

# XOR Cipher

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
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# Goal

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- Introduce the concept of cryptanalysis
- Present the parameters needed to define «safe» a cipher
- Classify cryptographic attacks based on their methodologies
- Give the definition of perfect encryption
- Present XOR cipher and One-Time-Pad as an example of a perfect cipher

# Prerequisites

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## ➤ Lecture:

➤ *CR\_1.1 – Introduction to cryptography and classical ciphers*

# Outline

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- Cryptanalysis
- Attacker's model and techniques
- Perfect encryption
- XOR Cipher and One-Time-Pad

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# Cryptanalysis

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- *Cryptanalysis* is a set of techniques, set up
  - **to test** the robustness of the algorithm and of the key by trying possible attacks against it
  - **to break** the code and infer the key from the available ciphertext or decrypt the ciphertext without knowing key
- Two kinds of attacks:
  - Analytic
  - Brute-force

# Safe encryption

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- A symmetrical encryption pattern is **safe** if:
  - The sender and the receiver receive and keep the key safely (**no attacker** must **intercept the key**)
  - The encryption **algorithm is robust**, i.e., an attacker in possession of a certain number of ciphertexts, but not of the encryption key, is unable to infer the plaintext or the key
- It is assumed that the algorithm is known and that it is impractical to decipher messages by having only ciphertexts (**Kerckhoffs's principle**)



# Kerckhoffs's principle

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- *The encryption scheme* is not secret
  - The attacker knows the encryption scheme
  - The only secret is the *key*
  - The key must be chosen at random and kept secret
- Some arguments in favor of this principle:
  - Easier to keep secret a *key* rather than an *algorithm*
  - Easier to change a *key* than to change an *algorithm*
  - Simplifies standardization:
    - Ease of deployment
    - Public validation

# Cryptanalysis application

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- Cryptanalysis techniques can be applied starting from different “hypotheses” about the information possessed by the attacker:
  - Not knowing anything, not even the algorithm
  - Knowing some ciphertexts and the algorithm
  - Knowing also some plaintexts

# Outline

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- Cryptanalysis
- **Attacker's model and techniques**
- Perfect encryption
- XOR Cipher and One-Time-Pad

# Attacker's Knowledge

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- *Ciphertext only*: A collection of ciphertexts
- *Known plaintext*: A collection of ciphertexts and one or more pairs <plaintext, ciphertext>
- *Chosen plaintext*: A collection of <plaintext, ciphertext> pairs with plaintexts selected by the attacker
- *Chosen ciphertext*: A collection of <plaintext, ciphertext> pairs with ciphertexts selected by the attacker
- *Chosen text*: Two collections of pairs, <plaintext, ciphertext> one with chosen text and the other with chosen ciphertext

# Cryptanalytic Attacks

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- The attacker tries:
  - to deduce the key used from a specific plain text, to compromise all future and past messages encrypted with that key
  - to guess the plain text from the encrypted text
- The attacker leverages on:
  - the knowledge of the **encryption algorithm**
  - some knowledge of the general characteristics of **plaintext**
  - (possibly) some sample **pairs** of **<plaintext, ciphertext>**

# Brute force attacks

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- The attacker:
  - Tries all possible keys on some ciphertexts until an intelligible translation into plaintext is obtained
  - On average, half of all possible keys must be tried to achieve success
- The attacker must have:
  - Some degree of knowledge of the expected plaintext
  - Some means to automatically distinguish plain texts from ciphered texts

# Levels of security

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- **Unconditional security**: no matter how much computer power or time is available, the cipher cannot be broken since the ciphertext provides insufficient information to uniquely determine the corresponding plaintext
- **Computational security**: given limited computing resources (e.g., the time needed for calculations is greater than the age of universe), the cipher cannot be broken
- **Quantum Computers might change the scene**: it might be possible to create specific algorithms for them that dramatically reduce the time needed to break cryptographic algorithms

# Shannon's principles

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- How to evaluate if a cipher is secure enough?
- Shannon defined two key concepts:
  - *Confusion*:
    - Makes relationship between ciphertext and key as complex as possible
    - The key must be well distributed in the ciphertext
    - Every bit of the ciphertext should depend on every bit of the key
  - *Diffusion*:
    - Dissipates statistical structure of plaintext over bulk of ciphertext
    - The plaintext must be well distributed in the ciphertext
    - Every bit of the ciphertext should depend on every bit of the plaintext
- Avalanche effect: changing 1 bit of the (plaintext, key) should change every bit of the ciphertext with a probability of 50%



# Outline

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- Cryptanalysis
- Attacker's model and techniques
- **Perfect encryption**
- XOR Cipher and One-Time-Pad

# Perfect secrecy

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- **Perfect secrecy** is based on the idea that, for any two messages **m1**, **m2** and any ciphertext **c**, the probability of obtaining **c** as the result of the encryption of **m1** or **m2** is the same
- **Symmetric encryption** algorithms rely on **substitutions and transpositions**. Even for the best of those currently in use, **it is not known** whether there can be an efficient cryptanalytic procedure that can reverse these transformations without knowing the encryption key
- **Asymmetric encryption** algorithms depend on mathematical problems that are thought to be difficult to solve. **There is no proof that these problems are hard**, and a **mathematical breakthrough** could make systems vulnerable to attack

# Outline

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# Exclusive Or (XOR)

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- Boolean operation that returns true only when inputs differ
- Typically represented by the symbol  $\oplus$  or with  $\wedge$  in many programming language
- Truth table:
  - Same inputs:  $0 \oplus 0 = 1 \oplus 1 = 0$
  - Different input:  $0 \oplus 1 = 1 \oplus 0 = 1$
- Some properties:
  - Identity element:  $A \oplus 0 = A$
  - Self-inverse:  $A \oplus A = 0$
  - Commutative:  $A \oplus B = B \oplus A$
  - Associative:  $A \oplus (B \oplus C) = (A \oplus B) \oplus C$
- We can construct a simple cipher with this operation

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Further details can be found in the lectures:

- *HW\_S\_0.2.1 – Logic Gates & Flip-Flops (slide 40-on)*
- *HW\_S\_0.2.3 – Linear Feedback Shift Registers - LFRSs*

# XOR Cipher

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- The XOR cipher is a simple encryption algorithm in which each character of a message  $m$  is encrypted by applying the bitwise XOR operation  $\oplus$  with a fixed key  $k$ , formally:
  - $m = m_1, m_2, m_3, \dots$  and  $k = k_1, k_2, k_3, \dots$  we have  $c = (m_1 \oplus k_1), (m_2 \oplus k_2), (m_3 \oplus k_3), \dots$
- For properties of the XOR operation, the decryption coincide with encryption
- By using a constant repeating key, a simple XOR cipher can trivially be broken using **frequency analysis**
- XOR cipher is vulnerable to **known-plaintext attack**, as given a pair  $(m, c)$  we recover the key as  $k = m \oplus c$
- Messages encrypted with XOR cipher are also easily malleable as we can alter portion of the ciphertext to obtain predictable changes in the message

# Perfect encryption with OTP

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- *One-Time Pad* (OTP) is a perfect encryption technique that **cannot be cracked**, but requires a **pre-shared key with at least the same size as the message** (the one-time pad)
- Is equivalent to a XOR Cipher where  $|k| = |m|$
- **If the key is truly random and never reused** (in whole or in part), the resulting ciphertext **will be impossible to decrypt**
- **Any cipher scheme, to guarantee perfect secrecy, must use keys with effectively the same requirements as OTP keys (slightly impractical!)**

# Many-Time Pad (MTP)

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- If the same key  $k$  is used to encrypt with One-Time Pad two or more different messages  $m_1, m_2, \dots$ , into  $c_1, c_2, \dots$ , we can perform a **Many-Time Pad attack**
- We know that:
  - $c_1 = m_1 \oplus k, c_2 = m_2 \oplus k \rightarrow c_1 \oplus c_2 = m_1 \oplus m_2$
- We can exploit statistical information from pairs of XORed message  $m_i \oplus m_j$ , examples can be found on the article:
  - <https://www.thecrowned.org/the-one-time-pad-and-the-many-time-pad-vulnerability>
- Useful tool to perform Many-Time Pad attack interactively:
  - <https://github.com/CameronLonsdale/MTP>



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