BEYOND Racism

EMBRACING AN INTERDEPENDENT FUTURE

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Introduction

Three Nations at the Crossroads is part of a larger body of work developed by the Comparative Human Relations Initiative, a collaborative effort by people and institutions in Brazil, South Africa and the United States. Its aim is to contribute to diverse efforts to overcome the unfair use of superficial traits such as color, gender, heritage or perceived race to benefit some people and disadvantage others in these nations and around the world.

Since 1995, the Initiative has supported an array of consultations and related events and commissioned country-specific and comparative papers to examine disparities in power and well-being between persons of European or African descent or appearance and strategies to reduce inequality. In other Initiative publications listed in the Appendix, the comparative issues and ideas are considered. This volume, featuring papers by sage activists and scholars from Brazil, South Africa and the United States, is complementary and focuses on country-specific issues, dynamics and histories. The juxtaposition of papers about the three nations and a timeline for each, however, will surely invite the reader to think comparatively, drawing his/her own conclusions about points of similarity and difference among venues.

Frequently, we have been asked why Brazil, South Africa and the United States are being compared. We have been reminded of the exceptional characteristics of each. Brazil, it is asserted, is so different from the United States and South Africa. It did not by operation of law impose second class citizenship on people of African descent following the abolition of slavery. It has a largely "mixed race" population due to the practice of miscegenation, which was encouraged in Brazil, unlike in the United States and South Africa where it was barred. Moreover, since there are so many "mixed race" poor people in Brazil, surely, it is said, dark skin color and racism are not the cause of poverty.

Admittedly, in South Africa "race" or skin color provided the basis for dividing the privileged from the disadvantaged. Apartheid was all encompassing. But South Africa is now governed by its majority Black population. It has a progressive constitution and has had two relatively peaceful democratic elections. Since the Black majority is now in power, the commitment to uprooting racism and discrimination is a given. Why focus on racial discrimination and racism in the new South Africa?

The United States is the world's wealthiest nation. Why compare it with two developing nations? African Americans are a permanent minority, and, due to immigration and differential birthrates, it is asserted, bi-polar analyses of race relations will be increasingly irrelevant. By the middle of the next century, the United States will be a "majority minority" nation. Hasn't significant progress been made in race relations? Perhaps, some suggest, it is time for a little "benign" neglect.

One of the limitations of much of the literature related to inter-group relations is that it is often very particularistic. We examine the trees without realizing that they are part of a forest. Comparisons allow us to discern broad trends, suggest fresh explanations for old problems, and cast familiar issues in a different light. In the global era into which the world has entered, we believe that the field of comparative studies will burgeon.

There are no simple answers to the questions set forth above. Here we can remind the reader only generally of the reasons why these nations form the basis of the comparison. It is, of course, true that these nations are exceptional, differing in history, culture, composition, resources, geography, and phases of development. But they bear a family resemblance.

- Each has a democratic form of governance premised upon accountability and responsiveness to the interests of all of the governed.
- All are powerful regionally and globally and must adapt to the rapidly changing world.
- The world community of nations looks to all three to provide leadership.
- All have in the past sanctioned the enslavement of people of African descent or appearance– in Brazil for over 370 years, in the United States for over 240 years. While in South Africa, slavery was not as widespread or long-term, in all three nations the institution created a cultural mold and an economic and political reality in which Whites were expected to be dominant, while Blacks and Browns and their offspring were expected to assume subservient positions.
- In all three countries, people of African descent or appearance were and, to varying degrees, still are denied rights and treatment equal to that taken for granted by most Whites. The difference in treatment is due to present de facto discrimination and/or the cumulative effects of past disadvantages and discrimination.
- Myths and false ideas to explain, sustain and justify racial inequality and the concentrated impoverishment of people of African descent or appearance have become part of the White-dominated culture of each nation.
- As a consequence of these factors, among others, people of African descent in these nations are disproportionately numbered among the poor and marginalized.

Brazil, South Africa and the United States also face a common set of international trends that will impact on them and have the potential to make them even more alike: the technology-driven, globalizing marketplace; immigration and demographic shifts; and human rights and women's rights movements. In the global information age into which all are entering, these trends promise to heighten communication, proximity and interdependence among peoples of diverse colors, races and ethnicities within nations and between and among nations.

In all three nations, poverty and race/color-based discrimination interact with and help to shape relations between people of European descent or appearance and their darker-skinned counterparts. The link between discrimination and poverty is seen most clearly and readily in South Africa where little time has elapsed between apartheid's end and the beginning of substantive democracy. The continuing effects of apartheid era policies and practices that deliberately under-invested in Black education, training, housing, employment, health care and other services and over-invested in such benefits for Whites are visible. Clearly, measures both to combat discrimination and alleviate poverty are needed in order to dismantle the dual system.

In Brazil, where slavery ended in 1888, without the subsequent practice of de jure segregation and racial discrimination, the passage of time allows many Brazilians to deny the presence of past or present racial discrimination against Afro Brazilians. A myth of "racial democracy" that ignores White privilege or conflates it with capacity or merit has taken hold. In the United States, where de jure segregation and discrimination ended less than 50 years ago, the intergenerational transfer of disadvantages and advantages between Blacks and Whites and current racial discrimination are often overlooked by or invisible to Whites. Since the exercise of power by Whites is normative, "skin privileges" they enjoy may be taken for granted.

What is disheartening in the United States and Brazil is that many policy makers and analysts spend their time arguing about whether "class" or "racial discrimination" is the problem, when clearly both operate in diverse combinations to foster

inequality. Anti-discrimination and poverty alleviation measures are both needed and would benefit the nations as a whole. It is not a fair criticism of anti-discrimination measures to say that they have not solved the problem of poverty nor of poverty-alleviation policies to say that they have not eliminated racial discrimination. But in Brazil and the United States, debate on these propositions provides a ready excuse for some to decline to support any response to racial discrimination, poverty or inequality. In South Africa, there is an awareness of the need for both approaches, where the economic climate in the nation and shortages of skilled workers– legacies of apartheid– are retarding economic progress.

In the new global economic era, racism and discrimination are no longer functional. At earlier stages of history, having large numbers of poor and uneducated people of African descent to exploit as sources of cheap labor may have been beneficial to elite groups. This is no longer the case.

In a real sense, discrimination and racism are passe. They have outlived their economic utility. No nation can any longer "afford" to waste the talent and productive capacities represented by large African descent populations. In the highly charged, global marketplace, nations with large numbers of people who are uncared for, unemployed, undereducated, unskilled, and impoverished are at a decided disadvantage. Why would investors or multinational corporations wish to put their funds at risk in nations where there are high crime rates, a poor quality of life, social instability, police violence, inadequate health care, and governments that cannot fulfill their first obligation: to provide for the essential well-being of their people?

Finding ways to develop this productive capacity through constructive investment in human capital is a priority of the first magnitude and a matter of national and international interest. In the past, racism and discrimination may have been a way to enrich elite members of the population. In the future, racism and discrimination will increasingly hamper the ability of nations to achieve or sustain economic growth and development for the benefit of all of their people.

One of the most powerful and transcendent ideas of the 20th century is that all people—irrespective of color or race or gender or other superficial traits—have fundamental human rights. The idea of human rights is now part of the world of commerce and law. It affects relations between and among governments. And it creates an entirely new set of obligations that governments must meet in order to be in compliance with international standards. Brazil, South Africa and the United States will increasingly find their national persona, economic fortunes, and world standing tarnished and harmed by the prevalence of racially identifiable inequality and poverty.

Racism and discrimination– no matter how they are explained or characterized– are a violation of human rights guaranteed by international instruments that the governments of Brazil, South Africa and the United States have ratified. Racism and racial discrimination are violations of domestic and international law.

Racism and discrimination are not simply matters of interpersonal relations or harmless aesthetic preferences. Racism and discrimination are not just habits of the heart. They may be encoded in institutional policies, practices and arrangements that disadvantage one group unfairly and disproportionately based on race or color and privilege another due to race or color. To a large extent, in all three countries, public and private policies and practices that appear to be neutral on their face, but which have an adverse and disproportionate effect on people of African descent or appearance constitute a violation of human rights. The failure to take positive steps in law, policy and practice to ensure the fair and evenhanded distribution of privileges and opportunities across diverse groups constitutes the violation.

A final thought about this volume. At its end, there is a timeline of key events for the three countries. Though not subject to amplification in the text, the timelines make a powerful point. They show that events in each country on matters related to race have to some extent influenced events in others. Freedom movements, in other words, are contagious. The successes in one venue prompt efforts in others. Racial discrimination is an international problem that calls for both national and international responses.

The United Nations has announced its intention to hold a World Conference on Racism in South Africa in 2001. This event, preceded and paralleled by meetings of non-governmental organizations, will furnish a forum for exploring many of the issues and ideas set forth in this volume. It is an important and timely event, coming as it does at the beginning of the new millennium.

It is a reminder that progress has been made in combating racism, albeit at a high price. At the beginning of the 20th century, White supremacy and hegemony were in full force in Brazil, South Africa and the United States. A hundred years later, there is an emerging consensus that the ideology of racial superiority and inferiority has no basis in fact and is unacceptable. The challenge of the new era will be to transform the systems that this old ideology spawned so that they embody the new ideals. Past can be prologue to a future beyond racism, if we honor the commitment of those who have gone before us.

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Brazil

Dance of Deception: A Reading of Race Relations In Brazil

By Abdias do Nascimento and Elisa Larkin Nascimento

Introduction

When South America was still, to Europeans, a far-fetched hypothesis of adventurers and dreamers confirmed only by information coming out of Africa,[1] Spain and Portugal were already dividing up the continent. By the terms of the Tordesillas Treaty of 1494– a kind of early Berlin Conference in Iberian royal style– the Portuguese landed themselves the largest territory, virtually a subcontinent, comparable in area to the United States,[2] seven times the size of South Africa,[3] and dwarfing all the other nations of the region. It is a territory of fabulous natural wealth, beginning with the soil itself, which "when one plants, will grow anything,"[4] and a subsoil brimming with precious metals. Waterways, forests, and huge expanses of fertile land sweep the Amazon, the Pantanal, and numerous other diverse regions; abundant fauna await the fisherman's net and the sportsman's hunt. In modern terms, the country harbors the world's greatest biodiversity.

With such a material base to build upon and a current population of almost 166 million, it is hardly surprising that today Brazil is routinely cited high on the list of future world powers. It has a solid industrial base, a modernized agricultural capacity and an expanding tertiary sector highly attractive to foreign investment. Powerful armed forces, satellite and space technology, nuclear power capacity, abundant hydroelectric resources, natural gas, and renewable fuel developed from sugar cane alcohol can be counted as only a few showcases of Brazil's enormous richness of resources. Yet they exist side by side with scenes of backwardness in which time seems to have halted ages ago, with human progress banned by the squalid poverty of "Barren Lives."[5]

Such contrasts cannot be understood without taking into account their racial dimension: the "barren lives" of Brazil are overwhelmingly non-White. While the roots of inequality have much in common with those in other developing countries, there are singularities that shape and influence their contours and the perspectives for policies designed to address them. In the case of racial inequality in Brazil, as compared with the United States and South Africa, the outstanding singularity is the absence of racial segregation by law and the accompanying national culture of "racial democracy" that has acted as a smokescreen to mask very stark racial inequities.

Inequality in Brazil: A General Picture

Wilmot James' description of South African economic development (pp. 49-51) fits Brazil like a glove: its "economic progress in the 20th century has been a compound of oppressive exploitation and rational-technical advance." Albeit commanding an advanced position in terms of economic development– ranked among the top 10 economies in the world– Brazil compares unfavorably with its neighbors in terms of social development (Table 1). In 1995, its per capita gross internal product was significantly lower than Argentina's or Uruguay's but three times higher than Paraguay's. Yet, 43 percent of Brazilian domiciles were poverty-stricken, a proportion higher than in Paraguay and more than four times greater than in Argentina and Uruguay (Cruz, 1998: 27-28). Brazil had the lowest literacy rate and by far the highest mortality rate among children under 5 years of age: 50 deaths per thousand, as opposed to about 18 per thousand among African-Americans in the United States (Asante and Mattson, 1991: 166). The minimum wage was about four times lower than that of Argentina and less than half that of Paraguay. The value of the monthly minimum wage at this writing is equivalent to about $75.00, more than 10 times below what is defined as poverty in the United States.

Table1: Comparative Data for "Mercosul" Countries

	ARGENTINA	BRAZIL	PARAGUAY	URUGUAY
Area (thousands of km)	2,737	8,457	397	175
Population	35,219,612	157,871,980	4,959,713	3,146,200
Gross Domestic Product Per Person	$5,120	$3,370	$1,148	$6,550
Domiciles in Poverty	10.0% (urban only)	43.0%	41.0%	7.0%
Literacy	96.2%	79.9%	91.2%	98.0%
Child Mortality Rate	25.3	50.2	29.0	24.4
Monthly Minimum Wage	$400.0	$108.00	$234.00	$88.00

Source: CEPAL (1995); Cruz (1998), 28-29; GDP in constant 1990 US dollars; deaths per thousand for children under 5; after the February 1999 currency crisis, the value of the minimum wage in Brazil dropped to less than that cited here for Uruguay – about $75.00 by the end of 1999; Mercusol is a "common market" in Central and South America.

Table 2 : Distribution of National Income in Brazil, 1960-2000 *(in percentages)*

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000
Poorest 50%	18	15	14	12	11
Richest 20%	54	62	63	65	64
Inequality index	3	4.1	4.5	5.4	5.8

Source: IPEA/IBGE; Mantega (1998), 99, projection for 2000.

Table 3: Inequality Index for Brazil, 1981-1995

Proportion of Income for	1981	1985	1988	1990	1993	1995
Poorest 10%	0.78	0.76	0.59	0.58	0.38	0.43
Poorest 20%	2.5	2.4	2.0	2.0	1.8	1.9
Poorest 30%	5.0	4.8	4.2	4.1	4.1	4.2
Poorest 40%	8.4	8.0	7.2	7.1	7.4	7.3
Poorest 50%	12.9	12.3	11.2	11.2	11.6	11.6
GINI coefficient	0.59	0.60	0.62	0.62	0.61	0.61

Source: compiled by the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA) with data from the 1996 National Survey of Domicile Samples (PNAD).

Table 4: Composition of Brazil's Gross Domestic Product, 1990-1996 *(in percentages)*

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Capital	33	38	38	35	38	40	41
Labor	45	42	44	45	40	38	38

Source: IBGE and Folha de São Paulo; Mantega (1998).

Brazil in 1999 ranked after only Sierra Leone with the second most unjust income distribution in the world;[6] income concentration consistently has increased over time (Tables 2, 3, and 4). Equally as important as the abject levels of poverty accentuating this inequality are the extravagantly high levels of income held by the rich (Roque and Corrêa, 1998: 3).

Over time the poor not only become poorer but are subjected to ever more subhuman living conditions. While an ostentatious minority elite consumes luxury imports in urban shopping centers, physicians in rural and poor, urban areas are writing prescriptions for rice, beans, and milk to cure one of the diseases afflicting most children: hunger.

Racial Inequality in Brazil

Before dealing with the racial aspect of inequality, one must make clear how racial groups are identified.[7] Official Brazilian census data use two color categories for African descendants: "Preto" (literally, "Black") for dark-skinned and "Pardo" (roughly, mulatto and mestizo) for others. This distinction has proved so arbitrary and subjective as to be essentially useless, yet it leads those unfamiliar with the Brazilian demographic context to mistake the smaller "Preto" group for "Black." It is now accepted convention to identify the Black population as the sum of the Preto and Pardo categories, referred to as "negro," "afro-brasileiro," or "afro-descendente." In English, "Black," "African Brazilian"

and "people of African descent" refer to this same sum of the two groups. The "White" and "Pardo" categories are notoriously inflated, and the "Preto" diminished, by the tendency of African-descended interviewees to classify themselves as White or mulatto (Mortara, 1970). This fact is essential to our reading of the information presented below.

Racial hierarchy and segregation are etched indelibly in contrasting landscapes of luxury and privation. African Brazilians in disproportionate numbers live in urban shantytowns called favelas, mocambos, palafitas and so on. To visit Rio de Janeiro's Central Station[8] is to witness dangerously dilapidated trains taking hours to transport overwhelmingly Black workers from the huge metropolitan area called the Baixada Fluminense to their jobs in the capital city, a scene that recalls Black South Africans' commute from segregated townships. The racial contrast between a public school in the Baixada– or in poor suburbs or favelas almost anywhere in Brazil– and a university in a rich area like Rio de Janeiro's Zona Sul very nearly duplicates the difference between a township school and a White university in South Africa. South Africans have Black universities and had them even under apartheid. African Brazilians have nothing comparable.

While the Baixada Fluminense has been ranked by the World Health Organization as the second most miserable poverty pocket in the world after Bombay, its situation is not exceptional in Brazil; similar scenarios are common throughout the country. For this reason, it provides a representative portrait of inequality.

Almost entirely Black, the five Baixada municipalities[9] are also almost entirely sewerless; children play in the stench of open gutters that carry filth through mud-ridden, mosquito-infested streets. They are called "Black gutters" (valas negras), a characteristically racist expression identifying African Brazilian people with the untreated sewage to which they are exposed. Leprosy and epidemics of preventable diseases such as dengue remain largely untouched by public policy in these areas. Seventy percent of Baixada children are severely undernourished. The Baixada rivals South African townships not only in poverty but also in violence; more people are killed there by homicide than by automobile accident.

Extremely unbalanced development levels within this immense nation result in enormous regional differences. Perhaps the greatest gap of social inequality separates dwellers in urban areas from miserably poor, rural populations of which African Brazilians are the majority (IBGE, 1997: 46). If the Baixada Fluminense can be compared to South African townships, Brazil's Northeast and Northern regions could be likened to Bantustans. The undercounted Afro-Brazilian group (the sum of the Preto and Pardo categories), officially about 45 percent of the overall population, is concentrated about 70 percent (Table 5) in these regions. Here, the practice of slavery generally goes unpunished, and semi-slavery is by no means uncommon. Assassinations of rural labor union officials and community leaders are routine matters of impunity: about 1,000 were actually murdered between 1964 and 1986. Countless other deaths went unrecorded (SBPC, 1987).

The tiny Asian group appearing in this table (less than .5 percent) represents the most recent in a series of immigration waves encouraged by the Brazilian government since the late 19th century. Active in agriculture, this mostly Japanese community is concentrated in prosperous rural areas of the Central-West as well as urban centers in the developed Southeast. In the poor Northeast, Asians amount to one-tenth of one percent of the population. Despite their very recent arrival in comparison with Blacks, who have been in Brazil for 500 years, Asians generally enjoy superior access to education, income, occupation and housing. Edson Lopes Cardoso (1999) has noted the contrast between two major urban neighborhoods named Liberty: the Asian one in São Paulo, the capital city of São Paulo State (Southeast region), and the African-Brazilian Liberty of Salvador, the capital of Bahia State in the Northeast. In São Paulo, it seems natural that the streets of Liberty are hung with signs saying "wanted: Oriental office boy" or "Japanese clerk required." No one finds it strange that Liberty banks have Asian tellers or its stores have Asian managers. In Salvador's Liberty, bank tellers and store managers are generally White, while any stated preference for Blacks in hiring, education or access to services is indignantly condemned by Bahian society as racist.

Table 5: Population Percent by Color or Race, 1996

	White	Preto	Pardo	Asian	Native Brazilian Indian
Brazil	55.2	6.0	38.2	0.4	0.2
Urban North*	28.5	3.7	67.2	0.4	0.2
Northeast	30.6	6.1	62.9	0.1	0.2
Southeast	65.4	7.4	26.5	0.6	0.1
South	85.9	3.1	10.5	0.4	0.1
Central-West	48.3	4.0	46.6	0.6	0.5

Source: PNAD (1996); excludes those who did not declare their color.

***** In all tables, "Urban North" excludes the rural area of Rondônia, Acre, Amazonas, Roraima, Pará and Amapá States in the northern region.

Native Brazilian Indians, original dwellers of this land, have been the victims of genocide in myriad forms since colonial times. As a result, they now make up a smaller part of the overall population than Asians, even in the Central-West region where they are most numerous. Living today in hopelessly squalid poverty, deprived of their land and tradition, their youth plagued with suicide in epidemic proportions, Native Brazilians continue their struggle for survival. Over history, they have been alternately despised and romanticized, becoming the symbol of this century's Modernist movement among elite urban artists and intellectuals. Its slogan of cannibalism (antropofagia) is an appropriate image of how White Brazilian society and culture metaphorically "ate up" and digested what they defined as Native Indian and Afro-Brazilian traditions, producing what they defined as a new "syncretic," modern culture. This self-laudatory image was at once self-deluding. While Modernists believed they were rejecting colonial European standards in favor of "more authentic" Native Brazilian and African ones, they in fact understood little if anything of Native Brazilian or African tradition and were merely mouthing slogans newly articulated but Western in essence.

What truly distinguishes Brazil from South Africa or the United States is not so much the nature of social injustice as the ideological dance of deception. Traditionally, analysts have been so enamored of the idea of harmony among races in Brazil as to largely ignore racial inequalities. When acknowledged, they are somewhat unnervingly attributed to what Brazilian intellectuals refer to as "the social question," as opposed to "the racial question." Inequalities of a racial nature are imputed to the historical legacy of slavery, with current or recent discrimination deemed insignificant to their composition. While the existence of "prejudice"– contrary to that of "discrimination"– is recognized, it is seen as merely an aesthetic problem exercising little, if any, influence on social reality.[10]

The power of such ideas, has been so central in the articulation of the Brazilian national consciousness as to endow them with a status akin to taboo. Recently, however, the racial nature of inequality progressively has been demonstrated by social science research,[11] to the extent that today Roque and Corrêa (1998) observe: "two factors of disparity cross over different levels of reproduction of social inequality and have deep roots in Brazilian culture: gender and race."

Gender and Race Disparities

Yet in Brazil the gender distinction cannot be adequately understood without considering race. In the income hierarchy, race is the first determining factor, then gender. White women retain a clearly privileged position in relation to Black men, and Afro-Brazilian women are left at the very bottom of the scale for income and job prestige.

Table 6: Average Earnings by Gender and Race.

White men	6.3
White women	3.6
Black men	2.9
Black women	1.7

Source: IBGE, 1994; expressed in multiples of the monthly minimum wage (the end of 1999, about $75.00).

Income disparities among racial groups exist regionally. Table 7 shows that the North and Northeast, where African Brazilians are the large majority, have the lowest income and economic activity levels in the country, and the highest inequality rates (Gini index).[12] Table 8, which shows average family income by region, confirms that the regions with majority Afro-Brazilian populations are by far the poorest.

Table 7: Income and Inequality Rates by Region

	Average Monthly Income (R$)	Gini Index	Rate of Economic Activity
Brazil	290	0.590	59.1
Urban North	236	0.569	54.9
Northeast	158	0.590	57.9
Southeast	366	0.569	58.1
South	325	0.567	64.6
Central-West	290	0.599	61.6

Source: IBGE, 1997; PNAD, 1996; population 10 years of age or over, with or without income; R$ = Real, Brazilian Currency.

There are also consistent and very significant differences among race or color groups within the regions. For example, in the richer states of the Southeast region, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, the incidence of miserable poverty is two to three times as high among Blacks as Whites (Table 9). In the Northeast, the proportion of Blacks in miserable poverty is a third higher than that of Whites; in the North/Central-West it is more than 60 percent higher.

In Brazil, Blacks generally earn less than half as much as Whites (Silva, 1998). White men earn almost four times as much as Afro-Brazilian women, who earn less than half the value of White women's average income.[13] About 26 percent of Blacks, compared to 16 percent of Whites, earn less

Table 8: Average Family Income, 1996

	Multiples of Minimum Wage					
	2 or less	2 to 5	5 to 10	10 to 20	Over 20	No income
Brazil	22.9	29.2	21.0	12.5	8.4	3.7
Urban North	23.1	31.4	20.7	12.0	6.4	5.1
Northeast	40.6	30.2	11.9	5.4	3.6	5.1
Southeast	14.1	27.4	25.4	16.6	11.4	2.9
South	17.8	30.5	24.9	13.9	8.7	2.6
Central-West	21.7	32.1	20.0	11.5	8.7	4.3

Source: PNAD, 1996; in multiples of the monthly minimum wage; excluding those who did not declare income.

than the minimum wage, while one percent of Blacks as opposed to four percent of Whites earned more than 10 times the minimum wage. Educated African Brazilians earn less than Whites with the same education, and in higher income brackets Whites receive about 5.6 times more income than Blacks. In all these situations, Black men earn more than Black women do, but White women earn more than Black men do (PNAD 1987).

Table 10 shows that fully twice as many Blacks (Pretos plus Pardos) as Whites live in "miserable poverty," earning only up to one-fourth the value of Brazil's monthly minimum wage. The inverse relation prevails at higher income levels; the proportion of Whites who enjoy higher incomes is three, four, or five times that of Blacks. Only in the groups receiving one-half to one minimum wage group (earning $32 to $75 a month) are differences of race or color less accentuated. About one-fourth of each group– Whites, Pretos and Pardos– appear in this category, a fact that speaks clearly of poverty levels in Brazil. At the next level up, among those earning $76 to $152, the proportion of Whites is twice as high as that of Blacks, a gap that grows as income levels rise.

African-Brazilian women embody the feminization of poverty observed by the women's movement internationally over the last decades. Eighty percent of the employed Black women are concentrated in manual occupations; more than half of these are domestic servants, and the rest are self-employed in domestic tasks (washing, ironing, cooking), among the lowest-paid in the economy. About one in four African-Brazilian female heads of households earn less than half the minimum wage (Castro, 1991). These parameters have remained consistent or have worsened over time.[14] Unemployment statistics, indicating higher unemployment rates among Blacks, suggests that African-Brazilian women account for more than their share of the extraordinarily high rates among women in general.

Table 9: Percent of "Miserable Poverty" by Region and Color, 1998

State/Region	Color		
	White	Preto	Pardo
Rio de Janeiro (Southeast)	6.0	12.7	13.8
São Paulo (Southeast)	4.0	12.3	8.7
South	15.2	23.8	27.9
Minas Gerais/Espírito Santo (Southeast)	19.4	37.7	35.1
Northeast	38.5	51.3	49.5
North/Central-West	14.0	26.9	23.2

Source: IBGE/PNAD, 1988; "miserable poverty" includes per capita family income up to 1/4 minimum wage; special compilations, courtesy of Nelson do Valle Silva/ IUPERJ.

Table 10: Per Capita Family Income by Color, 1988

Per Capita Family Income	Color		
	White	Preto	Pardo
Up to 1/4 minimum wage	14.7%	30.2%	36.0%
1/4 to 1/2 m.w.	19.2	27.4	26.8
1/2 to 1 m.w.	24.2	24.9	20.7
1 to 2 m.w.	20.2	12.0	10.6
2 to 3 m.w.	8.2	2.7	2.9
3 to 5 m.w.	6.5	1.6	1.8
5 to 10 m.w.	4.5	0.8	0.9
10 to 20 m.w.	1.5	0.3	0.2
20 or more m.w.	0.3	0.1	0.0
Total	100%	100%	100%

Source: IBGE, PNAD-88; special compilations by Nelson do Valle Silva/IUPERJ; courtesy of Nelson do Valle Silva/IUPERJ; the minimum wage is approximately $150 per month.

Table 11: Unemployment Rates by Sex and Race, 1996

	Total	Men	Women	White	Black*
Brazil	6.9	5.7	8.8	6.6	7.7
Urban North	7.7	6	10.2	6.8	8.2
Northeast	6.3	5.2	7.8	5.7	6.5
Southeast	7.7	6.2	9.8	7.4	8.7
South	5.4	4.5	6.6	5.1	8.1
Central-West	7.9	6.2	10.5	7.6	8.7

Source: PNAD, 1996; percent of population 10 years of age or over, with or without income.

* Preto and Pardo equal "Black" in all tables.

Education Disparities

Not only are Black families disproportionately concentrated among the poor, but their per capita income levels are lower. Thus, more people in the family must work for equivalent household earnings. Children often leave school to "help the family" by cutting sugar cane, working harvests or mines, or selling candy at traffic signals. Illiteracy rates among African Brazilians are more than double those among Whites, and the percentage of Blacks with nine years of schooling or more is almost three times smaller than that of Whites. According to one study, about two-thirds of African-Brazilian children obtain a basic education, whereas about 85 percent of White children do. Once through elementary school, a Black child's chances of going on to secondary school are on the order of 40 percent, whereas a White child's is 57 percent. African Brazilians who graduate from high school have about half the chance of White students to go on to university (Sant'Anna and Paixão, 1998: 112-114.)

The following tables give a picture of education and literacy levels by region, gender and color. Table 12 shows that illiteracy rates are by far the highest in the poor and mostly Black Northeast, where enrollment rates are lowest; differences between men and women are more accentuated there. According to Table 13, differences in education levels are significantly greater between Blacks and Whites than between men and women in all the regions, a fact confirmed by Table 14. Here again, race is more significant than gender. Half as many White women as Black women have only one year or less of schooling, while the difference between White men and Black men is only slightly smaller. In this category, as in all the others, the difference between White men and White women (about 30 percent) is significantly smaller than the Black/White disparity, and the difference between Black men and Black women is even less accentuated. In the group with 11-14 years of schooling, the proportion of Black men and women is about half that of White men and women, respectively. Black women are slightly more present than Black men in the higher education categories, but this gap is negligible when compared with the difference between Blacks and Whites– a whopping six times more in the category for 15 years of education or more.

Table 12: Illiteracy and Enrollment Rates by Region and Gender, 1996

	Illiteracy Rates			Enrollment Rates		
	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women
Brazil	14.7	14.5	14.8	91.2	90.6	91.8
Urban North	11.6	11.2	11.9	92.1	92.1	92.2
Northeast	28.7	31.1	26.6	86.4	84.8	88.0
Southeast	8.7	7.5	9.9	94.1	93.9	94.3
South	8.9	7.8	9.9	93.6	94.1	93.0
Central-West	11.6	11.3	11.8	92.9	92.5	93.4

Source: PNAD, 1996; percent of persons 15 years of age or over.

Public education is notoriously inferior in quality to private schooling, which mostly White, privileged pupils attend. Brazil's military regime, which ruled from 1964 to 1985, was largely responsible for creating this situation. The

Table 13: Average Years of Schooling by Gender and Color, 1996

	Total	Men	Women	White	Black
Brazil	5.3	5.2	5.4	6.2	4.2
Urban North	5.2	4.9	5.4	6.3	4.7
Northeast	3.9	3.6	4.2	4.8	3.5
Southeast	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.6	4.9
South	5.8	5.8	5.8	6.0	4.3
Central-West	5.5	5.2	5.5	6.3	4.7

Source: PNAD, 1996; persons 10 years of age or over.

Table 14: Adult Years of Schooling by Gender and Color, 1996

Years of Schooling	Men			Women		
	White	Preto	Pardo	White	Preta	Parda
No school/ less than 1yr	16.2	24.0	23.4	11.2	25.5	21.0
1 to 3 years	17.0	23.8	25.8	15.7	21.4	23.2
4 to 7 years	36.6	33.9	32.0	35.5	32.3	33.7
8 to 10 years	15.6	11.2	10.5	15.3	11.5	11.5
11 to 14 years	14.4	6.1	7.1	16.4	8.2	9.2
15 or more yrs	6.2	0.9	1.2	5.9	1.1	1.4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: PNAD, 1996; special compilation by Nelson do Valle Silva/IUPERJ; courtesy of Nelson do Valle Silva/IUPERJ; percent of persons 20 years old or older.

effects of its education policies far outlasted the dictatorship, eroding or destroying the public school system and turning education over to the private, education-for-profit lobby. Quality public education, which did exist before the 1970s, was virtually erased. Today, the public system of primary and secondary education fails to prepare pupils for university, while public university education is available almost exclusively to an elite able to pay expensive tuition at private primary and secondary schools.

Indeed, removing mention of the descendents of India and of "excellent" schooling (even at best, educational standards in Brazil are less than excellent), the following description of South Africa's education system (James, pp. xx) could well have been written to describe Brazil's as:

... a schooling system which struggles to enroll all eligible pupils, fails to retain the majority of them to secondary level, and offers them a quality of schooling which varies from the excellent (for a minority) to the abysmal (for the majority). The consequence is a racial pyramid of educational attainment. ... The rapid expansion of tertiary educational involvement by Africans has meant their enrollment in the less technical directions since most schools for African pupils fail to qualify them in mathematics and science. The technical and commercial elite remains predominantly White and Indian as a result.

Disparities in Mortality and Living Conditions

Life expectancy is shorter among Blacks than Whites, even taking into account differences in income and education levels. While regional differences in infant and child mortality rates are enormous, these rates are significantly higher among Blacks in all regions. Perhaps most compelling are racial disparities in living conditions (sewage, garbage collection, treated water) shown in Tables 18 and 19. Again, they prevail over and above the stark inequalities among regions.[15]

Table 15: Life Expectancy at Birth by Race

	1940/50	1970/80
Whites	47.5	66.1
Non-Whites	40	59.4

Source: PNAD, 1990; compiled by Singer (1995); Bento (1998), 61.

Disparities in Public Images

School curricula and literature generally depict a White Brazil, omitting or distorting the history and culture of Afro-Brazilians. In the same way, the mass media present an image of Brazil that looks Scandinavian, whereas nearly half the population is of African descent even according to distorted, official, statistics. When depicted, African Brazilians are generally stereotyped in subordinate positions. Publicity images with racist connotations have been denounced frequently in recent years.

Stereotype-based discrimination is very concrete in Afro-Brazilian life, especially in the form of police repression. Blacks notoriously are "suspect"; citizens as well as African diplomats, taken for "uppity" Negroes, whose fancy cars could only be stolen, have experienced arbitrary detention. Convictions are disproportionately high among indicted Blacks, only one among countless forms of discrimination

Table 16: Life Expectancy at Birth by Race, Income and Education, 1996

	Income		Education	
	Lowest Levels	Highest Levels	1-4 Years	4 Years or More
Whites	59.5	70.4	66.2	72.3
Non-Whites	55.8	63.7	62.2	66.6

Source: PNAD, 1996; compiled by Singer (1995); Bento (1998), 61.

Table 17: Child Mortality Rate by Gender and Color, 1996

	Infant Mortality		Child Mortality	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Brazil	48.0	36.4	65.5	49.7
Urban North	45.2	34.6	-	41.6
Northeast	71.7	60.8	105.7	33.5
Southeast	27.7	17.2	41.4	74.8
South	25.2	14.8	36.2	50.0
Central-West	29.5	19.3	46.1	35.1

	Infant Mortality		Child Mortality	
	White	Black	White	Black
Brazil	37.3	62.3	45.7	76.1
Urban North	-	-	-	-
Northeast	68	96.3	82.8	102.1
Southeast	25.1	43.1	30.9	52.7
South	28.3	38.9	34.8	47.7
Central-West	27.8	42.0	31.1	51.4

Source: PNAD, 1996; mortality for children under 5 is estimated from 1993; all rates per person for every 1000.

Table 18: Sanitation by Race of Heads of Household, 1996

	Treated Water		Sewage Disposal	
	White	Blacks	White	Blacks
Brazil	81.0	64.7	73.6	49.7
Urban North	63.0	54.8	56.5	41.6
Northeast	64.2	52.6	47.0	33.5
Southeast	89.1	52.6	86.8	74.8
South	77.0	52.6	69.2	50.0
Central-West	72.0	76.8	43.6	35.1

Source: PNAD, 1996; "sewage disposal" includes either sewage collection system or septic tank; percent of heads of households.

in the justice system (Oliveira et.al., 1998). Favela dwellers at their homes are routinely invaded by police. Deaths and injuries among innocent bystanders are common. Violence against children and adolescents, internationally recognized since the Candelária and Vigário Geral massacres, victimizes African-Brazilians in 80 to 90 percent of the cases.

While hotly denied in everyday discussion, job and pay discrimination are well-documented realities (PNDH, 1998; Nascimento, 1997-99).[16] Other types of daily discrimination affect Blacks in Brazil as in any segregated society. One current form takes place in banks, where automatic metal-detector doors block out Black customers in situations where Whites routinely would be let in. Also, Afro-Brazilians face frequent, unfounded accusations of shoplifting and exceptionally rigorous demands for identification and documentation when paying by check.[17]

Table 19: Housing Infrastructure by Color, 1996

Housing Conditions	Color			Total
	White	Preto	Pardo	
Domestic garbage collection	70.8	53.1	47.8	61.0
Piped water	84.2	61.6	56.1	72.1
Electricity	92.1	81.8	78.0	86.1
Rustic homes, one room or accommodation	3.2	11.9	11.6	7.0
Refrigerator	81.0	58.5	54.1	69.4
Television	82.9	64.1	59.4	72.8

Source: PNAD, 1996; courtesy of Nelson do Valle Silva/IUPERJ; percent of inhabitants.

Historical Roots of Inequality

Modern Brazil's beginnings lie in the same process that brought into being countries like the United States and South Africa: the heady expansion of Europe in the 15th century when Portuguese navigators wrenched the lands of indigenous peoples to dominate the wealth and women of the world.

Portuguese and Spanish colonialists sought less to build a home in a new land than to transfer wealth to Europe. Institutionalized rape of non-White women was a fact as basic to structuring these societies as White women's subjugation. From Brazil's beginnings, foreign debt and a production policy based on monoculture and mineral extraction for export set the tone of macroeconomic policies that consistently have bled the nation to this day.

Perhaps the difference that most marks the historical and contemporary presence of Africans in Brazil, compared with the United States, is that Africans and their descendants have constituted the majority of its population, as in the minority White settler regime of South Africa. All of South and Central America have majority populations of indigenous and/or African descent. This fact brings into focus the first agile step in the dance of deception, for the title "Latin" America betrays the imposition, often by violent means, of a European identity on non-Latin peoples. Its companion pirouette, the notion of "discovery" applied to a land of advanced civilizations inhabited over millennia, obscures the process of genocide unleashed against those peoples for centuries. From this process emerged an America that is "Latin" to the extent that its minority White elites have succeeded in repressing its peoples.

Importation of Africans to Spanish and Portuguese colonies began much earlier than in the United States. From 1502 to 1870, South and Central America imported 5.3 million enslaved Africans, with Brazil accounting for 3.6 million. In the same period, some 450,000 Africans were brought into the United States (Chiavenato, 1980). Brazil's relative proximity to Africa meant prices so low that it was more profitable to buy a new African than to preserve a slave's health. Africans generally lasted about seven years, after which they were replaced, a procedure not economically sound in the United States. The Southern United States' image of slave cabins contrasts sharply with colonial Brazil, where the senzala was similar to a landed slave ship, housing hundreds at a time.

Brazil was the last Christian country to abolish slavery in 1888. No measures were taken to integrate new African-descended citizens into the national economy or society. Many stayed on plantations as semi-slaves or moved from senzalas to urban hills, forming favelas. Some of these had earlier beginnings as Quilombos.[18] Santos (1994, 1996) cogently demonstrates how the nature of slavery's abolition is crucial to the interrelated factors causing and characterizing African Brazilians' exclusion from society.

During colonial and abolitionist periods, the non-Latin majority in South and Central America was generally on the order of three-fifths to two-thirds. In 1872 in Brazil, Blacks numbered 6.1 million compared with 3.7 million Whites. Abolition brought panic to the ruling elite, which hurried to set about constructing public policies aimed at rubbing out the "Black stain" and "purifying the nation's racial stock."[19] The goal announced by the Brazilian delegate to the 1911 Universal Races Congress in London was to eliminate African descendants[20] by the year 2012 (Skidmore, 1974: 66). The subjugation of women, both White and Black, was of course key to this sort of policy planning.

These policies had two cornerstones: 1) massive state-subsidized European immigration under laws excluding undesirable races and 2) cultivation of the whitening ideal based on the subordination of women and the slogan "marry white to improve the race." Here the politics of deception stand out in bold relief. Until very recently in academic research, European immigration was considered by respected analysts (e.g. Prado Jr., 1966) as necessary due to a "lack of qualified labor" to compete in Brazil's fledgling industrial economy. Social science, like society, simply obliterated from the employment equation the majority population of emancipated African Brazilians who, enslaved or free, not only had been responsible for highly skilled labor but also had been "qualified" to operate every technological change hitherto introduced in the economy. The fact is that jobs now went to "more desirable" Europeans whose subsidized arrival was intended to contribute to the "improvement" (the whitening) of Brazilian racial stock (Skidmore, 1974).

The majority population of African descent embodied a potential threat to the minority elite's political power that was translated into the discourse of national unity. Combined with notions of pseudo-scientific racism, this discourse established Africanity or Blackness as anti-Brazilian. While Brazil has always had Africans, they were transformed into foreigners by an almost exclusively European definition of "national identity."

Between 1890 and 1914, more than 1.5 million Europeans arrived in São Paulo alone, 64 percent with travel fare paid by the State government (Andrews, 1991). Meanwhile, stigmatized not only as unqualified but also as dangerous and disorderly (Gomes, 1995),[21] Black men were virtually

excluded from the new industrial labor market. African-Brazilian women went to work for a pittance– if for anything at all besides board and bread– as cooks, nursemaids, washerwomen, and street vendors. Afro-Brazilian religious communities,[22] led mostly by Black women, made survival and human development possible for Afro-Brazilian people despite police persecution.

Such is the historical backdrop of the severe income, employment, housing and other disparities affecting African Brazilians today. While not generally characterized by legal mandates (albeit numerous laws did explicitly establish racist policies, including the inscription of "eugenics" into the 1934 Constitution), these inequalities clearly constitute a stark reality of de facto segregation.

Whitening, Demography and Color Classifications

In Brazil, as in all of "Latin" America, the culture of whitening (embranquecimento or blanqueamiento) based on the subjugation of women leads the mestiçagem/mestizaje ballet in intricate toesteps around the conviction that Iberian elites created a cordial and harmonious form of race relations (Dzidzienyo, 1971). Closely associated are two corollaries: 1) that slavery there was a more benevolent institution,[23] and 2) that the absence of legalized racial segregation and a constitutional provision of equality before the law were sufficient to evidence a nonracist society. Both notions have had enormous impact not only on the Brazilian popular conscience but also on the country's image abroad.[24]

The very existence of the mestizo population has been taken as a final guarantee against the existence of racial discrimination, in contrast to "truly racist" countries like the United States and South Africa, where the dancers of the racial democracy ballet believe there is no race mixture.[25] Allegations that miscegenation was based on mutual consent for intermarriage or on cordial sexual relations among the races have been unmasked by African-descent writers, who show that it as a function of subordinating Black women since colonial times.[26]

The notion of harmonious relations in a benevolent slave system is not unlike the rosy portrayals of the antebellum South in U.S. literature and cinema classics. But the "Latin" flavor of machismo marks this ideology profoundly, as illustrated in the sweet picture of miscegenation painted, for example, by Pierre Verger (1977: 10). He describes how the White sons of plantation owners

... would roam the fields together with the black youngsters who served as their whipping boys but also as their playmates and schoolmates. They adopted African reactions and patterns of behavior. Later on, they would undergo their sexual initiation with the colored girls working in the big house or in the fields, thus infusing elements of sensual attraction and comprehension into their relations with what one has chosen to call persons of different races.

Sexual abuse against subordinated women is a matter of domination, whether in war (from the Roman legions and Atilla the Hun to Bosnia and Kosovo) or in the maintenance of rule by force in colonial or authoritarian regimes. Miscegenation as its fruit says little about comprehension or attraction among human beings but speaks eloquently of violent control over women. The genius of the Brazilian ideology is to make this violence the meat of self-laudatory discourse in which the White elite purges itself of responsibility for its excesses of oppression.[27] Gilberto Freyre (1940, 1946) is its master. He graphically describes the horrors of torture committed against enslaved Africans, then concludes by leaving such pearls as this one shining against the backdrop of inequality in Brazil:

The crossbreeding so widely practiced here corrected the social distance which otherwise would have remained enormous between plantation mansion and slave quarters. What the large-landholding, slaveowning monoculture produced in the way of aristocratization, dividing Brazilian society into classes of masters and slaves, ... was in great part neutralized by miscegenation's social effects. Indian and African women, at first, then mulatto women, the yallers, octoroons and so on, becoming the white master's domestics, concubines and even legitimate wives, played a powerful role in Brazil's social democratization.

Such ideas are intricately combined with a social hierarchy of color that has been defined by African-American intellectuals of the region as pigmentocracy,[28] in which lighter skin is identified with greater prestige and economic status. Social reward is offered not only for "improving" the race but also for rejecting African identity and assuming European cultural values and criteria of personal beauty.

Central to this problem are the intricacies of discourse around the mulatto woman. Her image as a paragon of beauty in the rosy portrayal of non-racist society has been roundly denounced (Nascimento, 1978; Ramos-Bennett, 1995; Gilliam and Gilliam, 1996; Gilliam, 1998) as a smokescreen and an excuse for sexual exploitation. The ultimate aesthetic ideal in Brazil is really the blue-eyed blonde,[29] who, unlike the mulatto woman, is not stereotyped as easy or loose. As one traditional saying goes: "White ladies for marrying, Black women to do the work, mulatto women to fornicate" (Nascimento, 1977: 46).

The social compulsion to whiteness is a common heritage of colonial regimes, and analysts like Frantz Fanon (1967) and Albert Memmi (1965) have long since revealed its attendant psychological problems. Rather than being seen as one of White supremacism's many faces or as a legacy of colonialism, it is presented as proof positive of Latin anti-racism. The following example (Diegues Junior, 1977) eloquently states the ruling elite's effort to portray Brazil as a White country irrespective of its demographic reality:[30]

... the predominance of the white contingent [of the Brazilian population] is evident, since in Brazil even those of mixed race who have a small or large amount of Negro or Indian blood, but without one of these groups' physical traits, are considered white. Which demonstrates the absence of any discrimination of racial nature, in terms of the person's ethnic origin.

In Brazilian social science, enormous energies are dedicated to this last proposition: there is an essential difference between rejection of African color and rejection of African origin. The hypodescendancy criterion is considered racist, whereas "prejudice of mark," pigmentocracy's color criterion,[31] is taken as arbitrary and innocent, a purely aesthetic aversion to the darker phenotype (Nogueira, 1955,1959). Theorists dissociate African phenotype from African origin and conclude that Latinos evolved a "more benign" form of prejudice, nonracial in nature.[32]

The whitening ideology has posed a demographic quandary[33] by pressuring census interviewees to declare themselves in the lighter of three official color categories: Branco (White), Preto (Black) or Pardo (mulatto). Statisticians recognize the resulting distortion of population statistics, in which "the preto group loses a great deal, the pardo group gains much more than it loses, and the white group gains a lot and loses nothing" (Mortara, 1970: 458).[34] While official statistics put the sum of Pretos and Pardos at 48 percent, estimates that take into account their distortion by the whitening ideal are closer to 70 or 80 percent. The category Pardo, a catchall group used since 1940 to accommodate the extremely subjective classifications used by Brazilians, is widely recognized as awkward and artificial. Yet when interviewees spontaneously classified themselves, the result was citation of 136 different color categories, reflecting the effort of the lighter-skinned not to be classed in the same categories as those any darker in hue (Vieira, 1995: 27).

Undoubtedly, hegemony belongs to Moreno, a term that gives full rein to the subjective wanderings of Brazilian color consciousness. It can be used to describe very dark Black people or very light mestizos, depending upon the point being made. Generally, the point is to get around saying "Black" (Preto or the more popular Escurinho), even if the person in question can be placed in a range of color variations that most certainly indicate African origin.

This brings us to the real nature of the plethora of color designations: euphemism. The pejorative connotation of words like "black" ("negro," "preto," "escuro") make almost any of these expressions traditionally an insult; thus, considerable effort is made politely to avoid them. The generally pejorative notion of Africanness is carefully weeded out of Brazilian national identity except in very specific instances like music, cuisine, religion, and sports. In these cases, it is defined largely by those who did not create it and where it is displayed as "proof" of racial harmony and tolerance of diversity.[35] Since African identity is still vaguely assessed as a threat to national unity, terms intimately associated with Africanity are avoided partly as a matter of citizenship loyalty.[36] Frequent protests that someone is not Black or of African origin, but Brazilian, are heard.

. . . if racism is deemed not to exist, with what legitimacy can its targets' voice be raised?

Voices and Viewpoints

A major consequence of de facto, as opposed to de jure, discrimination is that those excluded lose their voice. Indeed, if racism is deemed not to exist, with what legitimacy can its targets' voice be raised? White spokesmen have assumed and been granted the legitimacy to speak for all. Challenging this procedure traditionally is considered "reverse racism."

The following illustrative exchange (Cadernos Brasileiros, 1968: 70-72) took place between this senior author and Clarival do Prado Valladares, a member of the White Bahian elite who in 1966 represented Brazil at the First International Festival of Black Arts in Dakar and was acting as moderator of a panel on abolition:[37]

Nascimento (N): ... in the Federal Council of Culture, of which the Moderator is one of the members, we do not see one Black representative of black culture.

Valladares (V): But sir, you see in the Federal Council of Culture men very concerned with Negro Culture in Brazil, authors of definitive works.

N: Perfect, but I think the Black people also have the

right, themselves, to advocate their own problems.

V: The Negro in Brazil is not represented only by pigmentation: the Negro in Brazil is Brazil. ... I believe that I have, more than the most pigmented of people, the consciousness of a Brazil with its Negro values; I have struggled for them and also dedicate myself to the biography of those values. ... If the Federal Council of Culture does not have characteristically a Negro by epiderm, it has someone who is zealously vigilant of Negro culture.

N: Perfect. I think that is formidable and I thank Your Excellency, but this precisely confirms the eternal .... process of Brazilian paternalist racism.

That this issue does not belong to an obsolete, if recent, past was graphically driven home in 1996, when the Ministry of Justice sponsored a groundbreaking event on affirmative action.[38] In the plenary sessions, Brazilian "experts" on race relations, nearly all of them White, joined African-American affirmative action specialists from the United States, to present their contributions.[39] Some of the affirmative action specialists (Gilliam, 1998) found themselves uncomfortably sharing the podium with authors publicly contested by the audience, almost exclusively African-Brazilian intellectuals and militants of the Black movement. Prominent anthropologist Roberto da Matta addressed this audience declaring that racial democracy, even though it had not been fully realized, was "a generous idea. ... After all, all of us have had, from childhood, at least one black friend whose affection we have cultivated throughout our lives." The audience might have asked, "all of who?" Da Matta's statement was a crystal clear expression of the racial identity implicitly assumed by "Brazilian society's" spokesmen when considering questions of race, particularly when speaking from the lofty heights of academic authority.

As Ghanaian scholar Anani Dzidzienyo (1995: 355) has observed: "The success of [Afro-Brazilian] struggle ultimately hinges on the legitimacy of a black perspective in national public discourse." (Emphasis added.)

Correcting the Record

Never has the Afro-Brazilian voice been silenced. The history of Africans' fight for freedom and against discrimination in Brazil is intense and extensive, covering the entire national territory and history,[40] albeit excluded from conventional versions still taught in the nation's schools. While this essay is not the place to document this history,[41] a few reparations are in order to restore the balance in favor of the Afro-Brazilian voice.

Whatever the tendency to invoke the "social question" or the color criterion, race is paramount to African Brazilians; the effect of de facto or color discrimination on their living conditions is equivalent to that of de jure or racial discrimination.[42]

More importantly, as Dzidzienyo (1995: 345) notes: "race relations ... can be understood only in the context of the power relations involved. Indeed, it is precisely the dimension of power and its unequal distribution that frames race relations throughout the Americas." Gains won by the Afro-Brazilian movement in the context of power relations are the heart of the next section, in which recent developments are considered.

New Perspectives

In looking at recent tendencies,[43] perhaps the Black movement's most outstanding gain has been progressively legitimating its perspective, namely that the "racial question" is a national issue of citizenship demanding the articulation of specific public policy. Second, while still very far from proportionate, Afro-Brazilian participation in elected and appointed posts of power has increased. Third, racism is viewed increasingly as a question of human rights.

In contrast to the United States and South Africa, where explicit racial oppression gave legitimacy to Black peoples' organized struggles, the racial democracy ideology deprives the dominated population of its base for collective self-defense and self-uplifting. Brazil lacks a tradition of an integrated civil rights movement, a void exacerbated by two major periods of authoritarian rule (1937-1945 and 1964-1985). Mostly White, leftist political leaders fighting to overcome military regimes saw the race question as their last priority and as a threat to the unity of democratic forces.

In 1937, the Brazilian Black Front, a mass civil rights movement based largely in São Paulo (Quilombhoje, 1998), was closed down along with all political parties, banned by the New State Dictatorship in a wave of censorship and repression. In the 1960s, when anti-poverty programs were being implemented in response to the U.S. civil rights movement, Brazil's military dictatorship[44] implemented policies to further concentrate wealth, exacerbating inequality by unleashing brutal repression against opposition forces. Congress was closed in 1968, leftist political leaders went into exile and the race question was defined as a national security matter. Any public discussion was prohibited by decree.

During the two major periods of reorganization of Brazilian democracy (1945-1950 and 1977-1985), Afro-Brazilian

movements were active if largely solitary in their campaigns for policy measures to combat racism. As the New State dictatorship gave way to a Constitutional Assembly in 1945, Black organizations unsuccessfully proposed inclusion of measures against racism in the new national charter (Nascimento and Larkin-Nascimento, 1992, 1998). In the 1970s, Afro-Brazilian organizations proliferated across the country. Yet only very recently, in the 1980s and 1990s, have they found solid support among allies in other social movements.

The women's movement is one example. Lélia González (1986) and other African- Brazilian women have documented their experience in the 1970s with a middle-class feminist movement largely insensitive to the race question. In their view, feminism voiced the concerns of White women whose liberation depended largely on the availability of underpaid domestic labor, mostly by Black women. The role of the feminist movement in creating political space in which to exercise the idea of diversity is undeniable. It is also a fact that many African Brazilian women did political work first within the black movement, where their specific concerns led them to organize independently. From this base, a new and richer encounter ensued between organized Black women's groups and the feminist movement. In 1995, African-Brazilian women took visible part in the delegation to the United Nations Women's Conference in Beijing. Recently, Councils on Women's Rights in local, state and federal governments have been created as a result of women's mobilization, bringing gender-specific public policy into focus. Black women slowly are making dents in the overwhelmingly White Council representation, but their presence is still far from proportionate to their percentage in the female population. Nevertheless, their concerns are being recognized as legitimate specific needs, not only in the Councils but by the women's movement as a whole.

With the rise of the Afro-Brazilian voice came self-definition. Color designations were generally replaced by terms that unite rather than divide, like "afro-brasileiro," "negro" (black), and "afrodescendente" (African-descended). The Afro-Brazilian movement and its allies set the standard of using the sum of the official categories Preto and Pardo to quantify the Black population.[45] Whatever the lingering academic fascination with color categories, the fact is that we have named ourselves and moved on to more important work.

Foremost among recent phenomena is the rise of an Afro-Brazilian movement made up of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community leaders actively engaged in labor unions, political parties, Christian churches, religious communities of African origin, cultural organizations, and so on. Raising the "racial question" in each area, often facing opposition and hostility, the Black movement over time won allies and convinced consciences. Perhaps the most visible expression of this trend was the effective substitution of May 13, the anniversary of slavery's abolition, for November 20, the anniversary of Zumbi's death in defending the Republic of Palmares, as the national day of Afro-Brazilian commemoration.[46] The country has followed this lead since the 1980s; now the media, public and private schools, cultural institutions and neighborhood organizations join in celebrating November 20 as National Black Consciousness Day, a change that demonstrates the power of the united Afro-Brazilian voice.

> . . . the racial democracy ideology deprives the dominated population of its base for collective self-defense and self-uplifting.

Perhaps the most important social movement of recent years is the Landless Movement (MST). Despite its billing as a recent phenomenon, the MST brings back to the fore an issue that mobilized Brazilians in the early 1960s during João Goulart's presidency.[47] Forty years later, land reform is still a need that has become much more than urgent. Afro Brazilians generally will be among the first to gain from land reform, and the MST leadership has at least rhetorically recognized the need to combat racism, making public reference to Zumbi and the Palmares Republic as models and examples of grassroots freedom struggles.

In addition to progressively discrediting the "racial democracy" myth, which nevertheless still carries great weight, the Afro-Brazilian movement has developed independent community action with important impact. One example is the University Admissions Preparation Courses for Blacks and Poor People, which exist in several states and municipalities. The goal is to increase access of young Afro Brazilians and poor people to higher education. Some have succeeded in getting universities to open subsidized admissions for students from these courses.[48]

Afro-Brazilian participation in the halls of power– political parties, elected offices and government agencies– has grown enormously. In 1982, when the first direct elections were held as dusk fell over the military dictatorship, this senior author was the only African Brazilian sent to Congress with a mandate to represent this population.[49]

Today, while by no means approaching what would be proportionate representation, the weight of the Black voice has been increased. Countless administrative appointments as well as the election of two governors and one vice governor,[50] an ever-increasing number of state and city legislators, three senators and enough congressmen brought together in 1997 an incipient Afro-Brazilian Caucus.[51] Pressure brought by the Black movement through its elected representatives influenced Brazil's South Africa policy in the 1980s and 1990s.[52]

In 1982, the idea of administrative policy geared toward attending to specific needs of the Afro-Brazilian population was generally taken as far-fetched and certainly racist. But with the Black movement's growing and increasingly effective mobilization and political presence (Nascimento, 1985), the idea began to evolve. Advisory bodies were created within government structures and agencies in an increasing number of state and city administrations.[53] On the federal level, the Ministry of Culture created an Advisory Group and then a Commission for the Centennial of Slavery's Abolition in 1988, out of which was born the Palmares Cultural Foundation.

In 1988, the Constitutional Congress approved several measures proposed by the Afro-Brazilian community through its Black elected members. Among others, these provisions established racism as a crime without bail or statute of limitations (Art. 5, sec. XLII); determined the demarcation of the lands of contemporary Quilombo communities (Art. 68, Transitional Provisions); announced the pluricultural and multiethnic nature of the country, providing that the State would protect manifestations of Afro-Brazilian culture among others (Art. 215, para. 1); preserved as national patrimony the sites of former Quilombos and their documents (Art. 216, sec. 5); and mandated inclusion of "the contributions of different cultures and ethnicities to the formation of the Brazilian people" in history courses (Art. 242, sec. 1).

Since 1988, promulgation of federal law 7.716 defining the crime of racism, as well as a plethora of state and municipal laws, many in the area of education, have attested to the movement's growing strength (Silva Jr., 1998).

The assistance to Quilombo communities mentioned in the Constitution (Art. 68, Transitional Provisions) is a policy area that illustrates a certain symbiosis between Afro-Brazilian communities, the Black movement and government response. These communities, found throughout the country, suffer precarious living conditions and threats from surrounding landowners encroaching on their lands, ownership of which is often undocumented. Since the 1988 Constitution incorporated this demand of the Black movement, a few have won legal title to their land and some form of assistance (CEN, 1996: 29-31; PR, 1998: 25-28.)

In 1991, Governor Leonel Brizola of Rio de Janeiro State inaugurated the Extraordinary Secretariat for Defense and Promotion of Afro-Brazilian Populations (SEAFRO), the first and only top-level state government agency created to deal specifically with the articulation and implementation of public policy for the Afro-Brazilian community.[54] However, predictably, opposition arose in the State Legislature under the allegation of reverse racism. Challenges to the constitutionality of the administrative law creating the Secretariat prevented its being made a permanent agency, and it was abolished by the succeeding administration.

This fact underlines the hallmark importance of the creation of Belo Horizonte's City Secretariat for Black Community Issues, inaugurated by Mayor Célio de Castro in December 1998.[55] It was approved by the City Legislature as a permanent agency.

Not until the mid-1990s was affirmative action seriously considered. Its first expression in Brazil, a bill for Compensatory Action presented to the House of Deputies (Nascimento, 1983-86, v. 1), was not widely supported or taken to plenary vote. However, the notion of affirmative action began to take hold, and the bill was reintroduced in the Senate in 1997 (Nascimento, 1997-99, v. 1).

In 1995, national and international celebration of the Zumbi's Third Centennial consolidated the enlarged scope of Afro-Brazilian mobilization, demonstrated in the Zumbi dos Palmares March on Brasília Against Racism, in Favor of Citizenship and Life. A Program for Overcoming Racism and Racial Inequality was presented to the President by the march organization's National Executive Committee; it still stands as a basic synthesis of the Black community's demands (CEN, 1996). Perhaps the highest expression of this moment was inscription of Zumbi's name alongside that of independence hero Tiradentes in the national shrine of Brasília's Pantheon of Freedom.[56]

By 1995, discussion and proposal of anti-discriminatory public policies was the order of the day (Munanga, 1996). On the day of the Zumbi March, responding to its demands, the Federal Government created an Interministerial Working Group for Valorization of the Black Population (GTI). Signing the decree creating the GTI (Silva Jr., 1998: 76), the President made an unprecedented official statement (PR, 1998) recognizing the existence of racial discrimination and the need for concrete measures to combat it. The GTI's mandate is to study, formulate, propose, discuss and articulate executive, legislative and judicial anti-discriminatory public policy measures with the

respective government agencies. It also is stimulating private initiative policy, "looking to the development and participation of the Black Population" and "consolidating the Black Population's citizenship."[57]

Underfunded and understaffed, the GTI's prospects for producing significant results are dubious at best. Nevertheless, it has drawn up 46 affirmative action proposals now under government consideration (PR, 1998: 62). One of its most important potential functions will be to enlarge the range of government agencies involved in anti-discrimination policy measures. The Strategic Matters Secretariat held an event on affirmative action, and the Army Ministry has been approached for the reforestation of the site of Palmares, various needs of the Quilombo communities and demarcation of their lands (PR, 1998: 76-77).

Among the most outstanding developments in recent federal government policy is the creation within the Ministry of Justice of the National Human Rights Program (PNDH). It works closely with the GTI and includes in its Proposals for Governmental Action a section on the Black Population made up of 22 short-, medium- and long-term goals (PNDH, 1998: 61). These proposals include support for "positive discrimination" and "compensatory policies" to combat racial inequality and to improve the Afro-Brazilian community's socio-economic status. Indeed, the GTI sponsored a series of seminars on affirmative action, and the Ministry of Justice organized an international event as well.[58]

That the need for affirmative action is being discussed in government circles is an enormous step forward. Unfortunately, the President himself has contributed to the general bias against affirmative action by identifying it with quotas and alleging that it "implies ignoring the evaluation of merit" (PR, 1998: 29-30). This notion is foremost in Brazilian society's resistance to anti-discrimination policy.

Major labor unions have fought this resistance by breaking the traditional leftist taboo that raising the racial discrimination issue would divide the working class. They have created internal agencies whose literature supports anti-discrimination policy (CUT/CNCDR, 1997, 1998).

This development led workers' organizations in 1994 to bring a case before the International Labor Organization (ILO) for noncompliance with Convention no. 111 on Employment Discrimination, ratified by Brazil in 1965. Responding to the ILO citation, Brazil requested technical cooperation. In 1996, the Labor Ministry instituted its Working Group for the Elimination of Employment and Occupation Discrimination (GTEDEO),[59] a tripartite body created with ILO technical support for implementation of Brazil's commitments under ILO Convention no. 111. A Multidisciplinary Working Group was created within the Ministry to "incorporate the question of discrimination into routine actions and activities" (PNDH, 1998). One of the major questions it has addressed is the promotion of equality through collective bargaining (MTb/OIT, 1998). Whether the Working Group will institute concrete measures beyond consciousness raising is an open question.

Inclusion of measures to advance actions against racism in the National Human Rights Program not only characterizes racial inequality as a question of human rights but also characterizes non-discrimination as a citizenship right.[60] In a clear expression of this trend, the Rio de Janeiro State administration, inaugurated in January 1999, created a Secretariat for Human Rights and Citizenship with a policy emphasis on racial inequality.

Strategies and Opportunities

In considering strategies and opportunities, we will divide the discussion into three parts. First we will consider the substance of anti-discrimination policy in Brazil, then the general policy context into which it needs to be inserted. Finally, we will evaluate strategies favoring effective implementation of anti-discrimination policy.

1. Anti-discrimination Policy: Substance

Space limitations prevent detailing each public policy proposal, but certain areas of emphasis are objects of general consensus. The first is acquisition of skills (occupational, technical and academic) and training for anti-discrimination work. In an increasingly technological economy, job and pay discrimination must be combated not only with target programs raising the pertinent issues in the workplace but also with training, specialization and development of labor skills. Moreover, consolidation of recent gains and development of new proposals for anti-discrimination work will be possible only with the training and multiplication of capable community leaders. Programs of this nature are an important initiative.[61]

Intimately linked to this is the second priority: education. Inequality is less a question of initial access to school and more of the means to stay there. Thus, the fight against child labor is primary; it has been addressed in some areas[62] by state aid to families for each child kept in the classroom. Closely associated is the need to educate young people and adults to compensate for earlier lack of schooling and to reduce illiteracy. Education efforts must also include technical and occupational training as well as secondary and university level education. Specific college preparation and admissions programs are needed, including but not limited to existing community efforts and coop-

eration between universities and NGOs. Public policy must address the need for Afro-Brazilian access to higher education, compensating losses resulting from recent restriction of tax benefits that made possible subsidized college admissions. Also crucial are the reformulation of curricula, an issue partly addressed by development of the new National Curriculum Parameters (MEC, 1998) and critical review of schoolbooks and children's literature, a project partially implemented by the Ministry of Education.

A third priority is communications media. The enormous impact of television and radio on individual and group identity development in modern society is well known. The racist tendencies of Brazilian telecommunications programming were graphically underscored in 1979, when Angola's state television corporation sought partnership with Brazil. The new African state was forced to decline the offer of one of Brazilian Educational TV's most popular programs, based on a traditional children's literature classic,[63] because its racist stereotyping rendered it unfit for viewing by African children. Most Brazilians take the stereotyping so much for granted that they hardly understood the problem. Pressure from the Afro-Brazilian movement has resulted in some, but not enough, reformulation by television networks.[64] The Palmares Cultural Foundation and the GTI established a partnership with the federal government's TVE, producing mini-documentaries, mini-series and programs. The current federal administration has a stated policy to include in its publicity images all groups making up the Brazilian multiracial population. Further efforts must be made to promote the elimination of discrimination in the private telecommunications sector. The specter of censorship, the almost absolute power of one broadcasting monopoly, and the continued prevalence of the "racial democracy" myth (and its corollary aversion to the "politically correct") have fortified a general state of lethargy.

Specific health programs directed to the Black population must take into account not only genetically linked diseases (sickle cell anemia) but those with higher incidence and more concentrated health impact on African Brazilians (mioma, hypertension, occupational diseases). Health issue campaigns (e.g., AIDS, leprosy) designed to reach the Afro-Brazilian public are needed as well as sewage, sanitation and preventive public health care in Afro-Brazilian communities. The current federal administration has taken small steps in the first two areas through seminars and training initiatives for health workers (PR, 1998: 62-71). However, the state of the public health system is deplorable, and monies raised by the special tax levied specifically to fund health care are being flagrantly diverted to other uses (ITM, 1998; Roque and Corrêa, 1998).

As for police violence, experience in São Paulo and in Rio de Janeiro during SEAFRO's existence included courses on discrimination and human rights in police training programs, consciousness-raising campaigns, and creation of special police agencies. This is particularly sticky terrain since the police institution is replete with Brazilians of African descent who have internalized racist stereotypes and are less sensitive than hostile to the issues raised by Afro-Brazilian NGOs and human rights organizations (Silva, 1994).

Finally, the economic base of the Afro-Brazilian community cannot continue to be composed of jobs alone. Except in the Southeast region (particularly São Paulo and, to a lesser extent, Rio de Janeiro), independent Black-owned business is close to nonexistent; the need to stimulate and support the strengthening of Afro-Brazilian capacity to build a sustainable capital base is paramount. Cooperation among African-Brazilian and African-American or African business is a promising perspective.[65]

One problem crosscuts all these areas: the need for reliable data to formulate public policies and evaluate their impact. Inclusion of information on race or color in birth and death certificates and other vital records, hospital and other institutional records, employee records, official documents, etc., is a chief concern (CEN, 1996; Munanga, 1996; PNDH, 1998).

Several forceful suggestions are being negotiated with the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) as it gears up for the 2000 census (Sant'Anna, 1998): that the census item "color" be associated with one on "origin"; that the "pardo" category be reviewed, and the term "negro" (Black) used to complement classifications by color (preta/negra) and origin (negra/africana); that the racial/ethnic composition of the population be recorded in the whole population and not just in samples, as has been the case to date; and that census takers be trained to deal with the race/color question.

2. General Policy Perspectives

While recent advances are considerable, they are far from adequate to deal with the enormous dimensions of inequality in Brazil. In evaluating strategies, three main issues are central. First, the limitations of government action are enormous, particularly at the federal level. Second, the effectiveness of partnership depends on how well citizens watch as NGOs critically evaluate the progress and effectiveness of government policy on all levels. Third, Brazilian society still strongly resists anti-discrimination programs and the very discussion of racism as an issue. More broadly, it also resists discussion and action on human rights itself, a proposition generally identified with the idea of pampering criminals.

Two dynamically related dimensions emerge: the need to strengthen the voice of NGOs to influence government action and the need to shift government priority in the direction of effective policies that eliminate inequality. Policy restructuring is needed on two fronts: 1) policies to combat hunger, poverty, income inequality and inequalities in general living conditions (housing, health care, education, sanitation, running water), and 2) policies that deal directly with racial inequality (such as those discussed in the previous subsection).

The first group of policies would specifically benefit African Brazilians, by far the majority of the poor and needy. However, it has been amply demonstrated (ITM, 1998; Roque and Corrêa, 1998) that macroeconomic policies recently approved by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and pursued by the federal government are entirely inadequate for reaching this goal. Monetary stabilization based on maintenance of the highest interest rates in the world (around 50 percent), fiscal reform anchored in privatization of lucrative state enterprises and the general dismantling of the state, cuts in social spending and massive dismissal of civil servants, denationalization of the economy and concentration of capital, stimulation of imports against exports– all these policies result in stagnation, unemployment and corrosion of national productive capacity. This occurs in a context of cuts in government-provided services, particularly the already underfunded and deteriorating public health and education systems. Monies unavailable in the federal budget are improvised by imposing supposedly temporary levies like the CPMF,[66] while official budget money is used to support failing banks.[67] Social security and pension benefits, whose real value has diminished, are now further taxed and restricted. The current devaluation crisis only underscores the artificiality of this administration's much-applauded "success" in combating inflation; it was already clear in 1997/98 that overall inequality indexes had increased since 1993 (Roque and Corrêa, 1998) and that these policies favored transnational capital rather than Brazilian enterprise, economy or employment (Salomão and Gonçalves, 1998).

Macroeconomic strategies favoring growth are not enough to reverse this situation; policies supporting national production and export are needed. Land and agrarian reform are urgent, immediate needs, including restriction of impunity in rural violence. Implementation of minimum income programs is imperative. Since 1991, two bills proposing minimum income programs were introduced in Congress; neither has reached a vote. Of 80 state and municipal programs proposed, four are in effect, only one on a permanent basis.[68] If minimum income proposals meet resistance, hope is small indeed for complementary redistributive programs, the need for which is evident in the extremes of inequality exhibited by Brazil.

Continuation of the work of NGOs monitoring economic policies is crucial, particularly the initiatives taken in the context of the Social Development Watch program associated with the United Nations (ITM, 1998).

3. Strategies for Implementation of Anti-discrimination Policy

As for the second group of policies, those dealing with racial inequalities, their positive effect will necessarily be limited in this overall context. Indeed, the PNDH (1998:45) virtually admits this fact by announcing that its work will emphasize civil rights in a context where social and economic rights are severely restricted by social inequality and probably will remain so.

> Brazilian society still strongly resists anti-discrimination programs and the very discussion of racism. . .

Nevertheless, specific programs responding to the organized Afro-Brazilian community's demands and addressing public policy directed to racial inequality cannot be ignored. A symbiotic relationship has grown between the action of Afro-Brazilian militants and NGOs on the one hand and government policy on the other. The language and measures adopted by government agencies and in laws have been developed largely by the influence of movement NGOs, intellectuals and activists directly participating in their formulation or indirectly contributing through actions and writings. However, their capacity to effectively monitor the concrete application of these measures is severely limited by lack of financial means, personnel and infrastructure.

Thus, important strategies for the Afro-Brazilian movement will be: securing sufficient political weight to guarantee the continuity of the gains made in state policy, including the maintenance and development of government agencies and programs already created at municipal, state and federal levels;[69] involving new government resources (infrastructure, personnel, agencies) in anti-discrimination programs; and implementing effective legislation. The greatest challenge will be overcoming societal resistance to human rights and affirmative action policies.

Further empowerment of Afro-Brazilian organizations themselves must accompany these strategies, for the effec-

tiveness of government agencies' work depends on critical and cooperative participation of labor unions, professional organizations, NGOs and community groups. They in turn must use the agencies' existence and the material they produce to legitimate and advance the goals of local programs. Indeed, the most visible result of agencies' work to date has been production of useful material (e.g. PNDH, 1998; PR, 1998; MTb/ OIT, 1998; MEC, 1998).

Among the most formidable obstacles to effective policy change is the lack of strong, well-organized political parties capable of translating the demands of social movements into executive and legislative action. Democracy in Brazil is greatly impaired by the continued power of corrupt local strongmen and entrenched elites.

The role of anti-discrimination law has been questioned (Dzidzienyo, 1995) in a society where the existence of rhetorical but ineffective legal norms has never guaranteed racial equality. The laws inscribed in the new Brazilian social order have a definite role but not as a result of their effective enforcement. Rather, they constitute a resource and a weapon in the hands of organized civil society to help implement the victories it has won that result in formulation of state policy. Also, legislation reflects progress in and tools to continue the task of overcoming societal resistance to the need for anti-discrimination measures. The international context is particularly important in this respect: the already visible action taken to implement ILO Convention 111 can be seen as a model for new initiatives.

In the end, the role of community organizations undoubtedly will remain a strategic imperative. It will be, as it has been, the African-Brazilian people themselves who push governmental and non-governmental institutions toward measures to build equality.

Perhaps in this respect, the "racial democracy" myth can be seen optimistically as a relative takeoff advantage. In societies where civil rights victories have changed institutional structures, the difficulties in denouncing and combating discrimination tend to become similar to those faced by the Afro-Brazilian movement to date. Denial of the racial nature of inequalities, appropriation by conservative forces of the discourse of equality, and allegations that anti-discrimination policy constitutes "reverse racism" led one of the present authors years ago to question whether post-Bakke[70] forms of discrimination in the United States were similar to Brazilian ones (Larkin-Nascimento, 1980). Similarly, democratic South Africa is now facing the need for state policy to address de facto racial inequalities with the legal structures of apartheid no longer intact; the demands of those excluded are urgent indeed. These situations are familiar to Afro-Brazilian activists, who insist upon devising ways to gain ground nevertheless.

In Brazil, the "racial democracy" legacy renders as onerous as in the United States the burden of proof of discrimination required to justify or generate public policy, while condoning the non-accountability of White society for past racism observed in the United States by our colleague Charles Hamilton (pp. 89-91). Likewise, the cynical stigma he observes against the "politically correct" is prevalent here. These elements may be countered in South Africa by the vivid memory and international condemnation of apartheid, which leave less room for doubt as to the need for and basic fairness of affirmative action policy. More important, however, is the political dimension: as the voting and party majority in South Africa, Africans are formulating and carrying out public policy. By its nature, this situation implies that limitations imposed by the political power equation are less constraining than in the United States or Brazil. Thus, while the Afro-Brazilian movement has made great gains, it is still true here, as in the United States, that "... race relations are simply not a top priority on the national agenda" (Hamilton, pp. 89-91). To the extent that the African-Brazilian majority overcomes the effects of the racial democracy taboo, it will place its concerns increasingly on that agenda. But there is still, indeed, a long road to walk.

Directions

While the dance of deception still carries great weight in social relations of everyday life, it seems certain that Brazil is moving toward a time when invocations of its multiracial nature will be reformulated in terms that reflect a legitimate Afro-Brazilian self-definition. Political action has resulted in victories including substantive changes in government policy, legislation, and academic evaluation. These actions further strengthen the Afro-Brazilian voice, which increasingly has commanded its own choreography in partnership with organized civil society. Undoubtedly, this development is changing the face of Brazilian society and its discourse. While eradication of inequality is still a remote possibility, recognition of the need to address its specific dimensions is a necessary step toward making viable the policies necessary to achieve that goal.

Conclusion

W.E.B. DuBois announced in 1903 that this would be the century of the color line. Indeed, these hundred years have witnessed the worldwide efforts of Africans to end the

sundry forms of domination that characterize racism, colonialism and their legacies lately expressed in neo-liberalism and globalization. Africans worldwide played a crucial role in the development of international human rights and of international law and solidarity. The rise and progress of these two tendencies has marked the world indelibly.

The new millennium will increasingly witness the rise of the Afro-Brazilian voice and that of African peoples in the Americas, Asia and Africa. Their participation in human development will doubtlessly demonstrate the force and weight of their potential to overcome the obstacles of race discrimination.

APPENDIX

The following tables present additional data on racial inequalities in Brazil.

Table 20: Sanitation and Electricity Conditions, 1996

	Treated Water	Sewage System	Septic Tank	Garbage Collection	Electricity
Brazil	74.2	40.3	23.3	87.4	92.9
Urban North	59.7	8.9	39.7	64.7	96.8
Northeast	56.2	15.3	22.4	72.9	81.7
Southeast	86.5	69.0	13.9	92.9	97.8
South	77.0	14.0	52.6	95.6	96.8
Central-West	65.5	15.0	11.3	89.2	93.2

Source: PNAD, 1996; percent of domiciles with service.

Table 21: "Miserable Poverty" by Color and Sex, 1988

Head of Family's Sex	Color		
	White	Preto	Pardo
Male	14.6	30.5	36.2
Female	15.4	28.9	34.9

Source: IBGE/PNAD, 1988; special compilations, courtesy of Nelson do Valle Silva/IUPERJ; percent of each group; see Table 9 for definition of "miserable poverty."

Table 22: "Miserable Poverty" by Color and Educational Level

Head of Family's Educational Level	Color		
	White	Preto	Pardo
No schooling/ less than 1 year	35.0	45.9	53.9
1 & 2 years	25.5	34.5	42.3
3 & 4 years	13.3	21.4	26.4
5 & 8 years	8.1	13.5	16.2
9 years & more	1.4	2.9	5.3

Source: Ibid.

Table 23: "Miserable Poverty" by Color and Number of Dependents, 1988

Number of Dependents in Family	Color		
	White	Preto	Pardo
0	4.2	9.4	10.2
1	6.2	11.1	15.6
2	8.5	17.6	20.9
3	13.1	27.4	30.9
4	21.3	38.6	40.9
5	31.5	42.8	54.3
6	46.9	65.1	60.7
7 to 10	65.8	75.1	71.0
11 and more	88.0	95.2	84.2

Source: Ibid.

Table 24: "Miserable Poverty" by Color and Age of Head of Family, 1988

Age of Head of Family	Color		
	White	Preto	Pardo
Up to 29	14.6	31.0	32.1
30 to 39	15.6	34.2	39.1
40 to 49	14.9	30.5	39.0
50 to 59	12.5	24.6	29.3
60 or more	12.7	23.7	29.8

Source: Ibid.

Table 25: Percent of Positive Responses to the Question: "Have you ever worked?" by Sex and Color

Age	Men			Women		
	White	Preto	Pardo	White	Preta	Parda
9	6.2	12.3	12.0	0.0	3.0	2.5
10	9.5	9.6	26.4	3.5	1.5	7.0
11	8.9	2.2	28.4	5.6	0.0	9.2
12	18.8	26.6	34.1	7.3	15.1	14.6
13	27.6	30.9	51.5	20.7	28.2	19.0
14	32.0	45.1	19.8	23.3	26.2	20.4
15	39.0	48.9	60.5	23.9	26.8	34.6
16	57.4	75.1	70.9	34.0	60.4	37.9

Source: PPV, 1996/97; compiled by Nelson do Valle Silva/IUPERJ; courtesy of Nelson do Valle Silva/IUPERJ.

END NOTES

1 Ivan Van Sertima (1976) provides a detailed, minutely researched presentation of this circumstance.

2 Excluding Alaska and Hawaii.

3 In square miles, Brazil's area is 3,286,470 as opposed to South Africa's 471,442.

4 Celebrated expression of Pero Vaz de Caminha, scribe of Pedro Álvares Cabral, in the first letter written to the Portuguese Court from Porto Seguro (in what is now Bahia State).

5 English-language title of Nelson Pereira dos Santos' classic film *Vidas Secas* on life in the poorest desertified areas of the Brazilian Northeast.

6 World Bank, *World Development Report*, 1999-2000.

7 We have always taken the stand that race is not a biological but a socially and culturally constructed reality, which makes it no less grounded in fact. What changes is the scientific location of the fact (social rather than biological).

8 The train and bus station serving the Rio de Janeiro metropolitan area made famous by the award-winning film *Central do Brasil*.

9 São João de Meriti, Duque de Caxias, Nova Iguaçu, Belford Roxo, Nilópolis. The data cited are taken from the report of the World Health Organization Seminar held in São Paulo (1991).

10 Literature supporting this kind of analysis ranges from works like Gilberto Freyre's sustaining the notions of "racial democracy" and "Lusotropicalism" (1940, 1946, 1963, 1959) or Donald Pierson's *Negroes in Brazil* (1967) to Oracy Nogueira's notion (1955, 1959) of "prejudice of mark" as opposed to that of "origin," which grounded the aesthetic prejudice theory. Other expressions of this line of thought, emerging from the political and ideological left, emphasized that indictment of racial discrimination would constitute a peril to the harmonious unity of the working class.

11 Florestan Fernandes (1964, 1972); Carlos Hasenbalg (1979); Lúcia Elena Garcia de Oliveira, Rosa Maria Porcaro and Tereza Cristina N. Araújo (1981); Nelson do Valle Silva (1998); contributors to Peggy Lovell's study (1991).

12 Possibly, the extremely high Gini index in the Central-West region reflects the concentration there of the Native Brazilian Indian population.

13 Oliveira, Porcaro and Araújo, 1981; Gonzalez, 1986; PNDH, 1998; IBGE, 1994. In São Paulo, the most highly developed city in the nation, White workers' average hourly wage according to the 1980 IBGE Census was equivalent to less than 48 U.S. cents; for Blacks it was less than 25 cents.

14 Oliveira, Porcaro and Araújo, 1981; Gonzalez, 1986; Lovell, 1991; Silva, 1998.

15 Health indicators are not generally available by race or color. Official data on medical visits to health care facilities (IBGE, 1999) show that "in the North Region only one annual visit per inhabitant can be accounted for, [while] in Southeast Region this average is 2.8 visits per inhabitant per year, bearing evidence that there are strong regional inequalities in the distribution." As for the availability of hospital beds, "The North Region (with 2.3 beds per 1,000 inhabitants) and the Northeast Region (with 3.1) are not as well served as the Southeast, South and Central West Regions, with over 4 beds per 1,000 inhabitants."

16 Countless incidents of job discrimination also are left undocumented by victims or witnesses who judge it more expedient not to confront the issue for fear of offending the discriminator and suffering some consequence, such as losing the inferior pay or position offered, or being taken to the courts in lawsuit for slander.

17 Having already presented the normal documents, Rio de Janeiro City Councilwoman Jurema Batista's official City Council identification recently was refused upon one of these extraordinary demands. The incidents cited are taken from a collection of newspaper clippings from 1997 and 1998 furnished by CEAP.

18 Maroon societies or communities founded by escaped and rebellious slaves or ex-slaves.

19 Such proposals go back to early colonial times and were subscribed by Latin abolitionists. Fray Alonso de Sandoval defended whitening as the solution to the "black stain" in his 1627 work *El Mundo de la Esclavitud Negra en América* (Bogotá: Empresa Nacional, 1956). José Antonio Saco, eminent 19th century Cuban historian, exclaimed: "We have no choice but to whiten, to whiten, to whiten, and so to make ourselves respectable." (apud. Larkin-Nascimento, 1981:130).

20 Both the "black race" and "*métis*" (mixed-bloods) are cited textually in the delegate's statement.

21 Gomes (1995) studies the revelation of such stereotypes in anthropological and anthropometric technique implanted in Rio de Janeiro and Bahia police institutes in the 1930s.

22 *Terreiros* of Candomblé, Xangô, Macumba and other African-derived religions as well as Catholic brotherhoods.

23 Pierson (1967: 45,76) characterized slavery in Brazil as "ordinarily a mild form of servitude."

24 A classic expression of this conscience and its irony before his-

torical fact is the following statement made by Brazilian diplomat José Sette Câmara (1974: 14) at a time when international authorities were reviewing abundant evidence of racist atrocities committed by the Portuguese in African colonies seeking independence: "Portuguese colonialism is different. The absence of racial discrimination, the ease of miscegenation, the disposition of the colonial Whites to stay, to grow and prosper with their new lands, exist in the Portuguese [African] colonies as they existed in Brazil. The Africans themselves recognize all these positive peculiarities of Portuguese colonization."

[25] A fine example of this discourse comes from the ranks of Brazilian diplomacy. Ambassador Guilherme Figueiredo (1975) describes Brazil to the largely African audience of a Seminar against Apartheid as a multiracial country "free of racial problems," race mixture having "prevented the problems of racial discrimination" from existing. He contrasts Brazil's "anti-racist formation, its miscegenation" to the United States, whose 25 million Blacks he judges to be "almost without mixture, almost always pure."

[26] Nascimento, 1977, 1978, 1980; Carneiro, 1997; Sant'Anna, 1998; Gilliam, 1998. The objective of Iberian colonialism being to extract wealth rather than to settle a homeland, White women were not initially brought from Europe. African women became the permanent and compulsorily available sexual property of White masters, perhaps in greater numbers but exactly as they did in segregationist White settler regimes like South Africa and the United States.

[27] Such sleight of hand is found today in commonplace encounters with innocent White Brazilians: "Me, racist? When I was a baby, I nursed at the breast of a black nanny..."

[28] Report of the 2nd Congress of Black Culture in the Americas (Panama, 1982).

[29] Beauty contests traditionally exclude Black and mulatto women, hence the initiative of the Black Experimental Theater in the 1940s and 1950s to organize beauty contests among them (Nascimento, 1997).

[30] In 1966, the Ministry of Foreign Relations published an English-language introductory book titled *Brazil* 1966, in which it informed, under the heading "Color: the majority of the Brazilian population is made up of Whites, the percentage of persons of mixed blood being minute."

[31] The "one drop" rule: any amount of African blood classifies one as Black.

[32] Suggestion that the color criterion, grounded in rejecting non-European peoples and extolling whiteness, is deemed an implicitly imperialist kind of reverse racism favored by African-Americans from the United States. See the exchanges among Fry (1995), Hanchard (1994, 1996) and Gilliam (1998).

[33] This is true not only in Brazil but also in other "Latin" countries (Larkin-Nascimento, 1980).

[34] In a survey (Hasenbalg and Silva, 1993) where interviewers classed respondents according to the traditional census categories "*brancos*," "*pretos*" and "*pardos*," the respondents also classed themselves substituting the options "*mulato*" and "*moreno*" for "*pardo.*" Less than half of those identified as *Pretos* so classed themselves; 18.3 percent declared themselves White, and 28.9 percent said they were mulattos.

[35] While the living, dynamic weight of Afro-Brazilian cultural influence on the country is cited routinely to support racial democracy theories, Dzidzienyo (1995: 348) remarks: "Here lies a fascinating contradiction: between the incorporation into the legitimate national arena of erstwhile African-derived religious, cultural, and social traditions once considered societally or politically subversive because of their 'primitive' provenance, and the absence of a corresponding insertion of Afro-Latin Americans into areas and structures of power and privilege from which they have traditionally been excluded."

[36] An interesting example is the controversy around the martial art of capoeira, which involves a whole school of thought, called *regionalista* that rejects out of hand the idea of capoeira's African origin, claiming it was developed wholly in Brazil. When asked why capoeira could not have an African origin, one *regionalista* stated to this junior author that "everything seems to come from outside, don't we have the right for at least one thing to be Brazilian?"

[37] On the qualification of Brazil's representation at this festival, see Abdias do Nascimento, "Open Letter to the First World Festival of Negro Arts," *Présence Africaine* English edition 30: 58 (1966).

[38] The International Seminar on Multiculturalism and Racism: the Role of Affirmative Action in Contemporary Democratic Societies (Brasilia, July 1996).

[39] Credit should be given to Professor Hélio Santos, Dr. Carlos Moura and others who made efforts, to some extent successful, to have African Brazilians included in the program.

[40] Moura (1972), Freitas (1982, 1985), Lima (1981), Morel (1979), Nascimento and Larkin-Nascimento (1992, 1997).

[41] See the essay "Reflections on the Afro-Brazilian Movement, 1928-1997," prepared by the present authors for the Comparative Human Rights Initiative (Nascimento and Larkin-Nascimento, 1997).

[42] This fact was driven home in a much-discussed incident in 1993, when Ana Flávia Peçanha de Azeredo was barred from the social elevator on racial grounds (Veja, July 7, 1993). A light-skinned mulatto and daughter of Albuíno Azeredo, then governor of Espírito Santo State, she was barred as Black– "*negra*"– and identified herself as Black. Her social status made it clear that this was not a case of racially neutral "social" discrimination against the poor. This incident led to much academic discussion around the color criterion versus hypodescendancy in Brazil (Hanchard, 1994b; Fry, 1995; Hanchard, 1996).

[43] For a more detailed account of this material, see Nascimento and Larkin-Nascimento, 1997.

[44] In 1964, President João Goulart was deposed in a U.S.-supported military coup that became viciously repressive, especially after the Institutional Act of 1968. In 1985, the Congress chose the first civilian president in indirect election, but democracy was not fully re-established until direct presidential elections were held in 1989.

[45] The need for statistical information was seen to outweigh in importance the distortions attributed to the whitening factor.

46 May 13th is now defined as a day of reflection on the false nature of abolition. Zumbi was the last elected leader (king) of the Republic of Palmares, a conglomeration of maroons – quilombos– located in the Brazilian Northeast (today's State of Alagoas). With a peak population of about thirty thousand, enormous for the period (1595 to 1695), Palmares repeatedly fought off Portuguese, Dutch, and Brazilian colonial expeditionary forces sent to destroy it over the century during which it existed. Beyond its opposition to the institutions of slavery and colonial rule, Palmares is also a paradigm of the efforts of Africans collectively to reconstruct their lives in freedom in the Americas in organized economic, social, cultural, and political communities. Price, 1996; Moura, 1972; Nascimento, 1989.

47 During Goulart's administration, democratic and grassroots social movements were very active and land reform was one among several major social programs envisioned by the government in the effort to respond to these movements' demands.

48 In Rio de Janeiro, the Pontifical Catholic University and others offered some 200 tuition grants.

49 These elections were for the federal Congress, state governors, and local and state legislatures. The indirect presidential election was held in 1985; Tancredo Neves, elected by the Congress, died days before his inauguration, and Vice President-elect José Sarney took office in his place. Nascimento's campaign in 1982 gave absolute priority to the representation of African people's interests: the fight against racism and racial discrimination and the articulation of positive measures benefiting Afro-Brazilians. His activity in Parliament (1983-1987) maintained these aims as priorities. As Federal Congressman, he presented bills of law proposing affirmative action programs and making racial discrimination a crime with severe sanctions; he also proposed that Brazil end diplomatic and commercial relations with the Apartheid regime in South Africa and in the Afro-Brazilian social movement, over the long run, to the creation of the Palmares Cultural Foundation. Before he took office, there had been members of the Brazilian Congress who could be classed as "African Brazilian" but who did not recognize or identify themselves as such. Instead, they "passed" as whites and represented the interests of the elite or advocated the class struggle in general, denying the existence of racism and the need for anti-discrimination or affirmative action measures in Brazil. In contrast, among the very few African Brazilian legislators who have taken office after Nascimento left the Chamber of Deputies in 1987, most did and do identify themselves as Black and support measures to combat racism.

50 Governors Albuíno Azeredo of Espírito Santo and Alceu Collares of Rio Grande do Sul were elected by the PDT in 1990. Former Senator Benedita da Silva of Rio de Janeiro took office as Vice Governor in January 1999.

51 This Caucus has met informally but has not yet developed concerted action on concrete issues.

52 Nascimento, 1985; see also *Afrodiaspora* 2, 3, 4, and 5 (Rio de Janeiro: IPEAFRO, 1983-86).

53 The first of these advisory bodies was the São Paulo State Council on Participation and Development of the Black Community, instituted in 1984 by Governor Franco Montoro.

54 Among its actions were the constitution of a Specialized Police Agency for Crimes of Racism, a public service for attending complaints of victims of racism, workshops and technical training in diversity sensitivity for Military Police, the Strength of Youth project of occupational training for adolescents, teacher training programs in different regions of the State for affirmative educational policy with respect to African and Afro-Brazilian history and culture, and publication of material for use in such programs (Larkin-Nascimento, 1993, 1994).

55 Secretary Diva Moreira and Adjunct Subsecretary Maria Mazzarella Rodrigues are both militants of Black community movements.

56 Implementing Senator Benedita da Silva's Bill of Law 27/1995 to this effect (Silva, 1997), Zumbi's name was inscribed on March 21, 1997. The Pantheon of Freedom is a museum located on the Capitol Square (Praça dos Três Poderes) where the Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary branches are seated. The shrine, called the Gallery of National Heroes, contains a huge book sculpted in bronze, whose pages had been inscribed only with the name of Tiradentes himself.

57 Presidential Decrees of November 20, 1995, and February 7, 1996 (Silva Jr., 1998: 76-81). The decree makes specific mention of competency to act in the areas of research, study and publication of statistics and other information; mobilization of new resources for programs and initiatives benefiting the Black population and optimization of their use; and Black presence in the communications media. The GTI is composed of eight Black movement representatives working with members from nine Federal Ministries.

58 International Seminar on Multiculturalism and Racism: the Role of Affirmative Action in Contemporary Democratic Societies (Brasilia, July 1996).

59 Presidental Decree of March 20, 1996 (Silva Jr., 1998: 82-83).

60 "The Program will deal with *obstacles to full citizenship* that lead to systematic violation of rights." PNDH, 1998: 45, emphasis added.

61 The Palmares Cultural Foundation sponsored a pioneer course in Capacitation in Public Administration for the Afro-Brazilian Community (Brasília, November 1998).

62 For example, Brasília, the Federal District.

63 Monteiro Lobato's *Sítio do Pica-Pau Amarelo*.

64 See the essays by Antônio Carlos Arruda da Silva and Sueli Carneiro in Munanga, 1996: 121-139.

65 I Fórum Empresarial das Afro-Américas: Brasil-EUA. Explorando Oportunidades num Mundo Globalizado. Coletivo de Empresários Afro-Brasileiros, Universidade do Estado da Bahia, Morehouse College. Mimeo, 1999.

66 Contribuição Provisória sobre Movimento Financeiro (CPMP) is a tax on financial transactions intended to fund the public health system.

67 In 1995-97, the federal government rescued many banks whose outrageously high profit margins had been sustained by financial speculation in an inflationary economy.

[68] Belo Horizonte, Campinas and Vitória are cities with provisional programs benefiting families with children up to 14 years of age, providing a monthly per capita income of R$40.00 (about US$30.00) with the proviso that the children stay in school. Brasília, the Federal District, has a permanent program reaching about 25,000 families.

[69] Brazilian politics are marked by a powerful tradition: incoming administrations tend to eradicate the work of their rivals leaving office, dismantling state agencies and policies created and starting over anew.

[70] In the Bakke case (1976), a White medical student alleged reverse discrimination to strike down an affirmative action university admissions policy and won in the U.S. Supreme Court. This case was a landmark, ushering in an era of discrediting and dismantling affirmative action based largely upon their characterization as "reverse racism."

ABBREVIATIONS

CAAS – Center of African-American Studies.

CEAP – Centro de Articulação das Populações Marginalizadas (Center for Articulation of Marginal Populations, Rio de Janeiro).

CEDEPLAR -Centro de Desenvolvimento e Planejamento Regional (Center for Regional Planning and Development), UFMG.

CEN – Comissão Executiva Nacional, Marcha Zumbi dos Palmares contra o Racismo, a Favor da Cidadania e da Vida (National Executive Committee, Zumbi dos Palmares March Against Racism, in Favor of Citizenship and Life).

CEPAL – Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean.

CHRI – Comparative Human Relations Initiative, Southern Education Foundation.

CNDH – Comissão Nacional de Direitos Humanos (National Human Rights Committee).

CUT – Central Única dos Trabalhadores (Unified Workers' Central).

EPPG – Escola de Políticas Públicas e Governo (Public Policy and Government School), UFRJ.

FASE – Fundação de Órgãos para Assistência Social e Educacional (Foundation for Social and Education Assistance Agencies).

FFCL/USP – Faculdade de Filosofia, Ciências e Letras (Faculty of Philosophy, Science and Letters), USP.

GTEDEO – Grupo de Trabalho para a Eliminação da Discriminação no Emprego e na Ocupação, Working Group for the Elimination of Employment and Occupation Discrimination), MTb.

GTI – Grupo de Trabalho Interministerial para Valorização da População Negra (Interministerial Working Group for Valuing the Black Population), Ministry of Justice.

IBGE – Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics).

ILO – International Labor Organization.

IPEA – Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (Institute of Applied Economic Research.

IPEAFRO – Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Afro-Brasileiros (Afro-Brazilian Studies and Research Institute, Rio de Janeiro).

IPHAN -– Instituto do Patrimônio Histórico e Artístico Nacional (National Artistic and Historical Patrimony Institute).

ITM – Instituto del Tercer Mundo (Third World Institute), Montevideo, Uruguay.

IUPERJ – Instituto Universitário de Pesquisas do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (University Research Institute of Rio de Janeiro).

MEC – Ministry of Education and Culture, now the Ministry of Education.

MINC -– Ministry of Culture.

MNDH – Movimento Nacional de Direitoos Humanos (National Human Rights Movement).

MTb – Ministry of Labor.

OAB – Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil (Order of Attorneys of Brazil).

OIT – Organização International do Trabalho (International Labor Organization).

PNAD – Pesquisa National por Amostragem de Domicílios (National Survey by Domicile Sample).

PNDH -– Programa Nacional de Direitos Humanos (National Human Rights Program).

PR – Presidência da República (Presidency of the Republic).

SBPC - Sociedade Brasileira para o Progresso da Ciência (Brazilian Society for the Advancement of Science).

SEAFRO – Secretaria Extraordinária de Defesa e Promoção das Populações Afro-Brasileira (Extraordinary Secretariat for Defense and Promotion of Afro-Brazilian Populations), Rio de Janeiro State Government.

SEF – Southern Education Foundation.

TVE – Televisão Educativa (Educational Television), Federal Government.

UCLA – University of California at Los Angeles.

UFG – Universidade Federal de Goiás (Federal University of Goiás).

UFMG – Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (Federal University of Minas Gerais).

UFRJ – Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro).

UnB – Universidade de Brasília.

USP – Universidade de São Paulo (São Paulo University).

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