Pinocchio

Nearly Practical Verifiable Computation

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Motivation

- Computational power is often asymmetric.
- Client may want to outsource to powerful workers.
 - Cloud computing;
 - Grid computing;
 - Distributed computing.
- Client needs to verify computations.
 - Fast verification;
 - Minimize overhead.

Verifiable Computation (VC)

- A VC scheme allows a client to outsource the evaluation of F(u).
- Then, the client can verify the correcteness of F(u).

Definition (Public Verifiable Computation)

A public verifiable computation scheme \mathcal{VC} consists of a set of three polynomial-time algorighms (KeyGen, Compute, Verify) defined as follows.

- $(\mathsf{EK}_F,\mathsf{VK}_F) \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGen}(F,1^\lambda)$: Outputs a *public* evaluation key EK_F and a public verification key VK_F .
- $(y, \pi_y) \leftarrow \mathsf{Compute}(\mathsf{EK}_F, u)$: Outputs $y \leftarrow F(u)$ and a proof π_y .
- $\{0,1\} \leftarrow \mathsf{Verify}(\mathsf{VK}_F, u, y, \pi_y)$: Uses VK_F and outputs whether F(u) = y.

Correctness: Verify always outputs 1 if y = F(u).

Security: Verify has negligible probability of outputting 1 for a wrong evaluation.

Efficiency: KeyGen is a one-time operation that is cheaper than F.



Definition

A QAP Q over field $\mathbb F$ contains three sets of m+1 polynomials $\mathcal V=\{v_k(x)\}$, $\mathcal W=\{w_k(x)\}$, $\mathcal Y=\{y_k(x)\}$, for $k\in\{0,\ldots,m\}$, and a target polynomial t(x).

Suppose F is a function that takes as input n elements of \mathbb{F} and outputs n' elements, for a total of N = n + n' I/O elements.

Then, we say that Q computes F if: $(c_1, \ldots, c_N) \in \mathbb{F}^N$ is a valid assignment of F's inputs and outputs iff there exist coefficients (c_{N+1}, \ldots, c_m) such that t(x) divides p(x) where:

$$p(x) = \left(v_0(x) + \sum_{k=1}^m c_k v_k(x)\right) \cdot \left(w_0(x) + \sum_{k=1}^m c_k w_k(x)\right) - \left(y_0(x) + \sum_{k=1}^m c_k y_k(x)\right)$$

In other words, there must exist h(x) such that $h(x) \cdot t(x) = p(x)$.

Let us build a QAP from an arithmetic circuit C.


- ullet For each *multiplicative* gate, pick an arbitrary root $\mathit{r_g} \in \mathbb{F}.$
- Define the target polynomial as $t(x) = \prod_g (x r_g)$.
- Associate an index $k \in [m] = \{1, ..., m\}$ to each input and output from a multiplication gate (not addition gates).
- Define \mathcal{V} , \mathcal{W} and \mathcal{Y} enconding the left input, right input and output of each multiplication gate, respectively.
 - $v_k(r_g) = 1$ if the k-th wire is a left input to gate g, and $v_k(r_g) = 0$ otherwise.
 - $w_k(r_g) = 1$ if the k-th wire is a right input to gate g, and $w_k(r_g) = 0$ otherwise.
 - $y_k(r_g) = 1$ if the k-th wire is a output to gate g, and $y_k(r_g) = 0$ otherwise.
- This way, we have a nice simplification:

$$\left(v_0(x) + \sum_{k=1}^m c_k v_k(r_g)\right) \cdot \left(w_0(x) + \sum_{k=1}^m c_k w_k(r_g)\right)$$

$$= \left(\sum_{k \in I_{left}} c_k\right) \cdot \left(\sum_{k \in I_{right}} c_k\right) = c_g y_k(r_g) = c_g \implies p(r_g) = 0$$

Example

Let
$$F(c_1, c_2, c_3, c_4) = (c_1 + c_2) \times (c_3 \times c_4)$$



- **Strong QAPs**: The same set of c_i must be applied to all sets of polynomials.
- It is possible to convert any regular QAP to a strong QAP.
- QAP's degree increases to 3d + 2N (tripling what we had before).

Bilinear maps

- Let \mathbb{G} be a group of order q for some large prime p.
- A bilinear map $e \colon \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \to \mathbb{G}$ is a function such that:

$$e(g^a, g^b) = e(g^{ab}, g)$$

 $\frac{e(g^{ab}, g)}{e(g^c, g)} = e(g^{ab-c}, g)$

$QAP \rightarrow VC: KeyGen$

Let F be a function with N I/O values from \mathbb{F} .

- Convert F into a QAP $Q = (t(x), \mathcal{V}, \mathcal{W}, \mathcal{Y})$ of size m and degree d.
- ② Let $I_{mid} = \{N+1, ..., m\}$ be the non-IO-related indices.
- **3** Let e be a non-trivial bilinear map $e \colon \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \to \mathbb{G}_T$, and let $g \in \mathbb{G}$.
- Choose $s, \alpha, \beta_v, \beta_w, \beta_y, \gamma \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}$.
- Onstruct the public keys as:

$$\begin{split} \mathsf{EK}_{F} &= (& \{ g^{\mathsf{v}_{k}(s)} \}_{k \in I_{\mathrm{mid}}}, \{ g^{\mathsf{w}_{k}(s)} \}_{k \in [m]}, \{ g^{\mathsf{v}_{k}(s)} \}_{k \in [m]}, \\ & \{ g^{\alpha \mathsf{v}_{k}(s)} \}_{k \in I_{\mathrm{mid}}}, \{ g^{\alpha \mathsf{w}_{k}(s)} \}_{k \in [m]}, \{ g^{\alpha \mathsf{y}_{k}(s)} \}_{k \in [m]}, \\ & \{ g^{s^{i}} \}_{i \in [d]}, \{ g^{\alpha s^{i}} \}_{i \in [d]} \) \end{split}$$

$$\begin{split} \mathsf{VK}_F = (& \quad g^1, g^\alpha, g^\gamma, g^{\beta_\nu \gamma}, g^{\beta_w \gamma}, g^{\beta_y \gamma}, \\ & \quad g^{t(s)}, \{g^{v_k(s)}\}_{k \in [N]}, g^{v_0(s)}, g^{w_0(s)}, g^{y_0(s)} \quad) \end{split}$$

$QAP \rightarrow VC$: Compute

- On input u, the worker evaluates the circuit for F to obtain y ← F(u); it also learns all c; values.
- ② Worker has Q, so it knows p(x).
- **3** The worker computes v(s), w(s) and y(s) using exponents.

$$g^{v_0(s)} \cdot \prod_{k \in [m]} \left(g^{v_k(s)} \right)^{c_k} = g^{v_0(s) + \sum_{k \in [m]} c_k v_k(s)} = g^{v(s)}$$

$$g^{\alpha v_0(s)} \cdot \prod_{k \in I_{mid}} \left(g^{\alpha v_k(s)} \right)^{c_k} = g^{\alpha (v_0(s) + \sum_{k \in I_{mid}} c_k v_k(s))} = g^{\alpha v_{mid}(s)}$$

• It can also compute h(s).

$$\frac{p(x)}{t(x)} = h(x) = h_0 + h_1 x + h_2 x^2 + \dots \implies h(s) = h_0 + h_1 s + h_2 s^2 + \dots$$

$$\implies \prod_{i \in [d]} \left(g^{s^i} \right)^{h_i} = g^{\sum_{i \in [d]} h_i s^i} = g^{h(s)}$$

$QAP \rightarrow VC$: Compute

5 Finally, it outputs the proof π_y as:

$QAP \rightarrow VC$: Verify

 $\bullet \ \ \, \text{Check correctness of} \ \, \alpha \ \, \text{and} \ \, \beta \ \, \text{proofs}.$

$$e\left(g^{v_{\mathsf{mid}}(\mathsf{s})},g^{\alpha}\right) = e\left(g^{\alpha v_{\mathsf{mid}}(\mathsf{s})},g\right)$$

② Divisibility check for the QAP: compute $g^{v_0(s)} = \prod_{k \in [N]} (g^{v_k(s)})^{c_k}$ and check:


$$\frac{e\left(g^{v_0(s)}g^{v_{\text{io}}(s)}g^{v_{\text{mid}}(s)},g^{w_0(s)}g^{w(s)}\right)}{e\left(g^{y_0(s)}g^{y(s)},g\right)}=e\left(g^{h(s)},g^{t(s)}\right)$$

$QAP \rightarrow VC$: Security

- If the adversary manages to provide a proof of a false statement that verifies, then these polynomials must not actually correspond to a QAP solution.
- So, either p(x) is not actually divisible by t(x) (in this case we break 2q-SDH) or $v(x) = v_{io}(x) + v_{mid}(x)$, w(x) and y(x) do not use the same linear combination (in this case we break q-PDH because in the proof we chose β in a clever way).

Conclusion: Pinocchio

- Uses regular QAPs.
- Implemented a basic compiler that translates C code to QAPs.
- Fast (about 10 ms).
- Proof is of constant length (little overhead).



Questions?