

Advanced Crypto

3. Hashing and Authentication

MD2. MD4. MD5. SHA-1. Salting. Collisions. Murmur and FNV. Bloom Filter. LM Hash. Whirlpool. RIPEMD (RACE Integrity Primitives Evaluation Message Digest). GOST. Tiger. SHA-3. Bcrypt. PBKDF2. Open SSL Hash passwords. Secret Shares. One Time Passwords. Timed One Time Password (TOTP). Hashed One Time Password (HOTP). HMAC. Time Stamp Protocol.

<http://asecuritysite.com/crypto>

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Bob



Alice



Eve



Trent



Advanced Crypto

3. Hashing and Authentication

Hash Types

<http://asecuritysite.com/crypto>

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Bob



Alice




Eve



Trent




How do we get a finger-print for data?



Solved by Prof Ron Rivest with the MD5 hash signature.



Author: Prof Bill Buchanan



**Hashing
Algorithm (MD5)**
- 128 bit signature



hello	----->	XUFAKrxLKna5cZ2REBfFkg
Hello	----->	ixqZU8RhEpaoJ6v4xHgE1w
Hello. How are you?	----->	CysDE5j+ZOUbCYZtTdsFiw
Napier	----->	j4NXH5Mkrk4j13N1MFXHtg
Base-64		

hello	->	5D41402ABC4B2A76B9719D911017C592
Hello	->	8B1A9953C4611296A827ABF8C47804D7
Hello. How are you?	->	CC708153987BF9AD833BEBF90239BF0F
Napier	->	8F83571F9324AE4E23D773753055C7B6
Hex		



**Hashing
Algorithm (SHA-1)**
- 160 bit signature



hello	→	qvTGHdzF6KLavt4PO0gs2a6pQ00=
Hello	→	9/+ei3uy4Jtwk1pdeF4MxdnQq/A=
Hello. How are you?	→	Puh2Am76bhjqE51bTwtwsqbdFC8=
Napier	→	v4GxNaVod2b09GR2Tqw4yopOuro=

Base-64

hello	→	AAF4C61DDCC5E8A2DABEDE0F3B482CD9AEA9434D
Hello	→	F7FF9E8B7BB2E09B70935A5D785E0CC5D9D0ABF0
Hello. How are you?	→	3EE876026EFA6E18EA13995B4D6B70B2A6DD142F
Napier	→	BF81B135A5687766F4F464764EAC38CA8A4EBABA

Hex

Author: Prof. Dr. B. Buchan

Message Hash

Authentication

SHA-1 hash algorithm



**Hashing
Algorithm (MD5)**
- 128 bit signature



Security and mobility are two of the **most** important issues on the Internet, as they will allow users to secure their data transmissions, and also break their link with physical connections.

F94FBED3DAE05D223E6B963B9076C4EC

+U++09rgXSI+a5Y7kHbE7A==

Base-64

Security and mobility are two of the **most** important issues on the Internet, as they will allow users to secure their data transmissions, and also break their link their physical connections.

8A8BDC3FF80A01917D0432800201CFBF

i ovCP/gKAZF9BDKAAGHPvw==

Hex

Author: Prof. Dr. Buchanan

OpenSSL

```
root@kali:~# echo -n "hello" | openssl md5  
(stdin)= 5d41402abc4b2a76b9719d911017c592
```

```
root@kali:~# echo -n "hello" | md5sum  
5d41402abc4b2a76b9719d911017c592 -
```

```
root@kali:~# openssl md5 pw  
MD5(pw)= 859b6a9be3b45262c4414bd1696ba91b
```

```
root@kali:~# md5sum pw  
859b6a9be3b45262c4414bd1696ba91b pw
```

Hash methods supported:

md2	md4	md5	rmd160	sha
sha1				

OpenSSLTM
Cryptography and SSL/TLS Toolkit

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan



Hashing Algorithm (MD5) - 128 bit signature

Hash signature

- Hash signatures are used to gain a signature for files, so that they can be checked if they have been changed.

Authentication
Message Hash

[Path] / filename	MD5 sum

[C:\windows\System32\]	
12520437.cpx	0a0feb9eb28bde8cd835716343b03b14
12520850.cpx	d69ae057cd82d04ee7d311809abefb2a
8point1.wav	beab165fa58ec5253185f32e124685d5
aac1ient.dll	ad45dedfdcf69a28cbaf6a2ca84b5f1e
AC3ACM.acm	59683d1e4cd0b1ad6ae32e1d627ae25f
Ac3audio.ax	4b87d889edf278e5fa223734a9bbe79a
ac3filter.cpl	10b27174d46094984e7a05f3c36acd2a
accessibilitycpl.dll	ac4cecc86eeb8e1cc2e9fe022cff3ac1
ACCTRES.dll	58f57f2f2133a2a77607c8ccc9a30f73
acledit.dll	0bcee3f36752213d1b09d18e69383898
. . .	
ZSHP1020.CHM	c671ed
ZSHP1020.EXE	96e45a
ZSHP1020.HLP	a07693
ZSPOOL.DLL	fae332
ZTAG.DLL	7ca836
ZTAG32.DLL	27b026

[Path] / filename	MD5 sum

[C:\windows\system32\]	
12520437.cpx	Cg/rnrKL3ozYNXFjQ7A7FA==
12520850.cpx	1prgv82C0E7n0xGAmr77Kg==
8point1.wav	vqswX6WOxSUxhfMuEkaF1Q==
aac1ient.dll	rUXe39z2mijLr2osqEtFHg==
AC3ACM.acm	wwg9HkzQsa1q4y4dYnrIXw==
Ac3audio.ax	S4fYie3yeOX6Ijc0qbvnmg==


Files/folders

**Hashing
Algorithm (MD5)**
- 128 bit signature

Hash signature

- Hash signatures are used to identify that a file/certificate has not been changed.

Bob




The digital certificate has an SHA-1 hash thumbprint (3f6a...89) which will be checked, and if the thumbprint is different, the certificate will be invalid.


One-way hash

- Hashes are used for digital fingerprints (see the next unit) and for secure password storage.
- Typical methods are NT hash, MD4, MD5, and SHA-1.


Windows login/ authentication



Cisco password storage (MD5)



Windows login/ authentication



mypass

NT hash
(MD4)

fa1bfa14fa13fa12fa10fa1ffa14fa12

One-way hash

- Hashing suffers from dictionary attacks, thus it is important that any passwords are not standard words, such as to change **password** for **pA55wOrd**.

NT-password
hash for Windows
NT, XP and Vista

Hashing suffers from **dictionary attacks**
where the signatures of well know words are
stored in a table, and the intruders does a
lookup on this

mypast

mypass

mypose

effahd13fa12fa10fgffa1ffa14fa144

fa1bfa14fa13fa12fa10fa1ffa14fa12

ff12189043210954defff0123444512d

test1

aabbfce023215546dfeddd0101001cd



Risk 4: One Password Fits All



150 million accounts
compromised

#	Count	Ciphertext	Plaintext
1.	1911938	EQ7fIpT7i/Q=	123456
2.	446162	j9p+HwtWWT86aMjgZFLzYg==	123456789
3.	345834	L8qbAD3j13jioxG6CatHBw==	password
4.	211659	BB4e6X+b2xLioxG6CatHBw==	adobe123
5.	201580	j9p+HwtWWT/i oxG6CatHBw==	12345678
6.	130832	5djv7ZCI2ws=	qwerty
7.	124253	dqi0asWPYvQ=	1234567
8.	113884	7LqYzKVeQ8I=	111111
9.	83411	PMDTbP0LZXu03SwrFUVYGA==	photoshop
10.	82694	e6MPXQ5G6a8=	123123



47 million accounts



6.5 million accounts
(June 2013)



1 million accounts – in
plain text. 77 million
compromised



One account hack ... leads to others



Dropbox
compromised 2013



200,000 client accounts

Brute Force - How many hash codes?

- 7 digit password with [a-z] ... how many?
 - Ans:
 - Time to crack - 100 billion per second:
- 7 digit with [a-zA-z] ... how many?
 - Ans:
 - Time to crack – 100 billion per second:
- 8 digit with [a-zA-z!@#\$%^&*()] ... how many?
 - Ans:
 - Time to crack – 100 billion per second:

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Other hash methods

<http://asecuritysite.com/crypto>

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Eve



Trent



LM Hash

LM Hash. LM Hash is used in many version of Windows to store user passwords that are fewer than 15 characters long.

SHA-3

SHA-3. SHA-3 was known as Keccak and is a hash function designed by Guido Bertoni, Joan Daemen, Michaël Peeters, and Gilles Van Assche. MD5 and SHA-0 have been shown to be susceptible to attacks, along with theoretical attacks on SHA-1. NIST thus defined there was a need for a new hashing method which did not use the existing methods for hashing, and setup a competition for competing algorithms. In October 2012, Keccak won the NIST hash function competition, and is proposed as the SHA-3 standard.

Tiger


Bcrypt

Bcrypt. This creates a hash value which has salt.



RIPEMD

RIPEMD (RACE Integrity Primitives Evaluation Message Digest) and GOST. RIPEM160. RIPEMD is a 128-bit, 160-bit, 256-bit or 320-bit cryptographic hash function, and was created by Hans Dobbertin, Antoon Bosselaers and Bart Preneel. It is used on TrueCrypt, and is open source. The 160-bit version is seen as an alternative to SHA-1, and is part of ISO/IEC 10118

Tiger. Tiger is a 192-bit hash function, and was designed by Ross Anderson and Eli Biham in 1995. It is often used by clients within Gnutella file sharing networks, and does not suffer from known attacks on MD5 and SHA-0/SHA-1. Tiger2 is an addition, in which the message is padded with a byte of 0x80 (in a similar way to MD4, MD5 and SHA), whereas in Tiger it is 0x01. Otherwise the two methods are the same in their operation.




Bob



Alice (Web)

Password

Salt



AES
Twofish
3DES

RIPEMD-160
SHA-1
Whirlpool

DK = PBKDF2(PRF, Password, Salt, c, dkLen)
DK = PBKDF2(HMAC-SHA1, passphrase, ssid, 4096, 256)

Encrypting disks

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Salting

<http://asecuritysite.com/crypto>

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Bob



Alice



Eve



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Adding salt

- Salt increases the range of the possible signatures



mypass

NT hash
(MD4)

fa1bfa14fa13fa12fa10fa1ffa14fa12

NT-password
hash for Windows
NT, XP and Vista

Salt increase the range of the signatures

mypast

effahd13fa12fa10fgffa1ffa14fa144

caaahdd3fa12ccfae342345500011aff

Ddde432969450310403010d0ae000100



password

\$1\$fred\$bATAk8UUH/IDAp9sd6IUv/

1

fred



bATAk8UUH/IDAp9sd6IUv/

password

bATAk8UUH/IDAp9sd6IUv/

fred

```
C:\openssl>openssl passwd -1 -salt fred password  
$1$fred$bATAk8UUH/IDAp9sd6IUv/
```



```
# cat /etc/shadow
root:$1$Etg2ExUZ$F9NTP7omafhKI1qaBMqng1:15651:0:99999:7:::
# openssl passwd -1 -salt Etg2ExUZ redhat
$1$Etg2ExUZ$F9NTP7omafhKI1qaBMqng1
```

```
$ openssl version
```

```
OpenSSL 1.0.1f 6 Jan 2014
```

```
$ openssl dgst -md5 file
```

```
MD5(file)= b1946ac92492d2347c6235b4d2611184
```

```
$ openssl genrsa -out mykey.pem 1024
```

```
Generating RSA private key, 1024 bit long modulus
```

```
.....++++++
...+++++
e is 65537 (0x10001)
```

```
$ openssl rsa -in mykey.pem -pubout > mykey.pub
```

```
writing RSA key
```

```
$ cat mykey.pub
```

```
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
```

```
MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDXv9HSFkpm+ZooQcpdHBZiUwX8
EZIKm0nsgjc5ZTYVaF9CMLtmKoTzep7aQX9o9nKepFt1kQ73Ta9vOPd6CX61/cgY
Xy2tShw0imrtFaVDFjX+7kLmc0uwbFFCoZMtJxIaXaa9SV2kARxOCTJ2uOjRTCce
XU09IjGHnIhSNjeIJQIDAQAB
```

```
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
```

```
$ cat /etc/shadow
```

```
root:$1$Etg2ExUZ$F9NTP7omafhKI1qaBMqng1:15651:0:99999:7:::
```

```
$ openssl passwd -1 -salt Etg2ExUZ redhat
```

```
$1$Etg2ExUZ$F9NTP7omafhKI1qaBMqng1
```

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3. Hashing and Authentication

Collisions.

<http://asecuritysite.com/crypto>

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Bob



Alice



Eve



Trent



A major factor with hash signatures is:

- **Collision.** This is where another match is found, no matter the similarity of the original message. This can be defined as a **Collision attack**.
- **Similar context.** This is where part of the message has some significance to the original, and generates the same hash signature. This can be defined as a Pre-image attack.
- **Full context.** This is where an alternative message is created with the same hash signature, and has a direct relation to the original message. This is an extension to a Pre-image attack.

In 2006 it was shown that MD5 can produce collision within less than a minute.

A 50% probability of a collision is:

$$\sqrt{N(\text{signatures})} = \sqrt{2^n} = 2^{\frac{n}{2}}$$



where n is the number of bits in the signature. For example, for MD5 (128-bit) the number of operations that would be required for a better-than-50% chance of a collision is:

$$2^{64}$$

Note, in 2006, for SHA-1 the best time has been 18 hours

d131dd02c5e6eec4693d9a0698aff95c
2fcab58712467eab4004583eb8fb7f89
55ad340609f4b30283e488832571415a
085125e8f7cdc99fd91dbdf280373c5b
d8823e3156348f5bae6dacd436c919c6
dd53e2b487da03fd02396306d248cda0
e99f33420f577ee8ce54b67080a80d1e
c69821bcb6a8839396f9652b6ff72a70

d131dd02c5e6eec4693d9a0698aff95c
2fcab50712467eab4004583eb8fb7f89
55ad340609f4b30283e4888325f1415a
085125e8f7cdc99fd91dbd7280373c5b
d8823e3156348f5bae6dacd436c919c6
dd53e23487da03fd02396306d248cda0
e99f33420f577ee8ce54b67080280d1e
c69821bcb6a8839396f965ab6ff72a70

The MD5 signature
gives the same
result



79054025255FB1A26E4BC422AEF54EB4





Nat McHugh

- 10 hours of computing on the Amazon GPU Cloud.
- Cost: 60 cents
- Used: Hashcat (on CUDA)
- Birthday attack: A group size of only 70 people results in a 99.9% chance of two people sharing the same birthday.
- M-bit output there are 2^m messages, and the same hash value would only require $2^{(m/2)}$ random messages.
18,446,744,073,709,551,616.

```
C:\openssl>openssl md5 hash01.jpg
```

```
MD5(hash01.jpg)= e06723d4961a0a3f950e7786f3766338
```

```
C:\openssl>openssl md5 hash02.jpg
```

```
MD5(hash02.jpg)= e06723d4961a0a3f950e7786f3766338
```


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3. Hashing and Authentication

LM and NTLM Hash

<http://asecuritysite.com/crypto>

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
Eve



Trent



```
C:> user2sid \pluto guest
S-1-5-21-7623811015-3361044348-030300820-501
C:> sid2user 5 21 7623811015 3361044348 030300820 500
Name is Fred
Domain is PLUTO
```



SIDs are used to uniquely identify users and their group memberships – identifies User, Group and Computer accounts.



Relative User ID (RID):

500 = Admin

501 = Guest

502 = Kerberos

1000 = First user

1001 = Second user


S – Security ID (SID)

Identifier Authority (48 bits)
5 = Login ID



SA



HKLM\SAM



SAM Database
(stores
usernames
and
passwords)



Domain Controller
- runs Active Directory which contains information of domain objects

Windows domain


Local Authority Subsystem (Lsass) – Windows Security mechanism – Attached by Sasser Worm which exploited a buffer overflow



Responsible for local security policy

- Controls access.
- Managing password policies.
- User authentication.
- Audit messages.

SAM



Registry:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SAM



- LM Hash (Windows XP, 2003)
- NTLMv2 (Windows 7, 8, etc) – connect to Active Directory
- NTLM (Windows 7, 8, etc) – No salt

```
C:\Windows\System32\config>dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is A2B3-7C7A
```

```
Directory of C:\Windows\System32\config
05-Oct-14  05:52 PM          262,144 SAM
05-Oct-14  05:56 PM          262,144 SECURITY
05-Oct-14  08:39 PM     149,946,368 SOFTWARE
05-Oct-14  08:40 PM     15,728,640 SYSTEM
```

- bkhive - dumps the syskey bootkey from a Windows system hive.
- samdump2 - dumps Windows 2k/NT/XP/Vista password hashes.

hashme gives: FA-91-C4-FD-28-A2-D2-57-AA-D3-B4-35-B5-14-04-EE
FF2A43841C84518A18795AB6E3C8A62E (NTLM)

napier gives: 12-B9-C5-4F-6F-E0-EC-80-AA-D3-B4-35-B5-14-04-EE
307E40814E7D4E103F6A69B04EA78F3D (NTLM)

<user>:<id>:<LM hash>:<NTLM hash>:<comment>:<homedir>:

```
Root@kali:~# cat pw
myuser:500:12B9C54F6FE0EC80AAD3B435B51404EE:307E40814E7D4E103F6A69B04EA78F3D:::
Root@kali:~# john pw
Loaded 1 password hash (LM DES [128/128 BS SSE2])
NAPIER (napier)
guesses: 1 time: 0:00:00:00 100% (1) c/s: 4850 trying: NAPIER - N4PI3R
Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
```


SAM



Registry:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SAM

```
Root@kali:~# cat pw
myuser:500:12B9C54F6FE0EC80AAD3B435B51404EE:307E40814E7D4E103F6A69B04EA78F3D:::
Root@kali:~# john pw
Loaded 1 password hash (LM DES [128/128 BS SSE2])
NAPIER (napier)
guesses: 1 time: 0:00:00:00 100% (1) c/s: 4850 trying: NAPIER - N4PI3R
Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
```

```
<user>:<id>:<LM hash>:<NTLM hash>:<comment>:<homedir>:
password:500:E52CAC67419A9A224A3B108F3FA6CB6D:8846F7EAE8
FB117AD06BDD830B7586C:$
myuser:500:12B9C54F6FE0EC80AAD3B435B51404EE:307E40814E7D4E103F6A69B04EA78F3D:::
```



Hash Crackers/Bit Coin Miners



Fast Hash One

- 1.536TH/s – Cost 3-5,000 dollars.

25 GPU Hash Cracker

- An eight character NTLM password cracked in 5.5 hours. 14 character LM hash cracked in six minutes. 350 billion hashes per second.



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Message authentication
codes (MACs)

<http://asecuritysite.com/crypto>

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Alice




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Advanced Crypto

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OTP, HOTP, TOTP

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**One-time
password**

$f(m)$

$f(f(m))$

$f(f(f(m)))$

**One-time
password (timed)**

$H(t1)$

$H(t2)$

$H(t3)$

**One-time
password
(counter)**

$H(c1)$

$H(c2)$



System logon



System logon



System logon

Advanced Crypto

3. Hashing and Authentication

FNV, Murmur and
Bloom's Filter

<http://asecuritysite.com/crypto>

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Trent



Murmur

While hashing methods such as MD5 and SHA-1 use crypto methods, the Murmur and FNV hashes use a non-cryptographic hash function. The Murmur hash, designed by Austin Appleby, uses a non-cryptographic hash function. This can be used for general hash-based lookups. It has a good performance compared with other hashing methods, and generally provide a good balance between performance and CPU utilization. Also it performs well in terms of hash collisions.

FNV

FNV (Fowler–Noll–Vo) is a 64-bit non-cryptographic hash function developed by Glenn Fowler, Landon Curt Noll, and Phong Vo. There are two main versions, of which 1a is the most up-to-date version.

Advanced Crypto

3. Hashing and Authentication

Shamir's Secret Sharing

<http://asecuritysite.com/crypto>

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Bob



Alice



Eve



Trent





Secret 1



Secret 2

This is a secret



000P7fID1RF7zOzKLtK
7KVyuv1IzOs=



001U65cH2XqiTOQ5hZT
2XYv7oFi iBY=



00254TgLzcbIzP0teF4
hwPIEgUCRRE=

Any 2 from 3

This is a secret

Shamir

Hash

Advanced Crypto

3. Hashing and Authentication

MD2. MD4. MD5. SHA-1. Salting. Collisions. Murmur and FNV. Bloom Filter. LM Hash. Whirlpool. RIPEMD (RACE Integrity Primitives Evaluation Message Digest). GOST. Tiger. SHA-3. Bcrypt. PBKDF2. Open SSL Hash passwords. Secret Shares. One Time Passwords. Timed One Time Password (TOTP). Hashed One Time Password (HOTP). HMAC. Time Stamp Protocol.

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