



# Securing transmissions by friendly jamming scheme in wireless networks

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## ABSTRACT

In this paper, we focus on the design of optimal relay and jammer selection strategy in **relay-aided wireless networks**. Different from previous works, assuming that the channel state information (CSI) of illegitimate nodes was available and only an eavesdropper existed, we first analyze disadvantages of joint relay and jammer selection (JRJS), average optimal relay selection (AORS), traditional maximum relay selection (TMRS) schemes. Then, we design an optimal relay and jammer selection strategy where the ratio of received SNRs at the destination generated by any two relays is maximized. By applying proposed strategy, computation complexity can be reduced. Moreover, we derive the lower and upper bounds of the secrecy outage probability based on the assumptions of existence of only illegitimate node and symmetric case for mathematical convenience. Finally, simulation shows that the proposed strategy operating with no CSI of illegitimate nodes can work efficiently compared with JRJS, TMRS and AORS strategies.

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## 1. Introduction

The broadcast nature of the transmission medium makes wireless communication systems vulnerable to security attacks. Traditionally, the security of wireless communications depends on cryptography-based techniques on the higher layers of the protocol stack. However, these techniques rely heavily on the assumption of limited computing power for illegitimate nodes, and have a high computational complexity consuming a significant energy. In recent years, the physical layer security (PLS) has emerged as a promising technique to improve the confidentiality of wireless communications, which exploits the time-varying properties of fading channels [38], such as **fading, noise and interference**.

To measure the performance of PLS-enhancement methods, the concept of secrecy outage probability (SOP) is introduced. That is, SOP refers to the probability that the secrecy capacity is less than a target secure rate  $R_s$ , where secrecy capacity is computed by  $\max(C_s, 0)$ ,  $C_s$  denotes the capacity difference between the primary channel, from the source to the destination, and the eavesdropping channel, from the source to the illegitimate nodes [40,45].

Information of illegitimate nodes has a great effect on design and analysis of PLS-enhancement based strategies. In the past few years, several PLS-enhancement approaches have been proposed in the literature with unavailability or availability of illegitimate

nodes' channel state information (CSI). Specifically, assuming that illegitimate nodes' CSI does not be unavailable, **adding artificial noise can hold back illegitimate nodes from intercepting the data** (e.g. [4,10,16,17,25,32,33,35,42,47]), **but this behavior also poses a negative effect on transmission reliability**. Assume that legitimate nodes can detect the existence of illegitimate nodes in their vicinity, setting protected zones (e.g. [4,26,50]) and guard zones (e.g. [9,41,44]) are additional effective schemes to ensure the PLS. Applying the availability assumption of illegitimate node's CSI, relay-based cooperative communications, usually combining with cooperative jamming schemes, (e.g., [14,19,23,28,34,36,38,46]) are designed to achieve both transmission reliability and security simultaneously, which is emerging as a promising research topic.

Given that the global CSI of both the legitimate and eavesdropping links was available, in [48,49], Zou *et al.* investigated both amplify-and-forward (AF) and decode-and-forward (DF) based optimal relay selection conceived for enhancing PLS in cooperative wireless networks. To prevent the data from being intercepted by illegitimate nodes, jamming techniques, which impose artificial interference on the illegitimate nodes, have also attracted significant attention (e.g., [5,7,22]). More specifically, several sophisticated joint relay and jammer selection (JRJS) schemes were proposed in [22], where the first relay increases the reliability of primary channel, whereas the carefully selected jammer creates intentional interference on the illegitimate nodes. In detail, let  $\gamma_{kd}$  and  $\gamma_{ke}$  denote the received SNR from relay  $k$  at the destination and illegitimate node  $e$ , respectively. With regard

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to the relay and the illegitimate nodes, the relay selection tries to maximize the ratio  $\gamma_{kd}/\gamma_{ke}$  with  $k = 1, \dots, n$ , while the jammer tries to minimize the same function, consequently the selection policy is independent of the selection order and will always select different relay terminals, where  $n$  is the number of relays. As far as the complexity, the simplified optimal selection with jamming policy has a complexity  $O(n)$  and does not require algebraic computations [22]. Subsequently, most optimal relay and jammer selections were proposed based on this idea with using the assumption of global or average of illegitimate node's CSI.

In addition, because of the time variance of the channel and the processing delay, CSIs for legitimate and eavesdropping links used to make the relay and jammer selections may not be these ones during data transmission, i.e., the former is outdated [24,30,31,37]. Furthermore, more effective relaying and jamming schemes, when taking the effect of the outdated CSIs, have been presented lately in [6,38,39].

Considering multiple illegitimate nodes, in [1], Alnahari et al. presented two-phase cooperative protocol. In the first phase of the adopted DF relaying protocol, a jammer is selected from the set of relays to send an intentional interference to the illegitimate nodes. In the second phase, two relaying nodes are selected: one relay is selected to assist the source to deliver its information to its legitimate destination using the DF protocol, while the second relay behaves as a jamming node to confuse the illegitimate nodes. The proposed selection schemes were analyzed in terms of the achievable secrecy rate and SOP. To further increase the achievable secrecy rate, in [12], Han et al. exploited the JRJS technique and proposed a smart jamming algorithm to interfere the eavesdropping channels. Instead of maximizing the achievable secrecy rate, in [21], Kolokotronis et al. proposed a signal-to-noise ratio based approach, as this can be proved to be more practical.

In the above-mentioned literatures, all relays are friendly trusted, but the eavesdroppers are external illegitimate nodes. Even so, such **untrusted relays are still valuable in cooperative transmission with AF or DF protocols**, such as [13,29].

Based on the idea assumption of perfect CSI among legitimate and illegitimate nodes, most prior studies focused on the selection of optimal relay and jammer. However, it is not realistic in real scenarios, since practical channel estimation imposes CSI imperfections, which are aggravated by the feedback delay, limited-rate feedback, and channel estimation errors [15]. Moreover, a special case where only one illegitimate node exists is analyzed, such as [38,48,49]. Therefore, it is a challenging problem to choose optimal relay and jammer without the use of CSI between legitimate nodes and illegitimate nodes.

Our work assumes relaying and jamming at both stages of DF protocol, but unlike [18] and [27] they assume the existence of a direct link between the source and the destination; another difference with all the aforementioned works is that, with the unavailability of the global CSI of illegitimate nodes, we propose a new jammer selection scheme, and simulated results show that this scheme is more effective than JRJS in some special cases. Even when illegitimate nodes cooperatively intercept the data, obtained SOP is lower than that of JRJS. Moreover, the closed-form expression of SOP can be established even if no CSI of illegitimate nodes is used.

Explicitly, in this paper, we focus our attention on the design of transmission schemes for ensuring PLS with one relay and one jammer in cooperative relays-assisted networks. Assume that global illegitimate nodes' CSI does not be available, we propose a max-ratio relay selection scheme (MRRSS), which maximizes the difference between ratio of  $\gamma_{id}/\gamma_{jd}$ . Specifically, the main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows.

- Based on traditional selection scheme in [48], we regard the legitimate relay which can generate the maximum SNR at the




Fig. 1. Two phase cooperative protocol.

destination as the optimal relay. In this way, transmission reliability can be ensured as much as possible. Then, the legitimate relay which can generate the minimum SNR at the destination is selected to be as the optimal jammer. Note that MRRSS strategy has only a complexity of  $O(n)$ .

- Applying the probability density function and the cumulative distribution function of random variable, we derive the lower and upper bounds of SOP for designed strategies.

- Simulated results show that MRRSS strategy can present a higher secure communication compared to [22] and [1] (considering the global CSI of illegitimate nodes) and [38] (considering the average CSI of illegitimate nodes).

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the network model, performance metrics based on the PLS and analysis of previous PLS-enhancement methods. In Section 3, we derive mathematical expressions on the SOP for symmetric case. Simulated results are shown in Section 4. Finally, conclusion is given in Section 5.

## 2. Network model and preliminaries

### 2.1. Network model

Considering a cooperative wireless network consisting of a source  $s$ , a destination  $d$ , a set of  $n$  relays  $\mathcal{R} = \{r_1, r_2, \dots, r_n\}$  and a set of  $n_e$  illegitimate nodes  $E = \{e_1, e_2, \dots, e_{n_e}\}$ . The direct communication between  $s$  and  $d$  is assumed to be unavailable due to the presence of obstructions and low transmission power, as well as the illegitimate nodes [38]. This assumption has been routinely exploited in previous literature, where the source and relays are located in the same cluster, the destination and illegitimate nodes are located outside the cluster, as shown in Fig. 1, and is particularly valid in networks with broadcast and unicast transmissions [22,38]. Moreover, the distances among the relays are assumed to be much smaller than the distances between relays and source/destination/illegitimate nodes; hence, the corresponding path losses among the different relays are approximately the same [1,38].

A **slow flat block Rayleigh fading** channel is assumed. That is, the channel fading gain remains static for one coherence interval (i.e., one slot) and changes independently in different coherence intervals, denoted by  $h_{ij} \sim \mathcal{CN}(0, \sigma_{ij}^2)$ , where  $\sigma_{ij}^2 = l_{ij}^{-\alpha}$ ,  $l_{ij}$  is the Euclidean distance between nodes  $i$  and  $j$ , and  $\alpha$  is the path-loss exponent [22,38]. Furthermore, additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) is assumed with zero mean and unit variance  $\sigma_n^2$  [20,43]. Let  $P$  denote the uniform transmission power of all nodes, then the instantaneous signal-noise ratio (SNR) from node  $i$  to node  $j$  is given by  $\gamma_{ij} = \frac{P|h_{ij}|^2}{\sigma_n^2}$ .

Table 1 shows some important notations.

**Table 1**  
Notation.

Term	Description	Page
$n$	The number of relays	5
$R$	The set of relays	5
$n_e$	The number of illegitimate nodes	5
$E$	The set of eavesdroppers	5
$h_{ij}$	Channel fading gain between $i$ and $j$	6
$l_{ij}$	Distance between $i$ and $j$	6
$\sigma_n^2$	The noise power	6
$\gamma_{ij}$	The SNR from $i$ to $j$	6
$C_{id}^{DF}$	The capacity from $r_i$ to destination	6
$R_s$	Target secrecy rate	7

## 2.2. Secure and cooperative communication

The communication from source  $s$  to destination  $d$  applies two-phase cooperative protocol. Considering the DF protocol, the source first broadcasts the signal to trusted relays. Next, the optimal relay is selected to re-encode and forward its decoded signal to the destination. Furthermore, another kind of relays is selected to generate intended interference to illegitimate nodes for high reliability. In this way, when selected relay  $r_i$  transmits data to destination  $d$ , the instantaneous SNRs measured by destination  $d$  and illegitimate node  $e$  are  $\gamma_{id} = \frac{P|h_{id}|^2}{\sigma_n^2}$  and  $\gamma_{ie} = \frac{P|h_{ie}|^2}{\sigma_n^2}$ , respectively.

Hence, considering  $r_i$  as the best relay, we can obtain the capacity of DF relaying transmission from  $r_i$  to destination by

$$C_{id}^{DF} = \frac{1}{2} \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{|h_{id}|^2 P}{\sigma_n^2} \right), \quad (1)$$

where the scalar factor is  $\frac{1}{2}$  due to the fact that two time units are required in the two-phase cooperative scheme.

Meanwhile, the illegitimate nodes can overhear the transmission from  $r_i$  to destination. Hence, the channel capacity from  $r_i$  to illegitimate nodes can be easily represented as

$$C_{ie}^{DF} = \frac{1}{2} \log_2 \left[ 1 + \max_{e \in E} \left( \frac{|h_{ie}|^2 P}{\sigma_n^2} \right) \right]. \quad (2)$$

To measure the performance of designed cooperative communication scheme, we introduce two measurement indexes to evaluate the performance of selected relay and jammer as follows.

**The Capacity of DF Relaying Transmission (CDFT)** [48]: CDFT refers to the difference between transmitting rate and eavesdropping rate which are given by Eqs. (1) and (2). That is Eq. (3).

$$C_i^{DF} = \begin{cases} [C_{id}^{DF} - C_{ie}^{DF}]^+ = \left[ \frac{1}{2} \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{|h_{id}|^2 P}{\sigma_n^2} \right) - \frac{1}{2} \log_2 \left( 1 + \max_{e \in E} \left( \frac{|h_{ie}|^2 P}{\sigma_n^2} \right) \right) \right]^+, & |\mathcal{R}| > 0; \\ 0, & |\mathcal{R}| = 0 \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

where  $|\mathcal{R}|$  denotes the size of set  $\mathcal{R}$ .

Note that no instantaneous non-zero secrecy rate can ensure to be achieved under fading channels. When CDFT is negative, the illegitimate nodes can intercept the signal. Thus, the probability that the illegitimate nodes wiretap source signal successfully, called **secrecy outage probability (SOP)**, is a key measuring index in evaluating the performance of PLS. In this paper, we mainly focus on how to decrease the SOP by exploiting the optimal relay and jammer selections.

**The secrecy outage probability (SOP):** The SOP is defined as the probability that the CDFT is less than a given target secrecy rate  $R_s > 0$  [2,3,22]:

$$p_{so} = \Pr[C_i^{DF} < R_s] \\ = \Pr \left[ \left[ \frac{1}{2} \log_2 \left( \frac{1 + \gamma_{RD}}{\max_{e \in \text{Seav}} \{1 + \gamma_{REm}\}} \right) \right]^+ < R_s \right], \quad (4)$$

where  $C_s$  is given in Eq. (3).

## 2.3. Analysis of previous methods

In this subsection, we give a brief summary for methods of cooperation communication with or without illegitimate node(s).

(1) **Traditional Max-min Relay Selection Scheme (TMRS)** [3]: Let us first present the traditional max-min relay selection scheme for the purpose of comparison. In the traditional relay selection scheme, the relay that maximizes the capacity of DF relaying transmission is viewed as the best relay. Thus, the traditional relay selection criterion is obtained from Eq. (1) as

$$r_i^* = \arg \max_{r_i \in \mathcal{R}} \min(|h_{si}|^2, |h_{id}|^2). \quad (5)$$

As shown in Eq. (5), only the main links' CSI  $|h_{si}|^2$  and  $|h_{id}|^2$  is considered in the max-min relay selection scheme without considering the illegitimate node's CSI  $|h_{ie}|^2$  for  $e \in E$ .

(2) **Proposed Best Relay Selection Scheme (PBRSS)** [48]: Considering the CSI of both main and wiretap links, in PBRSS, the relay that maximizes the secrecy capacity of DF relaying transmission is selected as the best relay. Thus, the best relay selection criterion is obtained from Eq. (3) as

$$r_i^* = \arg \max_{r_i \in \mathcal{R}} C_i^{DF} \\ = \arg \max_{r_i \in \mathcal{R}} \frac{\min(|h_{si}|^2, |h_{id}|^2) P + \sigma_n^2}{|h_{ie}|^2 P + \sigma_n^2}. \quad (6)$$

One can observe from Eq. (6) that the proposed best relay selection scheme takes into account not only the main links' CSI, but also the wiretap link's CSI. This differs from the traditional max-min relay selection criterion in Eq. (5) where only the main links' CSI is considered.

(3) **The average optimal relay selection (AORS)** [22]: Only average CSI of illegitimate nodes is obtained, AORS selects the optimal relay. It is a solution which efficiently makes a trade-off between TMRS and PBRSS with a low complexity overhead. The AORS is expressed as

$$r_i^* = \arg \max_{r_i \in \mathcal{R}} \left\{ \frac{\gamma_{id}}{E[\gamma_{ie}]} \right\}. \quad (7)$$

(4) **The joint relay and jammer selection (JRJS)** [38]: To increase transmission security in schemes of TMRS, PBRSS and AORS, the JRJS is expressed as

$$r_i^* = \arg \max_{r_i \in \mathcal{R}} \left\{ \frac{\gamma_{id}}{\min_{e \in E} \{\gamma_{ie}\}} \right\}, \quad (8a)$$

$$r_j^* = \arg \min_{r_j \in \mathcal{R} \setminus \{r_i^*\}} \left\{ \frac{\gamma_{jd}}{\max_{e \in E} \{\gamma_{je}\}} \right\}, \quad (8b)$$

where  $r_j^*$  is the selected optimal jammer.

Note that PBRSS and JRJS schemes need the global CSI of illegitimate nodes, whereas AORS scheme needs their average CSI. From [22], we observe that with regard to the relaying and the eavesdropping nodes, the relay selection tries to maximize the ratio  $\gamma_{id}/\gamma_{ie}$ , while the jammer tries to minimize the same function, consequently the selection policy is independent of the selection order and will always select different relays.

However, illegitimate nodes intercept the data once the optimal relay is selected by Eq. (8a). Without considering cooperation among illegitimate nodes, a special illegitimate node, denoted by  $e^*$ , whose received SNR  $\gamma_{1^*e}$  is maximum has the greatest possibility of wiretapping the data successfully. Based on this fact, we should choose another relay to generate intended interference to above illegitimate node rather than to illegitimate node  $e$  which means that the ratio of received SNRs  $\gamma_{jd}/\gamma_{je}$  is minimum among for all illegitimate nodes. In fact, the optimal jammer selected by Eq. (8b) may not generate larger enough interference to  $e^*$ , then resulting in a higher SOP.

Next, we design two PLS-based strategies as follows.

(4) *The Max Relay Selection Scheme (MRSS)*: In MRSS, the relay that maximizes CDFT  $C_{id}^{DF}$  is viewed as the best relay. That is,

$$\begin{aligned} r_{i^*} &= \arg \max_{r_i \in \mathcal{R}} C_{id}^{DF} \\ &= \arg \max_{r_i \in \mathcal{R}} |h_{id}|^2. \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

Without considering the CSI of illegitimate nodes, the idea of MRSS is only maximizing received SNR at the destination for high level of reliability. Then, to achieve high level of transmission security, we give following scheme consisting of optimal relaying and jamming nodes. The computation complexity of MRSS is at most  $n$ .

(5) *The Max-Ratio Relay Selection Scheme (MRRSS)*: We now propose the best relay selection criterion without considering the CSI of wiretap links, in which the relay that maximizes CDFT  $C_{id}^{DF}$  is selected as the best relay, and the jammer that minimizes CDFT  $C_{jd}^{DF}$  is selected as the best jammer. Thus, the best relay and jammer selection criterions are given by

$$(r_{i^*}, r_{j^*}) = \arg \max_{r_i \in \mathcal{R}} \frac{|h_{id}|^2}{\arg \min_{r_j \in \mathcal{R} \setminus \{r_{i^*}\}} |h_{jd}|^2}. \quad (10)$$

Additionally, for mathematical convenience of the SOP, as shown in [22,38,49] and [8], assume that  $n_e = 1$  and  $E[\sigma_{id}^2] = E[\sigma_{ie}^2] = E[\sigma_{je}^2] = \sigma^2$ . This configuration simplifies the analysis and gives a guideline for the general asymmetric case. But in simulation, those assumptions are removed and we evaluate performance difference of cooperative communication schemes mentioned in this paper.

### 3. The expression of SOP with proposed selection

We apply the following proposition and corollary to derive SOP.

**Proposition 1.** If  $X_k$  and  $Y_k$  are two independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) exponential random variables with mean  $\lambda$  and  $k = 1, \dots, n$ , the probability density function (PDF) and the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of new random variable  $Z_k = \frac{X_k}{Y_k}$  are given by

$$P_Z(z) = \begin{cases} \frac{z}{1+z}, & z \geq 0 \\ 0, & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases} \quad (11)$$

$$p_Z(z) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{(1+z)^2}, & z \geq 0 \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (12)$$

**Corollary 1.** The CDF and the PDF of new random variable  $Z_{\max} = \max\{Z_k\}$  with  $k = 1, \dots, n$  are expressed as

$$P_{Z_{\max}}(z) = \begin{cases} \left(\frac{z}{1+z}\right)^n, & z \geq 0 \\ 0, & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases} \quad (13)$$

$$p_{Z_{\max}}(z) = \begin{cases} n \left(\frac{z}{1+z}\right)^{n-1} \frac{1}{(1+z)^2}, & z \geq 0 \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (14)$$

Under the MRSS, only optimal relaying node is selected. Thus, we get with high SNR

$$\begin{aligned} p_{so} &= \Pr[C_i^{DF} < R_s] \\ &= \Pr \left[ \log_2 \left( \frac{1 + \frac{|h_{id}|^2 P}{\sigma_n^2}}{1 + \frac{|h_{ie}|^2 P}{\sigma_n^2}} \right) < R_s \right] \\ &\simeq \Pr \left[ \frac{\max_{r_i \in \mathcal{R}} |h_{id}|^2}{|h_{ie}|^2} < \epsilon \right] \\ &= P_{\hat{\mathcal{X}}_{\max}}(\epsilon), \end{aligned} \quad (15)$$

where  $\epsilon = 2^{2R_s}$ ,  $\mathcal{X}_{\max} = \max\{X_k\}$ , and  $P_{\hat{\mathcal{X}}_{\max}}(\cdot)$  denotes the CDF of  $\frac{\mathcal{X}_{\max}}{\mathcal{X}_k}$  with  $k = 1, \dots, n$  which is given by

$$\begin{aligned} P_{\hat{\mathcal{X}}_{\max}}(\epsilon) &= \int_0^{+\infty} P_{\mathcal{X}_{\max}}(x\epsilon) p_X(x) dx \\ &= \int_0^{+\infty} (1 - e^{-\lambda x\epsilon})^n \lambda e^{-\lambda x} dx \\ &\stackrel{(*)}{=} \frac{1}{\epsilon} \mathbf{B}\left(\frac{1}{\epsilon}, n+1\right), \end{aligned} \quad (16)$$

where  $\mathbf{B}(x, y) = \int_0^1 t^{x-1} (1-t)^{y-1} dt$  is the Beta function, and  $(*)$  holds due to  $\int_0^{+\infty} (1 - e^{-\frac{x}{\epsilon}})^{n-1} e^{-\mu x} dx = \beta \mathbf{B}(\beta\mu, n)$  [11].

Furthermore, we show that the SOP obtained by MRSS strategy cannot be reduced to 0 due to unavailability of illegitimate nodes' CSI. That is, the lower bound of SOP can be derived by

$$\begin{aligned} p_{so} &\simeq \Pr \left[ \frac{\max_{r_i \in \mathcal{R}} |h_{id}|^2}{|h_{ie}|^2} < \epsilon \right] \\ &= 1 - \Pr \left[ \frac{\max_{r_i \in \mathcal{R}} |h_{id}|^2}{|h_{ie}|^2} \geq \epsilon \right] \\ &\geq 1 - \Pr \left[ \max_{r_i \in \mathcal{R}} \frac{|h_{id}|^2}{|h_{ie}|^2} \geq \epsilon \right] \\ &= 1 - \int_{\epsilon}^{\infty} n \left( \frac{z}{1+z} \right)^{n-1} \frac{1}{(1+z)^2} dz \\ &= \left( \frac{\epsilon}{1+\epsilon} \right)^n. \end{aligned} \quad (17)$$

From results in Eqs. (16) and (17), increasing the number of relays is an effective way to ensure high level of security.

**Corollary 2.** The CDF and the PDF of new random variable  $Z'_{\min} = \min\{Z_k\}$  with  $k = 1, \dots, n-1$  are expressed as

$$P_{Z'_{\min}}(z) = \begin{cases} 1 - \left(\frac{1}{1+z}\right)^{n-1}, & z \geq 0 \\ 0, & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases} \quad (18)$$

$$p_{Z'_{\min}}(z) = \begin{cases} (n-1) \frac{1}{(1+z)^n}, & z \geq 0 \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (19)$$

Under the MRRSS, both optimal relaying node and jamming node are selected, based on conclusions of Corollaries 1 and 2, we get with high SNR

$$\begin{aligned} p_{so} &= \Pr[C_i^{DF} < R_s] \\ &= \Pr \left[ \log_2 \left( \frac{1 + \frac{|h_{id}|^2 P}{|h_{jd}|^2 P + \sigma_n^2}}{1 + \frac{|h_{ie}|^2 P}{|h_{je}|^2 P + \sigma_n^2}} \right) < R_s \right] \\ &\simeq \Pr \left[ \frac{\frac{|h_{id}|^2}{|h_{ie}|^2}}{\frac{|h_{jd}|^2}{|h_{je}|^2}} < \epsilon \right] \end{aligned}$$



$$\begin{aligned} &\geq \Pr \left[ \frac{Z_{\max}}{Z'_{\min}} < \epsilon \right] \\ &= P_{\hat{Z}}(\epsilon) \end{aligned} \quad (20)$$

where  $P_{\hat{Z}}(\cdot)$  denotes the CDF of  $\hat{Z} = \frac{Z_{\max}}{Z'_{\min}}$  which is given by

$$\begin{aligned} P_{\hat{Z}}(\epsilon) &= \Pr \left[ \frac{Z_{\max}}{Z'_{\min}} < \epsilon \right] = \Pr [Z_{\max} < Z'_{\min} \epsilon] \\ &= \int_0^{+\infty} P_{Z_{\max}}(z\epsilon) p_{Z'_{\min}}(z) dz \\ &= \int_0^{+\infty} \left( \frac{z\epsilon}{1+z\epsilon} \right)^n (n-1) \frac{1}{(1+z)^n} dz \\ &= (n-1)\epsilon^n \int_0^{+\infty} \left[ \frac{z}{(1+z\epsilon)(1+z)} \right]^n dz \\ &= \frac{\epsilon^n}{2^n - (1+\epsilon)^n} \left( \frac{1}{\epsilon} - 1 \right). \end{aligned} \quad (21)$$

Additionally, we get

$$\begin{aligned} p_{so} &\leq \Pr \left[ \frac{Z_{\min}}{Z'_{\max}} < \epsilon \right] \\ &= P_{\hat{Z}}(\epsilon) = \Pr [Z_{\min} < Z'_{\max} \epsilon] \\ &= \int_0^{+\infty} P_{Z_{\min}}(z\epsilon) p_{Z'_{\max}}(z) dz \\ &= \int_0^{+\infty} \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{1}{1+z\epsilon} \right)^n \right] (n-1) \frac{z^{n-2}}{(1+z)^n} dz \\ &= n\epsilon \int_0^{+\infty} \left( \frac{z}{1+z} \right)^{n-1} \left( \frac{1}{1+z\epsilon} \right)^{n+1} dz. \end{aligned} \quad (22)$$

To sum up, MRRSS scheme is completely independent of the global CSI of illegitimate node, and we derive the close-form expression of SOP. In the following section, we evaluate the performance of PLS-based schemes in realistic environment.

#### 4. Evaluations

In this section, we validate the performance of TMRS [3], PBRSS [48], AORS [22], JRJS [1,22,38], MRSS and MRRSS strategies by simulator MATLAB. Furthermore, simulations are carried out on a  $1000 \times 1000 \text{ m}^2$  plane constructed by randomly placing legitimate relays and illegitimate nodes, the source is located in [300, 300], and the results averaged over 5000 runs. Additionally, we set the transmission power  $P = 1 \text{ mW}$ , the decoding threshold  $\beta_t = 0.5 \text{ dB}$ , the path-loss exponent  $\alpha = 5$ , the radius of cluster is 10 m, the distance between the source and the destination is 50 m, and a fraction of transmission power in broadcasting phase  $P$  is 0.1 mW.

The radius of cluster is 10 m, the distance between the source and the destination is 50 m, the number of relays  $n = 10$ , the target rate  $R_s = 0.01$  and the noise power is  $\sigma_n^2 = 10^{-9}$ , in Fig. 2, we evaluate the performance of TMRS, PBRSS, AORS, JRJS and MRRSS (considering illegitimate node cooperation or not) strategies for different number of eavesdroppers. As expected, although MRRSS scheme does not obtain the eavesdroppers' CSI, the corresponding SOP is strictly lower than those of TMRS, PBRSS, AORS and JRJS schemes. The reason is that although the difference between strengths of two different signals is maximized, interference suffered from jamming node has little difference compared with strength of expected signal transmitted by optimal relay due to small radius of cluster, namely  $\gamma_{je}/\gamma_{je}$  is more or less the same. This confirms that the PRRSS scheme is effective by modifying selecting process of optimal relaying and jamming nodes from Eqs. (8a) and (8b) to Eq. (10).




Fig. 2. The SOP vs.  $n_e$  with  $R_s = 0.01$ .






Fig. 3. The SOP vs.  $n$  with  $R_s = 0.01$ .

Generally speaking, cooperation among illegitimate nodes can decrease the transmission security. MRRSS with cooperative illegitimate nodes can obtain a lower SOP than those of PBRSS, AORS, JRJS operating with illegitimate nodes' CSI, which further evaluates the effectiveness of MRRSS scheme. MRSS operating no jamming cannot provide a secure transmission, in other words, applying jamming scheme can improve transmission security to some extent, even if illegitimate nodes eavesdrop the data cooperatively, as shown in MRRSS with cooperative eavesdropping. Similarly, AORS scheme only knows average CSI of eavesdroppers and does not consider cooperative jamming scheme, the SOP of AORS scheme is almost same to those of TMRS, MRSS operating with no eavesdroppers' CSI.




The radius of cluster is 10 m, the distance between the source and the destination is 50 m, the number of relays  $n_e = 100$ , the target rate  $R_s = 0.01$  and the noise power is  $\sigma_n^2 = 10^{-9}$ , in Fig. 3, we can see that MRRSS strategy outperforms TMRS, PBRSS, JRJS, AORS and MRSS for different number of relays, which validates the effectiveness of our conclusion for MRRSS. Furthermore, as expected, increasing the number of relays will be able to improve the performance of transmission security. Generally, cooperation among illegitimate nodes can decrease the transmission security, even if jamming scheme is adopted. Specifically, MRRSS with eavesdropping cooperatively shows a higher level of security than other schemes. This is because that the selected optimal jammer is more optimal than those of JRJS, which demonstrates the effectiveness of Eq. (10).

Fig. 4. The SOP vs. the radius of cluster with  $R_s = 0.01$ .Fig. 5. The SOP vs. the distance with  $R_s = 0.01$ .

The number of illegitimate nodes is  $n_e = 100$ , the distance between the source and the destination is 50 m, the number of relays  $n = 10$ , the target rate  $R_s = 0.01$  and the noise power is  $\sigma_n^2 = 10^{-9}$ , in Fig. 4, we compare MRRSS scheme with other schemes for different radius of cluster. Similar to Figs. 3 and 4, MRRSS strategy shows the best performance of security; and the level of security for MRRSS with cooperative illegitimate nodes is higher than those of JRJS, PBRSS and AORS operating with the illegitimate nodes' CSI. The reason is also similar to those in Figs. 3 and 4.

The number of illegitimate nodes is  $n_e = 100$ , the number of relays  $n = 10$ , the target rate  $R_s = 0.01$  and the noise power is  $\sigma_n^2 = 10^{-9}$ , in Fig. 5, we validate the performance difference between MRRSS strategy and other strategies for different settings of communication distance. As expected, on the one hand, MRRSS shows the best secure performance; on the other hand, although illegitimate nodes cooperatively intercept the data by using MRRSS strategy, the induced SOP is lower than that of JRJS when transmission distance from the source to the destination 60 m, which further confirms the effectiveness of MRRSS strategy.

The number of illegitimate nodes is  $n_e = 100$ , the number of relays  $n = 10$ , the distance between the source and the destination is 50 m and the target rate  $R_s = 0.01$ , to further explore the impact of noise power on the SOP, we show in Fig. 6 how MRRSS outperforms TMRS, PBRSS, JRJS, AORS and MRSS for different settings of noise power. It can be observed from Fig. 6 that the SOPs achieved by those strategies increase with  $\sigma_n^2$ . It is noticed that the overall impact of noise on the strength of

Fig. 6. The SOP vs.  $\sigma_n^2$  with  $R_s = 0.01$ .Fig. 7. The SOP vs.  $n_e$  with  $R_s = 0.1$ .Fig. 8. The SOP vs.  $n$  with  $R_s = 0.1$ .

received signal from the relay to the destination is larger than the impact of noise power on the strength of eavesdropping signal from the relay to the illegitimate nodes. Although adding artificial noise may lower the transmission from the relay to the illegitimate nodes, it also makes the transmission from the relay to the destination bad. Therefore, it is suggested to not add some artificial noise to achieve a lower SOP for some occasions.

With settings of  $R_s = 0.1$ , the impacts of  $n$ ,  $n_e$ ,  $\sigma_n^2$  and the distance from the source to the destination on the SOP are shown in Figs. 7–11.




Fig. 9. The SOP vs. the radius of cluster with  $R_s = 0.1$ .




Fig. 10. The SOP vs. the distance with  $R_s = 0.1$ .




Fig. 11. The SOP vs.  $\sigma_n^2$  with  $R_s = 0.1$ .

To sum up, MRRSS strategy not only achieves the highest level of transmission security without available CSI of illegitimate nodes, but also needs more lower computation complexity.

## 5. Conclusion

In this paper, we investigated how to improve the physical layer security in cooperative wireless networks with multiple trusted relays and no CSI of illegitimate nodes. We analyzed three

popular PLS-enhancement methods and derived the lower and upper bounds of the SOP of MRRSS scheme. Theoretical analysis and simulated results demonstrated that MRRSS scheme is more effective than JRJS scheme. However, all relays are friendly trusted in this paper, in some situations, the relays act as illegitimate nodes to decode the message besides forwarding the confidential message. Therefore, how to enhance PLS for untrusted relays will be studied in future work.

## CRedit authorship contribution statement

**Guangshun Li:** Conceptualization, Methodology. **Xiaofei Sheng:** Writing - original draft. **Junhua Wu:** Writing - review & editing. **Haili Yu:** Writing - review & editing.

## Declaration of competing interest

The authors declare the following financial interests/personal relationships which may be considered as potential competing interests:

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