
FCS ASSIGNMENT 1

Report for Question 3


For this question, I explored dnsdumpster and crt.sh. Dnsdumpster showed the public IP addresses of the various subdomains of iiitd.edu.in. It also showed DNS mappings of the domains, geographic location of the hosts, details of ISP, details of servers, trace path, hosts sharing the same IPs.





I also explored crt.sh which showed details of the certificates, the certificates itself, the issuer(CA) and details of the CA.


rtificates		Logged At ☆			Common Name	Matching Identities		Issuer Name
	7746158468	2022-10-12			weave.iiitd.edu.in		C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3	
	7733568567	2022-10-12	2022-10-12	2023-01-10	weave.iiitd.edu.in	weave.iiitd.edu.in	C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3	
	7745062670	2022-10-12	2022-10-12	2023-01-10	adarsht.iiitd.edu.in	adarsht.iiitd.edu.in	C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3	
	7731948630	2022-10-12	2022-10-12	2023-01-10	adarsht.iiitd.edu.in	adarsht.iiitd.edu.in	C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3	
	7723384990	2022-10-08	2022-10-08	2023-01-06	webs.iiitd.edu.in	webs.iiitd.edu.in	C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3	
	7710577156	2022-10-08	2022-10-08	2023-01-06	webs.iiitd.edu.in		C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3	
	7676113177	2022-10-01	2022-10-01	2022-12-30	blr.opendata.iiitd.edu.in		C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3	
	7658188062	2022-10-01	2022-10-01	2022-12-30	blr.opendata.iiitd.edu.in		C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3	
	7663572419	2022-09-30				auth. fh. ilitd. edu. in booking fh. ilitd. edu. in crams. fh. ilitd. edu. in fh. ilitd. edu. in fms. fh. ilitd. edu. in hostel. fh. ilitd. edu. in share. fh. ilitd. edu. in share. fh. ilitd. edu. in wellbeing. fh. ilitd. edu. in	C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3	
	7650029643				fh.iiitd.edu.in	auth. fh. ilitd. edu. in booking fh. ilitd. edu. in crams. fh. ilitd. edu. in fh. ilitd. edu. in fms. fh. ilitd. edu. in nodues. fh. ilitd. edu. in share. fh. ilitd. edu. in share. fh. ilitd. edu. in wellbeing. fh. ilitd. edu. in	C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3	
	7655991293					federatedhealthplatform.tavlab.iiitd.edu.in		
						federatedhealthplatform.tavlab.iiitd.edu.in		
					odorify.ahujalab.iiitd.edu.in		C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3	
	7635851553				odorify.ahujalab.iiitd.edu.in		C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3	
	7643245052				evidenceflow.tavlab.iitd.edu.in		C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3	
	7632383091				evidenceflow.tavlab.iiitd.edu.in		C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3	
	7639147880				kracr.iiitd.edu.in		C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3	
	7628552853				kracr.iiitd.edu.in		C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3	
	7626927022				antibioticsteward.tavlab.iiitd.edu.in		C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3	
	7617955958				antibioticsteward.tavlab.iiitd.edu.in		C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3	
	7625194367				visiontoli.iiitd.edu.in		C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3	
	7616929045				visiontoli.iiitd.edu.in		C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3	
	7614610796				deepgraphh.ahujalab.iiitd.edu.in		C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3	
	7607351760				deepgraphh.ahujalab.iiitd.edu.in		C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3	
	7601284316				eda.tavlab.iiitd.edu.in eda.tavlab.iiitd.edu.in		C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3 C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3	

A few certificates' screenshots:










Screenshots of a few Issuer's certificates:



Part a:

The private IP addresses of each of this subdomain were obtained using host (similar to ping or nslookup) command. When I was not connected to the IIITD network, 'host'

command displayed the public IPs as shown in dnsdumpster. But after connecting to the IIITD network using VPN, the 'host' command showed private IPs of the domain.

All these private IPs are listed in the attached file Q3partA.txt. Some of these are:

byld5.iiitd.edu.in:[1.1.1.121] foobar.iiitd.edu.in:[1.1.1.116] precog.iiitd.edu.in:[1.1.1.17] digest.raylab.iiitd.edu.in:[192.168.30.176] cosylab.iiitd.edu.in:[1.1.1.92]

Their certificates are attached above.

Part b:

This list was obtained by using host command for the subdomains by being inside the IIITD network.

The process for automating is as follows:

I downloaded the .xlsx file of all subdomains with their private IPs from dnsdumpster. Only subdomain name and IP columns were selected. I converted this into a CSV file. This CSV file, named Subdomains.csv is attached in the submission.

Inside the python program, I read this CSV file. Using this I ran a bash command for the host from within the python program. This was to get the private IPs. I appended all private IPs in the file private_ip.txt which gets created during runtime. Now these private IPs, along with their subdomains and corresponding public IPs are listed in a CSV file, 'SubdomainMappings.csv' which also is created in runtime. The subdomains and their corresponding private IPs are printed as well.

To get all this information, just run: python 2020155 g3.py.

Part c:

Although an attacker outside of IIITD cannot get access to the private IPs without having access to the internal IIITD network. But, with the private IPs, he can launch an attack at the IP protocol of the network layer if the IP layer isn't secured with IPsec. He can modify the IP source IP addresses or destination IPs of the packets. He can also launch routing attacks. If an attacker gets access to the private IPs and somehow gets inside the IIITD network, he can cause a lot of trouble such as pinging the websites several times to puthem down. He can even access malicious sites, or launch a virus attack within IIITD. This will happen as he would have bypassed at least one layer of firewall.

The information, publicly available on dnsdumpster and crt.sh can be very useful for the attacker. 'Dnsdumpster' shows the entire mapping of all the subdomains in the network. This can help the attacker understand the entire network structure of an organization.

Hence whenever he would find a vulnerability, he can plan his attack well as he'll have the entire structure of the attack surface.

'crt.sh' has all the information about certificates, domain and subdomain names. This also gives the attacker information about network infrastructure. With the certificate information available publicly, the attacker can go through certificate transparency logs, which are also available publicly.

Using all this an attacker can pan out a DOS attack.

References:

https://blog.appsecco.com/certificate-transparency-part-3-the-dark-side-9d401809b025