Bitmarkets

anonymous decentralized markets based on two party escrow

no fees, no middle men, no altcoin, open protocol and source working and avaiable today

Steve Dekorte, lead at voluntary.net

"I've been working on a new electronic cash system that's fully peer-to-peer, with no trusted third party."


first public words of Satoshi Nakamoto

"I've been working on a new electronic cash system that's fully peer-to-peer, with no trusted third party."

Can we make markets like this?


CENTRALIZED MARKETS

NO PRIVACY, HIGH FEES



P2P ORDER BOOK & PAYMENTS

FULL PRIVACY, NO FEES



BITMESSAGE NETWORK

PUBLIC CHANNEL FOR LISTINGS PRIVATE MSGS BETWEEN USERS

BITCOIN NETWORK

PAYMENTS
2 PARTY ESCROW

P2P 2 PARTY ESCROW

BUYER PUTS UP 2X, SELLER PUTS UP 1X ITEM PRICE


FROM BUYER **BUYER DEPOSIT**

BUYER PAYMENT


FROM SELLER

SELLER DEPOSIT


LOCK TWO PARTY ESCROW




RELEASE PAYMENT



RELEASE REFUND



NO AGREEMENT



PERMANENTLY UNRESOLVED DISPUTES REDUCE BTC MONEY SUPPLY TRANSFERRING THE PURCHASING POWER TO ALL OTHER BTC HOLDERS

TWO PARTY ESCROW

SELLER BUYER

-1x

LOSES DEPOSIT

KEEPS ITEM

SELLER FRAUD

DOESN'T SEND ITEM OR SIGN REFUND

-2x

LOSES DEPOSIT

LOSES PAYMENT

-2x

LOSES DEPOSIT
LOSES ITEM

BUYER FRAUD

DOESN'T SEND PAYMENT

-1x

LOSES DEPOSIT

GAINS ITEM

NO FRAUD

GAINS ITEM

GAINS PAYMENT

NEITHER CAN PROFITABLY DEFRAUD OTHER.
REPEATED BAD ACTORS GO BANKRUPT.

WHY NOT USE ESCROW AGENTS?

NO MEANS OF FAIRLY RESOLVING DISPUTES

buyer's vs seller's word

delivery receipt != quality item delivered

GAME THEORY

If >50% of people act punitively, cheating is money losing strategy.

A "rational" actor would accept cheating to get deposit back, but do humans?

Answer: NO

For even 10% cheating, Ultimatum Game psychology experiment shows 60% act punitively.

Similar results in chimps & bonobos.

Our social instincts evolved for repeated interactions.

"Game theory is very weak as a security model, but on internet probably superior to reputation, and certainly to assuming trusted third parties."

Nick Szabo on two party escrow

PROBLEMS WITH REPUTATION

PROXY ATTACKS

automated script can gain reputation by proxying agent, buyer or seller orders

leave bad reviews for competitors & leave good reviews for attacker ids

2 of 3 exit scam using ids

UNSTABLE EQUILIBRIUM

as reputation increases, so does potential exit scam profit

AGENT MARKETS NOT SOLUTION

many agents no different than many markets acting as agents lowers costs of proxy attacks

PSUSEDONYMOUS ESCROW AGENT SCAMS

NOT A THEORETICAL PROBLEM

"I am so sorry, but Verto and Kimble have f*ed us all,"

NSWGreat on Evolution

"I can't believe mdparity has decided to exit scam now"

MrDoe on BlankBank

Prediction: fraud will continue until move to two party escrow

WALLET

syncing with bitmessage network - 8 connections, 1506 messages processed

Markets

Sells

Buys

000

Wallet 1.5000 BTC

About

Balance


1.5000BTC 355.3USD 319.0EUR

Deposit


Withdraw

Amount	Description	Туре	Confirms	Time
+ 1.5000 BTC	1JwuqYuTu9cGkvHpon2aTdXXira8BwAZL	Deposit	20372	2014-12-17 16:18


BROWSING POSTS



TRACKING YOUR SALES



Bitmarkets History



Two party escrow makes fraud unprofitable without trusted third parties, courts or threat/use of force.

A voluntary economy.

app, source, white paper and protocol spec available at

bitmarkets.org

users & contributors welcome!

Who are we?

Chris Robinson UI Designer

Rich Collins Bitcoin integration

Adam Thorsen Bitmessage & Tor integration

Steve Dekorte UI implementation & lead

Greg Casamento Windows & Linux port & Riccardo Mottola

Differences with OpenBazaar?

can't fairly resolve disputes

makes fraud profitable

gameable reputation

sellers must run servers

not based on tor

no goal of anonymity

Is seller deposit a significant burden?

