# **Capstone Project: Wireshark Traffic Analysis-Malicious Download from a Fake Software Site**

#### **Incident Report of my Capstone Project**

**Capstone Title:** Wireshark Traffic Analysis — Malicious Download from a Fake Software Site

## **★1** Executive Summary


On **22nd January 2025**, the BluemoonTuesday SOC team detected unusual network activity from a workstation within its internal LAN 10.1.17.0/24 following the download of a suspicious .zip file from a fake *Google Authenticator for Windows* site. The compromised host **(10.1.17.215)** communicated with external IPs, downloaded PowerShell scripts, and demonstrated signs of post-infection Command and Control (C2) beaconing.

A detailed Wireshark traffic analysis confirmed the infection chain, identified Indicators of Compromise (IOCs), and recommended immediate containment actions.


## **12** Timeline of Events

Time (UTC)	Event
11:45:56	Host <b>10.1.17.215</b> sent an HTTP GET request to 5.252.153.241 for a file download.
11:45:58	Download of multiple suspicious .ps1 files and other payloads.
11:46:04	Beaconing requests observed to /1517096937 on the same external IP (C2 traffic).
11:46:23	Secondary payload downloaded from 199.232.214.172 via /filestreamingservice/files/.
11:46:23–onwa rd	Continued DNS queries, indicating persistence attempts and connectivity checks.


- Loaded the 2025-01-22-traffic-analysis-exercise.pcap file into Wireshark.
- Filtered for suspected internal host: ip.addr == 10.1.17.215
- Focused on HTTP traffic: ip.addr == 10.1.17.215 and http
- Inspected suspicious file downloads via: /api/file/get-file/
- and multiple GET requests to /1517096937
- Used Statistics → HTTP → Requests for overview of request patterns.
- Checked DNS queries and resolved suspicious lookups via: ip.addr ==
  10.1.17.215 and dns









- Captured screenshots of:
  - HTTP request URIs
  - o C2 communication GET requests
  - o DNS requests to play.vidyard.com, msftconnecttest.com, etc.











Question Answer

IP address of infected

client

10.1.17.215

MAC address Can be extracted via eth, addr filter if

needed

Hostname Seen in DNS traffic: DESKTOP-L8C5GSJ

User account name Not captured in this PCAP (no SMB/LDAP)

Domain of fake site Connected to 5.252.153.241 directly

C2 server IP addresses 5.252.153.241, 199.232.214.172

## **★**5 IOC Table

Indicator Type Value

Malicious IPs 5.252.153.241, 199.232.214.172

Suspicious URLs /api/file/get-file/, /1517096937,

/filestreamingservice/files/

Domains play.vidyard.com, msftconnecttest.com


Payload Types PowerShell scripts, executable payloads

## **★**6 Screenshots from Wireshark

## Screenshots to capture:

- Filtered HTTP GET requests to /api/file/get-file/
- Repeated C2 beaconing GET requests to /1517096937
- DNS queries to play.vidyard.com and other unusual domains
- ullet HTTP Statistics window from Statistics  $\rightarrow$  HTTP  $\rightarrow$  Requests







## ⑦Recommendations for Mitigation

- 1. Isolate infected host 10.1.17.215 from the network immediately.
- 2. Block malicious IP addresses 5.252.153.241 and 199.232.214.172.
- 3. Perform full endpoint malware scan and forensics.
- 4. Reset all credentials used on the affected system.
- 5. Update antivirus and EDR signatures.
- 6. Conduct a company-wide phishing awareness refresher.
- 7. Audit Active Directory for suspicious new accounts or privilege escalations.


#### Pcap file:

Screenshot of the processes involved in downloading and uploading pcap file on Wireshark:





#### Screenshot of the method i used to identify the Filtered suspected internal host:



#### Note:

Cross-referenced the identified Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) — such as play.vidyard.com, beaconing IP addresses, and suspicious HTTP requests — against the provided threat intelligence resources (LinkedIn and Twitter/X posts from Unit42). The analysis confirmed alignment between the captured network traffic and the reported malicious activity patterns described in those sources.

#### **Conclusion**

The investigation into the suspicious network activity originating from host **10.1.17.215** successfully confirmed a malware infection incident within the BluemoonTuesday corporate network. Through detailed Wireshark traffic analysis, multiple Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) were identified — including malicious file downloads, repeated Command and Control (C2) beaconing attempts, and suspicious DNS queries.

The infection chain was reconstructed, beginning with an initial malicious HTTP download from **5.252.153.241**, followed by subsequent PowerShell script retrievals, repeated unauthorized external communications, and secondary payload downloads from **199.232.214.172**.

These findings were cross-referenced with the provided **threat intelligence resources from Unit42 on LinkedIn and Twitter/X**, validating that the observed malicious domains and network behavior matched known threat actor tactics documented in those reports.

In response, immediate containment and remediation actions were recommended, including host isolation, network blocklists, malware scans, credential resets, and staff awareness training. This case underscores the importance of proactive traffic monitoring, timely incident response, and integrating threat intelligence into SOC workflows.

The incident has been fully documented with supporting evidence, including decoded packet captures, analysis walkthroughs, IOC tables, and recommended mitigations for the organization's security leadership team.