

The Opioid Epidemic: Causes and Consequences

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Abstract

This paper exploits the role of the marketing of OxyContin in the expansion of the prescription opioids supply to study the origins and consequences of the opioid epidemic. We obtained recently unsealed documents from state litigation against Purdue Pharma and accessed confidential documents related to the initial marketing targets of OxyContin. We exploit detailed features of the initial marketing of OxyContin to instrument for the supply of prescription opioids. We find that moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile in the distribution of the prescription opioids supply increases deaths from prescription opioids by 89% and deaths from all opioids by 39%. This corresponds to over 200,000 deaths. We estimate that the opioid crisis did not have an effect on labor market outcomes, such as labor force participation or employment rates, but it deteriorated socioeconomic conditions by increasing claims from SNAP and disability and increased crime. We estimate decreases in pregnancy duration, birth weight and health at birth but no effect on infant mortality and an increase in fertility rates.

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I. Introduction

Over the last two decades, mortality from opioid overdoses in the United States has increased at an alarming rate: Since 1999, opioid overdoses have claimed the lives of almost 400,000 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2019), and have contributed to the longest sustained decline in life expectancy in the last century, excluding the influenza and Covid pandemics (Dyer, 2018). Furthermore, the rise has been accompanied by stagnation in labor force participation (Krueger, 2017); an increase in disability claims (Park and Powell, 2021); a worsening of birth outcomes (Lynch et al., 2018); and record numbers of children living in foster care as a result of a parent’s drug use (Meinhofer and Angleró-Díaz, 2019; Buckles, Evans and Lieber, 2020).

Prescription opioids not only contributed directly to the increase in overdose deaths, but also indirectly by initiating opioid addiction, which can lead to the use of heroin and fentanyl, and by affecting one’s ability to work, recover from illness, and care for children, among other daily activities. In 2017, 35% of adults in the US had a prescription for opioid painkillers, and 4.1% had used them for nonmedical purposes (NSDUH, 2017). Opioids are highly addictive, with rapid progression to physiological dependence with tolerance and withdrawal, even at prescribed doses and within a short period (Hah et al., 2017; Sharma et al., 2016).

In this paper, we first study the origins of the opioid crisis and, given the scope and scale of the epidemic, we estimate its effects on a broad range of health and economic outcomes. Multiple hypotheses have been put forth regarding the initial causes of the opioid crisis. Demand-side hypotheses suggest that deteriorating cultural and economic conditions may have induced a surge of “deaths of despair” by increasing drug overdoses (Case and Deaton, 2017). Alternative hypotheses consider the role of supply-side factors, such as the dramatic increase in opioid access, changes in physician prescribing attitudes, and the aggressive marketing of prescription opioids (Alpert, Dykstra and Jacobson, 2020; Fernandez and Zejcirovic, 2018 and Eichmeyer and Zhang, 2020, among others). The challenge in tracing the origins of the opioid crisis and its effects lies in the fact that the variation in the level of prescription opioids across geographies and over time is not random (Ruhm, 2019). On the one hand, deteriorating socioeconomic conditions at the community or individual level could be the initial cause of an increase in demand for opioids (Carpenter, McClellan and Rees, 2017), and can also explain subsequent negative outcomes. On the other hand, the supply of prescription opioids is positively linked to access to healthcare and to the number of physicians per capita, so that areas with higher access to opioids are positively selected along health indicators.

To address this challenge, we exploit detailed features of the initial marketing of prescription opioids, which we obtained from recently unsealed court records from state litigation against Purdue Pharma, the manufacturer of OxyContin, a prescription opioid

at the center of the drug epidemic.¹ We document that because of its marketing and for regulatory reasons, OxyContin was initially promoted for cancer patients, with the plan to quickly expand to non-cancer patients and doctors in these same high-cancer-incidence communities. This led to an increase in the promotion of and exposure to OxyContin in areas with higher cancer incidence from the time it was introduced, which persisted over time and opened the door for other pharmaceutical companies to promote their prescription opioids beyond the cancer market. We exploit this geographic variation in exposure to OxyContin as an instrument for the supply of prescription opioids. We provide empirical support for the strategy by showing that (i) before the launch of OxyContin, cancer incidence is not related to opioid mortality and areas with higher cancer mortality are not on a differential trend with respect to education, income, or health variables; (ii) the evolution of cancer incidence is parallel over time in low- and high-incidence regions and does not account for the differences that appear over time as the opioid epidemic unfolds; and (iii) communities with high rates of cancer at the time of launch experienced a substantial influx of prescription opioids, which was mostly driven by prescribed oxycodone, the active ingredient in OxyContin. This rapid trend was not observed in low-cancer communities.²

We quantify the effects of the marketing of OxyContin on drug mortality and a host of economic and health variables: the labor market, demand for social insurance, crime, and a broad range of birth and fertility outcomes. We leverage data from multiple sources, including administrative data from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to measure prescription opioid distribution across the country and restricted-access data from the National Vital Statistics System (NVSS) to measure opioid deaths, cancer deaths, and birth and fertility outcomes. We use Local Area Unemployment Statistics from the Bureau of Labor Statistics to measure our labor market outcomes, and data from the Food and Nutrition Service of the Department of Agriculture and the Social Security Administration to construct demand for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI). Finally, we build our measures of crime from Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Our analysis is conducted at the commuting-zone level, an aggregation that encompasses all metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas in the US. This is a natural geographic unit for measuring exposure and access to the local market for prescription opioids. We restrict our sample to areas with more than 25,000 residents, which represents 99.8% of all opioid deaths and 99.3% of the total population. Our final dataset consists of 590 commuting zones, with data from 1999 to 2018.

In terms of the direct effects of the marketing of OxyContin, we estimate that com-

¹These court documents are from Case 07-CI-01303 Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Purdue Pharma.

²Oxycodone is a semisynthetic opioid that is 50% more potent than morphine and indicated for the management of acute pain.

muting zones with the highest cancer incidence—the 95th percentile relative to the 5th percentile—at the time of the launch of OxyContin received 1.96 doses more of opioids per capita, which amounts to 64% of the average change from 1999 to 2018. We use this increase as an exogenous variation in the supply of prescription opioids and find that increasing this supply from the 25th to the 75th percentile caused an increase of prescription opioid deaths of 89% and of all opioid deaths of 39%. This work adds to the literature that documents the importance of supply-side factors (Alpert et al., 2019; Powell, Pacula and Taylor, 2020; Fernandez and Zejcirovic, 2018; Finkelstein, Gentzkow and Williams, 2018; Schnell and Currie, 2018; Eichmeyer and Zhang, 2020; Evans, Lieber and Power, 2019; Alpert, Powell and Pacula, 2018) in explaining the opioid epidemic relative to demand-side factors (Case and Deaton, 2015, 2017). We also build on the seminal work of Alpert et al. (2019), who use variation in state-level regulations regarding the prescription of Schedule II drugs.³ They show that the five states that, at the time of the launch of OxyContin, had a more cumbersome process for prescribing opioids—e.g., requiring triplicate prescriptions—were not targeted by Purdue Pharma in their initial marketing plans, and subsequently reported a lower level of prescription opioids and overdose deaths. We exploit a different dimension of the marketing of OxyContin that allows us to shed light on within-state variation in prescription rates, which is as large as the between-state variation. In addition, our empirical strategy alleviates the power-related issues that arise when researchers estimate effects on opioid mortality using longitudinal data and exploiting state-level variation, as Griffin et al. (2020) point out.⁴

This paper also contributes to the literature on the effects and economic costs of the opioid epidemic on the labor market, demand for social assistance benefits, crime, and birth and maternal outcomes. The paper not only adds the estimation of these effects to the literature, but is also the first to provide estimates that exploit the same source of variation across multiple outcomes. The strength of this approach is that it provides a complete picture of the impact of the opioid epidemic and sheds light on the mechanisms through which the epidemic unravelled.

Labor market outcomes. Recent studies have linked the opioid crisis to the decline in labor force participation (Krueger, 2017). On the one hand, opioid use could improve labor market outcomes if it enhanced work capacity by helping workers alleviate chronic pain, but on the other, labor market outcomes could worsen if addiction or other prescription opioid-related problems reduce work capacity. Which channel dominates is an empirical question that has yielded different answers. Using variation in the rates of

³The DEA defines Schedule II drugs as drugs with a high potential for abuse, with use potentially leading to severe psychological or physical dependence. These drugs are also considered dangerous.

⁴Griffin et al. (2020) assess the relative performance of multiple statistical methods commonly used in evaluation studies of state-level opioid policies using a simulation study based on observed state-level opioid-related outcomes. Their main result indicates that many commonly used methods have very low statistical power to detect a significant policy effect ($< 10\%$) when the policy effect size is small yet sizable (e.g., 5% reduction in opioid mortality).

prescription opioids across time and over space, [Harris et al. \(2020\)](#); [Aliprantis, Fee and Schweitzer \(2019\)](#); and [Beheshti \(2019\)](#) find that access to opioids reduces labor force participation, and [Park and Powell \(2021\)](#), who study how the 2011 reformulation of OxyContin and the subsequent transition to heroin and fentanyl affected labor market outcomes, find that it had negative effects on traditional labor supply measures.⁵ On the other hand, [Currie and Schwandt \(2020\)](#) argue that there is little relationship between the opioid crisis and labor market outcomes. This literature, however, relies on the assumption that variation in prescription opioids across space and over time is exogenous. With our instrumental variable approach, we estimate that the opioid crisis did not affect labor market outcomes such as labor force participation or employment rates.

Demand for social assistance benefits. There is significant policy interest in understanding the drivers of the recent increase in demand for social assistance and its connection to the opioid crisis. Studying the effects of opioid prescriptions for workers on short-term disability directly, [Savych, Neumark and Lea \(2019\)](#) find that an increase in long-term opioid prescribing leads to considerably longer duration of temporary disability. [Park and Powell \(2021\)](#) exploit the rise in heroin and fentanyl use as a result of OxyContin’s reformulation and find that states with a one-standard-deviation higher rate of non-medical OxyContin use before reformulation experienced a 7% relative increase in disability applications after. We find that the supply of prescription opioids deteriorated socioeconomic conditions substantially by increasing claims for SNAP and disability benefits. Specifically, a change from the 25th to the 75th percentile in the growth of prescription opioids per capita caused a 57% increase in the share of SNAP recipients, a 47% increase in the share of the population receiving SSI, and a 76% increase in the share receiving SSDI.

Crime. Drug epidemics often induce a rise in crime. The heroin wave of the 1970s and the crack cocaine crisis of the 1980s were each accompanied by major gun violence, including large numbers of murders and violent and property crimes ([Szalavitz and Rigg, 2017](#)). Policies intended to curb the opioid epidemic, such as the introduction of prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMP) across states, have been documented as producing mixed results on crime. [Dave, Deza and Horn \(2020\)](#) exploit the differential timing in the implementation of PDMP, they document that the overall crime rate declines by 5%; these reductions are associated with both violent and property crimes. Since restrictions on the supply of prescription opioids can increase the demand for illegal opioids, [Mallatt \(2018\)](#) focuses on heroin crimes and finds that PDMP had no effects on average, but increased crime in counties with high rates of opioid use. [Deiana and Giua \(2018\)](#) find similar results after state implementation of pain management clinic laws. Ours is the

⁵In 2010, the FDA approved a reformulated, abuse-deterrent version of OxyContin designed to make the pill difficult to crush or dissolve. [Alpert, Powell and Pacula \(2018\)](#) and [Evans, Lieber and Power \(2019\)](#) document how the substantial reduction in the supply of abusable prescription opioids impacted overdoses involving heroin and other types of opioids.

first paper to study the direct effects of the supply of opioids on crime. We find that the availability of prescription opioids increased crime across the board: A change from the 25th to the 75th percentile in the growth of prescription opioids per capita caused an increase in crime incidents by 60% relative to the mean, with property crimes increasing 65% and violent crime increasing by 39%.

Birth and maternal outcomes. From 2000 to 2007, one in five women filled a prescription for an opioid during pregnancy (Desai et al., 2014). Also according to the CDC, between 2008 and 2012, on average, 39% of women of reproductive age covered by Medicaid obtained a prescription for an opioid during the year (Ailes et al., 2015). This naturally raises concerns about the risks of opioid abuse in this population and its effects on infant health. Ziedan and Kaestner (2020) exploit changes in the policy environment across states (PDMP and “pill mill” legislation) to estimate the effect of prescription opioids on infant health.⁶ They estimate that a 100% increase in opioid sales is associated with a 22 gram decrease in birth weight, a 0.3 percentage-point increase in the share of low-birth-weight babies, and no statistically significant effects on gestational age. Regarding maternal behaviors, they document that state policies that reduce prescription opioid sales result in small improvements in the start date and quality of prenatal care. In this paper, we contribute to the literature by examining directly the effects of the opioid epidemic on birth and maternal outcomes. We find that a 25th-to-75th-percentile increase in the supply of prescription opioids decreases birth weight by 0.7%, and deteriorates APGAR scores by 0.9%.⁷ We estimate that there is no effect on infant mortality or on the share of low-birth-weight infants, but we find an increase in the APGAR score of infants who died in the first year, meaning that healthier babies died. We find an increase in the incidence of preterm births—but this estimate is not statistically significant—and a decline in pregnancy duration of 0.24 weeks. Finally, we estimate an increase in fertility rates of 9%, mostly driven by women 25-29 years old, and we do not find an effect on the quality of prenatal care.⁸

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II provides background on the marketing of OxyContin and other prescription opioids. Section III describes the data sources and provides summary statistics. Section IV explains our identification strategy, provides empirical evidence to support our approach, and assesses threats to the validity of the instrument. Section V presents our results along with robustness checks. Section VII concludes.

⁶The term “pill mill” is typically used to describe a doctor, clinic, or pharmacy that prescribes or dispenses controlled prescription drugs inappropriately (Malbran, 2007).

⁷The APGAR score is a measure of the physical condition of a newborn infant. It is obtained by adding points (2, 1, or 0) for heart rate, respiratory effort, muscle tone, response to stimulation, and skin coloration; a score of 10 represents the best possible condition.

⁸We measure quality of prenatal care as the share of mothers with an adequate level of the Kessner Index of prenatal care, which includes information about both the timing of prenatal care initiation and prenatal care visits after initiation.

II. Background: The Marketing of OxyContin and the Opioid Epidemic

In 1996, Purdue Pharma introduced OxyContin to the market. OxyContin is the brand-name for the extended-release formulation of oxycodone. When patented, OxyContin was described as a controlled-release oxycodone compound that substantially reduces the time and resources needed to titrate patients who require pain relief on opioid analgesics (Oshlack et al., 1996). Two key technological innovations are responsible for its success. First, its long-acting formula provided 12 hours of continuous pain relief, an improvement over the standard practice of pain relief every 6-8 hours. Second, it is a single-agent narcotic, so there is no ceiling on the amount of oxycodone per tablet.⁹ Both of these factors significantly increased patients' access to potent doses of opioids and augmented the risk of dependency and use disorder. For example, Percocet was the most common oxycodone product on the market before 1996, and was mostly sold in the form of 2.5 mg tablets of oxycodone. In contrast, the most common forms of OxyContin were 20 mg and 40 mg tablets of oxycodone, while 80 mg and 160 mg tablets were also available. Furthermore, OxyContin users rapidly learned that crushing or dissolving the pill causes the oxycodone to be delivered all at once—instead of the slow release over 12 hours—which causes strong euphoric effects.

Prior to the introduction of OxyContin, pain management focused on cancer and end-of-life pain treatment. Patients who suffered from debilitating chronic pain but who do not have a fatal illness were excluded from long-term therapy with opioids, based on careproviders' fear that patients would become addicts (Melzack, 1990). MS Contin, also produced by Purdue Pharma, was the gold standard for cancer pain treatment. OxyContin's development was in response to the generic competition Purdue Pharma expected to face when MS Contin's patent protection expired in 1996. OxyContin was intended to take over MS Contin's market and gain ground in the much larger non-cancer pain treatment market, in which opioids were almost absent. Nonetheless, establishing the use of OxyContin for moderate and chronic pain was not an easy task; it was clear to Purdue that they were going to face pushback when expanding to the non-cancer market. Specifically, based on physician focus groups in 1995, Purdue concluded that *"there is not the same level of enthusiasm toward this drug for use in non-cancer pain as we identified in cancer pain"* (Purdue Pharma, 1995). The two main barriers Purdue Pharma faced were (i) the stigma related to the use of opioids for non-terminal or non-cancer pain and (ii) the administrative barriers physicians and pharmacies had to overcome to prescribe and sell Schedule II drugs.

⁹Other oxycodone products on the market were a combination of oxycodone and ibuprofen or acetaminophen, and the toxicity of the former sets a limit on the amount of active ingredients in the formula.

To overcome these obstacles, Purdue deployed a comprehensive marketing strategy based on three main pillars. First, to effectively change physician prescribing behaviors, Purdue Pharma implemented an aggressive marketing plan that pushed the message of an untreated pain epidemic that affected millions of Americans on a daily basis. Pain was introduced as the fifth vital sign, with the goal of encouraging the standardized evaluation and treatment of pain symptoms (Jones et al., 2018). This messaging also included misleading statements—for instance, that opioid addiction rates were lower than 1% and that oxycodone was weaker than morphine, when it is 50% more potent.¹⁰

Second, OxyContin was promoted directly to physicians by the largest and highest-paid sales force in the industry.¹¹ The continuous promotion of OxyContin through advertisements, gifts, and promoted medical literature was delivered through repeated visits and calls to physicians. At the same time, the marketing team carefully tracked physician prescription habits to concentrate on the highest prescribers (Van Zee, 2009); OxyContin’s annual budget plans state that they will focus on physicians in the top 3 deciles of prescriptions (OxyContin Launch Plan, September 1995, OxyContin Budget Plan, 1996).¹²

Third, Purdue focused their initial marketing efforts on physicians and pharmacies who faced less stigma and paperwork when prescribing opioids. Purdue initially targeted cancer patients and oncologists with a plan whereby *“the use of OxyContin in cancer patients, initiated by their oncologists and then referred back to FPs/GPs/IMs, will result in a comfort that will enable the expansion of use in chronic non-malignant pain patients also seen by the family practice specialists”* (OxyContin Launch Plan, September 1995). That is, Purdue exploited its previously established network of oncologists and cancer patients to introduce its newest product to the broader market. This strategy also solved additional logistical problems related to the sales of Schedule II drugs, such as OxyContin. At the time of launch, only about half of the pharmacies in the country had the paperwork required to sell Schedule II drugs, and because *“pharmacists are generally reluctant to stock Class II opioids,”* Purdue decided that their *“initial targets will be the 25,000 stores who stock MS Contin,”* where there was no additional paperwork or training required for pharmacies to stock OxyContin.

Purdue’s marketing strategy succeeded in (i) making OxyContin a blockbuster drug; OxyContin sales grew from \$48 million in 1996 to almost \$1.1 billion in 2000 (Van Zee,

¹⁰ “We are well aware of the view held by many physicians that oxycodone is weaker than morphine. We all know that this is the result of their association of oxycodone with less serious pain syndromes. This association arises from their extensive experience with and use of oxycodone combinations to treat pain arising from a diverse set of causes, some serious, but most less serious. This ‘personality’ of oxycodone is an integral part of the ‘personality’ of OxyContin.” Exhibit 11 from Richard Sackler’s deposition, August 28, 2015.

¹¹The average sales representative’s annual salary of \$55,000, was complemented by annual bonuses that averaged \$71,500, with a range of \$15,000 to nearly \$240,000 (Van Zee, 2009).

¹²From 1996 to 2000, Purdue increased its total physician call list from approximately 33,400 to 44,500 to approximately 70,500 to 94,000 physicians United States. General Accounting Office (2003).

2009) and yielded \$35 billion in revenue for Purdue Pharma (Keefe, 2017), and (ii) making the use of opioids standard practice in the treatment of moderate and chronic pain for a wide range of non-terminal conditions. By 2003, nearly half of all physicians prescribing OxyContin were primary care physicians (Van Zee, 2009). This strategy also opened the door for other pharmaceutical companies to promote their prescription opioids beyond the cancer market following, Purdue’s leadership. These companies—Janssen, Endo, Cephalon-Teva, Actavis, Insys, and Mallinckrodt—who are also part of dozens of lawsuits for their role in the opioid epidemic, closely shadowed OxyContin’s marketing with the objective of growing by reducing OxyContin’s market share: “*Success means increasing Duragesic share at the expense of OxyContin*” (Sales Force Memorandum, 2001, Exhibit S0510, State of Oklahoma v. Purdue Pharma et al.)¹³ For our purposes, this strategy means that areas with a higher incidence of cancer would receive a disproportionate amount of marketing and prescriptions for OxyContin and other opioids. This allows us to exploit the differential promotion of OxyContin and its competitors across geographies as a source of exogenous variation in the supply of opioids to quantify the effects of the opioid epidemic on a broad range of outcomes.

III. Data and Summary Statistics

A. Prescription Opioids

We digitize historical records from the Automation of Reports and Consolidated Orders System (ARCOS) of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). These reports contain the distribution records of all Schedule II substances by active ingredient (e.g., oxycodone, hydrocodone, and morphine). These data are available at the 3-digit ZIP code level from 1997 to 2018.¹⁴ Our main independent variable is grams of prescription opioids per capita at the commuting-zone level; this corresponds to the sum of oxycodone, codeine, morphine, fentanyl, hydrocodone, hydromorphone, and meperidine in morphine-equivalent mg. The group of drugs included in the ARCOS changes over time—e.g., to account for changes in the classification of an ingredient. Nonetheless, we focus on a set of prescription opioids that can be tracked consistently over the period of analysis. We construct a geographic crosswalk from 3-digit ZIP codes to commuting zones using *Geocorr* (a geographic correspondence engine) powered by the Missouri Census Data Center. We report all ARCOS measures in morphine-equivalent doses, equal to 60 morphine-equivalent mg.

The first panel of Table 1 presents summary statistics of shipments of all prescription opioids and the three main controlled substances: oxycodone, hydrocodone, and

¹³Duragesic is a fentanyl patch manufactured by Janssen.

¹⁴ARCOS system data are available online from 2000 to the first half of 2020. We retrieved and digitized the reports up to 2018, the last year of our sample. For periods before 2000, we used the WayBack Machine application and collected data for 1997 to 1999.

morphine. On average, the shipment of oxycodone to a commuting zone is 3.15 doses per capita in a given year. This figure is 1.6 times as much hydrocodone shipped (1.93 doses per capita) and 3.3 times as much morphine shipped in a given year (0.94 doses per capita). There is wide variation among commuting zones in the levels of opioid prescriptions per capita: While some commuting zones received no doses, others report as much as 51.31 oxycodone doses per capita in a given year, Figure 1 shows a map of this variation, and Table A1 shows the evolution of doses per capita over the last two decades. In 1997, the first year with available data, oxycodone and morphine average doses per capita were 0.31 and 0.35, respectively. A decade later, oxycodone doses were 3.26 average per capita—three times higher than morphine doses per capita. To provide a reference number, consider that in 2016 the CDC established guidelines suggesting that a prescription of 3 days or less, at the lowest effective dose, should be sufficient to treat acute pain (Dowell, Haegerich and Chou, 2016). Thus, by 2007 the average prescription per capita was already at the prescribing limit the CDC would suggest 9 years later.

B. Opioids, Cancer, and Birth Outcomes

We use data from the National Vital Statistics System (NVSS) to construct mortality measures and birth outcomes. We use restricted data to access county identifiers. Mortality measures come from Detailed Multiple Cause of Death (MCOB) files from 1991 to 2018. These record every death in the US along with the county of residence, the underlying cause of death, and up to 20 additional causes and thus represent a census of deaths in the US. The 1991-1998 data use ICD-9 codes to categorize the cause of death, and the 1999-2018 data use ICD-10 codes.

We construct two main measures of opioid-related deaths: prescription opioids and all opioid deaths. The prescription opioids category captures deaths whose underlying cause is substances usually found in prescription painkillers such as hydrocodone, methadone, morphine, and oxycodone, among others.¹⁵ We also consider a broader measure of opioid-related deaths, in which we include deaths from heroin and synthetic opioids; e.g., fentanyl.¹⁶ The CDC reports that the transition from the ICD-9 to ICD-10 resulted in a small increase in poison-related deaths of 2% (Warner et al., 2011). Appendix Figure A2 shows the time series for the US for these two measures.

Table 1 reports summary statistics on opioid mortality. There were 4 deaths from prescription opioids and 7 deaths from any opioids per 100,000 residents, on average, per year between 1999 and 2018. Prescription opioid deaths vary from no deaths to as many

¹⁵We use identification codes T40.2 and T40.3 to identify these deaths in the ICD-10 data and codes 965.00, 965.02, 965.09, E850.1, and E850.2 in the ICD-9 data. We follow recommendations from the CDC to construct comparable measures of prescription deaths over time; see CDC (2013).

¹⁶We use identification codes T40.0-T40.4, X42, X62, and Y12 to count deaths from any opioid in the ICD10-data and codes 965.00, 965.01, 965.02, 965.09, E850.0, E850.1, and E850.2 in the ICD-9 data; see CDC (2013).

as 106 per 100,000 residents in the most affected commuting zones. Figure 2 shows a map of this geographical variation.¹⁷

We measure cancer incidence by computing cancer mortality in a given commuting zone from the MCODE files. For our purposes, a direct measure of cancer incidence would be to compute the rate of cancer patients in the population. Unfortunately, these data are not available. Incidence measures reported by the CDC and the Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results (SEER) Program are aggregated at the state level, and are more likely to be affected by variation in diagnosis rates, especially for early-stage cancers. In contrast, cancer mortality is available at county level and has a closer connection to the rates of cancer patients who are using opioid pain-killers (e.g., MS Contin) to manage cancer pain, especially in the later stages of cancer treatment.

Summary statistics on cancer mortality for the pre-OxyContin period are presented in the second panel of Table 1, along with cancer mortality rates for the years 1999-2018. Figure 3 shows the variation in cancer mortality in 1994-1996. On average, there were 2.52 cancer deaths. The commuting zone with the lowest cancer mortality experienced 1 death for every 1,000 residents, and the commuting zone with the highest mortality experienced 60 deaths per 1,000 residents. These figures are comparable to those documented for the years 1999-2018, when there were 2.48 cancer deaths on average. We present further evidence on the determinants of cancer in Section IV.

Data on birth outcomes come from the Linked Birth and Infant Death Data of the NVVS of the National Center for Health Statistics. The microdata for each year between 1995 and 2018 include the deaths of all infants born in that calendar year for which the death certificate can be linked to a birth certificate and all births occurring in a given calendar year.¹⁸ We construct infant mortality as the ratio of infant deaths to live births in a given calendar year. The Linked Birth and Infant Death Data also include data on the infant's condition at birth, such as weight and length of gestation. The main measures of infant health we compute from the birth files are the commuting-zone-level (i) average birth weight for all live births, (ii) share of low-birth-weight newborns, (iii) share of preterm births, (iv) APGAR score of all births, (v) APGAR score of deceased infants, and (vi) median pregnancy duration. We also use the birth file to compute the average fertility rate at the commuting-zone level, defined as the ratio of the number of single pregnancies to the female population aged 15 to 44 years old.¹⁹ Finally as a measure of pregnancy care, we compute the share of mothers with adequate prenatal care

¹⁷We restrict our sample to commuting zones with a population higher than 25,000 in 1999. These commuting zones represent 99.8% of all opioid deaths and 99.3% of the total population. In Appendix Table A3 we present results for different population cuts.

¹⁸At least 98% of deaths are linked to their corresponding birth certificate. This figure varies by year; e.g., in 2018, 99.3% of all infant deaths were successfully linked, while in 1998, 98.4% of death records were linked.

¹⁹We follow the CDC's definition to compute the aggregate or general fertility rate. In additional results, we also present fertility rates for other age breakdowns.

using the Kessner Index.²⁰

Data from the MCODE files and the Linked Birth and Infant Death Data files are provided with county-level identifiers. We use the crosswalks developed by Autor and Dorn (2013) to go from county-level to commuting-zone-level aggregates.²¹ These crosswalks enable a probabilistic matching of sub-state geographic units, defined by the US Census, to commuting zones.

C. Other Outcome Variables

Labor market outcomes. Labor market variables are constructed based on county-level labor force data from the Local Area Unemployment Statistics program of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In particular, we construct measures of labor force participation and employment for the period 1990-2018 by aggregating county-level annual averages for each commuting zone.

Demand for social assistance benefits. We construct a measure of SNAP benefit reciprocity rates at the commuting-zone level, using data from the Food and Nutrition Service of the Department of Agriculture. In particular, we use data on county-level participation in the month of January for all years spanning 1989-2018, focusing on beneficiaries of Food Stamps (FSP) and Electronic Benefit Transfers (EBT) in the context of the program. We then aggregate the county-level counts to compute the share of beneficiaries in the population at the commuting-zone level. When information at the local level is not available, we impute the state-level share of SNAP recipients.²² We include two measures of disability benefits reciprocity, constructed as the share of the population 18 to 65 that receives Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and who is blind or disabled, and the share of the population 18 to 65 that receives Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI). Information on the total number of SSI recipients in each county is based on SSI Annual Statistical Reports and Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI) reports prepared by the National Social Security Administration, which we aggregate at the commuting-zone level. The main limitation we observe in these data is that they capture stocks rather than flows—i.e., we observe the number of beneficiaries at a given point in time but do not observe the number of beneficiaries entering or exiting the programs. Thus, we cannot speak to the question of whether a change in the stock is due to people entering more quickly or receiving benefits for longer time.

²⁰The Kessner Index takes three factors into account: month in which prenatal care began, number of prenatal care visits, and length of gestation. Importantly, the Kessner Index can be computed for all years under analysis.

²¹Some commuting zones cross state borders. When this happens, the commuting zone is assigned to the state where the higher share of the zone’s population is located. This criterion helps to preserve the strong within-cluster and weak between-cluster commuting ties.

²²Table A7 shows the result for the sample of commuting zones that do not require state level imputation. Our results are not sensitive to this sample restriction.

Crime outcomes. To create our crime variables, we use data from the yearly files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reports for the period 1996-2018. We use the Offenses Known and Clearances by Arrest dataset, which records yearly reported violent and property crimes at the law enforcement agency level. Because several agencies are inconsistent in their reporting frequency, we restrict the data to law enforcement agencies that reported crimes for all years in the period, and for which December was the last month of reporting in each year.²³ Finally, we aggregate the data at the commuting-zone level and construct a measure of total reported crimes per 100,000 resident, by type of offense: overall, violent, and property crime.

IV. Empirical Strategy

The level of prescription opioids in a given place and time is an equilibrium object determined by supply and demand factors. Supply factors, such as the density of the healthcare network, and demand factors, such as the incidence of pain in the population, affect the level of prescription opioids and may also affect the evolution of our outcome variables. Table 2 shows that the distribution of opioids is not random across space, but rather is related to the demographic composition of the commuting zone and its economic performance. A greater share of the white population and higher median income at the commuting-zone level have a positive correlation with prescription opioids per capita; the share of the Hispanic population, the employment rate, and the demand for social insurance have a negative correlation with the opioid supply.²⁴ This is in line with [Finkelstein, Gentzkow and Williams \(2018\)](#), who estimate that areas with more physicians per capita, higher levels of income and education, lower Medicare spending per capita, and higher scores on a healthcare quality index have higher opioid abuse rates.

To identify the effect of prescription opioids on opioid-related mortality and our outcomes of interest we use an instrumental variable strategy that exploits geographical variation in the promotional efforts for OxyContin and other prescription opioids as an exogenous variation in the opioid supply. We estimate the causal effects of the supply of prescription opioids via the following equations, which are run over the sample of commuting zones for the period 1999-2018:

First Stage:

$$\Delta \text{Presc. Opioids}_{ct} = \alpha_0 + \phi \text{CancerMR}_{ct0} + \alpha \Delta X_{ct} + \gamma_{st} + v_{ct} \quad (1)$$

²³Alternatively, we restrict the data to law enforcement agencies that reported crimes for all years in the period and for all months in each of these years, and the results are the same.

²⁴We also find a small negative correlation between the share of employment in the manufacturing industry and opioid prescription rates.

Second Stage:

$$\Delta y_{ct} = \tau_0 + \beta \Delta \widehat{Presc. Opioids}_{ct} + \tau \Delta X_{ct} + \lambda_{st} + \varepsilon_{ct}, \quad (2)$$

where c indexes commuting zones, t indexes years, s indexes states, and t_0 is defined as the average of the pre-OxyContin period, i.e., 1994-1996. The operator Δ works as follows: For any random variable W_{ct} , ΔW_{ct} equals the difference $W_{ct} - W_{ct_0}$; we refer to this operation as the long-change of variable W_{ct} . Regarding equation (1), *Presc. Opioids* _{ct} corresponds to doses of opioids per capita shipped to commuting zone c in year t and *CancerMR* _{ct_0} is the cancer mortality rate in commuting zone c in 1994-1996 (t_0). Regarding equation (2), y_{ct} refers to one of our outcomes of interest, e.g., a measure of opioid-related mortality. Both equations include a vector ΔX_{ct} that represents the long-changes in the time-varying control variables. The control variables include contemporaneous cancer mortality, share of the population over 66, share of the population 18-65, share of the population under 1 year, shares of the white and black populations, share of females, and share of Hispanic population. We add state times year fixed effect represented by the term γ_{st} (and λ_{st} in the second-stage equation). These fixed effects control for the variation in outcomes over time that is common to all commuting zones within state s and purge the variation in the supply of prescription opioids that results from a change in state-level policies, such as the implementation of a PDMP. The variables v_{ct} and ε_{ct} are idiosyncratic error terms. We cluster standard errors at the commuting-zone level, which is the level of exogenous variation.

Our instrumental variable approach is similar in spirit to a shift-share instrument. In this research design, the shares measure differential exposure to common shocks and identification is based on its exogeneity (Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin and Swift, 2020). In our application, the shares are cancer rates in the mid-1990s, which capture exposure to the marketing of prescription opioids, and the shift is the national growth of Purdue Pharma’s marketing or the growth in the supply of prescription opioids. Our preferred specification uses as an instrument cancer mortality before the launch of OxyContin, which highlights the fact that our only source of exogenous variation corresponds to the shares. In Appendix Table A2, we show results using the shift-share instrument; to construct this instrument, we use the national growth rate of prescription opioids as the shift component. The results are quantitatively indistinguishable from our preferred specification; as Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin and Swift (2020) point out, using a Bartik instrument is “equivalent” to using the shares as an instrument. This is because the temporal variation induced by the growth of prescription opioids is mostly absorbed by the time dimension of our state times time fixed effects.

We have defined our main specification using a long-changes form—i.e., by computing the change relative to a baseline year for each variable in the estimation. This approach

has two advantages. First, it allows us to control for unobservable characteristics at the commuting-zone level. Since our exogenous variation is at the commuting-zone level, we cannot include commuting-zone fixed effects in the regression. However, by expressing our variable in changes, we can partially absorb some of the variation that is specific to the commuting zone. Second, we argue that *how* the supply of opioids per capita evolves relative to the base year is more indicative of the exposure to opioids than its variation in levels. The opioid epidemic has evolved in three waves, with each one characterized by the highest levels of misuse and abuse of a given substance.²⁵ The misuse and abuse of prescription opioids were the main driver of deaths until 2010. Nonetheless, research has also found that prescription opioids play an important role in the initiation and use of heroin and fentanyl (American Psychiatric Association, 2017).

The parameter of interest β captures the causal effect of an increase in one dose of opioids per capita relative to the baseline year on the change in opioid mortality rate (and other outcomes of interest). That is, for a unit increase in the supply of prescription opioids relative to the period 1994-1996, the mortality rate from prescription opioids (and any other *outcome*) changes in β units relative to the pre-OxyContin launch period. For the IV estimator of β to be consistent, the cancer mortality rate in the baseline period must be (i) strongly correlated with the opioid supply—i.e., the coefficient ϕ must be statistically different from zero, and (ii) uncorrelated with the error term in the second-stage equation 2. Evidence supporting our strategy was first presented in Section II, in which we discussed Purdue Pharma’s marketing strategy and its rationale for focusing on the cancer market as the place to start and expand from. Next, we provide empirical evidence to support this empirical strategy and assess threats to the validity of the instrument.

A. Does cancer mortality in the mid-1990s predict growth in the supply of prescription opioids?

We start by providing graphical evidence in Figure 1. We divide commuting zones into quartiles according to their level of cancer mortality before the launch of OxyContin and trace the evolution of all prescription opioids, oxycodone, hydrocodone, and morphine in these communities. Panel A of Figure 1 shows the evolution of oxycodone per capita in commuting zones in the bottom and top quartiles of cancer mortality in 1994-1996 and, panel B shows the analogous exercise for the aggregate of prescription opioids.²⁶ It is clear

²⁵The first stage reflected massive increases in the use of prescribed opioids and dates from the mid-1990s through 2010. The second wave, from 2010 to 2013, was distinguished by extensive growth in heroin use and associated deaths. The third and current wave, beginning in 2013, has been characterized by surging deaths and problems related to the use of synthetic opioids, particularly fentanyl and its analogs (Maclean et al., 2020)

²⁶In Appendix Figure A1 we present the analogous analysis, but we split the data based on 8 octiles of cancer mortality and observe the same pattern.

from the graph that communities with high rates of cancer experienced a much larger influx of prescribed oxycodone (solid orange line) than low-cancer communities (dashed orange line), even though the two groups started the period with a comparable prevalence of oxycodone. Specifically, between 1997 and 2010, areas in the highest quartile of cancer incidence saw an increase in oxycodone gm per capita of 2,900%, and areas in the lowest quartile experienced a growth that was one-third of that, even though the incidence of cancer varied equally across the two groups, as shown in Figure 2.

Table 3 shows the results of the first-stage regression defined in equation 1. Column 1 is a bivariate regression of prescription opioids per capita on cancer mortality at t_0 . Columns to the right add time-varying controls and different specifications of fixed effects. Our preferred specification is the one in column 5, in which we control for state-times-year fixed effects and our covariates. For all specifications, there is a positive and strong relationship between cancer rates in the mid-1990’s and the change in opioids per capita. A one-unit (one-standard-deviation) increase in 1994-1996 cancer mortality increases the change in prescription opioids per capita relative to 1997 by 1.1 (0.13 standard deviation). To put this figure in context, a change from a commuting zone in the 5th percentile of the cancer distribution to the 95th percentile increases opioids per capita by 33% relative to the base period. Furthermore, this positive relationship is robust to the exclusion of all states, one at a time (Figure A3), for other opioids, specifically oxycodone (column 3 of Table 6), and is also present in the cross-section for all years.

The literature on weak instruments has developed a variety of tests and confidence sets that remain valid whether or not the instruments are weak, in the sense that their probability of incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis and covering the true parameter value, respectively, remains well controlled. We implement these procedures and present weak-instrument-robust inference. We follow Andrews, Stock and Sun (2019) recommendations and present the effective first-stage F statistic proposed by Olea and Pflueger (2013) to assess the instrument’s strength. In the rest of this paper, we refer to this as the *effective F-stat*. The value of the F-statistic testing the null hypothesis that the instrument is equal to zero in the first stage is always greater than 10, suggesting that we can reject the null hypothesis. Nonetheless, Lee et al. (2020) suggest that this standard practice of relying on the first-stage F exceeding some threshold (e.g., 10) delivers tests of incorrect size. Thus, to assess the statistical significance of our estimates, we (i) compute the “tF 0.05 standard error” proposed by Lee et al. (2020), which inflates the usual standard errors to take into account the strength of the first stage, and (ii) present *p-values* based on Anderson-Rubin Test (Anderson, Rubin et al., 1949).²⁷

²⁷Based on Lee et al. (2020), we use a correction factor of $\frac{2.75}{1.96} = 1.4031$ to compute the “tF 0.05 standard error.” To facilitate its interpretation, we present the *t-statistic* computed with the corrected standard errors. This *t-statistic* should be compared with a critical value of 1.96 to assess the null hypothesis.

B. What determines cancer mortality in the mid-1990s and is it related to our outcome variables?

Variation in cancer mortality across locations is not random; rather, it depends on demographic and socioeconomic variables. This could be a threat to our identification strategy, since our baseline regression links cancer mortality in commuting zone c at time t_0 with the changes in an outcome variable (e.g., drug mortality) in commuting zone c at time t_0 . Nonetheless, the validity of our identification strategy does not require that cancer be randomly distributed across areas, but rather that in the absence of OxyContin marketing, areas with higher cancer mortality in the pre-OxyContin period (t_0) exhibit the same growth as areas with lower cancer mortality in t_0 in terms of our outcome variables (Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin and Swift, 2020).

We provide evidence to support this assumption. We estimate one regression for each outcome variable in which we replicate our main reduced-form specification in the pre-period. We regress the changes in y at t relative to 1989-1990 on the level of cancer mortality in 1989-1990, which are the first years of our data. That is, for each of our outcome variables, we consider the following specification:

$$\Delta y_{ct} = \mu_0 + \mu_1 \text{CancerMR}_{ct_0} + \mu \Delta X_{ct} + \theta_{st} + \omega_{ct}, \quad (3)$$

where the Δ operator works as before, but uses 1990 as the baseline year—i.e., for a random variable W_{ct} the corresponding ΔW_{ct} equals the difference between its levels in 1996 and 1990. We estimate this regression in an out-of-sample period to avoid any effects induced by the opioid epidemic on our outcome variables. CancerMR_{ct_0} is the cancer mortality rate in 1989-1990 and X_{ct} are our time-varying covariates at the commuting-zone level, which, as before, we express in long-changes (ΔX_{ct}). Table 4 shows the results of this estimation. We estimate that areas with higher cancer mortality are not on a differential trend for education, income, or health variables. Moreover, with the exception of a weak relationship to labor force participation, the evolution of our outcome variables is unrelated to lagged cancer mortality. As an additional robustness check, we replicate our main analysis, adding labor market controls to our set of covariates, and our results remain unchanged; see Table A4.

We also estimate whether lagged cancer mortality (1989-1990) predicts changes in opioid-related mortality from 1991 to 1996. Column's 1 and 2 of Table 6 show the results of this estimation. We find that, different from the period after the launch of OxyContin, lagged cancer mortality is unrelated to future opioid mortality. This suggests that the connection between cancer and opioids exists only as a result of the marketing of OxyContin, and is not the result of other underlying mechanisms.

C. Is cancer mortality in the mid-1990s predictive of future mortality from opioids?

Figures 3 and 4 show our reduced-form results on drug-related mortality. We follow the same strategy as in Figure 1, and split commuting zones based on the cancer mortality distribution. Before the launch of OxyContin, opioid deaths are very similar in high- and low-cancer areas, for both prescription opioids and all opioid mortality. Consistent with what we found in the first-stage graph, the marketing of OxyContin had a positive effect on opioid-related mortality. Early in the 2000s, a wedge starts to appear between high- and low-cancer-incidence groups, and by the end of the sample opioid mortality in high-cancer areas is 75% higher for both prescription opioids and all opioids.

In regression form, we estimate the following reduced-form specification:

$$\Delta Y_{ct} = \pi_0 + \pi_1 \text{CancerMR}_{ct_0} + \pi \Delta X_{ct} + \psi_{st} + \nu_{ct}, \quad (4)$$

where Δ is the long-change operator that uses 1994-1996 as the baseline year, Y corresponds to prescription opioid mortality and mortality from all opioids, CancerMR is the cancer mortality rate in 1994-1996 (t_0), and X_{ct} is our set of covariates. Columns (2) and (5) of Table 5 show the results of this estimation. We find that there is a strong and positive relationship between mid-1990s cancer mortality and future increases in opioid mortality.

D. Are other mid-1990s mortality rates predictive of future prescription opioids per capita distribution?

Our identification strategy connects mid-1990s cancer mortality to future growth in the supply of prescription opioids through the targeted marketing of Purdue Pharma. As a result, we can test the validity of our design by estimating first-stage regressions for placebo instruments—i.e., mid-1990s mortality from causes unrelated to cancer. However, finding a good placebo instrument is challenging, given that the causes that underlie the incidence of cancer and other conditions, such as heart disease are not independent (Honoré and Lleras-Muney, 2006). As a result, there is substantial overlap across underlying causes and the correlation across measures is very high. With this caveat, in Table A8 we show placebo instrument regressions for two mortality rates that are less likely to be affected by the previous concern: Cerebrovascular disease and transit accidents. We find that none of these measures predict future distribution of opioids (Columns 1 and 2) or change the predicted power of our instrument (Columns 3 and 4).

V. Results

Figure 5 presents a series of graphs that foreshadow our main results. We present the evolution of the main outcomes by 1994-1996 cancer prevalence. This graphical analysis shows two consistent patterns. First, the pre-1996 trend in outcomes is quite similar among high- and low-cancer-prevalence commuting zones. Second, this figure shows that high-cancer-prevalence commuting zones had worse outcomes than low-cancer prevalence commuting zones across the board.

In the rest of this section, we take equations 1 and 2 to the data and discuss our results.

A. Direct effects: Prescription and all opioid mortality

Commuting zones with the highest cancer incidence at the time of OxyContin launch of received 64% more opioids per capita than their counterparts—i.e., the 95th percentile relative to the 5th percentile. Using this increase as an exogenous increase, we estimate that an additional dose of prescription opioids per capita caused an increase in prescription opioid mortality of 0.0068 points and in all opioid mortality of 0.0065 points. The estimates presented in columns 3 and 6 of Table 5 are statistically significant using *t*-ratio inference, Anderson-Rubin weak instrument robust inference, and the recent *tF* procedure suggested by Lee et al. (2020). Our results imply that when doses per capita increase from the 25th to the 75th percentile—i.e., a 5.02 dose increase—mortality from prescription opioids increases by 88.6% and all opioid mortality increases by 39.3%.²⁸

The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates (columns 1 and 4 of Table 5) differ considerably from the IV estimates. We find a positive correlation between opioid supply and opioid mortality rate, but the difference in magnitude between the OLS and the IV estimates suggests that the former suffers from a negative bias. Put another way, by looking at the correlation between opioid supply and opioid deaths, we would underestimate the role of the supply of prescription opioids in explaining the rise in mortality. The negative bias in the OLS estimates is consistent with commuting zones that receive a disproportionate amount of marketing being positively selected on observable characteristics: Areas initially targeted by OxyContin campaigns had better access to healthcare and a larger number of physicians per capita, which served as OxyContin initial network. These results are consistent with Finkelstein, Gentzkow and Williams (2018), who document that higher opioid abuse rates are correlated with more physicians per capita, higher levels of income and education, lower Medicare spending per capita, and higher scores on a healthcare quality index.

²⁸The standard deviation of the distribution of prescription opioids per capita between 1997-2018 is 4.34, thus a change from the 25th to the 75th percentile in such distribution represents 1.15 of a standard deviation.

Drug overdose deaths can be hard to categorize. Since we use data that record deaths using both the ICD-9 and ICD-10 codes, we construct an additional outcome measure for opioid mortality, the drug-induced mortality rate, and present the results using this measure in columns 6 and 7 of Table 6. The drug-induced category has the advantage that comparisons across years are less affected by changes in the ICD classification, but this comes at the cost of being less linked to our main outcome of interest—i.e., deaths from prescription opioids.²⁹ Exploiting this measure, we arrive at similar conclusions: An additional dose of opioids per capita caused an increase in the drug-induced mortality rate of 0.0112 points. An increase from the 25th to the 75th percentile of prescription opioids per capita increases drug-induced mortality by 51%. In Tables A5 and A6, we also split our sample using different starting and ending years and find stronger effects for the first wave of the epidemic. However, these differences across periods are not statistically significant.

Finally, we also estimate the effects of the increase in the supply of prescription opioids on all cause adult mortality, excluding cancer deaths. It is important to note that the exclusion restriction for this exercise requires a much stronger assumption—i.e., that mid-1990’s cancer mortality is not related to all future non-cancer mortality. With this caveat, Table 7 presents our results. We find aggregate declines in mortality as a result of the increase in prescription opioids that are completely driven by a decrease in mortality for those over 65 years of age. For adults 20 to 64, we find an increase in mortality; however, this estimate is not statistically different from zero. To put these results in context, it is important to note that at their peak in 2017, opioid-related deaths represent 1.8% of all deaths, and that deaths from those over 65 represent 75% of all adult deaths.

B. Labor market and social assistance benefits

Commuting zones with higher exposure to prescription opioids did not see a worsening in their labor market outcomes as a result of the opioid epidemic. The first panel of Table 8 presents these results. We do not detect a statistically significant deterioration in employment, and we find a positive but imprecisely estimated increase in labor force participation as a consequence of the differential increase in prescription opioids supply driven by the marketing practices of Purdue Pharma and its competitors. When we split our sample by periods in Table A6, we find increases in labor force participation for the initial wave of the epidemic (1999-2010), and no effect for the period 2010-2018.

Addiction to and misuse of prescription opioids could reduce work capacity and put people at risk of permanently reducing their labor supply; in this context, disability insurance applications are a useful proxy for longer-term labor force attachment. We document a tight link between the opioid epidemic and an increase in disability benefi-

²⁹Drug-induced deaths category include deaths from poisoning and medical conditions caused by use of legal or illegal drugs, as well as deaths from poisoning due to medically prescribed and other drugs.

ciaries. These results are presented in columns (2) and (4) of the second panel of Table 8. We find positive and significant effects for measures of both disability programs. A change from the 25th to the 75th percentile in the growth of opioids per capita caused a 47% increase in the share of the population receiving SSI and a 76% increase in the share receiving SSDI.³⁰

SNAP is designed to act as a safety net for low-income workers. In our context, applications to SNAP are a useful proxy for deteriorating economic conditions that are not necessarily reflected by direct labor market outcomes. We find a positive effect on the share of SNAP beneficiaries: Our estimates suggest that a change from the 25th to the 75th percentile in the growth of oxycodone per capita caused a 57% increase in the share of the population enrolled in SNAP.³¹ Overall, we find no evidence of an effect on labor supply or employment. However, these aggregated statistics mask the effects on a population of interest: those with poor health, a weak attachment to the labor market, and who are at risk of abuse and addiction. For this population, we find a substantial worsening of economic conditions. The effects we observe on SSDI and SNAP are particularly strong during the third wave of the epidemic, when the incidence of illicit drug use, such as of heroin and fentanyl, increased (Table A6).

C. Crime

Soon after the launch of OxyContin, there was a surge of demand for the drug in illegal markets, which profited illegal drug dealers and placed users in dangerous situations (Meier, 2018). The situation worsened during later stages of the opioid crisis, when rates of illegal drug use, such as of heroin increased. We are the first to estimate the causal effect of the supply of prescription opioids on crime rates. The bottom panel of Table 8 shows our results. We find large increases in crime across the board, but this is mostly driven by property crimes. Specifically, a change from the 25th to the 75th percentile in the growth of prescription opioids per capita caused an increase of 61% in total crime, 39% in violent crimes, and 65% in property crimes.

D. Birth and maternal outcomes

The opioid epidemic among adults could affect the well-being of infants through various channels. In this paper, we explore how the epidemic has impacted infant health and

³⁰SSDI uses 1996 data as the baseline year, and SSI uses 1998 as the baseline year.

³¹The receipt of benefits from multiple programs is not uncommon. SNAP administrative data from 2011 indicate that 20% of SNAP households received SSI benefits and 22% received Social Security benefits (see, for example, Strayer et al., 2012). We claim that our estimated effect on SNAP applications cannot be entirely driven by dual applicants. Under the assumption that 20% of SNAP recipients are also SSI recipients, the lower bound for the effect on SNAP recipient rate is 15.6% (0.20×78). Our estimated effect is well above this figure, suggesting that the average effect on SNAP applications is also driven by low-income workers.

maternal outcomes (Table 9). We find evidence that an increase in opioid prescriptions caused a worsening of birth outcomes; a 25th-to-75th-percentile increase in the supply of prescription opioids decreases birth weight by 0.7%, and deteriorates APGAR scores by 1% relative to its mean value. Although not statistically significant, we estimate increases in the share of low-weight births. We also find an increase in the APGAR score of infants who died in the first year, which means that healthier infants died. However, in aggregate terms we do not find any increase in the infant mortality rate.

The bottom panel of Table 9 presents our main estimates on maternal outcomes. We find a 0.62% reduction in the median gestation period when the opioid supply increases from the 25th to the 75th percentile. This result translates to a reduction in the median length of pregnancy of 0.24 weeks, although the increase in the incidence of preterm births is not statistically significant. We estimate an increase in fertility, a 25th-to-75th percentile increase in opioids increases fertility by 9%. This is the result of an increase in fertility for women 25 to 29 years old, that compensates a decline in fertility for those over 35 years old. These results are presented in Appendix Table A9.

In summary, our results suggest that the opioid epidemic, while not affecting directly the infant mortality rate, contributes to the worsening of birth outcomes through reductions in pregnancy duration and infant health at birth. This deterioration in birth outcome, could have been compensated for by the change in the composition of mother’s age in favor of younger mothers. Nonetheless, our estimated declines in birth weight are not small in magnitude. For a reference, [Almond, Hoynes and Schanzenbach \(2011\)](#) estimate an increase in birth weight of 0.5 percentage point as a result of the roll-out of foodstamps, and [Hoynes, Miller and Simon \(2015\)](#) find a 0.3% increase in birth weight from the expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). This is particularly important in light of evidence on the importance of birth weight and health at birth for future health, schooling and earnings ([Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2004](#)).

VI. Policy Implications and Conclusions

This paper studies the effects of the marketing and introduction of OxyContin on the subsequent opioid epidemic. We exploit geographical variation in the initial promotion of OxyContin that targeted the cancer patients and physicians market. We document that this initial targeting had long-term effects on opioid mortality, along with a deterioration in socioeconomic conditions measured by the demand for SSDI, SSI, and SNAP; an increase in crime; and a worsening of birth outcomes. Overall, we find strong evidence that the marketing practices for OxyContin were central to the opioid epidemic. In this paper we sought to provide a complete picture of the effects of the opioid epidemic. However, data access limitations have prevented us from speaking to some important topics, such as the effects on children’s living arrangements and environments, foster care

referrals, and the demand for and use of healthcare.³² We hope that future research will shed light on this subjects.

Our results have direct policy implications regarding the desirability of promotional efforts by pharmaceutical companies that target physicians, pharmacies, and patients. We document the devastating consequences of aggressive and deceitful marketing. Although marketing expanded over the 25 years since the introduction of OxyContin, regulatory oversight remains relatively limited.³³ Some regulatory initiatives constitute small steps in the right direction, such as the Sunshine Act of 2010 that required the reporting of payments from the pharmaceutical industry to physicians, with a recent expansion that includes payments to physician assistants, nurse practitioners, nurses, pharmacists, and dietitians. Furthermore, a growing segment of the medical community has spoken out against the pharmaceutical industry’s effort to influence doctors, and a number of teaching hospitals have enacted policies that restrict or ban visits from pharmaceutical representatives. However, most of these initiatives are concerned with the rising costs of prescription drugs, and not with the risks of abuse and addiction. More can be done to restrict the pharmaceutical promotion that carries this risk.

³²Data on these outcomes are available for a shorter window of time than our analysis—e.g., the American Community Survey provides data on living arrangements of children starting in 2010 or at a more aggregated geography level—e.g., foster care placements are available at the state level or only for a subset of large counties.

³³Currently, prescription drug marketing practices in the US include direct-to-consumer and professional branded advertising, detailing visits, free drug samples, and direct physician and hospital payments (e.g., speaker fees, food, travel accommodations). Direct-to-consumer prescription drug advertising is only permitted in the US and New Zealand (Schwartz and Woloshin, 2019).

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
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
VII. Maps and Figures

Map 1: Prescription Opioids Distribution in 2010




Notes: This map shows the distribution of prescription opioids in 2010. Lighter shades indicate commuting zones with a lower supply and darker shades indicate commuting zones with a higher supply. Each group corresponds to one quartile of the prescription opioids distribution; i.e., each color accumulates 25% of the mass of this distribution.

Map 2: Any Opioid Mortality Rate 1999 - 2018



Notes: This map shows the distribution of opioid mortality for the period 1999 - 2018. Lighter shades indicate commuting zones with lower opioid mortality, while darker shades indicate commuting zones with higher opioid mortality. Each group corresponds to one quartile of the opioid mortality distribution; i.e., each color accumulates 25% of the mass of this distribution.


Map 3: Distribution of Cancer Mortality 1994 & 1996




Notes: This map shows the cancer mortality rate at the commuting-zone level in 1994 - 1996. Lighter shades indicate commuting zones with lower cancer prevalence, while darker shades indicate commuting zones with higher cancer prevalence. Each group corresponds to one quartile of the cancer mortality distribution; i.e., each color accumulates 25% of the mass of this distribution.

Figure 1: Evolution of Prescription Opioids by 1994-1996 Cancer Prevalence

(a) Main Prescription Opioids




(b) All Prescription Opioids




Notes: This figure shows the evolution of oxycodone, hydrocodone, and morphine (panel a) and all prescription opioids (panel b) in the forth quartile (solid lines) and first quartile (dashed lines) of the cancer mortality rate distribution before the launch of OxyContin. Between 1997 and 2010, areas in the highest quartile of cancer incidence saw an increase in oxycodone gm per capita of 2,900%, while areas in the lowest quartile experienced a growth that was one-third that. Oxycodone, hydrocodone, and all prescription opioids are measured in morphine-equivalent mg.

Figure 2: Evolution of Cancer Mortality and Oxycodone by 1994-1996 Cancer Prevalence




Notes: The left-hand axis of this figure shows the evolution of oxycodone in the forth quartile (solid lines) and first quartile (dashed lines) of the cancer mortality rate distribution before the launch of OxyContin. The right-hand axis of this figure shows the evolution of cancer mortality in the top and bottom quartiles of the cancer mortality distribution before the launch of OxyContin. Oxycodone is measured in morphine-equivalent mg.

Figure 3: Prescription Opioid Mortality Rate by 1994-1996 Cancer Prevalence




Notes: This figure shows the evolution of prescription opioid mortality by 1994-1996 cancer prevalence. The high-cancer mortality rate corresponds to the group of commuting zones in the fourth quartile of cancer mortality in 1994-1996 and low cancer corresponds to the first quartile. The vertical line at 1996 indicates the year OxyContin was launched. Prescription opioid mortality captures deaths whose underlying cause is substances usually found in prescription painkillers such as hydrocodone, methadone, morphine, and oxycodone, among others; see data section for details on the codes used to construct this measure.

Figure 4: All Opioids Mortality Rate by 1994-1996 Cancer Prevalence



Notes: This figure shows the evolution of all opioid mortality by 1994-1996 cancer prevalence. The high-cancer mortality rate corresponds to the group of commuting zones in the fourth quartile of cancer mortality in 1994-1996 and low cancer corresponds to the first quartile. The vertical line at 1996 indicates the year OxyContin was launched. All opioids mortality captures deaths whose underlying cause is substances found in prescription painkillers, as well as heroin and synthetic opioids - e.g., fentanyl; see data section for details on the codes used to construct this measure.

Figure 5: Main Outcomes of Interest by 1994-1996 Cancer Prevalence



Solid line: High cancer CZ. Dashed line: Low cancer CZ

Notes: This figure shows the evolution of our main outcomes of interest by 1994-1996 cancer prevalence. The high-cancer mortality rate corresponds to the group of commuting zones in the fourth quartile of cancer mortality in 1994-1996 and low cancer corresponds to the first quartile. The vertical line at 1996 indicates the year OxyContin was launched.

VIII. Tables

Table 1: Summary Statistics, 1999-2018

	Mean	Median	SD	Min	Max	Obs
Opioid Prescriptions: Doses per capita						
All Opioids	6.42	5.48	4.32	0.00	57.65	11,876
Oxycodone	3.15	2.52	2.60	0.00	51.31	11,876
Hydrocodone	1.93	1.55	1.50	0.00	16.66	11,876
Morphine	0.94	0.77	0.69	0.00	10.67	11,876
Cancer Mortality per 1,000						
Cancer mortality rate 1994-1996	2.52	2.53	0.58	0.11	6.04	590
Cancer mortality rate	2.48	2.49	0.55	0.59	4.75	11,876
Outcomes: Mortality per 1,000						
Prescription opioids	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.00	1.06	11,876
Any opioids	0.07	0.05	0.07	0.00	1.22	11,876
Outcomes: Labor Market						
Labor force participation	0.48	0.49	0.06	0.02	1.00	11,800
Employment	0.94	0.94	0.02	0.73	0.99	11,800
Outcomes: Social Assistance						
Share SSI	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.30	11,800
Share SSDI	0.05	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.16	11,800
Share SNAP	0.12	0.11	0.06	0.00	0.57	11,800
Outcomes: Crime rates per 100,000						
Total crime rate	1574.51	1383.37	1372.12	0.00	6849.93	11,800
Violent crimes rate	168.38	122.09	174.31	0.00	1249.73	11,800
Property crimes rate	1406.14	1235.60	1221.13	0.00	6462.62	11,800
Birth and Maternal Outcomes						
Infant MR (per 1,000 births)	6.86	6.54	2.87	0.00	30.61	11,880
Birth weight	3274.4	3276.9	79.7	2930.3	3569.8	11,800
Share low birth weight	0.08	0.08	0.02	0.02	0.20	11,800
Share preterm	0.12	0.12	0.03	0.05	0.62	11,800
APGAR score - all infants	8.82	8.84	0.19	5.00	10.00	11,800
APGAR score - dead infants	5.62	6.00	2.28	0.00	10.00	11,460
Median gestation	38.95	39.00	0.24	35.0	40.0	11,800
Fertility rate	0.08	0.08	0.01	0.04	0.19	11,800
Adequacy of care	0.80	0.82	0.09	0.02	0.97	11,800

Notes: This table presents summary statistics for our main outcomes, measures of the prescription opioid supply, and cancer mortality incidence for the period 1999 - 2018. We leverage data from multiple sources. Prescription drugs distribution data come from the DEA. Data on opioid, cancer, birth, and maternal outcomes come from the NVSS. We use Local Area Unemployment Statistics from the BLS to measure labor market outcomes, and data from the Food and Nutrition Service of the Department of Agriculture and the SSA to construct demand for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI). Crime data come from Uniform Crime Reports from the FBI.

Table 2: Determinants of the Opioid Distribution in 2000

Dependent variable: Prescription opioids per capita			
	(1)		(2)
<i>Demographics (in shares)</i>		<i>Crime (in rates)</i>	
White	3.526*** [0.961]	Overall	-0.0000622 [0.0000752]
Hispanic	-3.323*** [0.807]	Violent	0.00160*** [0.000614]
Female	6.709 [9.973]	<i>Economic characteristics</i>	
Aged 18-65	21.67*** [4.348]	Ln income	2.517*** [0.922]
Aged +66	6.211 [7.665]	Share below poverty line	0.0521 [0.0625]
Infants	-100.8* [56.42]	Share employed in manufacturing	-0.0374*** [0.0105]
<i>Labor market</i>		Share with some college education	0.00938 [0.0135]
Employment rate	-16.18*** [6.031]	<i>Health outcomes</i>	
Labor Force Participation	-1.805 [2.493]	Cancer mortality rate	-0.164 [0.330]
<i>Social assistance</i>		Infant mortality rate	-0.0117 [0.0199]
SSDI	48.45*** [9.821]	Birth weight	0.000336 [0.00127]
SSI	5.740 [8.944]	Share preterm births	2.330 [4.796]
SNAP	-1.914 [3.848]	Gestation	-0.200 [0.396]
		Fertility rate	52.51*** [14.07]
Mean dependent variable			2.8567
Year			2000
Observations			590

Notes: This table presents estimated coefficients from a cross-section regression of oxycodone distribution per capita on demographic characteristics, labor market outcomes, measures of social assistance demand, crime outcomes, economic characteristics, and health outcomes at the commuting-zone level. Data on economic characteristics come from county-level tabulations of Decennial Census Data. The variable share with some college measures the share of the population older than 25 years old who have some education at the college level or higher. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 3: First-stage Results

Dependent variable: Prescription opioids per capita					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Cancer MR 94-96	0.960***	1.091***	1.061***	1.132***	1.078***
<i>se</i>	[0.210]	[0.222]	[0.231]	[0.258]	[0.264]
<i>t-stat</i>	4.571	4.914	4.593	4.388	4.083
<i>Effective F-stat</i>	20.894	24.147	21.096	19.254	16.630
Effect size	56.92	64.69	62.91	67.12	63.92
Controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
FE	No	State Year	State \times Year	State Year	State \times Year
Observations	11,800	11,800	11,800	11,800	11,800
Clusters	590	590	590	590	590
Adj. R^2	0.019	0.524	0.559	0.533	0.564

Notes: Control variables are contemporaneous cancer mortality rate, share of population under 1 year old, share of population between 18 and 65, share of population over 66 years, share of Black, White, and Hispanic population, and share of female population. Effect size is computed as the predicted changes in doses of prescription opioids per capita from an increase in cancer mortality that would change a commuting zone in the 5th percentile of the cancer distribution to the 95th percentile. Standard errors are clustered at the CZ level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 4: Mid-1990s Cancer Selection

<i>Independent variable:</i>	Cancer MR 89-90
<i>Dependent variables</i>	
Income per capita	19.42 [62.24]
Share with some college	0.0063 [0.00386]
Share with high school or less	0.00257 [0.00420]
Share working in manufacturing	0.0063 [0.00386]
Prescription Opioids Mortality Rate	-0.000795 [0.000580]
Any Opioid Mortality Rate	-0.00101 [0.000671]
Infant Mortality Rate	-0.0989 [0.154]
Labor Force Participation	-0.00153* [0.000821]
Employment rate	-0.000781 [0.000489]
Share SSDI	-0.000523 [0.000890]
Share SSI	0.000151 [0.000345]
Share SNAP	-0.000529 [0.000840]
Total crime rate	44.5 [28.63]
Fertility rate	-0.641 [0.490]

Notes: Each coefficient corresponds to a separate regression where the dependent variable is measured as the change with respect to 1989-1990. For prescription opioids, any opioids, labor market variables, crime, SNAP, and IMR, we run a panel regression; for the other variables, where yearly data are not available, we run one cross-sectional regression. All regressions include as control variables: cancer mortality rate, share of population under 1 year, share of population between 18 and 65, share of population over 66 years old, share of Black, White, and Hispanic population, and share of female population. In panel-level regressions, standard errors are clustered at the commuting-zone level; in cross-sectional regressions, standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 5: Direct Effects on Opioid Mortality

Dependent var:	Prescription opioids MR			Any Opioid MR		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prescription opioids pc	0.00374*** [0.00117]		0.00679*** [0.00200] (0.00281)	0.00419*** [0.00139]		0.00646*** [0.00231] (0.00324)
<i>tF 0.05 se</i>			2.3876			1.9747
<i>t-stat using tF 0.05 se</i>			0.0000			0.0019
<i>AR p-value</i>						
Cancer MR 94-96		0.00732*** [0.00167]			0.00697*** [0.00229]	
Effect size (%)	49.47		88.63	25.73		39.30
Model	OLS	RF	IV	OLS	RF	IV
Observations	11,800	11,800	11,800	11,800	11,800	11,800
Clusters	590	590	590	590	590	590
Adj R^2	0.4304	0.3908		0.5368	0.5144	
Effective F-stat			16.63			16.63
Cragg-Donald Wald F-stat			358.58			358.58

Notes: Control variables are contemporaneous cancer mortality rate, share of population under 1 year old, share of population between 18 and 65, share of population over 66 years old, share of Black, White, and Hispanic population, and share of female population. Effect size indicates the percent change in the dependent variable relative to its mean when doses of prescription opioids per capita increase from the 25th to the 75th percentile. Standard errors in square brackets are clustered at the CZ level. Using these standard errors, we report * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. tF 0.05 se, t -stat using tF0.05 se, and the AR p -value correspond to weak-instrument-robust inference procedures.

Table 6: Robustness Checks and Alternative Specifications

Dependent var:	Presc. opioids MR	All opioids MR	Oxycodone pc	Presc. opioids MR	All opioids MR	Drug Induced MR	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Cancer MR 89-90	-0.000122 [-0.16]	-0.000208 [-0.22]					
Cancer MR 94-96			0.605*** [0.186]				
Oxycodone pc				0.0121*** [0.00412] (0.00578)	0.0115*** [0.00436] (0.00612)		
<i>tF 0.05 se</i>				2.0932	1.8799		
<i>t-stat using tF 0.05 se</i>				0.000	0.002		
<i>AR p-value</i>							
Prescription Opioids pc						0.0121*** [0.00314]	0.0112*** [0.00369] (0.00518)
<i>tF 0.05 se</i>							2.1633
<i>t-stat using tF 0.05 se</i>							0.0001
<i>AR p-value</i>							
Effect size (%)			38.00	91.50	40.37		50.71
Model	RF	RF	FS	IV	IV	RF	IV
Observations	3,540	3,540	11,800	11,800	11,800	11,800	11,800
Clusters	590	590	590	590	590	590	590
Adj R^2	0.065	0.13	0.526			0.569	

Notes: Regressions in columns (3) to (7) include state times year fixed effects. Control variables are contemporaneous cancer mortality rate, share of population under 1 year old, share of population between 18 and 65, share of population over 66 years old, share of Black, White, and Hispanic population, and share of female population. Effect size in column (3) is computed as the predicted changes in doses of prescription opioids per capita from an increase in cancer mortality that would change a commuting zone in the 5th percentile of the cancer distribution to the 95th percentile. Effect size in columns (4), (5) and (7) indicates the percent change in the dependent variable relative to its mean when doses of prescription opioids per capita increase from the 25th to the 75th percentile. Standard errors in square brackets are clustered at the CZ level; using these standard errors, we report * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. tF 0.05 se, *t-stat* using tF0.05 se, and the *AR p-value* correspond to weak-instrument-robust inference procedures.

Table 7: All Cause Mortality Effects by age

Dependent variable: Age group:	Adult Mortality rates			Adult Mortality rates		
	All	20-64	65 plus	All	20-64	65 plus
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prescription opioids pc	-18.09***	-3.594**	-68.16***	-0.284***	0.0596	-1.008**
	[-3.12]	[-2.05]	[-3.14]	[0.0950]	[0.0376]	[0.430]
<i>tF 0.05 se</i>				(0.1333)	(0.0519)	(0.6033)
<i>t-stat using tF 0.05 se</i>				-2.1307	1.1481	-1.6708
<i>AR p-value</i>				0.0005	0.0815	0.0090
Effect size (%)				-14.45	10.71	-13.54
Model	OLS	OLS	OLS	IV	IV	IV
Adj R^2	0.472	0.421	0.52			
<i>Effective F-stat</i>				16.63	16.63	16.63
Observations	11,800	11,800	11,800	11,800	11,800	11,800
Clusters	590	590	590	590	590	590

Notes: Control variables are contemporaneous cancer mortality rate, share of population under 1 year old, share of population between 18 and 65, share of population over 66 years old, share of Black, White, and Hispanic population, and share of female population. Effect size indicates the percent change in the dependent variable relative to its mean when doses of prescription opioids per capita increase from the 25th to the 75th percentile. Standard errors in square brackets are clustered at the CZ level; using these standard errors, we report * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. tF 0.05 se, *t-stat using tF0.05 se*, and the *AR p-value* correspond to weak-instrument-robust inference procedures.

Table 8: Labor Market and Social Assistance Outcomes

<i>Panel A: Labor Market Outcomes</i>						
Dependent var:	Employment rate		Labor Force Participation			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		
Prescription opioids pc	-0.000108	-0.00181	0.000290	0.00348		
	[0.000171]	[0.00214]	[0.000388]	[0.00239]		
<i>tF 0.05 se</i>		(0.0030)		(0.0034)		
<i>t-stat using tF 0.05 se</i>		-0.6028		1.0378		
<i>AR p-value</i>		0.3990		0.1152		
Effect size (%)	-0.66	-11.12	2.46	29.53		
Model	OLS	IV	OLS	IV		
<i>Panel B: Social Assistance Programs</i>						
Dependent var:	SSDI		SSI		SNAP	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prescription opioids pc	0.000444***	0.00574***	0.00000709	0.00311**	0.000144	0.00982***
	[0.0000985]	[0.00132]	[0.000147]	[0.00144]	[0.000285]	[0.00299]
<i>tF 0.05 standard error</i>		(0.00185)		(0.00202)		(0.00420)
<i>t-stat using tF 0.05 se</i>		3.0777		1.5393		2.3360
<i>AR p-value</i>		0.0000		0.0114		0.0000
Effect size (%)	5.95	76.39	0.11	46.88	0.83	56.58
Model	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
<i>Panel C: Crime Outcomes</i>						
Dependent var:	Aggregate		Violent		Property	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prescription opioids pc	12.78*	275.8***	1.236	23.22***	11.43*	254.1***
	[6.567]	[71.92]	[1.118]	[7.455]	[5.980]	[66.55]
<i>tF 0.05 se</i>		(100.9082)		(10.4598)		(93.3737)
<i>t-stat using tF 0.05 se</i>		2.7332		2.2199		2.7213
<i>AR p-value</i>		0.0000		0.0001		0.0000
Effect size (%)	2.82	60.90	2.08	39.07	2.90	64.58
Model	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV

Notes: All regressions include state times year fixed effects. Each regression is run over a sample of 11,800 observations with 590 clusters (commuting zones). Control variables are contemporaneous cancer mortality rate, share of population under 1 year old, share of population between 18 and 65, share of population over 66 years old, share of Black, White, and Hispanic population, and share of female population. Effect size indicates the percent change in the respective dependent variable relative to its mean when doses of prescription opioids per capita increase from the 25th to the 75th percentile. Standard errors in square brackets are clustered at the CZ level; using these standard errors, we report * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. *tF 0.05 se*, *t-stat using tF 0.05 se*, and the *AR p-value* correspond to weak-instrument-robust inference procedures.


Table 9: Birth and Maternal Outcomes

<i>Panel A: Birth outcomes</i>						
Dependent var:	Infant Mortality		Birth weight		Share low birth weight	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prescription opioids pc	0.0511**	-0.0232	-0.552*	-4.490**	0.000169*	0.000905
	[0.0242]	[0.140]	[0.331]	[2.143]	[0.000102]	[0.000640]
<i>tF 0.05 se</i>		(0.1964)		(3.0068)		(0.0009)
<i>t-stat using tF 0.05 se</i>		-0.1171		-1.4933		1.0078
<i>AR p-value</i>		0.8678		0.0163		0.1272
Effect size (%)	4.057	-1.826	-0.085	-0.687	1.043	5.584
Model	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
<i>Panel B: Birth outcomes</i>						
Dependent var:	Preterm births		APGAR score - all infants		APGAR score - dead infants	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prescription opioids pc	0.000270*	0.00141	-0.000501	-0.0169*	0.0155	0.282*
	[0.000150]	[0.000937]	[0.00188]	[0.00994]	[0.0179]	[0.153]
<i>tF 0.05 se</i>		(0.0013)		(0.0139)		(0.2147)
<i>t-stat using tF 0.05 se</i>		1.0649		-1.1472		1.3137
<i>AR p-value</i>		0.1126		0.0674		0.0383
Effect size (%)	0.836	5.852	0.000	-0.910	1.383	25.169
Model	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
<i>Panel C: Maternal outcomes</i>						
Dependent var:	Gestation		Fertility rate		Adequacy of care	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prescription opioids pc	-0.000164	-0.0489***	0.0000665	0.00153***	-0.00104	0.00292
	[0.00304]	[0.0186]	[0.0000621]	[0.000566]	[0.000811]	[0.00531]
<i>tF 0.05 se</i>		(0.0261)		(0.0008)		(0.0075)
<i>t-stat using tF 0.05 se</i>		-1.8393		1.8889		0.3892
<i>AR p-value</i>		0.0011		0.0010		0.5771
Effect size (%)	0.000	-0.618	0.000	9.405	-0.627	1.818
Model	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV

Notes: All regressions include state times year fixed effects. Each regression is run over a sample of 11,800 observations with 590 clusters (commuting zones). Control variables are contemporaneous cancer mortality rate, share of population under 1 year old, share of population between 18 and 65, share of population over 66 years old, share of Black, White, and Hispanic population, and share of female population. Effect size: indicates the percent change in the respective dependent variable relative to its mean when doses of prescription opioids per capita increase from the 25th to the 75th percentile. Standard errors in square brackets are clustered at the CZ level; using these standard errors, we report * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. *tF 0.05 se*, *t-stat using tF 0.05 se*, and the *AR p-value* correspond to weak-instrument-robust inference procedures.


A Extra Figures

Figure A1: Evolution of Oxycodone by Octiles of the 1994-1996 Cancer Prevalence



Notes: This figure shows the evolution of oxycodone in eight groups of commuting zones. Each group is composed of those commuting zones in the n th octile of the cancer mortality rate distribution before the launch of OxyContin. Darker colors indicate groups with higher cancer prevalence (e.g., the 8th octile corresponds to the series that peaked in 2010 at 19 morphine-equivalent millions of gm per capita). Lighter colors indicate groups with lower cancer prevalence.


Figure A2: Evolution of Prescription Opioid and All Opioid Mortality Rates



Notes: This figure shows the evolution of prescription opioid and all opioid mortality rates from 1991 to 2018. The 1991-1998 data use ICD-9 codes to categorize the cause of death, and the 1999-2018 data use ICD-10 codes. The time series show that the transition from ICD-9 to ICD-10 classifications resulted in a small increase in poison-related deaths; this is consistent with what the CDC reports ([Warner et al., 2011](#)).


Leave Out One State at a Time

Figure A3: Estimates of the First-stage Coefficient




Notes: This graph reports the estimated coefficient of the first stage (ϕ) and the corresponding 95% confidence interval. The first coefficient and confidence interval replicate the result from column 6 of Table 3. Each of the subsequent coefficients are computed by excluding all commuting zones in the state indicated on the horizontal axis.

Figure A4: Effects on Prescription Opioids Mortality



Notes: This graph shows the estimated coefficient of the IV regression on prescription opioid mortality, instrumenting oxycodone shipments with cancer mortality in 1994-1996. The first coefficient and confidence interval replicate the result from column 3 of Table 5. Each of the subsequent coefficients are computed by excluding all commuting zones in the state indicated on the horizontal axis.

Figure A5: Effects on All Opioids Mortality



Notes: This graphs shows the estimated coefficient of the IV regression on all opioids mortality, instrumenting oxycodone shipments with cancer mortality in 1994-1996. The first coefficient and confidence interval replicate the result from column 6 of Table 5. Each of the subsequent coefficients are computed by excluding all commuting zones in the state indicated on the horizontal axis.

B Extra Tables

Table A1: Additional Summary Statistics: Opioid Prescriptions, doses per capita

	Mean	Median	SD	Min	Max	Observations
1997						
All opioids	1.49	1.40	0.67	0.04	7.64	590
Oxycodone	0.35	0.32	0.21	0.01	1.76	590
Hydrocodone	0.55	0.49	0.34	0.01	2.73	590
Morphine	0.31	0.29	0.17	0.01	1.89	590
2007						
All opioids	7.03	6.24	4.01	0.22	36.24	590
Oxycodone	3.26	2.76	2.33	0.08	26.86	590
Hydrocodone	2.33	1.87	1.72	0.04	14.30	590
Morphine	1.04	0.89	0.68	0.04	8.58	590
2017						
All opioids	6.97	6.30	3.50	0.19	27.47	590
Oxycodone	3.75	3.42	2.25	0.11	15.34	590
Hydrocodone	1.86	1.63	1.17	0.04	10.57	590
Morphine	0.92	0.82	0.50	0.03	5.27	590

Notes: This table presents summary statistics for our measure of the prescription opioids supply and the distribution of oxycodone, hydrocodone, and morphine for the years 1997, 2007, and 2017. Data come from the ARCOS and are expressed in morphine-equivalent mg.

Table A2: Baseline Results under a Shift-share Instrument

Dependent var:	Presc. Opioids pc	Presc. Opioids MR	Any Opioids MR	SNAP	SSDI	SSI
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Shift Share	0.00417*** [0.000997]					
<i>Effective F-stat</i>	17.47					
Presc. Opioids pc		0.00644*** [0.00188]	0.00635*** [0.00219]	0.00927*** [0.00277]	0.00553*** [0.00127]	0.00319** [0.00158]
Model	FS	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
Observations	11,800	11,800	11,800	11,800	11,800	11,800
Clusters	590	590	590	590	590	590
Dependent var:	LFP	Employment	Crime Rate	IMR	Fertility rate	Birth weight
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Presc. Opioids pc	0.00273 [0.00213]	-0.00262 [0.00196]	258.7*** [66.83]	-0.0218 [0.120]	0.00149*** [0.000548]	-4.344** [1.964]
Model	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
Observations	11,800	11,800	11,800	11,800	11,800	11,800
Clusters	590	590	590	590	590	590

Notes: Column 1 reports the estimated coefficient for the first stage. Columns 2 to 9 present results from IV regressions using the shift-share instrument. Our preferred specification restricts the sample to commuting zones with population higher than 25,000 residents. All regressions include state times year fixed effects and a set of control variables: contemporaneous cancer mortality rate, share of population under 1 year old, share of population between 18 and 65, share of population over 66 years old, share of Black, White, and Hispanic population, and share of female population. Standard errors are clustered at the CZ level.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A3: Baseline Results under Alternative Sample Restrictions

<i>Panel A: First Stage</i>						
Dependent variable:	Prescription Opioids pc					
	(1)	(2)	(3)			
Cancer MR 94-96	1.191*** [4.79]	1.055*** [3.55]	1.018*** [3.54]			
Sample	15,000+	40,000+	55,000+			
R squared	0.467	0.568	0.608			
<i>Panel B: Instrumental Variables Results</i>						
Dependent variable:	Prescription Opioids MR			Any Opioids MR		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Presc. Opioids pc	0.00355*** [2.65]	0.00684*** [2.96]	0.00826*** [3.08]	0.00152 [0.89]	0.00697** [2.56]	0.00885*** [2.69]
Sample	15,000+	40,000+	55,000+	15,000+	40,000+	55,000+
Observations	12,820	10,880	9,620	12,820	10,880	9,620
Clusters	641	544	481	641	544	481

Notes: Panel A presents results for the first-stage regression using alternative sample definitions. Panel B presents results from a regression of the opioid mortality measure on all prescription opioids distribution per capita, instrumenting the latter by the cancer incidence in the commuting zone in 1994-1996; i.e., reproduces the results presented in Table 5 under alternative sample restrictions. Our preferred specification restricts the sample to commuting zones with population higher than 25,000 residents. All regressions include state times year fixed effects and a set of control variables: contemporaneous cancer mortality rate, share of population under 1 year old, share of population between 18 and 65, share of population over 66 years old, share of Black, White, and Hispanic population, and share of female population. Standard errors are clustered at the CZ level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A4: Baseline Results with Labor Market Controls

Dependent var:	Presc. Opioids pc	Presc. Opioids MR	Any Opioids MR	SNAP	SSDI	SSI	Crime Rate	IMR	Fertility rate
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Cancer MR 94-96	1.072*** [0.264]								
Presc. Opioids pc		0.00674*** [0.00200]	0.00639*** [0.00231]	0.0103*** [0.00308]	0.00587*** [0.00136]	0.00313** [0.00141]	277.0*** [72.58]	-0.0326 [0.138]	0.00148*** [0.000562]
Observations	11,800	11,800	11,800	11,800	11,800	11,800	11,800	11,800	11,800
Clusters	590	590	590	590	590	590	590	590	590

Notes: Column 1 reports the estimated coefficient for the first stage. Columns 2 to 9 present results from regressing the dependent variable on prescription opioids distribution per capita, instrumenting the latter by the cancer incidence in the commuting zone in 1994-1996; i.e., reproduces the results presented in Table 5 under an alternative set of control variables. All regressions include state times year fixed effects and a set of control variables: labor force participation, contemporaneous cancer mortality rate, share of population under 1 year old, share of population between 18 and 65, share of population over 66 years old, share of Black, White, and Hispanic population, and share of female population. Standard errors are clustered at the CZ level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A5: Baseline Results with Different Time Periods

<i>Panel A: First Stage</i>				
Dependent variable:	Prescription Opioids pc			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Cancer MR 94-96	1.078***	0.916***	1.047***	1.474***
<i>se</i>	[0.264]	[0.258]	[0.277]	[0.330]
<i>t-stat</i>	4.08	3.55	3.78	4.46
Observations	11,800	7,080	8,850	5,310
Adj R squared	0.564	0.565	0.582	0.425
Sample	All	1999-2010	1999-2013	2010-2018

<i>Panel B: Instrumental Variables</i>				
Dependent variable:	Prescription Opioids Mortality Rate			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Presc. Opioids pc	0.00679***	0.00785***	0.00769***	0.00533***
	[0.00200]	[0.00259]	[0.00230]	[0.00169]
Observations	11,800	7,080	8,850	5,310
<i>Effective F-stat</i>	16.63	12.62	14.25	19.90
Sample	All	1999-2010	1999-2013	2010-2018

Dependent variable:	Any Opioid Mortality Rate			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Presc. Opioids pc	0.00646***	0.00677***	0.00672***	0.00562**
	[0.00231]	[0.00256]	[0.00232]	[0.00237]
Observations	11,800	7,080	8,850	5,310
<i>Effective F-stat</i>	16.63	12.62	14.25	19.90
Sample	All	1999-2010	1999-2013	2010-2018

Notes: Panel A presents results for the first-stage regression using alternative periods. Column (1) reproduces the main results for 1999-2018, column (2) presents estimates for the first wave of the opioid epidemic, column (3) presents estimates for the first and second waves pooled together, and column (4) presents estimates for the after-OxyContin reformulation period. Panel B presents results from a regression of the opioid mortality measure on all prescription opioids distribution per capita, instrumenting the latter by the cancer incidence in the commuting zone in 1994-1996; i.e., reproduces the results presented in Table 5 under alternative periods. All regressions include state times year fixed effects and a set of control variables: contemporaneous cancer mortality rate, share of population under 1 year old, share of population between 18 and 65, share of population over 66 years old, share of Black, White, and Hispanic population, and share of female population. Standard errors are clustered at the CZ level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A6: Baseline Results with Different Time Periods. IV Estimates.

	Labor force participation			SNAP		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Presc. Opioids pc	0.0115*** [0.00423]	0.00792** [0.00321]	-0.000297 [0.00196]	0.00455* [0.00250]	0.00487** [0.00219]	0.00680*** [0.00205]
Observations	7,080	8,850	5,310	7,080	8,850	5,310
<i>Effective F-stat</i>	15.22	17.06	25.70	15.22	17.06	25.70
Sample	1999-2010	1999-2013	2010-2018	1999-2010	1999-2013	2010-2018

	SSDI			SSI		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Presc. Opioids pc	0.00584*** [0.00144]	0.00605*** [0.00141]	0.00718*** [0.00135]	0.00226* [0.00133]	0.00248* [0.00141]	0.00320* [0.00174]
Observations	7,080	8,850	5,310	7,080	8,850	5,310
<i>Effective F-stat</i>	15.22	17.06	25.70	15.22	17.06	25.70
Sample	1999-2010	1999-2013	2010-2018	1999-2010	1999-2013	2010-2018

Instrumental Variables	Aggregate crime rate			Fertility		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Presc. Opioids pc	320.8*** [89.26]	322.8*** [83.61]	363.9*** [76.31]	0.00210*** [0.000696]	0.00233*** [0.000674]	0.00350*** [0.000778]
Observations	7,080	8,850	5,310	7,080	8,850	5,310
<i>Effective F-stat</i>	15.22	17.06	25.70	15.22	17.06	25.70
Sample	1999-2010	1999-2013	2010-2018	1999-2010	1999-2013	2010-2018

	IMR			Birth weight		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Presc. Opioids pc	0.0458 [0.185]	0.0512 [0.160]	0.0846 [0.113]	-5.989** [2.811]	-5.093** [2.316]	-2.915* [1.623]
Observations	7,080	8,850	5,310	7,080	8,850	5,310
<i>Effective F-stat</i>	15.22	17.06	25.70	15.22	17.06	25.70
Sample	1999-2010	1999-2013	2010-2018	1999-2010	1999-2013	2010-2018

Notes: This table presents results from a regression of outcome y on prescription opioids distribution per capita, instrumenting the latter by the cancer incidence in the commuting zone in 1994-1996; i.e., reproduces the results presented in Table 5 under alternative periods. Columns (1) and (4) present estimates for the first wave of the opioid epidemic, columns (2) and (5) present estimates for the first and second waves pooled together, and columns (3) and (6) present estimates for the after-OxyContin reformulation period. All regressions include state times year fixed effects and a set of control variables: contemporaneous cancer mortality rate, share of population under 1 year old, share of population between 18 and 65, share of population over 66 years old, share of Black, White, and Hispanic population, and share of female population. Standard errors are clustered at the CZ level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A7: Alternative Sample Results for SNAP

Dependent variable:	Share SNAP					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Presc. Opioids pc	0.000144 [0.51]		0.00982*** [3.28]	0.000213 [0.74]		0.0106*** [3.23]
Cancer 94 96		0.0106*** [4.67]			0.0116*** [5.53]	
<i>Effective F-stat</i>			16.63			13.70
Model	OLS	RF	IV	OLS	RF	IV
Sample	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Restricted	Restricted	Restricted
Observations	11,800	11,800	11,800	9,962	9,962	9,962
Clusters	590	590	590	533	533	533

Notes: Columns 1-3 report baseline results and columns 4-6 report results only for commuting zones where county-level data were available. All regressions include state times year fixed effects and a set of control variables: labor force participation, contemporaneous cancer mortality rate, share of population under 1 year old, share of population between 18 and 65, share of population over 66 years old, share of Black, White, and Hispanic population, and share of female population. Standard errors are clustered at the CZ level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A8: Alternative Instruments

Dependent variable:	Prescriptions Opioids pc			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Cardiovascular disease 94-96	0.372 [0.611]		-2.023** [0.822]	
Transit accidents 94-96		1.621 [1.546]		-0.991 [1.528]
Cancer 94-96			1.381*** [0.347]	0.954*** [0.243]
Model	FS	FS	FS	FS
Observations	11,800	11,800	11,800	11,800
Rsquared	0.588	0.587	0.602	0.598
Clusters	590	590	590	590

Notes: Columns 1-2 report first-stage regression with alternative instrument. Columns 3-4 add our baseline instrument. All regressions include state times year fixed effects and a set of control variables: labor force participation, contemporaneous cancer mortality rate, share of population under 1 year old, share of population between 18 and 65, share of population over 66 years old, share of Black, White, and Hispanic population, and share of female population. Standard errors are clustered at the CZ level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A9: Effects on Fertility Rate by Age

Age group:	10-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Presc. Opioids pc	-0.00038 [-1.40]	-0.00107 [-0.96]	0.00327*** [2.83]	0.0000223 [0.05]	-0.00123** [-2.47]	-0.0000851** [-2.08]
<i>Effective F-stat</i>	16.63	16.63	16.63	16.63	16.63	16.63
Model	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
Observations	11,800	11,800	11,800	11,800	11,800	11,800
Clusters	590	590	590	590	590	590

Notes: This table presents results of the effect of the prescription opioids supply on the fertility rate of women age 10 to 44 years by age group. Standard errors in square brackets are clustered at the CZ level; using these standard errors, we report * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.