Extent and Nature of Racial Inequalities In Brazil

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Introduction

Contrary to popular wisdom, social scientists are wont to believe that if money does not bring happiness, it certainly comes close to doing so. First and possibly most important, money buys a longer lifetime. It buys a healthier life, less paralyzed by the afflictions of disease. Money provides access to the so-called "good things in life," such as well-prepared food, clothes tailored with fine fabric, cars, travel, and anything else on the consumer list of any "bon vivant." Money also buys more and better education, giving one access to "high culture" or even the snobbishness to disdain it. Finally, money buys self-esteem or at least allows one to pay the analyst's bill.

For these reasons, when one discusses social inequalities, the most common gesture is to brandish statistics on income distribution. Income differences summarize the extent of social injustice. Indeed, this has become so commonplace through exposure in our mass media, that every Brazilian, in a kind of reverse patriotism, recognizes and demands for his or her country the dubious glory of being a "world champion of social injustice." This theme leaves no one indifferent, provoking attitudes that range from fatalistic despair to sarcastic smiles and enraged discourse with indignantly pointed index finger.

One aspect that has received increasing publicity is the marked differences associated with individuals' color. Sociological research on this dimension of inequality in Brazil has a history that goes back a few decades. The results have been quite stable: Income differences associated with individuals' color not only are flagrantly obvious but they also cannot be totally explained by other differences such as social origin, geographic location, or education. Racial discrimination in the labor market is possibly a relevant part of the explication of income inequalities. For example, in reviewing the results of research on wage and salary inequality, Reis and Barros (1991, 75) comment on two studies that focus on discrimination in the Brazilian labor market. One analyzes gender differentials, and the other examines those of color. According to the authors, in both cases the results obtained show not only that after controlling for a variety of observable characteristics the differentials persist, but also that the attributes are remunerated in distinct ways, suggesting that different criteria are used in the determination of wages, based on gender and color. We are dealing with evidence, in sum, compatible with the existence of discrimination in the Brazilian labor market.

With respect to people's color, the evidence seems to be quite clear. Analyzing data from the 1976 National Domicile Sample Survey (PNAD),[1] Oliveira, Porcaro, and Costa (1983) observed that in all socio-occupational categories studied, Pretos and Pardos[2] had average incomes significantly inferior to those of Whites. Moreover, these differences are not proportional to educational differences among these groups. Generically, substantial differences exist in the monetary return from educational investments, and this differential is increased and accentuated as the educational level of the work force rises (Oliveira, Porcaro, and Costa, 1983: 49).

Lovell (1989) uses data on Brazilian metropolitan areas from the 1980 census to show that the average income of the population of color is about half the corresponding level for the White population. Additionally, using a standardization procedure, she estimated that 25 to 30 percent of the income differences between Whites and Pretos and Pardos could be

attributed to discriminatory practices in the labor market. Contrary to earlier analyses based on data from Rio de Janeiro in 1960 (Silva, 1978), Lovell's work indicates important differences between Pretos and Pardos, with the proportions of income differences between these groups and Whites, attributable to wage discrimination, varying according to region, job sector, and occupational position.

It is natural for differences of this magnitude to spill over into certain areas of life. It is not surprising to note that Brazilians self-identified as Pretos or Pardos are exposed to higher infant mortality rates than Whites. In 1980, infant mortality per thousand live births was 77 for Whites and 105 for Pretos and Pardos combined– a rate that in 1980 corresponded to approximately that of Whites in 1960 (Tamburo, 1987). Pretos' and Pardos' life expectancy at birth is significantly inferior to that of Whites: life expectancy in 1980 was 66.1 years for Whites and 59.4 years for Pretos and Pardos. This difference is close to that of 7.5 years which separated these groupings in 1950 (Wood and Carvalho, 1988: 445). Regarding education, Preto and Pardo children complete fewer years of schooling, even when we control for social origin or average per capita family income (Rosemberg, 1986; Hasenbalg and Silva, 1988: chap. 5).

To understand the extent of racial inequalities in Brazil today, let us consider the most recent data available on the question, furnished by the National Domicile Sample Survey (PNAD) conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) in November 1996. Restricting our focus to adult men, more specifically to heads of family or spouses, and ignoring individuals classified as Asian or indigenous (a minute fraction of the population), we arrive at the following values for average total incomes: R$950 for Whites, R$403 for Pretos, and R$433 for Pardos. In other words, White individuals receive more than double the wages than those earned by Pretos as well as Pardos, with the values for these groups being quite close to each other.

To explain these differences, the usual procedure is to look for other differences– i.e., differences in other characteristics– that could contribute causes for the observed phenomena. In fact, when we examine other correlates, we also observe the existence of marked racial differences with respect to other socioeconomic characteristics of individuals. These same individuals also present differences in educational level in the same direction as income differences (see Table 26). The average level of years of schooling for Whites is 6.25; the corresponding numbers for Pretos and Pardos are 3.81 and 3.96, respectively. Other characteristics show a similar pattern. For example, the average years of schooling among White respondents' parents is 2.96, while the values for the parents of Pretos and Pardos are only 1.33 and 1.57, respectively. Similarly, the rates of occupational status (measured by the metric scale proposed by Silva, 1973 and updated for the 1996 data) for the parents of respondents self-classified as Pretos is 5.58. For the parents of Pardo individuals it is 6.04. For the parents of Whites it rises to 8.66.

Table 26: Selected Socioeconomic Characteristics by Color - Men

Socioeconomic Characteristic	Color		
	White	Preto	Pardo
Years of Schooling	6.25	3.81	3.96
Age of first employment	12.66	12.20	12.01
Per capita family income (R$)	376.57	166.87	163.61
Size of family	3.70	4.05	4.18
Urban residence (%)	83.17	77.79	73.19
Father's years of schooling	2.96	1.33	1.57
Father's occupational status	8.66	5.58	6.04

Source: PNAD 96

The question then is to what extent can these differences explain the observed income differences (or those of happiness, as we suggested before)? To answer this question, one must use complex statistical models that take multiple determining factors into account. This complexity makes this same explanation sound somewhat mystifying and abstruse. In the following sections, I will try to show how social inequalities in Brazil are produced by what we could call "cycles of cumulative disadvantages." For this paper, the explanation must be simplified. We will not use the myriad explicative factors such as those listed in Table 26. This simplification will show clearly the cumulative nature of the process of generation of inequalities.

Social Mobility

When opinions are given on racial inequalities in Brazil, the argument essentially is this: the great majority of people of color who live in poverty today come from families who also were poor in the past. This explanation constitutes the cornerstone of Brazilian racial ideology: the "survival of slavery" or "heritage of poverty." Indeed, this is a very plausible idea and, as we have just seen in the information in Table 26, it has a real empirical foundation. On average, White individuals come from families much better positioned in the social hierarchy, with better-educated parents and a more comfortable social position. So this seems a necessary explanation if we want to consider the real sit

uation of racial inequalities in our country. But the question remains: Is this explanation sufficient?

To answer this, I will focus on income differences and will use a conceptual scheme specifying that incomes are achieved via a path characterized by two distinct stages in individuals' lives. The first stage is a process through which people of different social origin (i.e., from families in distinct social positions) obtain positions in the social hierarchy. I will call this process "social mobility" and use the father for the position of origin and the respondent for the current position as the occupational stratum.

The second stage is the phase in which, having achieved a certain position in the occupational hierarchy, this position is converted into monetary gains. Individuals in different positions are capable of commanding different remuneration. However, individuals in the same hierarchical position are capable of commanding different remuneration because of the differential value that the "market" gives to different individual characteristics. In this context, is an individual's color one of these individual characteristics that result in differentiated treatment by the labor market? To this stage of individuals' life cycle I give the name "income acquisition."

Let us begin with the "social mobility" stage. The analysis involved in this essay uses data from the Supplement on Social Mobility of the 1996 PNAD. For definitions of occupational strata used to build mobility flux matrixes, we will adopt the same methodology proposed by Pastore, not only in his pioneer work but in his later works updating it (e.g., Pastore and Haller, 1993). In these studies, he uses six strata based on a metric socioeconomic scale elaborated with data from the 1970 census. The 1996 PNAD is based on a broader, more detailed classification of occupations than the one in the 1970 census. Consequently, the original classification must be made compatible with the 1996 PNAD by allocating the occupations of the new classification to the most adequate groups from the original classification.

Two criteria were adopted for this process. First, in cases where the occupational title is identical in both classifications, allocation to the groups defined in the original work was respected. Second, in cases of new or diverse occupational title, the effort was to find the allocation most adequate in terms of the substantive description of the group (see below) as well as the socioeconomic score of the occupation and the score that characterizes the group.

In Grid 1, I provide a summary description of the different occupational strata defined as well as the average value of the socioeconomic status index (SSI) for 1996, which replicated the procedures adopted for the data from the 1970 census. The occupational grouping follows criteria of "social distance" (measured by the socioeconomic status index), and, therefore, these strata strictly measure differences in socioeconomic position. At the same time, this classification also corresponds to other criteria, particularly the manual/nonmanual distinction and also the rural/urban difference. The form of classification is not inconsequent for the level of results obtained. Although occupational groups 1 and 2 show a relatively similar SSI, the urban/rural dimension essentially distinguishes them. This allows us, by construction, to identify the process of rural/urban migration with upward mobility. In other words, the recent urbanization of Brazilian society coincides with an improvement in the distribution of positions within the occupational structure.

It is also useful to emphasize that intergroup social distances increase as one climbs the social structure, which is a very realistic characteristic, considering what is known about the high levels of inequality in our society. Thus, the average socioeconomic status index of the highest stratum is more than 15 times that of the lowest.

Following the prevailing tradition in social mobility studies in Brazil, we will restrict our sample to male heads of family between 20 and 64 years of age. The exclusion of spouses and female heads of families relates to the nature of the data collected. The information on occupational status of origin in the 1996 PNAD is limited to the occupation of the respondent's father. Thus, in the case of women, the analysis of their mobility would be limited to a comparison with the position of their fathers (not their mothers). Since occupational segregation imposes occupational profiles that are highly differentiated between men and women, a mobility matrix involving comparison of fathers and daughters would result in very peculiar flux patterns, not strictly comparable with those observed for men. Additionally, female participation in the workforce is characteristically self-selective, with a greater tendency to work concentrated at the extremes of the social hierarchy. The option is to eliminate from the analysis women who do not work (and who, therefore, do not have their own occupational status) or impute to these women the occupational status of their spouse (and, in this way, make the comparison with other women fragile). Whatever the solution, introducing procedures with unclear theoretical consequences would tilt the estimate of women's positions, especially in the middle strata.

Now we will examine the current occupational position of individuals according to their self-classification by color and their strata of origin (e.g., the occupational strata of their fathers when the respondent began working).

Table 27: Index of Social Distance for Occupational Groups

Occup. Group	Stratum	Representative Occupations	Average SSI "Social Distance"
1	Lower low: nonqualified rural workers	Peasants and self-employed rural producers without employees; other agricultural workers and cattlemen; fishermen	2.90
2	Upper low: nonqualified urban workers	Self-employed traders; night watchmen; janitors, hodmen, low-level assistants; unspecified manual laborers; street hawkers; domestic servants	6.49
3	Lower middle: qualified and semi-qualified workers	Drivers; bricklayers; automobile mechanics; carpenters; painters and whitewashers; solderers; electricians	8.68
4	Middle: Non-manual workers, low-level professionals and small property owners	Small-property owners in agriculture; administrators and managers in agriculture and cattle raising; administrative and office assistants; equipment repair people; local and traveling salespeople; armed forces enlistees	17.01
5	Upper middle: Middle-level professionals and middle-sized property owners	Cattle raisers; directors, consultants, advisors and heads in public service; administrators and managers in industry and commerce; section heads and chiefs; commercial representatives	27.19
6	Upper high level: Professionals and large property owners	Industrial entrepreneurs; administrators and managers of financial, real estate and insurance firms; engineers; physicians; accountants; university professors; attorneys; armed forces officers	44.06

Table 28: Current Occupational Group by Color

Current Occupational Group	Color of Respondent		
	White	Preto	Pardo
1	18.5	28.8	32.4
2	22.1	25.8	25.4
3	27.0	32.6	25.8
4	15.3	7.6	10.4
5	9.8	3.6	4.1
6	7.2	1.5	1.8
All Groups	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**

Table 29: Father's Occupational Group by Color

Current Occupational Group	Color of Respondent		
	White	Preto	Pardo
1	49.5	58.6	64.6
2	14.1	14.0	11.6
3	17.7	19.5	13.9
4	10.3	5.8	6.5
5	4.3	1.2	2.2
6	4.0	1.0	1.3
All Groups	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**

The differences in the social positioning of individuals by their declared color group are marked and clear compared with the differences observed for other socioeconomic characteristics. Among self-declared Whites, a few less than 19 percent are found in the lowest stratum of rural workers. The equivalent percentage among Pretos is almost 29 percent and among Pardos is almost one-third of the total number of individuals in this color group. On the other extreme, among nonmanual occupations (strata 4 and 6), the percentage of Whites who occupy these strata comes to 32.3 percent; among Pardos the percentage is cut to about half (more precisely, 16.3 percent). Among Pretos it is a little more than one-third of the equivalent among Whites, i.e., only 12.7 percent.

One common way to quantify these differences in percentage distributions is to calculate the so-called "coefficient of similarity," (D) which indicates the percentage of individuals in a distribution that has to be reallocated to other strata in order for the two compared groups to be equalized. In calculating this index for the distributions of Whites and

Pretos, we verify that it has the value of D=19.6. This implies that almost 20 percent of the individuals (i.e., Pretos) would have to be reallocated in order for their social situation to become equal to that of the other group (i.e., Whites). The dissimilarity between Whites and Pardos is also quite close to this value (D=17.2), while the difference between Pretos and Pardos is much more modest (D=7.2).

When we examine the distributions by social origin (Table 28), large differences are also apparent, albeit the differences between Whites and Pretos are smaller than in the case of the current situation, a fact that already constitutes a symptomatic indication.

The next analysis looks at social mobility itself. Grouped according to the person's color, Table 34 in this chapter's appendix shows the matrixes of the individuals' intergenerational occupational mobility that we are analyzing (i.e., men, heads of family or spouses, 20 to 64 years of age).

From these data it is possible to distinguish the type of mobility that color groups experience. The numbers on the main diagonal of the matrixes indicate the quantity of interviewees who have remained in the same occupational group as their fathers. The numbers above the diagonal indicate the volume of upward mobility, while the numbers below the diagonal express downward mobility. Table 30 summarizes this information.

Table 30: Intergenerational Occupational Mobility by Color, 1996

Type of Mobility	Whites	Pretos	Pardos
Upward	52.5%	43.9%	45.5%
Immobility	33.1	42.6	42.4
Downward	14.4	13.5	12.1
All Types	100%	100%	100%

Whites have a significant advantage in terms of upward occupational mobility; a little more than half (52.5 percent) are found in higher occupational groups than their fathers, while this occurs for only 43.9 percent of Pardos and 45.5 percent of Pretos. Both non-White groups experience a higher level, almost 10 percent, of immobility or inheriting the father's status. Finally, the proportion of those with downward mobility is very similar in the three-color groups, oscillating between 12 and 14 percent.

Table 31 presents percentage outflows of interviewees moving from their fathers' occupational groups to their current occupational groups, according to their color.

Table 31: Outflow from Occupational Groups

Occup. Group of Father	Color	Current Occupational Group					
		1	2	3	4	5	6
1	White	33.3	23.1	25.9	9.8	5.1	2.7
	Preto	44.9	22.1	26.4	4.2	1.8	0.6
	Pardo	45.9	23.4	21.0	6.6	2.3	0.8
2	White	4.1	28.7	26.0	20.8	12.0	8.3
	Preto	8.4	37.5	34.8	11.4	4.8	3.0
	Pardo	7.9	36.9	29.6	15.3	7.6	2.8
3	White	2.8	20.8	41.3	17.9	11.4	5.8
	Preto	4.5	28.9	48.9	10.3	6.0	1.3
	Pardo	5.5	24.8	46.3	15.1	5.6	2.7
4	White	4.8	18.6	21.8	26.1	15.5	13.2
	Preto	6.5	29.0	35.5	18.8	6.5	3.6
	Pardo	12.0	28.0	23.9	23.5	7.9	4.7
5	White	7.1	14.1	14.2	20.2	24.9	19.5
	Preto	3.4	20.7	34.5	17.2	17.2	6.9
	Pardo	11.5	23.9	27.3	20.9	12.1	4.2
6	White	1.9	10.0	9.2	19.4	22.7	36.6
	Preto	4.3	8.7	34.8	26.1	8.7	17.4
	Pardo	3.7	21.1	18.9	23.2	15.8	17.4

Note: Values expressed in percentages, each line totaling 100%.

Whatever the occupational group of origin, the current occupational distribution of non-Whites is notably more concentrated in the lower occupational strata. For example, among the sons of Occupational Group 1 (rural workers), the proportion of Pretos and Pardos who inherit the occupational status of their fathers is significantly larger than that of Whites: about 45 percent for both Pretos and Pardos, compared with 33 percent for Whites. In this same group of origin, the proportion of sons who move up to highest strata of 5 and 6 is about 7.8 percent for Whites, 2.4 percent for Pretos, and 3.1 percent for Pardos. These same proportions among those who are sons in group 2 (nonqualified urban workers) is about 20.3 percent for Whites, 10.4 percent for Pardos, and only 7.8 percent for Pretos. On the opposite extreme of the occupational hierarchy, considering the occupational destiny distribution of interviewees who are sons of group 6 (high-level professionals and property owners), the proportion of Whites (36.6 percent) who manage to preserve this position is much larger than both Pardos and Pretos (both at 17.4 percent). This means that persons of color (Pretos and Pardos)

born into families with relatively high status are at greater risk of experiencing downward social mobility and losing the positions won by the previous generation.

To summarize the distribution of social mobility opportunities among color groups, non-Whites are exposed to fewer chances for social climbing, difficulties in upward mobility increase along with the level of the stratum of origin, and those born into higher strata are exposed to greater risks of downward mobility.

One way to quantify these differences is to calculate the occupational distribution that Pretos and Pardos hypothetically would have if there were no differences in their chances for mobility in relation to Whites. In other words, non-White groups would experience the same rates of mobility as Whites. Engaging in this exercise, we would come up with the following hypothetical occupational distributions for the current situation of Pretos and Pardos:

Table 32: Hypothetical Distribution by Color without "Racial Differences" in Occupational Groups

Individual's Color	Situation in Hypothesis of Non-difference/ Group Occupational						Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Preto	21.0%	23.0%	28.4%	14.1%	8.3%	5.2%	100%
Pardo	22.9	22.8	27.3	13.6	8.1	5.3	100%

Comparing these distributions, using the dissimilarity index D, with the distribution of Whites, we arrive at the values of D=4.8 for Pretos and D=5.4 for Pardos. It is useful to recall that the real dissimilarity observed between the distribution of Whites and Pretos was D=19.6. Thus, in the absence of differences in mobility opportunity, i.e., due exclusively to the fact that Whites and Pretos have distinct social origins, the dissimilarity now is reduced to 4.8 percentage points. This implies that no less than 14.8 percentage points of the total dissimilarity index (i.e., more than three-fourths of that index) are attributable to differences in mobility opportunity between Whites and Pretos, to the detriment of Pretos, as becomes evident on examination of real and hypothetical distributions.

In the case of Pardos, a similar situation is manifest. The total real dissimilarity of D=17.2 is reduced to a dissimilarity of 5.4 percentage points, implying that more than two-thirds of the total dissimilarity is due to differences in mobility opportunity. Once more, this is to the detriment of individuals of color. Clearly, the differences in occupational distributions between Whites and non-Whites are not attributable to differences in family situation of origin but to the extremely unequal distribution of occupational mobility opportunity.

Acquisition of Income

As indicated previously, the occupational strata used to study social mobility were generated based on the socioeconomic level of the occupations allocated to them. The income earned by incumbents in the different occupational titles constitutes the central axis of this socioeconomic position. Put simply, the hierarchy of occupational strata is a hierarchy of incomes associated with the occupations included in those strata. The logic of socioeconomic occupation scales presupposes that income is, basically, an attribute of position in the technical division of labor (i.e., of occupation) rather than the individuals who occupy the position. In neoclassical economic terms, productivity (wage, salary, or income) is a characteristic inherent to the occupational position. However, within a certain level of average occupational productivity, there may be secondary differences in productivity associated with certain individual characteristics, such as education and experience.

Thus, it is not surprising that these occupational strata reflect the notorious and abysmal income inequalities that mark Brazilian society. The last column in Table 33 shows that the average income in the highest stratum is almost 12 times greater than that corresponding to the stratum of the worst socioeconomic situation. Two income differences between successive strata are extremely outstanding and represent eventual class cleavages in the occupational structure. The first separates stratum 1 from the next, indicating the passage from the rural sector to the urban sector, where the difference in income is almost twofold in favor of the urban manual stratum. The second differential is the one placed on the dividing line between the manual and nonmanual strata (strata 3 and 4), where the income differences are practically twofold in favor of the nonmanual stratum. The other differences, also high, are more modest in magnitude.

What interests us most is the differences by color within each occupational stratum. When we compare the income of Pretos and Pardos with that of Whites, whatever the occupational stratum, the differences are very noticeable in size, especially in strata 1 and 5. Even in the stratum where the differential is smallest (stratum 3), the income of Whites surpasses by nearly 40 percent the income of Pardos and Pretos. These values imply that individual Pretos and Pardos find it more difficult to transform their occupational

achievement into higher incomes. On the same occupational level, their incomes, on the average, are smaller than that of Whites.

As we noted earlier, Whites on average earn more income than both Pretos and Pardos. But a large part of these differences are not due to the fact that Whites have higher levels of occupational achievement (i.e., they are better

Table 33: Average Incomes by Occupational Stratum and Color

Occupational stratum	Color			Total Average
	White	Preto	Pardo	
1	315.96	158.12	182.06	239.46
2	577.88	311.75	350.09	473.17
3	644.88	464.99	458.49	567.48
4	1,246.94	717.05	775.80	1,100.78
5	1,877.23	987.32	1,039.20	1,678.49
6	2,919.93	1,805.16	1,940.11	2,772.62
Total	949.66	403.24	432.81	734.18

Note: Average Income in R$

positioned in the occupational hierarchy). To estimate the extent of this, we can calculate the hypothetical income of Pretos and Pardos if they had the same occupational return (the same average income per occupational stratum) that Whites receive. With this calculation, we estimate that in the hypothesis of identical returns for Pretos and Whites, Pretos would have an estimated income of R$670. Since Whites' income is R$950 and the real income of Pretos is R$403, we can conclude that a little less than half the difference between Whites and Pretos (49 percent) can be explained by income differences within the occupational strata. A similar calculation for Pardos indicates a hypothetical income of R$687, which also represents a difference of 49 percent of the total difference attributable to unequal returns from occupational achievements.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have pursued two complementary objectives. First, I have tried to show the scope and magnitude of the racial differences that permeate our society. I have showed this with respect to characteristics such as social origin, educational and occupational achievement, and especially income. And, as we have seen, this list could be extended to include a broad range of other relevant social characteristics, such as health and mortality. The evidence always points to marked differences that prejudice the groups of people who identify themselves as Pardos or Pretos.

The second objective was to show the cumulative nature of the intergenerational construction of these inequalities. I distinguished two phases in individuals' socioeconomic life cycles: "social mobility" and "income acquisition." For the same stratum of social origin, Pretos and Pardos confront greater difficulties in their process of upward mobility and are exposed to higher levels of immobility. The result is a more modest profile of occupational achievement for these groups that to a limited extent can be attributed to differences in social origin.

Additionally, I have tried to show that, for the same occupational result, non-Whites also experience greater difficulties in transforming their occupational achievement into income. Almost half the differences between Whites and Pretos and Pardos are attributable to the lower levels of monetary return for the occupational achievements of non-Whites. Eventually, if we consider other relevant individual characteristics (such as education and experience) that can still persist within each occupational stratum, this aggregated difference may become more modest. But education, for example, is also a process that is part of individuals' life cycles and, as such, is subject to the same types of disadvantages that prejudice the social progress of non-White groups. It constitutes another possible link in the chain of disadvantages that accumulate during individuals' lives and that subject Pretos and Pardos to living conditions markedly inferior to those of Whites in Brazilian society

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END NOTES

[1] Pesquisa Nacional por Amostragem de Domicílios, Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE).

[2] We do not translate the expressions *Pretos* (literally, Blacks) and *Pardos* (mixed bloods, mulattos, or mestizos) because their meanings differ considerably from those of the English language expressions. Essentially, *Pretos* designates only very dark-skinned Blacks, while *Pardos* refers to a wide range of lighter-skinned mixed-bloods. When referring to the category that in English would be called "Blacks," the sum of these two categories is used. T.N.

[3] SP mean São Paulo; RJ means Rio de Janeiro.

[4] University Institute of Research on Rio de Janeiro (Candido Mendes University, Rio de Janeiro).

[5] Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics.

APPENDIX

Table 34: Intergenerational Occupational Mobility of Men 20-64 Years of Age by Color, 1996

	Whites					
	Current Occupational Group					
Father's Occup. Group	1	2	3	4	5	6
1	4,059	2,816	3,149	1,195	623	332
2	142	995	902	722	416	286
3	123	907	1,798	778	496	254
4	123	474	553	663	394	335
5	75	150	151	214	264	207
6	19	98	90	190	222	358
	Pretos					
	Current Occupational Group					
Father's Occup. Group	1	2	3	4	5	6
1	627	308	368	59	25	9
2	28	125	116	38	16	10
3	21	134	227	48	28	6
4	9	40	49	26	9	5
5	1	6	10	5	5	2
6	1	2	8	6	2	4
	Pardos					
	Current Occupational Group					
Father's Occup. Group	1	2	3	4	5	6
1	4,420	2,250	2,022	634	221	75
2	136	637	511	265	131	48
3	113	512	956	312	116	55
4	116	270	231	227	76	45
5	38	79	90	69	40	14
6	7	40	36	44	30	33