

Calculating bias / Variance but to a deviation.
 Considering absolute deviation.

c. Please write down formula for variance? Briefly explain what the formula represents?
 [1+1 points]

Variance is basically how much the values vary when considering
 collected data set (difference across observations)

$$\text{Variance} = E[(X - \mu)^2] = E(X^2) - E(X)^2 \quad (2)$$

d. Please compute variance using the information for the models MR1 and MR2. [3 points]

Variance is $E[(X - \mu)^2]$
MR1

$\mu = 1.5$ (average deviation)

$$(1 - 1.5)^2 = 0.25$$

$$(2 - 1.5)^2 = 0.25$$

$$(1 - 1.5)^2 = 0.25$$

$$(2 - 1.5)^2 = 0.25 = \frac{0.25 \times 6}{6}$$

$$(1 - 1.5)^2 = 0.25$$

$$(2 - 1.5)^2 = 0.25$$

$$(1.5 - 0.25)^2 = 1.5625 \quad \text{Variance from answer}$$

MR2

$\mu = 1.5$ (average deviation)

$$(2 - 1.5)^2 = 0.25$$

$$(1 - 1.5)^2 = 0.25$$

$$(2 - 1.5)^2 = 0.25$$

$$(1 - 1.5)^2 = 0.25$$

$$(2 - 1.5)^2 = 0.25$$

$$(1 - 1.5)^2 = 0.25$$

$$\text{avg} = 0.25$$

$$(1.5625) \quad \text{Variance}$$

e. Please compute the MSE (Mean Square Error) for MR1 and MR2. Please write down the formula being used before presenting the computations. [3+1 points]

mean squared error is $\frac{\sum |f(x) - y|_{\text{real}}|^2}{n}$

(what the squared
 not divided)

$$\text{MR1: } |y_1 - y_1|^2 + |y_2 - y_2|^2 + |y_3 - y_3|^2 + |y_4 - y_4|^2 + |y_5 - y_5|^2 + |y_6 - y_6|^2$$

$$1+4+1+4+1+4=15$$

MR2

$$= |y_1 - \hat{y}_1|^2 + |y_2 - \hat{y}_2|^2 + |y_3 - \hat{y}_3|^2 + |y_4 - \hat{y}_4|^2 + |y_5 - \hat{y}_5|^2 + |y_6 - \hat{y}_6|^2$$

$$= 15$$

f. Based on the results above, what would your final model or suggestion be? Please explain the choice made in detail. [3 points]

So, we would prefer the model having minimum mean squared error this is because we want to have an ideal model that is neither overfitted nor underfitted. by this we want less bias, less variance!!

We would try to have minimum mean squared error.

① MSE value is our model.

Refer last pages

2. Please answer the following questions regarding POMDPs along with all the steps and computations involved. With the IPL season ongoing, popular site Cricinfo provides the winning chance of the teams (T1, T2) at any point, as (z%, 100-z%). This represents the belief (z/100, 1-(z/100)) of winning the match for each team from the current point.

a. You construct your belief vector using Cricinfo and take part in a bet where you bet that T1 would win. Both winning and losing the bet would be same value of 100 rupees (i.e., +100 or -100). Please mention whether the following statement is True or False and present the calculations to support: Using the belief vector, you would expect to receive 60 rupees if z is 60%.

[3 points]

Ref: R(100, -100)

$$\text{if } z = 60\%, \text{ then belief} = \left[\frac{60}{100}, 1 - \frac{60}{100} \right] = [0.6, 0.4]$$

\downarrow \downarrow
 P(win) \rightarrow P(lose)

$$\text{expected utility: } (0.6)(100) + (0.4)(-100)$$

$$60 - 40 = 20$$

False


bet

Since belief of T1 \rightarrow T2 win
 hence we might win and hence expect ~~60~~ 100 rupees!!
 but 60 rupees

- b. If you are a risk neutral agent, you would play the bet in (a). Please mention True or False and present a suitable utility function to make the case for your answer along with calculations involved.

[3 points]

thing is if we are risk neutral then we know that \rightarrow
 So yes if we are risk neutral agent then we
 would go ahead with bet
 because the utility of not playing would be 0 risk neutral
 but $(0.6)(100) - (0.4)(100) = 20$ if playing (3)




hence you will value this game in

plea that you might get 100 with 60% possibility

- c. If you are a risk averse agent, you would definitely not play the bet in (a). Please mention True or False and present a suitable utility function to make the case for your answer along with calculations involved.

[3 points]

We know that risk averse agent is one whose graph for utility
 is concave \downarrow difference



(1.5)

because according to graph above, as well your risk of losing
 money has more utility than you gaining money

$$\frac{U(x) - U(x-c)}{\text{losing}} > \frac{U(x) + U(x+c)}{\text{winning}}$$

hence you prefer not play

final answer?

- d. If the current status from Cricinfo is $(z\%, 100-z\%)$ and if action Watch will help you understand the game better before taking a bet, please compute the new belief θ' if post Watch action you realize that T2 has increased its chances of winning by 15%. [3 points]

Since you learn via watch, hence you update your belief state based upon what you observe.

$$(1/11) + \frac{15}{100} (1/2) \times (100 - 2 + 15 \times 1)$$

Initially $T_1: Z$.

$$T_2 = 100 - Z\%$$

$$(100 - Z) + \frac{15}{100} (100 - Z) = \frac{115}{100} (100 - Z)$$

$$\frac{1}{11} + \frac{15}{100} (1/2) \times (100 - 2 + 15 \times 1) = \frac{1}{11} + \frac{15}{100} (100 - 2 + 15) = \frac{1}{11} + \frac{15}{100} (113) = \frac{1}{11} + \frac{1695}{100} = \frac{1}{11} + 16.95 = 17.05$$

Dependent

3. Consider a robot that is moving in an environment. The goal of the robot is to move from an initial point to a destination point as fast as possible. However, the robot has the limitation that if it moves fast, its engine can overheat and stop the robot from moving. The robot can move with two different speeds: Slow and Fast. If the robot moves Fast, it gets a (immediate) reward of 10 and if it moves Slow, it gets a (immediate) reward of 4. We can model this problem as an MDP by having three states: Cool, Warm, and Off. The transitions are shown as below. Assume that the discount factor is 0.9 and also assume that when the robot reaches the (terminal) state Off, it will remain there without getting any reward.

s	A	s'	P(s' s,a)
Cool	Slow	Cool	1
Cool	Fast	Cool	1/4
Cool	Fast	Warm	3/4
Warm	Slow	Cool	1/2
Warm	Slow	Warm	1/2
Warm	Fast	Warm	1/4
Warm	Fast	Off	3/4

- a) Consider the conservative policy J when the robot always moves Slow. Assume that the robot starts at state Cool. What is the value of $J(\text{Cool})$ i.e., expected discounted sum of rewards for state Cool. Please show steps of computation. [4 points]

Now, expected discounted sum of reward for state cool

$$V = \sum P(\text{Cool} | \text{Cool}, \text{Slow}) \cdot R(\text{Cool})$$

$$(0.9)(1)(0.9) = 0.81$$

(note that since start state is cool and agent can only move slow it won't reach warm by any means)

" Expected discounted of sum of rewards can be seen as


$$V = \max_{a'} P(s'/s, a) \cdot U(s') \rightarrow \text{value of that state}$$

 discount factor \leftarrow \max \rightarrow probability of reaching it via state s by taking action a .

cont: from cool three are possible fast, fast, slow but slower calculate utility using 0 for each and select the max one.

slow: $(1/4) \times 4 = 1$ fast: $3/4 \times 10 + (2/5)(3) = 7.5$ (warm) Sum?
 fast: $(1/4) \times 10 = 2.5$ (cool) robot will prefer it max one!!

+3 b) What is the optimal policy for the robot at each state? Please explain in detail or show computations for how you arrived at the solution. Answer without clear supporting details will receive 0 points. -- 11 by others [5 points]



at each state robot will try to choose action that maximizes its utility. (in done continued).

c) Is it possible to change the discount factor to get a different optimal policy? If yes, please provide the discount factor and the policy it gives and if not, please justify your answer with detailed reasoning. -- [3 points, mentioning Yes/No without relevant explanation will not receive points]

basically thing is action agent chooses depend upon γ 0.1?
 $P(s'/s, a) \cdot U(s')$ but it's not directly dependent on γ
 γ the reward of that state the overall value would decrease γ but no policy won't change

⑪ Other is that you choose reward in such a way that equality remains same as say $\text{fast} = 2.0$
 $\text{slow} = 6$

then $(1/4), (1/2)(3.0), (1/4)(2.0)$ here you notice that the value changed but policy remains the same.

- d) Is it possible to change the immediate reward function so that $J(\text{Cool})$ [not the policy J but the value provided by J at state Cool] changes but the optimal policy would remain unchanged? If yes, please give such a change and if no justify your answer in a couple of sentences. [3 points, mentioning Yes/No without relevant explanation will not carry points]

Basically thing is consider state cool you have three options available ~~available~~, cool

slow	fast	fast
$(1/4)$	$(1/2)(10)$	$(1/4)(10)$
4	2.5	7.5

Immediate reward function may/may not change the optimal policy e.g.,

① If you choose reward for fast too slow then the one you choose for fast too slow then

obviously slow will be preferred. Consider

- e) If you plan to solve the above MDP using the Linear Programming approach, please present the complete A matrix for this problem. [5 points]

So it would be solved as, we need to satisfy

$$\max(Vx) \quad | \quad Ax = b \quad \text{initial probability}$$

maximising the total reward.

matrix $(S_i - P_{ij}^a)$ → (probability of reaching state i via action a from j)
 $\leftarrow 1$ (when $i=j$)

explained how it will be done on last + page - ②

4. Assume that there are 100 students in a class you are part of. Each of the 100 students in the class is provided with a fair coin i.e. $P(\text{Heads}) = P(\text{Tails}) = 0.5$. All of you toss your coin simultaneously in each round. Please answer the following questions and present all the relevant reasoning:

a) If the class tossed once, what is the probability that you and your friend both tossed a heads in that round? [1 points]

$$P(\text{I head}) \cdot P(\text{friend head}) = \left(\frac{1}{2}\right) \cdot \left(\frac{1}{2}\right) = \frac{1}{4} = 0.25$$

①

0.25

b) If the class plans to toss twice, what is the probability that you would toss a heads in second round conditioned on the fact that you tossed a heads in the first round? [2 points]

so A: toss head in second round
B: toss head in first round

$$P(A|B) = \frac{P(A \cap B)}{P(B)}$$

Since A and B are independent event hence $P(A \cap B) = P(A) \cdot P(B)$

$$\frac{P(A) \cdot P(B)}{P(B)} = P(A) = \left(\frac{1}{2}\right) = 0.5$$

0.5

②

c) If the class tossed twice, what is the probability that you obtained heads twice in the two rounds while your friend obtained a tails both times? [2 points]

assuming while don't try conditioning here rather simultaneous action

A: you obtain head twice in two round B: friend obtained tail both time

$P(A \cap B) = P(A) \cdot P(B)$ (since friend's toss is independent from your toss)

$$\left(\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{2}\right) \cdot \left(\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{2}\right) = \frac{1}{16} = 0.0625$$

②

d) If the class tossed once, what is the probability that you are the only one that tossed a heads while everyone else in the class tossed a tails? [3 points]

so A: you tossed heads

B: 99 other tossed tail

$$P(A \cap B) = P(A) \cdot P(B)$$

(as your toss is independent of their tosses)

$$P(A) = \frac{1}{2} \text{ (you tossed head)}$$

$$P(B) = \left(\frac{1}{2}\right) \cdot \left(\frac{1}{2}\right) \dots \dots \left(\frac{1}{2}\right)$$

99 times for each other student for tail

$$P(A) \cdot P(B) = \left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^{100} = (0.5)^{100}$$

- ✓ If the class tossed once, what is the probability that both you and your friend tossed a Heads given the information that you are risk averse but your friend is risk seeking? You can define suitable utility functions that model risk averse and risk seeking behavior but please present the inputs modeled.

[3 points]

Since you are risk averse: for you since both action have same result to C but $U(x+C) - U(x) < U(x) - U(x-C)$

$$\frac{U(x+C) + U(x-C)}{2} < U(x)$$

not playing any more
since you want loss!!



Since friend is risk overge, $P(\text{head}) = 1/2$ since $P(A \cap B) = 0.1/2$

10

✓ ⑥ →

5. Prove the following using truth table method: $(A \rightarrow (B \rightarrow C)) \leftrightarrow ((A \wedge B) \rightarrow C)$

[5 points]

① $X \rightarrow Y$
is false only if
 X is true & Y is
false

A	B	C	$B \rightarrow C$	$A \rightarrow (B \rightarrow C)$	$A \wedge B$	$(A \wedge B) \rightarrow C$
T	T	T	T	T	T	T
T	T	F	F	F	T	F
T	F	T	T	T	F	T
T	F	F	T	T	F	T
F	T	T	T	T	F	T
F	T	F	F	T	F	T

3. Borrowing writing material or calculators from other students in the examination hall is prohibited.
4. If any student is found indulging in malpractice or copying in the examination hall, the student will be given 'F' grade for the course and may be debarred from writing other examinations.

$$P(\text{actual} | T_1) = \frac{P(\text{actual} \cap T_1)}{P(T_1)} = \frac{(0.3)}{(0.3) + (0.1)} = \frac{0.3}{0.4}$$

getting positive
↑
tested

$$P(T_1) = P(\text{covid} | T_1) + P(\text{noncovid} | T_1)$$

$$= (0.3) + (0.1) = 0.4$$

on last

(b) What is the entropy of the population?

We know that Entropy = $-\sum p_i \log p_i$

hence for population: 100, cancer = $\frac{1}{100} \times 100 = 1$, non cancer = 99

$$= -\left(\frac{1}{100} \log \left(\frac{1}{100}\right) + \frac{99}{100} \log \left(\frac{99}{100}\right)\right) = -\left(\frac{1}{100} (-2) + \frac{99}{100} \log(0.99)\right)$$

$$= -(-0.02432) = 0.02432$$

(c) What is the information gain of T_1 ?

$$\text{Gain}(T_1) = \text{Entropy } S - \sum \frac{|S_v|}{|S|} \text{Entropy } S_v$$

in 100 population

cancer: $\frac{1}{100} \log \left(\frac{1}{100}\right) = (-0.3) (-0.522) = 0.1568$

noncancer: $\frac{99}{100} \log \left(\frac{99}{100}\right) = 0.98$

— continued on last

8. The spam class of a spam dataset has the following probabilities:

$$P(A|\text{spam}) = 0.2, P(B|\text{spam}) = 0.3, P(C|\text{spam}) = 0.4, P(AB|\text{spam}) = 0.15$$

Given an email with the keywords, (A, B, C), what will naive bayes compute as the probability that the email is spam? [5 points]

$$\text{now, } P(\text{spam}) = P(A|\text{spam}) + P(B|\text{spam}) + P(C|\text{spam}) - P(AB|\text{spam})$$

$$= 0.2 + 0.3 + 0.4 - 0.15 = 0.75$$

$$\text{now } P(\text{non-spam}) = P(\text{spam}) \cdot [P(A|\text{spam}) + P(B|\text{spam}) + P(C|\text{spam})]$$

A	B	C	B→C	A→(B→C)	A∩B	A∩B→C
F	F	T	T	T	F	T
F	F	F	T	T	F	T

only in ① and ② for all possible values whenever ① is true,

② is also true hence $(A \rightarrow (B \rightarrow C)) \Leftrightarrow (A \cap B) \rightarrow C$ B

6. What are all the infrequent candidates (after pruning) that would be generated by Apriori if the frequent itemsets are: $F = \{A, B, C, D, AB, AC, BC, AD, ABC\}$ [Available items are A, B, C, D] [10 points]

Let's first analyze what all can Apriori generate $4C2 = 6$

A, B, C, D
 $\Rightarrow AB, BC, CD, AD, BD, AC$ (CD, BD in this set)
 ✓ ✓
 ↓ Prune (remove CD, BD)

AB, BC, AD, AC

↓ these will generate following sets

ABC, ABD, ABC, ADC

↳ will get pruned no DC

⊗ will get

Pruned (no BD)

↓
 ABC left!

(ADC, ABD in this set)

(these will be for infrequent ones generated by Apriori but will get pruned out !!)

7. The probability of cancer in a population is 1%. A test (T_1) for cancer identifies cancer patients with a probability of 30% and identifies non-cancer patients with a probability of 99%. [15 points]

(a) Given that a patient has tested positive, what is the probability that he actually has cancer?

He can say population $P(\text{cancer}) = 0.01$

T_1 cancer $P(\text{cancer determined by } T_1) = 0.3$

$P(\text{noncancer by } T_1) = 0.99$

Answer.


Q9-6)

$$MS: \sqrt{(70-60)^2 + (70-60)^2} = \sqrt{200} = 14.14$$

$$QM: \sqrt{(70-60)^2 + (70-70)^2} = \sqrt{100+0} = 10$$

$$\min(10, 14.14, 11.18) = 10$$

single link distance = 10



① We will calculate distances between them i.e.

$$Q \rightarrow R: \sqrt{(65-60)^2 + (60-70)^2} = \sqrt{100+95} = \sqrt{195} = 11.18$$

$$Q \rightarrow S: \sqrt{(60-60)^2 + (70-60)^2} = \sqrt{0+100} = \sqrt{100} = 10$$

$$Q \rightarrow M: \sqrt{(70-60)^2 + (70-70)^2} = \sqrt{100+0} = \sqrt{100} = 10$$

(a) Single link: minimum distance between two clusters is

$$\text{Single link } \min(10, 10, 11.18) = 10$$

(b) Complete link is the maximum distance between two clusters

$$\max(10, 10, 11.18) = 11.18 \text{ ans}$$

(c) Average link: average distance between two clusters.

$$\frac{11.18 + 10 + 10}{3} = 10.393 \approx 10.39 \text{ ans}$$

$$(0.75)(0.2)(0.3)(0.4) = 0.018$$

Naive Bayes basically would try to classify it as Phom
as P(Phom) * (P(given cond'n | Phom))

since all occur simultaneously hence multiplied

9. Data: {(Ram, 65, 60), (Shyam, 60, 60), (Gita, 60, 70), (Mohan, 70, 70)}. Given that Ram, Shyam and Mohan are in one cluster and Gita is in the other cluster, determine: [5x3 points]

(i) Single-link distance between the two clusters: 10

R(65, 60)
S(60, 60)
G(60, 70) 1

M(70, 70) 2

Complete on next page ①

Single link is the minimum distance between two clusters.

Calculating all distances as:

$$RM: \sqrt{(70-65)^2 + (70-60)^2} = \sqrt{25+100} = \sqrt{125} = 11.18$$

cont on next page ①

(ii) Complete-link distance between the two clusters: 14.14

Complete link is the maximum distance between two clusters.

from part ① we have, RM: 11.18, MS: 14.14, GN: 10

$$\max(11.18, 14.14, 10) = 14.14$$

11.18

(iii) Average-link distance between the two clusters: _____

10.39

Q3(e)

Task: $\max(x)$

→ maximising total reward

Such that

$Ax = \vec{x}$ → initial probabilities of being in particular states

to

	x_{11}	x_{12}	x_{21}	x_{22}	x_{31}	x_{32}	x_{41}	x_{42}	x_{51}	x_{52}
s_1										
s_2										
s_3										
s_4										
s_5										
s_6										

(From, action)

→ on vertical axis we write the states, on horizontal are the x_{ab} : moving from state a via action b !!

hence a cell has the value $|S_{ij}^* - P_{ij}^a|$

1 (when $i=j$)

0 (otherwise)

→ probability of reaching state j via action a from i .

in this question the set of actions are fast, slow.

set of states are warm, cool.

$a_{cool, slow}$ $a_{cool, fast}$ $a_{warm, slow}$ → think how the action will be

cool			
warm			

States

	ACS	ACF	GWS	GWP
C	①	②	③	④
W	⑤	⑥	⑦	⑧

no opp?

① $\delta U - P_U^a = 1 - \left(\text{heat from cool} \rightarrow \text{to cool by slow} \right) = 1 - 1 = 0$

② $\delta U - P_U^a = 1 - \left(\text{heat from cool} \rightarrow \text{cool by fast} \right) = 1 - \frac{1}{4} = \frac{3}{4} = 0.75$

③ $\delta U - P_U^a = 0 - \left(\text{from warm} \rightarrow \text{cool by slow} \right) = 0 - \frac{1}{2} = -\frac{1}{2} = -0.5$

④ $\delta U - P_U^a = 0 - \left(\text{from warm} \rightarrow \text{cool by fast} \right) = 0 - (0) = 0$

⑤ $\delta U - P_U^a = 0 - \left(\text{from cool} \rightarrow \text{warm by slow} \right) = 0$

⑥ $\delta U - P_U^a = 0 - \left(\text{from cool} \rightarrow \text{warm by fast} \right) = 0 - \frac{3}{4} = -\frac{3}{4}$

⑦ $\delta U - P_U^a = 1 - \left(\text{warm} \rightarrow \text{warm by slow} \right) = 1 - \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{2}$

⑧ $\delta U - P_U^a = 1 - \left(\text{warm} \rightarrow \text{warm fast} \right) = 1 - \frac{1}{4} = \frac{3}{4}$

once you get a row $AX = a$

Q2) POMDP: partially observable Markov decision processes !!

(a) It is false as 0.6 probability means that there are 60% percent chance to go into win in that case win utility amounts to $(0.6 \times 100) = 60$. It isn't the amount of money you get !! It's just utility hence false

Max
Roll

Root
Spec

(b) No, being risk neutral is when your utility also varies linearly with the amount, clearly risk for losing is more than gaining clearly winning is more than losing for sure,

$$\begin{aligned}
 U + U(x+c) &< U = U(x) \rightarrow U(x+c) - U(x) < U - U(x) \\
 -U(x) + U(x+c) &< U - U(x) \rightarrow U(x+c) - U(x) < U - U(x) \\
 \frac{U(x+c) + U(x-c)}{2} &< U(x) \rightarrow U(x+c) + U(x-c) < 2U(x)
 \end{aligned}$$

hence if you are risk neutral you play the bet !!

you might get 100 with utility 20 hence you are a winner

(c) No being risk averse we won't play because here utility of losing > utility of winning hence won't take risk of losing -100 by probability of 40% !!

(d) we know that new belief state is basically the updated probability i.e. after considering the watch confidence you get

if it was $(z\%, (100-z)\%)$ and after watch
 to increased by 15% it will be just (taking
 absolute)

$$((z-15)\% \rightarrow (100-z+15)\%)$$

new belief state after considering observation

Q3/6 Optimal policy of robot is one that maximizes
 reward!!

for the cool state, optimal policy would be to
reach warm state by fast action thereby getting reward of
 (+10) and probability is $3/4$. hence relatively higher than
 what other would provide

for the warm state, optimal policy would be to do
off getting reward 10, probability of $3/4$!!

because the net motive is to maximize $\sum P(s'|s, a) \cdot U(s')$

probability of reaching state
 s' via state s by taking action
 a ($U(s')$ be the value of
 state s' has reached).

② and, optimal policy won't get affected by changing γ since the probability and rewards are all constant

Q1-c

$$\begin{aligned} & (0.02432) - \left(\left(\frac{1}{100} \right) (0.1568) + \left(\frac{99}{100} \right) (0.98) \right) \\ &= (0.02432) - (0.001568 + 0.9702) \\ &= -0.947448 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Q1-a } \frac{P(\text{actually good} + \text{test})}{P(\text{tested})} &= \frac{\frac{32}{100} \times \frac{0.1}{10}}{\left(\frac{30}{100} \right) \times (0.1) + \left(\frac{1}{100} \right) (0.99)} \\ &= \frac{0.03}{0.03 + 0.0099} = \frac{0.03}{0.0399} \approx 75\% \end{aligned}$$

— Thanks

Q6) Apriori Algorithm concept + Example

used for pruning out infrequent data set
 ↳ defined with some threshold
 w.r.t

It is based upon fact that a set is frequent if and only if all its subset are frequent!!

say that you have ~~AB, BC, AC~~ as frequent ones
 now you can get ~~ABC, ABC~~ but

say yes here AB, BC, CD, AD

you formed ABD, BCD, CAD but $!!$ CAD
 ABC

will get pruned there's no $CA!!$

BCD will get pruned there is not $BD!!$

ABD will get pruned not $BD!!$

only ABC
survives!!

that's what question demands returning all the ones that
got pruned (infrequent one).