# Security Analysis Report

# solana-civ

Oct 13, 2023

by sec3 X-ray Auditor



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### **SUMMARY**

## **Summary**

sec3 X-ray Auditor ("sec3 Auditor") was used by Metaversium (the "Client") to conduct security analysis of the **solana-civ** Solana smart contract program. The artifact of the analysis was the source code of the following on-chain smart contract excluding tests in a public repository:

• Commit c417b2642e6a2792429e2f1f232e0f3a45f499be

This analysis revealed 1 potential issues, of which 0 are critical.

This report presents the output from sec3 Auditor.

### **DISCLAIMER**

### **Disclaimer**

This report ("Report") includes the results of a security analysis, by Sec3 X-ray Auditor, of a specific build and/or version of the source code provided by the Client and specified in the Report ("Assessed Code").

The sole purpose of the Report is to provide the Client with the results of the security analysis of the Assessed Code. The Report does not apply to any other version and/or build of the Assessed Code.

Regardless of its contents, the Report does not (and shall not be interpreted to) provide any warranty, representation, or covenant that the Assessed Code: (i) is error and/or bugfree, (ii) has no security vulnerabilities, and/or (iii) does not infringe any third-party's rights. The Report is not, and shall not be construed or interpreted, in any manner, as, (i) an endorsement by the Company of the Assessed Code and/or of the Client, or (ii) investment advice or a recommendation to invest in the Assessed Code and/or the Client.

This Report shall be null and void if the Report (or any portion thereof) is altered in any manner.

#### About sec3 X-ray Auditor

sec3 X-ray Auditor extracts essential code structure and relationships into a set of databases that enable sophisticated analysis of source code. Sec3 Software employs Maximal Concolic Execution (MCE) techniques, amongst others, to provide the ability to systematically explore code paths, encode path conditions and check path invariants.


At the time of this report, sec3 Auditor can scan 60 types of security vulnerabilities, including Missing Signer Check, Missing Owner Check, etc. Please refer to Appendix A for more information.

#### About sec3

Founded by leading academics in the field of software security and senior industrial veterans, sec3 is a leading blockchain security company that currently focuses on Solana programs. We are also building sophisticated security tools that incorporate static analysis, penetration testing, and formal verification. At sec3, we identify and eliminate security vulnerabilities through the most rigorous process and aided by the most advanced analysis tools. For more information, check out our website and follow us on twitter.

## **Overview of the Result**

#### By Vulnerability Type



## Program: programs\_solciv

#### Untrustful Account No.1 High

#### SVE1019 - The account may not be properly validated and may be untrustful

proxycapital-solana-civ-c417b26/programs/solciv/src/instructions/mint.rs:51

- 45| associated\_token::mint = mint,
  46| associated\_token::authority = owner,
  47| )]
  48| pub destination: Account<'info, TokenAccount>,
  49| /// CHECK: this can be any personal address of the player
  50| /// it's important to check the signer, while recipient of gems can be any address
  >51| pub owner: AccountInfo<'info>,
  52| #[account(mut)]
- 53| pub player\_account: Account<'info, Player>,
- 54| #[account(mut)]
- 55| pub player: Signer<'info>,
- 56| pub rent: Sysvar<'info, Rent>,
- 57| pub system program: Program<'info, System>,

## Appendix A - sec3 Vulnerabilities and Exposures (SVE)

SVE	Checker	Description	Examples
		The function may suffer	
		from reentrancy attacks	
		due to the use of	
SVE10001	ReentrancyEtherVulnerability	call.value, which can	<u>Example</u>
		invoke an external	
		contract's fallback	
		function	
		The function may allow an	
SVE10002	ArbitrarySendERC20	attacker to send from an	<u>Example</u>
30210002	AI DILI AI Y SEIIUCHC20	arbitrary address, instead	<u>cxampte</u>
		of from the msg.sender	
		The function may allow an	
SVE10003	UnprotectedSelfDestruct	attacker to destruct the	<u>Example</u>
		contract	
		The function may be	
SVE10004	MissingCalleeCheck	missing a check callee !=	<u>Example</u>
		address(this)	
SVE1001	MissingSignerCheck	The account is missing	<u>Example</u>
	MissingSignerCheck	signer check	<u>cxampte</u>
SVE1002	MissingOwnerCheck	The account is missing	<u>Example</u>
	Missingownercheck	owner check	
SVE1003	luta anno 110 anni la ca	The add operation may	<u>Example</u>
	IntegerAddOverflow	result in overflows	<u>cxampte</u>
SVE1004	IntegerUnderflow	The sub operation may	Evamplo
3021004	integerondernow	result in underflows	<u>Example</u>
SVE1005	IntegerMulOverflow	The mul operation may	<u>Example</u>
	integermutovernow	result in overflows	
SVE1006	IntegerDivOverflow	The div operation may	<u>Example</u>
	ווונבצבו הוא האבו ונהוא	result in overflows	Lvaiiihra
		The account is not	
SVE1007	UnverifiedParsedAccount	validated before parsing	<u>Example</u>
		its data	

SVE	Checker	Description	Examples
SVE1008		These two accounts are	
	DuplicateMutableAccount	both mutable and may be	<u>Example</u>
		the same account	
EVE1000	InsecureAccountClosing	The account may not be	Evample
SVE1009	insecureAccountclosing	closed securely	<u>Example</u>
		These two account data	
SVE1010	TypeFullCosplay	types are fully compatible	<u>Example</u>
3021010	Турегицсоѕріау	and can be used to launch	cxampte
		type confusion attacks	
		These two account data	
		types are partially	
SVE1011	TypePartialCosplay	compatible and may be	<u>Example</u>
		exploited by type	
		confusion attacks	
		The arithmetic operation	
SVE1012	DivideByZero	may result in a divide-by-	<u>Example</u>
		zero error	
		The account may be	
SVE1013	AccountReInitialization	vulnerable to program re-	<u>Example</u>
		initialization	
		The account's bump seed	
SVE1014	BumpSeedNotValidated	is not validated and may	<u>Example</u>
3021014	BumpseedNotValidated	be vulnerable to seed	<u>CAUTIFIE</u>
		canonicalization attacks	
		The PDA sharing with	
SVE1015	InsecurePDASharing	these seeds may be	<u>Example</u>
		insecure	
SVE1016		The CPI may be vulnerable	
	ArbitraryCPI	and invoke an arbitrary	<u>Example</u>
		program	
SVE1017	MaliciousSimulation	The program may contain	<u>Example</u>
	MaliciousSimulation	malicious simulation	Lvambre

SVE	Checker	Description	Examples
		The sysvar instructions	
SVE1018	UnsafeSysVarAPI	API is unsafe and	<u>Example</u>
3421010		deprecated (wormhole	<u>cxumpte</u>
		exploit)	
		The account may not be	
SVE1019	UnvalidatedAccount	properly validated and	<u>Example</u>
		may be untrustful	
		The program has outdated	
SVE1020	OutdatedDependency	and vulnerable	<u>Example</u>
		dependencies	
SVE1021	UnsafeRust	The program contains	<u>Example</u>
3021021	olisalenust	unsafe Rust code	cxampte
SVE1022	OverPayment	The code misses checking	<u>Example</u>
3VE1022	OverFayment	to prevent over payment	cxampte
SVE1023	StalePriceFeed	The code may use a stale	
3701023	Staterficer eed	price feed (solend loss)	<u>Example</u>
SVE1024	MissInitTokenMint	The init instruction misses	<u>Example</u>
3701024	MISSILICIONELIMILIC	minting pool tokens	
SVE1025	MissRentExempt	The account misses rent	<u>Example</u>
	Missilentexempt	exempt check	
		The account misses	
SVE1026	MissFreezeAuthority	checking for freeze	<u>Example</u>
		authority	
		The instruction may suffer	
SVE1027	FlashLoanRisk	from a flashloan risk due	<u>Example</u>
		to internal price oracle	
		The arithmetics here may	
SVE1028	BidirectionalRounding	suffer from bidirectional	<u>Example</u>
		rounding vulnerabilities	
		The cast operation here	
SVE1029	LossyCastTruncation	may lose precision due to	<u>Example</u>
		truncation	
		The PDA account may not	
SVE1030	UnvalidatedPDAAccount	be properly validated and	<u>Example</u>
		may be untrustful	

SVE	Checker	Description	Examples
SVE1031		The account is used as	
		destination in token	
	UnvalidatedDestinationAccount	transfer without	<u>Example</u>
	OlivatidatedDestillationAccount	validation and it could be	cxampte
		the same as the transfer	
		source account	
		The PDA account may be	
		incorrectly used as shared	
SVE1032	IncorrectAuthorityAccount	authority and may allow	<u>Example</u>
		any account to transfer or	
		burn tokens	
		The `init_if_needed`	
SVE1033	InsecureAnchorInitIfNeeded	keyword in anchor-lang	<u>Example</u>
3451033	insecui exilciloi initinveeded	prior to v0.24.x has a	cxampte
		critical security bug	
		The spl_token account	
SVE1034	InsecureSPLTokenCPI	may be arbitrary prior to	<u>Example</u>
		version v3.1.1	
		The associated token	<u>Example</u>
SVE1035	InsecureAssociatedTokenAccount	account is missing PDA	
3451033		key check and may be	
		faked	
		The account realloc in	
SVE1036	Incocura/scountPopulos	solana_program prior to	<u>Example</u>
3421030	InsecureAccountRealloc	v1.10.29 may cause	<u>exampte</u>
		programs to malfunction	
		These two PDA accounts	
SVE1037	PDASeedCollisions	may have the same seeds,	' Curumla
2/E103/	PDASeedCollisions	which may lead to PDA	<u>cxampte</u>
		collisions	
SVE20001		The init function misses	
		checking admin	
	MissingInitAdminCheck	uniqueness and may allow	<u>Example</u>
		an attacker to call the init	
		function more than once	

SVE	Checker	Description	Examples
SVE20002	BitShiftOverflow	The bit shift operation	<u>Example</u>
	DITELLITORELIFON	may result in overflows	
SVE20003	DivisionPrecisionLoss	The division operation	<u>Example</u>
3VE20003	DIVISIONALECIZIONEOSS	here may lose precision	
		The I128 signed integer	
		implementation in Move is	
SVE20004	VulnerableI128Implementation	not recommended and	<u>Example</u>
30220004	vullerablenzomplementation	may be vulnerable.	<u>example</u>
		Consider using the built-in	
		Move types only.	
CVC3001	location and a support of a sign	Loop break instead of	C
SVE2001	IncorrectLoopBreakLogic	continue (jet-v1 exploit)	<u>Example</u>
5,453,003	1	Liquidation condition >=	· .
SVE2002	IncorrectConditionCheck	should be >	<u>Example</u>
5725003		The calculation has	
SVE2003	ExponentialCalculation	exponential complexity	<u>Example</u>
		Incorrect checked_div	
		instead of	
SVE2004	IncorrectDivisionLogic	checked_ceil_div (spl-	<u>Example</u>
		token-swap vulnerability:	
		stable curve division)	
		The token amount	
		calculation may be	
SVE2005	$Incorrect Token {\tt Calculation}$	incorrect. Consider using	<u>Example</u>
		the reserves instead of	
		the balances.	
SVE2001	PostCocurity/Prostico	The code does not follow	Evample
SVE3001	BestSecurityPractice	best security practices	<u>Example</u>
		The code may be	
SVE3002	CriticalUnusedCode	redundant or unused, but	<u>Example</u>
		appears critical	
SVE3003		The program uses Anchor	
	InconsistentAnchor	inconsistently across	<u>Example</u>
		different instructions	

SVE	Checker	Description	Examples
		The configuration and	
SVE3004	InconsistentConfig	initialization data are	<u>Example</u>
		inconsistent	
		The token account's	Example  Example
SVE3005	MissingCPIAccountReload	amount may be incorrect	Evample
3453003	IVII33IIIger Incedulititetadi	without calling reload	<u>LXampte</u>
		after CPI	
		The unstake instruction	
SVE3006	MissingUnstakeAccessControl	may be missing an	Evample
3453000	MISSINGOTISTAKEACCESSCOTTIOC	access_control account	<u>LABITIPLE</u>
		validation	
		The instruction may suffer	
		from a race condition	
SVE3007	OrderRaceCondition	between order	<u>Example</u>
		cancellation and order	
-		recreation by an attacker	
		The account may break	
		the ABI of the deployed	
SVE3008	New Account Not Backwards Compatible	on-chain program as it	<u>Example</u>
		does not exist in the IDL	
		available on Anchor	
		The mutable account may	
		break the ABI of the	
		deployed on-chain	
SVE3009	${\bf Mutable Account Not Backwards Compatible}$	program as it is	<u>Example</u>
		immutable according to	
		the IDL available on	
		Anchor	
		These two accounts are	
		reordered in the	
		instruction and may break	
SVE3010	ReOrderAccountsNotBackwardsCompatible	the ABI of the deployed	<u>Example</u>
		on-chain program,	
		according to the IDL	
		available on Anchor	