Basic_Number_Theory_Without_Images

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0.1 Elementary Number Theory

```
[1]: def binaryPow(a, b, mod):
    res = 1
    while b > 0:
        if b & 1:
            res = (res * a) % mod
            a = (a * a) % mod
            b >>= 1
    return res
print(binaryPow(2, 300, 100000000000))
```

706183397376

1.349003109770199e+17

```
[3]: import math
def leastCommonMultiple(a, b):
    return a / math.gcd(a, b) * b
```

[4]: print(leastCommonMultiple(100, 20))

100.0

0.2 Extended GCD

- Extended Euclidean Algorithm
 - -a * x + b * y = gcd(a, b)
 - Going backwards: let us assume we found the coefficients (x_1,y_1) for (b,a*mod*b) * $b*x_1+(a*mod*b)*y_1=g$
 - $* \ a * x + b * y = g$
 - $* \ a * mod * b = a \frac{a}{b} * b$
 - * After rearranging: $g = a * y_1 + b(x_1 y_1 * \frac{a}{b})$

$$* \left\{ \begin{array}{l} x = y_1 \\ y = x_1 - y_1 * \frac{a}{b} \end{array} \right.$$

```
[5]: def extendedGCD(a, b):
    x,y, u,v = 0,1, 1,0

while a:
    q, r = b // a, b % a
    m, n = x - u * q, y - v * q
    b,a, x,y, u,v = a,r, u,v, m,n

gcd = b
    return gcd, x, y
```

0.3 Modular Arithmetic

- $(\frac{a}{b})\%c = ((a\%c)*(b^{-1}\%c))\%c$
- b^{-1} is the multiplicative modulo inverse of b
- Modular exponentiation $-> x^n = x * x * x ... * x (n times)$
 - Break down with Binary Exponentiation -> Time Complexity $O(\log N)$
 - * If n is even, replace x^n with $(x^2)^{\frac{n}{2}}$
 - * If n is odd, replace x^n with $x * x^{n-1}$. n-1 becomes even
 - * Use modular Exponentiation for faster runtimes -> Time Complexity and Space Complexity $O(\log N)$
- Modular multiplicative inverse
 - If A, B = 1 then B is $\frac{1}{A}$ or A^{-1}
 - If (A, B) % M = 1 then B is said to be modular multiplicative inverse of A under modulo M if it satisfies the following equation: $A, B = 1*(mod\ M)$ where B is in the range [1, M-1]
 - An inverse exists only when A and M are coprime: GCD(A, M) = 1
 - Two approaches
 - * A and M are coprime, Ax + My = 1. In the extended Euclidean algorithm, x is the modular multiplicative inverse of A under modulo M. Therefore, the answer is x.
 - * Used only when M is prime, $A^{M-1}=1 \pmod{M}$. Mulitply both sides by A^{-1} and rearrange: $A^{-1}=A^{M-2} \pmod{M}$

```
[6]: # Binary Exponentiation

def binaryExponentiationR(x, n):
    if n == 0:
        return 1
    elif n % 2 == 0:
        return binaryExponentiationR(x * x, n / 2)
    else:
        return x * binaryExponentiationR(x * x, (n-1)/2)

def binaryExponentiationI(x, n):
    result = 1
```

```
while n:
        if n % 2 == 1:
            result *= x
        x *= x
        n /= 2
    return result
def modularExponentiation(x, n, m):
    result = 1
    while n:
        if n % 2 == 1:
            result = (result * x) % m
        x = (x * x) \% m
        n /= 2
    return result
# Mod Inverse when A and M are coprime
def modInverseCoPrime(a, m):
    d, x, y = extendedGCD(a, m)
    return (x \% m + m) \% m
# Mod Inverse only when M is prime
def modInverseM_Prime(a, m):
    return modularExponentiation(a, m-2, m)
print(modInverseCoPrime(5, 12))
print(modInverseM_Prime(5, 11))
print(modInverseCoPrime(3, 13))
```

9

0.4 Primes

- Composite numbers are also numbers that are greater than 1 but they have at least one more divisor other than 1 and itself.
- Determine if prime using Sieve of Eratosthenes for fast factorization -> O(N*loglogN), factorization in \sqrt{N}
- Fermat's Little Theorem
 - If p is a prime number, then for any integer a, the number a^p-p is an integer multiple of p
 - $-a^p = a \mod p \rightarrow a^p \% p = a$

- If a is not divisible by p then $a^{p-1}-1$ is an integer multiple of p: $a^{p-1}=1 \mod p a^{p-1}\% p = 1$
- Pingala's Exponentiation Algo: begin with the desired exponent (e.g. e=90), and carry out a series of steps: replace e by e/2 if e is even, and replace e by (e-1)/2 if e is odd. Repeat this until the exponent is decreased to zero.
- Miller-Rabin test. We carry out Pingala's exponentiation algorithm to compute $b^{p-1} \mod p$. If we find a violation of ROO along the way, then the test number p is not prime. And if, at the end, the computation does not yield 1, we have found a Fermat's Little Theorem (FLT) violation, and the test number p is not prime.
 - Conditional probability: $Prob(tests\ prime\ |\ is\ composite) < \frac{1}{4\#witnesses}$

```
[7]: def fermat_theorem_mod(base, exp, prime):
    if exp == prime:
        return base
    elif exp + 1 == prime and base % prime != 0:
        return 1
    else:
        return -1;

print(fermat_theorem_mod(273246787654, 65536, 65537))
```

```
[8]: def Pingala(e):
    current_number = e
    while current_number > 0:
        if current_number%2 == 0:
            current_number = current_number // 2
            print("Exponent {} BIT 0".format(current_number))
        if current_number%2 == 1:
            current_number = (current_number - 1) // 2
            print("Exponent {} BIT 1".format(current_number))
Pingala(90)
```

```
Exponent 45 BIT 0
Exponent 22 BIT 1
Exponent 11 BIT 0
Exponent 5 BIT 1
Exponent 2 BIT 1
Exponent 1 BIT 0
Exponent 0 BIT 1
```

```
[9]: def pow_Pingala(base,exponent):
    result = 1
    bitstring = bin(exponent)[2:] # Chop off the 'Ob' part of the binary
    ⊶expansion of exponent
```

```
for bit in bitstring: # Iterates through the "letters" of the string. Here
the letters are '0' or '1'.

if bit == '0':

result = result*result

if bit == '1':

result = result*result * base

return result

pow_Pingala(5, 90)
```

[9]: 807793566946316088741610050849573099185363389551639556884765625

```
[10]: def powmod_Pingala(base,exponent,modulus):
    result = 1
    bitstring = bin(exponent)[2:] # Chop off the 'Ob' part of the binary
    expansion of exponent
    for bit in bitstring: # Iterates through the "letters" of the string. Here
    the letters are 'O' or '1'.
        if bit == '0':
            result = (result*result) % modulus
        if bit == '1':
            result = (result*result * base) % modulus
        return result

powmod_Pingala(5, 90, 91)
```

[10]: 64

```
[11]: def Miller_Rabin(p, base):
          Tests whether p is prime, using the given base.
          The result False implies that p is definitely not prime.
          The result True implies that p **might** be prime.
          It is not a perfect test!
          111
          result = 1
          exponent = p-1
          modulus = p
          bitstring = bin(exponent)[2:] # Chop off the 'Ob' part of the binaryu
       ⇔expansion of exponent
          for bit in bitstring: # Iterates through the "letters" of the string. Here
       ⇔the letters are '0' or '1'.
              sq_result = result*result % modulus # We need to compute this in any_
       ⇔case.
              if sq_result == 1:
                  if (result != 1) and (result != exponent): # Note that exponent is_
       \hookrightarrow congruent to -1, mod p.
```

```
return False # a ROO violation occurred, so p is not prime
              if bit == '0':
                  result = sq_result
              if bit == '1':
                  result = (sq_result * base) % modulus
          if result != 1:
              return False # a FLT violation occurred, so p is not prime.
          return True # If we made it this far, no violation occurred and p might be
       \hookrightarrow prime.
[12]: # Let's see how many witnesses observe the nonprimality of 41041.
      for witness in range (2,20):
          MR = Miller_Rabin(41041, witness) #
          if MR:
              print("{} is a bad witness.".format(witness))
          else:
              print("{} detects that 41041 is not prime.".format(witness))
     2 detects that 41041 is not prime.
     3 detects that 41041 is not prime.
     4 detects that 41041 is not prime.
     5 detects that 41041 is not prime.
     6 detects that 41041 is not prime.
     7 detects that 41041 is not prime.
     8 detects that 41041 is not prime.
     9 detects that 41041 is not prime.
     10 detects that 41041 is not prime.
     11 detects that 41041 is not prime.
     12 detects that 41041 is not prime.
     13 detects that 41041 is not prime.
     14 detects that 41041 is not prime.
     15 detects that 41041 is not prime.
     16 is a bad witness.
     17 detects that 41041 is not prime.
     18 detects that 41041 is not prime.
     19 detects that 41041 is not prime.
[13]: def sieve(N):
          isPrime = [True if idx >= 2 else False for idx in range(N+1)]
          idx = 2
          while idx ** 2 <= N:
              if isPrime[idx]:
                  idx_j = idx ** 2
```

```
while idx_j <= N:
    isPrime[idx_j] = False
    idx_j += idx

idx += 1

return isPrime

print(sieve(10))</pre>
```

[False, False, True, False, True, False, True, False, False, False]

```
[14]: def factorize(n):
    res = []
    idx = 2

    while idx ** 2 <= n:
        while (n % idx == 0):
            res.append(idx)
            n //= idx
        idx += 1

    if n != 1:
        res.append(n)

    return res

print(factorize(50))</pre>
```

[2, 5, 5]

```
[15]: import math as mt

MAXN = 100001

# stores smallest prime factor for
# every number
spf = [0 for i in range(MAXN)]

# Calculating SPF (Smallest Prime Factor)
# for every number till MAXN.
# Time Complexity : O(nloglogn)
def sieve():
    spf[1] = 1
    for i in range(2, MAXN):

# marking smallest prime factor
```

```
# for every number to be itself.
        spf[i] = i
    # separately marking spf for
    # every even number as 2
    for i in range(4, MAXN, 2):
        spf[i] = 2
    for i in range(3, mt.ceil(mt.sqrt(MAXN))):
        # checking if i is prime
        if (spf[i] == i):
            # marking SPF for all numbers
            # divisible by i
            for j in range(i * i, MAXN, i):
                # marking spf[j] if it is
                # not previously marked
                if (spf[j] == j):
                    spf[j] = i
# A O(log n) function returning prime
# factorization by dividing by smallest
# prime factor at every step
def getFactorization(x):
    ret = list()
    while (x != 1):
        ret.append(spf[x])
        x = x // spf[x]
    return ret
# Driver code
# precalculating Smallest Prime Factor
sieve()
x = 50
print("prime factorization for", x, ": ",
                                end = "")
# calling getFactorization function
p = getFactorization(x)
for i in range(len(p)):
    print(p[i], end = " ")
```

0.5 Euler's Theorem and Modular Roots

- If m is a positive integer and GCD(a, m) = 1 then $a^{\phi(m)} = 1 \mod m$
 - $-\phi(m)$ denotes the totient of m, which is the number of elements of $\{1,...,m\}$ which are coprime to m
- The totient is a multiplicative function, meaning that if GCD(a, b) = 1 then $\phi(ab) = \phi(a)\phi(b)$. Therefore, the totient of number can be found quickly from the totient of the prime powers within its decomposition
- Totient of a prime power is: $\phi(p^e) = p^e p^{e-1} = p^{e-1}(p-1)$

```
[16]: def GCD(a,b):
                      # Recall that != means "not equal to".
          while b:
               a, b = b, a \% b
          return abs(a)
      def totient(m):
          tot = 0 # The running total.
          j = 0
          while j < m: # We go up to m, because the totient of 1 is 1 by convention.
               j = j + 1 # Last step of while loop: j = m-1, and then j = j+1, so j_{\perp}
        \hookrightarrow = m.
               if GCD(j,m) == 1:
                   tot = tot + 1
          return tot
      print(totient(17)) # The totient of a prime p should be p-1.
      print(totient(1000))
      print(17**totient(1000) % 1000) # Let's demonstrate Euler's theorem. Note
        \hookrightarrow GCD(17, 1000) = 1.
```

16 400 1

```
[17]: from math import sqrt # We'll want to use the square root.

def smallest_factor(n):
    '''
    Gives the smallest prime factor of n.
    '''
    if n < 2:
        return None # No prime factors!

test_factor = 2 # The smallest possible prime factor.
    max_factor = sqrt(n) # we don't have to search past sqrt(n).</pre>
```

```
while test_factor <= max_factor:</pre>
        if n%test_factor == 0:
            return test_factor
        test_factor = test_factor + 1 # This could be sped up.
    return n # If we didn't find a factor up to sqrt(n), n itself is prime!
def decompose(N):
    Gives the unique prime decomposition of a positive integer N,
    as a dictionary with primes as keys and exponents as values.
    current number = N # We'll divide out factors from current number until we
 ⇔get 1.
    decomp = {} # An empty dictionary to start.
    while current_number > 1:
        p = smallest_factor(current_number) # The smallest prime factor of the
 ⇔current number.
        if p in decomp.keys(): # Is p already in the list of keys?
            decomp[p] = decomp[p] + 1 # Increase the exponent (value with key_
 \hookrightarrow p) by 1.
        else: # "else" here means "if p is not in decomp.keys()".
            decomp[p] = 1 # Creates a new entry in the dictionary, with key p_{\parallel}
        current_number = current_number // p # Factor out p.
    return decomp
def mult_function(f_pp):
    When a function f_pp(p,e) of two arguments is input,
    this outputs a multiplicative function obtained from f_pp
    via prime decomposition.
    111
    def f(n):
       D = decompose(n)
        result = 1
        for p in D:
            result = result * f_pp(p, D[p])
        return result
    return f
def totient_pp(p,e):
    return (p**(e-1)) * (p-1)
totient = mult_function(totient_pp)
totient(143564423)
```

[17]: 142968480

0.6 Euler's Totient Function

- Euler's Totient function Φ (n) for an input n is the count of numbers in $\{1, 2, 3, ..., n-1\}$ that are relatively prime to n, i.e., the numbers whose GCD (Greatest Common Divisor) with n is 1
- $\phi(n) = n * \prod_{p \ prime \ p|n} (1 \frac{1}{n})$
- Observations
 - The sum of all values of Totient Function of all divisors of N is equal to N
 - The value of Totient function for a certain prime P will always be P-1 as the number P will always have a GCD of 1 with all numbers less than or equal to it except itself.
 - For 2 number A and B, if GCD(A, B) == 1 then Totient(A)*Totient(B) = Totient(A*B)
- If f, then e is a multiplicative inverse of f modulo $\phi(m)$. It exists only if $GCD(e, \phi(m)) = 1$. $-ex = 1 \mod m$ is equivalent to solving the linear Diophantine equation ex + my = 1

```
[18]: def phi(n):
          # Initialize result as n
          result = n:
          # Consider all prime factors
          # of n and subtract their
          # multiples from result
          p = 2;
          while(p * p \le n):
              # Check if p is a
              # prime factor.
              if (n \% p == 0):
                  # If yes, then
                  # update n and result
                  while (n \% p == 0):
                      n = int(n / p);
                  result -= int(result / p);
              p += 1;
          # If n has a prime factor
          # greater than sqrt(n)
          # (There can be at-most
          # one such prime factor)
          if (n > 1):
              result -= int(result / n);
          return result;
```

```
# Driver Code
      for n in range(1, 11):
          print("phi(",n,") =", phi(n));
      print(f"phi({1023}) = {phi(1023)}")
     phi(1) = 1
     phi(2) = 1
     phi(3) = 2
     phi(4) = 2
     phi(5) = 4
     phi(6) = 2
     phi(7) = 6
     phi(8) = 4
     phi(9) = 6
     phi(10) = 4
     phi(1023) = 600
[19]: def mult_inverse(a,m):
          111
          Finds the multiplicative inverse of a, mod m.
          If GCD(a,m) = 1, this is returned via its natural representative.
          Otherwise, None is returned.
          u = a # We use u instead of dividend.
          v = m # We use v instead of divisor.
          u_hops, u_skips = 1,0 # u is built from one hop (a) and no skips.
          v_hops, v_skips = 0,1 # v is built from no hops and one skip (b).
          while v := 0: # We could just write while v:
              q = u // v \# q  stands for quotient.
              r = u \% v \# r \text{ stands for remainder.} So u = q(v) + r.
              r_hops = u_hops - q * v_hops # Tally hops
              r_skips = u_skips - q * v_skips # Tally skips
              u,v = v,r # The new dividend, divisor is the old divisor, remainder.
              u_hops, v_hops = v_hops, r_hops # The new u_hops, v_hops is the old_
       \neg v_hops, r_hops
              u_skips, v_skips = v_skips, r_skips # The new u_skips, v_skips is the_
       \hookrightarrow old v_skips, r_skips
          g = u # The variable g now describes the GCD of a and b.
          if g == 1:
              return u_hops % m
          else: # When GCD(a,m) is not 1...
              return None
      print(mult_inverse(3,40)) # 3 times what is congruent to 1, mod 40?
```

```
print(mult_inverse(7, 57))
```

0.7 Chinese Remainder Theorem

- Let $p=p_1*p_2*...*p_k$ where p_i are pairwise relatively prime $-a=a_1(mod\ p_1) \\ -a=a_2(mod\ p_2) \text{-...} \\ -a=a_k(mod\ p_k)$
- Then the given set of congruence equations always has one and exactly one solution modulo p
 - Then all the systems of equations is equivalent to $x = a \pmod{p}$
- \bullet We seek a representation on the form -> called the mixed radix representation of a
 - $-\ a = x_1 + x_2 * p_1 + x_3 * p_1 * p_2 + \ldots + x_k * p_1 * \ldots * p_(k-1)$
- Garner's algorithm computes the coefficients of $x_1,...,x_k$

```
[20]: def inv(a, m):
          mO = m
          x0 = 0
          x1 = 1
          if (m == 1) :
              return 0
          # Apply extended Euclid Algorithm
          while (a > 1):
              # q is quotient
              q = a // m
              t = m
              # m is remainder now, process
              # same as euclid's algo
              m = a \% m
              a = t
              t = x0
              x0 = x1 - q * x0
              x1 = t
          # Make x1 positive
          if (x1 < 0):
              x1 = x1 + m0
```

```
return x1
# k is size of num[] and rem[].
# Returns the smallest
# number x such that:
# x \% num[0] = rem[0],
# x % num[1] = rem[1],
# ......
\# x \% num[k-2] = rem[k-1]
# Assumption: Numbers in num[]
# are pairwise coprime
# (gcd for every pair is 1)
def findMinX(num, rem, k) :
    # Compute product of all numbers
   prod = 1
   for i in range(0, k) :
       prod = prod * num[i]
    # Initialize result
   result = 0
    # Apply above formula
   for i in range(0,k):
       pp = prod // num[i]
        result = result + rem[i] * inv(pp, num[i]) * pp
   return result % prod
# Driver method
num = [3, 4, 5]
rem = [2, 3, 1]
k = len(num)
print( "x is " , findMinX(num, rem, k))
```

x is 11

1 Cryptography On Crypto Hack

- Grew up in Flagstaff Arizona
 - Cryptography is in my roots, Flagstaff is where the NSA recruited the Navajo during WWII
 - Go through the history of the Wind Talkers.
 - This book is in honor of those heros
 - https://www.npr.org/2022/07/31/1114766110/samuel-sandoval-one-of-the-last-

1.1 What?

• This book is an introduction to Crypto Hack in order to learn more about cryptography.

1.2 Why?

- Cryptographic security and cryptanalysis is used extensively in capture the flag competitions.
- Crypto Hack is usually contracted by Hack The Box (HTB) in order to provide these crypto puzzles.
- Examining Crypto Hack should enable us to be better at cyber security and penetration testing.

1.3 Dragons Beware

- Some of the algorithms below were stolen without attribution.
- Fort Meade/John Hopkins spoke this month on that very same issue.
- According to NSA, there is a systemic issue impacting our cyber-security community: the theft and unauthorized use of algorithms by corporate entities. Entities who themselves may be part of the community. Ultimately because we do not live in an ideal world.
 - https://www.blackhat.com/us-22/briefings/schedule/#dj-vu-uncovering-stolenalgorithms-in-commercial-products-27673
- SO, since I am not making money off of this... take this reference as a way to study for Number Theory

1.3.1 Registering For Crypto Hack

• Later we will use a dictionary to be able to tell which sentence is likely English/Code Page of interest.

```
[21]: import functools

def checkTransmission(func):
    @functools.wraps(func)
    def CaesarCipher(*args, **kwargs):
        return func([x.lower() if x.isalpha() else " " for x in args[0]])

    return CaesarCipher
```

```
results.append("".join([mapper[message[x]] if message[x].isalpha() else_u 

"" for x in range(len(message))]))

print(results)
```

```
[23]: print(decryptCaesarCipher([x.lower() if x.isalpha() else " " for x in "GTMCQDC__ ARVZLO LZQFHM CDRHFM"]))
```

['gtmcqdc rvzlo lzqfhm cdrhfm', 'hundred swamp margin design', 'ivoesfe txbnq nbshjo eftjho', 'jwpftgf uycor octikp fgukip', 'kxqguhg vzdps pdujlq ghvljq', 'lyrhvih waeqt qevkmr hiwmkr', 'mzsiwji xbfru rfwlns ijxnls', 'natjxkj ycgsv sgxmot jkyomt', 'obukylk zdhtw thynpu klzpnu', 'pcvlzml aeiux uizoqv lmaqov', 'qdwmanm bfjvy vjaprw mnbrpw', 'rexnbon cgkwz wkbqsx nocsqx', 'sfyocpo dhlxa xlcrty opdtry', 'tgzpdqp eimyb ymdsuz pqeusz', 'uhaqerq fjnzc znetva qrfvta', 'vibrfsr gkoad aofuwb rsgwub', 'wjcsgts hlpbe bpgvxc sthxvc', 'xkdthut imqcf cqhwyd tuiywd', 'yleuivu jnrdg drixze uvjzxe', 'zmfvjwv koseh esjyaf vwkayf', 'angwkxw lptfi ftkzbg wxlbzg', 'bohxlyx mqugj gulach xymcah', 'cpiymzy nrvhk hvmbdi yzndbi', 'dqjznaz oswil iwncej zaoecj', 'erkaoba ptxjm jxodfk abpfdk', 'fslbpcb quykn kypegl bcqgel']

1.4 Introduction To Crypto Hack

1.4.1 ASCII Conversion

```
[24]: def convert2ASCII(arr):
    return "".join([chr(x) for x in arr])
```

```
[25]: convert2ASCII([99, 114, 121, 112, 116, 111, 123, 65, 83, 67, 73, 73, 95, 112, 414, 49, 110, 116, 52, 98, 108, 51, 125])
```

[25]: 'crypto{ASCII_pr1nt4bl3}'

1.4.2 Bytes To ASCII

- Hard way
- Easy way: bytes.fromhex()

```
crypto{You_will_be_working_with_hex_strings_a_lot}
Next
crypto{You_will_be_working_with_hex_strings_a_lot}
```

1.4.3 Hex To Base64

- Hard way
- Easy way: base64.b64encode()
- Linux way: xxd -p -r hexString.txt | base64

```
[27]: # Hard way
      hexString = "72bca9b68fc16ac7beeb8f849dca1d8a783e8acf9679bf9269f7bf"
      binaryString = ""
      mapping = {idx: chr(65 + idx) for idx in range(26)}
      for idx in range(26):
          mapping[26+idx] = chr(97 + idx)
      for idx in range(10):
          mapping[52+idx] = idx
      mapping[62] = "+"
      mapping[63] = "/"
      for idx in range(0, len(hexString), 2):
          tmp = bin(int(hexString[idx], 16) * 16 + int(hexString[idx+1], 16))[2:]
          while len(tmp) < 8:
              tmp = "0" + tmp
          binaryString += tmp
      for idx in range(0, len(binaryString), 6):
          print(mapping[int(binaryString[idx:idx+6], 2)], end = "")
      print()
      # Easy way
      import base64
      print(base64.b64encode(bytes.fromhex(hexString)).decode())
      # Linux way
      !touch hexString.txt
      !echo "72bca9b68fc16ac7beeb8f849dca1d8a783e8acf9679bf9269f7bf" > hexString.txt
      !xxd -p -r hexString.txt | base64
```

crypto/Base+64+Encoding+is+Web+Safe/ crypto/Base+64+Encoding+is+Web+Safe/

1.4.4 Big Integers To Bytes

```
• long_to_bytes()
```

• Reverse: bytes to long()

crypto{3nc0d1n6_411_7h3_w4y_d0wn}

1.4.5 XOR Starter

```
[29]: xorString = "".join([chr(ord(letter)^13) for letter in 'label'])
print("crypto{" + xorString + "}")
```

crypto{aloha}

1.4.6 XOR Properties

• Commutative: A B = B A

• Associative: A $(B \ C) = (A \ B) \ C$

• Identity: A = 0 = A

• Self-Inverse: A A = 0

```
[30]: # Information given
     KEY1 = bytes.fromhex("a6c8b6733c9b22de7bc0253266a3867df55acde8635e19c73313")
     KEY2_KEY1 = bytes.

¬fromhex("37dcb292030faa90d07eec17e3b1c6d8daf94c35d4c9191a5e1e")

     KEY2 KEY3 = bytes.

¬fromhex("c1545756687e7573db23aa1c3452a098b71a7fbf0fddddde5fc1")

     FLAG_KEY1_KEY3_KEY2 = bytes.

¬fromhex("04ee9855208a2cd59091d04767ae47963170d1660df7f56f5faf")

     KEY1 = [ord(x) for x in KEY1.decode(encoding= 'unicode_escape')]
     KEY2_KEY1 = [ord(x) for x in KEY2_KEY1.decode(encoding= 'unicode_escape')]
     KEY2_KEY3 = [ord(x) for x in KEY2_KEY3.decode(encoding= 'unicode_escape')]
     FLAG_KEY1_KEY3_KEY2 = [ord(x) for x in FLAG_KEY1_KEY3_KEY2.decode(encoding=_
      # All are the same length
     print([len(x) for x in [KEY1, KEY2_KEY1, KEY2_KEY3, FLAG_KEY1_KEY3_KEY2]])
     def xorPairs(arrX, arrY):
         for idx in range(len(arrX)):
```

```
arrX[idx] ^= arrY[idx]

return arrX

# Result

KEY2 = xorPairs(KEY2_KEY1, KEY1)

KEY3 = xorPairs(KEY2_KEY3, KEY2)

FLAG = xorPairs(FLAG_KEY1_KEY3_KEY2, KEY2)

FLAG = xorPairs(FLAG, KEY3)

FLAG = xorPairs(FLAG, KEY1)

print("".join(chr(x) for x in FLAG))
```

```
[26, 26, 26, 26]
crypto{x0r_i5_ass0c1at1v3}
```

1.4.7 Favorite Byte

• No broken (British) English here

crypto{0x10_15_my_f4v0ur173_by7e}

1.4.8 You Either Know, XOR You Don't

- Computer being tapped here without legal right. Wiretapping Act of 1968. Means you have the right to listen, not to manipulate user systems.
- FBI has labeled everyone at NSA as Anonymous. We have been at war since Project Carnivore. Support the homeland and keep out these terrorists.
- Finish this later!
- Long Live the Resistance: NSA, CIA, Pentagon, American People.

```
for (o1, o2) in zip(encrypted_msg, flag_format)] + [ord("y")]

flag = []
key_len = len(key)
for i in range(len(encrypted_msg)):
    flag.append(
        encrypted_msg[i] ^ key[i % key_len]
    )
flag = "".join(chr(o) for o in flag)

print("Flag:")
print(flag)
```

Flag:

crypto{1f_y0u_Kn0w_En0uGH_y0u_Kn0w_1t_4ll}

1.5 Modular Arithmetic

1.5.1 Greatest Common Divisor

- Naive way
- Smart way

```
[33]: a = 66528
      b = 52920
      # Naive way
      smallest = min(a, b)
      largest = max(a, b)
      divisors = [smallest]
      for i in range(1, smallest//2 + 1):
          if smallest % i == 0:
              divisors.append(i)
      for num in sorted(divisors, reverse = True):
          if largest % num == 0:
              print(num)
              break
      # Smart way
      def gcd(a, b):
          while b:
              a %= b
              tmp = a
              a = b
              b = tmp
```

```
return a
print(gcd(a, b))
```

1.5.2 Extended GCD

• Extended Euclidean Algorithm

```
\begin{array}{l} -\ a*x+b*y=\gcd(a,b)\\ -\ \text{Going backwards: let us assume we found the coefficients }(x_1,y_1)\ \text{for }(b,a*mod*b)\\ *\ b*x_1+(a*mod*b)*y_1=g\\ *\ a*x+b*y=g\\ *\ a*mod*b=a-\frac{a}{b}*b\\ *\ \text{After rearranging: }g=a*y_1+b(x_1-y_1*\frac{a}{b})\\ *\ \left\{\begin{array}{l} x=y_1\\ y=x_1-y_1*\frac{a}{b} \end{array}\right. \end{array}
```

```
[34]: def extendedGCD(a, b):
    x,y, u,v = 0,1, 1,0

while a:
    q, r = b // a, b % a
    m, n = x - u * q, y - v * q
    b,a, x,y, u,v = a,r, u,v, m,n

gcd = b
    return gcd, x, y
```

```
[35]: p = 26513
  q = 32321

larger = max(p, q)
  smaller = min(p, q)

def captureAllExtendedEuclidean(large, small):
    steps = []
  while large and small != 0:
    q = large // small
    r = large - (small * q)
    steps.append((large, q, small, r))
    large = small
    small = r
    return steps

for line in captureAllExtendedEuclidean(larger, smaller):
```

```
print(f"{line[0]} - {line[1]}({line[2]}) = {line[3]}")
gcd_num, u, v = extendedGCD(p, q)
print("Equation")
print(f''(gcd_num) = \{u\}(\{p\}) + \{v\}(\{q\})'')
32321 - 1(26513) = 5808
26513 - 4(5808) = 3281
5808 - 1(3281) = 2527
3281 - 1(2527) = 754
2527 - 3(754) = 265
754 - 2(265) = 224
265 - 1(224) = 41
224 - 5(41) = 19
41 - 2(19) = 3
19 - 6(3) = 1
3 - 3(1) = 0
Equation
1 = 10245(26513) + -8404(32321)
1.5.3 Modular Arithmetic I
  • a = b \mod m
        – If m | a (if m divides a) -> \frac{a}{m} = 0*mod*m
```

```
[36]: def getB(a, m):
          if a // m <= 0:
              return False
          while a > (m * 2):
              a //= m
          return a % m
      a1, m1 = 11, 6
      a2, m2 = 8146798528947, 17
     print(min(getB(a1,m1), getB(a2,m2)))
```

1.5.4 Modular Arithmetic II

```
[37]: def fermat_theorem_mod(base, exp, prime):
          if exp == prime:
              return base
          elif exp + 1 == prime and base % prime != 0:
```

```
return 1
    else:
        return -1;
print(fermat_theorem_mod(273246787654, 65536, 65537))
```

Modular Inverting 1.6

```
[38]: # Mod Inverse when A and M are coprime
      def modInverseCoPrime(a, m):
          d, x, y = extendedGCD(a, m)
          return (x \% m + m) \% m
      print(modInverseCoPrime(3, 13))
```

9

1.7Quadratic Residues

- We say that an integer x is a Quadratic Residue if there exists an a such that $a^2 = x \mod p$. If there is no such solution, then the integer is a Quadratic Non-Residue
- If $a^2 = x$ then $(-a)^2 = x$. So if x is a quadratic residue in some finite field, then there are always two solutions for a

```
[39]: p = 29
      ints = [14, 6, 11]
      qr = [a for a in range(p) if pow(a,2,p) in ints]
      print(f"flag {min(qr)}")
```

flag 8

1.8 Legendre Symbol (Study)

- Allows us to make a single calculation to determine whether an integer is a quadratic residue (assuming modulo is prime)
- Property of quadratic (non-)residues
 - $(Quadratic Residue)^2 = Quadratic Residue \rightarrow 1^2 = 1$
 - $-\ Quadratic\ Residue*Quadratic\ Nonresidue=Quadratic\ Nonresidue -> 1*-1=-1$
 - $-\ Quadratic\ Nonresidue*Quadratic\ Nonresidue=Quadratic\ Residue \ -> -1*-1=1$
- Legendre's Symbol: $\frac{a}{p} = a^{\frac{p-1}{2}} \mod p$ obeys $-\frac{a}{p} = 1$ if a is a quadratic residue and $a \neq 0 \mod p$
 - $-\frac{\frac{p}{a}}{n} = 0$ if $a = 0 \mod p$
 - $-\frac{b}{a} = -1$ if a is a (quadratic nonresidue) mod p
 - Which means given any integer a, calculating pow(a,(p-1)/2,p) is enough to determine if a is a quadratic residue

- Calculating the square root modulo a prime: use Tonelli-Shanks
 - All primes that aren't 2 are of the form $p = 1 \mod 4$ or $p = 3 \mod 4$
 - We still need the case $p = 1 \mod 4$
 - Tonelli-Shanks doesn't work for composite (non-prime) moduli. Finding square roots modulo composites is computationally equivalent to integer factorization.

Square root: 9329179912536670680654563847579743051210497606610361026993802570995
22470200610908048701861952859987276802009798538487185891267657425508559548052902
53592144209552123062161458584575060939481368210688629862036958857604707468372384
27804974136915350618266026487611542825198345534421919413303317770049098169614152

```
# Returns true if square root of n under
# modulo p exists. Assumption: p is of the
# form 3*i + 4 where i >= 1
def squareRoot(n, p):
    if (p \% 4 != 3):
        print( "Invalid Input" )
        return
    # Try "+(n^{((p + 1)/4)})"
    n = n \% p
    x = power(n, (p + 1) // 4, p)
    if ((x * x) \% p == n):
        print( "Square root is ", x)
        return
    # Try "-(n ^ ((p + 1)/4))"
    x = p - x
    if ((x * x) \% p == n):
        print( "Square root is ", x )
        return
    # If none of the above two work, then
    # square root doesn't exist
    print( "Square root doesn't exist " )
```

```
[42]: for num in ints:
    if pow(num, (p-1)//2, p) == 1:
        squareRoot(num, p)
```

Square root is 9329179912536670680654563847579743051210497606610361026993802570 99522470200610908048701861952859987276802009798538487185891267657425508559548052 90253592144209552123062161458584575060939481368210688629862036958857604707468372 38427804974136915350618266026487611542825198345534421919413303317770049098169614 1526

1.9 Modular Square Root (Study)

```
def tonelli(n, p):
    assert legendre(n, p) == 1, "not a square (mod p)"
    q = p - 1
    s = 0
    while q % 2 == 0: \#(p-1)\%2
        q //= 2
        s += 1
    if s == 1:
        return pow(n, (p + 1) // 4, p)
    for z in range(2, p): #quadratic non-residue (z)
        if p - 1 == legendre(z, p):
            break
    c = pow(z, q, p) # c <- z^q
    r = pow(n, (q + 1) // 2, p) # r <- n^q
    t = pow(n, q, p) # t <- n^q
    m = s \# m < -s
    t2 = 0
    while (t - 1) % p != 0: \#t=0 or t=1
        t2 = (t * t) \% p
        for i in range(1, m): \#0 < i < m \ t^2 * i = 1
            if (t2 - 1) \% p == 0:
                break
            t2 = (t2 * t2) \% p
        b = pow(c, 1 \ll (m - i - 1), p) # b \ll c^2m-i-1
        r = (r * b) \% p # r < -rb
        c = (b * b) \% p # c <-b^2
        t = (t * c) \% p # t < -t*b^2
        m = i \# m < -i
    return r
if __name__ == '__main__':
   ttest = [(n,p)]
    for n, p in ttest:
        r = tonelli(n, p)
        assert (r * r - n) \% p == 0
        print("\t roots : \n%d \n%d" % (r, p - r))
# r is first solution, second solution is -r \mod p =
```

roots :

 $23623393076830486383277732985804892989321375055205003883382710520537347478623517\\ 79647314176817953359071871560041125289919247146074907151612762640868199621186559\\ 52206833803260099131188222401602122267224313936218046123264673246584884042545825\\ 79308878565833796009677617385967828778513184893556798228131551230457052851120994\\ 48146426755110160002515592418850432103641815811071548456284263507805589445073657\\ 56538185052136796967569976075531078462357707644003774768176030243492493211364006\\ 17387776011946222441927580241808539162444272540654419625572825728491627727407989$

 $28169512554311284614348161812907461395482195258388583125795498809297226147214152\\90761405563891778919035691757825971779216730291300792798984176397729243448878263\\59642536777433420387485673330740435892678962923730287247638080066977070703010353\\39291758998923066001985927788808579330075671953036025191791621915640175242425390\\39721267479733213280188288022350617720116886492048499354601728433882951201092207\\50186895053816428870429809715820583438750781788369658959872713920819264583922833\\54971823611423820865651283490761548053384731721391637064349021755899877224522161\\311561209530712702153163501623531290150340903913036821041$

```
[44]: def square_root(a, p):
          #Tonelli-Shanks algorithm
          if legendre_symbol(a, p) != 1:
              return 0
          elif a == 0:
              return 0
          elif p == 2:
              return 0
          elif p \% 4 == 3:
              return pow(a, (p + 1) / 4, p)
          s = p - 1
          e = 0
          while s % 2 == 0:
              s //= 2
              e += 1
          n = 2
          while legendre_symbol(n, p) != -1:
              n += 1
          x = pow(a, (s + 1) // 2, p)
          b = pow(a, s, p)
          g = pow(n, s, p)
          r = e
          while True:
              t = b
              m = 0
              for m in range(r):
                  if t == 1:
                      break
                  t = pow(t, 2, p)
              if m == 0:
                  return x
```

```
gs = pow(g, 2 ** (r - m - 1), p)
g = (gs * gs) % p
x = (x * gs) % p
b = (b * g) % p
r = m

def legendre_symbol(a, p):
    ls = pow(a, (p - 1) // 2, p)
    return -1 if ls == p - 1 else ls

print (square_root(n, p))
```

 $23623393076830486383277732985804892989321375055205003883382710520537347478623517\\79647314176817953359071871560041125289919247146074907151612762640868199621186559\\52206833803260099131188222401602122267224313936218046123264673246584884042545825\\79308878565833796009677617385967828778513184893556798228131551230457052851120994\\48146426755110160002515592418850432103641815811071548456284263507805589445073657\\56538185052136796967569976075531078462357707644003774768176030243492493211364006\\17387776011946222441927580241808539162444272540654419625572825728491627727407989\\89647948645207349737457445440405057156897508368531939120$

1.10 Chinese Remainder Theorem (Study)

```
[45]: def inv(a, m):
          {\tt m0} \ = \ {\tt m}
          x0 = 0
          x1 = 1
          if (m == 1) :
               return 0
          # Apply extended Euclid Algorithm
          while (a > 1):
               # q is quotient
               q = a // m
               t = m
               # m is remainder now, process
               # same as euclid's algo
               m = a \% m
               a = t
               t = x0
```

```
x0 = x1 - q * x0
        x1 = t
    # Make x1 positive
    if (x1 < 0):
        x1 = x1 + m0
    return x1
# k is size of num[] and rem[].
# Returns the smallest
# number x such that:
# x \% num[O] = rem[O],
# x % num[1] = rem[1],
# ......
# x \% num[k-2] = rem[k-1]
# Assumption: Numbers in num[]
# are pairwise coprime
# (gcd for every pair is 1)
def findMinX(num, rem, k) :
    # Compute product of all numbers
    prod = 1
   for i in range(0, k) :
       prod = prod * num[i]
    # Initialize result
    result = 0
    # Apply above formula
   for i in range(0,k):
        pp = prod // num[i]
        result = result + rem[i] * inv(pp, num[i]) * pp
    return result % prod
# Driver method
num = [5, 11, 17]
rem = [2, 3, 5]
k = len(num)
print( "x is " , findMinX(num, rem, k) % 935)
```

x is 872

```
[46]: from functools import reduce
      def chinese_remainder(n, a):
          sum = 0
          prod = reduce(lambda a, b: a*b, n)
          for n_i, a_i in zip(n,a):
              p = prod/n_i
              sum += a_i * mul_inv(p, n_i) * p
          return sum % prod
      def mul inv(a, b):
          b0 = b
          x0, x1 = 0,1
          if b == 1:
              return 1
          while a > 1:
              q = a // b
              a , b = b , a\%b
              x0, x1 = x1 - q*x0, x0
          if x1 < 0:
              x1 += b0
          return x1
      a = [2,3,5] \# x = a \mod x
      n = [5,11,17] \# x = x \mod n
      print(chinese_remainder(n,a))
```

872.0

1.11 Symmetric Cryptography

```
[47]: # Needed for code import numpy as np
```

1.12 Keyed Permuations

• One-to-one correspondence is a bijection

1.13 Resisting Bruteforce

• Best single-key attack against AES is the biclique attack

1.14 Structure Of AES

• AES-128 begins with a key schedule and then runs 10 rounds over a state. The starting state is just the plaintext block that we want to encrypt, represented as a 4x4 matrix of bytes.

Over the course of the 10 rounds, the state is repeatedly modified by a number of invertible transformations.

- 1. Key Expansion or Key Schedule
 - * From the 128 bit key, 11 128 bit round keys are derived; one at each AddRoundKey step
- 2. Initial Key Addition
 - * AddRoundKey -> bytes of first round key are XORd with bytes of state
- 3. Round -> this phase is looped 10 times
 - * SubBytes -> each byte of state substituted for a different byte according to lookup table/S-box
 - * ShiftRows -> last three rows of the state matrix are transposed-shifted over a column(s)
 - * MixColumns -> matrix multiplication on columns of the state, combining the four bytes in each column. Skipped in final round.
 - * AddRoundKey -> bytes of current round key are XORd with bytes of the state

```
[48]: def bytes2matrix(text):
          """ Converts a 16-byte array into a 4x4 matrix.
          return [list(text[i:i+4]) for i in range(0, len(text), 4)]
      def matrix2bytes(matrix):
          """ Converts a 4x4 matrix into a 16-byte array.
          arr = []
          for row in matrix:
              for num in row:
                  arr.append(num)
          return arr
      def bytes2matrixNP(text):
          return np.array([list(text[i:i+4]) for i in range(0, len(text), 4)],

dtype=np.uint8)
      def matrix2bytesNP(matrix_np):
          return matrix_np.ravel()
      matrix = \Gamma
          [99, 114, 121, 112],
          [116, 111, 123, 105],
          [110, 109, 97, 116],
          [114, 105, 120, 125],
      encodedMatrixNP = bytes2matrixNP(("yell"*4).encode())
      print(matrix2bytesNP(encodedMatrixNP))
      print("".join([chr(x) for x in matrix2bytes(matrix)]))
```

[121 101 108 108 121 101 108 108 121 101 108 108 121 101 108 108] crypto{inmatrix}

1.15 Round Keys

- KeyExpansion takes in our 16 byte key and produces 11 4x4 matrices called round keys.
- Initial key addition phase has a single AddRoundKey step: XORs current state with current round key
- AddRoundKey is what makes AES a "keyed permutation" rather than just a permutation

```
[49]: state = [
          [206, 243, 61, 34],
          [171, 11, 93, 31],
          [16, 200, 91, 108],
          [150, 3, 194, 51],
      ]
      round_key = [
          [173, 129, 68, 82],
          [223, 100, 38, 109],
          [32, 189, 53, 8],
          [253, 48, 187, 78],
      ]
      def add round key(s, k):
                 return [[sss kkk for sss, kkk in zip(ss, kk)] for ss, kk in zip(s, k)]
          if len(s) != len(k) or len(s[0]) != len(k[0]):
              return False
          for x in range(len(s)):
              for y in range(len(s[0])):
                   s[x][y] \stackrel{\sim}{=} k[x][y]
          return s
      def add_round_keyNP(s, k):
          return np.bitwise_xor(s, k)
      print("".join([chr(x) for x in matrix2bytes(add_round_keyNP(state,_
       →round_key))]))
      print("".join([chr(x) for x in matrix2bytes(add round key(state, round key))]))
     crypto{r0undk3y}
     crypto{r0undk3y}
```

1.16 Confusion Through Substitution

• First step of each AES round is SubBytes

- Takes each byte of the state matrix and substitutes it for a different byte in a preset 16x16 lookup table/S-box (Substitution)
 - * "Confusion" means that the relationship between the ciphertext and the key should be as complex as possible. Given just a ciphertext, there should be no way to learn anything about the key.
 - * If a cipher has poor confusion, it is possible to express a relationship between ciphertext, key, and plaintext as a linear function. For instance, in a Caesar cipher, ciphertext = plaintext + key
- S-boxes are aiming for high non-linearity
- The fast lookup in an S-box is a shortcut for performing a very nonlinear function on the input bytes. This function involves taking the modular inverse in the Galois field 2^8 and then applying an affine transformation which has been tweaked for maximum confusion.
- $-f(x) = 5 * x^{fe} + 9 * x^{fb} + f * 9x^{fb} + 25 * x^{f7} + f * 4x^{ef} + x^{df} + b * 5x^{bf} + 8 * fx^{7f} + 63$
- To make the S-box, the function has been calculated on all input values from 0x00 to 0xff and the outputs put in the lookup table.

```
[50]: s_box = (
                         0x63, 0x7C, 0x77, 0x7B, 0xF2, 0x6B, 0x6F, 0xC5, 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2B,
                   \hookrightarrow0xFE, 0xD7, 0xAB, 0x76,
                         0xCA, 0x82, 0xC9, 0x7D, 0xFA, 0x59, 0x47, 0xF0, 0xAD, 0xD4, 0xA2, 0xAF,
                  \hookrightarrow 0x9C, 0xA4, 0x72, 0xC0,
                         OxB7, OxFD, Ox93, Ox26, Ox36, Ox3F, OxF7, OxCC, Ox34, OxA5, OxE5, OxF1,
                   0x71, 0xD8, 0x31, 0x15,
                         0x04, 0xC7, 0x23, 0xC3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9A, 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xE2, 0xE2, 0x80, 0xE2, 
                   \hookrightarrow0xEB, 0x27, 0xB2, 0x75,
                         0x09, 0x83, 0x2C, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x6E, 0x5A, 0xAO, 0x52, 0x3B, 0xD6, 0xB3, 11
                   \Rightarrow0x29, 0xE3, 0x2F, 0x84,
                         0x53, 0xD1, 0x00, 0xED, 0x20, 0xFC, 0xB1, 0x5B, 0x6A, 0xCB, 0xBE, 0x39,
                   \hookrightarrow0x4A, 0x4C, 0x58, 0xCF,
                         0xD0, 0xEF, 0xAA, 0xFB, 0x43, 0x4D, 0x33, 0x85, 0x45, 0xF9, 0x02, 0x7F,
                   \hookrightarrow0x50, 0x3C, 0x9F, 0xA8,
                         0x51, 0xA3, 0x40, 0x8F, 0x92, 0x9D, 0x38, 0xF5, 0xBC, 0xB6, 0xDA, 0x21,
                  \rightarrow0x10, 0xFF, 0xF3, 0xD2,
                         0xCD, 0xOC, 0x13, 0xEC, 0x5F, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, 0xC4, 0xA7, 0x7E, 0x3D,
                  0x64, 0x5D, 0x19, 0x73,
                         0x60, 0x81, 0x4F, 0xDC, 0x22, 0x2A, 0x90, 0x88, 0x46, 0xEE, 0xB8, 0x14,
                   \hookrightarrow 0xDE, 0x5E, 0x0B, 0xDB,
                         0xE0, 0x32, 0x3A, 0x0A, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5C, 0xC2, 0xD3, 0xAC, 0x62,
                  0x91, 0x95, 0xE4, 0x79,
                         OxE7, OxC8, Ox37, Ox6D, Ox8D, OxD5, Ox4E, OxA9, Ox6C, Ox56, OxF4, OxEA,
                  \rightarrow0x65, 0x7A, 0xAE, 0x08,
                         0xBA, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2E, 0x1C, 0xA6, 0xB4, 0xC6, 0xE8, 0xDD, 0x74, 0x1F,
                   \hookrightarrow0x4B, 0xBD, 0x8B, 0x8A,
                         0x70, 0x3E, 0xB5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xF6, 0x0E, 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xB9, 11
                   \hookrightarrow0x86, 0xC1, 0x1D, 0x9E,
```

```
0xE1, 0xF8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xD9, 0x8E, 0x94, 0x9B, 0x1E, 0x87, 0xE9, 
     \hookrightarrow0xCE, 0x55, 0x28, 0xDF,
                0x8C, 0xA1, 0x89, 0x0D, 0xBF, 0xE6, 0x42, 0x68, 0x41, 0x99, 0x2D, 0x0F,
   \hookrightarrow 0xB0, 0x54, 0xBB, 0x16,
inv_s_box = (
                0x52, 0x09, 0x6A, 0xD5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xA5, 0x38, 0xBF, 0x40, 0xA3, 0x9E,
     \hookrightarrow0x81, 0xF3, 0xD7, 0xFB,
                0x7C, 0xE3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9B, 0x2F, 0xFF, 0x87, 0x34, 0x8E, 0x43, 0x44,
     \hookrightarrow0xC4, 0xDE, 0xE9, 0xCB,
                0x54, 0x7B, 0x94, 0x32, 0xA6, 0xC2, 0x23, 0x3D, 0xEE, 0x4C, 0x95, 0x0B, u
     \hookrightarrow0x42, 0xFA, 0xC3, 0x4E,
                0x08, 0x2E, 0xA1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xD9, 0x24, 0xB2, 0x76, 0x5B, 0xA2, 0x49, 0x60, 
     \hookrightarrow0x6D, 0x8B, 0xD1, 0x25,
                0x72, 0xF8, 0xF6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16, 0xD4, 0xA4, 0x5C, 0xCC,
     90x5D, 0x65, 0xB6, 0x92,
                0x6C, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xFD, 0xED, 0xB9, 0xDA, 0x5E, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, u
     \hookrightarrow 0xA7, 0x8D, 0x9D, 0x84,
                0x90, 0xD8, 0xAB, 0x00, 0x8C, 0xBC, 0xD3, 0xOA, 0xF7, 0xE4, 0x58, 0x05, u
     \hookrightarrow 0xB8, 0xB3, 0x45, 0x06,
                0xD0, 0x2C, 0x1E, 0x8F, 0xCA, 0x3F, 0x0F, 0x02, 0xC1, 0xAF, 0xBD, 0x03,
     90x01, 0x13, 0x8A, 0x6B,
                0x3A, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4F, 0x67, 0xDC, 0xEA, 0x97, 0xF2, 0xCF, 0xCE,
     \hookrightarrow0xF0, 0xB4, 0xE6, 0x73,
                0x96, 0xAC, 0x74, 0x22, 0xE7, 0xAD, 0x35, 0x85, 0xE2, 0xF9, 0x37, 0xE8,
     \rightarrow0x1C, 0x75, 0xDF, 0x6E,
                0x47, 0xF1, 0x1A, 0x71, 0x1D, 0x29, 0xC5, 0x89, 0x6F, 0xB7, 0x62, 0x0E,
     \hookrightarrow 0xAA, 0x18, 0xBE, 0x1B,
                0xFC, 0x56, 0x3E, 0x4B, 0xC6, 0xD2, 0x79, 0x20, 0x9A, 0xDB, 0xC0, 0xFE,
     \rightarrow0x78, 0xCD, 0x5A, 0xF4,
                0x1F, 0xDD, 0xA8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xC7, 0x31, 0xB1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x10, 0x10, 0x59, 0x10, 
     \hookrightarrow0x27, 0x80, 0xEC, 0x5F,
                 0x60, 0x51, 0x7F, 0xA9, 0x19, 0xB5, 0x4A, 0x0D, 0x2D, 0xE5, 0x7A, 0x9F,
     \hookrightarrow0x93, 0xC9, 0x9C, 0xEF,
                0xA0, 0xE0, 0x3B, 0x4D, 0xAE, 0x2A, 0xF5, 0xB0, 0xC8, 0xEB, 0xBB, 0x3C,
     90x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61,
                0x17, 0x2B, 0x04, 0x7E, 0xBA, 0x77, 0xD6, 0x26, 0xE1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, u
     \hookrightarrow0x55, 0x21, 0x0C, 0x7D,
state = [
                  [251, 64, 182, 81],
                  [146, 168, 33, 80],
                  [199, 159, 195, 24],
                  [64, 80, 182, 255],
```

crypto{l1n34rly}
crypto{l1n34rly}

1.17 Diffusion Through Permutation

- Diffusion: relates to how every part of a cipher's input should spread to every part of the output
- Substitution on its own creates non-linearity, however it doesn't distribute it over the entire state. Without diffusion, the same byte in the same position would get the same transformations applied to it each round
- Avalanche Effect: An ideal amount of diffusion causes a change of one bit in the plaintext to lead to a change in statistically half the bits of the ciphertext
- ShiftRows and MixColumns work together to ensure every byte affects every other byte in the state within just two rounds
 - ShiftRows: keeps the first row of the state matrix the same. The second row is shifted over one column to the left, wrapping around. The third row is shifted two columns, the fourth row by three
 - MixColumn: performs Matrix multiplication in Rijndael's Galois field between the columns of the state matrix and a preset matrix. Each single byte of each column therefore affects all the bytes of the resulting column.

```
[51]: def shift_rows(s):
    s[0][1], s[1][1], s[2][1], s[3][1] = s[1][1], s[2][1], s[3][1], s[0][1]
    s[0][2], s[1][2], s[2][2], s[3][2] = s[2][2], s[3][2], s[0][2], s[1][2]
    s[0][3], s[1][3], s[2][3], s[3][3] = s[3][3], s[0][3], s[1][3], s[2][3]

def inv_shift_rows(s):
    s[1][1], s[2][1], s[3][1], s[0][1] = s[0][1], s[1][1], s[2][1], s[3][1]
    s[2][2], s[3][2], s[0][2], s[1][2] = s[0][2], s[1][2], s[2][2], s[3][2]
    s[3][3], s[0][3], s[1][3], s[2][3] = s[0][3], s[1][3], s[2][3], s[3][3]
```

```
def inv_shift_rowsNP(s):
    for i in range(s.shape[1]):
         s[:, i] = np.concatenate((s[-i:, i], s[:-i, i]), axis = 0)
# learned from http://cs.ucsb.edu/~koc/cs178/projects/JT/aes.c
xtime = lambda a: (((a << 1) ^{\circ} Ox1B) & OxFF) if (a & Ox80) else (a << 1)
def mix_single_column(a):
    # see Sec 4.1.2 in The Design of Rijndael
    t = a[0] ^ a[1] ^ a[2] ^ a[3]
    u = a[0]
    a[0] \stackrel{}{\sim} t \stackrel{}{\sim} xtime(a[0] \stackrel{}{\sim} a[1])
    a[1] ^= t ^ xtime(a[1] ^ a[2])
    a[2] \stackrel{=}{} t \stackrel{\sim}{} xtime(a[2] \stackrel{\sim}{} a[3])
    a[3] \stackrel{}{}= t \stackrel{}{} xtime(a[3] \stackrel{}{} u)
def mix_columns(s):
    for i in range(4):
         mix_single_column(s[i])
def inv_mix_columns(s):
    # see Sec 4.1.3 in The Design of Rijndael
    for i in range(4):
        u = xtime(xtime(s[i][0] ^ s[i][2]))
         v = xtime(xtime(s[i][1] ^ s[i][3]))
         s[i][0] ^= u
         s[i][1] ^= v
         s[i][2] = u
         s[i][3] = v
    mix_columns(s)
state = [
    [108, 106, 71, 86],
    [96, 62, 38, 72],
    [42, 184, 92, 209],
    [94, 79, 8, 54],
]
stateNP = np.array(state, dtype=np.uint8)
inv_mix_columns(state)
```

```
inv_mix_columns(stateNP)
inv_shift_rows(state)
inv_shift_rowsNP(stateNP)

print("".join([chr(x) for x in matrix2bytes(state)]))
print("".join([chr(x) for x in matrix2bytes(stateNP)]))

crypto{d1ffUs3R}
```

crypto{d1ffUs3R}
crypto{d1ffUs3R}

1.18 Bringing It All Together

- AddRoundKey seeds the key into this substitution-permutation network, making the cipher a keyed permutation
- Decryption involves performing the steps described in the "Structure of AES" challenge in reverse, applying the inverse operations. Note that the KeyExpansion still needs to be run first, and the round keys will be used in reverse order. AddRoundKey and its inverse are identical as XOR has the self-inverse property

```
[52]: import binascii
      N ROUNDS = 10
                 = b'\xc3,\\xa6\xb5\x80^\x0c\xdb\x8d\xa5z*\xb6\xfe\'
      ciphertext = b'\xd10\x14j\xa4+0\xb6\xa1\xc4\x08B)\x8f\x12\xdd'
      def expand_key(master_key):
          Expands and returns a list of key matrices for the given master_key.
          # Round constants https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
       →AES_key_schedule#Round_constants
          r con = (
              0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x04, 0x08, 0x10, 0x20, 0x40,
              0x80, 0x1B, 0x36, 0x6C, 0xD8, 0xAB, 0x4D, 0x9A,
              0x2F, 0x5E, 0xBC, 0x63, 0xC6, 0x97, 0x35, 0x6A,
              0xD4, 0xB3, 0x7D, 0xFA, 0xEF, 0xC5, 0x91, 0x39,
          )
          # Initialize round keys with raw key material.
          key_columns = bytes2matrix(master_key)
          iteration_size = len(master_key) // 4
          # Each iteration has exactly as many columns as the key material.
          i = 1
          while len(key_columns) < (N_ROUNDS + 1) * 4:</pre>
```

```
# Copy previous word.
        word = list(key_columns[-1])
        # Perform schedule_core once every "row".
        if len(key_columns) % iteration_size == 0:
            # Circular shift.
            word.append(word.pop(0))
            # Map to S-BOX.
            word = [s box[b] for b in word]
            # XOR with first byte of R-CON, since the others bytes of R-CON are
 →0.
            word[0] ^= r_con[i]
            i += 1
        elif len(master_key) == 32 and len(key_columns) % iteration_size == 4:
            # Run word through S-box in the fourth iteration when using a
            # 256-bit key.
            word = [s_box[b] for b in word]
        # XOR with equivalent word from previous iteration.
       word = bytes(i^j for i, j in zip(word, key_columns[-iteration_size]))
       key columns.append(word)
    # Group key words in 4x4 byte matrices.
   return [key_columns[4*i : 4*(i+1)] for i in range(len(key_columns) // 4)]
def inv_sub_bytes(s, sbox=inv_s_box):
   for i in range(len(s)):
        for j in range(len(s[0])):
            s[i][j] = sbox[s[i][j]]
def decrypt(key, ciphertext):
    # Remember to start from the last round key and work backwards through them,
 ⇔when decrypting
   round keys = expand key(key)
    # Convert ciphertext to state matrix
    ciphertext = bytes2matrix(ciphertext)
   add_round_key(ciphertext, round_keys[-1])
   # Initial add round key step
   inv_shift_rows(ciphertext)
   inv_sub_bytes(ciphertext)
   for i in range(N_ROUNDS - 1, 0, -1):
        add_round_key(ciphertext, round_keys[i])
        inv_mix_columns(ciphertext)
        inv_shift_rows(ciphertext)
```

```
inv_sub_bytes(ciphertext)

# Run final round (skips the InvMixColumns step)
add_round_key(ciphertext, round_keys[0])

# Convert state matrix to plaintext
return matrix2bytes(ciphertext)

print("".join([chr(k) for k in decrypt(key, ciphertext)]))
```

crypto{MYAES128}

```
[54]: # Work in Progress
      def decryptNP(key, ciphertext):
          # binascii.hexlify(key).decode('utf-8')
          # binascii.hexlify(ciphertext).decode('utf-8')
          # Remember to start from the last round key and work backwards through them,
       ⇔when decrypting
          #print(expand_key(key))
          #round keys = [binascii.hexlify(x).decode('utf-8')] for x in expand key(key)]
          round keys = []
          keys = expand key(key)
          for idx in range(len(keys)):
              if idx == 0:
                  round_keys.append(keys[idx])
              else:
                  #round_keys.append([list(binascii.hexlify(row)) for row in_
       \hookrightarrow keys[idx]])
                  tmp = []
                  for row in keys[idx]:
                      row = binascii.hexlify(row)
                      newRow = []
                      for idx in range(0, len(row), 2):
                          newRow.append(row[idx] + row[idx+1])
                      tmp.append(newRow)
                  round_keys.append(tmp)
          ciphertext = bytes2matrixNP(ciphertext)
          add_round_keyNP(ciphertext, round_keys[-1])
          # Initial add round key step
          inv_shift_rowsNP(ciphertext)
          inv_sub_bytes(ciphertext)
          for i in range(N_ROUNDS - 1, 0, -1):
```

```
add_round_keyNP(ciphertext, round_keys[i])
    inv_mix_columns(ciphertext)
    inv_shift_rowsNP(ciphertext)
    inv_sub_bytes(ciphertext)

# Run final round (skips the InvMixColumns step)
add_round_keyNP(ciphertext, round_keys[0])
print(type(ciphertext))
# Convert state matrix to plaintext
return matrix2bytes(ciphertext)

#print("".join([chr(k) for k in decryptNP(key, ciphertext)]))
```

1.19 Public Key Encryption

- Maybe later
- Don't use in my projects much

1.20 Elliptic Curves

• Same thing