

Viking Tribe

Game&Token

SMART CONTRACT AUDIT

25.08.2021

Made in Germany by Chainsulting.de



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1. Disclaimer

The audit makes no statements or warrantees about utility of the code, safety of the code, suitability of the business model, investment advice, endorsement of the platform or its products, regulatory regime for the business model, or any other statements about fitness of the contracts to purpose, or their bug free status. The audit documentation is for discussion purposes only.

The information presented in this report is confidential and privileged. If you are reading this report, you agree to keep it confidential, not to copy, disclose or disseminate without the agreement of Viking Tribe Token. If you are not the intended receptor of this document, remember that any disclosure, copying or dissemination of it is forbidden.

Major Versions / Date	Description
0.1 (02.06.2021)	Layout
0.5 (03.06.2021)	Automated Security Testing
	Manual Security Testing
0.8 (03.06.2021)	Testing SWC Checks
0.9 (04.06.2021)	Summary and Recommendation
1.0 (05.06.2021)	Final document



2. About the Project

Website: www.vikingtribe.top

GitHub: https://github.com/VikingTribe/VikingTribe

Twitter: https://twitter.com/viking_tribe

Telegram: https://t.me/VikingTribe

BSCScan (Viking Tribe Token): https://bscscan.com/address/0xa600a8513d248c0f152dc994dfcb7ef27446272e

Presale DAPP:www.vikingtribe.top/presale.html



2.1 Project Overview

Viking Tribe is a unique platform that combines the best tokenomics of currrent frictionless yield protocols for instant rewards with the additional benefits of staking in our upcoming marketplace. This way the best rewards can be guaranteed without any token inflation. A 3% transaction tax goes to holders (later on merchants too), stakers, and a perpetual marketing and development fund. This project is built to keep going and continually expand further until it has its own ecosystem to call its own. The \$Viking Tribe system guarantees token rewards to LP stakers on every block, regardless if there was a \$Viking Tribe transaction on it or not. Under the same system, rewards will scale as the project grows, whilst ensuring the rewards pool can never run out.



3. Vulnerability & Risk Level

Risk represents the probability that a certain source-threat will exploit vulnerability, and the impact of that event on the organization or system. Risk Level is computed based on CVSS version 3.0.

Level	Value	Vulnerability	Risk (Required Action)
Critical		A vulnerability that can disrupt the contract functioning in a number of scenarios, or creates a risk that the contract may be broken.	Immediate action to reduce risk level.
High		·	Implementation of corrective actions as soon as possible.
Medium		A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.	Implementation of corrective actions in a certain period.
Low		have a significant impact on	Implementation of certain corrective actions or accepting the risk.
Informational		A vulnerability that have informational character but is not effecting any of the code.	An observation that does not determine a level of risk



4. Auditing Strategy and Techniques Applied

Throughout the review process, care was taken to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specification and best practices. To do so, reviewed line-by-line by our team of expert pentesters and smart contract developers, documenting any issues as there were discovered.

4.1 Methodology

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

- 1. Code review that includes the following:
 - i.Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Chainsulting to make sure we understand the size, scope, and functionality of the smart contract.
 - ii. Manual review of code, which is the process of reading source code line-by-line in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
- iii. Comparison to specification, which is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Chainsulting describe.
- 2. Testing and automated analysis that includes the following:
 - i. Test coverage analysis, which is the process of determining whether the test cases are actually covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run those test cases.
 - ii. Symbolic execution, which is analysing a program to determine what inputs causes each part of a program to execute.
- 3. Best practices review, which is a review of the smart contracts to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarify, maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices, recommendations, and research.
- 4. Specific, itemized, actionable recommendations to help you take steps to secure your smart contracts.



4.2 Used Code from other Frameworks/Smart Contracts (direct imports)

1. SafeMath.sol (0.6.0)

https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/blob/v3.3.0/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol

2. IERC20.sol (0.6.0)

https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/blob/v3.3.0/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol

3. SafeERC20.sol (0.6.0)

https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/blob/v3.3.0/contracts/token/ERC20/SafeERC20.sol

4. Ownable.sol (0.6.0)

https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/blob/v3.3.0/contracts/access/Ownable.sol

5. Address.sol (0.6.0)

https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/blob/v3.3.0/contracts/utils/Address.sol

6. Context.sol (0.6.0)

https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/blob/v3.3.0/contracts/GSN/Context.sol




4.3 Tested Contract Files

The following are the MD5 hashes of the reviewed files. A file with a different MD5 hash has been modified, intentionally or otherwise, after the security review. You are cautioned that a different MD5 hash could be (but is not necessarily) an indication of a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of the review

File	Fingerprint (SHA256)
Viking TribeGame.sol	01b1e800e02d36aadbfb13b6ba4e6fbe
Viking TribeToken.sol	49c943c28ecd903153bad9fbb1c7d340




4.4 Metrics / CallGraph





4.5 Metrics / Source Lines





4.6 Metrics / Capabilities

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,		Experim Features	nental	& Fur	Can Receive 1ds	Asser		Has Destroyable Contracts	
0.7.4						**** (0 asn	n blocks)		
Transfers	≠Lo Calls	w-Level	☆ DelegateCa	ıll	Uses Hash Functions		ECRecover		New/Create/Create2
yes									

 № Public	∲ Payabl	е		
44	0			
External	Internal	Private	Pure	View
21	39	20	4	25



4.7 Metrics / Source Unites in Scope

Typ e	File	Logic Contrac ts	Interfaces	Line s	nLine s	nSLO C	Comme nt Lines	Comple x. Score	Capabilities
	Viking Tribe- main/contracts/Viking TribeGame. sol	1		272	264	189	48	151	•
•	Viking Tribe- main/contracts/Viking TribeToke n.sol	1		565	502	377	34	289	
\$	Totals	2		837	766	566	82	440	₽



5. Scope of Work

The Viking Tribe Token Team provided us with the files that needs to be tested. The scope of the audit are the Game and Token contracts.

Following contracts with the direct imports been tested Viking

VIKING

TribeGame.sol


Viking

TribeToken.sol

The team put forward the following assumptions regarding the security, usage of the contracts:

- LP Token Staker are always able to withdraw LP Token shares
- Viking Tribe Token deployer cannot mint any new token
- Viking Tribe Token deployer cannot burn or lock user funds
- Viking Tribe Token deployer cannot pause the contract
- Checking the overall security of the contracts

The main goal of this audit was to verify these claims. The auditors can provide additional feedback on the code upon the client's request.





5.1 Manual and Automated Vulnerability Test

CRITICAL ISSUES

During the audit, Chainsulting's experts found **no Critical issues** in the code of the smart contract.

HIGH ISSUES

During the audit, Chainsulting's experts found **no High issues** in the code of the smart contract.

MEDIUM ISSUES

During the audit, Chainsulting's experts found **no Medium issues** in the code of the smart contract.

LOW ISSUES

During the audit, Chainsulting's experts found **no Low issues** in the code of the smart contract.



5.2. SWC Attacks & Special Checks

ID	Title	Relationships	Test Result
<u>SWC-131</u>	Presence of unused variables	CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code	· 💉
SWC-130	Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E)	CWE-451: User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information	\$
SWC-129	Typographical Error	CWE-480: Use of Incorrect Operator	
SWC-128	DoS With Block Gas Limit	CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption	3
<u>SWC-127</u>	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	CWE-695: Use of Low-Level Functionality	· 🗸
<u>SWC-125</u>	Incorrect Inheritance Order	CWE-696: Incorrect Behavior Order	: .
<u>SWC-124</u>	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	CWE-123: Write-what-where Condition	\$
<u>SWC-123</u>	Requirement Violation	CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller	\$



ID	Title	Relationships	Test Result
<u>SWC-122</u>	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity	
<u>SWC-121</u>	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature	
SWC-120	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values	*
SWC-119	Shadowing State Variables	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	V.
SWC-118	Incorrect Constructor Name	CWE-665: Improper Initialization	\$
SWC-117	Signature Malleability	CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature	
SWC-116	Timestamp Dependence	CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	\$
SWC-115	Authorization through tx.origin	CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function	\$
<u>SWC-114</u>	Transaction Order Dependence	CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')	\$



ID	Title	Relationships	Test Result
SWC-113	DoS with Failed Call	CWE-703: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions	· 🗸
SWC-112	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	\$
<u>SWC-111</u>	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function	
<u>SWC-110</u>	Assert Violation	CWE-670: Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation	2 400
SWC-109	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	CWE-824: Access of Uninitialized Pointer	. .
<u>SWC-108</u>	State Variable Default Visibility	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	\$
<u>SWC-107</u>	Reentrancy	CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow	\$
SWC-106	Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction	CWE-284: Improper Access Control	
<u>SWC-105</u>	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	CWE-284: Improper Access Control	\$
SWC-104	Unchecked Call Return Value	CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value	



ID	Title	Relationships	Test Result
SWC-103	Floating Pragma	CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime	
SWC-102	Outdated Compiler Version	CWE-937: Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities	\$
SWC-101	Integer Overflow and Underflow	CWE-682: Incorrect Calculation	\$
SWC-100	Function Default Visibility	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	V



7. Verify Claims

7.1 LP Token Staker are always able to withdraw LP Token shares Status: tested and verified Code: Ln 217 – 246 Viking TribeGame.sol function withdraw(uint256 _pid, uint256 _amount) public { PoolInfo storage pool = poolInfo[_pid]; UserInfo storage user = userInfo[_pid][msg.sender]; require(user.amount >= _amount, "Withdraw amount is greater than user amount"); updatePool(_pid); uint256 pending = user.amount.mul(pool.accViking TribePerShare).div(1e12).sub(user.rewardDebt); if (pending > 0) { safeTokenTransfer(msg.sender, pending); } if $(_amount > 0)$ { user.amount = user.amount.sub(_amount); pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(address(msg.sender), _amount); user.rewardDebt = user.amount.mul(pool.accViking TribePerShare).div(1e12); emit Withdraw(msg.sender, _pid, _amount); function emergencyWithdraw(uint256 _pid) public { PoolInfo storage pool = poolInfo[_pid]; UserInfo storage user = userInfo[_pid][msg.sender]; user.amount = 0;user.rewardDebt = 0; pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(address(msg.sender), user.amount);

emit EmergencyWithdraw(msg.sender, _pid, user.amount);



}

7.2 Viking Tribe Token deployer cannot mint any new



token Status: tested and verified Code: Ln 62 Viking TribeToken.sol

uint256 private constant ACTUAL_TOTAL = 100_000_000 * 1e18;

7.3 Viking Tribe Token deployer cannot pause the



contract Status: tested and verified

Code: Viking TribeToken.sol

7.4 Viking Tribe Token deployer cannot burn or lock user



funds Status: tested and verified Code: Viking TribeToken.sol

7.5 Checking the overall security of the contracts



8. Executive Summary

The overall code quality of the project is very good, not overloaded with unnecessary functions, these is greatly benefiting the security of the contract. It correctly implemented widely-used and reviewed contracts from OpenZeppelin and for safe mathematical operations.

The main goal of the audit was to verify the claims regarding the security of the smart contract and the functions. During the audit, no issues were found after the manual and automated security testing.

9. Deployed Smart Contract

VERIFIED

Viking TribeToken

https://bscscan.com/address/0xa600a8513d248c0f152dc994dfcb7ef27446272e

