


B. Imports

The executable imports 6 libraries in total, and in particular PESTudio marks as blacklisted 21 functions belonging to *Kernel32.dll* and *user32.dll*. The most interesting are:

- **getModuleHandleA**, to call external files, such as *dll* or *exe*;
- **loadLibraryA**, similar to the one above;
- **GetProcAddress**, to get the address of a procedure inside a library;
- **getStartupInfoA**, to get information about startup;
- **getCommandLineW**, to let the program execute code on the command line;

Moreover there are also imports of functions dealing with *Threads*, *Clipboard* and *Windows*. This suggests a suspicious behavior, due to the possibility of the program to access to all the libraries of the installed operating system. In the dynamic analysis we will see what actions are actually performed. The figure below contains all the blacklisted imports detected by PESTudio.



C. Strings

Regarding strings we noticed that those in *.text*, *.data* and *.rsrc* sections are in clear; furthermore many of them are function calls or values used to modify system registers. Following them there are thousands of obfuscated strings, seemingly meaningless, which belong to the “*vpm0*” section. This is another clue of code obfuscation.

III. DYNAMIC ANALYSIS

The dynamic analysis consists of the execution of the malware in a controlled and isolated system to observe the behavior and the malicious actions performed.

To accomplish this task we used *VirtualBox*, a virtualization program that let us run a Windows 7 machine. VirtualBox handles the snapshots too, so that after every test the machine was restored to its initial state. The machine was also isolated from internet in order to avoid leaks.

The machine was equipped with various tools to monitor the execution of the malware. The main ones were:

- **regshot**, to detect files and registers alterations between a time lapse;
- **procmon**, to log system functions called by the malware;
- **fakenet**, to track internet traffic in a simulated network.

These programs were executed with administrator permission in order to detect access to restricted locations.


The tools can cooperate but they need to be executed in a certain schedule, in order to avoid conflicts among them. The analysis proceeded following these phases:

- 1) launch Fakenet;
- 2) launch and setup Procmon;
- 3) launch Regshot, setup path and run of its first shot;
- 4) start Procmon analysis and launch of the malware;
- 5) interaction with calculator by the GUI;
- 6) stop Procmon tracking
- 7) second Regshot shot;
- 8) stop Fakenet;

The first test did not last too long: the GUI remained opened for just a few seconds. These tests did not give us evidence of malicious behavior, probably because of the poor performance of the host machine.

Then we ran other tests letting the malware run for a couple of minutes, having all the time needed to perform bad actions. Then we collected the logs and analyzed them one by one.

The first evidence of malicious behavior has been observed without any tools. After 20-30 seconds from the program execution the operating system prompted us a message about the *Windows security center*; it was disabled and, from the control panel, it could not be re-activated. This is a serious threat to the security of the machine, leaving it opened to many other infections.



A. Fakenet

FakeNet is a dynamic network analysis tool for malware analysts and penetration testers. It simulates a network logging the traffic generated by the machine. Every request is a file containing:

- Request type
- Destination URL
- Protocol
- User agent

The user agent field contains various informations about the local machine, such as architecture, operating system, product and so on. This string is

```
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0
(compatible; MSIE 28;...
```

There are other numbers dealing with the versions that have not been written for simplicity.

The registered requests are over 900, whereas the destinations are 300, mainly russian sites. Unluckily the body is empty, and we cannot know the expected result due to the presence of Fakenet, which builds a fake http page as response to every request.

Fakenet generated also a *.pcap* file, containing the captured packets. Examining it with *Wireshark* we noticed all the TCP streams related to the POST requests, and other packets irrelevant with the malware, such as DHCP, ARP and DNS. One frequent message was a request to *www.msftncs.com*, asking for a txt file called *ncsi*. This sort of message is generated by Windows as a heart beat, keeping the machine constantly connected to the internet.

This whole internet traffic should not be present, due to the absence of any socket library imported by the executable. Thus, in order to send packets over the network the malware needs to load external libraries dynamically, leaving a trace on the system that we capture using *Procmon*.

B. Procmon

Process Monitor is an advanced monitoring tool for Windows that shows real-time file system, registry and process/thread activity. Procmon offers also a filtering function, and we set it to keep only the actions made by the malware.

We can group these actions in 3 main sets: dll, registry and file.

Dll stands for dynamic link library. These are particular files, shared among all the programs of the Windows operating system, that expose useful functions to programs which can call them to perform frequent operations. Every time that the malware loads a dll the system keeps a track of the action, thus using Procmon we were able to collect them all, identifying 46 different dlls used with the "Load Image" function. This primitive allows the program to load also other executables but, in our case, the only one loaded by the malware was the malware itself.

Overall we counted 46 dll files loaded, among which the most interesting are the cypher family, like *cryptbase* and *crypt32*, to handle cryptography and certificates.

In order to perform network operations the malware needs a library to handle internet connections. This is made possible

by the load of *ws2_32.dll*, which stands for web socket. This library provides the APIs (Application programming interface) needed to do POST requests to all of the different URLs listed before.

Among the actions concerning with the registers Procmon logged many Open-Read-Close operations on many different ones, but only a few were written directly by the malware. These ones are about the "Language list" and "Internet settings". This last one manage the permission over the internet among the 4 different zones (Intranet, Trusted, Internet, Restricted), setting the value to 0 which means "Accept all". This is dangerous as exposes the machine to possible attacks over the net.

Procmon registered also accesses to thousands of file, and we noticed that many one of them were infected. The infection procedure followed these steps:

- Read the *.exe* victim file.
- Write of the content plus the infected part in a *.vir* file with the same name.
- Copy of the content of the *.vir* file to the *.exe* one changing the EOF location.
- Set of fake information on the executable such as creation and last access time.
- Delete the *.vir* file.

After the infection the victim had another section called *.vmp0*, having a similar size to the original one, which is both executable and writable. The infected files are hundreds and they are stored in many different locations. Many of them are common applications such as Windows Media Player, Internet Explorer, Windows Defender, Windows Mail, Windows Photo Viewer and other files in the System32 directory.

C. RegShot

Regshot is an open-source (LGPL) registry compare utility that allows you to quickly take a snapshot of your registry and then compare it with a second one, just after making system changes or installing a new software product.

In our use-case we recorded the first shot just before the execution of the malware. Then we ran it for some minutes and, after the program exit, we took the second shot, saving the result of the comparison in a *.txt* file.

This file contains variuos information about registries files and folders. The downside of Regshot is that it takes care of all the system changes, but it cannot associate each change to the process that caused it, so there is no way to separate the malware generated events from the system ones. The only clue that we can use is a comparison to the logfile generated by Procmon.

Analyzing the output there are 6 new key added to the registry, 4 related to error reporting, one to instrumentation and one to the Security Center. This last one is the most interesting because it is the trace left by the deactivation of the security center that we noticed during the malware execution. In fact among the values added to the registries there is "Enable Notifications" set to zero. Then we found all the changes reported by Procmon about the internet zones, where every value is set to 0 (Allow anything).

Another malicious evidence that we found is that the value “Start” of the *wscsvc* service set to 4. This service is the security center, and the value 4 stands for disabled.

The weird thing is that Procmon did not log those events, so they are not made by the malware itself, but by another process. In order to validate this hypothesis we ran Procmon and executed the sample another time, keeping even the action performed by other processes. We discovered that those registry modifications had been made by “services.exe” and “dllhost.exe”. They are not malicious process, but they are likely to be corrupted by the malware to deactivate the security center.

The file attributes that are modified are those related to the infected files and thus they have a different creation time.

IV. REVERSE ENGINEERING

In order to analyze the source code of the malware we used a tool called IDA, which is a feature rich, cross-platform, multi-processor disassembler and debugger developed by Hex-Rays. We also used OllyDBG, a 32-bit assembler-level debugger, which turned out fundamental to decode hidden instructions.

The whole process of reverse engineering is very difficult due to the obfuscation of the code and to the presence of *VMPProtect* which encrypts the core of the program. Analyze *.vmp0* section is not possible until the code in *.text* is executed, therefore we had to use OllyDBG on the malware’s first section and obtain a decrypted version of the code. After that, we generated a dump of the memory so we could analyze the whole code using IDA.

A. Code rebuilding

The process of reverse engineering began with the disassembly phase, made possible by IDA. The tool shows the entry point and builds a cfg for each function. We analyzed the main one, obtaining a pseudo code of the function itself (See listing 1). This main procedure manages the de-obfuscation of the real malware. The *.vmp0* section is decrypted through a cycle that perform an arithmetic xor of the code with a certain key. The cycle is repeated 7 times, but during the last one the key is incremented by one. The key is 0x58. After this cycle there are two more that simply move portions of code. Next we observed a strange behavior: there are not return statements, but after the main procedure there are many functions. Following the code execution with a debugger we discovered that the program executes the code inside those functions like simple statements of the main procedure. Hence, the disassembler is unable to build a consistent cfg. At this point we decided to stop the code rebuilding and we began a debugging phase.

B. Debugging

In order to perform this analysis we began executing the malware with OllyDBG one instruction at the time, keeping procmon active alongside in order to detect malicious actions. Every time we found a function call we stepped over, tracking the results in order to isolate the interesting ones. Then we restarted the machine and repeat the whole process entering the target function, looking for nested calls to analyze.

This malware uses a lot of external functions, imported from various dynamic link libraries. This functions are loaded with two primitives in Windows: *loadLibrary* and *GetProcAddress*. The malware then stores the pointers to those functions as global values in the *.data* section, thus the disassembler cannot statically detect the imported function. The only way to bypass it is to execute the malware with a debugger who can get the function name whenever it is called.

Our aims were the infection procedure, which lets the malware copy its code inside other files, and the method used to stop the Windows Security Center.

We discovered that the first thread was responsible for the GUI, whereas the second one did the real infection. In order to bypass loops we often put breakpoints after them. Eventually we achieved a procedure to debug the infection function:

- 1) breakpoint in 0101273A; then after the *RET* the malware enters the obfuscated section.
- 2) breakpoint in 010AAB30; then there is the creation of the second thread which is the analyzed one.
- 3) breakpoint in 010BD0A9 which is the begin of the target function

In particular we discovered that the thread calls *FUN_010ACABF*, which then calls *FUN_0109F059*, which then calls iteratively *FUN_010B0CAD*; this last one contains *FUN_010BD0A9* which is the target function that performs the malicious actions.

The infection function is *FUN_10BD636*. It has only the target name as parameter. This procedure is huge, with too much code to reverse; it even contains a recursive call inside.

The second target of our analysis is the deactivation of the security center. During the dynamic analysis we discovered that this was done by another process: *services.exe*. Thus we repeated the debugging process keeping *procmon* active, filtering the actions made by that process. We executed the malware step by step, finding that the instruction which performs the action is located at 010B10C7. At this point the program calls an external function which is *StartServiceA* from *ADVAPI32.dll*. This instruction is executed two times without any apparent effect, but the third time immediately after the return the Security Center is turned off. Reading the documentation of the dll we found that this function is able to close services, but only if the caller has the rights to do it. However the malware is executed without administrative privilege, so it’s likely to have a privilege escalation from previous functions.

V. CONCLUSION

Summing up the result of our analysis we can describe the malware as a polymorphic one, which performs various malicious actions such as internet connections, replications on other system programs and deactivates the security center. It disguise itself as a calculator, fooling the average user. The following table sums up its characteristics. The final evaluation given by both static and dynamic analysis considers the executable suspicious, and our analysis confirms the result.

Static Analysis			
Category	Select	Score	
Packed	Packed	2	
Strings	Suspicious Strings	3	
Imports	Suspicious	2	
Sections	Abnormal Sections	1	
Main Icon	Legitimate Icon	0	
Additional Icons	Legitimate	0	
Dialogs	Legitimate	0	
Version Information	Present	0	
Digital Signature	Not Present	2	
Total Score		10	
Verdict		Potentially Suspicious	

Dynamic Analysis			
Category	Select	Score	
Persistence	Multiple Entries	2	
File Manipulation	Affects other files	2	
Process Manipulation	Affects other processes	2	
Registry Manipulation	Registry manipulation	1	
Additional Processes	Doesn't start other processes	0	
Removal Resistance	No removal prevention	0	
Analysis Resistance	No analysis prevention	0	
Interface/Visible Activity	GUI/Interface	0	
Network Activity	Network Activity	1	
Rootkit Behaviour	Rootkit Behaviour	2	
System Calls	Suspicious system calls	1	
Behaviour	Expected behaviour	0	
Total Score		11	
Verdict		Suspicious	

```

1 void entry(void){
2     unsigned short uVar1;
3     int iVar2;
4     unsigned int uVar3;
5     int iVar4;
6     unsigned int local_50;
7     unsigned int local_48;
8     int *local_3c;
9
10    //Constant pointer to the code: 0x101E00B
11    char *code_start = 0x183A+0x1FB4+0x101BADF-0x12C2;
12
13    unsigned int i, j;
14
15    for (i=0; i<7; i++){
16        for (j=0x33cc1; j>0x12c5; j--){
17            code_start[j] ^= (char)(i / 6) + 0x58U;
18        }
19    }
20
21    for (i=0; i<0x24880; i++)
22        DAT_0109c000[i] = DAT_0101f6cd[i];
23
24    local_3c = &DAT_0104e6cd;
25
26    for (i=0; i<0xalc8; i++)
27        DAT_011b9000[i] = DAT_010440cd[i];
28 }
29

```

Listing 1: Pseudo code of the decryption function.