

# Portuguese Colonial Land Grants in Brazil: Long-term Effects on Inequality and Economic Development

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## What I'm Looking for

- ▶ What's the best way to proceed with the project, given the data and a timeline for graduation.
- ▶ Some of the issues with each identification strategy I've thought about.
  - ▶ Paper itself would not just be one identification but a combination of multiple of them.
- ▶ Possible interesting section to analyze how they were distributed.

## Motivation

- ▶ Inequality, in both land and income, is high in Brazil.
  - ▶ “**Brazil has one of the highest levels of inequality of land distribution in the world [...] An estimated 1% of the population owns 45% of all land in Brazil.**” (USAID, 2016)

# Motivation

- ▶ However, land inequality is nothing new<sup>1</sup>:

**TABLE 1. Ratios of Occupied Land to Total Land (in percentages)**

	Total Area in Farms						
	1920	1940	1950	1960	1970	1980	1985
Brazil	20.6	23.2	27.2	29.3	34.6	42.9	44.1
North	6.0	7.1	6.5	6.6	6.5	11.6	12.6
Northeast	23.2	27.6	37.6	40.6	47.9	57.0	59.3
Southeast	49.4	62.1	66.4	68.8	75.2	79.5	79.2
South	47.7	54.9	61.6	67.8	79.0	83.3	83.3
Center-West	23.6	21.4	28.5	31.9	43.4	60.3	61.9

*Source:* Fundação Instituto Brasileiro de Geographia e Estatístico (IBGE), Censo Agropecuário, 1920-85.

**TABLE 2. Gini Coefficient of Landownership Distribution in Brazil**

Region	1960	1970	1975	1980	1985
Brazil	0.842	0.844	0.850	0.853	0.854
North	0.944	0.839	0.865	0.830	0.795
Northeast	0.846	0.855	0.858	0.858	0.865
Southeast	0.771	0.761	0.754	0.763	0.766
South	0.727	0.727	0.725	0.735	0.744
Center-West	0.845	0.856	0.851	0.840	0.836

*Source:* Hoffman 1982 and C. C. Mueller 1987.

<sup>1</sup>Table obtained from Alston et al. (2010)

## Research Question

- ▶ How much of it can be traced to colonial institutions?
  - ▶ Goal of this research would analyze the effects of colonial Portuguese land grants (*sesmarias*) on long-term inequality in Brazil.
- ▶ Proposed Identification:
  - ▶ Exploit **exogenous** variation on where the *sesmarias* could be granted during early colonization because of a treaty between Portugal and Spain ([Laudares et al., 2022](#)).
  - ▶ Generate **placebo land grants** and compare the effects with the actual ones ([Dell et al., 2019](#)).
  - ▶ Exploit **variation of soil quality** for different types of production across colonial Brazil ([Wigton-Jones, 2020](#)).
  - ▶ Exploit the **contents of the letters themselves** and how they might have changed through different events.

## Background

- ▶ Historical and anecdotal evidence of the land grants having permanent effects in Brazilian economic structure:
  - ▶ Early studies argued it led to the development of the “**economic aristocracy of the colonial society**” and the “**principal cause of the [large estates]**” in Brazil (Lima, 2002, p. 36; Costa Porto, 1979, p. 48).
  - ▶ “Today the system of ownership and use of land is a **continuation of the colonial system, with the sesmaria becoming [large estate] property**” (Andrade, 1980, p. 18).

## Possible Channels

- ▶ What are the long-term economic effects of colonial Portuguese land grants in Brazil?
  - ▶ Economic Development ⇒ the lands granted were (supposed to be) developed by the owners, leading to the early economic development of an area (possible conflict with extractive institutions though). **[Hard to measure for 1872 though]**
  - ▶ Land inequality ⇒ only those with sufficient financial conditions were granted *sesmarias*, and were often granted vast plots of land.
  - ▶ Income inequality ⇒ land was associated with wealth, fewer people with land lead to wealth accumulation by the few.
  - ▶ Demographic Differences ⇒ *Sesmarias* often required African slaves, which could skew the demographics of a location.
  - ▶ Political dominance ⇒ Dominance by aristocrats often hampered efforts for local reform and investment.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> "If the land was concentrated by a few owners, [large estates] are created and it limits the number of settlers and the possibility of them entering the social class of [land owners] or farmers (Bandecchi, 1963, p. 40)

## Literature Review

- ▶ Role of colonization and land tenure in present outcomes:
  - ▶ Institutional Origins: [Acemoglu et al., 2001](#) (AER), [Sokoloff et al., 2000](#) (JEP).
  - ▶ United States: [Smith, n.d.](#) (WP)
  - ▶ Brazil and Latin America: [Naritomi et al., 2012](#) (JEH), [Musacchio et al., 2014](#) (JEH), [Wigton-Jones, 2020](#) (JEG), [Laudares et al., 2022](#) (WP), [Sellars et al., 2018](#) (JDE).
  - ▶ India: [Banerjee et al., 2005](#) (AER).
  - ▶ Africa: [Lowes et al., 2020](#) (WP).

## Data


- ▶ Information of *sesmarias* from the [Sesmarias of the Luso-Brazilian Empire Database](#) [**Partially Added, In Progress**].
- ▶ Brazilian Censuses (1872-2010)
- ▶ Brazilian Agricultural Censuses (First one in 1920).
- ▶ LandSat data to measure land usage from [MapBiomas](#) (begins in 1985).
- ▶ Nightlight data from [Li et al. \(2020\)](#)
- ▶ Brazilian election results from 1889-1937 [History of Political Institutions](#) (To be released).
- ▶ FAO GAEZ dataset for crop suitability. [**Added for sugarcane**]

## Data

Information extracted from the letters:

- ▶ Location.
- ▶ Year of Concession (In 1697 they were limited to 3 **leagues** by 3 **leagues**).
- ▶ Type of Settler to whom it was granted.
- ▶ What purpose was the land requested (cattle, sugar plantation/factory, etc.).
- ▶ Who granted the request.



# Georeferenced Data



# Selection

- ▶ Agglomeration: Effects on Neighboring Grids

# Treaty of Tordesillas (1494)




Key to Captaincies

1. João de Barros e Aires da Cunha (Pará), 2nd Part
2. Fernão Álvares de Andrade (Maranhão)
3. Antônio Cardoso de Barros (Paulínia)
4. João de Barros e Aires da Cunha, 1st Part
5. Pero Lopes de Sousa (Itamaracá), 3rd Part
6. Duarte Coelho (Pernambuco)
7. Francisco Pereira Coutinho (Bahia)
8. Jorge Figueiredo Correia (Ilhéus)
9. Pero do Campo Tourinho (Pôrto Seguro)
10. Vasco Fernandes Coutinho (Espírito Santo)
11. Pero de Gois (São Tomé)
12. Martim Afonso de Sousa (Rio de Janeiro), 2nd Part
13. Pero Lopes de Sousa (Santo Amaro), 1st Part
14. Martim Afonso de Sousa (São Vicente), 1st Part
15. Pero Lopes de Sousa (Sant'Ana), 2nd Part

Captaincies of Brazil in the sixteenth century

# Treaty of Madrid (1750)



# Identification

## Fuzzy RDD Design

- ▶ Estimate a Fuzzy RDD in which the probability a municipality has a *sesmaria* is a function of whether it is located to the Portuguese side of the Treaty of Tordesillas (follows [Laudares et al., 2022 \(WP\)](#)).

First Stage:

$$Sesmarias_{m,s} = \delta \cdot TT_{m,s} + f(D_{m,s}) + \mu_s + X_{m,s} + \epsilon_{m,s}$$

Second Stage:

$$Y_{m,s} = \beta \cdot \widehat{Sesmarias}_{m,s} + f(D_{m,s}) + \mu_s + X_{m,s} + \epsilon_{m,s}$$

- ▶ **Issue:** For now I only have georeferenced data along the Northeast, which would require pushing the georeferencing to states alongside the coast. Also, since a RDD would require a lot of observations for power.

# Identification

Dell et al., 2019

- ▶ Follow Dell et al., 2019 (REStud) in generating placebo land grants based on similar characteristics as the actual granted ones and estimate differential effect of both.
- ▶ **Idea:** “Propensity Score Matching” + randomization inference, but not on unit of observation but instead on the location of the land grants

$$Y_{i,s} = \alpha + \sum_{j=1}^D \delta_1 \cdot dgrant_{i,s}^j + \beta X_{i,s} + \epsilon_{i,s}$$

# Identification

## Instrumental Variable

- ▶ Exploit exogenous land quality for certain types of requests, following [Wigton-Jones, 2020](#) (JEG).

First Stage:

$$Sesmarias_{m,s} = \delta \cdot Suitability_{m,s} + \mu_s + X_{m,s} + \epsilon_{m,s}$$

Second Stage:

$$Y_{m,s} = \beta \cdot \widehat{Sesmarias}_{m,s} + \mu_s + X_{m,s} + \epsilon_{m,s}$$

- ▶ **Issue:** Tried with potential sugarcane output, and there is no first stage in 1872, but there is in 2010 FS FS - 2010
- ▶ (Not a lot of Obs.  $\Rightarrow$  I can double it if needed)

# Identification

## Exploring the Content of the Letters

- ▶ Focus on the letters and their contents.
- ▶ Make the unit of observation a state by year.
- ▶ **Example Research Question:** How would a change in state governorship affect the contents of the letter:
  - ▶ **Channel:** New governor, not enough information on how strict he would be enforcing the land grants ⇒ the letters are longer and more specific.

# Descriptive Maps

- ▶ Description of the Land Grants: [Economic Activity](#) [Discovery](#) [Discovery by Year](#) [Claimed no land](#)  
[Year of Request](#)
- ▶ 1872 Census Maps: [Slavery](#) [Sugarcane Output](#) [Gender Ratios](#)
- ▶ Graphs: [Size Distribution](#) [Size Distribution Pre and Post 1697](#)

## Descriptive Maps - Grid Level


- ▶ Sugarcane: Potential Sugarcane Sugarcane Land Usage
- ▶ Pasture: Pasture Land Usage
- ▶ Nightlight: Nightlight

# Tables and Results

- ▶ Summary Tables: [Municipality Summary](#) [Land Grant Summary](#)
- ▶ OLS Results: [Economic Activity](#) [Economic Development Proxies](#) [Land Usage by Year of Grant](#)

# Future Steps

## Data Collection



## Future Steps

### To Do List

- ▶ Add more data!
- ▶ Add the information on the data about the people to whom the land grant was requested.
  - ▶ In some cases, there is some information **which city/location** the petitioner lived.

## References I

-  Acemoglu, D, S Johnson, and J A Robinson (2001). "The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation". In: *Am. Econ. Rev.*
-  Alston, Lee J, Gary D Libecap, and Bernardo Mueller (May 2010). *Titles, conflict, and land use*. Economics, Cognition, and Society. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
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-  Banerjee, Abhijit and Lakshmi Iyer (Sept. 2005). "History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India". In: *Am. Econ. Rev.* 95.4, pp. 1190–1213.
-  Costa Porto, José da (1979). *O sistema sesmarial no Brasil*. pt-BR. Editora Universidade de Brasília.

## References II

-  Dell, Melissa and Benjamin A Olken (Mar. 2019). "The Development Effects of the Extractive Colonial Economy: The Dutch Cultivation System in Java". en. In: *Rev. Econ. Stud.* 87.1, pp. 164–203.
-  Laudares, Humberto and Felipe Valencia Caicedo (2022). *Tordesillas, slavery and the origins of Brazilian inequality*. [https://conference.nber.org/conf\\_papers/f164242.pdf](https://conference.nber.org/conf_papers/f164242.pdf). Accessed: 2022-10-3.
-  Li, Xuecao et al. (June 2020). "A harmonized global nighttime light dataset 1992–2018". en. In: *Sci Data* 7.1, p. 168.
-  Lima, Ruy Cirne (2002). *Pequena história territorial do Brasil: sesmarias e terras devolutas*. pt-BR. Editora UFG.
-  Lowes, Sara and Eduardo Montero (Oct. 2020). *Concessions, Violence, and Indirect Rule: Evidence from the Congo Free State*. Tech. rep. w27893. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
-  Musacchio, Aldo, André Martínez Fritscher, and Martina Viarengo (Sept. 2014). "Colonial Institutions, Trade Shocks, and the Diffusion of Elementary Education in Brazil, 1889–1930". In: *J. Econ. Hist.* 74.3, pp. 730–766.

## References III

-  Naritomi, Joana, Rodrigo R Soares, and Juliano J Assunção (May 2012). "Institutional Development and Colonial Heritage within Brazil". In: *J. Econ. Hist.* 72.2, pp. 393–422.
-  Sellars, Emily A and Jennifer Alix-Garcia (Nov. 2018). "Labor scarcity, land tenure, and historical legacy: Evidence from Mexico". In: *J. Dev. Econ.* 135, pp. 504–516.
-  Smith, Cory (n.d.). *Land concentration and Long-run development in the frontier United States*. <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5f50c7f3798bae1a11362t/642b171c72aca01369a9ab0f/1680545566532/CorySmithLandConcentrationFrontier.pdf>. Accessed: 2023-4-27.
-  Sokoloff, Kenneth L and Stanley L Engerman (Sept. 2000). "Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World". In: *J. Econ. Perspect.* 14.3, pp. 217–232.
-  USAID (2016). *USAID COUNTRY PROFILE: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND RESOURCE GOVERNANCE - Brazil*. Tech. rep. USAID.
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## Other Relevant (?) Information to Add

- ▶ *Sesmarias* caused economic uncertainty in colonial times as often poor people would settle, develop land, and then lose the right of the land because a richer person would claim it ([Costa Porto, 1979](#), p. 142).

## Manueline Ordinances 1511-1512

“Na petição por uma carta de sesmaria, o requerente devia justificar seu pedido, e quando recebesse a carta de concessão havia uma serie de obrigações entre as quais estava a necessidade do cultivo”

## Example of Document





PA 0001  
Carta de concessão a Domingos Pereira Valadares - 19/06/1738

Registro de uma carta de data e sesmaria passada a Domingos Pereira Valadares de 3 léguas de terra de comprimento e uma de largura, no sítio chamado a Serra dos Cocos.


# 1872 Census - Slavery Distribution

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
# 1872 Census - Potential Sugarcane Output

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

# 2010 Census - Potential Sugarcane Output

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
# 1872 Census - Gender Distribution

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
# Basic Descriptive Statistics

Year Dist. [Back](#)




# Basic Descriptive Statistics (1 hec = 2.5 Football Fields)

Size Dist. [Back](#)



# Basic Descriptive Statistics (1 hec = 2.5 Football Fields)

Size Dist. [Back](#)




## Smallest Land Grant

- ▶ The smallest land grant we have in the dataset is from 1603, in Rio de Janeiro (RJ0118). The petitioner asked for some land to build a house in the city of São Sebastião, which explains why in hectares it is so small.

# Basic Descriptive Statistics


No Obs. in Pernambuco



# Georeferenced Land Grants

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## Sugarcane vs. Ranching




# Georeferenced Land Grants

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## Alleged Discovery of the Land

Claimed Discovery of the Land




Claimed Discovery of Land: □ No ■ Yes

# Georeferenced Land Grants

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## Alleged Discovery of the Land




# Georeferenced Land Grants

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## Alleged Discovery of the Land

Claimed Not Owning Any Land




Claimed Not Owning Land: □ No ■ Yes

# Georeferenced Land Grants

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Year of the Land Grant

Pre and Post 1700




# Georeferenced Land Grants

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## Alleged Discovery of the Land

Claimed Not Owning Any Land




Claimed Not Owning Land: □ No ■ Yes

# Georeferenced Land Grants

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
## Alleged Discovery of the Land



# Georeferenced Land Grants

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
## Alleged Discovery of the Land



# Georeferenced Land Grants

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
## Alleged Discovery of the Land



# Georeferenced Land Grants

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
## Alleged Discovery of the Land



# Georeferenced Land Grants

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
Pasture request + Land Usage in 2000



# Georeferenced Land Grants

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
Sugarcane request + Potential Sugarcane Production



# Georeferenced Land Grants

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
Sugarcane request + Area used for Sugarcane (2000)



# Georeferenced Land Grants

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All requests + Nightlight data (2000)



# First-Stage Estimates - 1872

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Table: Effects of Potential Sugarcane Output on Land Grants

	Any Land Grants		Sugar Land Grants	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Maximum Sugarcane Output (Thousand of Tons per hectare)	-0.085 (0.079)	-0.068 (0.109)	0.027 (0.064)	-0.041 (0.073)
N	104	104	104	104
Geographical Controls		✓		✓
R <sup>2</sup>	0.15	0.23	0.02	0.12

\* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

# First-Stage Estimates - 2010

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Table: Effects of Potential Sugarcane Output on Land Grants - 2010

	Any Land Grants		Sugar Land Grants	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Maximum Sugarcane Output (Thousand of Tons per hectare)	-0.039 (0.038)	-0.093** (0.042)	0.001 (0.006)	-0.019* (0.010)
N	677	677	677	677
Geographical Controls		✓		✓
R <sup>2</sup>	0.09	0.19	0.00	0.04

\* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

# First-Stage Estimates - Grid

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Table: Effects of Potential Sugarcane Output on Land Grants

	Any Land Grants		Sugar Land Grants	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Maximum Sugarcane Output (Thousand of Tons per hectare)	0.054*** (0.020)	-0.009 (0.023)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.005* (0.003)
N	2083	2083	2083	2083
Geographical Controls		✓		✓
R <sup>2</sup>	0.11	0.13	0.00	0.01

\* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

Table: OLS of Land Grants on Present Day Economic Activity

	Area dedicated to Sugarcane		Area dedicated to Livestock	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Sugar Land Grants	10.132** (4.810)	4.022 (3.827)	-15.872*** (5.837)	-10.327** (5.139)
Livestock Land Grants	-0.051 (0.389)	-0.609* (0.328)	7.505*** (1.366)	6.052*** (1.330)
Geographical Controls		✓		✓
DV Mean	2.79	2.79	30.96	30.96
N	2083	2083	2083	2083
R <sup>2</sup>	0.15	0.34	0.11	0.27

\* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

Table: OLS of Land Grants on Economic Development

	Ln(Nightlight + 1)		Urban Area (%)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Sugar Land Grants	2.308*** (0.539)	0.623** (0.315)	1.283 (0.989)	0.395 (0.928)
Livestock Land Grants	0.658*** (0.158)	0.425*** (0.137)	0.203 (0.182)	0.108 (0.180)
Geographical Controls		✓		✓
DV Mean	4.25	4.25	0.57	0.57
N	2083	2083	2083	2083
R <sup>2</sup>	0.11	0.34	0.00	0.06

\* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

# OLS - Land Usage

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Table: OLS of Land Grants by Year of Grant on Land Usage

	Sugarcane Area (%)		Pasture Area (%)		Urban Area (%)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Grants Pre-1697	5.223*** (1.511)	1.605 (1.260)	-7.529*** (2.613)	-7.339*** (2.378)	2.302** (0.953)	1.824** (0.887)
N	2083	2083	2083	2083	2083	2083
Geographical Controls		✓		✓		✓
DV Mean	2.79	2.79	30.96	30.96	0.57	0.57
R <sup>2</sup>	0.16	0.34	0.10	0.27	0.03	0.07

\* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

Table: OLS of Land Grants on Surrounding Grids

	Surrounding Grids Land Grant Presence (0/1)		Surrounding Grids Number of Land Grants			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
At Least One Land Grant	0.147*** (0.021)	0.084*** (0.021)	1.195*** (0.164)	0.921*** (0.153)		
Total Land Grants					0.770*** (0.116)	0.620*** (0.106)
Geographical Controls		✓		✓		✓
DV Mean	0.6	0.6	1.93	1.93	1.93	1.93
N	2083	2083	2083	2083	2083	2083
R <sup>2</sup>	0.30	0.41	0.33	0.39	0.34	0.40

\* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

## Grid Level

Table: Summary Statistics for the Land Grants - Grid Level

	At least 1 Land Grant (N=427)		No Land Grants (N=1656)		Diff. in Means	Std. Error
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.		
<b>Geographical</b>						
Distance to Nearest River (km)	296.0	115.0	182.3	140.7	-113.7**	6.6
Distance to the Coast (km)	105.9	86.9	187.7	144.3	81.9**	5.5
Mean Slope (m)	2.3	1.6	2.4	1.6	0.1	0.1
Mean Elevation (m)	267.8	206.4	347.3	208.8	79.5**	11.2
Latitude	-36.6	1.1	-37.5	1.6	-0.9**	0.1
Longitude	-7.0	1.1	-7.8	1.3	-0.8**	0.1
<b>Agriculture</b>						
Potential Sugarcane Output (FAO)	1318.8	542.8	1320.0	447.9	1.2	28.5
Maximum Calories Pre-1500 (Galor, 2016)	11331.1	1568.6	11022.0	2253.7	-309.0**	94.0
Maximum Calories Post-1500 (Galor, 2016)	11567.7	1320.4	11186.7	2166.6	-381.0**	83.2
<b>Satellite Data</b>						
Sugarcane Area (%)	2.9	9.2	2.8	9.7	-0.2	0.5
Livestock Area (%)	31.9	22.0	30.7	24.4	-1.2	1.2
Urban Area (%)	1.1	4.8	0.4	2.0	-0.7**	0.2
Ln(Nightlight + 1)	744.4	1155.1	394.2	685.6	-350.2**	58.4

# Balance Tables

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## 1872 Municipality Level

Table: Summary Statistics for Municipalities in 1872

	At least 1 Land Grant (N=86)		No Land Grants (N=18)		Diff. in Means	Std. Error
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.		
<b>Geographical</b>						
Distance to Nearest River (km)	230.3	129.7	136.8	115.9	-93.6**	30.7
Distance to the Coast (km)	79.3	90.2	83.9	134.8	4.6	33.2
Mean Slope (m)	2.7	1.1	3.1	1.5	0.4	0.4
Mean Elevation (m)	259.0	199.8	193.2	207.2	-65.9	53.4
<b>Agriculture</b>						
Potential Sugarcane Output (FAO)	1436.2	422.4	1647.6	333.9	211.4**	90.9
Maximum Calories Pre-1500 (Galor, 2016)	11061.2	1506.3	9963.2	1514.2	-1098.0**	392.1
Maximum Calories Post-1500 (Galor, 2016)	11494.7	1054.4	10714.4	1300.4	-780.3**	326.9
<b>Demographics</b>						
Total Population	17591.1	14256.7	15940.1	11420.2	-1650.9	3099.8
Enslaved Population as Total (%)	8.0	4.3	10.8	6.1	2.8***	1.5
Ratio of Free Men to Free Women	1.0	0.1	1.0	0.1	0.0***	0.0
Ratio of Enslaved Men to Enslaved Women	1.1	0.3	1.0	0.1	-0.1***	0.0
<b>Labor</b>						
Proportion of Industrial Workers (%)	0.9	0.8	1.3	1.4	0.4	0.3
Proportion of Enslaved People working in Farming (%)	36.5	20.4	38.8	18.6	2.3	4.9
Proportion of Farmers (%)	31.6	15.3	27.5	13.4	-4.1	3.6
Proportion of Free Men Farmers (%)	44.3	16.9	39.2	17.6	-5.0	4.5
Proportion of Free Women Farmers (%)	17.4	17.8	12.5	12.5	-5.0	3.5
<b>Human Capital</b>						
Literacy Rate (%)	16.3	8.3	13.5	6.2	-2.8	1.7

Table: Summary Statistics for the Land Grants

	Granted between 1624-1696 (N=101)		Granted between 1697-1750 (N=531)		Diff. in Means	Std. Error
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.		
Distance to Nearest River (km)	359.6	873.8	342.9	345.6	-16.7	88.2
Distance to the Coast (km)	183.7	926.9	119.9	342.8	-63.9	93.4
Mean Slope (m)	2.2	2.1	2.2	2.5	0.0	0.2
Mean Elevation (m)	200.5	224.9	253.2	201.8	52.7**	24.1
Potential Sugarcane Output (FAO)	1413.0	522.1	1281.0	549.0	-132.0**	57.6
Maximum Calories Pre-1500 (Galor, 2016)	10473.6	1993.8	11482.7	1316.7	1009.1**	208.4
Maximum Calories Post-1500 (Galor, 2016)	11022.9	1754.8	11660.0	1073.5	637.2**	182.4