Protocol Audit Report

Version 1.0

Vinay

August 29, 2025

Protocol Audit Report

Vinay Vig

August 29, 2025

Prepared by: [Vinay] Lead Auditor: - Vinay

Table of Contents

Protocol Summary

Protocol does X, Y, Z

Disclaimer

The Vinay's team makes all effort to find as many vulnerabilities in the code in the given time period, but holds no responsibilities for the findings provided in this document. A security audit by the team is not an endorsement of the underlying business or product. The audit was time-boxed and the review of the code was solely on the security aspects of the Solidity implementation of the contracts.

Risk Classification

		Impact		
		High	Medium	Low
Likelihood	High	H	H/M	M
	Medium	H/M	M	M/L
	Low	M	M/L	L

We use the CodeHawks severity matrix to determine severity. See the documentation for more details.

Audit Details

The findings described in this document correspond the following comit hash:

```
7d55682ddc4301a7b13ae9413095feffd9924566
```

Scope

```
./src/
#-- PasswordStore.sol
```

- Solc Version: 0.8.18
- Chain(s) to-deploy contract to: Ethereum

Roles

- Owner: The user who can set the password and read the password.
- Outsiders: No one else should be able to set or read the password.
-

Executive Summary

Add some notes about the audit went, types of things you found, etc.

We spent X hours with Z auditors using Y tools. etc

Issues found

Severity	Number of issues found
High	2
Medium	0
Low	0
Info	1
Total	3

Findings

High

[H-1] Storing the password on-chain makes it visible to anyone, and no longer private

Description: All data stored on-chain is visible to anyone, and can be read directly from the blockchain. The `PasswordStore::s_password` variable is intended to be a private variable and only accessed through the `PasswordStore::getPassword` function, which is intended to be only called by the owner of the contract.

We show one such method of reading any data off chain below.

Impact: Anyone can read the private password, severly breaking the functionality of the protocol.

Proof of Concept: (Proof of code)

The below test case shows how anyone can read the password directly from the blockchain.

1. Create a locally running chain

```
make anvil
```

2. Deploy the contract to the chain

```
make deploy
```

3. Run the storage tool

We use 1 because that's the storage slot of `s_password` in the contract.

```
cast storage <ADDRESS_HERE> 1 --rpc-url http://127.0.0.1:8545
```

You'll get an output that looks like this:

`0x6d7950617373776f726400000000000000000000000000000000000000000014`

You can then parse that hex to a string with:

```
cast parse-bytes32-string 0
    x6d7950617373776f726400000000000000000000000000000000000000000014
```

And get an output of:

```
myPassword
```

Recommended Mitigation: Due to this, the overall architecture of the contract should be rethought. One could encrypt the password off-chain, and then store the encrypted password on-chain. This would require the user to remember another password off-chain to decrypt the password. However, you'd also likely want to remove the view function as you wouldn't want the user to accidentally send a transaction with the password that decrypts your password.

[H-2] `PasswordStore::setPassword` has no access control, meaning a non-owner could change the password

Description: The `PasswordStore::setPassword` function is set to be an `external` function, however, the natspec of the function and overall purpose of the smart contract is that `This function allows only the owner to set a new password.`

```
    function setPassword(string memory newPassword) external {
@>      // @audit - There are no access controls
        s_password = newPassword;
        emit setNewPassword();
    }
```

Impact: Anyone can set/change the password of the contract, severly breaking the contract intended functionallity.

Proof of Concept: Add the following to the `PasswordStore.t.sol` test file.

Code

```
    function test_anyone_can_set_password(address randomAddress) public
        {
        // Arrange
        vm.assume(randomAddress != owner);
        string memory expectedPassword = "myNewPassword";

        // Act
        vm.prank(randomAddress);
        passwordStore.setPassword(expectedPassword);

        // Assert
        vm.prank(owner);
        string memory actualPassword = passwordStore.getPassword();
        assertEq(actualPassword, expectedPassword);
    }
```

Recommended Mitigation: Add an access control conditional to the `setPassword` function.

```
    if(msg.sender != s_owner) {
        revert PasswordStore__NotOwner();
    }
```

Informational

[I-1] Incorrect NatSpec in `PasswordStore::getPassword`

Description:

```
/*
 * @notice This allows only the owner to retrieve the password.
 * @param newPassword The new password to set.
 */
function getPassword() external view returns (string memory) {
    if (msg.sender != s_owner) {
        revert PasswordStore__NotOwner();
```

```
8         }
9         return s_password;
10    }
```

The NatSpec comment for `PasswordStore::getPassword` includes a parameter (`@param newPassword`) that does not exist in the function signature.
The actual signature is `getPassword()`, not `getPassword(string)`.

Impact:
The NatSpec documentation is misleading and incorrect, which can cause confusion for developers or auditors relying on it.

Recommended Mitigation:
Remove the incorrect `@param` line from the NatSpec.

```
1 - * @param newPassword The new password to set.
```