CHAPTER 1

The Classification of Emotions

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There comes a time in the progression of any scientific endeavor when the elemental dimensions of a discipline need to be more fully defined, elaborated, and differentiated. This was achieved in chemistry by the Russian chemist Dimitry Mendeleyev (1834–1907) in his construction of the periodic table of elements and in biology by the Swedish botanist Carolus Linnaeus (1707–1778) in his classification of plants and animals.

However, nothing this universal and comprehensive has been attempted in the study of human relations and emotions. As Kemper (1978:24) has pointed out "we have no general statements concerning either a full range of emotions or a full range of interaction conditions that might produce emotions." Optimistically, de Rivera (1977:98) postulated that "it should be possible to specify relations between various emotions and to create a language for emotional life much the same way chemistry reveals necessary relations between atoms and elements" and Ortony et al. (1988) commented that such a system could well be parsimonious.

So, is it too presumptuous to suggest that all human emotions are related members of a single system, a system in which the properties of each emotion category can be differentiated from the properties of each of the others? This chapter addresses that possibility. The objectives include (1) an examination of traditional classification approaches, (2) a review of contemporary theorists' contributions, (3) an investigation of relevant factors in classifying emotions, and (4) a proposed Linnaean-like classification scheme.

TRADITIONAL CLASSIFICATION APPROACHES

From various traditions, philosophers have postulated a set number of salient human emotions. Aristotle maintained that there were 15 basic emotions, Descartes listed 6, Hume listed only 2, Spinoza mentioned 3, Hobbes mentioned 7, Aquinas had 11, and Nietzsche, Darwin, and others

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proposed various numbers for basic emotions. These schemes typically involved a rather arbitrary selection of emotion labels based on religious or philosophical assumptions. (See Gardiner et al. ([1937] 1970) for an extensive review of many of these traditional conceptualizations.)

Until the present, scholars have not been able to specify the differences among a wide range of emotion categories in any systematic way. For example, they have not been able to successfully differentiate specific meanings for common emotion labels such as guilt, regret, embarrassment, and shame. It is also probable that for this reason, they have failed to reach agreement on which emotions are elemental and which are not. In most cases, labels are equated with the emotion (e.g., shame *is* the emotion).

Many of these scholars have some agreement on which emotions are elemental and which are not. However, elemental structures of any natural phenomenon (emotion in this case) cannot be decided simply by taking a survey of those doing theoretical manipulations, no matter how well the investigators are thought of.

Labeling Approaches

During the past few decades, a controversy has emerged between the "prototypical" labeling approach and the "structural dimension" approach to the classification of emotions. The prototypical approach concentrates on the "resemblance" among emotion concepts, stressing internal structure with no sharp boundaries, whereas the dimensional approach takes the classical view that there are necessary and sufficient, mutually exclusive, conditions by virtue of which emotion categories are differentiated (see Russell 1991). Shaver et al. (1987) argued that the prototypical approach is more sensitive to the finer details of the emotion, and Morgan and Heise (1988) countered that the dimensional approach is a more efficient way to represent the emotion domain.

In a conciliatory response, MacKinnon and Keating (1989:83) concluded that "the two schools of thought may be more complementary than irreconcilable." The immediate concern, however, is not which is the best approach to the classification of emotions, but which of the two is more effective in generating mutually exclusive emotion categories and which approach should be primary in the overall classification process.

Initiating the classification of human emotions by attempting to demonstrate interconnections among a list of emotion "concepts" or "labels" is rather futile. It is analogous to labeling the various species of "flowers" prior to examining the necessary and sufficient conditions that define and differentiate their foliages and other inherent structural attributes. Viable classifications systems of any natural phenomenon cannot evolve with attempts to assign labels to categories prior to the elaboration of each category's underlying structural dimensions, conditions, and states. In classifying emotions, best-fit labels can only be researched and assigned after the variations of structural conditions that define emotion categories have been differentiated.

The primary concern in understanding emotion is not how labels are interconnected, but in the attempt to find the causal preconditions that best differentiate them. Or, as Clore and Ortony (1988:391) have argued, the goal must not be to define emotion words but to discover the structure of the conditions to which such words apply. In this regard, Solomon (2002:134) argued that "the quest for basic emotions should be understood and pursued in such a way as to capture the richness and variety of human existence, not by way of reducing our emotional lives to the pre-set workings of a limited number of *affect programs*" (emphasis added).

Overall, the widespread speculation in labeling primary emotions has been unproductive in providing seminal models for an extensive differentiation of emotion categories. In discussing

this futility, Weiner (1982) maintained that the search for taxonomy of emotions has not been successful, and there is little agreement concerning how many emotions there are, or what these emotions are to be called.

The failure of prototypical approaches to successfully differentiate a large number of emotion categories is in their faulty assumptions about what causes emotion in the first place. It is less fruitful to begin a classification scheme of emotions with a list of emotion terms or concepts than with an elaboration of the social conditions that predict them. For this reason, a "dimensional approach" will be applied in the proposed classification scheme as a more effective tool in differentiating a larger number and wider range of emotion categories.

Psychoevolutionary Approaches

The psychoevolutionary approach to emotions originated with the assumption that emotions evolve out of the human need to survive (Darwin 1872). It is unclear, however, just how such basic survival functions can be meaningfully applied in a scheme to classify emotions. Such attempts have not been entirely successful. For example, Plutchik (1980) suggested in his psychoevolutionary approach that there are four basic dimensions ("existential problems of life") essential in his emotion theory. They included (1) hierarchy, (2) territory, (3) identity, and (4) temporality, as if to suggest that other dimensions are unnecessary or incidental for a comprehensive classification system.

Tenhouten (1996:194) offered a critique of Plutchik's proposition that two emotions combine as "adjacent primary emotions" to equal "secondary emotions." Although some of his combinations have face validity, at least one of his pairs of primaries equaling a secondary emotion, as well as other definitions, is problematic. Combinations are defined rather arbitrarily, and combining two primary labels to equal a secondary avoids the possibility of a third or fourth component. Tenhouten (1995) also noted that Plutchik's theory posits that a cognitive evaluation of a "stimulus" precedes an emotional reaction. What is missing is an elaboration of the concept of "stimulus." Tenhouten argued that from a sociological perspective, environmental forces, processes, and structures should be the focus in explaining emotions rather than "existential problems."

In summary, Plutchik's classification of emotion labels is limited in that it (1) is arbitrary, (2) based on the selection of only four dimensions, and (3) is a prototypical labeling approach to emotion classification. However, the major limitation in his theory is the inability to account for the social preconditions (stimuli) to emotions (i.e., a detailed mechanism by which emotions are appraised and socially differentiated).

Socioevolutionary Approaches

In the following year, Tenhouten (1996) proposed his own evolutionary scheme as an extension of Plutchik's theory. He offered a reformulation of Plutchik's model for the prediction of primary and secondary emotions in listing 10 additional emotions as adaptive reactions to the 4 elementary forms of social relations. He referred to this new model as "socioevolutionary" because it held that the emotional experience is a result of social relationships and that emotions have a long evolutionary history. For a *socioevolutionary* approach, such as Tenhouten's, to be viable in the classification of emotions, it would have to demonstrate how social forms in relationships

somehow evolved over time and culture from a single origin, in terms of kind and sequence, and then show how the evolution of these social relational forms are relevant to the differentiation of emotion categories.

In this pursuit, the evolution of social structures needs more attention and might very well be of taxonomic interest. However, how such a socioevolutionary model would be directly translated into emotion categories is still a mystery. It is not as simple as listing emotion labels for categories in temporal ordering of their appearances in an evolutionary chain of concurrent social structures. This approach might some day aid in understanding the origin and development of structural emotions, but at this stage of development, it seems of limited value in systematically differentiating emotion categories.

In contrast to these approaches, it is proposed that emotions can only be defined, differentiated, and categorized in terms of *social structural dimensions* and *variations* that predict them, just as biological or chemical labels of "trees" or "hydrogen" are defined in terms of their unique structural characteristics. The elaboration of these structural dimensions and conditions is a primary focus in the construction of the proposed classification scheme.

CONTEMPORARY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS

Over the past 30 years, several scholars have proposed methods of classifying emotions. Among the most prominent, representing various approaches, include Kemper (1978), Plutchik (1980), Hochschild (1983), Ortony et al. (1988), and Turner (2002). They will be directly reviewed in terms of how they evolved emotion categories to differentiate the meanings of emotions and how they came to assign labels to the various categories they generated.

Kemper first published his theory of emotions in the late 1970s and his theory is perhaps still the state of the art. His primary assumption in classifying structural emotions is that they flow from the outcomes of relations of power and status in interpersonal interaction. His approach is from a social structural perspective, assuming that as structural variations change, so do emotion experiences. He saw actors in given social relations being attributed with different amounts of power or status, ranging from *deficient* to *adequate* to *excessive*. How much power or status a person was attributed with predicts the subsequent emotion. As a result of his research, he assigned emotion labels for these structural variations. In the classification of emotions, Kemper's most salient contribution is that the dimensions of power and status are essential in differentiating emotion categories and labels.

A few years after Kemper's theory came out, Plutchik, a psychologist, introduced his psychoevolutionary synthesis of emotions. His theory proposed that there are eight basic adaptive patterns that provide a basis for all emotions. He then elaborated a formal structural model describing the relations among primary emotions, and from these, he identified "derivative" emotions. In these derivations, as was outlined above, he considered the various ways the primary emotions are mixed in order to synthesize more complex emotions. In his "wheel," any adjacent pair of primary emotions could be combined to form an intermediate mixed emotion, just as any two adjacent colors on the color circle form an intermediate hue. His classification approach included having subjects judge the similarity of emotion terms and place them in a circle according to their similarity in order to provide a conceptual basis for a dictionary of emotions. Also, he saw the organization of his emotion categories as being analogous to the periodic table in chemistry.

Bordering a sociological perspective, he considered evaluations of stimulus situations as good or bad and argued the importance of valences and polarity (opposites) in emotion categories. His

methodology included a subjective or introspective language approach including terms used to describe inner-feeling states such as angry, happy, and sad. In addition, he introduced an intensity dimension suggesting that emotion terms can be graded. In summary, his major contributions to emotion classification included the dimensions of polarity, valences, mixed emotion categories, compounded emotions, intensity, analogy, and the possibility of a dictionary of emotions.

In 1983, Hochschild elaborated a classification system from a constructionist and affect-control theory perspective. She saw emotions as managing "temporary roles" involving "expecting and wanting." Her notions on classification involved charting emotions as a result of the individual's "momentary focus." She listed emotion labels and categories in terms of what individuals liked or wanted, in terms of what they had or did not have, or had lost, and in terms of what individuals approve or disapprove. One of her contributions to the classification of emotions is the elaboration of categories of expectations and sanctions used to differentiate emotion labels.

Ortony et al. published their cognitive theory of emotions in 1988. They were a few of the first psychologists to recognize the importance of social events in elaborating emotion categories. Their categories included being pleased or displeased about *desirable* or *undesirable events*. These positive and negative sanctioning dimensions were used to define *joy* as Self being pleased about a desirable event and *distress* as Self being displeased about an undesirable event. Happy-for-other was defined as being pleased about a desirable event for Other and sorry-for-other as being displeased about an undesirable event for Other. Like Hochschild, they also elaborated emotion categories in terms of *approving* or *disapproving* of an individual's actions. They defined *pride* in terms of self-approving of one's own action and *shame* as self-disapproving of one's own action. When Self approves of someone else's action, they assigned the label *admiration*, and when Self disapproves of someone else's action, the label *reproach* was assigned.

They also noted to which actor an emotion was directed, to Self or to Other. The *directionality* dimension is one of their contributions for classifying emotions. Another is the categorization of emotions in terms of the extent to which actors approve of their and other actor's actions (meeting expectations) and defining events as desirable (receiving rewards) or undesirable. In addition, they believed that the emotion categories they generated provided a "meaning" for emotion labels and a basis for grouping them into "levels of differentiation," separating the higher orders of emotions from the elemental ones.

Turner's (1998, 2002) approach to classification included the assumption of a set of four primary emotions generally agreed upon by other scholars that had origins in the evolutionary natural selection process. He grouped these four primary emotions in terms of their intensity and then "mixed" the primaries into *first-order combinations* or *elaborations*. These elaborations involved the simultaneous activation of two primary emotions with one being more dominant. He demonstrated that the permutations of each set of 2 primary labels "produced" 12 first-order groupings of over 50 new emotion labels. More complex second-order emotion categories were then generated, each combining three of the four primaries. Just how he determined the labels for each of the categories generated is not clear, but their elaborations at different levels became a model for a more comprehensive system of classification. Perhaps Turner's most seminal contribution is his belief that sanctions and expectations were the "two critical dimensions of any interaction that constrained and circumscribed the valence and amplitude of emotions" (Turner 2002:83).

What each of these scholars had in common was a set of theoretical dimensions from which they deduced the meanings for emotion categories and for which they attached primary and secondary labels. The various dimensions and categories proposed by these scholars will be critical in outlining a new classification system.

RELEVANT FACTORS IN CLASSIFYING EMOTIONS

Before presenting a classification scheme, a brief definition of emotion is needed. From a sociological perspective, emotion, in general, concerns the way the body responds to environmental conditions. If emotions are responses to environmental events (Arnold 1970; Kagan 1958), they must be defined in terms of their behavioral and environmental preconditions (Thamm 1975). Even Plutchik (2001) conceded that emotions are reactions to situations usually of a social origin, such as a change in a social relationship.

The assumption from a sociological perspective not only precludes the existence of social stimuli that aids in the prediction of emotion states, but is also a cognitive appraisal of emotion-relevant social preconditions and states (Thamm 1992, 2004). The social appraisals (cognitive processing) then produce subsequent physiological responses (affective arousal). For this taxonomic exercise, *emotion* includes both the appraisal and social dimensions and is defined as the *process of actors appraising and responding to real or imagined focused social situations.*

CULTURE, STRUCTURE, AND APPRAISAL

Although the appraisal process is essential in understanding emotions, the immediate concern will be on the antecedent social conditions that, after being appraised, directly define the meaning of each emotion category. In this regard, the most vital question is, exactly which social dimensions are being appraised in focused emotion situations. There are 2 distinct social factors in the emotion causal chain: the *social content* factor and the subsequent *social structure* factor. It is important to distinguish between them, for it will be assumed in the classification model that the social structural factor is more effective in differentiating emotion categories.

Content versus Structure

From the constructionists perspective (e.g., Averill 1980; Harré 1986), the presence or absence of emotion depends on the nature of the *social context* (or *content*) in unique cultural settings, as well as on the cognitive constructions of perceivers of emotion events. However, philosophers of social construction have denied any "essence" to emotion that can be reidentified across time and culture. In fact, they have devoted a great deal of effort to show that there are no legitimate ways of grouping emotions that would allow them to be classified across cultural contexts. In this regard, Griffiths (1997) noted that Harre and other constructionists have greatly exaggerated the range of emotion phenomena that they can explain.

So, can culture-specific social *content* differentiate emotion categories? From a constructionist perspective, it seems difficult, in that social content connected to a given emotion varies from time to time and location to location. If emotions involve cognitive constructions derived from culture-specific events, then it would seem impossible to isolate and define universal emotion categories using this methodology. For example, the same social content producing the emotion labeled anger in one culture-specific social situation might not in another.

How then can universal structures of emotion categories be differentiated and classified if the content associated with each of them has so much intercultural variation? In this respect, the culture-specific *social content* approach hardly provides a foundation for classifying universal emotion categories. Cultural content in emotion instances, however, can be conceptualized as a necessary precursor to the structural appraisals of that content. Gordon (1990:157) recognized this blending of social content and structure in the understanding of emotions by mandating that

an "analysis is needed of the *social structural* and *cultural* circumstances that are prerequisite to experiencing and expressing a particular emotion" (emphasis added). According to Gordon (1990), *social structure* refers to persisting patterns of social relationships that instigate emotions. In turn, these social structural variations are theoretically associated with definitions of specific emotion categories.

Social Structure and Appraisal

In the past, appraisals of *social content* have not shown to be productive in emotion differentiation. This is partly because there are literally millions of social content instances that might evoke any given emotion. Moreover, there are far fewer emotion categories than the almost infinite number of social content situations that can be used to predict each of them (Morgan and Heise 1988). This leads us to postulate that although the social content approach has failed to produce a viable paradigm for the classification of emotions, the social structural approach has promise.

However, how does the appraisal process of deriving emotion structures and categories from social content instances work? More specifically and significantly, what do these millions of specific emotion content instances have in common? For example, what do all anger-producing social situations have in common? Attempting to answer these questions requires a closer examination of the appraisal process. The key observation in this explanation centers around the notion that emotion appraisals are not of social content per se, as some constructionists believe, but, rather, of the *structure of the content.* Within an emotion-focused situation, the real-perceived or imagined social-action content is appraised in terms of its structural configurations. The structure of the content is the "essence" of emotion appraisal, not the content itself.

This distinction is important in that it is the variants of *structural configurations* that ultimately define each emotion category. More importantly, these structural configurations can be elaborated, independent of content. The construction of emotion categories requires no specific social content, in that the collectivity of thousands of diverse and sometimes conflicting social content exemplifications might all be members of the structure of a specific emotion category.

Once the appraisal of the structural emotion categories is made, the emotion follows, but the emotion categories exist independently, whether or not they were ever appraised in any social situation. In this sense, the appraisal process is redundant in elaborating emotion categories, for it is only the remaining structurally defined categories that serve as the bases for emotion differentiation and classification.

THE CLASSIFICATION SCHEME

The proposed strategy of classifying emotions is divided into three stages. The first stage is the formal construction of emotion categories. During this stage, there is little need to consider either the subsequent effects of emotions (e.g., physiological responses and behavioral expression of emotions) or the antecedent *social content* of perceived social-emotion situations. It only involves the elaboration of *social structural* conditions and states associated with each emotion category generated and provides, in a Linnaean-like model, for their levels of differentiation.

The second stage involves the labeling of emotion categories elaborated at stage one. A preliminary glossary of emotion terms is eminent at this stage. A possible third stage involves the formal mapping of emotion categories similar to the Mendelean periodic chart. Charting or mapping of emotions would be the final stage in understanding how structural emotions are classified. However, the focus in this chapter is the enactment of stage one.

"CLASSIC" CONSTRUCTION OF EMOTION CATEGORIES

The primary purpose in the first stage of the classification scheme is to outline a strategy for defining and differentiating a comprehensive range of emotion categories. This requires a *classic* elaboration of sets of necessary and sufficient conditions that define each category. These conditions, in a sense, constitute the meanings of emotion. As Clore and Ortony (1991:48) maintained, such an approach involves defining emotions in terms of the conditions that produce them, since "the central tenet of the classical view is that there are necessary and sufficient conditions by virtue of which something is a member of a category." This is not an easy task in the elaboration of emotion categories. Russell (1991) cautioned that although philosophers and psychologists have tried for centuries, no one has listed features for emotion that are commonly accepted as necessary and sufficient.

In understanding the specific conditions necessary to define each emotion category, *structural dimensions* found in the literature will be applied at several levels of emotion differentiation. Recent attempts to explain human emotions have produced valuable contributions in proposing these necessary structural dimensions. However, one persistent problem has been the *number of dimensions* required to span the domain of emotions adequately. Morgan and Heise (1988) noted that as many as 5–11 structural dimensions have been proposed.

According to them, much discussion and research in past decades has centered on the three semantic differential scales of "evaluation, potency and activity" (EPA) (Osgood 1969), and there is much support, especially among the affect-control theory group, that these three dimensions represent universal and comprehensive dimensions of emotion. Morgan and Heise (1988), for example, concurred in favoring this EPA "three-dimensional structure" originally proposed by Osgood. The inclusion of these three dimensions in the classification scheme is critical, but to incorporate *only* these three dimensions is quite limiting.

Plutchik (1980), on the other hand, has classified the emotions according to four additional dimensions. They included (1) positive or negative, (2) primary or mixed, (3) polar opposites, and (4) varying intensity. Among sociologists, Kemper (1978), in a multidimensional approach, classified emotions in terms of (1) their duration (long or short term), (2) their real, imagined, and anticipated outcomes in social relations, (3) whether they are structural, anticipatory, or consequent, (4) whether they are positive or negative, and (5) whether they are power or status related. From a different perspective, Thamm (1992) and Turner (2002) saw expectations and sanctions as essential dimensions in classifying emotions, and Stryker (2004) and others have proposed numerous additional dimensions as part of their emotion theories.

Some of these dimensions are widely reported in the literature, but they might not be sufficient in predicting and differentiating a wide range of emotion categories. There might be other more important, yet unreported dimensions that need to be taken into account. However, whichever known dimensions contribute to the effective differentiation of emotion categories also need to be incorporated into the scheme. One objective is to include as many of these reported dimensions as possible.

Emotion Categories

The purpose of categorization in the sciences is to group together things because of some underlying similarity-generating mechanism. According to Griffiths (1997:16), instances of the same chemical element, for example, resemble one another because of a "shared microstructure." The

general purpose in classifying emotion categories is the same, except that instead of chemical elements, the intent is to group emotion instances in terms of their resemblances because of their *microsocial structures*.

In grouping emotion instances, Gordon asked which elements that form a particular emotion differentiate it from other emotions. He maintained that "an analysis is needed of the *social structural* and cultural circumstances that are prerequisite to experiencing and expressing an emotion" (emphasis added) (Gordon 1990:157). In examining these circumstances, the social structural conditions and states that define each emotion category need to be uncovered, elaborated, and formalized.

Formal Category Dimensions

The primary benefit of formalizing structures of emotion categories is providing a scheme in which complex structural configurations that predict each emotion can be easily summarized and illustrated in condensed symbolic notations. In this manner, a clear interpretation of complex structural conditions and states that define emotion categories can more easily be achieved.

To this end, various universal emotion structural dimensions will be incorporated and integrated into a formal system of notations, symbolic of the necessary and sufficient conditions and states that define each emotion category. The result is a rather complex but parsimonious formal paradigm for generating and classifying the meanings for a wide range of human emotions.

According to Russell (1991), to know the meaning of each emotion is to know, at least implicitly, a set of necessary and sufficient causal features. In addition, he proposed that membership in an emotion category "is determined by a set of common features. All members have all the defining features, all members are equal in membership, and members can be precisely distinguished from nonmembers" (Russell 1991:37–38). In defining emotion categories, the following propositions are offered in addition to Russell's criteria.

1. Elemental emotion categories are "pure," discrete, mutually exclusive, and nonoverlapping.
2. Compound emotion categories are overlapping and are not characterized by mutual exclusivity.
3. Emotion categories are exhaustive. Meaningful additional categories cannot be logically deduced.
4. Emotion categories can be classified according to various levels of differentiation, complexity, and generality.

These criteria are suggested as guidelines in the following classification process.

Levels, Dimensions, and Formalizations

The elaboration and inclusion of various emotion-relevant social structural dimensions are prerequisite to generating specific emotion categories. The general objective is to use these dimensions to devise a formal classification of emotion categories and to combine many dimensions proposed in the literature into multiple "levels of differentiation" (Ortony et al. 1988).

The general classification model will also utilize analogies to the classical Mendelean and Linnean systems. Such approaches heretofore have been advocated by many scientists. After citing a few of these scholars, Plutchik (1980) listed three arguments favoring the viability of analogical

method: (1) The resemblance between the laws of a science and the laws of another science makes one of the two sciences serve to illustrate the other; (2) it permits the organization of a large body of phenomenology in a logically consistent way according to a previously investigated logical system; and (3) it is characteristic of human language in that it is made up of metaphors and analogies, which are a fertile ground for the exploration of ambiguity and the discovery of hidden likenesses.

The analogical scheme proposed below parallels the seven-level conceptual approach used by Linnaeus in categorizing living things. He classified plants and animals ranging from the most general level (kingdom) to the most specific level (species): kingdom, phylum, class, order, family, genus, and species. The classification system outlined below will generally be analogous to the logic, levels, and terminology applied by Linnaeus. Each of these Linnaean levels will include selected emotion-relevant structural dimensions as well as respective emotion categories generated within them.

LEVELS OF EMOTION DIFFERENTIATION

The classification scheme begins with elaborating the most general and least complex categories and ends with the most specific and most complex categories. The most general level of differentiation is presented first. It incorporates the dimension of *valences,* including positive, negative, and mixed emotion categories.

Level I. Positive and Negative "Kingdoms" of Emotions

The positive-negative polarity and the notion of opposites originally derived from the medieval church, which, in turn, traces its psychology back to Aristotle. Today, the concept of valence enters in virtually every theory of emotion in at least an indirect way. The reliance on valence pairs has a long history in psychology. "Since 1961, more than 600 published papers have explored and tested the concepts of positive and negative affect" (Solomon and Stone 2002:418).

Many scholars have argued for the centrality of a valence in grouping emotions. Aquinas, for example, used "good" and "evil" to classify emotions. More recently, Arnold (1970) expanded the criteria used by Aquinas as to whether an object is "good" or "bad." Russell (1980:1163) later suggested that one property of the cognitive representation of affect is the dimension of "pleasantness-unpleasantness," and Kemper (1978:47) argued that an emotion is "a relatively short-term evaluative response essentially positive or negative in nature." Kelley (1984) reviewed the early valence-oriented emotion theories of Abelson (1983), de Rivera (1977), Roseman (1979), and Wiener (1980) and concluded that one feature common to all the theories is the positive or negative (pleasant or unpleasant, wanted or unwanted) nature of the emotion experience.

Other theorists connect the valence dimension to a preferred selected second dimension. Shelly (2001), in his model of how sentiments lead to expectations, extensively used valences to represent task-outcome states in terms of success or failure, states of liking or disliking, and states of task ability. Clark (1990) used "positive other-emotions" and "negative other-emotions" in indicating inferiority and superiority in controlling the balance of emotional energy and eliciting a sense of obligation in relations, and Collins (1990) contrasted positive and negative "short-term emotions" in terms of how they are generated and expressed as levels of "emotional energy." Hammond (1990) saw positive and negative arousal in terms of pursuing "affective maximization," and according to Plutchik (1980), environmental stimuli are given a positive or negative valence.

Appraisal models commonly suggest that situations are judged positively or negatively and that these "definitions of the situation" are emotionally appraised and reappraised. Other models, such as those presented by Arnold (1970) and Lazarus et al. (1980), however, failed to specify what instances or events in the situation led to positive or negative appraisals. However, in any case, *valence* seems to be a most fundamental and most frequently applied dimension in grouping emotions and it also appears to be the most commonly discussed emotion dimension by theorists and researchers. Overall, emotion scholars in their conceptualizations seem to have little reservation in elaborating positive and negative categories and they proceed to list examples of emotion labels attached to each.

In the proposed classification scheme, the *kingdoms* of emotion will include the *positive*, *negative*, and *mixed* emotion categories. These categories will be notated with various configurations of positive [+] or negative [−] states.

Level II. Normal and Abnormal "Phyla" of Emotions

The *normality* of emotion is also a fundamental classification dimension. However, because this dimension is not generally discussed at length by theorists or researchers, there seems to be little concern about a formal distinction between normal and abnormal emotion categories. This difference, however, is apparent in the psychological academic community in the offering of specialized courses in "abnormal psychology" that generally have a psychoanalytic orientation. The abnormal emotions are commonly identified with emotional (mental) disorders and "imaginary" emotion experiences, whereas the normal emotions are considered those experienced in most "real" day-to-day social interactions.

The primary assumption in classifying the phyla of emotions is that *social content* of appraisals is altered when moving from the normal to abnormal, but *social structural forms* do not change. Actors, as they wander from social reality, recall, fantasize, or dream by reconstructing social content. This cognitive manipulation of *real* content provides actors with more idealized escapes and solutions to a "shame-based" past reality. Although the *content* of their imaginations can be considered abnormal, the *structures* of their "magically" created emotion instances take on the same social forms as are found in normal emotion situations and categories. If the structures of emotion categories are the same for normal (real) and abnormal (imagined) social situations, they both can be formalized using the same notation system. The only two differences include a formal notation change by circling or inflating the valence signs to indicate abnormal states and the use of different emotion labels for abnormal categories due to their unreal properties.

The classification of the two emotion phyla includes the *normal* emotion categories and the *abnormal* emotion categories, along with their respective conditions and states. The states for these two emotion branches are identified with a notation and a brief structural definition.

1. Pluses [+] and minuses [−] represent *normal* emotion conditions when appraised emotion states reflect *real* social situations.
2. Circled pluses [⊕] and minuses [⊖] represent *abnormal* emotions when appraised emotion states reflect *imaginary* social situations.

These distinctions are interesting in that, perhaps for the first time, the formalization and integration of psychoanalytic processes might be possible. An elaboration of the phylum of abnormal emotions is eminent, but far beyond the limitations and scope of this presentation. The uncircled plus and minus notations will be used throughout the remainder of the chapter to represent *normal* emotion states.

Level III. Static and Dynamic "Classes" of Emotions

There is a long-standing structural-functional theoretical tradition distinguishing the *static* from the *dynamic* aspects of social systems. The static is usually defined more in terms of social structural variations, whereas the dynamic is defined in terms of social change and social functions in interactions and institutions (e.g., Parsons 1951). These distinctions can be applied in differentiating the two *classes* of emotions. The class of *structural emotions* is represented by states that are relatively stable and fixed, whereas the class of *transition emotions* is represented by processes of social change, from a set of stable states to an opposite set, from positive to negative, or vice versa. As states on social structural conditions change, so do emotion appraisals, and these changing states define the class of transient emotion categories. Gordon (1985:136) supported this distinction in stating that structural change in society ultimately leads to change in the emotions, and "as social stimuli change, so must emotional responses change."

Kemper (1978) characterized "structural emotions" (static) as a point of equilibrium, as being relatively stable with little change from interaction episode to episode, and, in contrast, he saw "anticipatory emotions" (dynamic) as looking to the future of the relationship, the probable success or failure of the relation, as prospectively good or bad, and in terms of optimism or pessimism. Kemper implied that positive anticipations involve going from a negative structural assessment to a positive assessment of the situation and that negative anticipations involve going from a positive structural assessment to a negative. Such transitions generally describe the *classes* of dynamic anticipatory emotion categories, including the positive "hopes" and the negative "fears."

Kemper further noted that in popular discourse, one of the most common anticipatory emotions is anxiety. Accepting this, *general anxiety* seems a reasonable label for both the positive and negative anticipatory emotion categories. An elaboration of the two *classes* of emotion includes the *static, stationary*, or *structural* emotion categories, and the *dynamic, anticipatory*, or *transitional* emotion categories. The states for these two emotion dimensions are identified with a notation and a brief structural definition.

1. Plus [+] and minus [−] *structural* emotion states: When emotion appraisal conditions are constructed from positive or negative *stable or stationary* conditions.
2. Minus-to-plus [− +] and plus-to-minus [+ −] *transitional* emotion states: When emotion appraisal conditions are constructed from positive or negative *anticipatory* conditions.

The static notations will be used directly in outlining the class of structural emotions. Like the phylum of abnormal emotions introduced at Level II, an elaboration of the class of anticipatory anxiety emotions is beyond the scope of this chapter.

Level IV. Expectation and Sanctioning "Orders" of Emotions

Before considering the more complex orders of emotion categories, a model for elaborating their conditions and states is presented. The following paradigm is designed to formalize emotion structures with up to four emotion-relevant conditions. An exhaustive number of permutations will be generated from the paradigm, and each configuration will symbolize the conditions and states associated with a specific emotion category.

Formal notations of brackets, conditions, and states are introduced. The brackets are used to illustrate the parameters of each emotion category. Structural conditions are presented in quadrant form within each bracket. The location of four elementary structural conditions is assigned to respective quadrants, and states on relevant conditions are illustrated within the quadrants.

To begin the formalization, each structural emotion category is defined in terms of the number of relevant emotion conditions and the appraised states for each condition. The number of relevant conditions is determined by how many pluses and minuses are illustrated within each bracket. The state on each relevant condition is notated in terms of valence signs with either a positive (+) valence or a negative (−) valence.

1. Examples of one-condition categories: [$^{+}$] and [$_{-}$].
2. Examples of two-condition categories: [$^{-}_{+}$], [$_{-}{}_{+}$], and [$_{-}{}^{+}$].
3. Examples of three-condition categories: [$^{-}{}^{-}_{+}$], [$^{-}_{-}{}_{+}$], and [$_{-}{}^{+}_{-}$].
4. Examples of four-condition categories: [$^{+}_{+}{}^{+}_{+}$], [$^{-}_{+}{}^{+}_{-}$], and [$^{-}_{-}{}^{+}_{+}$].

Different structural dimensions and conditions occupy different locations in the paradigm and their meanings and formal notations, illustrated as emotion categories, are generated and differentiated.

Expectation Dimensions. The first major social dimension to be formalized using the notations outlined above pertains to the extent to which actors meet or do not meet expectations in emotion situations. Over the past few decades, expectation states theory (see Berger 1988) has played a major role in understanding the structure of emotions. The essential idea in this theory is that interaction is organized around expectations that constrain how individuals respond to each other (Turner 2002). Such theories, however, center on expectations of group members prior to meeting or not meeting them. The meaning of the concept of *expectation* in this theoretical literature is confusing, in that actors are "expected" to meet "expectations" in social situations. This statement seems to have a double meaning in that the "expected" outcome is a different concept than the "actual" outcome. The expected outcome is described in the literature in terms of a "potential," "likely," or "probable" outcome and is a function of the "ability" of the actor to successfully meet expectations.

Expectation states theory thus seems to be more concerned with predicting whether actors will potentially perform (meet expectations in the future) or not (not meet expectations in the future), compared to whether actors *did* in fact perform (met expectations) or did not perform (failed to meet expectations). This theory is more about the unknown *anticipated* outcome rather than the known structural outcome, as in "the actor is expected to win the race," contrasted to "the actor won the race." Because of the dynamic and anticipated nature of the "expected" conceptualization, its classification value is more in understanding *transition* emotion categories where outcomes are unknown, rather than *structural* categories where outcomes have already been determined. The structural dimension proposed in this classification system pertains only to the outcomes in relations, *after* the expectations are or are not met, and how these outcomes, when appraised, define emotion categories.

This structural expectation dimension also does not involve the *content* of subsequent actions or future evaluations made by the actors subsequent to the emotion event. To this extent, expectation states theory again fails to provide a viable model for the prediction of *structural* emotion variation, as it is more concerned with "social content" in the appraisal process rather than the consequences of social structural outcomes. More relevant to the proposed dimension, Gordon (1990) noted that emotions are commonly aroused when one's expectations are either fulfilled or violated.

From a slightly different perspective, Kemper (1978) introduced the concept of *agency*, whereby Self or Other is *responsible* for social structural variations in relations. If Self is the agent, the implication is that Self is "responsible" for the outcome. Following this logic, the responsible Self is to be blamed or praised for meeting or not meeting expectations and to subsequently receive appropriate rewards or punishments (sanctions). Weiner (1982) also thought along similar lines in

identifying a dimension of emotion that he called "controllability." Controllability implies internal causation and is defined in terms of which actor (Self or Other) is attributed with the responsibility (blame or praise) for controllable causal conditions. Like Kemper, the notion of *responsibility* presented by Weiner helps define this emotion-relevant dimension of actors having met or not met expectations.

Sanctioning Dimensions. In learning theory, environmental events consist of rewards and punishments or "reinforcements" for appropriate or inappropriate actions. Reflecting this theoretical tradition, Gray (1971) noted that the common element binding emotions is that they all represent some kind of reaction to a reinforcing event. For example, Turner (2002) proposed that using negative sanctions invites negative emotional responses. In contrast, positive sanctions generate variants and elaborations of happiness. Roseman (1979) also associated specific emotions with situational sanctioning. Positive sanctioning is represented as the "occurrence of a desired event," and negative sanctioning is represented as the "occurrence of an undesired event." He maintained that actors experience joy when a desired event occurs and sorrow when a desired event does not occur, and distress when an undesired event occurs and relief when an undesired event does not occur. It goes almost without saying that rewards tend to make people happy and punishment makes people unhappy!

What is important in the classification process, however, is how rewards and punishments are distributed among actors in emotion situations. This is perhaps the most salient dimension, for what could be more central emotionally than appraisals of who received or did not receive rewards in social relations?

Expectation-Sanction Dimensions. Social role-model theories of emotion (e.g., Averill 1980) have two variants: The first is that behavior is driven by attempts to conform to social roles (meeting expectations), and the second is that behavior is brought into conformity by patterns of reinforcement (positive sanctioning) (Griffiths 1997). Elaborating on this, Hochschild (1983) argued that emotions are about "expecting and wanting," and she went on to categorize 19 emotion labels by the individual's "momentary focus." They include categories of liking or disliking, approving and disapproving (expectation dimensions), having or not having, and wanting or not wanting (sanctioning dimensions). Such categories fit well into the expectation-sanctioning conceptualization being proposed.

According to Turner (2002) and Thamm (1992), sanctions and expectations are the primary mechanisms by which emotions are aroused in encounters. The significance of these dimensions cannot be overemphasized, and their inclusion is necessary in any comprehensive emotion categorization scheme.

Directionality Dimensions. Sociologists of emotion have been interested in a vocabulary used to identify emotions directed to Self or Other or emotions directed to both Self and Other. For example, it is quite likely that anger and pity can be self-directed, as well as other-directed (Weiner 1982). Expanding on this, Kemper (1978) maintained that different emotions might be directed toward the different parties involved, including Self, Other, and a third party (if there is one). Therefore, emotion appraisal can focus either on the Self, Other, both, or on all three parties, as in the special case of jealousy.

Interaction theory also assumes the identities of both Self and Other, and as Goffman (1974) indicated, emotions occurs *between* persons. Thus, concern for others or one's relation to others is reflected in various appraisal dimensions and might give rise to many different emotions

(Manstead and Fischer 2001). In general, there is somewhat of a consensus among thinkers that the *directionality* of emotions is a necessary social dimension in elaborating emotion categories. The Self-Other dimension combined with the expectation-sanction dimension will account for the elemental emotion categories.

Elemental Emotions. A controversy over the basic emotions has been ongoing for several thousand years. Although there is a vast literature on this subject, there is little agreement concerning how many basic emotion traits there are or what these traits are to be called (Weiner 1982). So are there basic emotions at all, and what is their number and identity, and why is there such disorder of various proposed lists? These questions signal some confusion in the search for basic emotions, and perhaps as Solomon (2002) concluded, no emotion deserves to be elevated over all the others as more basic. However, there does seem to be agreement that some emotions are more basic, primarily because they have less complex specifications and eliciting conditions than others (Ortony et al. 1988).

Finally, Gordon (1990) asked if there might be a set of sociologically basic emotions relevant to social interaction. In response to his question, it is proposed that there is such a set of basic emotions, and these categories will be the first elaborated. It is achieved by formally integrating the positive-negative, the expectation-sanction, and the Self-Other dimensions. The combinations of these dimensions will define the most elemental (and mutually exclusive) emotion categories, and from these, more compound categories will be generated at the next level.

Formalization of Elemental Emotions. The classification of the two emotion orders includes the *expectation emotion* and the *sanctioning emotion* categories. *Expectation* conditions and states will be notated on the top row within the paradigm brackets, with *sanctioning* conditions and states on the bottom row. Of the dimensionality categories, *Self's* emotion states are indicated in the left column and *Other's* emotion states in the right column.

Like atoms in the differentiation of chemical elements, valences are used to elaborate the structure of the eight elemental emotion categories. They include the following structural configurations and corresponding notations:

1. Self met expectations [$^{+}$], or Self did not meet expectations [$_{-}$].
2. Other met expectations [$^{+}$], or Other did not meet expectations [$^{-}$].
3. Self received rewards [$_{+}$], or Self did not receive rewards [$^{-}$].
4. Other received rewards [$_{+}$], or Other did not receive rewards [$_{-}$].

Other theorists have come to similar conclusions. Ortony et al. (1988) have listed structures paralleling the elemental emotion categories outlined above.

Approving of one's own act [$^{+}$].
Disapproving of one's own act [$^{-}$].
Approving of another's act [$^{+}$].
Disapproving of another's act [$^{-}$].
Pleased about a desirable event [$_{+}$].
Displeased about an undesirable event [$_{-}$].
Pleased about a desirable event for Other [$_{+}$].
Displeased about an undesirable event for Other [$_{-}$].

The one-condition elemental emotion categories can also be combined to form compound emotion categories. The two-condition compounds will be addressed next.

Level V. The Comparative "Families" of Emotions

Ortony et al. (1988) noted that the "levels of differentiation" indicate higher orders of emotions and they differentiate them from the elemental ones. At this level, 24 two-condition categories compare 2 elemental categories, and together they make up the attribution, distribution, and interaction *families* of emotions. These three dimensions and their variations will account for the classification of a large number of the most commonly experienced emotions.

Mixed Valences. In addition to the "pure" and mutually exclusive elemental emotion categories, emotions can have mixed positive and negative components. Even the traditional approaches attempt to explain and classify emotions by labeling a certain number of "primary" emotions and then argue that these emotion "labels" are interconnected in some fashion. From these primary emotions, more complex, or blended, emotions could be derived (Russell 1991).

Many theorists had something to say about mixed emotions. In a positive vein, Averill (1975) proposed the construction of "compound" emotions, based on the more "elementary" ones. Ekman (1982), in confirming his studies of facial expression of emotions, concluded that emotions do "mix," and Plutchik (1962) spoke of "mixed states" of primary emotions, in that a small number of "pure" emotions could be combined into more uniquely specific "compound" and "complex" structures. In addition, Turner (2002) noted that one way to increase the emotional repertoire is to "mix" primary emotions.

Conversely, Ortony and Turner (1990) argued that the mixing of emotions is not helpful and has caused a lack of precision and clarity. Also, Weiner (1982) concluded that how complex emotions get built up from more basic ones is still a mystery. Hopefully, the proposed formal integration of these mixed valence emotion categories will help dispel such a mystery and such vagueness.

Before formally elaborating the 24 mixed emotion categories, a brief review of the three families of emotions is offered along with some theoretical implications. The attribution family will be addressed first, followed by the distribution and interaction families.

Attribution Emotion Family. Emotions can be attributed to either Self or Other, or to both. In this subsection, the comparative emotion attributions of Self and Other will be examined from identity theory and power-status theory perspectives. However, how expectations are related to sanctions in defining the compound attribution emotion categories will be examined first.

Some time ago, Durkheim (1938) asserted that expectations define punishments and rewards for various forms of behavior and specify social consequences for the person performing the action. More recently, Scheff (1990) discussed how conformity (meeting expectations) related to sanctioning. He argued that actors usually conform because they are likely to be rewarded when they do and punished when they do not.

Turner (2002) tied these dimensions to emotions in maintaining that "sanctions are used to assure that individuals do what they are supposed to do." Sanctions, according to Turner (1998:445), are "ultimately a response to expectations about proper conduct, and moral codes have no meaning unless they are imbued with emotional content." Turner (2002) further hypothesized that the more individuals receive positive sanctions and the more expectations are met, the greater will be the variants and elaborations of satisfaction-happiness (positive emotions), and the more individuals receive negative sanctions and the less expectations are met, the greater will be the variants and elaborations of assertion-anger, aversion-fear, and disappointment-sadness (negative emotions). In conclusion, Turner (2002:89) argued, "if negative sanctions and failures to meet

expectations did not arouse emotion, humans would all be sociopaths; and as a result, the social order would not be possible."

Attribution Theory. Comparing the appraisals of meeting or not meeting expectations for an actor to the resulting sanctions defines Self's and Other's attribution emotion categories. Weiner (1982) stated that "attributional analysis" facilitates the understanding of emotional experiences and underlying dimensions of attributions are the significant determinants of affective reactions. Moreover, he contended that causal attributions appear to be sufficient antecedents for emotions elicitation, and the discovery of these causal dimensions is an indispensable requirement for the construction of a general attribution theory of emotion.

Attribution processes, according to Turner (2002), are also an important part of emotional reactions. When emotions are positive, individuals can *attribute* their success in meeting expectations and receiving positive sanctions to themselves, or to others, or to categories of others. In assessing attributions in relations, actors define themselves or others in terms of expectation-sanction emotion categories, and the Self or the Other can take on verified attribution configurations as part of an "identity standard" (Burke 2004).

Identity Theory. Smith-Lovin (1990:238) has suggested that a sociological theory of emotion should link emotional response to other aspects of social action, like identity, and Stryker (2004) noted that one element in identity theory thinking recognizes the import of affect. Stryker further argued that actors care whether expectations are met, and the success or failure to meet expectations generates more or less strong and diverse forms of affective expression. More specifically, expected behavior typically generates or reflects feelings.

In reviewing identity theories, Turner (1998:432) proposed that "emotions drive individuals to act consistent with *expectations*" and to "receive *positive reinforcement.*" Performance (meeting or not meeting expectations) and sanctioning (receiving rewards or punishments) seem to be central dimensions in defining an individual's identities, and according to Turner (2002), expectations are key in the emotional reactions of individuals to self-verification. The relevance of the expectation-sanction dimension to identity theory is also discussed by Thoits (1985). She argued that in the process of self-labeling, actors are motivated to conform to social expectations and, from identity enactment, to obtain social rewards. Moreover, she argued that social rewards are presumed to encourage voluntary conformity to normative expectations. Thusly, she connects the self-labeling identity conceptualizations to the expectation and sanctioning dimensions outlined earlier for the differentiation of emotion categories.

Valence and Identities. Although identities can be defined in terms of expectation-sanctioning dimensions, how are such identities represented in terms of positive and negative states? Turner (2002:101) noted that "one does not have a view of self without emotional valences." He believes that it necessary to untangle the complexity of the emotional Self in analyzing emotional valences attached to varying cognitions that individuals have about themselves. The relation between identity and affect certainly needs more attention, and this is addressed in the next subsection, in which power-status and expectation-sanction dimensions are integrated and applied in the elaboration of attribution identity emotion categories.

Power and Status Identities. Kemper (1978) pointed to two underlying relational themes that have consistently emerged in prior theory and research efforts. He labeled these two dimensions

power and *status*. Kemper and Collins (1990) also viewed these dimensions as critical and have articulated a strong defense for their application in understanding emotions. They, however, did not provide a mechanism by which these dimensions can be formally translated into expectation-sanction valence states, a necessary requirement for inclusion in this classification system.

Power and Status Valences. Many theorists have offered definitions of power and status conceptualizations and have suggested distinctions between them. An extensive review of these definitions was conducted by Kemper (1978) in reviewing many theorists' conceptualizations, including Weber, Parsons, Homans, Blau, Osgood, Thibaut and Kelley, Heise, Kemper and Collins, Scheff, and several others.

In response to his review, Thamm (2004) entertained the possibility that power and status, as conceived by these many theorists, could be represented in terms of positive and negative valences and then further elaborated in terms of expectation and sanctioning states. These valences and definitions are summarized below in terms of power and status attribution emotion categories.

- [$\overset{+}{+}$] *High Status:* When Self did something positive and received something positive, or Self met expectations and received rewards.
- [$\overset{-}{-}$] *Low Status:* When Self did something negative and received something negative, or Self did not meet expectations and did not receive rewards.
- [$\overset{-}{+}$] *High Power:* When Self did something negative but received something positive, or Self did not meet expectations but received rewards.
- [$\overset{+}{-}$] *Low Power:* When Self did something positive but received something negative, or Self met expectations but did not receive rewards.

How, then, are power concepts generally differentiated from status concepts? It is apparent, as Kemper (1978:35) suggested, that rewards are not "the *differentia*." The condition that distinguishes power from status is not sanctioning, but it differentiates whether expectations were met in a given social situation. Both power and status suggest that actors were rewarded, but only power derives reward as a result of not meeting expectations, including "coercion," as Kemper argued. Status, conversely, requires compliance in meeting expectations, also argued by Kemper. Although Kemper elaborated an extensive emotion theory, he failed to define his power and status conceptualizations in terms of either expectation-sanctioning dimensions or in terms of valences. Expressing power and status dimensions as formal representations allows for their added meaning to the attribution emotion categories and provides for their more parsimonious classification.

Power- and Status-Identity Types. In affect-control theory, the evaluation, potency, and activity (EPA) dimensions introduced by Osgood (1969) include "feeling good" or "feeling bad" about performing. The good-bad performance dimension (meeting or not meeting expectations) could also include feeling good or bad about receiving rewards or punishment in social situations, a sanctioning dimension. Feeling good or bad, as expectation and sanctioning dimensions, can then be applied in defining both power and status attributions.

Combining feeling good about both one's performance and one's rewards defines a *high-status attribution*; feeling bad about ones performance along with feeling bad about one's punishment would constitute a *low-status attribution*; feeling good about one's performance but bad about one's punishment would be a *low-power attribution*; and feeling bad about one's performance but good about one's rewards would be a *high-power attribution.* This elaboration expands the EPA dimensions to include power and status, where "evaluation" becomes a status dimension and "potency" becomes a power dimension, a conclusion initiated by Kemper (1978).

Long-term power and status attributions might also be used to profile "classic" identity or personality types, such as the case with "heroes and villains." Of course, heroes are the high performers and villains the low performers. The corresponding sanctioning terms include "suffering" (receiving punishment) and "conquering" (receiving rewards). In summary, high status [$\begin{smallmatrix}+\\+\end{smallmatrix}$] is represented by the "conquering hero" identity type, low status [$\begin{smallmatrix}-\\-\end{smallmatrix}$] by the "suffering villain," high power [$\begin{smallmatrix}-\\+\end{smallmatrix}$] by the "conquering villain," and low power [$\begin{smallmatrix}+\\-\end{smallmatrix}$] by the "suffering hero." Each of these attribution types, when experienced over the long term, could be implemented as a fundamental dimension in characterizing a person's emotion identity.

Another classic psychological "typing" parallels the power and status attribution dimensions, including the categories of "sweet grapes" [$\begin{smallmatrix}+\\+\end{smallmatrix}$] for high status, "sour lemon" [$\begin{smallmatrix}-\\-\end{smallmatrix}$] for low status, "sweet lemon" for high power [$\begin{smallmatrix}-\\+\end{smallmatrix}$], and "sour grapes" [$\begin{smallmatrix}+\\-\end{smallmatrix}$] for low power. Applying the "mixed valence" conceptualizations of power and the "pure valence" conceptualizations of status allows for their inclusion within the proposed scheme. One insight in using power and status valence structures in defining emotion categories is that the consequences of meeting expectations is not always rewarding and not meeting expectations is not always punitive.

Distribution Emotion Family. Inequalities in the distribution of rewards are especially emotion relevant, as indicated by Marx and Engels in their structural theory of the alienation of labor. Other conflict theorists have added to the understanding of inequality in societies, including Dahrendorf, Coser, and Mills, among others. In combination, they have extensively critiqued the unequal and discriminating effects of centralized reward distributions in society.

However, their emotion concerns were with the macro and were general in scope, rather than with outlining microemotion categories (Scheff 2000). At the micro level, Hammond (1990:65) argued that inequality serves as one means to pursue what he called "affective maximization" for the individual. However, an affective maximization for the larger collectivity demands a different logic, where rewards or performances are decentralized and shared more equally among members.

Although much discussion in the literature concerns inequalities in the distribution of rewards, performance inequalities and their corresponding emotion categories are not widely considered. One explanation for this is that the distribution of performances is generally not as salient as the distribution of rewards in producing emotional reactions. The eight distribution emotion categories, however, reflect the inequalities in both actors' performances and actors' sanctioning.

Interaction Emotion Family. In the eight comparative interaction structures, only permutations of the two conditions in the diagonals of the brackets are elaborated, as they make up these categories. They each consist of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of one actor's performance on the other actor's sanctioning as well as the contribution that one actor made to the other or the retribution that one actor received from the other.

These interaction categories can also be used to define both specific and general interaction identities. One example is of the "loving mother" as having a role-specific social *content identity*, as opposed to a generalized "giving person" as the corresponding *structural identity.* Another example is the "sadistic boss" confirmed as Self's role-specific identity and the "abusive person" as the corresponding general structural identity.

The eight two-condition comparative interaction emotion categories are listed at the end of this fifth level of differentiation. The complete interaction categories, including both the contribution and retribution structures and their exchange outcomes, will be discussed at Level VII, where the complete four-condition emotion syndromes are elaborated.

FORMALIZATION OF COMPARATIVE EMOTIONS. The classification of the three comparative emotion families includes (1) the eight power and status identity *attributions* of Self and Other, (2) the eight *distributions* of performances and rewards between Self and Other, and (3) the eight contributive and retributive basic *interactions*. The categories for each of these 24 two-condition emotions are listed below with a brief structural definition.

Attribution Categories. *Just* (deserving) and *unjust* (undeserving) attribution identities make up the structural definitions of these categories. Just structures are defined when the expectation sign is consistent with the sanctioning sign, and unjust structures are defined when the two signs are inconsistent. This distinction parallels Turner's (2002) conceptualization of justice and injustice in relations.

1. Self status-identity dimensions (just/deserving)
   a. [$^{+}_{+}$] Self high-status-identity outcomes
   b. [$^{-}_{-}$] Self low-status-identity outcomes
2. Self power-identity dimensions (unjust/undeserving)
   a. [$^{-}_{+}$] Self high-power-identity outcomes
   b. [$^{+}_{-}$] Self low-power-identity outcomes
3. Other status-identity dimensions (just/deserving)
   a. [$^{+}_{+}$] Other high-status-identity outcomes
   b. [$^{-}_{-}$] Other low-status-identity outcomes
4. Other power-identity dimensions (unjust/undeserving)
   a. [$^{-}_{+}$] Other high-power-identity outcomes
   b. [$^{+}_{-}$] Other low-power-identity outcomes

Distribution Categories. Distribution emotion categories include the distribution of performances and the distribution of sanctions, between Self and Other. *Equal* distribution structures are defined when the two expectation signs are consistent, and *unequal* distribution structures are defined when the signs are inconsistent.

5. Performance-equality distribution dimension (equal/consistent signage)
   a. [$^{+}$ $^{+}$] Self and Other high-performance-equality outcomes
   b. [$^{-}$ $^{-}$] Self and Other low-performance-equality outcomes
6. Performance-inequality dimension (unequal/inconsistent signage)
   a. [$^{+}$ $^{-}$] Self performance-advantaged outcomes
   b. [$^{-}$ $^{+}$] Self performance-disadvantaged outcomes
7. Reward-equality dimensions (equal/consistent signage)
   a. [$_{+}$ $_{+}$] Self and Other high-reward-equality outcomes
   b. [$_{-}$ $_{-}$] Self and Other low-reward-equality outcomes
8. Reward-inequality dimension (unequal/inconsistent signage)
   a. [$_{+}$ $_{-}$] Self reward-advantaged outcomes
   b. [$_{-}$ $_{+}$] Self reward-disadvantaged outcomes

Interaction Categories. Emotion categories generated by this dimension include *contributions* of Self-to-Other and *retributions* from Other-to-Self. *Effective* interaction structures are defined when the two signs are consistent, and *ineffective* interaction structures are defined when the two signs are inconsistent.

9. Effective contribution dimension (effective/consistent signage)
   a. [$^{+}_{+}$] Self-rewarded-Other outcomes
   b. [$^{-}_{-}$] Self-punished-Other outcomes
10. Ineffective contribution dimension (ineffective/inconsistent signage)
   a. [$^{+}_{-}$] Self-failed-to-reward-Other outcomes
   b. [$^{-}_{+}$] Self-failed-to-punish-Other outcomes
11. Effective retribution dimension (consistent signage)
   a. [$^{+}_{+}$] Other-rewarded-Self outcomes
   b. [$^{-}_{-}$] Other-punished-Self outcomes
12. Ineffective retribution dimension (inconsistent signage)
   a. [$^{+}_{-}$] Other-failed-to-reward-Self outcomes
   b. [$^{-}_{+}$] Other-failed-to-punish-Self outcomes

These 24 comparative emotion categories combine several dimensions including attribution-distribution/interaction, power-status, Self-Other, just-unjust, and social identities. The families of emotions are some of the most commonly apprised in normal day-to-day relations.

Level VI. The "Genera" of Subtle Emotions

The three condition categories constitute the most undifferentiated groupings of emotions. There is little if any discussion in the literature elaborating emotion categories where three of the possible four conditions in the expectation-sanction paradigm are known. This is probably because of the subtle distinctions and highly overlapping structures among the 32 possible permutations. For this reason, the process of differentiating and classifying these subtle and complex emotion categories is especially difficult. Perhaps only the complexity and subtleties in natural language can offer meaning for these emotion categories. This remains to be seen.

Formalization of Subtle Emotions. Each of the three-condition subtle emotion categories is composed of three two-condition categories, including one interaction, one attribution, and one distribution category, as well as three one-condition elemental categories.

Four of the three-condition categories make up a complete syndrome of four conditions. Each of the eight formal complete emotion syndrome categories is created below, including their respective four three-condition unique subsets. The structures are listed below in additive form, beginning with the eight four-condition syndrome categories.

$$[^{+}_{+}\,^{+}_{+}] = [^{+}_{+}\,_{+}] + [^{+}_{+}\,^{+}] + [^{+}\,^{+}_{+}] + [_{+}\,^{+}_{+}]$$
$$[^{-}_{-}\,^{-}_{-}] = [^{-}_{-}\,_{-}] + [^{-}_{-}\,^{-}] + [^{-}\,^{-}_{-}] + [_{-}\,^{-}_{-}]$$
$$[^{-}_{+}\,^{-}_{+}] = [^{-}_{+}\,_{+}] + [^{-}_{+}\,^{-}] + [^{-}\,^{-}_{+}] + [_{+}\,^{-}_{+}]$$
$$[^{+}_{-}\,^{+}_{-}] = [^{+}_{-}\,_{-}] + [^{+}_{-}\,^{+}] + [^{+}\,^{+}_{-}] + [_{-}\,^{+}_{-}]$$
$$[^{+}_{+}\,^{-}_{-}] = [^{+}_{+}\,_{-}] + [^{+}_{+}\,^{-}] + [^{+}\,^{-}_{-}] + [_{+}\,^{-}_{-}]$$
$$[^{-}_{-}\,^{+}_{+}] = [^{-}_{-}\,_{+}] + [^{-}_{-}\,^{+}] + [^{-}\,^{+}_{+}] + [_{-}\,^{+}_{+}]$$
$$[^{-}_{+}\,^{+}_{-}] = [^{-}_{+}\,_{-}] + [^{-}_{+}\,^{+}] + [^{-}\,^{+}_{-}] + [_{+}\,^{+}_{-}]$$
$$[^{+}_{-}\,^{-}_{+}] = [^{+}_{-}\,_{+}] + [^{+}_{-}\,^{-}] + [^{+}\,^{-}_{+}] + [_{-}\,^{-}_{+}]$$

A complete structural definition of each complex four-condition category can be achieved by adding their respective one-, two-, and three-condition structures. These elaborations are too extensive and complex to explore in this chapter.

Level VII. The "Species" of Emotion Syndromes

Lazarus et al. (1980) maintained that some emotions are components of others and that several emotions can occur simultaneously. He argued that certain more complex emotions are distinguished by different patterns of components, which is what urges the analogy to a syndrome. Emotion syndromes in this scheme are manifested when all four conditions and states are appraised and known.

Power and Status Relations and Identities. Kemper (1978) identified structural emotion hierarchies in terms of power and status positions and believed that different outcomes of power and status in interaction predict specific emotions. He used the power and status dimensions to generate a set of relational structures and outcomes to predict certain emotions. These dimensions included Self or Other having varying amounts of power or status over the other. An actor might have an excess of power or status, an adequate amount of power or status, or insufficient power or status, compared to the other actor.

In terms of this classification scheme, Kemper's hierarchal arrangements are interpreted as an actor has (1) power advantage (excessive power) or (2) status advantage (excessive status). Of course, if one actor has an advantage, the other must have a disadvantage. In terms of disadvantaged relations, an actor might have (3) power disadvantage (insufficient power) or (4) status disadvantage (insufficient status) in the relation. In the remaining four elaborations of the power and status syndromes, actors have (5) high power equality (adequate power), (6) high status equality (adequate status), (7) low power equality (inadequate power), or (8) low status equality (inadequate status) in the relation. Applying these interpretations, the eight syndrome categories can be elaborated in terms of power and status advantages or disadvantages.

In reference to status distributions, Clark (1990) showed an interest in how actors establish "emotional place" in relations, where one actor stands in a relation compared to the other. Clark believed that knowing one's "place" in the relation is created "either by elevating oneself, or reducing the standing of the other." This creates identity positions of superiority, inferiority, or equality in standing. The strategies she outlines (Clark 1990:327) included "expressing negative other-emotions" or "expressing positive other-emotions" (to curry favor, promote one's own self-worth, or diminish others). Clark's categories parallel the status-advantaged (superiority), the status-disadvantaged (inferiority), and the status-equality structures in the scheme. Consistent with this thinking, Collins (1984) considered hierarchical versus egalitarian structures as a basis for differentiating emotions. Other research and theory dealing with power and status advantages in relations, and their correspondence to some of the proposed emotion categories, are discussed by Hegtvedt (1990).

Exchange Theory and Emotions. Kemper (1978) has argued that a sociological theory of emotions must stand basically on a comprehensive model of interaction. Interactive relations commonly involve exchanges, and, as Clark (1990) noted, the act of giving might underscore or enhance the donor's social worth. It might also obligate the recipient to repay the social debt. She maintained that obligation is either an emotion or an emotional blend and that it is necessary to discover how feelings of obligation develop and are channeled in exchange relations.

Exchange theory was originally developed by Thibaut and Kelley (1959), Homans (1961), and Blau (1964). It was based on the simple principle that one actor's contribution to another in costs can be compared to the other actor's retribution to the first in profits when comparing the "costs" and "benefits" among actors in exchanging rewards. In applying these economic

concepts, Homans (1961) was concerned with which emotions were produced when his principle of "distributive justice" was violated in social exchange. He linked alternative exchange structures with emotion labels and proposed that when a person's cost exceeded his or her profit, the person will display anger, and when the person's profit exceeded his or her cost, the person will display guilt. These principles are examples of unfairness in exchange relations. Fairness, on the other hand, occurs when a person's profits are equal to the investments (costs). The greater the investment (or contribution), the greater the profits (or retribution).

A simple definition of fairness is offered by Hegtvedt (1990). She maintained that fairness exists when what an individual receives from an exchange (the retribution inputs) in relation to what he or she contributes to the exchange (the outputs) is equivalent to the outcome/input ratio of his or her partner. Following these definitions, variations of fair and unfair exchange in interactions are considered highly emotion-relevant, and their corresponding emotion categories are formalized below.

FORMALIZATION OF EMOTION SYNDROMES. The eight syndromes include complete status and power self-identity emotion structures. The identity dimensions are complete in that they compare Self's identity to Other's identity, compare fairness to unfairness in exchange, and compare advantages and disadvantages in power and status relations. They are subdivided into either consensus or conflict relations. Structures represent consensus relations when the attribution signs for Self and Other are equal and represent conflict relations when they are unequal. Four of the eight emotion syndromes, including status-consensus and power-conflict syndromes, represent effective exchange relations between Self and Other, and the other four syndromes, including status-conflict and power-equality, define ineffective exchanges. Emotion structures are "fair" when the contribution-to-Other is equal to the retribution-from-Other, and they are "unfair" when the contribution-to-Other is unequal to the retribution-from-Other.

Status-Identity Syndromes. There are eight possible permutations of these dimensions and conditions. The four status-identity emotion categories, indicating either consensus or conflict in relations, are listed first, along with their structural definitions.

Status-consensus identity dimension (fair/effective interactions)

1. $\left[\begin{smallmatrix}+ & +\\ + & +\end{smallmatrix}\right]$ High-status-consensus identity outcomes
2. $\left[\begin{smallmatrix}- & -\\ - & -\end{smallmatrix}\right]$ Low-status-consensus identity outcomes

Status-conflict identity dimension (unfair/ineffective interactions)

3. $\left[\begin{smallmatrix}+ & -\\ + & -\end{smallmatrix}\right]$ Status-advantaged identity outcomes
4. $\left[\begin{smallmatrix}- & +\\ - & +\end{smallmatrix}\right]$ Status-disadvantaged identity outcomes

Power-Identity Syndromes. The four power-identity emotion categories, reflecting either consensus or conflict in relations, are listed below, along with their structural definitions.

Power-consensus identity dimension (fair/ineffective interactions)

5. $\left[\begin{smallmatrix}- & -\\ + & +\end{smallmatrix}\right]$ High-power-consensus identity outcomes
6. $\left[\begin{smallmatrix}+ & +\\ - & -\end{smallmatrix}\right]$ Low-power-consensus identity outcomes

Power-conflict identity dimension (unfair/effective interactions)

7. $\left[\begin{smallmatrix}- & +\\ + & -\end{smallmatrix}\right]$ Power-advantaged identity outcomes
8. $\left[\begin{smallmatrix}+ & -\\ - & +\end{smallmatrix}\right]$ Power-disadvantaged identity outcomes

Exchanges are more central and effective in the status-consensus and power-conflict structures where the interaction signs are consistent. They are less central and ineffective in

status-conflict and power-consensus relations where the sanctioning signs are inconsistent with the expectation signs.

Below are a few examples of where the formal definitions of emotion categories might be applied to theoretical conceptualizations.

1. When actors have status discrepancies [$\overset{+}{+}\ \overset{-}{-}$] or [$\overset{-}{-}\ \overset{+}{+}$] there appears to be less intimacy and more distance (Brown 1965; Stets 2004). This might be due to the ineffective interactions in these syndromes [$^{+}\ _{-}$] and [$_{+}\ ^{-}$] or [$^{-}\ _{+}$] and [$_{-}\ ^{+}$].
2. The person who loves least (contributes the least [$^{-}\ _{-}$]) usually maintains more power (has power-advantage [$\overset{-}{+}\ \overset{+}{-}$]) in a relationship (Waller 1963).
3. Cohesive bonds [$\overset{+}{+}\ \overset{+}{+}$] between actors are a consequence of mutually rewarding exchanges [$^{+}\ _{+}$] and [$_{+}\ ^{+}$] (Lawler and Yoon (1998).
4. Those who elicit more emotion from others [$_{+}\ ^{+}$] than they invest [$^{-}\ _{-}$], exercise control (power) [$\overset{-}{+}\ \overset{+}{-}$] over the interaction (Clark 1990).

CONCLUSIONS

Categorical variations listed in Levels I to VII might well constitute an exhaustive accounting of normal structural emotions. In this regard, Kemper (1987) asked how many emotions there are. Accepting the permutations outlined above, there are 72 structural emotion categories. Perhaps the number of possible emotion categories is better limited to the number of social structural configurations generated in social relations rather than the number of emotion labels somewhat arbitrarily listed in the literature. Kemper (1978) has argued that a full set of structural combinations would lead to 3^4, or 81 categories. This estimate is not far from the 72 outlined above.

The primary objective in this chapter has been to design a formal classification system that differentiates a wide variety of emotion categories. A number of social dimensions proposed by psychologists and sociologists were integrated in a formal elaboration of the structural emotions. These dimensions included (1) positive versus negative, (2) Self versus Other, (3) expectation versus sanction, (4) attribution versus distribution, (5) contribution versus retribution, (6) mild versus intense, (7) power versus status, (8) just versus unjust, (9) deserving versus undeserving, (10) fair versus unfair, (11) equality versus inequality, (12) conflict versus consensus, (13) consistent versus inconsistent, (14) effective versus ineffective, (15) elemental versus compound, (16) one condition versus multiconditions, (17) structural versus transitional, and (18) normal versus abnormal. The unique structures of emotion categories were described in terms of these 18 dimensions. What remains is the process of uncovering the best fit of emotion term or label for each of them.

The final question of course is which scheme best elaborates and predicts a large number of diverse human emotions? Although Kemper, Turner, Plutchik, and others have effectively proposed comprehensive structural theories of emotion, two of the advantages of this taxonomy over theirs include the larger number of structural dimensions that are taken into account in deriving emotion categories and the formal parsimonious differentiation of each category from each of the others.

In this outline of emotion categories, contributions of numerous scholars have been overlooked. It would require several volumes to do them justice. Nevertheless, many of their theories and research have been critical, directly or indirectly, in designing the taxonomy. Contributions of those frequently cited were indispensable.

The scheme outlined is obviously incomplete and preliminary, but, then again, every classification system is incomplete. In order to explain anything, one must omit the pretense of explaining

everything. As Kemper (1990:207) pointed out, "there are always unanswered questions, challenges from other theories, from disconfirming findings, and from possible failures in internal logic."

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