

```

lemma max-agg-rej-snd-imp-seq-contained:
  fixes
     $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$  and
     $n :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$  and
     $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $V :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
     $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$  and
     $a :: 'a$ 
  assumes
    f-prof: finite-profile  $V A p$  and
    module-m: social-choice-result.electoral-module  $m$  and
    module-n: social-choice-result.electoral-module  $n$  and
    rejected:  $a \in \text{reject } m V A p$ 
  shows mod-contains-result  $n (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) V A p a$ 
  using assms
proof (unfold mod-contains-result-def, safe)
  show social-choice-result.electoral-module  $(m \parallel_{\uparrow} n)$ 
    using module-m module-n
    by simp
next
  show  $a \in A$ 
    using f-prof in-mono module-m reject-in-alts rejected
    by (metis (no-types))
next
  assume  $a \in \text{elect } n V A p$ 
  thus  $a \in \text{elect } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) V A p$ 
    using parallel-composition.simps
      max-aggregator.simps[of
         $A \text{ elect } m V A p \text{ reject } m V A p \text{ defer } m V A p$ 
         $\text{elect } n V A p \text{ reject } n V A p \text{ defer } n V A p$ ]
    by simp
next
  assume  $a \in \text{reject } n V A p$ 
  thus  $a \in \text{reject } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) V A p$ 
    using f-prof max-agg-rej-iff-both-reject module-m module-n rejected
    by metis
next
  assume  $a \in \text{defer } n V A p$ 
  moreover have  $a \in A$ 
    using f-prof max-agg-rej-fst-imp-seq-contained module-m rejected
    unfolding mod-contains-result-def
    by metis
  ultimately show  $a \in \text{defer } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) V A p$ 
    using disjoint-iff-not-equal max-agg-eq-result max-agg-rej-iff-both-reject
      f-prof mod-contains-result-comm mod-contains-result-def
      module-m module-n rejected result-disj
    by metis
qed

```

```

lemma max-agg-rej-snd-equiv-seq-contained:
  fixes
     $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$  and
     $n :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$  and
     $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $V :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
     $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$  and
     $a :: 'a$ 
  assumes
    finite-profile  $V \ A \ p$  and
    social-choice-result.electoral-module  $m$  and
    social-choice-result.electoral-module  $n$  and
     $a \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p$ 
  shows mod-contains-result-sym  $(m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ n \ V \ A \ p \ a$ 
  using assms
proof (unfold mod-contains-result-sym-def, safe)
  assume  $a \in \text{reject } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ V \ A \ p$ 
  thus  $a \in \text{reject } n \ V \ A \ p$ 
    using assms max-agg-rej-iff-both-reject
    by (metis (no-types))
next
  have mod-contains-result  $n \ (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ V \ A \ p \ a$ 
    using assms max-agg-rej-snd-imp-seq-contained
    by (metis (full-types))
  thus
     $a \in \text{elect } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ V \ A \ p \implies a \in \text{elect } n \ V \ A \ p$  and
     $a \in \text{defer } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ V \ A \ p \implies a \in \text{defer } n \ V \ A \ p$ 
    using mod-contains-result-comm
    unfolding mod-contains-result-def
    by (metis (full-types), metis (full-types))
next
  show
    social-choice-result.electoral-module  $(m \parallel_{\uparrow} n)$  and
     $a \in A$ 
    using assms max-agg-rej-snd-imp-seq-contained
    unfolding mod-contains-result-def
    by (metis (full-types), metis (full-types))
next
  show
     $a \in \text{elect } n \ V \ A \ p \implies a \in \text{elect } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ V \ A \ p$  and
     $a \in \text{reject } n \ V \ A \ p \implies a \in \text{reject } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ V \ A \ p$  and
     $a \in \text{defer } n \ V \ A \ p \implies a \in \text{defer } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ V \ A \ p$ 
    using assms max-agg-rej-snd-imp-seq-contained
    unfolding mod-contains-result-def
    by (metis (no-types), metis (no-types), metis (no-types))
qed

```

```

lemma max-agg-rej-intersect:
  fixes

```

$m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module and}$
 $n :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module and}$
 $A :: 'a \text{ set and}$
 $V :: 'v \text{ set and}$
 $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$
assumes
 $\text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m \text{ and}$
 $\text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } n \text{ and}$
 $\text{profile } V \ A \ p \text{ and finite } A$
shows $\text{reject } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ V \ A \ p = (\text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p) \cap (\text{reject } n \ V \ A \ p)$
proof –
have $A = (\text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p) \cup (\text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p) \cup (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \wedge$
 $A = (\text{elect } n \ V \ A \ p) \cup (\text{reject } n \ V \ A \ p) \cup (\text{defer } n \ V \ A \ p)$
using $\text{assms result-presv-alts}$
by metis
hence $A - ((\text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p) \cup (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p)) = (\text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p) \wedge$
 $A - ((\text{elect } n \ V \ A \ p) \cup (\text{defer } n \ V \ A \ p)) = (\text{reject } n \ V \ A \ p)$
using $\text{assms reject-not-elec-or-def}$
by fastforce
hence $A - ((\text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p) \cup (\text{elect } n \ V \ A \ p) \cup (\text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p) \cup (\text{defer } n \ V \ A \ p)) =$
 $(\text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p) \cap (\text{reject } n \ V \ A \ p)$
by blast
hence $\text{let } (e, r, d) = m \ V \ A \ p;$
 $(e', r', d') = n \ V \ A \ p \text{ in}$
 $A - (e \cup e' \cup d \cup d') = r \cap r'$
by fastforce
thus $?thesis$
by auto
qed

lemma $d\text{compat-dec-by-one-mod}:$
fixes
 $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module and}$
 $n :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module and}$
 $A :: 'a \text{ set and}$
 $V :: 'v \text{ set and}$
 $a :: 'a$
assumes
 $\text{disjoint-compatibility } m \ n \text{ and}$
 $a \in A$
shows
 $(\forall p. \text{finite-profile } V \ A \ p \longrightarrow \text{mod-contains-result } m \ (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ V \ A \ p \ a) \vee$
 $(\forall p. \text{finite-profile } V \ A \ p \longrightarrow \text{mod-contains-result } n \ (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ V \ A \ p \ a)$
using $\text{DiffI assms max-agg-rej-fst-imp-seq-contained max-agg-rej-snd-imp-seq-contained}$
unfolding $\text{disjoint-compatibility-def}$
by metis

5.6.4 Composition Rules

Using a conservative aggregator, the parallel composition preserves the property non-electing.

theorem *conserv-max-agg-presv-non-electing[simp]*:

fixes
 $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**
 $n :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$
assumes
 $\text{non-electing } m$ **and**
 $\text{non-electing } n$
shows $\text{non-electing } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n)$
using *assms*
by *simp*

Using the max aggregator, composing two compatible electoral modules in parallel preserves defer-lift-invariance.

theorem *par-comp-def-lift-inv[simp]*:

fixes
 $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$ **and**
 $n :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$
assumes
 $\text{compatible: disjoint-compatibility } m \ n$ **and**
 $\text{monotone-m: defer-lift-invariance } m$ **and**
 $\text{monotone-n: defer-lift-invariance } n$
shows $\text{defer-lift-invariance } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n)$
proof (*unfold defer-lift-invariance-def, safe*)
have *mod-m: social-choice-result.electoral-module m*
using *monotone-m*
unfolding *defer-lift-invariance-def*
by *simp*
moreover have *mod-n: social-choice-result.electoral-module n*
using *monotone-n*
unfolding *defer-lift-invariance-def*
by *simp*
ultimately show *social-choice-result.electoral-module (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n)*
by *simp*
fix
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $V :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ **and**
 $q :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ **and**
 $a :: 'a$
assume
 $\text{defer-a: } a \in \text{defer } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ V \ A \ p$ **and**
 $\text{lifted-a: Profile.lifted } V \ A \ p \ q \ a$
hence *f-profs: finite-profile V A p \wedge finite-profile V A q*
unfolding *lifted-def*
by *simp*

```

from compatible
obtain  $B :: 'a \text{ set}$  where
  alts:  $B \subseteq A \wedge$ 
    ( $\forall b \in B. \text{indep-of-alt } m \ V \ A \ b \wedge$ 
      ( $\forall p'. \text{finite-profile } V \ A \ p' \longrightarrow b \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p'$ ))  $\wedge$ 
    ( $\forall b \in A - B. \text{indep-of-alt } n \ V \ A \ b \wedge$ 
      ( $\forall p'. \text{finite-profile } V \ A \ p' \longrightarrow b \in \text{reject } n \ V \ A \ p'$ ))
using f-profs
unfolding disjoint-compatibility-def
by (metis (no-types, lifting))
have  $\forall b \in A. \text{prof-contains-result } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ V \ A \ p \ q \ b$ 
proof (cases)
  assume a-in-B:  $a \in B$ 
  hence  $a \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p$ 
  using alts f-profs
  by blast
with defer-a
have defer-n:  $a \in \text{defer } n \ V \ A \ p$ 
  using compatible f-profs max-agg-rej-snd-equiv-seq-contained
  unfolding disjoint-compatibility-def mod-contains-result-sym-def
  by metis
have  $\forall b \in B. \text{mod-contains-result-sym } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ n \ V \ A \ p \ b$ 
  using alts compatible max-agg-rej-snd-equiv-seq-contained f-profs
  unfolding disjoint-compatibility-def
  by metis
moreover have  $\forall b \in A. \text{prof-contains-result } n \ V \ A \ p \ q \ b$ 
proof (unfold prof-contains-result-def, clarify)
  fix  $b :: 'a$ 
  assume b-in-A:  $b \in A$ 
  show social-choice-result.electoral-module  $n \wedge \text{profile } V \ A \ p$ 
     $\wedge \text{profile } V \ A \ q \wedge b \in A \wedge$ 
    ( $b \in \text{elect } n \ V \ A \ p \longrightarrow b \in \text{elect } n \ V \ A \ q$ )  $\wedge$ 
    ( $b \in \text{reject } n \ V \ A \ p \longrightarrow b \in \text{reject } n \ V \ A \ q$ )  $\wedge$ 
    ( $b \in \text{defer } n \ V \ A \ p \longrightarrow b \in \text{defer } n \ V \ A \ q$ )
  proof (safe)
    show social-choice-result.electoral-module  $n$ 
      using monotone-n
      unfolding defer-lift-invariance-def
      by metis
    next
      show profile  $V \ A \ p$ 
      using f-profs
      by simp
    next
      show profile  $V \ A \ q$ 
      using f-profs
      by simp
    next
      show  $b \in A$ 

```

```

    using b-in-A
    by simp
next
  assume  $b \in \text{elect } n \ V \ A \ p$ 
  thus  $b \in \text{elect } n \ V \ A \ q$ 
    using defer-n lifted-a monotone-n f-profs
    unfolding defer-lift-invariance-def
    by metis
next
  assume  $b \in \text{reject } n \ V \ A \ p$ 
  thus  $b \in \text{reject } n \ V \ A \ q$ 
    using defer-n lifted-a monotone-n f-profs
    unfolding defer-lift-invariance-def
    by metis
next
  assume  $b \in \text{defer } n \ V \ A \ p$ 
  thus  $b \in \text{defer } n \ V \ A \ q$ 
    using defer-n lifted-a monotone-n f-profs
    unfolding defer-lift-invariance-def
    by metis
qed
qed
moreover have  $\forall b \in B. \text{mod-contains-result } n \ (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ V \ A \ q \ b$ 
  using alts compatible max-agg-rej-snd-imp-seq-contained f-profs
  unfolding disjoint-compatibility-def
  by metis
ultimately have prof-contains-result-of-comps-for-elems-in-B:
 $\forall b \in B. \text{prof-contains-result } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ V \ A \ p \ q \ b$ 
  unfolding mod-contains-result-def mod-contains-result-sym-def
    prof-contains-result-def
  by simp
have  $\forall b \in A - B. \text{mod-contains-result-sym } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ m \ V \ A \ p \ b$ 
  using alts max-agg-rej-fst-equiv-seq-contained monotone-m monotone-n f-profs
  unfolding defer-lift-invariance-def
  by metis
moreover have  $\forall b \in A. \text{prof-contains-result } m \ V \ A \ p \ q \ b$ 
proof (unfold prof-contains-result-def, clarify)
  fix  $b :: 'a$ 
  assume b-in-A:  $b \in A$ 
  show social-choice-result.electoral-module  $m \wedge \text{profile } V \ A \ p \wedge$ 
    profile  $V \ A \ q \wedge b \in A \wedge$ 
     $(b \in \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p \longrightarrow b \in \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ q) \wedge$ 
     $(b \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p \longrightarrow b \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ q) \wedge$ 
     $(b \in \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p \longrightarrow b \in \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ q)$ 
  proof (safe)
    show social-choice-result.electoral-module  $m$ 
      using monotone-m
    unfolding defer-lift-invariance-def
    by metis

```



```

next
  show profile V A p
  using f-profs
  by simp
next
  show profile V A q
  using f-profs
  by simp
next
  show  $b \in A$ 
  using b-in-A
  by simp
next
  assume  $b \in \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p$ 
  thus  $b \in \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ q$ 
  using alts a-in-B lifted-a lifted-imp-equiv-prof-except-a
  unfolding indep-of-alt-def
  by metis
next
  assume  $b \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p$ 
  thus  $b \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ q$ 
  using alts a-in-B lifted-a lifted-imp-equiv-prof-except-a
  unfolding indep-of-alt-def
  by metis
next
  assume  $b \in \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p$ 
  thus  $b \in \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ q$ 
  using alts a-in-B lifted-a lifted-imp-equiv-prof-except-a
  unfolding indep-of-alt-def
  by metis
qed
qed
moreover have  $\forall b \in A - B. \text{mod-contains-result } m \ (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ V \ A \ q \ b$ 
  using alts max-agg-rej-fst-imp-seq-contained monotone-m monotone-n f-profs
  unfolding defer-lift-invariance-def
  by metis
ultimately have  $\forall b \in A - B. \text{prof-contains-result } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ V \ A \ p \ q \ b$ 
  unfolding mod-contains-result-def mod-contains-result-sym-def
  prof-contains-result-def
  by simp
thus ?thesis
  using prof-contains-result-of-comps-for-elems-in-B
  by blast
next
  assume  $a \notin B$ 
  hence a-in-set-diff:  $a \in A - B$ 
  using DiffI lifted-a compatible f-profs
  unfolding Profile.lifted-def
  by (metis (no-types, lifting))

```

```

hence reject-n:  $a \in \text{reject } n \ V \ A \ p$ 
  using alts f-profs
  by blast
hence defer-m:  $a \in \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p$ 
  using mod-m mod-n defer-a f-profs max-agg-rej-fst-equiv-seq-contained
  unfolding mod-contains-result-sym-def
  by (metis (no-types))
have  $\forall b \in B. \text{mod-contains-result } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ n \ V \ A \ p \ b$ 
using alts compatible f-profs max-agg-rej-snd-imp-seq-contained mod-contains-result-comm
  unfolding disjoint-compatibility-def
  by metis
have  $\forall b \in B. \text{mod-contains-result-sym } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ n \ V \ A \ p \ b$ 
using alts max-agg-rej-snd-equiv-seq-contained monotone-m monotone-n f-profs
  unfolding defer-lift-invariance-def
  by metis
moreover have  $\forall b \in A. \text{prof-contains-result } n \ V \ A \ p \ q \ b$ 
proof (unfold prof-contains-result-def, clarify)
  fix  $b :: 'a$ 
  assume b-in-A:  $b \in A$ 
  show social-choice-result.electoral-module  $n \wedge \text{profile } V \ A \ p \wedge$ 
     $\text{profile } V \ A \ q \wedge b \in A \wedge$ 
     $(b \in \text{elect } n \ V \ A \ p \longrightarrow b \in \text{elect } n \ V \ A \ q) \wedge$ 
     $(b \in \text{reject } n \ V \ A \ p \longrightarrow b \in \text{reject } n \ V \ A \ q) \wedge$ 
     $(b \in \text{defer } n \ V \ A \ p \longrightarrow b \in \text{defer } n \ V \ A \ q)$ 
proof (safe)
  show social-choice-result.electoral-module  $n$ 
    using monotone-n
    unfolding defer-lift-invariance-def
    by metis
next
  show profile  $V \ A \ p$ 
    using f-profs
    by simp
next
  show profile  $V \ A \ q$ 
    using f-profs
    by simp
next
  show  $b \in A$ 
    using b-in-A
    by simp
next
  assume  $b \in \text{elect } n \ V \ A \ p$ 
  thus  $b \in \text{elect } n \ V \ A \ q$ 
    using alts a-in-set-diff lifted-a lifted-imp-equiv-prof-except-a
    unfolding indep-of-alt-def
    by metis
next
  assume  $b \in \text{reject } n \ V \ A \ p$ 

```

```

    thus  $b \in \text{reject } n \ V \ A \ q$ 
      using alts a-in-set-diff lifted-a lifted-imp-equiv-prof-except-a
      unfolding indep-of-alt-def
      by metis
  next
    assume  $b \in \text{defer } n \ V \ A \ p$ 
    thus  $b \in \text{defer } n \ V \ A \ q$ 
      using alts a-in-set-diff lifted-a lifted-imp-equiv-prof-except-a
      unfolding indep-of-alt-def
      by metis
  qed
  qed
  moreover have  $\forall b \in B. \text{mod-contains-result } n \ (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ V \ A \ q \ b$ 
    using alts compatible max-agg-rej-snd-imp-seq-contained f-profs
    unfolding disjoint-compatibility-def
    by metis
  ultimately have prof-contains-result-of-comps-for-elems-in-B:
     $\forall b \in B. \text{prof-contains-result } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ V \ A \ p \ q \ b$ 
    unfolding mod-contains-result-def mod-contains-result-sym-def
    prof-contains-result-def
    by simp
  have  $\forall b \in A - B. \text{mod-contains-result-sym } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ m \ V \ A \ p \ b$ 
    using alts max-agg-rej-fst-equiv-seq-contained monotone-m monotone-n f-profs
    unfolding defer-lift-invariance-def
    by metis
  moreover have  $\forall b \in A. \text{prof-contains-result } m \ V \ A \ p \ q \ b$ 
  proof (unfold prof-contains-result-def, clarify)
    fix  $b :: 'a$ 
    assume b-in-A:  $b \in A$ 
    show social-choice-result.electoral-module  $m \wedge \text{profile } V \ A \ p \wedge$ 
      profile  $V \ A \ q \wedge b \in A \wedge$ 
       $(b \in \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p \longrightarrow b \in \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ q) \wedge$ 
       $(b \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p \longrightarrow b \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ q) \wedge$ 
       $(b \in \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p \longrightarrow b \in \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ q)$ 
    proof (safe)
      show social-choice-result.electoral-module  $m$ 
        using monotone-m
        unfolding defer-lift-invariance-def
        by simp
    next
      show profile  $V \ A \ p$ 
        using f-profs
        by simp
    next
      show profile  $V \ A \ q$ 
        using f-profs
        by simp
    next
      show  $b \in A$ 

```

```

    using b-in-A
    by simp
next
  assume  $b \in \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p$ 
  thus  $b \in \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ q$ 
    using defer-m lifted-a monotone-m
    unfolding defer-lift-invariance-def
    by metis
next
  assume  $b \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ p$ 
  thus  $b \in \text{reject } m \ V \ A \ q$ 
    using defer-m lifted-a monotone-m
    unfolding defer-lift-invariance-def
    by metis
next
  assume  $b \in \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p$ 
  thus  $b \in \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ q$ 
    using defer-m lifted-a monotone-m
    unfolding defer-lift-invariance-def
    by metis
qed
qed
moreover have  $\forall x \in A - B. \text{mod-contains-result } m \ (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ V \ A \ q \ x$ 
  using alts max-agg-rej-fst-imp-seq-contained monotone-m monotone-n f-profs
  unfolding defer-lift-invariance-def
  by metis
ultimately have  $\forall x \in A - B. \text{prof-contains-result } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ V \ A \ p \ q \ x$ 
  unfolding mod-contains-result-def mod-contains-result-sym-def
    prof-contains-result-def
  by simp
thus ?thesis
  using prof-contains-result-of-comps-for-elems-in-B
  by blast
qed
thus  $(m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ V \ A \ p = (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n) \ V \ A \ q$ 
  using compatible f-profs eq-alts-in-profs-imp-eq-results max-par-comp-sound
  unfolding disjoint-compatibility-def
  by metis
qed

lemma par-comp-rej-card:
  fixes
     $m :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$  and
     $n :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}$  and
     $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
     $V :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
     $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$  and
     $c :: \text{nat}$ 
  assumes

```

compatible: *disjoint-compatibility* $m\ n$ **and**
prof: *profile* $V\ A\ p$ **and**
fin-A: *finite* A **and**
reject-sum: $\text{card } (\text{reject } m\ V\ A\ p) + \text{card } (\text{reject } n\ V\ A\ p) = \text{card } A + c$
shows $\text{card } (\text{reject } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n)\ V\ A\ p) = c$
proof –
obtain B **where**
alt-set: $B \subseteq A \wedge$
 $(\forall a \in B. \text{indep-of-alt } m\ V\ A\ a \wedge$
 $(\forall q. \text{profile } V\ A\ q \longrightarrow a \in \text{reject } m\ V\ A\ q)) \wedge$
 $(\forall a \in A - B. \text{indep-of-alt } n\ V\ A\ a \wedge$
 $(\forall q. \text{profile } V\ A\ q \longrightarrow a \in \text{reject } n\ V\ A\ q))$
using *compatible prof*
unfolding *disjoint-compatibility-def*
by *metis*
have *reject-representation*:
 $\text{reject } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n)\ V\ A\ p = (\text{reject } m\ V\ A\ p) \cap (\text{reject } n\ V\ A\ p)$
using *prof fin-A compatible max-agg-rej-intersect*
unfolding *disjoint-compatibility-def*
by *metis*
have *social-choice-result.electoral-module* $m \wedge \text{social-choice-result.electoral-module}$
 n
using *compatible*
unfolding *disjoint-compatibility-def*
by *simp*
hence *subsets*: $(\text{reject } m\ V\ A\ p) \subseteq A \wedge (\text{reject } n\ V\ A\ p) \subseteq A$
using *prof*
by *(simp add: reject-in-alts)*
hence *finite* $(\text{reject } m\ V\ A\ p) \wedge \text{finite } (\text{reject } n\ V\ A\ p)$
using *rev-finite-subset prof fin-A*
by *metis*
hence *card-difference*:
 $\text{card } (\text{reject } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n)\ V\ A\ p) =$
 $\text{card } A + c - \text{card } ((\text{reject } m\ V\ A\ p) \cup (\text{reject } n\ V\ A\ p))$
using *card-Un-Int reject-representation reject-sum*
by *fastforce*
have $\forall a \in A. a \in (\text{reject } m\ V\ A\ p) \vee a \in (\text{reject } n\ V\ A\ p)$
using *alt-set prof fin-A*
by *blast*
hence $A = \text{reject } m\ V\ A\ p \cup \text{reject } n\ V\ A\ p$
using *subsets*
by *force*
thus $\text{card } (\text{reject } (m \parallel_{\uparrow} n)\ V\ A\ p) = c$
using *card-difference*
by *simp*
qed

Using the max-aggregator for composing two compatible modules in parallel, whereof the first one is non-electing and defers exactly one alternative, and

the second one rejects exactly two alternatives, the composition results in an electoral module that eliminates exactly one alternative.

```

theorem par-comp-elim-one[simp]:
  fixes
    m :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
    n :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module
  assumes
    defers-m-one: defers 1 m and
    non-elec-m: non-electing m and
    rejec-n-two: rejects 2 n and
    disj-comp: disjoint-compatibility m n
  shows eliminates 1 (m ||↑ n)
proof (unfold eliminates-def, safe)
  have social-choice-result.electoral-module m
    using non-elec-m
    unfolding non-electing-def
    by simp
  moreover have social-choice-result.electoral-module n
    using rejec-n-two
    unfolding rejects-def
    by simp
  ultimately show social-choice-result.electoral-module (m ||↑ n)
    by simp
next
fix
  A :: 'a set and
  V :: 'v set and
  p :: ('a, 'v) Profile
assume
  min-card-two: 1 < card A and
  prof: profile V A p
hence card-geq-one: card A ≥ 1
  by presburger
have fin-A: finite A
  using min-card-two card.infinite not-one-less-zero
  by metis
have module: social-choice-result.electoral-module m
  using non-elec-m
  unfolding non-electing-def
  by simp
have elec-card-zero: card (elect m V A p) = 0
  using prof non-elec-m card-eq-0-iff
  unfolding non-electing-def
  by simp
moreover from card-geq-one
have def-card-one: card (defer m V A p) = 1
  using defers-m-one module prof fin-A
  unfolding defers-def
  by blast

```

```

ultimately have card-reject-m: card (reject m V A p) = card A - 1
proof -
  have well-formed-social-choice A (elect m V A p, reject m V A p, defer m V A
p)
    using prof module
    unfolding social-choice-result.electoral-module-def
    by simp
  hence
    card A = card (elect m V A p) + card (reject m V A p) + card (defer m V
A p)
    using result-count fin-A
    by blast
  thus ?thesis
    using def-card-one elec-card-zero
    by simp
qed
have card A ≥ 2
  using min-card-two
  by simp
hence card (reject n V A p) = 2
  using prof rejec-n-two fin-A
  unfolding rejects-def
  by blast
moreover from this
have card (reject m V A p) + card (reject n V A p) = card A + 1
  using card-reject-m card-geq-one
  by linarith
ultimately show card (reject (m ||↑ n) V A p) = 1
  using disj-comp prof card-reject-m par-comp-rej-card fin-A
  by blast
qed
end

```

5.7 Elect Composition

```

theory Elect-Composition
  imports Basic-Modules/ Elect-Module
          Sequential-Composition
begin

```

The elect composition sequences an electoral module and the elect module. It finalizes the module's decision as it simply elects all their non-rejected alternatives. Thereby, any such elect-composed module induces a proper voting rule in the social choice sense, as all alternatives are either rejected

or elected.

5.7.1 Definition

```
fun elector ::
('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module  $\Rightarrow$  ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module where
  elector m = (m  $\triangleright$  elect-module)
```

5.7.2 Auxiliary Lemmas

```
lemma elector-seqcomp-assoc:
  fixes
    a :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module and
    b :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module
  shows (a  $\triangleright$  (elector b)) = (elector (a  $\triangleright$  b))
  unfolding elector.simps elect-module.simps sequential-composition.simps
  using boolean-algebra-cancel.sup2 fst-eqD snd-eqD sup-commute
  by (metis (no-types, opaque-lifting))
```

5.7.3 Soundness

```
theorem elector-sound[simp]:
  fixes m :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module
  assumes social-choice-result.electoral-module m
  shows social-choice-result.electoral-module (elector m)
  using assms
  by simp
```

```
lemma elector-only-voters:
  fixes m :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module
  assumes only-voters-vote m
  shows only-voters-vote (elector m)
  using assms
  by (simp add: elect-mod-only-voters seq-comp-only-voters)
```

5.7.4 Electing

```
theorem elector-electing[simp]:
  fixes m :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module
  assumes
    module-m: social-choice-result.electoral-module m and
    non-block-m: non-blocking m
  shows electing (elector m)
proof –
  have  $\forall m'$ .
    ( $\neg$  electing m'  $\vee$  social-choice-result.electoral-module m'  $\wedge$ 
      ( $\forall A' V' p'. (A' \neq \{\} \wedge \text{finite } A' \wedge \text{profile } V' A' p') \longrightarrow$ 
        elect m'  $V' A' p' \neq \{\}$ ))  $\wedge$ 
    (electing m'  $\vee \neg$  social-choice-result.electoral-module m')
```


$\vee (\exists A V p. (A \neq \{\} \wedge \text{finite } A \wedge \text{profile } V A p \wedge \text{elect } m' V A p = \{\}))$
unfolding *electing-def*
by *blast*
hence $\forall m'.$
 $(\neg \text{electing } m' \vee \text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m' \wedge$
 $(\forall A' V' p'. (A' \neq \{\} \wedge \text{finite } A' \wedge \text{profile } V' A' p') \rightarrow \text{elect } m' V' A' p' \neq \{\})) \wedge$
 $(\exists A V p. (\text{electing } m' \vee \neg \text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m' \vee A \neq$
 $\{\} \wedge$
 $\text{finite } A \wedge \text{profile } V A p \wedge \text{elect } m' V A p = \{\}))$
by *simp*
then obtain
 $A :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module} \Rightarrow 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $V :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module} \Rightarrow 'v \text{ set}$ **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module} \Rightarrow ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ **where**
electing-mod:
 $\forall m'::('a, 'v, 'a \text{ Result}) \text{ Electoral-Module}.$
 $(\neg \text{electing } m' \vee \text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m' \wedge$
 $(\forall A' V' p'. (A' \neq \{\} \wedge \text{finite } A' \wedge \text{profile } V' A' p') \rightarrow \text{elect } m' V' A' p' \neq \{\})) \wedge$
 $(\text{electing } m' \vee \neg \text{social-choice-result.electoral-module } m' \vee A m' \neq \{\} \wedge$
 $\text{finite } (A m') \wedge \text{profile } (V m') (A m') (p m') \wedge \text{elect } m' (V m') (A m') (p$
 $m') = \{\})$
by *metis*
moreover have *non-block*:
 $\text{non-blocking } (\text{elect-module}::'v \text{ set} \Rightarrow 'a \text{ set} \Rightarrow ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile} \Rightarrow 'a \text{ Result})$
by (*simp add: electing-imp-non-blocking*)
moreover obtain
 $e :: 'a \text{ Result} \Rightarrow 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $r :: 'a \text{ Result} \Rightarrow 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $d :: 'a \text{ Result} \Rightarrow 'a \text{ set}$ **where**
 $\text{result}::\forall s. (e s, r s, d s) = s$
using *disjoint3.cases*
by (*metis (no-types)*)
moreover from this
have $\forall s. (\text{elect-r } s, r s, d s) = s$
by *simp*
moreover from this
have $\text{profile } (V (\text{elector } m)) (A (\text{elector } m)) (p (\text{elector } m)) \wedge \text{finite } (A (\text{elector } m)) \rightarrow$
 $d (\text{elector } m) (V (\text{elector } m)) (A (\text{elector } m)) (p (\text{elector } m))) = \{\}$
by *simp*
moreover have *social-choice-result.electoral-module* (*elector m*)
using *elector-sound module-m*
by *simp*
moreover from electing-mod result
have $\text{finite } (A (\text{elector } m)) \wedge$
 $\text{profile } (V (\text{elector } m)) (A (\text{elector } m)) (p (\text{elector } m)) \wedge$
 $\text{elect } (\text{elector } m) (V (\text{elector } m)) (A (\text{elector } m)) (p (\text{elector } m)) = \{\} \wedge$

```

      d (elector m (V (elector m)) (A (elector m)) (p (elector m))) = {} ∧
      reject (elector m) (V (elector m)) (A (elector m)) (p (elector m)) =
      r (elector m (V (elector m)) (A (elector m)) (p (elector m))) →
      electing (elector m)
using Diff-empty elector.simps non-block-m snd-conv non-blocking-def reject-not-elec-or-def
      non-block seq-comp-presv-non-blocking
by (metis (mono-tags, opaque-lifting))
ultimately show ?thesis
using non-block-m
unfolding elector.simps
by auto
qed

```

5.7.5 Composition Rule

If m is defer-Condorcet-consistent, then $\text{elector}(m)$ is Condorcet consistent.

```

lemma dcc-imp-cc-elect:
  fixes m :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module
  assumes defer-condorcet-consistency m
  shows condorcet-consistency (elector m)
proof (unfold defer-condorcet-consistency-def condorcet-consistency-def, safe)
  show social-choice-result.electoral-module (elector m)
    using assms elector-sound
    unfolding defer-condorcet-consistency-def
    by metis
next
fix
  A :: 'a set and
  V :: 'v set and
  p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
  w :: 'a
  assume c-win: condorcet-winner V A p w
  have fin-A: finite A
    using condorcet-winner.simps c-win
    by metis
  have fin-V: finite V
    using condorcet-winner.simps c-win
    by metis
  have prof-A: profile V A p
    using c-win
    by simp
  have max-card-w:  $\forall y \in A - \{w\}.$ 
    card  $\{i \in V. (w, y) \in (p\ i)\} <$ 
    card  $\{i \in V. (y, w) \in (p\ i)\}$ 
    using c-win fin-V
    by simp
  have rej-is-complement:  $\text{reject } m\ V\ A\ p = A - (\text{elect } m\ V\ A\ p \cup \text{defer } m\ V\ A\ p)$ 
    using double-diff sup-bot.left-neutral Un-upper2 assms fin-A prof-A fin-V

```

defer-condorcet-consistency-def elec-and-def-not-rej reject-in-alts
by (*metis (no-types, opaque-lifting)*)
have *subset-in-win-set*: $\text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p \cup \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p \subseteq$
 $\{e \in A. e \in A \wedge (\forall x \in A - \{e\}.$
 $\text{card } \{i \in V. (e, x) \in p \ i\} < \text{card } \{i \in V. (x, e) \in p \ i\})\}$
proof (*safe-step*)
fix $x :: 'a$
assume $x\text{-in-elect-or-defer}: x \in \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p \cup \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p$
hence $x\text{-eq-w}: x = w$
using *Diff-empty Diff-iff assms cond-winner-unique c-win fin-A fin-V insert-iff*
 $\text{snd-conv prod.sel}(1) \ \text{sup-bot.left-neutral}$
unfolding *defer-condorcet-consistency-def*
by (*metis (mono-tags, lifting)*)
have $\bigwedge x. x \in \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p \implies x \in A$
using *fin-A prof-A fin-V assms elect-in-alts in-mono*
unfolding *defer-condorcet-consistency-def*
by *metis*
moreover have $\bigwedge x. x \in \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p \implies x \in A$
using *fin-A prof-A fin-V assms defer-in-alts in-mono*
unfolding *defer-condorcet-consistency-def*
by *metis*
ultimately have $x \in A$
using $x\text{-in-elect-or-defer}$
by *auto*
thus $x \in \{e \in A. e \in A \wedge$
 $(\forall x \in A - \{e\}.$
 $\text{card } \{i \in V. (e, x) \in p \ i\} <$
 $\text{card } \{i \in V. (x, e) \in p \ i\})\}$
using $x\text{-eq-w max-card-w}$
by *auto*
qed
moreover have
 $\{e \in A. e \in A \wedge$
 $(\forall x \in A - \{e\}.$
 $\text{card } \{i \in V. (e, x) \in p \ i\} <$
 $\text{card } \{i \in V. (x, e) \in p \ i\})\}$
 $\subseteq \text{elect } m \ V \ A \ p \cup \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p$
proof (*safe*)
fix $x :: 'a$
assume
 $x\text{-not-in-defer}: x \notin \text{defer } m \ V \ A \ p$ **and**
 $x \in A$ **and**
 $\forall x' \in A - \{x\}.$
 $\text{card } \{i \in V. (x, x') \in p \ i\} <$
 $\text{card } \{i \in V. (x', x) \in p \ i\}$
hence $c\text{-win-}x: \text{condorcet-winner } V \ A \ p \ x$
using *fin-A prof-A fin-V*
by *simp*
have (*social-choice-result.electoral-module m* $\wedge \neg$ *defer-condorcet-consistency*)

```

m →
  (∃ A V rs a. condorcet-winner V A rs a ∧
    m V A rs ≠ ({}, A - defer m V A rs, {a ∈ A. condorcet-winner V A rs
a}))) ∧
  (defer-condorcet-consistency m →
    (∀ A V rs a. finite A → finite V → condorcet-winner V A rs a →
      m V A rs = ({}, A - defer m V A rs, {a ∈ A. condorcet-winner V A rs
a})))
  unfolding defer-condorcet-consistency-def
  by blast
  hence m V A p = ({}, A - defer m V A p, {a ∈ A. condorcet-winner V A p
a})
  using c-win-x assms fin-A fin-V
  by blast
  thus x ∈ elect m V A p
  using assms x-not-in-defer fin-A fin-V cond-winner-unique
    defer-condorcet-consistency-def insertCI prod.sel(2) c-win-x
  by (metis (no-types, lifting))
qed
ultimately have
  elect m V A p ∪ defer m V A p =
    {e ∈ A. e ∈ A ∧
      (∀ x ∈ A - {e}.
        card {i ∈ V. (e, x) ∈ p i} <
          card {i ∈ V. (x, e) ∈ p i})}
  by blast
  thus elector m V A p =
    ({e ∈ A. condorcet-winner V A p e}, A - elect (elector m) V A p, {})
  using fin-A prof-A fin-V rej-is-complement
  by simp
qed
end

```

5.8 Defer One Loop Composition

```

theory Defer-One-Loop-Composition
  imports Basic-Modules/Component-Types/Defer-Equal-Condition
    Loop-Composition
    Elect-Composition
begin

```

This is a family of loop compositions. It uses the same module in sequence until either no new decisions are made or only one alternative is remaining in the defer-set. The second family herein uses the above family and

subsequently elects the remaining alternative.

5.8.1 Definition

fun *iter* :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module \Rightarrow ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module
where

iter *m* =
 (let *t* = defer-equal-condition 1 in
 (*m* \circ_t))

abbreviation *defer-one-loop* ::

('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module \Rightarrow ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module
 ($\circ_{\exists!d}$ 50) **where**

m $\circ_{\exists!d} \equiv$ *iter* *m*

fun *iterelect* :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module \Rightarrow ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module **where**

iterelect *m* = *elector* (*m* $\circ_{\exists!d}$)

end

Chapter 6

Voting Rules

6.1 Plurality Rule

```
theory Plurality-Rule
  imports Compositional-Structures/Basic-Modules/Plurality-Module
           Compositional-Structures/Revision-Composition
           Compositional-Structures/Elect-Composition
begin
```

This is a definition of the plurality voting rule as elimination module as well as directly. In the former one, the max operator of the set of the scores of all alternatives is evaluated and is used as the threshold value.

6.1.1 Definition

```
fun plurality-rule :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module where
  plurality-rule V A p = elector plurality V A p
```

```
fun plurality-rule' :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module where
  plurality-rule' V A p =
    ({a ∈ A. ∀ x ∈ A. win-count V p x ≤ win-count V p a},
     {a ∈ A. ∃ x ∈ A. win-count V p x > win-count V p a},
     {})
```

```
lemma plurality-revision-equiv:
```

```
  fixes
    A :: 'a set and
    V :: 'v set and
    p :: ('a, 'v) Profile
  shows plurality' V A p = (plurality-rule'↓) V A p
proof (unfold plurality-rule'.simps plurality'.simps revision-composition.simps,
       standard, clarsimp, standard, safe)
  fix
    a :: 'a and
    b :: 'a
```

```

assume
  finite  $V$  and
   $b \in A$  and
   $\text{card } \{i. i \in V \wedge \text{above } (p \ i) \ a = \{a\}\} <$ 
     $\text{card } \{i. i \in V \wedge \text{above } (p \ i) \ b = \{b\}\}$  and
   $\forall a' \in A. \text{card } \{i. i \in V \wedge \text{above } (p \ i) \ a' = \{a'\}\} \leq$ 
     $\text{card } \{i. i \in V \wedge \text{above } (p \ i) \ a = \{a\}\}$ 
thus False
using leD
by blast
next
fix
   $a :: 'a$  and
   $b :: 'a$ 
assume
  finite  $V$  and
   $b \in A$  and
   $\neg \text{card } \{i. i \in V \wedge \text{above } (p \ i) \ b = \{b\}\} \leq$ 
     $\text{card } \{i. i \in V \wedge \text{above } (p \ i) \ a = \{a\}\}$ 
thus  $\exists x \in A.$ 
   $\text{card } \{i. i \in V \wedge \text{above } (p \ i) \ a = \{a\}\}$ 
     $< \text{card } \{i. i \in V \wedge \text{above } (p \ i) \ x = \{x\}\}$ 
using linorder-not-less
by blast
next
fix
   $a :: 'a$  and
   $b :: 'a$ 
assume
  finite  $V$  and
   $b \in A$  and
   $a \in A$  and
   $\text{card } \{v \in V. \text{above } (p \ v) \ a = \{a\}\} < \text{card } \{v \in V. \text{above } (p \ v) \ b = \{b\}\}$  and
   $\forall c \in A. \text{card } \{v \in V. \text{above } (p \ v) \ c = \{c\}\} \leq \text{card } \{v \in V. \text{above } (p \ v) \ a =$ 
 $\{a\}\}$ 
thus False
by auto
qed

lemma plurality-elim-equiv:
fixes
   $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
   $V :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
   $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$ 
assumes
   $A \neq \{\}$  and
  finite  $A$  and
  profile  $V \ A \ p$ 
shows plurality  $V \ A \ p = (\text{plurality-rule'} \downarrow) \ V \ A \ p$ 

```

using *assms plurality-mod-elim-equiv plurality-revision-equiv*
 by (*metis (full-types)*)

6.1.2 Soundness

theorem *plurality-rule-sound[simp]: social-choice-result.electoral-module plurality-rule*
 unfolding *plurality-rule.simps*
 using *elector-sound plurality-sound*
 by *metis*

theorem *plurality-rule'-sound[simp]: social-choice-result.electoral-module plurality-rule'*
proof (*unfold social-choice-result.electoral-module-def, safe*)

fix
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $V :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$
have *disjoint3* (
 $\{a \in A. \forall a' \in A. \text{win-count } V \ p \ a' \leq \text{win-count } V \ p \ a\},$
 $\{a \in A. \exists a' \in A. \text{win-count } V \ p \ a < \text{win-count } V \ p \ a'\},$
 $\{\}$)
 by *auto*
moreover have
 $\{a \in A. \forall x \in A. \text{win-count } V \ p \ x \leq \text{win-count } V \ p \ a\} \cup$
 $\{a \in A. \exists x \in A. \text{win-count } V \ p \ a < \text{win-count } V \ p \ x\} = A$
 using *not-le-imp-less*
 by *auto*
ultimately show *well-formed-social-choice A (plurality-rule' V A p)*
 by *simp*
qed

lemma *plurality-rule-only-voters:*
only-voters-vote plurality-rule
 unfolding *plurality-rule.simps*
 using *elector-only-voters plurality-only-voters*
 by *blast*

6.1.3 Electing

lemma *plurality-rule-elect-non-empty:*
fixes
 $A :: 'a \text{ set}$ **and**
 $V :: 'v \text{ set}$ **and**
 $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$
assumes
 $A\text{-non-empty: } A \neq \{\}$ **and**
 $\text{prof-A: profile } V \ A \ p$ **and**
 $\text{fin-A: finite } A$
shows *elect plurality-rule V A p $\neq \{\}$*
proof
 assume *plurality-elect-none: elect plurality-rule V A p = $\{\}$*

obtain *max* **where**
max: $max = Max (win-count \ V \ p \ ' \ A)$
by *simp*
then obtain *a* **where**
max-a: $win-count \ V \ p \ a = max \wedge a \in A$
using *Max-in A-non-empty fin-A prof-A empty-is-image finite-imageI imageE*
by (*metis (no-types, lifting)*)
hence $\forall \ a' \in A. win-count \ V \ p \ a' \leq win-count \ V \ p \ a$
using *fin-A prof-A max*
by *simp*
moreover have $a \in A$
using *max-a*
by *simp*
ultimately have $a \in \{a' \in A. \forall \ c \in A. win-count \ V \ p \ c \leq win-count \ V \ p \ a'\}$
by *blast*
hence $a \in elect \ plurality-rule' \ V \ A \ p$
by *simp*
moreover have $elect \ plurality-rule' \ V \ A \ p = defer \ plurality \ V \ A \ p$
using *plurality-elim-equiv fin-A prof-A A-non-empty snd-conv*
unfolding *revision-composition.simps*
by *metis*
ultimately have $a \in defer \ plurality \ V \ A \ p$
by *blast*
hence $a \in elect \ plurality-rule \ V \ A \ p$
by *simp*
thus *False*
using *plurality-elect-none all-not-in-conv*
by *metis*
qed

The plurality module is electing.

theorem *plurality-rule-electing[simp]: electing plurality-rule*
proof (*unfold electing-def, safe*)
show *social-choice-result.electoral-module plurality-rule*
using *plurality-rule-sound*
by *simp*
next
fix
A :: '*b* set **and**
V :: '*a* set **and**
p :: ('*b*, '*a*) Profile **and**
a :: '*b*
assume
fin-A: finite *A* **and**
prof-p: profile *V A p* **and**
elect-none: $elect \ plurality-rule \ V \ A \ p = \{\}$ **and**
a-in-A: $a \in A$
have $\forall \ A \ V \ p. A \neq \{\} \wedge finite \ A \wedge profile \ V \ A \ p \longrightarrow elect \ plurality-rule \ V \ A \ p \neq \{\}$

```

    using plurality-rule-elect-non-empty
    by (metis (no-types))
  hence empty-A:  $A = \{\}$ 
    using fin-A prof-p elect-none
    by (metis (no-types))
  thus  $a \in \{\}$ 
    using a-in-A
    by simp
qed

```

6.1.4 Property

lemma *plurality-rule-inv-mono-eq*:

```

  fixes
    A :: 'a set and
    V :: 'v set and
    p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    q :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
    a :: 'a
  assumes
    elect-a:  $a \in \text{elect } \text{plurality-rule } V A p$  and
    lift-a:  $\text{lifted } V A p q a$ 
  shows  $\text{elect } \text{plurality-rule } V A q = \text{elect } \text{plurality-rule } V A p \vee$ 
     $\text{elect } \text{plurality-rule } V A q = \{a\}$ 
proof -
  have  $a \in \text{elect } (\text{elector plurality}) V A p$ 
    using elect-a
    by simp
  moreover have  $\text{eq-p: } \text{elect } (\text{elector plurality}) V A p = \text{defer plurality } V A p$ 
    by simp
  ultimately have  $a \in \text{defer plurality } V A p$ 
    by blast
  hence  $\text{defer plurality } V A q = \text{defer plurality } V A p \vee \text{defer plurality } V A q =$ 
 $\{a\}$ 
    using lift-a plurality-def-inv-mono-alts
    by metis
  moreover have  $\text{elect } (\text{elector plurality}) V A q = \text{defer plurality } V A q$ 
    by simp
  ultimately show
     $\text{elect } \text{plurality-rule } V A q = \text{elect } \text{plurality-rule } V A p \vee$ 
     $\text{elect } \text{plurality-rule } V A q = \{a\}$ 
    using eq-p
    by simp
qed

```

The plurality rule is invariant-monotone.

theorem *plurality-rule-inv-mono[simp]*: *invariant-monotonicity plurality-rule*

proof (*unfold invariant-monotonicity-def, intro conjI impI allI*)

show *social-choice-result.electoral-module plurality-rule*

```

    by simp
next
fix
  A :: 'b set and
  V :: 'a set and
  p :: ('b, 'a) Profile and
  q :: ('b, 'a) Profile and
  a :: 'b
  assume a ∈ elect plurality-rule V A p ∧ Profile.lifted V A p q a
  thus elect plurality-rule V A q = elect plurality-rule V A p ∨
    elect plurality-rule V A q = {a}
    using plurality-rule-inv-mono-eq
  by metis
qed
end

```

6.2 Borda Rule

theory *Borda-Rule*

imports *Compositional-Structures/Basic-Modules/Borda-Module*
Compositional-Structures/Basic-Modules/Component-Types/Votewise-Distance-Rationalization
Compositional-Structures/Elect-Composition

begin

This is the Borda rule. On each ballot, each alternative is assigned a score that depends on how many alternatives are ranked below. The sum of all such scores for an alternative is hence called their Borda score. The alternative with the highest Borda score is elected.

6.2.1 Definition

fun *borda-rule* :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module **where**
borda-rule V A p = *elector borda* V A p

fun *borda-rule_R* :: ('a, 'v::wellorder, 'a Result) Electoral-Module **where**
borda-rule_R V A p = *swap-R unanimity* V A p

6.2.2 Soundness

theorem *borda-rule-sound: social-choice-result.electoral-module borda-rule*
unfolding *borda-rule.simps*
using *elector-sound borda-sound*
by *metis*

```

theorem borda-rule $\mathcal{R}$ -sound: social-choice-result.electoral-module borda-rule $\mathcal{R}$ 
  unfolding borda-rule $\mathcal{R}$ .simps swap- $\mathcal{R}$ .simps
  using social-choice-result. $\mathcal{R}$ -sound
  by metis

```

6.2.3 Anonymity Property

```

theorem borda-rule $\mathcal{R}$ -anonymous: social-choice-result.anonymity borda-rule $\mathcal{R}$ 
proof (unfold borda-rule $\mathcal{R}$ .simps swap- $\mathcal{R}$ .simps)
  let ?swap-dist = votewise-distance swap l-one
  from l-one-is-sym
  have distance-anonymity ?swap-dist
    using symmetric-norm-imp-distance-anonymous[of l-one]
    by simp
  with unanimity-anonymous
  show social-choice-result.anonymity
    (social-choice-result.distance- $\mathcal{R}$  ?swap-dist unanimity)
  using social-choice-result.anonymous-distance-and-consensus-imp-rule-anonymity
  by metis
qed

end

```

6.3 Pairwise Majority Rule

```

theory Pairwise-Majority-Rule
  imports Compositional-Structures/Basic-Modules/Condorcet-Module
    Compositional-Structures/Defer-One-Loop-Composition
begin

```

This is the pairwise majority rule, a voting rule that implements the Condorcet criterion, i.e., it elects the Condorcet winner if it exists, otherwise a tie remains between all alternatives.

6.3.1 Definition

```

fun pairwise-majority-rule :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module where
  pairwise-majority-rule V A p = elector condorcet V A p

```

```

fun condorcet' :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module where
  condorcet' V A p =
    ((min-eliminator condorcet-score)  $\odot_{\exists!d}$ ) V A p

```

```

fun pairwise-majority-rule' :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module where
  pairwise-majority-rule' V A p = iterelect condorcet' V A p

```

6.3.2 Soundness

theorem *pairwise-majority-rule-sound:*
social-choice-result.electoral-module pairwise-majority-rule
unfolding *pairwise-majority-rule.simps*
using *condorcet-sound elector-sound*
by *metis*

theorem *condorcet'-rule-sound:*
social-choice-result.electoral-module condorcet'
unfolding *condorcet'.simps*
by (*simp add: loop-comp-sound*)

theorem *pairwise-majority-rule'-sound:*
social-choice-result.electoral-module pairwise-majority-rule'
unfolding *pairwise-majority-rule'.simps*
using *condorcet'-rule-sound elector-sound iter.simps iterelect.simps loop-comp-sound*
by *metis*

6.3.3 Condorcet Consistency Property

theorem *condorcet-condorcet: condorcet-consistency pairwise-majority-rule*
proof (*unfold pairwise-majority-rule.simps*)
show *condorcet-consistency (elector condorcet)*
using *condorcet-is-dcc dcc-imp-cc-elector*
by *metis*
qed
end

6.4 Copeland Rule

theory *Copeland-Rule*
imports *Compositional-Structures/Basic-Modules/Copeland-Module*
Compositional-Structures/Elect-Composition
begin

This is the Copeland voting rule. The idea is to elect the alternatives with the highest difference between the amount of simple-majority wins and the amount of simple-majority losses.

6.4.1 Definition

fun *copeland-rule* :: (*'a, 'v, 'a Result*) *Electoral-Module* **where**
copeland-rule V A p = elector copeland V A p

6.4.2 Soundness

```
theorem copeland-rule-sound: social-choice-result.electoral-module copeland-rule  
  unfolding copeland-rule.simps  
  using elector-sound copeland-sound  
  by metis
```

6.4.3 Condorcet Consistency Property

```
theorem copeland-condorcet: condorcet-consistency copeland-rule  
proof (unfold copeland-rule.simps)  
  show condorcet-consistency (elector copeland)  
    using copeland-is-dcc dcc-imp-cc-elect  
    by metis  
qed  
  
end
```

6.5 Minimax Rule

```
theory Minimax-Rule  
  imports Compositional-Structures/Basic-Modules/Minimax-Module  
           Compositional-Structures/Elect-Composition  
begin
```

This is the Minimax voting rule. It elects the alternatives with the highest Minimax score.

6.5.1 Definition

```
fun minimax-rule :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module where  
  minimax-rule V A p = elector minimax V A p
```

6.5.2 Soundness

```
theorem minimax-rule-sound: social-choice-result.electoral-module minimax-rule  
  unfolding minimax-rule.simps  
  using elector-sound minimax-sound  
  by metis
```

6.5.3 Condorcet Consistency Property

```
theorem minimax-condorcet: condorcet-consistency minimax-rule  
proof (unfold minimax-rule.simps)  
  show condorcet-consistency (elector minimax)  
    using minimax-is-dcc dcc-imp-cc-elect
```

```

    by metis
qed

end

```

6.6 Black's Rule

```

theory Blacks-Rule
  imports Pairwise-Majority-Rule
          Borda-Rule
begin

```

This is Black's voting rule. It is composed of a function that determines the Condorcet winner, i.e., the Pairwise Majority rule, and the Borda rule. Whenever there exists no Condorcet winner, it elects the choice made by the Borda rule, otherwise the Condorcet winner is elected.

6.6.1 Definition

```

declare seq-comp-alt-eq[simp]

fun black :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module where
  black A p = (condorcet  $\triangleright$  borda) A p

fun blacks-rule :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module where
  blacks-rule A p = elector black A p

export-code blacks-rule in Haskell

declare seq-comp-alt-eq[simp del]

```

6.6.2 Soundness

```

theorem blacks-sound: social-choice-result.electoral-module black
  unfolding black.simps
  using seq-comp-sound condorcet-sound borda-sound
  by metis

theorem blacks-rule-sound: social-choice-result.electoral-module blacks-rule
  unfolding blacks-rule.simps
  using blacks-sound elector-sound
  by metis

```

6.6.3 Condorcet Consistency Property

```

theorem black-is-dcc: defer-condorcet-consistency black

```

```

unfolding black.simps
using condorcet-is-dcc borda-mod-non-blocking borda-mod-non-electing seq-comp-dcc
by metis

theorem black-condorcet: condorcet-consistency blacks-rule
  unfolding blacks-rule.simps
  using black-is-dcc dcc-imp-cc-elector
  by metis

end

```

6.7 Nanson-Baldwin Rule

```

theory Nanson-Baldwin-Rule
  imports Compositional-Structures/Basic-Modules/Borda-Module
           Compositional-Structures/Defer-One-Loop-Composition
begin

```

This is the Nanson-Baldwin voting rule. It excludes alternatives with the lowest Borda score from the set of possible winners and then adjusts the Borda score to the new (remaining) set of still eligible alternatives.

6.7.1 Definition

```

fun nanson-baldwin-rule :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module where
  nanson-baldwin-rule A p =
    ((min-eliminator borda-score)  $\odot_{\exists!d}$ ) A p

```

6.7.2 Soundness

```

theorem nanson-baldwin-rule-sound:
social-choice-result.electoral-module nanson-baldwin-rule
  unfolding nanson-baldwin-rule.simps
  by (simp add: loop-comp-sound)

end

```

6.8 Classic Nanson Rule

```

theory Classic-Nanson-Rule
  imports Compositional-Structures/Basic-Modules/Borda-Module
           Compositional-Structures/Defer-One-Loop-Composition

```


begin

This is the classic Nanson’s voting rule, i.e., the rule that was originally invented by Nanson, but not the Nanson-Baldwin rule. The idea is similar, however, as alternatives with a Borda score less or equal than the average Borda score are excluded. The Borda scores of the remaining alternatives are hence adjusted to the new set of (still) eligible alternatives.

6.8.1 Definition

```
fun classic-nanson-rule :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module where
  classic-nanson-rule V A p =
    ((leq-average-eliminator borda-score)  $\circ_{\exists!d}$ ) V A p
```

```
export-code classic-nanson-rule in Haskell
```

6.8.2 Soundness

```
theorem classic-nanson-rule-sound: social-choice-result.electoral-module classic-nanson-rule
  unfolding classic-nanson-rule.simps
  by (simp add: loop-comp-sound)
end
```

6.9 Schwartz Rule

```
theory Schwartz-Rule
  imports Compositional-Structures/Basic-Modules/Borda-Module
           Compositional-Structures/Defer-One-Loop-Composition
begin
```

This is the Schwartz voting rule. Confusingly, it is sometimes also referred as Nanson’s rule. The Schwartz rule proceeds as in the classic Nanson’s rule, but excludes alternatives with a Borda score that is strictly less than the average Borda score.

6.9.1 Definition

```
fun schwartz-rule :: ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module where
  schwartz-rule V A p =
    ((less-average-eliminator borda-score)  $\circ_{\exists!d}$ ) V A p
```

6.9.2 Soundness

```
theorem schwartz-rule-sound: social-choice-result.electoral-module schwartz-rule
```

```

unfolding schwartz-rule.simps
by (simp add: loop-comp-sound)

end

```

6.10 Sequential Majority Comparison

```

theory Sequential-Majority-Comparison
imports Plurality-Rule
          Compositional-Structures/Drop-And-Pass-Compatibility
          Compositional-Structures/Revision-Composition
          Compositional-Structures/Maximum-Parallel-Composition
          Compositional-Structures/Defer-One-Loop-Composition
begin

```

Sequential majority comparison compares two alternatives by plurality voting. The loser gets rejected, and the winner is compared to the next alternative. This process is repeated until only a single alternative is left, which is then elected.

6.10.1 Definition

```

fun smc :: 'a Preference-Relation  $\Rightarrow$  ('a, 'v, 'a Result) Electoral-Module where
  smc x V A p =
    ((elector (((pass-module 2 x)  $\triangleright$  ((plurality-rule  $\downarrow$ )  $\triangleright$  (pass-module 1 x))))  $\parallel_{\uparrow}$ 
      (drop-module 2 x))  $\odot_{\exists ! d}$ ) V A p)

```

6.10.2 Soundness

As all base components are electoral modules (, aggregators, or termination conditions), and all used compositional structures create electoral modules, sequential majority comparison unsurprisingly is an electoral module.

```

theorem smc-sound:
  fixes x :: 'a Preference-Relation
  assumes linear-order x
  shows social-choice-result.electoral-module (smc x)
proof (unfold social-choice-result.electoral-module-def, simp, safe, simp-all)
fix
  A :: 'a set and
  V :: 'v set and
  p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
  x' :: 'a
  let ?a = max-aggregator

```

```

let ?t = defer-equal-condition
let ?smc =
  pass-module 2 x ▷
    ((plurality-rule↓) ▷ pass-module (Suc 0) x) ||?a
    drop-module 2 x ∘?t (Suc 0)
assume
  profile V A p and
  x' ∈ reject (?smc) V A p and
  x' ∈ elect (?smc) V A p
thus False
using IntI drop-mod-sound emptyE loop-comp-sound max-agg-sound assms
  par-comp-sound pass-mod-sound plurality-rule-sound rev-comp-sound
  result-disj seq-comp-sound
by metis
next
fix
  A :: 'a set and
  V :: 'v set and
  p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
  x' :: 'a
let ?a = max-aggregator
let ?t = defer-equal-condition
let ?smc =
  pass-module 2 x ▷
    ((plurality-rule↓) ▷ pass-module (Suc 0) x) ||?a
    drop-module 2 x ∘?t (Suc 0)
assume
  profile V A p and
  x' ∈ reject (?smc) V A p and
  x' ∈ defer (?smc) V A p
thus False
using IntI assms result-disj emptyE drop-mod-sound loop-comp-sound
  max-agg-sound par-comp-sound pass-mod-sound plurality-rule-sound
  rev-comp-sound seq-comp-sound
by metis
next
fix
  A :: 'a set and
  V :: 'v set and
  p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
  x' :: 'a
let ?a = max-aggregator
let ?t = defer-equal-condition
let ?smc =
  pass-module 2 x ▷
    ((plurality-rule↓) ▷ pass-module (Suc 0) x) ||?a
    drop-module 2 x ∘?t (Suc 0)
assume
  prof: profile V A p and

```

```

    elect-x':  $x' \in \text{elect } (?smc) \ V \ A \ p$ 
have social-choice-result.electoral-module ?smc
  by (simp add: loop-comp-sound)
thus  $x' \in A$ 
  using prof elect-x' elect-in-alts
  by blast
next
fix
   $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
   $V :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
   $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$  and
   $x' :: 'a$ 
let ?a = max-aggregator
let ?t = defer-equal-condition
let ?smc =
  pass-module 2 x  $\triangleright$ 
  ((plurality-rule $\downarrow$ )  $\triangleright$  pass-module (Suc 0) x)  $\parallel_{?a}$ 
  drop-module 2 x  $\odot_{?t}$  (Suc 0)
assume
  prof: profile V A p and
  defer-x':  $x' \in \text{defer } (?smc) \ V \ A \ p$ 
have social-choice-result.electoral-module ?smc
  by (simp add: loop-comp-sound)
thus  $x' \in A$ 
  using prof defer-x' defer-in-alts
  by blast
next
fix
   $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and
   $V :: 'v \text{ set}$  and
   $p :: ('a, 'v) \text{ Profile}$  and
   $x' :: 'a$ 
let ?a = max-aggregator
let ?t = defer-equal-condition
let ?smc =
  pass-module 2 x  $\triangleright$ 
  ((plurality-rule $\downarrow$ )  $\triangleright$  pass-module (Suc 0) x)  $\parallel_{?a}$ 
  drop-module 2 x  $\odot_{?t}$  (Suc 0)
assume
  prof: profile V A p and
  reject-x':  $x' \in \text{reject } (?smc) \ V \ A \ p$ 
have social-choice-result.electoral-module ?smc
  by (simp add: loop-comp-sound)
thus  $x' \in A$ 
  using prof reject-x' reject-in-alts
  by blast
next
fix
   $A :: 'a \text{ set}$  and

```

```

  V :: 'v set and
  p :: ('a, 'v) Profile and
  x' :: 'a
let ?a = max-aggregator
let ?t = defer-equal-condition
let ?smc =
  pass-module 2 x ▷
  ((plurality-rule↓) ▷ pass-module (Suc 0) x) ||?a
  drop-module 2 x ∘?t (Suc 0)
assume
  profile V A p and
  x' ∈ A and
  x' ∉ defer (?smc) V A p and
  x' ∉ reject (?smc) V A p
thus x' ∈ elect (?smc) V A p
  using assms electoral-mod-defer-elem drop-mod-sound loop-comp-sound
  max-agg-sound par-comp-sound pass-mod-sound plurality-rule-sound
  rev-comp-sound seq-comp-sound
  by metis
qed

```

6.10.3 Electing

The sequential majority comparison electoral module is electing. This property is needed to convert electoral modules to a social choice function. Apart from the very last proof step, it is a part of the monotonicity proof below.

theorem *smc-electing*:

fixes $x :: 'a$ *Preference-Relation*

assumes *linear-order* x

shows *electing* (*smc* x)

proof –

let $?pass2 = \text{pass-module } 2 \ x$

let $?tie-breaker = (\text{pass-module } 1 \ x)$

let $?plurality-defer = (\text{plurality-rule}\downarrow) \triangleright ?tie-breaker$

let $?compare-two = ?pass2 \triangleright ?plurality-defer$

let $?drop2 = \text{drop-module } 2 \ x$

let $?eliminator = ?compare-two \parallel_{\uparrow} ?drop2$

let $?loop =$

let $t = \text{defer-equal-condition } 1 \text{ in } (?eliminator \circ_t)$

have 00011: *non-electing* (*plurality-rule*↓)

by *simp*

have 00012: *non-electing* $?tie-breaker$

using *assms*

by *simp*

have 00013: *defers* 1 $?tie-breaker$

using *assms pass-one-mod-def-one*

by *simp*

have 20000: *non-blocking* (*plurality-rule*↓)

```

  by simp
have 0020: disjoint-compatibility ?pass2 ?drop2
  using assms
  by simp
have 1000: non-electing ?pass2
  using assms
  by simp
have 1001: non-electing ?plurality-defer
  using 00011 00012 seq-comp-presv-non-electing
  by blast
have 2000: non-blocking ?pass2
  using assms
  by simp
have 2001: defers 1 ?plurality-defer
  using 20000 00011 00013 seq-comp-def-one
  by blast
have 002: disjoint-compatibility ?compare-two ?drop2
  using assms 0020 disj-compat-seq pass-mod-sound plurality-rule-sound
    rev-comp-sound seq-comp-sound pass-mod-only-voters
    plurality-rule-only-voters seq-comp-only-voters
    rev-comp-only-voters
  by metis
have 100: non-electing ?compare-two
  using 1000 1001 seq-comp-presv-non-electing
  by simp
have 101: non-electing ?drop2
  using assms
  by simp
have 102: agg-conservative max-aggregator
  by simp
have 200: defers 1 ?compare-two
  using 2000 1000 2001 seq-comp-def-one
  by simp
have 201: rejects 2 ?drop2
  using assms
  by simp
have 10: non-electing ?eliminator
  using 100 101 102 conserv-max-agg-presv-non-electing
  by blast
have 20: eliminates 1 ?eliminator
  using 200 100 201 002 par-comp-elim-one
  by simp
have 2: defers 1 ?loop
  using 10 20 iter-elim-def-n zero-less-one prod.exhaust-sel
    defer-equal-condition.simps
  by metis
have 3: electing elect-module
  by simp
show ?thesis

```

```

    using 2 3 assms seq-comp-electing smc-sound
    unfolding Defer-One-Loop-Composition.iter.simps
              smc.simps elector.simps electing-def
    by metis
qed

```

6.10.4 (Weak) Monotonicity Property

The following proof is a fully modular proof for weak monotonicity of sequential majority comparison. It is composed of many small steps.

theorem *smc-monotone*:

fixes $x :: 'a$ *Preference-Relation*

assumes *linear-order* x

shows *monotonicity* ($smc\ x$)

proof –

let $?pass2 = pass-module\ 2\ x$

let $?tie-breaker = pass-module\ 1\ x$

let $?plurality-defer = (plurality-rule\downarrow) \triangleright ?tie-breaker$

let $?compare-two = ?pass2 \triangleright ?plurality-defer$

let $?drop2 = drop-module\ 2\ x$

let $?eliminator = ?compare-two \parallel_{\uparrow} ?drop2$

let $?loop =$
 $let\ t = defer-equal-condition\ 1\ in\ (?eliminator \circ_t)$

have 00010: *defer-invariant-monotonicity* ($plurality-rule\downarrow$)

by *simp*

have 00011: *non-electing* ($plurality-rule\downarrow$)

by *simp*

have 00012: *non-electing* $?tie-breaker$

using *assms*

by *simp*

have 00013: *defers* 1 $?tie-breaker$

using *assms pass-one-mod-def-one*

by *simp*

have 00014: *defer-monotonicity* $?tie-breaker$

using *assms*

by *simp*

have 20000: *non-blocking* ($plurality-rule\downarrow$)

by *simp*

have 0000: *defer-lift-invariance* $?pass2$

using *assms*

by *simp*

have 0001: *defer-lift-invariance* $?plurality-defer$

using 00010 00012 00013 00014 *def-inv-mono-imp-def-lift-inv*

unfolding *pass-module.simps only-voters-vote-def*

by *blast*

have 0020: *disjoint-compatibility* $?pass2\ ?drop2$

using *assms*

by *simp*

```

have 1000: non-electing ?pass2
  using assms
  by simp
have 1001: non-electing ?plurality-defer
  using 00011 00012 seq-comp-presv-non-electing
  by blast
have 2000: non-blocking ?pass2
  using assms
  by simp
have 2001: defers 1 ?plurality-defer
  using 20000 00011 00013 seq-comp-def-one
  by blast
have 000: defer-lift-invariance ?compare-two
  using 0000 0001 seq-comp-presv-def-lift-inv
    plurality-rule-only-voters pass-mod-only-voters
    rev-comp-only-voters seq-comp-only-voters
  by blast
have 001: defer-lift-invariance ?drop2
  using assms
  by simp
have 002: disjoint-compatibility ?compare-two ?drop2
  using assms 0020 disj-compat-seq pass-mod-sound pass-mod-only-voters
    plurality-rule-sound rev-comp-sound seq-comp-sound
    plurality-rule-only-voters pass-mod-only-voters
    rev-comp-only-voters seq-comp-only-voters
  by metis
have 100: non-electing ?compare-two
  using 1000 1001 seq-comp-presv-non-electing
  by simp
have 101: non-electing ?drop2
  using assms
  by simp
have 102: agg-conservative max-aggregator
  by simp
have 200: defers 1 ?compare-two
  using 2000 1000 2001 seq-comp-def-one
  by simp
have 201: rejects 2 ?drop2
  using assms
  by simp
have 00: defer-lift-invariance ?eliminator
  using 000 001 002 par-comp-def-lift-inv
  by blast
have 10: non-electing ?eliminator
  using 100 101 conserv-max-agg-presv-non-electing
  by blast
have 20: eliminates 1 ?eliminator
  using 200 100 201 002 par-comp-elim-one
  by simp

```



```

have 0: defer-lift-invariance ?loop
  using 00 loop-comp-presv-def-lift-inv
    plurality-rule-only-voters pass-mod-only-voters drop-mod-only-voters
    rev-comp-only-voters seq-comp-only-voters max-par-comp-only-voters
  by metis
have 1: non-electing ?loop
  using 10 loop-comp-presv-non-electing
  by simp
have 2: defers 1 ?loop
  using 10 20 iter-elim-def-n prod.exhaust-sel zero-less-one defer-equal-condition.simps
  by metis
have 3: electing elect-module
  by simp
show ?thesis
  using 0 1 2 3 assms seq-comp-mono
  unfolding Electoral-Module.monotonicity-def elector.simps
    Defer-One-Loop-Composition.iter.simps
    smc-sound smc.simps
  by (metis (full-types))
qed

end

```

6.11 Kemeny Rule

```

theory Kemeny-Rule
  imports
    Compositional-Structures/Basic-Modules/Component-Types/Votewise-Distance-Rationalization
    Compositional-Structures/Basic-Modules/Component-Types/Distance-Rationalization-Symmetry
  begin

```

This is the Kemeny rule. It creates a complete ordering of alternatives and evaluates each ordering of the alternatives in terms of the sum of preference reversals on each ballot that would have to be performed in order to produce that transitive ordering. The complete ordering which requires the fewest preference reversals is the final result of the method.

6.11.1 Definition

```

fun kemeny-rule :: ('a, 'v::wellorder, 'a Result) Electoral-Module where
  kemeny-rule V A p = swap- $\mathcal{R}$  strong-unanimity V A p

```

6.11.2 Soundness

```

theorem kemeny-rule-sound: social-choice-result.electoral-module kemeny-rule
  unfolding kemeny-rule.simps swap- $\mathcal{R}$ .simps

```

using *social-choice-result.R-sound*
by *metis*

6.11.3 Anonymity Property

theorem *kemeny-rule-anonymous: social-choice-result.anonymity kemeny-rule*
proof (*unfold kemeny-rule.simps swap-R.simps*)
let *?swap-dist = votewise-distance swap l-one*
have *distance-anonymity ?swap-dist*
using *l-one-is-sym symmetric-norm-imp-distance-anonymous[of l-one]*
by *simp*
thus *social-choice-result.anonymity*
(social-choice-result.distance-R ?swap-dist strong-unanimity)
using *strong-unanimity-anonymous*
social-choice-result.anonymous-distance-and-consensus-imp-rule-anonymity
by *metis*
qed

6.11.4 Neutrality Property

lemma *swap-dist-neutral: distance-neutrality valid-elections (votewise-distance swap l-one)*
using *neutral-dist-imp-neutral-votewise-dist swap-neutral*
by *blast*

theorem *kemeny-rule-neutral: social-choice-properties.neutrality valid-elections kemeny-rule*
using *strong-unanimity-neutral' swap-dist-neutral*
strong-unanimity-closed-under-neutrality
social-choice-properties.neutr-dist-and-cons-imp-neutr-dr[of
votewise-distance swap l-one strong-unanimity]
unfolding *kemeny-rule.simps swap-R.simps*
by *blast*

6.11.5 Datatype Instantiation

datatype *alternative = a | b | c | d*

lemma *alternative-univ [code-unfold]: UNIV = {a, b, c, d} (is - = ?A)*
proof (*rule UNIV-eq-I*)
fix *x :: alternative*
show *x ∈ ?A*
by (*cases x*) *simp-all*
qed

instantiation *alternative :: enum*
begin

definition *Enum.enum ≡ [a, b, c, d]*
definition *Enum.enum-all P ≡ P a ∧ P b ∧ P c ∧ P d*
definition *Enum.enum-ex P ≡ P a ∨ P b ∨ P c ∨ P d*

```

instance proof
  qed (simp-all only: enum-alternative-def enum-all-alternative-def
        enum-ex-alternative-def alternative-univ, simp-all)
end

end

```

Bibliography

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- [2] K. Diekhoff, M. Kirsten, and J. Krämer. Verified construction of fair voting rules. In M. Gabbrielli, editor, *29th International Symposium on Logic-Based Program Synthesis and Transformation (LOPSTR 2019), Revised Selected Papers*, volume 12042 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, pages 90–104. Springer, 2020.