

ON THE ROLE OF BLOCKCHAIN IN E-VOTING

April 8, 2016

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ABSTRACT. “The digital revolution remains marginal in the field of decision-making, and is almost completely absent of our political institutions. Trust in our political systems require more frequent votes, votes that have greater impact, votes that are not made out of paper. Because voting is at the roots of democratic societies, e-voting should be flawless. Users don’t only chose who or what they vote for, they chose how they will do it.” — *nemos.io*

1. DIGITAL REVOLUTION

Democracies are built on their population’s consent, and a trustworthy voting system is crucial to this consent. [<http://naveen.ksastry.com/papers/cryptovoting-usenix05.pdf>]

Known electronic voting systems are usually proprietary and centralized, e.g., a single entity controls everything: the hardware, the code base, the data base, system outputs and even the monitoring tools [NOIZAT 2014]. Adam Kaleb Ernest of the FOLLOW MY VOTE project describes the electronic voting process in the United States as *black box voting* and links the lack of transparency directly to lower voter turnouts [ERNEST 2014]. In addition, the used systems have been vulnerable for software and hardware attacks for a long time. [VARSHNEYA et al. 2015].

Chaum and Neff have proposed cryptographic schemes that work without the need to trust the integrity of any software in a voting system. These protocols come with multiple advantages: voters can verify that their votes have been accurately recorded, and everyone can verify that the tallying procedure is correct, preserving privacy and coercion resistance in the process. The ability for anyone to verify that votes are counted correctly is particularly exciting, as no prior system has offered this feature. Yet, several potential weaknesses in these voting protocols have been discovered which only became apparent when considered in the context of an entire voting system. [<http://naveen.ksastry.com/papers/cryptovoting-usenix05.pdf>]

A number of alternative proposals have originated from the realm of Blockchain systems. Going beyond the pure execution of polls, they often pose as a means of decentralizing the democratic process to promote election fairness and security. Yet, the idea of a complete decentralization is infeasible considering identity confirmation must occur in any official setting. Verifying users’ credentials requires a central authority in order to avoid Sybil attacks on the system. [<http://bitcoin-class.org/projects/voting.pdf>]

In this paper we want to pick up on the cryptographic protocols of Chaum and Neff and see how they can be combined with blockchain technology to use the best of both worlds. We want to design a system that makes polling and collaborative decision making more accessible while keeping the good properties of verifiability, preserving privacy and coercion resistance.

2. ON BLOCKCHAIN VOTING

Will blockchain create the base technology for democratic applications? The answer is still outstanding. A lot of questions arise regarding both the voting process and the underlying technology. A lot of them remain unanswered. This paper tries to ask all questions and – where possible – gather and evaluate potential approaches to solve them.

2.1. Why blockchain matters. After Satoshi Nakamoto presented the first concept of a fully decentralized and trustless currency BITCOIN (BTC) in 2008 [NAKAMOTO 2008] and published the first blockchain protocol reference implementation in 2009, many years have passed until the underlying technology seriously got recognized as a game changer by the technology scene. Blockchain tools today are considered and valued with a high potential. The current emerge of blockchain related start-ups aswell as global operating cooperations entering the market is often compared to the beginning of the internet [ÉPIÉ et al. 2015].

The impact on society, industry and governance hardly can be estimated. Suddenly, transactions can share information without any middle man. The blockchain is owned, run and monitored by everyone, but controlled by anyone [ÉPIÉ et al. 2015].

The non-hierarchical, self-organizing, peer-to-peer collaboration nature of blockchain ecosystems within communitarian network structures is the foundation for both censorship resistance and full transparency, which leaves no room for any tampering. This is a big feature that nothing but blockchains can provide [SCOTT 2016] [KAYE 2016].

2.2. Blockchain 2.0 technology. In 2013 so called *Bitcoin 2.0* projects or *blockchain 2.0* technologies emerged. They aim is to provide collectively maintained decentralized ledgers that record things other than currency transactions and store all manner of diverse data, including voting decisions [SCOTT 2016].

At the cutting edge of the scene are smart contracts, small scripts on the blockchain, which participants can interact with. The new contract-orientated development paradigm allows for a switch in terminology: the *trustless* nature of transactions on the blockchain moves aside for *trust-enabling* transparent scripts doing exactly as programmed [SCOTT 2016].

Among the most innovative blockchain 2.0 technologies of the recent years are BITSHARES (BTS), RIPPLE (XRP), NXT (NXT) and ETHEREUM (ETH).

Bitshares offers a stack of financial services including exchange and banking on a blockchain. It is mainly targeted at next-level financial applications and developed the concept of decentralized autonomous cooperations (DAC) which operate autonomously on the blockchain, issue tokens and payout shareholders as programmed.

Ripple is a commercial solution for the financial technology sector. Its distributed financial technology allows for banks to directly transact with each other without the need for a central counterparty or correspondent.

Nxt improves the financial technology, crowdfunding and governance industries by providing powerful, modular toolsets to build any application on top of the blockchain.

Blockchain 2.0 projects are often considered to pave the way for the *Web 3.0* which will be decentralized. Ethereum claims to be “the way the internet was supposed to work”. “What Bitcoin does for payments, Ethereum does for anything that can be programmed.”, states Grace Caffen from Coindesk referring to the underlying technology.

The Ethereum blockchain contains a distributed virtual machine (EVM) which enables code on the blockchain to be executed. Whereas every blockchain technology offers its own, often limited scripting languages, the revolutionary concept behind the EVM is the lifting of all limits by implementing a *turing-complete* programming language. This allows – in theory – to build everything on top of the Ethereum blockchain technology: Smart contracts implement the logic, the blockchain manages the decentralized consensus and users can interact with trustable decentralized applications (DAPPS) [ÉPIÉ et al. 2015].

2.3. Blockchain voting versus ‘votechains’. Voting is a key functionality of blockchain technology. The underlying consensus protocols on most distributed peer-to-peer solutions always have to include ways to update protocols and restore consensus upon disputes. A prominent example is the Bitcoin Improvement Proposal #BIP34, of the crypto-currency BITCOIN [NAKAMOTO 2008], proposing miner behaviour on softforking mechanics. This is voting on a very technical level and not considered part of this paper.

The following projects and voting references rather focus on applications or services *on top of* blockchains, enabling democratic participation in any kind of groups, communities or societies.

2.4. Requirements for voting applications. Electronic or online voting has to follow the same high standards as traditional paper or offline voting processes do. Necessary key features and requirements will be gathered below. Existing approaches to blockchain based voting applications will be checked against these criteria.

How can elections be auditable and anonymous? How can a voter’s identity be private but verifiable? [VARSHNEYA et al. 2015] as well as [ERNEST 2016] and [BORGSTRUP 2014] define following key features for blockchain voting.

- **Fair.** Participants can vote for anyone they like, not only the candidate they prefer most.

- **Accessible.** Everyone should be able to use it without the introduction of any entry barriers.
- **Anonymous.** Privacy of voters has to be protected and it should be infeasible to determine identity behind a vote.
- **Authenticated.** The identity on the blockchain must be unique, and provably certified to vote to ensure only registered voters can take part in elections.
- **Secure.** It also has to be impossible to decrypt voter’s identities or to link voter’s to voting behaviour. All communications should be encrypted.
- **Integer.** It should not be possible to tamper with votes.
- **Coercion-resistant.** The system should be able to prevent coercion of voters to vote in a certain way.
- **Verifiable.** Individuals must be able to verify their votes are included in the final tally. Also, anyone must be able to check the election results were computed correctly.
- **Auditable.** The whole process must enable a complete audit trail from the first user authentication through the final election.
- **Decentralized.** A trust-enabling and tamper-resistant blockchain voting system has to be decentralized by design.
- **Open source.** It has to be possible to examine code and to verify everything works as proposed.

Only applications fulfilling all points above should be considered for official electronic voting processes.

3. EVALUATION OF EXISTING IMPLEMENTATIONS

3.1. Projects utilizing blockchain voting. Below is a short overview of existing research, organizations and implementations of blockchain based democracy applications.

3.1.1. Follow My Vote. Formerly ‘Vote DAC’, Follow My Vote is a distributed autonomous company (DAC) emerged from the Bitshares community. It’s currently heavily developing both a stake-weighted and a one-person-one-vote (1P1V) blockchain voting DAC by a team around Adam Kaleb Ernest [ERNEST 2016].

This is currently the most advanced project on creating a next generation voting platform. It utilizes the Bitshares blockchain with its delegated proof-of-stake (DPOS) consensus mechanisms. The Vote DAC implements an end-to-end verified voting system which enables verified users to take part in transparent but private polls [ERNEST 2014].

An exact technical protocol specification is outstanding [VARSHNEYA et al. 2015] and can not be evaluated at the time of writing. Questions remain on why the whole project is designed as a corporation which issues shares (10 billion VOTE tokens) [ERNEST 2014]. It might be a way to raise funds but having shares in a corporation which allows voting by stake raises new issues: The most power has the user with the biggest stake.

In addition, the voter registration is onymous and depending on a centralized voter certification authority [VARSHNEYA et al. 2015]. However, blind signatures allow for maximum voting privacy on the blockchain [HOURT 2015B].

Checking against the requirements from section 2.4, Follow My Vote scores 10/11 points for being fair, accessible, anonymous, authenticated, secure, integer, coercion resistant, verifiable, auditable and open source.

3.1.2. Bitmessage Vote. In 2014 Jesper Borgstrup wrote a master’s thesis on ‘Private, trustless and decentralized message consensus and voting schemes’ [BORGSTRUP 2014]. The protocol uses blockchain-technology and invertible bloom lookup tables for defining deadlines and timestamping of messages. Linkable ring signatures provide a scheme suitable for signing votes. A reference implementation is based on the PyBitmessage application.

He proposed a protocol to conduct anonymous, trustless, decentralized elections on the internet and mainly solved the decentralized deadline consensus issue by utilizing the Bitcoin blockchain technology to record timestamps. Multiple votes from the same voter are discarded. For elections, a list of public keys of registered voters has to exist in any form. Linkable ring signatures are used to ensure every vote comes from registered voters, the identity of voter can not be determined and double votes are easily detectable [BORGSTRUP 2014].

This implementation introduced issues regarding scalability. Only 8,000 voters can be registered per ballot which requires up to 2 GiB disk space. To vote, the bitmessage protocol requires a proof-of-work verification which takes up to two minutes per vote and increases in time with the number of voters. In addition, this implementation does not provide any solutions on voter authentication and the way lists of public keys are generated.

Checking against the requirements from section 2.4, Bitmessage Vote scores 6/11 points for being anonymous, secure, integer, verifiable, decentralized and open source.

3.1.3. Unchain Voting. One of the earliest blockchain voting implementations is Unchain Voting. It’s build on top of the Bitcoin blockchain. Each electronic vote is a transaction and each voter receives voting credits – around 0.01 BTC – to spend them on candidate recipients. Candidates generate Bitcoin vanity addresses to be easily recognizable. Organizers of the election distribute keys to the voters. The keys are hierarchical deterministic (HD) and each voter gets one key [NOIZAT 2014].

Checking against the requirements from section 2.4, Unchain Voting scores 6/11 points for being authenticated, secure, integer, verifiable, auditable and open source.

3.1.4. Public Votes. Public Votes is an Ethereum voting application designed and implemented by Dominik Schiener. Both his proposal [SCHIENER 2015A] and more recent analytics [SCHIENER 2015B] are highlighting advantages and issues arising with Ethereum and blockchain voting.

The implementation utilizes a MeteorJS frontend, a MongoDB server backend and the Ethereum blockchain. It is provably fair, transparent and easy to use but

should only be regarded as a proof-of-concept implementation since it is no decentralized application [SCHIENER 2015A].

The centralized backend is used to generate transactions and pay for the fees. In addition, the voting results will not only be stored in the Ethereum blockchain but in the MongoDB backend, to improve the overall website performance. The public record of the poll and the votes is an Ethereum smart contract on the blockchain written in Solidity [SCHIENER 2015A].

Flaws of this system are obvious. It is not decentralized by design, implements an IP based user ‘authentication’ which can be easily tampered with and the contract is not sybil attack proof as it could accept transactions from anywhere [SCHIENER 2015B].

Checking against the requirements from section 2.4, Public Votes scores 5/11 points for being accessible, anonymous, secure, integer and open source.

3.1.5. Nemos. Developed by France’s netparty, Nemos is a blockchain-proved decision making tool based on Ethereum with eliminated gas costs [MARGOT-DUCLOT 2015].

3.1.6. Blockchain Apparatus. The Blockchain Apparatus aims to become a blockchain-secured voting machine.

3.1.7. Quadratic Voting (V)². (V)² emerged from the Ether.camp hackathon in december 2015 and developed a quadratic voting dapp based on the Ethereum network.

3.1.8. BitVote. BitVote suggests to be an Ethereum decentralized application (DApp) using encryption chains and a peer-to-peer hybrid technology for the purpose of proposal collaboration, information sharing and voting. There is a whitepaper draft available which was not completed in the recent two years [BALE 2014]. The reference implementation is far from complete and lacks a working blockchain integration.

Checking against the requirements from section 2.4, BitVote scores 0/11 points since neither the code nor the whitepaper can be evaluated due to the lack of the most basic content.

3.1.9. E-Vox.

3.1.10. VoteFlux.

3.1.11. BitCongress. BitCongress claims to be a decentralized voting platform but is lacking references or source code, a whitepaper is available though. It proposes to use the Bitcoin blockchain for its proof-of-work security, COUNTERPARTY (XCP) assets for crowdfunding and Ethereum contracts for unknown reasons [ROCKWELL 2014].

This is not sybil attack proof as anyone can register to become a voter and introduces issues with 3 blockchain dependencies by design. In addition, votes can be traded like any other token and could be easily shared or sold [VARSHNEYA et al. 2015].

The initial XCP crowdsale never happened in two years and this project is therefore to be considered dead. It can not be checked against the requirements in section 2.4 and scores 0/11.

3.1.12. *Democracy Earth*. Democracy.earth is a follow-up project by Santiago Siri and Pia Mancini from DemocracyOS who relocated to the United States recently. The project is currently creating a community, recruiting enthusiasts and researching on blockchain voting and identity. No possible solutions have been published yet [MANCINI et al. 2015].

DemocracyOS is a centralized web-application from Argentina which allows you to propose, debate and vote online. The team discussed blockchain integration back in 2015 twice [DEMOCRACYOS 2015A][DEMOCRACYOS 2015B]. An article on Newschallange contains first mockups which appear to use the Bitcoin blockchain for simple voting transactions [MANCINI 2015].

Not much more can be found and therefore, it can not be checked against the requirements in section 2.4 and scores 0/11.

3.1.13. *Sure Voting*. Students from the West Virginia University WVU, Ricky Kirkendall and Ankur Kumar, are currently creating SureVoting, a student government voting app for iPads. There is no concept or code released yet though [COYNE 2015]. It can not be checked against the requirements in section 2.4 and scores 0/11.

3.1.14. *VoteCoin*. Votecoin is a proposal for a hash based voting technology. The whitepaper calls for a fair, transparent, practical solution but fails to deliver conceptual details or a working implementation [LEVEL 2014]. It can not be checked against the requirements in section 2.4 and scores 0/11.

3.1.15. *Agora Voting*. AgoraVoting had the idea to add a distributed voting system on top their working solutions [ELVIRA 2013] but failed to raise the required development funds. Due to the lack of specification and implementation, it can not be checked against the requirements in section 2.4 and scores 0/11.

3.1.16. *V-Initiative*. V-Initiative proposed a decentralized voting app but the project seems dead since the website is partially unreachable. It therefore can not be checked against the requirements in section 2.4 and scores 0/11.

3.2. **Scope for Votesapp**. The team for Votesapp wants to provide a blueprint for a better democratic process and develop blockchain based tools which educate, inform, support the decision making. This paper is initialized by them and tries to connect the projects above by promoting an improved cross-initiatives collaboration.

4. GENERAL OUTLINE ON KEY ISSUES

Currently existing solutions are not robust enough to supplement current voting schemes. Most of them incur technical cost to understand crypto-currencies, are riddled with implementation issues and vulnerabilities or lack of decentralized identity proof [VARSHNEYA et al. 2015].

The following chapter will focus on open issues arising with blockchain based electronic voting systems.

4.1. Blockchain identity issue.

4.2. **Architecture considerations**. For reference, the Bitcoin blockchain size is – at the time of writing – 63 GiB in size and growing at a rate of around 3 GiB per month. The Ethereum blockchain is 12 GiB in size and growing at a rate of 1.5 GiB per month.

This introduces a logistic, technical entry barrier for users of blockchain technology. The trade-off in decentralized, transparent and trustless systems is that every participant in the network stores its own copy of all available data.

Considering the *inclusion* of every citizen in the world or a specific nation in a blockchain voting process, one has to consider the different levels of both technological understanding of each person – regardless of age, education, social and cultural background – and access to technology supporting distributed ledgers. Ideally, any device from smartwatches, through smartphones, notebooks or workstations should be able to participate in the blockchain voting process. But storing a full copy of an underlying blockchain is not always possible.

4.2.1. *Light clients*. A possible solution is the utilization of light nodes on small devices which connect to random full nodes on more dedicated devices. Full nodes store a copy the blockchain and are equal peers in the peer-to-peer network. They offer the highest degree of security as they can directly verify transactions, votes and election results. A network of full nodes directly connected to each other reaches the highest degree of decentralization and it's almost impossible to shut down or disrupt the network. Downsides of full nodes are the high space requirements for storing the full copy of the ledger and the very slow synchronization and verification process.

Introducing a light-to-full-node communication can bypass the synchronization issues and disk space requirements. This can be done by connecting to random full nodes in the network via any kind of API which offers querying the blockchain on such clients. The disadvantage of such an architecture is the need of trust towards the full nodes as they could deliver tampered data. The light clients can not directly verify transactions, votes and elections as they have no copy of the blockchain to calculate own results. This is a drawback in decentralization. By disrupting the communication between light and full clients or by setting up malicious full nodes, this system introduces serious vulnerabilities.

4.2.2. *State-trie pruning*. Ethereum adds another option to this considerations. Since Ethereum clients not only store the blockchain but the full state trie, it is possible to *prune* the blockchain state history and save up to 80% of the disk space. The default synchronization process is *unpruned*. This stores the full blockchain on the device, verifies all block's proof-of-work and commits all transactions to update the state trie. This allows the client to verify any state of the blockchain in the past by querying recent states. The downside is – as discussed earlier – that this method has huge space requirements and a very slow synchronization process. An alternative is to prune the state trie. This only downloads the blockchain and verifies the proof-of-work but it does not commit all transactions included in the blocks. The whole state history is not calculated. After the blockchain was downloaded, the client requests the latest state from other nodes and saves it.

State-trie-pruning nodes might be the way to go as in most cases only the current state is interesting for the clients. This lowers space requirements and speeds up blockchain synchronization without introducing a gap of trust between nodes as seen with light client architectures. The only downside is the lack of the full state trie *history*.

4.3. Blockchain voting scalability. Blockchain scalability is a hot debated topic right now. The Bitcoin blockchain has reached a state where almost each block in the network reached its maximum size of 1 MiB and on busy days the backlog of unconfirmed transactions piles up to several thousand transactions. The following scalability considerations will be made on a worst-case assumption which requires each vote to be a single signed transaction.

4.3.1. Bitcoin scalability. The Bitcoin block size limit is hardcoded at 1 MiB per block. The average block time is 10 minutes and the average transaction size to transfer funds is around 600 Bytes. This allows an average maximum of around 1748 transactions per block.

$$(1) \quad \frac{1 \cdot 1024 \cdot 1024B}{600B} = 1747.62667 \frac{tx}{block}$$

With an average of 10 minutes per block there are 144 blocks per day.

$$(2) \quad \frac{60min \cdot 24h}{10 \frac{min}{block}} = 144 \frac{blocks}{day}$$

With the assumption that one vote is one transaction and the blockchain is not used by anything else but voting, this allows roughly 251,659 votes per day.

$$(3) \quad 144 \frac{blocks}{day} \cdot 1747.62667 \frac{tx}{block} = 251658.24 \frac{tx}{day}$$

Comparing that figure with numbers of registered voters in general elections around the world, one gets the idea what kind of limits this introduces. A big downside of Bitcoin is the inability to scale the number of transactions per time without introducing any network forks. Possible solutions exist but there is no consensus on which solution to use. Currently Bitcoin does *not* scale.

4.3.2. Ethereum scalability. [SCHIENER 2015B] analyzed Ethereum blockchain voting and noticed that it would take around 40 days to hold the general elections of the United Kingdom on the Ethereum network. He gathered data from his own voting prototype which was not optimized regarding transaction size and also did not take into account that the block size is not fixed in Ethereum.

The Ethereum network determines fees by utilizing *Gas*. Each transaction costs a certain amount of gas and each block has a block gas limit which determines the maximum of gas which can be spent each block. The current default gas limit of the Ethereum network after the Homestead release in March 2016 is 4,712,388 gas per block. The minimum cost of a transaction – most likely just for transferring funds – is 21,000 gas. This allows around 225 transactions per block by default.

$$(4) \quad \frac{4712388 \frac{gas}{block}}{21000 \frac{gas}{tx}} = 224.39943 \frac{tx}{block}$$

The current average block time is 15 seconds. Therefore, the network generates around 5760 blocks per day.

$$(5) \quad \frac{60min \cdot 24h}{15 \frac{sec}{block}} = 5760 \frac{blocks}{day}$$

With the assumption that one vote is a transaction of minimal size and the network is not used for anything else, this allows to process 1,292,541 votes per day.

$$(6) \quad 5760 \frac{blocks}{day} \cdot 224.39943 \frac{tx}{block} = 1292540.70857 \frac{tx}{day}$$

But that's only the default network capacity. Referring to the Ethereum yellow paper equations 44-46, the block gas limit scales as follows [WOOD 2014]:

$$(7) \quad H_l < P(H)_{H_l} + \left\lfloor \frac{P(H)_{H_l}}{1024} \right\rfloor \quad \wedge$$

$$(8) \quad H_l > P(H)_{H_l} - \left\lfloor \frac{P(H)_{H_l}}{1024} \right\rfloor \quad \wedge$$

$$(9) \quad H_l \geq 125000$$

Simplyfied, this allows each block to grow by $1 + \frac{1}{1024}$ in terms of block gas limit. This allows a theoretic maximum increase of the block size limite by factor 142 per day.

$$(10) \quad \left(1 + \frac{1}{1024}\right)^{5760 \frac{blocks}{day}} = 141.82762$$

Ethereum scales by design only limited by physical boundaries like bandwidth, available disk space and the central processing unit.

4.4. Transaction fees issue. Distributed ledgers are not controlled by anyone. Therefore, mechanisms have to be introduced which prevent spam or abuse of the network. Blockchain technology depends on fees which are usually paid by the signer of a transaction.

This introduces issues regarding several applications which operate on top of blockchains. Even though the fees are very low – sometimes just a fraction of a cent – they introduce an entry barrier for instance to interact with smart contracts or to vote on a blockchain.

Updating the records of the public ledger always costs fees. A fee worth less than a cent makes network attacks expensive but also requires every participant of the network to have access to the underlying currency. Decentralized applications must offer free transaction models to compete with centralized alternatives. Daniel Larimer of the Bitshares project adds, “it doesn't matter how good the service is, people expect certain things to be free” [LARIMER 2016].

Dominik Schiener calculated the average fees based on his proof-of-concept implementation would cost around 0.0091875 USD per vote [SCHIENER 2015B]. He further concluded, voting on blockchain is far cheaper compared to the costs of the general elections in the United Kingdom. However, any fee – as low as it could ever be – will just prevent a majority of potential users to use such applications.

A practical solution is still outstanding. Five approaches should be discussed for integration into future blockchain projects.

4.4.1. Fractional reserve. Larimer further suggests a dynamic fractional reserve which eliminates fees and introduces a model based on available *bandwidth* to write on the blockchain. The bandwidth is determined by how much stake (e.g., coins, gas) a participant in the network has [LARIMER 2016]. This is certainly a promising approach, but is still not free as users would have to hold any form of

currency. This does not solve the underlying issue because it does not remove the initial entry barrier.

4.4.2. Transaction server. Schiener introduces a central polling server, which signs the transactions of the voters and pays the transaction fees [SCHIENER 2015A]. The fees are prefilled by the creator of the election. But this, however, introduces other issues, as discussed in section 3.1.4.

4.4.3. Refunding contracts. Another approach could involve smart contracts refunding senders of transactions addressed at the contract. The creator of a poll fills the balance of the contract account and the user gets a refund after triggering the code execution on the contract based on his spent fees. This solution should be among the most easy ones to implement, however, it also does not remove the need to hold any unit of a crypto-currency. In addition, this might allow malicious parties to repeatedly call the contract to deplete its funds.

4.4.4. Forwarding contracts.

4.4.5. Contract pays. The current model of most blockchain environments implements the earlier described ‘sender pays’ method where the signer of a transaction has to cover the fees. Recent advances in smart contract technology plan to implement new models.

Rootstock, which builds a smart contract platform on top of the Bitcoin platform, introduces an ‘author pays’.

4.5. Decentralized deadline consensus problem.

4.6. Voting coercion in distributed systems.

4.7. Power distribution with proof-of-work.

5. OUTLOOK

6. LICENSE

This paper is available in the public domain (CC0).

7. FURTHER READING

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