VIBRANIUM AUDITS

Security Assessment

Origyn

Verified by Vibranium Audits on 22 July 2024

Revised on 15 August 2024

Vibranium Audits Verified on July 22nd, 2024
Revised on August 15th, 2024

Origyn NFT

The security assessment was prepared by Vibranium Audits.

Executive Summary

TYPES	ECOSYSTEM	METHODS
DEFI/NFT	ICP	Manual Review, penetration testing

LANGUAGE	TIMELINE	KEY COMPONENTS
Motoko	Delivered on 15/08/2024	N/A

CODEBASE	COMMITS
https://github.com/ORIGYN-SA/origyn_nft/tree/0.1.6	6d8ed5ebd50d07cca9420816f5875148f2b014f6

Vulnerability Summary

5	2	0	0	3	0	0
Total Findings	Resolved	Mitigated	Partially Resolved	Acknowledged	Declined	Unresolved

0 Critical			Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation by external or internal actors.
1 High	0 Resolved		High vulnerabilities are usually harder to exploit, requiring specific conditions, or have a more limited scope, but can still lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation by external or internal actors.
0 Medium	0 Resolved		Medium vulnerabilities are usually limited to state manipulations, but cannot lead to assets loss. Major deviations from best practices are also in this category.
1 Low	0 Resolved		Low vulnerabilities are related to outdated and unused code or minor gas optimization. These issues won't have a significant impact on code execution, but affect the code quality.
3 Informational	0 Resolved		Informational errors are often recommendations to improve the style of the code or certain operations to fall within industry best practices. They usually do not affect the overall functioning of the code.

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CODEBASE | ORIGYN NFT

Repository

https://github.com/ORIGYN-SA/origyn_nft/tree/0.1.6

Commits

6d8ed5ebd50d07cca9420816f5875148f2b014f6

AUDIT SCOPE | ORIGYN NFT

1 repo audited ● 1 repo with Acknowledged findings ● 5 files with Resolved findings

ID	Branch	Commit Hash
● VOF	0.1.6	6d8ed5ebd50d07cca9420816f5875148f2b014f6

APPROACH & METHODS | ORIGYN NFT

This report has been prepared for ORIGYN NFT(2023) to discover issues and vulnerabilities in the source code of the ORIGYN NFT project as well as any contract dependencies that were not part of an officially recognized library. A comprehensive examination has been performed, utilizing Manual Review, rigorous Penetration Testing and Static Analysis techniques.

The auditing process pays special attention to the following considerations:

- Pen-Testing the smart contracts against both common and uncommon attack vectors.
- Assessing the code base to ensure compliance with current best practices and industry standards
- Ensuring contract logic meets the specifications and intentions of the client.
- Cross referencing contract structure and implementation against similar smart contracts produced by industry leaders.
- Thorough line-by-line manual review of the entire code base by industry experts.

The security assessment resulted in findings that ranged from critical to informational We recommend addressing these findings to ensure a high level of security standards and industry practices.
We suggest recommendations that could better serve the project from the security perspective:

- Testing the smart contracts against both common and uncommon attack vectors.
- Enhance general coding practices for better structures of source codes.
- Review unit tests to cover the possible use cases.
- Review functions for readability, especially for future development work.

FINDINGS | ORIGYN NFT

5	2	0	1	3
Total Findings	High	Medium	Low	Informational

This report has been prepared to discover issues and vulnerabilities for ORIGYN NFT.
Through this audit, we have uncovered 5 issues ranging from different severity levels.
Utilizing the techniques of Manual Review & Penetration Testing, we discovered the following findings:

ID	Title	Category	Severity	Status
VOF-01	Inter-Canister calls (Reentrancy)	Logical Issue	Informational	Revised
VOF-02	Large Data Attacks	Logical Issue	High	Resolved
VOF-03	Rollback	Logical Issue	Informational	Acknowledged
VOF-04	Redundant Code/Comments	Best Practices	Informational	Acknowledged
VOF-05	Lack of cycle management	Logical Issue	Low	Acknowledged

VOF-01 | Inter-Canister calls (Reentrancy)

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Logical Issue	Informational	Multiple Findings	Revised

Description

Function register_escrow_sale_nft_origyn (main.mo):

The register_escrow_sale_nft_origyn function involves several steps, including state checks, validations, and an inter-canister call to balance_of_nft_origyn.

The function involves multiple state changes, including updating user registrations and interacting with external canisters. These state changes, if manipulated, can lead to significant issues, such as incorrect registrations, unauthorized access, or inconsistencies in the application logic.

If an attacker can re-enter the function before the asynchronous call completes, they could manipulate the state inconsistently, potentially leading to unauthorized actions or exploitation of the canister's state.

The key aspect to check for reentrancy vulnerabilities is whether the function changes the state before making an asynchronous call, allowing an attacker to re-enter the function and manipulate the state inconsistently.

1. Initial Call:
   - An attacker initiates a call to the register_escrow_sale_nft_origyn function with a crafted request.
2. State Check and Setup:
   - The function performs initial checks and setup, such as validating the max_desired value and the escrow receipt.
3. State Changes Before Async Call:
   - The function updates the state (e.g., modifying state.user_registrations) based on the request and other conditions.
4. Asynchronous Call:
   - The function makes an asynchronous call to nft_canister.balance_of_nft_origyn. During this call, control is yielded back to the canister's message queue, allowing other messages to be processed.
5. Reentrant Call:
   - Before the asynchronous call completes, the attacker makes another call to the register_escrow_sale_nft_origyn function. This reentrant call can exploit the partially updated state, causing inconsistent state changes or other issues.
6. Completion of Initial Call:
   - Once the asynchronous call completes, the initial function resumes execution, further modifying the state based on the response from the asynchronous call.

- Other Cases:

announceTransaction (metadata.mo): While the specific function you provided does not exhibit a direct vulnerability due to state reads before asynchronous calls, the principles of cautious state management and reentrancy guards are generally good practices, especially in more complex scenarios where state changes are involved. In the context of your function, the risk is minimal, but applying these strategies ensures robustness against potential future modifications that might introduce such risks.

Recommendation

Proper Failure Handling:
Ensure that any state changes made before the inter-canister call are properly handled or reverted in case of failure.

Example:

```
let originalState = state.state.collection_data.announce_canister;
let result = await Droute.publish(state.state.droute, eventName, payload);
if (result != #ok()) {
  // Revert state changes if necessary
  state.state.collection_data.announce_canister := originalState;
  // Handle failure, log error, etc.
}
```

AND/OR:

- Add a var inTransaction: Bool = false at the top level of the canister.
- Set inTransaction := true at the beginning of the function.
- Checked if (inTransaction) at the start to prevent reentrancy.
- Reset inTransaction := false at appropriate places to allow the function to be re-entered after it completes.

```
var inTransaction : Bool = false;

public shared(msg) func register_escrow_sale_nft_origyn(request: Types.RegisterEscrowRequest) : async
Result.Result<Types.RegisterEscrowResponse, Types.OrigynError> {
    if (inTransaction) {
        return #err(Types.errors(#reentrancy, "Reentrant call detected", ?msg.caller));
    }
    inTransaction := true;

    if (request.max_desired == 0) {
        inTransaction := false;
        return #err(Types.errors(#improper_escrow, "register_escrow_sale_nft_origyn - max_requested
must be greater than 0 " # debug_show(request), ?msg.caller));
    }

    switch (request.escrow_receipt) {
        case (null) {};
        case (?val) {
            if (val.amount == 0) {
                inTransaction := false;
                return #err(Types.errors(#improper_escrow, "register_escrow_sale_nft_origyn - amount
must be greater than 0 " # debug_show(request), ?msg.caller));
            }
            if (NFTTypes.account_eq(val.buyer, #principal(msg.caller))) {
                inTransaction := false;
                return #err(Types.errors(#improper_escrow, "register_escrow_sale_nft_origyn - buyer
must be sender " # debug_show(request), ?msg.caller));
            }
        }
```

Recommendation

After revision, the vulnerability has been demoted to informational as the concerned functionality (register_escrow_sale_nft_origyn) was considered as not needed by the protocol and therefore was completely removed from the codebase, as well as no direct risk concerning the function ‘announceTransaction’.

VOF-02 | Large Data Attacks

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Logical Issue	HIGH	Multiple Findings	Resolved

Description

A large data attack involves an attacker sending excessively large inputs to a smart contract function, which can lead to high memory usage, excessive cycle consumption, and potentially cause denial-of-service (DoS) conditions. This type of attack is particularly dangerous because it can exploit the resource limitations of the Internet Computer (IC) canisters, draining their cycles and making them unresponsive.

In the context of **get_nat_as_token_id function (utils.mo)**, the vulnerability arises because the function does not impose any restrictions on the size of the Nat value it receives. Since Nat is an unbounded natural number, an attacker could send a very large Nat value, leading to high memory consumption when converting it to bytes and processing it further.

Large Nat Values:

- The tokenNat parameter is of type Nat, which is an unbounded natural number. This means it can represent extremely large values.
- Converting a very large Nat to bytes using Conversions.natToBytes(tokenNat) can lead to a large byte array, consuming significant memory.

Memory Consumption:

- The conversion of the large Nat value to bytes and the subsequent processing (e.g., creating buffers and appending them) can consume a significant amount of memory, leading to potential memory exhaustion.

Cycle Consumption:

- Processing large amounts of data can consume a lot of cycles, draining the canister's cycle balance quickly.

Other cases:

owner.mo: public func transferDip721
public func transferICRC7
ledger_interface.mo: public func send_payment_minus_fee

Recommendation

To mitigate the risk of large data attacks, implement the following strategies:

1. Restrict Input Size:
   - Implement checks to restrict the size of the Nat value before processing it. This prevents excessively large inputs from consuming too many resources.
2. Validate Data Size:
   - Before performing any operations, validate the size of the data to ensure it is within acceptable limits.

```
public func get_nat_as_token_id(tokenNat: Nat) : Text {
    let maxNatSize : Nat = 2**128; // Example limit, adjust as needed

    // Check if the Nat value exceeds the limit
    if (tokenNat > maxNatSize) {
        throw Error.reject("Nat value too large");
    }

    debug if (debug_channel.announce) D.print("nat as token");
    debug if (debug_channel.announce) D.print(debug_show(Conversions.natToBytes(tokenNat)));

    var staged = Conversions.natToBytes(tokenNat);
    let stagedBuffer = CandyTypes.toBuffer<Nat8>(staged);
    let prefixBuffer = if (staged.size() % 4 == 0) {
        CandyTypes.toBuffer<Nat8>([])
    } else if (staged.size() % 4 == 1) {
        CandyTypes.toBuffer<Nat8>([0,0,0])
    } else if (staged.size() % 4 == 2) {
        CandyTypes.toBuffer<Nat8>([0,0])
    } else {
        CandyTypes.toBuffer<Nat8>([0])
    };

    SB.append(prefixBuffer, stagedBuffer);
    return Conversions.bytesToText(SB.toArray(prefixBuffer));
}
```

Revision

The necessary checks within the relevant functionalities have been implemented to mitigate the issues.

VOF-03 | Rollbacks

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Logical Issue	Informational	Multiple Findings	Acknowledged

Description

In the context of the Internet Computer and the Motoko programming language, the rollback vulnerability can occur when a canister's state changes and then an error occurs, causing a rollback of those changes. The behavior of rollbacks can be surprising and error-prone because not all error conditions trigger a rollback.

- Throwing an Error: When a function throws an error using throw, the state changes that happened before the throw are not rolled back.
- Trapping (e.g., assert or Debug.trap): When a function traps, the state changes before the trap are rolled back. This can lead to inconsistencies if not properly handled.

Although this vulnerability is originally of HIGH level, it does not particularly exist within the codebase but is mentioned within comments, the planned usage of 'throw' in the future:

owner.mo Line 157
mint.mo Line 1375
market.mo Line 3173/3364

Recommendation

- **Understand the Difference between Throw and Trap:**
  Be aware that throw does not roll back state changes, while trap (e.g., assert failures) does.
- **Validate Conditions before State Changes:**
  Perform all necessary validations before making any state changes to ensure that the state changes only occur when all conditions are met.
- **Use Try-Catch for Error Handling:**
  Use try-catch blocks to handle errors gracefully and ensure that any necessary rollback logic is explicitly handled.

Revision

The Origyn team acknlowdges the risks mentioned with the potential future changes mentioned above.

VOF-05 | Lack of cycle management

Categor y	Severity	Location	Status
Logical Issue	Low	main.mo	Acknowledged

Description

Certain functions perform multiple tasks and includes several operations that could lead to cycle consumption issues. These issues arise primarily from the complexity and length of the function.

Although generally throughout the codebase, there has been great and consistent checks for the functions' cycle consumption, how certain functions lacked these checks which can potentially cause threats:

main.mo: redeem_allocation_sale_nft_origyn
register_escrow_sale_nft_origyn

Recommendation

- Use Cycle Estimation:

Estimate the cycles required for different parts of the function and monitor cycle consumption. Adjust the logic to ensure it stays within acceptable limits.

Revision

The Origyn team acknlowdges the risks mentioned with the potential vulnerability mentioned above.

VOF-04 | Redundant Code

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Logical Issue	Informational	General	Acknowledged

Description

The codebase contains a significant amount of redundant code, primarily consisting of numerous commented-out functions. These commented functions occupy a substantial amount of space, contributing to code bloat and negatively impacting the maintainability and readability of the code. Such redundant code includes:

1. Obsolete Functions: Functions that were once used but are no longer relevant to the current functionality of the application. These have been commented out but not removed from the codebase.
2. Duplicate Functions: Functions that replicate the functionality of other parts of the code. These may have been commented out during refactoring but were not deleted.
3. Unused Experimental Functions: Functions that were written for experimental purposes or as part of a feature that was never fully implemented or integrated. These functions remain in the code as comments.

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