

Password-based Attacks



Valid Accounts (I)



- ❑ Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining:
 - ❑ **Initial Access**
 - ❑ **Persistence**
 - ❑ may grant persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop.
 - ❑ ...

Valid Accounts (II)



- ❑ Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining:
 - ❑ **Initial Access**
 - ❑ **Persistence**
 - ❑ **Privilege Escalation**
 - ❑ may grant **increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas** of the network.
 - ❑ **Defense Evasion**
 - ❑ may be used to **bypass access controls** placed on various resources on systems within the network
- (and **Lateral Movement** through Remote Services)
- ❑ **Not only Initial Access!**

Valid Accounts (III)



- **Very attractive to Attackers**
 - Exploits may not be available
 - Exploits may not be reliable
 - Exploits may have to be used as little as possible
(to not risk **disclosing** their existence)

- Detecting **legitimate access** with **malicious purposes** is **more difficult** than detecting malware, attack tools, exploits

October 2025 (I)



As phishing-resistant MFA and conditional access strengthen user defenses, attackers are pivoting to workload identities—apps, services, and scripts that access cloud resources. These non-human identities often hold elevated privileges but lack sufficient security controls, resulting in a growing blind spot that attackers are exploiting.

Identity protection must extend to every identity—including non-human identities—by verifying explicitly, enforcing least privilege, and assuming breach.

Microsoft Digital
Defense Report 2025

October 2025 (II)



97%

In the first half of 2025, identity-based attacks rose by 32%.

97% of identity attacks were password spray attacks. Even as more sophisticated tactics evolve, most identity attackers exploit the common problem of weak and overused passwords.

Obtaining Passwords



- ❑ **MANY** techniques in **multiple** tactics
- ❑ **Reconnaissance**
 - ❑ Phishing for Information (fake login pages)
 - ❑ Gather Victim Identity Information (data breaches, purchase)
- ❑ **Credential Access**
 - ❑ **17** techniques (with many sub-techniques)

Credential Access


The adversary is trying to steal account names and passwords.

Credential Access consists of techniques for stealing credentials like account names and passwords.

Password Stealing: Some Key Techniques



Input Capture




During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes.

Input capture mechanisms may be **transparent** to the user or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into **what they believe to be a genuine service**.

("you have a malware where you are inserting credentials")

Insecure Storage



Adversaries may search compromised systems to find and obtain **insecurely stored credentials** (e.g., plaintext files).

These credentials can be stored and/or misplaced in many locations on a system

Network Sniffing



Adversaries may **sniff network traffic** to capture information about an environment

An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.

Data captured via this technique may include **user credentials**, especially those sent over an **insecure, unencrypted protocol**.

Remark (I)



- ❑ Input Capture
 - ❑ Insecure Storage
 - ❑ Network Sniffing
-
- ❑ PWD is stolen in **cleartext**

Remark (II)



- ❑ Input Capture
- ❑ Insecure Storage
- ❑ Threat model:
 - ❑ Execution (+ C&C)
 - ❑ Account with "sufficient" privileges

- ❑ Network Sniffing
- ❑ Threat model:
 - ❑ Ability to observe network traffic (+ C&C)

Password Stealing: User Stores



Password Stores of Users (I)

- ❑ Stealing **password storage** of **applications**
- ❑ Many accounts of the **same** user on **different** systems



Password Stores of Users (II)



- ❑ In both cases:
 - ❑ Credentials stored in **encrypted format**
 - ❑ **Key** may be read from **process memory**
- ❑ Browser
 - ❑ Key can be obtained by **any process** associated with the user (or the SYSTEM) account
- ❑ Password manager
 - ❑ Key is **not stored anywhere**
 - ❑ Key is derived from a master password **typed** on the keyboard (Input Capture)

Password Stealing: O.S. Stores



Authentication DB: Local (I)



Account Password

Account	Password
...	
Paolo	pwd-Paolo
...	

One row for each account

AuthDB

- ❑ Impersonating an account requires proving knowledge of a certain **secret** (password)
- ❑ AuthDB usually managed by the **operating system** (a certain file, at a certain location)

Authentication DB: Local (II)


□ Windows

- **SAM** (Security Account Manager)
- Account definition + Passwords

□ Linux


- /etc/passwd
- /etc/shadow

Account definitions
Passwords



Stealing: Password Stores of the O.S. (I)

- ☐ Stealing **password storage** of the **o.s.**
- ☐ **Many** accounts of the **same** system



Stealing: Password Stores of the O.S. (II)



- ❑ Stealing **password storage** of the **o.s.**
- ❑ **Many** accounts of the **same** system

- ❑ Usually stored as a **non-invertible function** of PWD
- ❑ **Not** ready for immediate use
 - ❑ Further **offline** attack techniques necessary for **attempting** to obtain PWD

Nice Windows property



- Usually stored as a **non-invertible function** of PWD
- **Not** ready for immediate use
 - Further **offline** attack techniques necessary for **attempting** to obtain PWD
- **Windows** systems:
 - You can use the **non-invertible function** of PWD (!)
 - You do **not** need a further offline attack for **attempting** to reconstruct PWD
- **Stealing o.s. password storage ⇒ Catastrophe**

Remark: VERY CONCRETE RISK

May 2016

111

pwned websites

977,283,532

pwned accounts

September 2016

129

pwned websites

1,388,845,883

pwned accounts

Top 10 breaches

 myspace	359,420,698	MySpace accounts
 in	164,611,595	LinkedIn accounts
 A	152,445,165	Adobe accounts
 tumblr	65,469,298	tumblr accounts
 Fling	40,767,652	Fling accounts
 A	30,811,934	Ashley Madison accounts
 mate1	27,393,015	Mate1.com accounts
 000webhost	13,545,468	000webhost accounts
 R2	13,186,088	R2Games accounts
 Gamigo	8,243,604	Gamigo accounts
<p> Sensitive breach, not publicly searchable</p>		

 myspace 359,420,698 MySpace accounts

 in 164,611,595 LinkedIn accounts

 A 152,445,165 Adobe accounts

 badoo 112,005,531 Badoo accounts

 VK 93,338,602 VK accounts

 dropbox 68,648,009 Dropbox accounts

 tumblr 65,469,298 tumblr accounts

 iMesh 49,467,477 iMesh accounts

 Fling 40,767,652 Fling accounts

 A 30,811,934 Ashley Madison accounts

<https://haveibeenpwned.com/>

This is me (as of January 29-th 2021)



bartoli.alberto@gmail.com

pwned?

Oh no — pwned!

Pwned in 9 data breaches and found no pastes (subscribe to search sensitive breaches)

9

bartoli.alberto@univ.trieste.it

pwned?

Oh no — pwned!


Pwned in 8 data breaches and found no pastes (subscribe to search sensitive breaches)

8

Password Stealing: Server Stores




Servers: AuthDB



- Service S may be structured to use accounts:
 1. Local O.S.
 - or
 2. Defined and managed by S itself
(usually in a **database table**)

Example: Windows Services (I)




- ❑ **net use G: \\remote_h\remote_f** /user:user_x pass_x
- ❑ Mount remote folder exported by **remote_h**

Example: Windows Services (II)

Authentication protocol

NTLM




- Service S may be structured to use accounts:
- 1. Local O.S.

- `net use G: \\remote_h\remote_f`
- SMB protocol (port 445)

Valid on `remote_h`

`/user:user_x pass_x`

Example: Web Server



- Service S use accounts:
 2. Defined and managed by S itself
(in a **database table**)

Keep in mind



- ❑ Never ever deploy a server with passwords stored in **cleartext**
 - ❑ Attacker that manages to steal password storage
 - ❑ Catastrophe
- 

Bad Example Server (Stolen)



id presidenza pwd name note file news admin key eventi keywords sections emailaddress
3355 0 1234 [REDACTED]
3355 0 andreal [REDACTED]
3355 0 password41 [REDACTED]
3355 0 password53 [REDACTED]
3355 0 password55 [REDACTED]
3355 0 password10 [REDACTED]
3355 0 15crs001 [REDACTED]
3355 0 PASSWORD05 [REDACTED]
3355 0 password03 [REDACTED]
3355 0 password34 [REDACTED]
3355 0 password58 [REDACTED]
3355 0 Antonietta31 [REDACTED]
3355 0 ducati996 [REDACTED]
3355 0 893ZqYy99R [REDACTED]
3355 0 1234 [REDACTED]
3355 0 attilio [REDACTED]
3355 0 1810 [REDACTED]
3355 0 crsbd [REDACTED]
3355 0 password30 [REDACTED]
3355 0 password46 [REDACTED]
3355 0 studio53 [REDACTED]

<https://bartoli-alberto.blogspot.com/2018/11/perche-la-password-deve-essere.html>

Bad Example: Tomcat web server DEFAULT

```
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
<tomcat-users>
    <role rolename="tomcat"/>
    <role rolename="role1"/>
    <user username="tomcat" password="tomcat" roles="tomcat"/>
    <user username="both" password="tomcat" roles="tomcat,role1"/>
    <user username="role1" password="tomcat" roles="role1"/>
</tomcat-users>
```

Common scenario for developer:

- Creates web site with protected portion
- Stores credentials in a database associated with the web server
- Defines format of database table with passwords


- ...Storing passwords "as they are" is the easiest thing to do

Online Guessing




Online Guessing (I)

Brute Force



Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown. Without knowledge of the password for an account or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. Brute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a service that will check the validity of those credentials.

Online Guessing (II-a)



Initial Access

Post-compromise

Online Guessing (II-b)



Often done by
large botnets
automatically

Which Services?



- SSH (22/TCP)
- Telnet (23/TCP)
- FTP (21/TCP)
- NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP)
- LDAP (389/TCP)
- Kerberos (88/TCP)
- RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP)
- HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP)
- MSSQL (1433/TCP)
- Oracle (1521/TCP)
- MySQL (3306/TCP)
- VNC (5900/TCP)
- SNMP (161/UDP and 162/TCP/UDP)

And email, cloud, office 365, wi-fi, routers,...

Not Targeted



- Guessing attacks are usually **not targeted**
- Password of **any account** is enough
- Usually <> Always

Sub-Technique: Password Guessing



- An adversary may guess login credentials without prior knowledge of system or environment passwords during an operation by using [a list of common passwords](#).

- **"Foreach username, try a few thousand passwords"**
- Construct target-set
- `foreach u ∈ target-set`
 - `foreach p ∈ candidate-password-set`
 - `try (u, p)`

Common Passwords (I)



The 2018 **Worst Passwords of the Year** list was determined after SplashData evaluated **over 5 million passwords** that have **leaked** online in the **last year**.

1. **123456** (Unchanged)
2. **password** (Unchanged)
3. **123456789** (Up 3)
4. **12345678** (Down 1)
5. **12345** (Unchanged)
6. **111111** (New)

Common Passwords (II)



- ☐ "github default password list"

Apache-Tomcat-Default-Passwords.mdown	List with Default Apache Tomcat Credentials
IPMI-Default-Password-List.mdown	Update IPMI-Default-Password-List.mdown
Oracle-Default-Password-List.mdown	Create Oracle Default Password List
PostgreSQL-Default-Password-List.md	Create PostgreSQL-Default-Password-List.md
README.md	Update README.md
VoIP-Default-Password-List.mdown	Update VoIP-Default-Password-List.mdown
Windows-Default-Password-List.mdown	Update Windows-Default-Password-List.mdown

Common Passwords (III)

- ❑ "default password list"
- ❑ "default database password list"
- ❑ "default oracle password list" →
- ❑ "administrator default password"
- ❑ "default router password list"
- ❑ ...



3COM	SuperStack II Switch	2200	Telnet	debug	synnet
3COM	SuperStack II Switch	1100/3300	Telnet	monitor	monitor
3COM	SuperStack II Switch	1100/3300	Telnet	security	security

Username Password	
SYSTEM ^{Foot_1}	MANAGER
SYS ^{Foot_2}	CHANGE_ON_INSTALL ^{Foot_3}
ANONYMOUS	ANONYMOUS
CTXSYS	CTXSYS
DBSNMP	DBSNMP
LBACSYS	LBACSYS
MDSYS	MDSYS
OLAPSYS	MANAGER
ORDPLUGINS	ORDPLUGINS
ORDSYS	ORDSYS
OUTLN	OUTLN
SCOTT	TIGER
WKSYS	WKSYS
WMSYS	WMSYS
XDB	CHANGE_ON_INSTALL

How many guesses?



- ❑ Hard to tell
- ❑ It depends on:
 - ❑ Detection / reaction capabilities of the target
 - ❑ Existence of alternative techniques
 - ❑ Importance of that specific target
- ❑ Maybe "no more than a few thousands per account"
- ❑ ...but maybe much less than that
 - ❑ Wannacry/Mirai propagated with very short lists

Sub-Technique: Password Spraying



- ❑ Adversaries may use a **single** or **small list** of commonly used passwords against **many different accounts**
- ❑ Construct target-set
- ❑ `foreach p ∈ candidate-password-set // swap loops`
 - ❑ `foreach u ∈ target-set`
 - ❑ `try (u, p)`
- ❑ Usually **more efficient** and **harder to detect**

Sub-Technique: Credential Stuffing



- ❑ Adversaries may use credentials obtained from **breach dumps of unrelated accounts** to gain access to target accounts through credential overlap (same username across different organizations)

- ❑ The information may be useful to an adversary attempting to compromise accounts by taking advantage of the **tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts.**

KEEP IN MIND



- ❑ Not in any dictionary
 - ❑ Not common
 - ❑ Not default
 - ❑ Not reused from a breached site
(never use the same password on multiple sites!)

MUCH more important than

- ❑ "7 digits, 3 special symbols, 2 uppercase, ..."

Remark: Threat model



- Stealing passwords / Cleartext
 - Attacker is able to **run software on victim machine** (privilege level determines impact of techniques)
- Online Guessing
 - Attacker is able to **execute authentication protocol** with victim machine
- Online Guessing requires much smaller capabilities!

Online Guessing: Defense



Defense: Detection



1. Detection

- ❑ Guessing / Stuffing
 - ❑ **Many** failed attempts at a **single** account
 - ❑ Common and "easy"
- ❑ Spraying
 - ❑ **Few** failed attempts at a **single** account
 - ❑ ...but many failed attempts at sets of accounts
 - ❑ Not common and "difficult"

2. Action

Defense: Action (I)



❑ Automatic account lockout

- ❑ Extremely dangerous: trivial avenue for denial of service!

❑ Blacklist guessing IP address

- ❑ Easily circumvented (Botnet, TOR)
- ❑ Potential false positives (NAT)

❑ Alert toward targeted account

- ❑ Not feasible for Spraying
- ❑ What to do next?

Defense: Action (II)



- ❑ Automatic username lockout
 - ❑ Blacklist guessing IP address
 - ❑ Alert toward targeted username coinvolti
-
- ❑ **Time throttling
(progressive increase of response delay)**
 - ❑ Very effective
 - ❑ ...but what if your service does not have it???
 - ❑ In practice, many kinds of server software exposed on the Internet do **not** have it

Microsoft Data



- ❑ Around **0.5%** of all accounts get compromised **each month**
 - ❑ In January 2020 was about **1.2 million**
- ❑ In most cases, ... simplistic attacks
- ❑ **40% guessing/stuffing**
- ❑ **40% spraying**
 - ❑ In January 2020 was about 480.000 + 480.000
- ❑ Nearly all hacked accounts are on **legacy protocols**
 - ❑ SMTP, POP, IMAP,...

Remark



- ❑ Around **0.5%** of all accounts get compromised **each month**
- ❑ UniTS: 3000 people ⇒ 15 accounts
 - ❑ Merely by stuffing e spraying
- ❑ Threat model for organizations:
 - ❑ "Bad actors outside / Trusted zone inside"
Completely unrealistic
 - ❑ "**Assume breach**"

Keep in mind



1. Detection

2. Action

- **Absence of any "not trivial" detection logic is no longer acceptable**

- Many thousands of failed attempts to a certain account...
- ...not even one single alert???

Secure Password Storage



Secure Password Storage



- Secure Password Storage: does **not** contain passwords in cleartext
- We need to understand:
 - How passwords are **represented** in the storage
 - How the storage is **used** in **normal** operation
 - The service receives the account password
 - How to check its validity?
 - How attackers use **stolen** storage

Hashed (I-a)

AuthDB

...

alberto

1e69e0a615e8cb797d75d4f08bdc2f56

eric

6163aabee5d4f08bdc615e8cb797d72b

...

- < account, Credentials > for each authorized account
- Credentials may be:
 1. **Hashed** < acc-x, H(pwd-acc-x) >
 2. ...
- H() is a **non reversible** function (**hash**)

Hashed (l-b)

AuthDB

...

alberto

1e69e0a615e8cb797d75d4f08bdc2f56

eric

6163aabee5d4f08bdc615e8cb797d72b

...

□ Service:

1. Receive acc-x, pwd-acc-x
2. Compute H(pwd-acc-x)
3. Check $H(\text{pwd-acc-x}) \in \text{AuthDB}$

Key Advantage

AuthDB

...

alberto
eric

1e69e0a615e8cb797d75d4f08bdc2f56
6163aabee5d4f08bdc615e8cb797d72b

...

- Adversary that manages to **steal** secure password storage does **not have the password**

- Some **additional** and **different** attack is needed

Defense in Depth



- **Fundamental principle**
- **Multiple and independent defensive layers**
- Of course, without increasing defensive cost linearly in the number of layers
- Good defensive tool:
 - DefenseCost-Increase << AttackCost-Increase

Hashed (II)

AuthDB

...

alberto

1e69e0a615e8cb797d75d4f08bdc2f56

eric

6163aabee5d4f08bdc615e8cb797d72b

...

□ Requirements on function H():

1. H(x) is **constant** length (128-256 bit)
2. H(x) does **not** provide **any** information on x ("cryptographically secure hash function")
3. ...later...

Hashed (III)



- Common for:
 - **Operating systems**
 - Local accounts, stored in every machine
 - **Large organizations**
 - Domain accounts, stored in domain controller
 - **Application servers**
 - Stored in database table

Example: Windows SAM (local accounts)

Username : Security identifier : HASH_1(PWD) (no longer used) : **HASH_2 (PWD)**

```
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e02bc503339d51f71d913c245d35b50b:::  
alberto:1019:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7a21990fcfd3d759941e45c490f143d5f:::  
anakin_skywalker:1011:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:c706f83a7b17a0230e55cde2f3de94fa:::  
artoo_detoo:1007:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:fac6aada8b7afc418b3afea63b7577b4:::  
ben_kenobi:1009:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:4fb77d816bce7aeee80d7c2e5e55c859:::  
boba_fett:1014:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:d60f9a4859da4feadaf160e97d200dc9:::  
chewbacca:1017:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e7200536327ee731c7fe136af4575ed8:::  
c_three_pio:1008:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0fd2eb40c4aa690171ba066c037397ee:::  
darth_vader:1010:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:b73a851f8ecff7acafbaa4a806aea3e0:::  
greedo:1016:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:ce269c6b7d9e2f1522b44686b49082db:::  
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::  
han_solo:1006:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:33ed98c5969d05a7c15c25c99e3ef951:::  
jabba_hutt:1015:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:93ec4eaa63d63565f37fe7f28d99ce76:::  
jarjar_binks:1012:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:ec1cd52077e75aef4a1930b0917c4d4:::  
kylo_ren:1018:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:74c0a3dd06613d3240331e94ae18b001:::  
lando_calrissian:1013:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:62708455898f2d7db11cfb670042a53f:::  
leia_organa:1004:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:8ae6a810ce203621cf9cfa6f21f14028:::  
luke_skywalker:1005:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:481e6150bde6998ed22b0e9bac82005a:::  
sshd:1001:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::  
sshd_server:1002:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:8d0a16cfcc061c3359db455d00ec27035:::  
vagrant:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e02bc503339d51f71d913c245d35b50b:::
```

Example: Application Server (Stolen)

password	userid	username
e9c17a2a22d7d8243c6eea17c8b192cc		
36ca45f981dc4643324744c3a0ea8ca8		
bc7ca5f24d00e681cb76b3e33dbae286		
56ef309697ca53a9c2d1b9cfdbd3d441		
4bf60591e1aaabc68e3ed1cde7c80bba		
97c14c073cc07c382b2597d80430afb8		
822dd494b3e14a82aa76bd455e6b6f4b		
037c70dbc1c812f6b2091688804d7b17		
91d78e7024a53864566c4ffdb423758f		
2b35ee7be359ca322583e8a66368d953		

<https://bartoli-alberto.blogspot.com/2018/11/perche-la-password-deve-essere.html>

Hashed and Salted (I-a)

AuthDB

...

alberto

1e69e0a615e8cb797d75d4f08bdc2f56 6623780aa33b

eric

6163aabee5d4f08bdc615e8cb797d72b 77635aabbce0

...

- < account, Credentials > for each authorized account
- Credentials may be:
 1. **Hashed** < acc-x, H(pwd-acc-x) >
 2. **Hashed and Salted** < acc-x, salt-x, H(concat(pwd-acc-x,salt-x)) >
 3. ...
- H() is a **non reversible** function (**hash**)
- salt-x is a random number (need **not** be secret)

Hashed and Salted (I-b)

AuthDB

...

alberto

1e69e0a615e8cb797d75d4f08bdc2f56

eric

6163aabee5d4f08bdc615e8cb797d72b

...

□ Service:

1. Receive acc-x, pwd-acc-x
2. Extract salt-x
3. Compute concat(pwd-acc-x,salt-x)
4. Compute H(concat(pwd-acc-x,salt-x))
5. Check $H(\text{concat}(\text{pwd-acc-x}, \text{salt-x})) \in \text{AuthDB}$

Hashed and Salted (II)




- For reasons analyzed **later**:
 - **More secure** than Hashed
(in case stolen by Attacker)
 - **Cannot** be used in Windows O.S.
(thus not even in Domain Controllers!)
- **In practice:**

□ Local Accounts Windows:	Hashed
□ Local Accounts Other O.S.:	Hashed and Salted
□ Domain Accounts:	Hashed
□ Application Servers:	Can use either

Example: Linux /etc/shadow

linuxize:\$6\$**zHvrJMa5Y690smbQ\$z5zdL...**:18009:0:120:7:14::



Confusing Terminology

vivek:\$1\$fnffffc\$pGteyHdicpGOfffXX4ow#5:13064:0:99999:7:
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
1 2 3 4 5 6

2. Password : Your encrypted password is in hash format.

It is **not** "encrypted"!

There is no "decryption key" capable of recovering the plaintext

Secure Storage



Secure Storage (I)

- ❑ For **equality check**
- ❑ O.S. / Server Password storage
- ❑ How: Hashing (with or without Salting)

- ❑ The password is **not stored**

- ❑ How to implement secure storage of password managers
- ❑ ...and encrypted file systems (e.g., smartphones)
- ❑ ...and cryptographic keys



Secure Storage (II)



- ❑ For **equality check**

- ❑ O.S. / Server Password storage
 - ❑ How: Hashing (with or without Salting)

- ❑ For **content recall**

- ❑ Password managers
 - ❑ Encrypted file systems (e.g., smartphones)
 - ❑ Stores of cryptographic keys
 - ❑ ...

Secure Storage for Recall (outline) (I)



- ❑ Storage encrypted with key K
 - ❑ K stored on file F(K) on secondary storage
 - ❑ Access to F(K) protected with ACL
-
- ❑ Common for
 - ❑ Encrypted file system
 - ❑ Stores of cryptographic keys
 - ❑ Services meant to run unattended and that must prove their identity
 - ❑ ...

Secure Storage for Recall (outline) (II)

□ Storage **creation**

- Choose
- Store

P , salt

$H(\text{concat}(P, \text{salt}))$, salt

□ Storage **access**

- Ask password P' to operator

□ IF $H(\text{concat}(P', \text{salt})) =$
□ THEN encrypt/decrypt with $K = \text{KeyDerivation}(H(P), \text{salt})$
□ ELSE abort

□ Common for

- Password managers

Remark



- Threat model:
 - Adversary has physical access to secondary storage
- Key stored on secondary storage
 - Adversary can reconstruct storage
- Key derived from master password and not stored anywhere
 - Adversary cannot reconstruct storage
(offline guessing needed)

Offline Guessing (Password cracking)



Remark: Windows



- ❑ Knowledge of H(pwd-U) suffices to impersonate U
(details later)



- ❑ Stealing of SAM / NTDS is a **complete catastrophe**
- ❑ Offline guessing required only if cleartext password was required for some reason
 - ❑ Example: access to esse3 / eduroam
(without changing password from other Windows services)


Offline Guessing (Password cracking) (I)

AuthDB



Offline Guessing (Password cracking)


Brute Force




Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained. Without knowledge of the password for an account or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. Brute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a service that will check the validity of those credentials or offline against previously acquired credential data, such as password hashes.

Offline Guessing (Password cracking) (II)

- **foreach** $p \in$ candidate-password-set
 - $x := H(p)$
 - **searchAndAddFound**(x , AuthDB)



Cracking tools



google "John the Ripper"
google "Hashcat"

Hash function Requirements

- Requirements on function H():
 1. H(x) is **constant** length (128-256 bit)
 2. H(x) does **not** provide **any** information on x ("cryptographically secure hash function")
 3. H(x) is computationally **very heavyweight**
- State of the art: **PBKDF2** or **bcrypt**
- Computational weight can be **parameterized**
 - PBKDF2: "iterations"
 - bcrypt: "rounds"

How many guesses? (I)



- $\# \text{guesses} = \# \text{guesses/sec} * \text{time_invested}$
- $\# \text{guesses/sec}$ depends on:
 - Available hardware
 - Hash function complexity
- time_invested depends on:
 - Available resources (time)
 - Fixation on that specific target

How many guesses? (II)



- #guesses/sec depends on:
 - Available hardware ?
 - Hash function complexity Known
- time_invested depends on:
 - Available resources (time) ?
 - Fixation on that specific target ?
- **Very hard to answer** (too many "unknowns")
- Realistic estimates later


Salting



Lookup table (I)

- ❑ foreach $p \in$ candidate-password-set
 - ❑ $x := H(p)$
 - ❑ searchAndAddFound(x , AuthDB)
- ❑ $H(p)$ is **computed while iterating**
- ❑ Why computing $H(p)$ **each time** someone wants to try p ?
- ❑ We could compute $H(p)$ for every p **in advance**: iteration would be **much faster**

...
123
1234
Admin
Admln
...




Lookup Table	
...	
123	782465bgcdcde4
1234	6%ce4aaab3%683
Admin	FedG4TxY1G6341
Admln	khHY76des30189
...	



Lookup table (II)

- **Lookup Table** ("Password Hash Dictionary")
 - Computed **in advance**
 - Valid for **any** AuthDB (that uses the corresponding hash algorithm)
 - Widely available on the Internet
- `foreach x ∈ lookup-table`
 - `searchAndAddFound(x, AuthDB)`



Hashed Format: Weakness 1



```
...  
pippo      H(12345)
```

```
...  
carlo      H(12345)  
...  
mario      H(12345)
```

Hashes
can be computed
in advance,
once and for all

Lookup Table	
...	
123	H(123)
1234	H(1234)
12345	H(12345)
Admin	H(Admin)
Adm1n	H(Adm1n)
...	

- Offline guessing is merely a set of **searches**
- **No computation at all**

Hashed Format: Weakness 2

Hash count in given (stolen) AuthDB

HashedPasswd	occurrences
0xC31AC605793F580B386C0FB53F1B9775	223
0xB081DBE85E1EC3FFC3D4E7D0227400CD	220
0x6E9B3A7620AAF77F362775150977EEB8	212
0xC8DE1FC2BEEC2D3BFF33A75C2A317604	201
0xF037584C99E7FD4F4F8C59550F8F507	198
0x19A2854144B63A8F7617A6F225019B12	194
0xF940A336C133D116F954DC32376D5D86	193
0x43DA75B94F8F4560177AF75F42D784EB	191
0x29AC25660E3078E87E3097D3822E50D7	184
0xCE0BF015059B68D67688884D7A3D3E8C	184
0xCE0E51D7856FD8BF50145848EE0CD973	1
0xCE0EDFA980805551FB0981D649A3DF8F	1

- **Password Frequency Analysis possible**



- Frequent hashes = Common passwords
- Probably those users are not good at security...
- Probably those passwords are in a dictionary



- Better focus on those hashes first

Hashed and Salted (REMIND)

AuthDB

...

alberto

1e69e0a615e8cb797d75d4f08bdc2f56 6623780aa33b

eric

6163aabee5d4f08bdc615e8cb797d72b 77635aabbce0

...

- < account, Credentials > for each authorized account
- Credentials may be:
 1. **Hashed** < acc-x, H(pwd-acc-x) >
 2. **Hashed and Salted** < acc-x, salt-x, H(concat(pwd-acc-x,salt-x)) >
 3. ...
- H() is a **non reversible** function (**hash**)
- salt-x is a random number (need **not** be secret)

Weakness 1: Solved




```
...  
pippo    7685491327459      H(123457685491327459)
```

```
...  
carlo    1332409100226      H(123451332409100226)  
...  
mario    2242330090650      H(123452242330090650)
```

- More secure** than Hashed (in case stolen by Attacker)
- Every account has a **random** salt:
⇒ hashes **cannot** be computed in advance
- Offline guessing requires **computation**
- With a given amount of resources, Attacker can make **less guesses**

Weakness 2: Solved



HashedPasswd	occurrences
0xC31AC605793F580B386C0FB53F1B9775	223
0xB081DBE85E1EC3FFC3D4E7D0227400CD	220
0x6E9B3A7620AAF77F362775150977EEB8	212
0xC8DE1FC2BEC2D3BFF33A75C2A317604	201
0x0F037584C99E7FD4F4E8C59550F97507	198
0x19A2854144B63A8F7617A6125019B12	194
0xF940A336C133D116F554DC32376D5D86	193
0x43DA75B94F854560177AF75F42D784EB	191
0x29AC2560E3078E87E3097D3822E50D7	184
0xCE0BFD15059B68D67688884D7A3D3E8C	184
0xCE0E51D7856FD8BF50145848EE0CD973	1
0xCE0EDFA980805551FB0981D649A3DF8F	1

- Every account has a **random** salt:
⇒ Password frequency analysis is **not** possible

Offline guessing Hashed and Salted



```
❑ foreach user ∈ AuthDB
    ❑ foreach p ∈ candidate-password-set
        ❑ x := H(concat(p, user.salt))
        ❑ IF x == user.H THEN p is ok
```

CRACKING
TOOL

- ❑ One could swap user/password loops...
- ❑ ...but hashes have to be computed anyway
- ❑ With the same amount of resources, much less guesses

Keep in mind



- foreach $p \in$ candidate-password-set
 - $x := H(p)$
 - searchAndAddFound (x, AuthDB)
- **Search on all the accounts**

- foreach $\text{user} \in \text{AuthDB}$
 - foreach $p \in$ candidate-password-set
 - $x := H(\text{concat}(p, \text{user.salt}))$
 - IF $x == \text{user.H}$ THEN p is ok
- **Compute hash for one account**

Guessing Attacks Today



Offline guessing: John the Ripper (I)

- "hundreds" of hash formats
- Usually it detects the correct one automatically

- `john --wordlist=candidate_pwd_list hash_list`

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ john --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt mysql-wpusers-hashes.txt
```

Offline guessing: John the Ripper (II)

- "hundreds" of hash formats
- Usually it detects the correct one automatically
- `john --wordlist=candidate_pwd_list hash_list`

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ john --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt mysql-wpusers-hashes.txt
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 4 password hashes with 4 different salts (phpass [phpass ($P$ or $H$) 128/128 SSE2 4x3])
Cost 1 (iteration count) is 8192 for all loaded hashes
Will run 2 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
manager          (manager)
vagrant          (vagrant)
2g 0:00:16:11 28.58% (ETA: 06:34:19) 0.002059g/s 4392p/s 8908c/s 8908C/s richh..richfield1
Use the "--show --format=phpass" options to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session aborted

(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$
```

Guessing Attacks Today (I-a)



Three phases:

1. Dictionaries

- Default / Common / Predictable patterns
- Previous breaches at other sites**
- Word lists

2. ...

3. ...

Guessing Attacks Today (I-b)

- ❑ They start by taking the >500M passwords which have been disclosed...Think of this as "**every password anyone has ever thought of, ever.**"
- ❑ ...build a list of all popular phrases, song lyrics, news headlines, whatever they can think of to pick up from search engines, Wikipedia, popular articles, etc.
- ❑ **These are available pre-canned** in the hash-breaker communities.



Rough Indications (I)

- They start by taking the >500M passwords which have been disclosed... Think of this as "**every password anyone has ever thought of, ever.**"
- This will break **>70%** of user passwords
- ...build a list of all popular phrases, song lyrics, news headlines, whatever they can think of to pick up from search engines, Wikipedia, popular articles, etc.
- This may pick up another **5-7%** of user passwords



Rough Indications (II)

- ❑ They start by taking the >500M passwords which have been disclosed...Think of this as "**every password anyone has ever thought of, ever.**"
 - ❑ This will break **>70%** of user passwords
 - ❑ State of the art HW 2020:
 - ❑ **Full dictionary** against 200 accounts / sec
- ⇒ Most accounts will fall **instantly**



Remark 1



SecLists / Passwords / Common-Credentials / 10-million-password-list-top-1000.txt

21 **qwertyuiop**

24 **1234567890**

95 **987654321**

120 **q1w2e3r4t5**

477 **789456123**

518 **minecraft**

557 **metallica**

- **Long <> hard to guess**
- Long passwords can be in dictionaries

Guessing Attacks Today (II)



Three phases:

1. Dictionaries

- Default / Common / Predictable patterns
- Previous breaches at other sites**
- Word lists

2. Mangling rules (applied to dictionary)

- Append (and/or prepend) a special char
- Replace o (and/or O) with 0
- ...

3. ...

Guessing Attacks Today (III)



Three phases:

1. Dictionaries
2. Mangling rules
3. All **permutations** required by target password policy:
 - Symbol-set **S1**, Password length P₁, P₂, P₃,...,P_N
Example: digits 0-9
 - Symbol-set **S2**, Password length P₁, P₂, P₃,...,P_N
Example: digits 0-9 Lowercase/Uppercase letters
 - ...

Guessing Attacks Today (IV)

1. Dictionaries
2. Mangling rules
3. Permutations of symbols

Rarely used

Even more rarely used

- ❑ Either phase 1 is enough
or
- ❑ Adversary changes attack **technique / target**

- ❑ Of course, not all Adversary have the same behavior...

KEEP IN MIND (REMIND)



- ❑ Not in any dictionary
 - ❑ Not common
 - ❑ Not default
 - ❑ Not reused from a breached site
(never use the same password on multiple sites!)

MUCH more important than

- ❑ "7 digits, 3 special symbols, 2 uppercase, ..."

That's why... (I)

- **Do not use complexity requirements**



- It is a **poor defence** against guessing attacks.
- It places an extra burden on users, many of whom will use predictable patterns (such as replacing the letter 'o' with a zero) to meet the required 'complexity' criteria. Attackers are familiar with these strategies and **use this knowledge to optimise** their attacks.
- You should specify a minimum password length, to prevent very short passwords from being used.

That's why... (II)

COMPUTER SECURITY



NIST Special Publication 800-63B

- Memorized secrets should be at least 8 characters in length...
- If the verifier **disallows** a chosen memorized secret **based on its appearance on a blacklist of compromised values**, the subscriber should be required to choose a different memorized secret.
- **No other complexity requirements** for memorized secrets should be imposed.

Remark 2 (I)

HOW SECURE IS MY PASSWORD?

.....

It would take a computer about

591 THOUSAND YEARS

to crack your password

- Webapp analyzes inserted password and:
 1. Determines symbol-set
 2. Determines length
 3. Computes #permutations
 4. Estimate time for trying them all

Remark 2 (II)

HOW SECURE IS MY PASSWORD?

.....

It would take a computer about

591 THOUSAND YEARS

to crack your password

"Great, I can use that password on all sites"

- ❑ Password strength meters are often **misleading!**
- ❑ Adversaries start from dictionaries: **not** from permutations!
- ❑ A password in a dictionary will be found immediately,
irrespective of its length/complexity


How many guesses?



- $\# \text{guesses} = \# \text{guesses/sec} * \text{time_invested}$
- **Very hard to answer** (too many "unknowns")
- Our path:
 1. Realistic #guesses/sec
(state of the art password cracking hw 2019)
 2. Realistic passwords that probably resist
(estimates..later)

Guessing speed

- ☐ Realistic #guesses/sec
(state of the art password cracking hw 2019)



	#hash/sec	Relative		
NTLM	715.6 G	1.4	M	Windows SAM/NTDS
MD5	391.2 G	0.8	M	Common reference
NetNTLMv2	27795 M	53.9	K	Windows NTLM protocol
Kerberos 5, etype 23, AS-REQ Pre-Auth	7191.1 M	13.9	K	
LastPass + LastPass snifffed (Iterations: 499)	39651.7 K	76.9		Password manager
WPA-EAPOL-PBKDF2 (Iterations: 4095)	6120.2 K	11.9		Enterprise Wi-Fi (eduroam)
bcrypt \$2*\$, Blowfish (Unix) (Iterations: 32)	515.7 K	1.0		Hashed and Salted Linux storage

Passwords that probably resist (I)



- Passwords that will "certainly" resist:
 - **Not in any dictionary**
 - Symbol-set easily typable chars (96)
 - Longer than 10 characters
- NB: cannot be proved

Passwords that probably resist (II)



- Look at "Hive systems passwords table" in companion website
- How long as a function of password length
 - Not in any dictionary: MD5 (similar to Windows SAM)
 - Not in any dictionary: bcrypt
 - In some dictionary

Passwords that probably resist (III)



- State of the art HW 2020
- Assuming 96 easily typable characters:
 - Any **8 characters** password can be broken in **a few days**
 - Any additional character multiplies number of attempts by 96
 - ⇒ **9 characters require a few months** (probably practical limit)
- 8 chars → 2^{52}
- 9 chars → 2^{60}
- 10 chars → 2^{66}



Hacking Lab: Metasploitable3 Demo 3




Kerberoasting (in a nutshell)



Kerberoasting (in a nutshell)

- Threat model: Attacker with credentials of **one account**
- Attacker:
 1. Asks for data encrypted with password of
≈any account of his choice
 2. Offline guessing
- Very common (and very dangerous) in Windows Active Directory



September 2025



September 10, 2025

Wyden Calls for FTC Investigation of Microsoft for Enabling Ascension Hospital Ransomware Hack with Insecure Software

- U.S. Senator Ron Wyden urged the FTC to launch an investigation of Microsoft for contributing to ransomware attacks against critical U.S. infrastructure, including the hack of millions of patient records from Ascension, the major hospital system, in 2024.
- ... the hack began when a contractor clicked on a malicious link after conducting a web search.... The link led to the contractor's laptop being inadvertently infected with malware; dangerously insecure default settings on Microsoft software allowed the hackers to ultimately gain highly privileged access to the most sensitive parts of Ascension's network.
- The hackers employed a technique known as "**Kerberoasting**,"