

Satellite Infrastructure Security and Resilience

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- ❖ Political and Technological Evolution
- ❖ Cybersecurity and Notable Attacks
- ❖ Collisions and Accumulating Waste
- ❖ Security Measures
- ❖ Resiliency Initiatives
- ❖ Laws Governing Space Operations

Agenda




What is a satellite?


Definition: A body that orbits another body in Space.

Background

- ❖ Remote Location: Upper Atmosphere and Beyond
- ❖ Capabilities: Overestimated and Underestimated
- ❖ Cross Medium: Cyberspace and Atmospheric Space
- ❖ Distant but Integral: Increasing Societal Dependence
- ❖ Serious Investment: Technological Strides
vs. Unforgiving Environment

Projected Growth in 2013





Political and Technological Evolution

Left: Sputnik (pronounced “Spoot-nik”), the first satellite successfully launched into space by the Soviet Union on Oct. 4th 1957

Early Political Origins

- ❖ During the Space Race of the 20th century (1955-1971), the United States and the Soviet Union sought to gain an upper hand in the Cold War by attaining superior space technologies
- ❖ Soviet Union achieved the first major milestones with the successful **launch of Sputnik(1957)** and the successful **orbital flight of Yuri Gagarin(1961)**.
- ❖ Through the continual development of its NASA Space Program, the U.S. quickly gained ground and with the success of the **Apollo 11 Mission(1969)** and **Neil Armstrong's walk on the moon** proved itself superior.



Space Reconnaissance during Cold War


- ❖ Both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. used satellites for photo reconnaissance
- ❖ During 1960s-1990s, satellites images allowed the U.S. to track adversaries progress towards developing nuclear weapons.
- ❖ In upper atmosphere → not vulnerable to anti-aircraft weapons
- ❖ Development supported by NRO, DoD, and CIA
- ❖ Long-standing asset to National Security

Additional info available on [National Museum of the United States Air Force](https://www.afmuseum.org/)



Gambit 3 KH-8

DAYTON, Ohio -- Gambit 3 KH-8 reconnaissance satellite in the Cold War Gallery at the National Museum




GAMBIT 1 KH-7 Reconnaissance Satellite

DAYTON, Ohio -- Gambit 1 KH-7 reconnaissance satellite in the Space Gallery at the National Museum of the U.S. Air Force. (U.S. Air Force Photo)



HEXAGON KH-9 Reconnaissance Satellite

DAYTON, Ohio -- The HEXAGON KH-9 Reconnaissance Satellite in the Space Gallery at the National



Modern Political Role

- ❖ Three world powers, U.S. (2,944), China(499), and Russia(169) compete for space superiority
- ❖ Space is the next frontier for expansion: Limited governance, room for technological expansion
- ❖ Dr. Marial Borowitz, Associate Professor:
 - ❖ Guidelines needed for permissible behavior
 - ❖ Establishment of Safety Zones
- ❖ Major Brian Stewart, Ph.D. Student:
 - ❖ “Space has always been weaponize”
 - ❖ “Unlikely place for military action”
- ❖ Countries are hesitant to **share data**, but mutual interest must be invested to build **effective laws**.

The background of the slide is a composite image. It features a dark blue space background filled with stars. In the upper right, there is a futuristic control room or interface with multiple glowing screens displaying maps and data. A large, semi-transparent globe is positioned in the center of this interface. A bright, glowing orange-red laser beam originates from the right side of the frame and points towards the globe. In the lower right foreground, a portion of the Earth's surface is visible, showing continents and oceans. A dark, semi-transparent rectangular box is overlaid on the left side of the image, containing the title text.

Cybersecurity and Notable Attacks

Cyber Vulnerability

- ❖ Cyberattacks are a very economical and viable threats
 - ❖ Less detectable than Missile Attacks, ASAT
 - ❖ Leave little evidence
 - ❖ Attribution is challenging
- ❖ Hackers seek to attempt exploit vulnerabilities to hijack satellites
 - ❖ Seize control of less secure satellite to use as projectile against more secure satellite
 - ❖ Orientate hijacked satellite in the wrong direction
 - ❖ Move hijacked satellites into orbit of another satellite
- ❖ Nation-States attempt to disrupt each other's satellite operations
 - ❖ Jamming of GPS Satellites
 - ❖ Corrupting of Data Transmission of Satellites
 - ❖ Hijack another satellite without causing damage
 - ❖ Hacking Third-Party Vendors

CYBER THREATS TO SPACE SYSTEMS

SPACE SEGMENT

- * Command Intrusion
- * Payload Control
- * Denial of Service
- * Malware

USER SEGMENT


- * Spoofing
- * Denial of Service
- * Malware

LINK SEGMENT

- * Command Intrusion
- * Spoofing
- * Replay

GROUND SEGMENT

- * Hacking
- * Hijacking
- * Malware



A composite image showing a dense field of space debris in orbit above the Earth's horizon. The debris includes various satellite components, solar panels, and fragments of spacecraft. The Earth's blue and white horizon is visible on the left side of the frame. The right side of the image is a dark blue gradient containing the title text.

Threat of Accumulating Waste

Danger of Collisions

- ❖ Dr. Mariel Borowitz: Excessive debris in space poses the greatest threat to space sustainability
- ❖ Cleaning space debris → Tedious task → Not highly prioritized.
- ❖ China, European Space Agency, CleanSpace initiatives to clean up space
- ❖ Nations are responsible for debris of their satellites
- ❖ Misinterpreted collisions could escalate tensions

THE PRESENT — DECEMBER 7, 2020

Giant 'space claw' to begin cleaning cosmic debris in 2025

The rush to clean up outer space has begun.






Security and Resilience



Security Measures Against Malicious Cyber Attacks



- Technical Staff at MIT: Not possible to measure vulnerability of satellite as attack surface too broad
 - Possible to test system against known threat models
 - Tiered System for testing attacks based on resources available to hacker
- Major defense contractors (national labs, private companies) work with the government to maintain high-functioning satellite systems and assist in creating new satellites.
- International treaties that offer guidelines on 'Space Etiquette'
 - Legal minimum distance between satellites in orbit
 - Expected response to various damages to satellites
- Require third-party vendors contracting with satellite systems to have a consistent standard of operations





Figure 2. Cyber threat taxonomy [1].


Resilience Initiatives

- **Space Domain Resilience White Paper:** “Resilience now squarely becomes the capability designer’s problem and becomes tradable with other system characteristics”
- **Satellite Constellations:** Distributing task and functionality of larger satellite over cheaper, more compact satellites that can be lost without crashing system.
- Schools of Thought to develop better Strategic Space Operations: **Space Sanctuary, Space Superiority, Space Survivability, and Space Dominance**
- **Agencies and Branches dedicated to space operations:** Space Development Agency, Space Force
- Backup Systems in place in **case satellite constellation disrupted**



GPS Constellation Model

Figure 3: Space System Resilience (U)




Security measures

- NIST Federal Information Processing Standard 140-3
- Defense Department's Instruction 8420-2
- USSF's Defensive Cyber Operations (DCO) team
- Remote operations capabilities
- Incident response
- Symposiums on Space Cybersecurity
- Project Moonlighter (Hack-A-Sat initiative)

Resiliency of Satellites

- Satellite Constellation
- Multiple stakeholders
- Space Domain Mission Assurance
 - Defensive Operations
 - Reconstitution
 - Resilience



Source: <https://www.gps.gov/multimedia/images/constellation.jpg>

Laws Governing Satellite Security

- Outer Space Treaty
- UNOOSA – United Nations Office of Outer Affairs
 - Technical Sub-committee
- National Space Policy
 - SPD 5
- Re-establishment of National Space Council

Questions for Discussion

- ❖ China and other countries has recently launched initiatives to clean up space debris. Should private companies (SpaceX, BlueOrigin, Bigelow) also try to join this initiative? Should they prioritize this plan over other new markets such as Space Tourism?
- ❖ Policy discussions with Russia regarding space policy have been put on hold due to the Ukraine Invasion. Should the rest of the world resume diplomacy without Russia or wait longer to see how situation evolves?
- ❖ Nations often outsource some of their development to third-party vendors. The potential trade-offs may include lower standards of security and resilience in exchange for concentrated expert development and cheaper cost. Do you think this trade off is reasonable?

References

<https://www.satellitetoday.com/cybersecurity/2021/12/16/us-space-force-to-launch-project-moonlighter-cybersecurity-satellite/>