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Emotions and Narrative Analysis: A Methodological Approach

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1. INTRODUCTION

Emotion research in sociology and many other academic disciplines has become a vibrant and continuously expanding field constituting what some would call an emotional or affective turn (e.g. Greco and Stenner, 2008; Clough, 2008). The growth and establishment of a sociology of emotions in Europe—including a vibrant research network within the European Sociological Association and swiftly increasing attention for emotions during large sociology conferences—may be indicative of this development (Kleres, 2009b). Surprisingly, however, this seems to have had little impact so far on methodological debates in sociology. How emotions can be studied empirically in systematic ways has been the focus of relatively little attention and debate. To be sure, there are some notable exceptions. Chief among them is a line of research that has developed sets of linguistic markers for certain specific emotions, such as shame and anger (Scheff, 1988; Retzinger, 1991) or more generally positive and negative self-feelings (Bloch, 1996). This is particularly interesting as it addresses covert instances of emotions—a key methodological problem (Bloch, 1996). However, these frameworks are limited to specific emotions. Tamar Zilber (1998) advanced a more inclusive framework when she listed some linguistic markers of emotionality per se. However, this remains partial and is not embedded into a sociological conception of emotions nor into a more general methodological frame. Qualitative methodology books are largely mute on the matter. If they do mention emotions it concerns e.g. the role of emotions during interviewing or within the narrative process but lacks an analytical access to emotions as manifested in interview text (e.g. Lucius-Hoene and Deppermann, 2004; Kleinman and Copp, 1993; Lee-Treweek and Linkogle, 2000; Gilbert, 2000).

This article thus deals with a very concrete problem: how can we systematically analyze emotional experience through qualitative interviewing? In particular, how can we do this if interviewees regularly fail to spell out their emotions

explicitly? I want to argue that we can fruitfully extend the principles of one specific methodology—narrative analysis—to the systematic empirical analysis of emotions. This involves a specific view on emotions—the notion of emotions' narrative nature. I will briefly introduce key concepts of narrative analysis to be able to demonstrate how it allows for emotion analysis. Next, the concept of narrative emotions will be developed. Finally, employing mainly linguistic (and some cognate) research will help elaborate narrative analysis as an empirical technique for the study of emotions.

2. NARRATIVE METHODOLOGY

Narrative analysis usually doesn't focus on emotions (for exceptions see Flam, 1998; Gammerl, 2009). Yet I want to argue that narratives are inextricably emotionally structured. Before I can look into this, I first need to outline some of the principles of narrative analysis.

Its fundamental theoretical premise is that human experience has a crucial narrative dimension.[1] It is organized along a temporal, sequential order of "first this, then that", "befores and afters" (Schütze, 1987: 15). The idea is that people have specific "narrative" knowledge—the knowledge of how things have come about, a kind of knowledge that has not been abstracted and that is thus only accessible in its narrative form.

At its core, narrative analysis (e.g. Schütze, 1983; 1987; Lucius-Hoene and Deppermann, 2004; for the following see also Labov and Waletzky, 1967) dissects the narrative structure of the interview text. Stories are made up of a series of discrete narrative segments. These describe phases or events. An example for a series of such events could be: graduation from high school, deciding what to do after that, finding a university, etc. These segments have an inner structure. Their beginnings and endings are marked in various ways. This includes, for instance, linguistic markers, such as a shift in focus or segment-abstracts at the beginning: "[*shift in focus:*] and then [*abstract:*] I had to decide what I wanted to do after high school . . ." There may also be a preamble indicating the overall meaning of the segment: e.g. "something horrible happened." An orientation indicates temporal, spatial and other situational contexts and relevant actors. The core of a segment is the narrative sentences or rather the so-called complication. These sentences actually narrate what happens. That something happens, that is something changes as time progresses, is the essential core of narrative as it is conceived throughout this text. It is in this respect, that narration of events contrasts with two other important textual modes, which are typically present in the interview text as well: description (evoking a static picture) and argumentation (evaluative or theoretical-explanatory comments). The narrative parts may be interjected with detailing remarks about the backgrounds of what happened. The segment may be closed by a resolution and coda that summarize the result and meaning of what

happened. At the segment end there can also be prosodic markers such as a falling intonation or pauses.

The sequence of segments forms the larger narrative structure. Hence a key analytical principle pertains to sequentiality (e.g. Schütze, 1983: 283): the meaning of any part of text can only be understood in its textual context. This leads to such issues as: which events follow each other, how are meanings of events based on previous ones, etc. It involves an analytical focus beyond the micro-structure of single segments that looks into how segments are related to each other (for a summary see Lucius-Hoene and Deppermann, 2004). There may be supra-segmental contexts, main and side-lines of the narrative. The relation between the time structure of the narrative text and the temporal structure of the experience being narrated can be rather varied: some parts of the narrative may be summarizing while others seem to progress slower than the original events with much interspersed commenting and detailing, still others seem to have a temporal structure parallel to the original situation. Apart from this, there may be temporal leaps and gaps as well as interruptions in the narrative. Narratives can have a linear structure, where events follow successively on each other in their natural order. But narrators can also deviate from this and interrupt the flow of the story to look back into the preceding past or make indications of what is to come. Finally, a narrative may be repetitive or iterative.

Analysis can also focus on aspects of perspective (Lucius-Hoene and Deppermann, 2004: 136–140). This involves aspects of the attitude of the narrator towards the narrated story. The narrator can assume the perspective of her own self at the time or tell the story from the perspective of the present tense. She can also emphasize the perspective of inner experience vs. a neutral and impersonal external perspective.

In sum, there is a broad array of specific analytical perspectives in narrative analysis ranging from the micro-level of single segments to an overarching focus on the entire narrative or larger parts of it. A common denominator of these diverse specific aspects, however, is identifying the different narrative elements of a story and looking at the significance of these elements within the story in relation to each other. Crucially, narrative analysis allows us to see both which aspects of experience matter to the narrator and how they matter.

This is obviously only a very cursory overview, but it will allow me to show in principle, how narrative analysis can help us research emotions. With the above description of narrative analysis we seem to arrive at a merely cognitive perspective. The next section will thus elaborate how emotions and narrative can be related theoretically.

3. THE NARRATIVITY OF EMOTIONS

Narrative analysis starts out with a very fundamental theoretical premise: the assertion that human experience has a crucial narrative dimension. If we

acknowledge at the same time emotions' fundamental relevance to social life this begs the question whether narrativity extends to emotions as well. And if so, how exactly do emotion and narrative bear on each other: is there a storied quality to emotions? To consider this issue, we need to depart from certain dominant notions and adopt a novel understanding of emotions—the idea that the nature of emotions is narrative and conversely that narratives are emotional.

The notion of narrative emotions has not enjoyed much attention in the social sciences despite some recent popularity of narrative research. In particular, this holds true for the sociology of emotions as well. We may perhaps come across the idea that *certain* emotions have a narrative quality. Illouz and Wilf have argued to this effect in their discussion of love, which "unfolds as a story, is conceived and felt in a story form and is intimately related to narratives of self" (Illouz and Wilf, 2009: 125; see also Illouz, 1997; Sternberg, 1996). This is arguably a limited concept of emotions' narrativity contrasting with the more basic concept I will employ here. In other academic disciplines, there has been more talk about narrative emotions, particularly in philosophy (e.g. Turski, 1991; Goldie, 2000; Nussbaum, 1988; 2003; Deslandes, 2004a; 2004b; De Sousa, 1980; 1990) and to a lesser extent in psychology, albeit with varying meanings of the term.

The Storied Nature of Emotions

Despite some theoretical differences, we can identify a recurring idea—the notion that emotions are embedded in narratives and are in fact socially learned through narratives or rather, stories. De Sousa, for instance, argued that "we are made familiar with the vocabulary of emotion by association with *paradigm scenarios*" (1980: 142, orig. emph.). These paradigm scenarios connect objects, which they help identify, with emotional responses, that they prescribe as a normal reaction (De Sousa, 1990: 182). Martha Nussbaum (1988: 226) views emotions—how to feel, our emotional repertoire—quite similarly as taught to us by society through paradigm stories: "it seems right to say [. . .] not only that a certain sort of story shows or represents emotion but also that emotion itself is the acceptance of, the assent to live according to, a certain kind of story. Stories, in short, contain and reach forms of feeling, forms of life." Finally, Goldie describes emotions as complex, episodic, and structured. An emotion "is structured in that it constitutes part of a narrative—roughly, an unfolding sequence of actions and events, thoughts and feelings—in which the emotion itself is embedded" (Goldie, 2000: 13).

The crucial idea to be taken from this is that the narrative elements of a story together configure emotional experience. The *gestalt* of actors, events, conditions, thoughts, feelings, etc. constitutes an emotion. From the constructivist perspective of narrative analysis we can add the emphasis, that subjective representations of these elements, their significance, are highly contingent.

Emotions and Temporality

A constitutive feature of narratives is temporality. Narrativity is defined by a change in time. Paradigm scenarios can in this sense be understood as narratives. The way De Sousa (1980; 1990) or Nussbaum (1988) define paradigm scenarios or stories, however, they resemble more concise narrative segments rather than elaborate and in practice typically very complex narratives. Yet, the principle of sequentiality in narrative analysis emphasizes the embeddedness of each segment or narrative element into the ongoing stream of the narrative. Temporality thus figures in a much more overarching way. In her later work on emotions Nussbaum (2003: 178–179, 236) elaborates on the issue of temporality. She argues, that any specific instance of emotionality cannot be fully understood unless there is some consideration of its history. This would tie well with the premises of narrative analysis. However, her notion of this history seems to be indebted to psychology, it is the history of any emotion in childhood and infancy. This is more of a developmental perspective than a narrative one. She does argue, however, "that the cognitive content of emotions arrives embedded in a complex narrative history, without mentioning which one frequently cannot give an account of the full specificity of the emotion itself" (2003: 179). From the perspective of narrative analysis, we need not subscribe to the psycho-developmental aspect of Nussbaum's argument to appreciate this latter point (cf. also Archer 2000:29 and her conceptualization of "Me" as an emotional memory bank). This is buttressed by Jack Katz' theorizing: emotions are "a double commentary on social interactions," that is not only on the present interaction but also a "comment on the overall stories that they are constructing as they shape a path through their life" (1999: 324). Emotional moments are part of a two-fold sense-making project (Katz, 1999: 324–325): they involve the micro-story of the present situation, but this story is embedded in, and gains (emotional) significance through, larger narrative contexts. Katz (1999: 327) concludes that "all socially situated emotions are dualistic narrative projects." From this perspective then, the narrative past is indispensable for understanding any present instance of emotionality.

The Emotional Nature of Narratives

The above remarks on the narrativity of emotions, it seems, could support a purely cognitive conception of narrative emotions, as they appear to be constituted by cognitive, narrative elements (the *gestalt* of actors, events, conditions etc.) and indeed Nussbaum's theory is purely and admittedly cognitive. Emotions, in her (1988; 2003) view, are intricately linked to beliefs or judgments about the world, which, she argues, are indeed sufficient for the emotion: "if I do not get angry, then I do not really truly accept or believe that I have been wronged" (Nussbaum, 1988: 232). The beliefs in question are cognitive categories about

what is valuable and important (1988: 232–233; 2003). From this perspective then narratives can be seen as the causes of emotions. There is, however, a fundamental problem with this view. Applying a linguistic-constructivist perspective, it seems tautological to argue that I *get* angry because I believe (cognitively) that I have been wronged. The very construction and perception of having been wronged *is* at the core of feeling angry rather than *causing* the emotion of anger. It is tantamount to an emotional construct. This has to do with a more fundamental problem: despite aiming at a cognitive theory of emotions, Nussbaum's argument implicitly and involuntarily points at the more pervasive role of emotions and feelings when she qualifies the specific kinds of beliefs pertinent to her argument as crucially involving subjective valuation and attribution of importance. Arguably, at this point emotions sneak back into her argument: they are critical in constituting salience (De Sousa, 1990: xv) and the very concepts of value and importance are inextricably emotional (cf. also Archer, 2000: 196).

Philosophical tendencies to over-intellectualize emotions are criticized on a general level by Goldie (2000). Against this, he proposes a specific notion of the intentionality of emotions, i.e. their directedness towards an object. He warns against the mistake of capturing this intentionality in terms of beliefs and/or desires, as both could be feelingless. Instead, he proposes the notion of *feeling towards*: "*thinking of* with feeling so that your emotional feelings are directed towards the object of your thought" (Goldie, 2000: 19, orig. emph.). There is a perceptual quality to this kind of thinking of: "Feeling towards, as it is thinking of with feeling, is a sort of thinking of. One can come to think of something as being a particular way; certain features become salient. And thinking of is related to seeing an aspect" (Goldie, 2000: 19–20).

This perspective resonates with arguments about an interlacing of reason, thought and emotion. From a sociological perspective, already Hochschild (1983: ch. 2) talks about emotions as clues and thus as a precondition to perception and ultimately to forms of rationality. Barbalet (1998) makes a sweeping argument for the interlacing of rationality and emotion. Katz criticizes the view that "emotions are in tension with reason, self-reflection, or thought [. . .] Emotions are ways of turning back on the self, ways of reflexively amplifying and giving added resonance to the transcendent meanings of situated action" (1999: 332). In his view, emotions are a form of perception in that persons do not apprehend the implications of a situation cognitively but rather in a sensual appreciation: "One commonly *feels* situations" (Katz, 1999: 332, orig. emph.). He terms these latent or incipient emotions. Coming from a quite different vantage point Schwarz-Friesel (2007: 112) concludes from her discussion of psychological theorizing that emotions and cognition are not separate, isolated and autonomous phenomena, but rather different aspects of one and the same phenomenon, that is the human mind.

From this perspective, emotionality is intimately intertwined with what can be described as the cognitive dimension of narrative. Narratives thus not only present us with the cognitive dimension of emotions, but with emotionality itself as it is an

inextricable part of the narrative. This idea can be further explained by relying on Sarbin's (1989; 2001) theory. He argues against the essentialist, reifying idea that emotions are "quasi-objects, sometimes cranial, sometimes visceral" (2001: 217; see also Archer, 2000: 196–197; Goldie, 2000:13), which is immanent in much other writing on emotions and narrativity. Instead, he argues for studying emotional life rather than discrete emotions, which he views as mere names of narrative plots. Emotions then appear as narrative emplotments (Sarbin, 1989). Rather than asking what emotions are, Sarbin (1989: 188) advises us to focus instead on the specifics of situations, such as the actors involved, the setting, the actual actions, etc. These aspects form the integral elements of an emotion narrative. In a similar vein, Turski (1991) argues against a purely intrapsychological account of emotions. He departs from a separation of meaning and emotion to conclude: "what gets identified in emotion formation is emphatically neither a simple feeling nor an abstract proposition about the world but a *form of activity*, a sense of engagement with that world" (1991: 378, orig. emph.). He goes on to define emotions as temporally and dramatically structured. The plot of the prototypical social dramas underlying emotions "at once defines the agent's role, feelings and reactions characteristic of the emotion as just that way of existing—as just that way [. . .] of being directed to something in the world" (1991: 378).

From this perspective, then, narratives provide us with more than merely the cognitive antecedents of emotions. They grant us access to human experience as it is inextricably meaningful and emotional at the same time. The very nature of emotional experience can be conceptualized as essentially narrative in nature (rather than mediated by narratives) and vice versa: narratives essentially are emotionally structured. Emotions emerge from this as essentially narrative configurations, scenarios or *gestalt*. Rather than existing as discrete, isolated, reifyable things, they exist in the very sets of narrative elements that make up a specific instance of emotional experience, that is a specific configuration of actors, objects, conditions, actions, events, etc. While these elements may be represented in thought, a merely cognitive rendition of these elements would ignore the fact that they are constitutive, integral elements of emotional experience. This concept of narrative emotions thus blurs the distinction between thought and emotion and renders them two sides of the same coin, that is human experience.

4. TOWARDS NARRATIVE EMOTION ANALYSIS

A methodology of narrative emotion analysis can fruitfully build on this conception of emotion. To develop the notion of narrative emotions in methodological terms, it proves very instructive to draw on existing research in other academic fields. In particular, linguistic research about emotions provides a wealth of analytical tools to approach the emotional content of texts (e.g. Schwarz-Friesel, 2007; Jahr, 2000; Fiehler, 1990). Together, this body of research shows, how

texts—as in a way cognitive representations of experience—are inseparably emotional. This research thus further buttresses the idea that emotionality is an inextricable element of narrative.

In line with the arguments from the previous section, linguistic research identifies more often than not markers of emotionality *per se* rather than describing linguistic profiles of certain emotions. This is because emotions are not explicable without recourse to other dimensions such as meaning and context (Jahr, 2000; Ochs and Schieffelin, 1989: 15). What linguistic analysis can thus provide us with are the analytical tools that allow dissecting a text's emotionality.

The Principal Perspective

An albeit small and scattered body of research in linguistics and cognate fields has focused on how we convey emotions narratively. The basic idea is that narratives present us with the antecedents of emotional experiences. Emotion narratives have been theorized this way as mere rationalizations, as legitimizing accounts (Fischer and Jansz, 1995; cf. Rymes, 1995): the modern, western subject is culturally supposed to be rational/unemotional and any display of emotions will thus threaten one's image. Socially stipulated feeling rules (Hochschild, 1983), however, have legitimizations inscribed into them. These legitimizing accounts can then be used to make sense of and rationalize an emotional episode and thus to restore one's image as a rational actor. Thus, emotions and emotion narratives operate on essentially separate levels. This would be very much in line with a more cognitive notion of narrative emotions.

Contrasting this view, the notion of narrative emotions developed above suggests a more realistic take on this. If emotions *are* narratives, emotional experience is then rather *constituted* by the situational circumstances, events and conditions *as they matter* for the emoting subject. To analyze emotions narratively we thus need to ask who acts how to whom and what happens (Sarbin, 1989: 188). This is the principal approach to narrative analysis of emotions. This is to say that antecedents are made up of narrative elements. Anger episodes, for instance, involve elements that together form a scene of faulty, unfair behavior by others (Fischer and Jansz, 1995: 73).

However, analysis should go beyond these narrative elements as antecedents are already configured by the very words used to constitute subjective reality. Compare for instance the following vignettes:

> Sue/ granny Sue/ granny/ grandmother/ the old tart . . .
>
> . . . passed away/ was called by the Lord/ bit the dust/ kicked the bucket.

All of these vignettes imply a different emotional stance towards one and the same referential event. Crucially, quite different, even opposing emotions can be

expressed by changing only one or two words, while keeping the referential content of the phrase the same.

By analyzing narrative components and their relations within the story, narrative analysis exactly looks at the antecedents of emotional experience. It shows us which elements make up subjective experience and how they relate to each other, for instance, which are the core events, how are they rendered, how do they relate to which backgrounds, how does an entire episode matter, etc. Narrative analysis can thus serve as a principal approach to empirical emotion analysis.

Structure

From here a number of more specific aspects can be considered. One such aspect concerns the narrative structure. Hudson et al. (1992), for instance, compared the structure of three different kinds of emotion narratives and found specific variations in their structures depending on the focal emotion: happiness episodes showed little dramatic action; madness narratives had rising action, a climax and then falling action; scared narratives showed dramatic action rising to a climax but lacking falling action after that. They abstracted this into a distinction of different narrative forms: moment-in-time stories recreate a specific mood lacking a climax; chronologies connect elements temporally but not causally without climax or mood recreation (emotions are described rather than evoked); plotted stories are causally structured and include a climax. Hudson et al. (1992) demonstrated how the three emotions under consideration correlated with these three narrative types: happiness—moment-in-time stories/chronologies; scared and mad narratives—plotted stories. As this research shows, both the dramatic structure as well as the specific mode of linking the narrative elements are expressive of emotional experience.

The concept of dramatic structure can be further explicated by recourse to narrative analysis concepts such as the temporal structure of the narrative: which parts are narrated in real-time, slow motion or are sped up. Another aspect of temporal structure is to be found in the order of events as narrated, that is what happens when in the narrative and how these events are temporally and causally connected. What is the degree of detail? Repetitions may have a dramatic effect as well. All these aspects can contribute to the recreation of the original situations or bestow a detached sense to the narrative.

Imagine for instance how a sense of being overwhelmed may be expressed by a staccato-like structure of the overwhelming instances that thus seem to fall down on the experiencer. Compare this to a minutely detailed, slowly progressing story. Or think, for instance, how shock may be expressed by narrating a number of soothing and pleasant instances, presented with much narrative embellishment and no hint at impending doom—the negative event will appear with shocking suddenness. Compare this to a structure where the eventual negative event

appears as a possibility from the outset and there is a description of how things gradually built up to it—perhaps a story of defeat, disappointed hopes or escalating fear? Consider also how a hope narrative might be structured, for instance by narrating numerous negative and discouraging instances, but by interspersing them with references to information that could justify hope.

Another aspect of structure has to do with the constructions of oppositions/comparisons. These have been described, on a syntactical level, as forms of emotional expressions (Schwarz-Friesel, 2007: 190–195; Fiehler, 1990: 238; Jahr, 2000: 97–98). However, they feature not only syntactically (see next section) but also in the narrative structure sometimes simply by way of juxtaposition. In fact they can often be found in narratives (e.g. Glinka, 2003). Think for instance how a narrative about angering unfairness may not so much directly address and express this unfairness as such but simply narrate the unfair situation and interweave this with another story line about another actor emphasizing certain parallels between both story lines which lead, however, in the second case to contrary, better outcomes. A hope narrative might involve comparative flashbacks to similar situations in the past where the outcomes were eventually positive. It might also involve comparative references to other actors seen in a similar situation. Such comparison with others may not only induce hope but also envy that may in turn translate into anger but also admiration (Neckel, 1999; Simmel, 1992: 318–319).

Finally, even the structure of the entire narrative can be expressive of emotions. Helena Flam (1998: ch. 5) demonstrates this in her analysis of narrative interviews with East German dissenters. She can show that they follow the structures of a *Bildungsroman* and thus ultimately conform to specific notions of honor. This is an inner kind of honor of the autonomous individual pitted against the demands of an outer order of state and bourgeois society. The individual matures out of coming to terms with this tension and retains a sense of honor from keeping a degree of autonomy from these outer demands. This constellation is also at the heart of *Bildungsroman*, typically "a story of a person who individuates his self through conflicts with successive social milieus which it joins, enjoins, comes to be critical of and then leaves" (Flam 1998: 193). Given this structure, Flam can show how East German dissent revolved around a quest for a specific kind of honor.

The emotional significance of the structure of entire narratives is brought into relief more systematically by employing Frye's (1971) (arche)typology of different narrative forms. He distinguishes between comedy, romance, tragedy and irony/satire corresponding to certain emotional universes evoked in readers or viewers (see Kuzmics, 2009: 96–97; Stern, 1995): in romance, heroes prevail over dark forces as their powers are superior to their peers and their environment. The essential plot element is thus the adventure and the dominant emotional state is optimism. Comedy can be described by "a U-shaped plot with the action sinking into deep and often potentially tragic complications and then suddenly turning upward into a happy ending" (Frye, 1961: 592). Comedies are stories of the

emergence of something new, which is initially obstructed (e.g. by certain characters in the plot representing an older order). This, however, is a matter of reconciliation, its happy endings do not involve moral defeat. As comedy moves towards triumph over such obstructions, it can thus be said to operate within a much more cheerful, joyous emotional universe than romance. Conversely, the plot structure of tragedy "has an inverted U, with the action rising in crisis to a peripety and then plunging downward to catastrophe through a series of recognitions, usually of the inevitable consequences of previous acts" (Frye, 1961: 592). Tragedies thus revolve around a somber and gloomy emotional universe. The fourth form is satire/irony. It involves the disappearance of the heroic as it describes a world of human absurdity, grotesqueness and folly. Wit and humor are essential emotional components, but it may also be bitter to the point that laughter sticks in one's throat, by grimly insisting that the desperate human situation is inescapable. As for an analysis of irony, it is also possible to draw on Brown's (1987; see also Kuzmics and Mozetic, 2003: 218) conceptualization of different forms of irony: rhetorical irony where a matter is presented in such a reduced way as to highlight its absurdity; the irony of forms, where there is a contradiction between message and its medium and the formal characteristics of its presentation; an irony of events or conduct, where mutually exclusive frames are juxtaposed, and finally, dialectical irony with its three variants: unmasking a social event or phenomenon by carving out its meaninglessness; highlighting a mutual dependency between alleged opposites; the dialectical dissolution of opposites.

Crucially, Frye's work draws attention to the complexity of emotional experience as it is conveyed in narrative. While his four plot structures help identify overarching emotional significances, he equally shows how each of the four contains elements of some of the others.

Agency

Another aspect concerns the narrative construction of agency (e.g. Schütze, 1981)—"*who* is doing what to *whom*" (Bamberg, 1997: 317, my emph.). Research has shown, how emotion narratives have agency configured in specific ways (Bamberg, 1997). Anger narratives, for instance may operate with an agentic other, with self as an object. Shameful situations may be narrated by diluting self's agency. Helplessness may involve a non-agentive experiencer as indicated by such grammatical features as modal auxiliaries, hypothetical past/future constructs, "try" predicates, and negation (Capps and Ochs, 1995: 419). In my own research about dissolved AIDS-NGOs I found many instances where interviewees were not outraged by certain political conditions. Lacking some kind of political analysis they found no one to ascribe agency to.

The key issue here is that self can be rendered as an object to other's actions or as agentic itself (Bamberg, 1997). As Bamberg (1997) further shows, agency can be

emphasized or de-emphasized by referring to the agent in a very concrete, individualizing vs. a rather vague way. It can be added to these findings, that an agentic other can be vague to the point of anonymity, where the narrator may attribute agency, for instance, to an unspecified or ambivalent "they". The passive voice may have that effect too (e.g. Capps and Bonanno, 2000). A causative agent may be entirely missing and things just seem to happen. Grammatically this may take the form of ellipsis (Capps and Bonanno, 2000: 5). Rymes (1995) argues that agency is mitigated narratively in cases where the agent's action is narrated as inevitable, a matter of necessity or duty. Specifically this may involve verbs of necessity (e.g. had to; Capps and Bonanno, 2000: 5). Similarly, Pomerantz (1978) points out that the attribution of blame depends on antecedent events. Rymes also points to grammatical limiters of agency, like "just" or discursive markers like "so": "so I's jus' bangin' his head" (1995: 506). Prosodic features may equally modulate agency, like intonation and hesitancy. Finally, Capps and Bonanno (2000) add to this list: the use of generic, impersonal forms of self-reference ("you just got to do that in this situation"), hypothetical past constructions (implying that a given result was not inevitable, followed by hypothetical acts/conditions that would have entailed a different outcome), and nominalization of emotions ("feelings of anger started up again").

Agency is not simply attributed in narratives, but actors are being constructed at the same time. Specifically, this refers to contingent constructions of identities in the narrative—a pivotal basis for emotional experience. Consider, for instance, how solidarity (e.g. Goodman, 2009) or compassion (e.g. Sznaider, 1998) operate on the basis of constructs of difference and identification. Discourse analysis on AIDS has shown how collective fears operate on strategies of othering, the drawing of limits between collectivities (see for a short overview from an emotions perspective Kleres, 2009a: 296–298). In a similar vein it has also been argued (Flam and Kleres, 2008) that the scientific construction of research subjects as agentic vs. passive entails different feeling rules: dominant theorizing in the German social sciences, for instance, casts neo-Nazis in the role of victims of modernization while migrants are blamed themselves for the social problems they are facing. This helps invoke different specific feelings towards these subjects of scientific inquiry, such as some degree of empathy and sympathy for neo-Nazis and indifference or antipathy for migrants.

5. OTHER LINGUISTIC MANIFESTATIONS OF EMOTIONS

I have argued above, that antecedents of emotionality are most fundamentally configured by the very words used to represent them. Implicitly, this points to the fact, that emotions are not only constituted narratively but also on the level of words and sentences. The following section will present some selected possibilities for emotions to be constituted lexically and syntactically, while a full treatment of these

aspects is certainly beyond the scope of a journal article. Considering these issues will show how intricately emotionality and meaning are intertwined when viewed linguistically. This will provide further evidence of the blurry distinction between meaning and emotion that I have proposed under the label of narrative emotions.

The Lexical Level: Words

Turning to the lexical dimension—or, more plainly, words—(see the overviews in Schwarz-Friesel, 2007: 144–154; Jahr, 2000: 86–93), we can distinguish so-called emotion words, which refer—more or less[2]—*descriptively* to emotional states. Languages have lexemes to refer to a given emotion category. For instance fear, concern, scared, dread, etc. refer to the emotion category FEAR (Schwarz-Friesel, 2007: 144). But there are also emotion *expressing* words such as: "Yuck!", "Gross!", "Finally!" or "Darling!" These do not explicitly reference emotions, but they provide information about emotional impressions and attitudes qua their semantic content. Specifically they may involve the use of diminutives and augmentatives (e.g. hottie, kitchenette, uber/super-accurate), evaluative pre-/suffixes (e.g. peacenik, fashionista, underachiever, hypersensitive), connotations (e.g. whining), modal words/particles[3] (e.g. finally, unfortunately, of course), etc. To this we could add interjections, such as: well, oh my, gee, heck, ah, uhm, ouch, etc. Beyond such direct emotional expressions words predicate events or situational circumstances that imply emotional experience (e.g. "Grandma just died."; "The rain really hit us hard.").

The Syntactical Level: Sentences

Emotions may also be expressed at the level of entire sentences (Schwarz-Friesel, 2007: 173–209; Jahr, 2000: 93–94). This includes: direct references to emotions—"I am scared"; double propositions, where a neutral sentence is embedded in an emotive one, such as: "I'm afraid that . . ."; optative sentences, expressing a wish, as in "If only I could . . ."; exclamations ("What a day!"); hyperbole ("the worst day of my life"); intensifying, repetitive genitive constructs ("the book of books"); questions and rhetorical questions; finally, comparisons as in "I felt about my wife's illness like I felt as a soldier during the war." The latter can be seen as part of a larger group of emotion expressions, that is figurative language. Here we also find metonymy and metaphors, which are a particularly suitable way of expressing emotions (Kövecses, 2003). As Gibbs et al. (2002) argue, metaphors allow for the expression of emotional states that are otherwise inexpressible. They also allow for a more vivid expression of emotions creating a sense of intimacy between speaker and addressee. For this reason, literal expression may be inadequate or insufficient to convey emotional states in their complexity. Other forms of figurative language

include the use of irony specifically involving sarcasm, rhetorical questions, satire, hyperbole, understatement, and overstatement (Gibbs et al., 2002: 140–146). Emotionality is conveyed by "irony's ability to mock, attack, and ridicule, provoking embarrassment, humiliation, even anger" (Gibbs et al., 2002: 142).

Prosody

A final level of analysis that is particularly relevant to spoken texts, such as interviews, is prosody—i.e. the rhythm, stress and intonation of speech—and other paraverbal aspects. Again, this is in itself a complex issue and I can only present some selected aspects of it here (but see e.g. Kehrein, 2002; Tischer, 1993; Frick, 1985; Bachorowski and Owren, 2008). As Fiehler (1990: 170) summarizes, this involves characteristics of the *voice*: loudness, pitch, vocal mode (e.g. trembling, coarse, cold or amused voice); *emphasis*: specific intonation curves, special emphases, modulation of accentuation, expressively stretched words ("noooo!"); *speech speed*; aspects of *vocal style*: e.g. staccato, separation of syllables ("shame-less!," "puh-lease!"), extremely correct pronunciation; and finally aspects of *verbal planning*, such as hesitation, aborted sentences, re-formulation/repairs, stuttering. Despite many attempts to identify prosodic profiles of emotions, empirical results are not entirely conclusive. At best, empirical research can identify prosodic correlates of certain emotional states (for overviews see e.g. Frick, 1985; Tischer, 1993: 110–113). For instance anger may be expressed by increased pitch, increased loudness, fast rate of speech and a specific prosodic contour (intonation curve of average pitch that is characteristically interrupted by jumps on stressed syllables) (Frick, 1985). Bloch (1996) found that a melodious, singing tone of voice, rapid speech, and audible inhaling were associated with positive self-feelings. In contrast, whispering, self-interruption and stammering marked the expression of negative self-feelings. In her study, there were also a number of ambiguous markers. Laughter, for instance, was at times associated with embarrassment and at times an expression of joy. Again, this points at the need to understand the emotional significance of discrete linguistic elements within their context. Interestingly, Bloch (1996: 335) also found that prosodic features may parallel the narrative structure of interview texts. For instance, there may be a pattern where prosodic markers of negative self-feeling are followed by sequences with prosodic markers of positive self-feeling, which structures the narrative into a story of relief.

6. A NOTE ON REALISM IN NARRATIVE INTERVIEWING

The analytical tools described in this article open a perspective on the emotionality of (narrative interview) texts per se. So far, this has left a crucial question unaddressed: how much can we learn about the actual, past social, emotional life

from such texts? This is in fact a problem that pertains to all forms of interviewing, but has sparked particular debate in the context of narrative analysis (Küsters, 2009: 36). However, as a closer examination will show, while making certain methodological claims, this approach has the analytical potential to expose any cracks in the narrative text. What is more, this aspect of narrative analysis proves to be a particularly fruitful lens in respect to emotions.

Aiming at reanimating sedimented streams of past experience through the technique of narrative interviewing, Schütze (e.g. 1976: 197) assumed that there is a principle homology between ad-hoc narratives and original processes of experience. This is not to say that narratives provide information about what *actually* happened, but rather that the structure of the narrative interview text will parallel, and be expressive of, the structure of the original subjective experience (Wohlrab-Sahr, 2000: 155; Bohnsack, 1997: 205). Schütze framed this within a theory of the narrative process (Kallmeyer and Schütze, 1977): the dynamic of spontaneous face-to-face narration forces the narrator to include the necessary and sufficient aspects in order to constitute a plausible, coherent and complete story. Only the strictly narrative elements of the text will run parallel to the structure of the original experience (cf. Katz, 1999: 8–9, who draws on Howard Becker for a similar argument), while description and argumentation can be much more expressive of present contexts. This does not mean that narrators will just overcome any barriers to recounting the past. It does mean, however, that any such barriers will most likely become visible: narrators often mark their post-hoc perspective more or less explicitly (as indicated e.g. by such expressions as: oddly, surely, maybe, that had to happen, etc., Schütze, 1976: 178–179). Barriers may be expressed symptomatically, for instance through leaps, hesitations, pauses and silences, efforts at leaving the narrator role and having the interviewer comment/react, through ostensible vagueness, or through changes in the textual mode (argumentation/description rather than narration), etc. (Schütze, 1976: 198; 1987: 44, 97). Finally and importantly, analysis involves comparisons between the strictly narrative elements of the text and its descriptive and argumentative parts (Schütze, 1983): a careful consideration where both dimensions do or do not converge and what functions instances of argumentation and description have at a specific point in the narrative (e.g. orientation, interpretation, legitimation, avoidance, repression) provides a particularly useful lens for interpretation. After all, this goes specifically for the narrator's emotions since any moves of narrative evasion will likely occur at emotionally charged, problematic junctures in the narrative (Schütze, 1987; Nelson and Horowitz, 2001).

This may be briefly illustrated by Schütze's (1992a; 1992b) analysis of an interview with a former German WWII soldier. Although the soldier was not committed to Nazi ideology, and was to some extent unsympathetic, he nevertheless complied with the regime as he willingly participated in the war. This could be expected to have caused guilt in him, especially as he came to be more and more exposed to the atrocities of genocide, war and prosecution. And yet—in

seeming contradiction to the homology postulate—when he directly narrates his war experience there seems to be no reference to guilt or guilt-inducing circumstances. This void, however, can be taken as a datum for analysis rather than as an instance of forgetfulness—all the more so as he does indicate, at later points of the narrative, awareness at the time of what was going on. He almost completely fails to narrate encounters with victims of the regime in the war "chapter" of his story. In making some closing commentaries on that segment (i.e. not in the narrative parts proper) he only briefly alludes to the disappearance of Jewish fellow citizens (e.g. by mentioning abandoned synagogues, Jews having been driven away), and swiftly moves away from the topic in a crucially argumentative-theoretical textual mode. Much later, however, when his wife had a stroke after the war, he refers to, and elaborates in great detail on his war experience for making the present feeling of powerlessness plausible. One of these illustrative episodes is about an encounter with Jewish slave workers in the Russian winter landscape raising the agonizing question whether to attempt to help them or not and whether that would be possible at all. Seemingly unable to feel guilty at the time, memories later came alive again and with them the ability to mourn. This is not just a lapse of memory. Theorizing compliance with a totalitarian regime, Schütze (1992a; 1992b) interprets this as an at the time dominant—institutionally backed and interactionally sustained—mode of fading out atrocities that would otherwise be shocking. It is in this way, that the structure of the narrative does in the end reflect past (emotional) experience.

7. CONCLUSION

Having described a number of textual features that convey emotionality, it has become clear that narrative interviewing and analysis provides excellent access to these dimensions of human experience. Specifically, the notion of the narrative nature of emotions allows us to extend narrative analysis to the empirical investigation of emotions. Based on this notion many dimensions of narrative analysis are indeed indicative of emotions. The empirical research I have synthesized here supports this. Emotion analysis cannot and should not stop at the narrative level, but must include other linguistic markers of emotions as well.

As this analytical framework shows, emotions are inextricably interwoven with the meaning dimension of texts to the point where the distinction between cognition and emotion becomes blurry. I have suggested that both may be better understood as two sides of the same thing, that is human experience, which can be described analytically in terms of emotions and meaning. The linguistic research I have presented here, emphasizing the interlacing of meaning and emotion, gives further substance to this claim.

The perspective of narrative emotion analysis then helps us overcome a specific methodical problem: the issue of emotions' low visibility or rather of non-

conscious emotions. This issue may not be readily accepted by some emotion researchers. However, several theorists have elaborated on this notion: Scheff (1988) talked about covert shame but based this in his specific theorizing of this one emotion. Barbalet (1998; 2009) theorized non- or unconscious emotions from a general vantage point. Katz (1999: 332) equally argued against necessarily conscious experience of emotions. Finally, Nussbaum (2003: 71–72) also acknowledged the (albeit exceptional) possibility of non-conscious emotions.

The notion of non-conscious emotions is in line with a fundamental premise of narrative analysis: that is the assumption that actors know more about their experience than they can present in abstracted terms when asked directly. As I outlined at the beginning, they have narrative knowledge, the knowledge of how things have come about, which is only accessible in its narrative form. Under the concept of narrative emotions, this premise can be extended to emotions as well. From this perspective then, non-conscious emotions emerge as much more pervasive than Nussbaum would have it. Indeed it can thus be assumed to be the dominant mode of emotional experience (cf. Archer, 2000: 197).

Clearly, what I have presented here is not an exhaustive analysis of the many ways emotions may manifest in narratives. Empirical research about this is scant and scattered and there is a need for further empirical investigation into the subject matter. However, the synthesis and systematization of existing research that I have presented here can serve as a solid starting point for future research that applies, tests and expands our range of analytical tools.

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NOTES

[1] This is not to exclude other forms of experience and action. Narrative interviewing is admittedly (e.g. Schütze, 1976; 1987) not applicable for capturing routine and habitual

aspects of social life. Similar arguments could be made with respect to flow experience (Bloch, 2000).

[2] As Jahr (2000: 86–87) argued, the precise emotional meaning of emotion words may only be explicable by reference to their context.

[3] Words and particles that reflect the mood and attitude of the speaker, they change the mood of the verb.

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