



Security Assessment **AURA DEX (CPMM)**

Verified by Vibranium Audits on 30 November 2024

Revised by Vibranium Audits on 14 December 2024



Vibranium Audits Verified on November 30th, 2024

AURA DEX (CPMM)

The security assessment was prepared by Vibranium Audits.

Executive Summary

TYPES

DEFI/NFT

ECOSYSTEM

Anchor

METHODS

Manual Review, penetration testing

LANGUAGE

Rust

TIMELINE

Delivered on 03/12/2024

KEY COMPONENTS

N/A

CODEBASE

Privately Shared Codebase

COMMITTS

N/A

Vulnerability Summary

6

Total Findings

5

Resolved

0

Mitigated

0

Partially Resolved

6

Acknowledged

1

Declined

0

Unresolved



1

Critical

1 Resolved

Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation by external or internal actors.



2

High

2 Resolved

High vulnerabilities are usually harder to exploit, requiring specific conditions, or have a more limited scope, but can still lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation by external or internal actors.



2

Medium

2 Resolved

Medium vulnerabilities are usually limited to state manipulations, but cannot lead to assets loss. Major deviations from best practices are also in this category.



0

Low

0 Resolved

Low vulnerabilities are related to outdated and unused code or minor gas optimization. These issues won't have a significant impact on code execution, but affect the code quality.



1

Informational

0 Resolved

Informational errors are often recommendations to improve the style of the code or certain operations to fall within industry best practices. They usually do not affect the overall functioning of the code.

CODEBASE | AURADEX

Repository

N/A

Commits

N/A

AUDIT SCOPE | AURADEX

1 repo audited ● 1 repo with Acknowledged findings ● 0 files with Resolved findings

ID		Branch	Commit Hash
● VAD		N/A	N/A

APPROACH & METHODS | AURADEX

This report has been prepared for AURADEX(2024) to discover issues and vulnerabilities in the source code of the AURADEX project as well as any contract dependencies that were not part of an officially recognized library. A comprehensive examination has been performed, utilizing Manual Review, rigorous Penetration Testing and Static Analysis techniques.

The auditing process pays special attention to the following considerations:

- Pen-Testing the smart contracts against both common and uncommon attack vectors.
- Assessing the code base to ensure compliance with current best practices and industry standards
- Ensuring contract logic meets the specifications and intentions of the client.
- Cross referencing contract structure and implementation against similar smart contracts produced by industry leaders.
- Thorough line-by-line manual review of the entire code base by industry experts.

The security assessment resulted in findings that ranged from critical to informational. We recommend addressing these findings to ensure a high level of security standards and industry practices.

We suggest recommendations that could better serve the project from the security perspective:

- Testing the smart contracts against both common and uncommon attack vectors.
- Enhance general coding practices for better structures of source codes.
- Review unit tests to cover the possible use cases.
- Review functions for readability, especially for future development work.

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Disclaimer

FINDINGS | AURADEX

6

Total Findings

1

Critical

2

High

2

Medium

0

Low

1

Informational

This report has been prepared to discover issues and vulnerabilities for AURADEX.

Through this audit, we have uncovered 6 issues ranging from different severity levels.

Utilizing the techniques of Manual Review & Penetration Testing, we discovered the following findings:

ID	Title	Category	Severity	Status
VAD-01	Partial Transaction Failures Leading to Inconsistent State	Logical Issue	CRITICAL	● Resolved
VAD-02	Use of .unwrap() Leading to Panics	Logical Issue	HIGH	● Resolved
VAD-03	Arithmetic Overflows and Underflows	Logical Issue	HIGH	● Resolved
VAD-06	Lack of Documentation and Comments	Best Practices	Informational	● Rejected
VAD-05	Event Emission Before Successful Execution	Logical Issue	Medium	● Resolved
VAD-04	Inconsistent Token Program Selection	Logical Issue	Medium	● Resolved

VAD-01 | Partial Transaction Failures Leading to Inconsistent State

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Logical Issue	● CRITICAL	<ul style="list-style-type: none">◦ collect_protocol_fee◦ deposit◦ swap_base_input◦ swap_base_output◦ withdraw	● Resolved

Description

- The code updates the program's state before performing external calls, such as token transfers. If an external call fails after the state has been updated, the transaction will fail, but the prior state updates may have already been applied. This can lead to an inconsistent state where the program's state reflects changes that did not fully occur due to the failed external call.
- State updates (e.g., updating the pool_state) are performed before external calls (e.g., transferring tokens). If an external call fails after the state update, the state remains changed, but the external action did not occur.
 - If transfer_from_user_to_pool_vault fails, the lp_supply has already been incremented, but the user's tokens were not transferred to the pool.
 - The lp_supply reflects an increased supply of LP tokens, but the pool did not receive the corresponding tokens from the user, leading to an imbalance.

Recommendation

- Reorder Operations to Ensure Atomicity:
 - Perform all checks and external calls before updating the program's state.
 - Only update the state after all external calls have succeeded.
- Use Temporary Variables:
 - Calculate all changes and store them in temporary variables before applying them to the state.

```
// Perform external calls
transfer_from_user_to_pool_vault(...)?;
transfer_from_pool_vault_to_user(...)?;

// Update state after successful operations
pool_state.lp_supply = pool_state.lp_supply.checked_add(lp_token_amount)
    .ok_or(ErrorCode::ArithmeticOverflow)?;
```

Revision

- The AuraDex team implemented the necessary measures to mitigate against this issue.

VAD-02 | Use of .unwrap() Leading to Panics

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Logical Issue	● HIGH	General	● Resolved

Description

- Issue: Use of .unwrap() can cause panics if an operation fails.
- Panics lead to unexpected program termination, which can be exploited or cause denial of service.

Recommendation

Use Proper Error Handling:

```
let amount = u64::try_from(results.amount)
    .map_err(|_| ErrorCode::ConversionError)?;
```

Define Custom Error Codes:

```
#[error_code]
pub enum ErrorCode {
    ConversionError,
    ArithmeticOverflow,
    // ... other errors
}
```

Revision

The proper error handling has been implemented.

VAD-03 | Arithmetic Overflows and Underflows

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Logical Issue	● HIGH	General	● Resolved

Description

- The code frequently performs arithmetic operations (addition, subtraction, multiplication, division) without checking for overflows or underflows. For example, using methods like `.unwrap()` after `checked_` arithmetic operations can lead to panics if the operation overflows or underflows.
- **Unchecked Arithmetic Operations:** In Rust, when using methods like `checked_add`, `checked_sub`, `checked_mul`, if the operation overflows, these methods return `None`. Calling `.unwrap()` on the result without checking can cause the program to panic.
- **Example:**

```
// Potential overflow if lp_supply + lp_token_amount exceeds u64::MAX
pool_state.lp_supply = pool_state.lp_supply.checked_add(lp_token_amount).unwrap();
```

- Unchecked overflows can cause the program to panic, leading to unexpected termination. In the context of Solana programs, panics are highly discouraged as they can be exploited to cause denial of service.
- **Incorrect State Updates:** Overflows and underflows can result in incorrect calculations, leading to incorrect balances, incorrect fee calculations, or incorrect token amounts being transferred.

Recommendation

- Use Safe Arithmetic Methods:

```
let total = amount.checked_add(fee)
    .ok_or(ErrorCode::ArithmeticOverflow)?;
```

Replace `.unwrap()` with proper error handling using `ok_or` and the `?` operator.

Use Rust's built-in checked arithmetic functions (`checked_add`, `checked_sub`, `checked_mul`, `checked_div`) and handle `None` results appropriately.

Revision

- The necessary error handling for arithmetic operations has been mostly covered.

VAD-04 | Event Emission Before Successful Execution

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Logical Issue	● MEDIUM	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• deposit• swap_base_input• swap_base_output• withdraw	● Resolved

Description

- Events are emitted before all operations in the transaction have successfully completed. If an error occurs after the event is emitted but before the transaction finishes, the event will still be recorded on the blockchain, even though the transaction ultimately failed.
- The code emits events immediately after calculating values but before performing token transfers or updating state.
- If the transaction fails after the event is emitted, external observers relying on events (e.g., indexers, analytics tools) may believe that the deposit succeeded, leading to inaccurate data and potential user confusion.

Recommendation

- Emit Events Only After Successful Execution:
 - Reorder the code to perform all critical operations (token transfers, state updates) before emitting events.
 - Ensure that the event accurately reflects the final state after all operations have succeeded.

```
// Perform token transfers and state updates
transfer_from_user_to_pool_vault(...)?;
// Update pool_state
pool_state.lp_supply = pool_state.lp_supply.checked_add(lp_token_amount)
    .ok_or(ErrorCode::ArithmeticOverflow)?;

// Emit event after successful execution
emit!(LpChangeEvent { ... });
```

Revision

- The necessary correct event emitting has been implemented.

VAD-05 | Inconsistent Token Program Selection

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Logical Issue	● MEDIUM	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• collect_protocol_fee• deposit• withdraw	● Resolved

Description

The code selects the token program (e.g., SPL Token v1 or Token2022) based on the owner of the mint account but lacks explicit checks or error handling when the mint's owner does not match any expected token program.

- If the mint's owner does not match any known token program, the code may proceed with an incorrect token program, leading to failed transactions or security vulnerabilities.
- An attacker could create a malicious token program and set it as the owner of a mint, potentially causing the program to interact with the malicious token program without proper validation.

Recommendation

- Add Explicit Checks and Error Handling:
 - Check for Known Token Programs:

```
let token_program_info = if ctx.accounts.vault_0_mint.owner == ctx.accounts.token_program.key() {  
  ctx.accounts.token_program.to_account_info()  
} else if ctx.accounts.vault_0_mint.owner == ctx.accounts.token_program_2022.key() {  
  ctx.accounts.token_program_2022.to_account_info()  
} else {  
  return Err(ErrorCode::InvalidTokenProgram.into());  
};
```

Validate Mints and Token Programs Together:

- Ensure that for each mint, the corresponding token program is used.
- For token transfers, verify that the token account's owner matches the expected token program.

Revision

- The necessary error handling for arithmetic operations has been mostly covered.

VAD-06 | Lack of Documentation and Comments

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Logical Issue	<div><div></div> INFORMATIONAL</div> GENERAL		<div><div></div> Rejected</div>

Description

- The code lacks detailed comments and documentation explaining the purpose and functionality of key components.
- Maintainability: Future developers may find it challenging to understand or modify the code.
- Potential Misuse: Without clear documentation, there's a higher risk of unintended usage or misconfiguration.

Recommendation

- Enhance Documentation:
 - Function Comments: Add doc comments explaining what the function does, its parameters, and return values.
 - Inline Comments: Include comments within the code to explain complex logic.
 - Documentation Standards: Follow Rust's documentation conventions.

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