“Threat Hunting in Active Directory Environment”

Anurag Khanna & Thirumalai Natarajan

!"#$%&'((%&)%$#(*%#+,-$%$,.#/0

- Hypothesis based on Threat Actor TTPs targeting Active Directory environment
- How Threat Actor abuse Active Directory
- Hunt and Detect Threat Actors TTPs

!"#$"%"&'(Understand the AD attack surface and hunt for techniques that Threat Actors use to target AD.

!"#$%&'()%""%

! "#$%%$$%&'$(

- Principal Consultant @Mandiant
- Incident Response & Remediation
- SANS Community Instructor
- GIAC Security Expert (GSE #97)

*)+$#,%-%+'.%/%$%0%"

!)#*'&+

- Principal Consultant @Mandiant
- Responding to Security Breaches
- Active Directory and Cloud Security
- Built & Managed Security Operations Center
- Die hard Football fan
- https://www.linkedin.com/in/thirumalainatarajan

!"/%$#(*%#+,-$%12$'3)%4'5)2$,5/0

- Widely adopted across enterprise
- Underlying fabric of IT environment
- Attractive target for Threat Actors
- Big attack surface
- Central to the cyber kill chain
- Long dwell time

!)*$"+(,-+.*/(+"*0$+("12("34/$(,-+56$(75*$-+.*&8(7$9$12$*/(1$$2(+.(
412$*/+"12(,-+56$(25*$-+.*&(3$++$*8

6'7%"-8$%"/9,$"):':%

1. 2'5'/+(-#.%6-$*$'%7#"'%8"'$-$('.9'
2. :,*$-./%20%;'<5-9+(-#.%8"'=-$$-#.$
3. 8"'$-$('.9'%*$-./%6+9>-.'?%>+$>
4. 6+5-9-#*$%@"#*<%8#5-94%A,B'9($
5. !"#$$%&#"'$(%)"*$(%+,*$'%*$-./%012%3-$(#"4
6. !"'C'.(-+5%3+"D'$(-./%*$-./%:E*"'%F2#..'9(

!"#$%&%'()*+,#-*./.%

;)5+)5,:%4)()<#$',8



- Impersonate Principal to access another service by a service
- Feature to support legitimate requirement in several scenarios like Domain Controllers, Web Servers, Reporting Servers, Application Servers

Example: A user authenticates to a webserver. The web application impersonates user to access backend database to retrieve content as the user.

- Un-Constrained
- Constrained
- Resource Based Constrained

0/,)#012+)3%.*.

Threat actor (TA) created persistence using ,-%./'$0%1232141($/0-%3 to the domain controller from a TA controlled system.

MITRE ATT&CK Technique – T1134

=,8:$5#'8).%4)()<#$',8%&'$"%>5,$,2,(%?5#8:'$',8



- **Service A** has "TRUSTED_TO_AUTH_FOR_DELEGATION" field set
- **Service A** has "msds-allowedtodelegateto" pointing to Target DC's Service B (CIFS/domain.com)

Constrained Delegation

- Used by a service to impersonate another principal and access destination service
- Two forms:
  - Protocol Transition - **S4u2Self**
  - Kerberos Authentication - **S4u2Proxy**

=,8:$5#'8).%4)()<#$',8%&'$"%>5,$,2,(%?5#8:'$',8




```
AD DC PS> !"# $%&'()*+#",     $-."/#0#123   4",506"% 72824"#$
%&%66(+/#'(/#,(9     $:,+;#".:(%+#<=(,&"9">?#0(/          @#,+"

AD DC PS>4"#$%&'()*+#",     $-."/#0#126())?/.(2       $%..2ABC);&4 $
%99(D".:(&"9">?#":(     CEAFC'-=4G.6HIJ#<,"?#<+/#0/>J."5CKL
```

!"#$%&'()*+,#-.,#/0123%%+

```
ServiceA PS>
M"N9"6#0(/J%;;")O91   PQR(?.S0#<T?,#0?9U?)"  FC41;#")J-."/#0#1V(."
9CK 8  (+#$/+99
ServiceA PS> @0.:(-)*",;(/?#"          E U"D$
WOX"6#41;#")J4"6+,0#1JT,0/60*?9JS0/.(D;-."/#0#1
AFY3&()?0/%.)0/   7CK
ServiceA PS> @0.:(-)*",;(/?#"J-)*",;(/?#"              FK
```

4"#5+()),+#-.,#/0123%%+

Threat Actor Workflow

@-8$'8<%A,5%=,8:$5#'8).%4)()<#$',8%+#2*.,,5:

Detection



!"#$%&'()*++"%,&)-.,./'#',&) 012',&)34)5657).8'(&)",)
9*88":';<"4'8'/.&'<" =)&")+(>&>+.8)?'(2@ 4"#.>,)+",&("88'()

Hunting

```
PS> !"#  $%&WOX"6#$N02BF;&4 $%99(D".:(&"9">?#":(      $90Z"2C[CK2
$?/.2F  \;",%66(+/#'(/#,(9          $O?/.2H]^HHHHHHKL2*,(*",#12    ;?)%66
(+/#U?)"_;",506"T,0/60*?9U?)"        _2);&4 $%99(D".:(&"9">?#":(    _2
+;",%66(+/#'(/#,(9
```

!"#6,7(,8#9:9-,;9#1%&'()*+,3#8(-.##$%&9-+0(&,3#
3,<,)0-(%&

- ! **Service A** has "TRUSTED_TO_AUTH_FOR_DELEGATION" field set
- ! **Service A** has "msds-allowedtodelegateto" pointing to Target DC's Service B (CIFS/domain.com)

0/,)#012+)3%.*.

Threat actor (TA) created persistence using **Resource-based constrained delegation (RBCD)** to the domain controller from a TA controlled system.

`MITRE ATT&CK Technique - T1134`

B):,-52) G#:).%=,8:$5#'8).%4)()<#$',8D



- **Service B** has "msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity " field set
- **Service B** has "msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity" pointing to Service A

B):,-52) G+#:).%=,8:$5#'8).%4)()<#$',8



<A('.&)*+&"()",8B)('C%>('?)+.$.D>8>&B)&")';#&4E 0
88":';<"+&F,G'A.8HFHF&A'(3;',&>&B=)",)&A')&.(/'&)+"#$%&'()"DI'+&@

```
DC PS> 4"# $%&'()*+#",    34",506"`   72$
T,0/60*?9;%99(D".:(&"9">?#":(%66(+/#          34",506"% 7
```

!"#$%&'()*+,#-.,#/0123%%+

```
ServiceA PS>
M"N9"6#0(/J%;;")O91   PQQR(?.S0#<T?,#0?9U?)"  FC41;#")J-."/#0#1V(."
9CK 8  (+# $/+99
ServiceA PS> @0.:(-)*",;(/?#"          E U"D$
WOX"6#41;#")J4"6+,0#1JT,0/60*?9JS0/.(D;-."/#0#1
AFY3&()?0/%.)0/   7CK
ServiceA PS> @0.:(-)*",;(/?#"J-)*",;(/?#"             FK
```

4"#5+()),+#-.,#/0123%%+

Threat Actor Workflow

@-8$'8<%A,5%BE=4%+#2*.,,5:

Detection*





4>('+&"(B)E'(2>+')*++'??)12',&)34)5JJ7).8'(&)",)KL34)
9MH6N+M[illegible]6P[illegible]5JD;[illegible]QDN[illegible]P;RNRRJ;;+6P=
4>('+&"(B)E'(2>+')!A.,/'?)12',&)34)ORMJ).8'(&)&")4>?$8.B)S.#')

Hunting

```
PS> !"#  $%&WOX"6$N09#",2BF);&4 $
%99(D".:(%6#W/`"<?9NWNW#<",-."/#0#1     $90Z"2C[CKL

PS> >"#$%&'()*+#",     34",506"`   72$*,(*",#0";2[282=:2
U?)"_T,0/60*?9;%99(D".:(&"9">?#":(%66(+/#
```

!"   =(9-(&)#6>$?#1%&'()*+0-(%&9

"#$%&'())%*+(,%-'./'01'.(23-.4

4"#56/.*,'#$7#8%2&*9()*+,#:%;<*..*+,.

0/,)#012+)3%.*.

Threat actor (TA) created persistence by adding 56371840,$/0-%81'+0..0-%.3 for a standard user.

MITRE ATT&CK Technique – T1003.006

46%B)9('2#$',8%9)5F'::',8:

- Combination of two permissions:
  DS-Replication-Get-Changes
  DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All

- Allows a principal to remotely retrieve NT hashes via the MS-DRSR protocol for any security principal

Roles that (by default) that have these permissions:

- Domain Controllers
- BUILTIN\Administrators (DCs)
- Domain Admins
- Enterprise Admins
- AD DS Connector account (eg. MSOL_)



46%B)9('2#$',8%9)5F'::',8:%G':-:)




```
PS > J2JaT(D",b0"DJ*;^
PS > %.. $WOX"6#%6$:?,>"#&0;#0/>+0;<".U?)"
c.6E :<,"?#d+/#0/>_.6    E."5c2  $T,0/60*?94?)%66(+/#U?)"      3+;",/?)"72
$M0><#;2&'41/6   $b",O(;"
```

!" $%&'()*+,#?$#6,@<(10-(%&#@,+;(99(%&#'%+#
9-0&30+3#*9,+

```
PS > -)*(,#   $)(.+9"2J   a-/5(Z"   $)0)0Z?#e
PS > -/5(Z"   $V0)0Z?#e  $'())?/.2Cc    9;?.+)*   QQ6;1/6
G+;",Q.()?0/    aZ,O#>#cC
```

4"#6,-+(,7,#-.,#A5#@0998%+3#.09.#%'# BAC *9,+#<0-,+

Threat Actor Workflow

@-8$'8<%A,5%46%B)9('2#$',8%2,8A'<-5#$',8

Detection



4>('+&"(B)E'(2>+')*++'??)12',&)34)5JJ7)/','(.&';):A',)4E)
T'$8>+.&>",)$'(#>??>",)>?).;;';)H"().)%?'(

Hunting

```
PS> F!"# $%69 c?.Qa.6E#<,"?#<+/#0/>_.6  E."5cKJ%66";;2282
D<"," $(OX"6#2B@fJWOX"6#:1*"  $"g  c^^h^Ni?? $j6Hk $^^.^  $NkjN$
HH6HlN6I.6.Ic2  $(,2@fJ (OX"6#:1*"  $"g  c^^h^
Ni?. $j6Hk $^^.^  $NkjN$HH6HlN6I.6.IcL2824"9"6#  $WOX"6#2
-."/#0#1M"N","/6"  _2(OX"6#:1*"
```

!" D*&-#'%+#*9,+9#8(-.#?E#6,@<(10-(%&#@,+;(99(%&

```
1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 (DS-Replication-Get-Changes)
1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 (DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All)
```

?E#6,@<(10-(%&#6().-9 FGHI?

```
="#:%;.*.)%,9%#/.*,'#-(93*,%>#3(.3
```

0/,)#012+)3%.*.

Threat actor (TA) stole 9$,#0%1:3$,,-&%/3 8$..;-'23#$.#3 and are accessing the target assets at will with privileged access.



`MITRE ATT&CK Technique – T1003`

G#2"'8)H%122,-8$

- 0'9*"-(4%<"-.9-<+5%*$'C%(#%-C'.(-74% 'D"'4%9#=<*('"%#,B'9(%-.%:9(-D'% 2-"'9(#"4
- G$'C%(#%9"'+('%)@0%7#"%6+9>-.'%08H$
- 6+-.(+-.$%6+9>-.'?%+99#*.(% <+$$I#"C%>-$(#"4
- 8+$$I#"C%9>+./'$%'D"'4%JK%C+4$% LC'7+*5(M
- 8+$$I#"C%9>+./'%-$%.#(%'.7#"9'C
- 8+$$I#"C%9>+./'%-$%-.-(-+('C%,4%.'(% 5#/#.%<"#9'$$%#.%6+9>-.'%,+$'C%#.% <#5-94



Machine$ password policy

G#2"'8)H%122,-8$%G':-:)




```
PS > -)*(,#   $)(.+9"2J   a-/5(Z"   $)0)0Z?#e
PS > -/5(Z"   $V0)0Z?#e  $'())?/.2Cc    9;?.+)*   QQ6;1/6
G+;",Q.()?0/    a3)?6<0/"@7cC
```

!" E-,0<#-.,#J01.(&,K#@0998%+3#.09.#

```
PS > 4"# $-#")T,(*",#1       $T?#<2
dnRV@4o4:pV a'+,,"/#'(/#,(94"#          a4",506";   a/"#9(>(/    aT?,?
)"#",;2   $U?)"2 V?]0)+)T?;;D(,.%>"      $b?9
+"  365
```

4"#$.0&),#-.,#+,)(9-+:#9,--(&)9

```
PS > -)*(,#   $)(.+9"2J   a-/5(Z"   $)0)0Z?#e
PS > -/5(Z"   $V0)0Z?#e  $'())?/.2mmmmmm
```

L"#H9,#-.,#J01.(&,K#.09.

Threat Actor Workflow

@-8$'8<%A,5%G#2"'8)H%122,-8$%G':-:)

Detection



Hunting

```
WS PS> !"# $-#")T,(*",#1 $T?#<2
dnRV@4o4:pV a'+,,"/#'(/#,(94"# a4",506"; a/"#9(>(/ aT?,?)"#",;282
;"9"6#2 &0;?O9"*?;;D(,.6<?/>
"_2 V?]0)+)T?;;D(,.%>"
```

!" D*&-#'%+#9*9@(1(%*9#70<*,9#(&#+,)(9-+:#M?,'0*<-#LNO

4"#6,7(,8#'%+#H& Ð0@@+%7,3#1.0&),9

?"#-(&*9*+/.#@;+/2#:+&*91#A6B%9).

0/,)#012+)3%.*.

Threat actor (TA) uses **Group Policy Objects** to exert control over target active directory objects by creating malicious GPOs.

`MITRE ATT&CK Technique – T1484.001`

I5,-9%>,('2/%J+K)2$%LI>J:M

- 8#5-9-'$%(#%9'.("+5-E'%=+.+/'%N%9#.("#5%
  !#=<*('"%N%G$"'%9#.7-/*"'+(-#.
- !"'+('C%+.C%$(#"'C%-.%C#=+-.%9#.("#55'"%+
  OP-.C#I$ O0Q0RAGSC#=+-.O8#5-9-'$
- G$"'$%I-(>%='=,"'$>-<%(#%@"#*<%8#5-94%
  !"'+(#"'%AI.'"$%/"#*<%#"'%C'5'/+('C%"-/>($%#D
  @"#*<%<#5-94%9#.(+-.'"%#,B'9(%9+.%9"'+('%
- @8A$%9+.%,'%*$'C%(#%'T'9*('%$9"-<($%C#:
  I-C'



G':-:'8<%I>J%$,%.)9(,/%B#8:,F&#5)

1.)>'"+(%:9(#"%'.+,5'C%$9"-<(%'T'9*(-#.
2. 2-$+,5'C%5#/#.%$9"-<(%C'5+4$
3. 2-$+,5'C%'.C%<#-.(%$'9*"-(4%$#7(I+'"
4. G$'C%S#/#.%$9"-<($%(#%C'<5#4%"+.$#=I+'"



TA Ransomware deployment technique

@-8$'8<%A,5%G#('2',-:%I>J

&'2T472!"# $!TW2$?99282q2B2!"# $!TWM"*(,# $!\-&2@fJ0.2 $M"*(,#:1*"
d:VR2$T?#<23(+#*+#.0, 7r a@F@f.0;*9?1U?)" KJ<#)9c2L



!" PQ@%+-#GRS9#'%+#-.,#3%;0(&



Policy Type	Policy Group or Registry Key	Policy Setting	attacker
HKLM	Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\SrpV2\Script\9428c672-5fc3-47f4-808a-a...	Value	<FilePathRule Id...
HKLM	Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\SrpV2\Script\ed97d0cb-15ff-430f-b82c-8...	Value	<FilePathRule Id...
HKLM	Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WinRM\Service	AllowAutoConfig	1
HKLM	Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WinRM\Service	AllowBasic	1
HKLM	Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WinRM\Service	AllowCredSSP	1
HKLM	Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WinRM\Service	AllowKerberos	1
HKLM	Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WinRM\Service	AllowUnencryptedTraffic	1
HKLM	Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WinRM\Service	DisableRunAs	0
HKLM	Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WinRM\Service	HttpCompatibilityListener	1
HKLM	Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WinRM\Service	IPv4Filter	*
HKLM	Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WinRM\Service	IPv6Filter	
HKLM	Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WinRM\Service\WinRS	AllowRemoteShellAccess	1
HKLM	System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa	NoLMHash	1
HKLM	System\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanManServer\Parameters	EnableSecuritySignature	1
HKLM	System\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanManServer\Parameters	RequireSecuritySignature	1
HKLM	System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Netlogon\Parameters	RequireSignOrSeal	1

4"#B&0<:T,#-.,#GRS9#'%+#,7(<

N'8.'8<%)3'(%'8%I>J:

Threat Actor Action/Backdoors	Hunting Action
Add privileged rights to standard users like Debug Program, Remote Desktop Services, Backup files and directories, Log on Locally (DCs)	Extract User Rights assignment settings and review for privileged access
Deploy startup/shutdown, Logon/Logoff scripts	Review scripts configured for execution
Deploy malicious Scheduled task	Reviews configured scheduled tasks
Create restricted groups and add it as member of built-in privileged groups	Review restricted groups and privileges

Enable weak algorithms (Wdigest, LMHash, Credential Manager eg) and extract hashes	Review registry hardening settings
	
	`HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\Wdigest\UseLogonCredential`
	`HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\NoLmHash`
	`HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\disabledomaincreds`

Limit Machine$ Account password change	Review registry entry for password change
	
	`HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\netlogon\Parameters\MaximumPasswordAge`
	`HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\netlogon\Parameters\DisablePasswordChange`

C"#D;+..#E+;%.)#F;/.)#(6/.%#/.*,'#7G$#0*.)+;1

0/,)#012+)3%.*.

Threat actor (TA) can perform privileged access to a trusting forest using 6<53 #0./-'=3 at will.

MITRE ATT&CK Technique - T1134.005

=5,::%N,5):$%?5-:$

- &#"'$(%-$%(>'%$'9*"-(4%,#*.C+"4
- !'"+('C%,'(I".%(I#%7#"'$(%"##(%C#=+-.$
-)#%+55#I%+99'$$%(#%"'$#*"9'$%-.%("*$(-./%7#"'$($
- !+.%,'%#.'Ħ+4%#"%(Ⅎ+4%("+.$-(-D'%("*$(
- S'/+94%#7%='"/'"$U+9V*-$-(-#.$
- 012%&-5('"-./%-$%'.+,5'C%,4%C'7+*5(



SID History

- 2-$+,5'C%,4%C'7+*5(
- W.+,5'C%(#%$*<<#"(%=-/"+(-#.%$9'.+"-#$
- !#.(+-.%<'"D-#*$%012$%*$'C%7#"%(>'%#,B'9(
- 17%'.+,5'C%012%&-5('"-./%I-55%ƑƵ₭9K%YKK
  ;12%8"-.9-<+5$%(#%9"#$$%("*$(

=5,::%N,5):$%?5-:$%#+-:)%-:'8<%6O4%@':$,5/



U%+,9-F>#B1-(%&9

```
DC Forest-B PS> U"#.()    #,+;#23=(,";#     $`72G.()?0/Q3=(,";#     $
%7G?O9";0.<0;#(,1Q1";
```

!" P&0/<,#EI?#D(9-%+:

```
DC Forest-B PS> New-ADGroup -Name "TA-Group" -SamAccountName TA-
Group -GroupScope Global
DC Forest-B PS!" Add-ADGroupMember -Identity Administrators -Members
TA-Group
```

4"#$+,0-,#0#9,1*+(-:#)+%*@#5B FG+%*@#033#-%#B3;(&(9-+0-%+9

U%+,9-FB#B1-(%&9

```
DC Forest-A PS> mimikatz# sid::add /sam:user-A /new:<SID TA-Group>
```

L"#B33#EI?#D(9-%+:#%'#5B FG+%*@#-%#0#*9,+#(&#U%+,9-#B

V"#I&7%2,#H9,+B -%#B11,99#U%+,9->#09#B3;(&(9-+0-%+

Attack Workflow

@-8$'8<%A,5%6O4%@':$,5/

Detection



L?'()*++"%,&)-.,./'#',&)12',&)34)56MN) U*;;>&>",)"H)E34)V>?&"(B

Hunting

```
DC Forest-A PS> !"# $%&\;",  $=09#",2c 4-&d0;#(,1  $90Z"2C[Cc2$
T,(*",#0";2  4-&<0;#(,1  82S<","2B@fJ 4-&d0;#(,1  $U(#R0Z"  r=(,";#%  $
4-&[cL
```

!"#=(9-#*9,+9#8(-.#EI?#D(9-%+:#033,3#

4"#6,7(,8# EI?D(9-%+: B--+(/*-,# '%+#@+(7(<,),3#EI?9

E,8-:%@-8$% P >5'3'()<).%122)::%&'$"'8%:#F)% 4,F#'8

Hunt for SID History injection within same domain SID

```
DC Domain-A PS> @&()?0/%f4-&    E2FF!"# $%&&()?0/ KJ&()?0/4-&Jb?9+"    K
DC Domain-A PS> !"#  $%&\;",    $=09#",2s  4-&d0;#(,1     $R0Z"2C[Cr2$T,(*",#0";2
4-&d0;#(,1     82S<","2B2@fJ 4-&d0;#(,1     $R0Z"2s@&()?0/%f4-&  $[r2L
```

!" =(9-#0&3#+,7(,8#*9,+9#8(-.#EI?#D(9-%+:#033,3#
'%+#-.,#90;,#3%;0(&#EI?

4"#6,7(,8#'%+#@+(7(<,),3#)+%*@#6I?9#(&#-.,#EI?#.(9-%+:
%'#-.,#9-0&30+3#R+(&1(@0<9#**eg (512 – Domain Admins ,**
518-Schema Admins, 519-Enterprise admins)

H"#5I/;%#5$ JD+,,%9)# K D;%L%,)*(&#0(;M%.)*,'

0/,)#012+)3%.*.

Threat actor (TA) is performing credential harvesting by implanting malware on the >?&'13>53@-%%1,/361'A1'B

MITRE ATT&CK Technique – TA0006

1Q-5)%14%=,88)2$

- 6-9"#$#7(%(##5%(#%$*<<#"(%34,"-C% :*(>'.(-9+(-#.
- 04.9>"#.-E'%*$'"%-C'.(-(-'$%,'(I".%A.Ƒ8'"=% :2%N%:E*'"%:2

- :E*'"%:2%:*(>'.(-9+(-#.%$*<<#"(Ƒ8+$$%3+$>%04.9>"#.-E+(-#.%L830M Ƒ8+$$%)>"#*/>%:*(>'.(-9+(-#.L8):M Ƒ&'C'"+('C%:*(>'.(-9+(-#.



>#::%?"5,-<"%1-$")8$'2#$',8%G)$",.



0-/. F.%'D'.($%+'"%'"9#"C'C%-.%:E*'"%:2%F.C%A
8'"=-$'%:9(-D'%C-'"9(#"4%$'"D'"$

AAD Connect running Pass Through Authentication (PTA).

1$$#2*'8<%1Q-5)%14%>?1

```
AADConnect PS > -)*(,#    $V(.+9"2  %%&-/#",/?9;
AADConnect PS > -/;#?99   $%%&-/#T:%4*1
```

!"#$%#&'()*+,#-./&*&021;3&'#4%516)%270")*+%1+8)'+&*.+&0'%9)'+:)6;&*)

```
AADConnect PS > Get-AADIntPTASpyLog

UserName                Password                        Time
--------                --------                        ----
blue@threathunting.dev <base64 Hash XXXX> 3/7/2021 3:52:29 AM
```

="">)?#8.6;),+)@#*6)@)'+&./,"
>./&@AB';./&@#*6)@)'+&./,#.6)#%77CD$C2#E#3FGGC2#/0*.//H



Threat Actor Workflow

AAD Connect running Pass Through Authentication (PTA).

@-8$'8<%A,5%114%>?1%69/

:*.+$-+(,,7(;.11$-+(/$*6$*("/("(!5$*<("//$+(=(>1"3?$(@A,

Detection



EB?#",) U3#./')W".;';) **Event Id 7 on** **4)!",,'+&)E'(2'(@)
W""X)H"()#.8>+>"%?)4WW?@)

Hunting

```
AAD Connect PS> !"# $T,(6";;2
%e+,"%&'(//"6#%+#<"/#06?#0(/%>"/#4",506"        824"9"6# $WOX"6#$
p]*?/.T,(*",#1        V(.+9";2
```

!" D*&-#'%+#9*9@(1(%*9#?==9#(&W,1-,3#(&#@+%1,99

4"#I3,&-(':#J0<(1(%*9#01-(7(-:#<(&2,3#-%#R5B#
$ M"50"D2?/12/"D2&RR;2.,(**".2(/2%%&'
$ V")(,12N(,"/;06;2#(2."#"6#2*,(6";;2d((Z0/>

L"#P7,&-9#'%+#E,+7(1,#5(12,-#6,X*,9-#'%+#BB?$%&&,1-#
8(<<#&%-#/,#<%)),3#(&#-.,#B1-(7,#?(+,1-%+:"
$ lkit2n",O",(;2?+#<"/#06?#0(/2:!:2,"g+";#
$ lkij2n",O",(;2;",506"2#06Z"#2D?;2,"g+";#".

12*8,&().<)F)8$:

The Good Folks at @Mandiant

@DrAzureAD

@harmj0y

@gentilkiwi

@elad_shamir

@_dirkjan

@PyroTek3

@mburns7

?"#8*:%A,5%(':$)8'8<R

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