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Eighth Annual World History Association '99 International Conference

— See Inside Front Cover —

WHA'99
THE EIGHTH ANNUAL WORLD HISTORY ASSOCIATION '99
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

June 24-27, 1999

University of Victoria
Victoria, British Columbia, Canada

Keynote Speakers

Li Bozhong, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
Thomas Metcalf, University of California Berkeley
Margaret Strobel, University of Illinois, Chicago

Conference Theme:

"Colonialism, its Impact and Legacies"

Sub - Themes:

- 1. Colonial Policy and Native Land**
- 2. Environmental Consequences of Colonialism**
- 3. Gender Issues in Colonial Contexts**
- 4. Colonialism and the Early Modern World Economy**
- 5. Representations and Resistance in Art and Architecture**
- 6. Teaching Colonialism**

CALL FOR ABSTRACTS

Paper and panel proposals *in any of these areas, or on any aspect of colonialism, are especially welcome, but proposals on any subject relevant to conceptualizing, researching or teaching world history will also be accepted. Proposals should contain institutional affiliation (if any), degrees, and relevant publications as well as an abstract of not more than 300 words. Electronic media (e-mail) preferred. Text in English.

Abstract submission directions follow. Web submission is preferred. Please choose ONE method.

PLEASE SUBMIT ABSTRACTS:

- 1) Through the Web site (see below)
- 2) By email to: WHA996@uvcs.uvic.ca
- 3) By mail (please include disk in MS Word) to:

WHA'99

c/o Conference Management
University of Victoria
PO Box 3030 STN CSC
Victoria, BC, Canada V8W 3N6

For PROGRAM information please contact:

Ralph Croizier
History Department
University of Victoria
PO Box 3045
Victoria, BC V8W 3P4
Phone: (250) 721-7404
Fax: (250) 721-8772
E-mail: oldcro@uvvm.uvic.ca

HIGH SCHOOL TEACHERS INSTITUTE

As part of the WHA's continuing commitment to classroom teaching there will be a specially designed one-week institute for high school teachers on "Comparative Civilizations and World History." The instructors will be Jim Ross, Spectrum High School, Victoria and Peter Seixas, Faculty of Education, University of British Columbia. It will run from June 24-30. Academic credit in Education is available. The registration fee will be approximately \$160 U.S. and there is inexpensive housing on campus. For more information contact: Berenice Wood, Continuing Studies in Education, University of Victoria, Victoria, BC V8W 3P4, e-mail: bwood@uvcs.uvic.ca

WHA '99
THE EIGHTH ANNUAL WORLD HISTORY ASSOCIATION '99
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

June 24-27, 1999
MacLaurin Building, University of Victoria
Victoria, British Columbia, Canada

REGISTRATION FORM

EARLY REGISTRATION DEADLINE: MAY 21, 1999

COWH588 1999S1-R01

Name: _____
(last) _____ (first) _____

Organization/Company Name: _____

Address: _____
_____ (suite number/street/RR#)

(city) _____ (province/state) _____ (zip/postal code) _____

Phone: (_____) _____

Fax : (_____) _____

E-Mail: _____

Conference Registration includes sessions and materials, opening reception, 2 lunches and all breaks. University of Victoria GST Registration #R108162470. All fees are in CANADIAN DOLLARS.

COWH588 1999S1-R01
Early Registration
Full Registration (\$125 + \$8.75 GST) @ \$133.75 \$ _____

Late Registration (after May 21st)
Full Registration (\$150 + \$10.50 GST) @ \$160.50 \$ _____

COWH588 BANQUT-N01
Banquet Tickets (\$35 + \$2.45 GST) @ \$37.45 \$ _____

TOTAL PAYMENT ENCLOSED: \$ _____

Yes, I have **SPECIAL NEEDS, DIETARY NEEDS**
(provide details here)

Credit Card Information

In order to use a credit card as payment for these fees, please CHECK (✓) the name of the card you are using.
Faxed registrations are payable only by credit card.

MASTERCARD VISA AMERICAN EXPRESS

NUMBER _____

Expir Date: _____

Authorized Signature _____

Date: _____

Purchase Order Number: _____

REGISTRATION POLICIES

Complete credit card information or full payment must accompany all registrations. Please make cheque or money orders in Canadian funds payable to the UNIVERSITY OF VICTORIA. No post-dated cheques are accepted. There is a \$15.00 fee for NSF cheques. Faxed registrations are payable only by credit card. GST is exempt on BC government paid registrations only. Receipts will be mailed to all registrants.

Refund policy

A processing fee of \$50.00 will be withheld for any cancellation prior to May 21, 1999. No refunds will be given for cancellations received after May 21, 1999. To obtain a refund, please return the white official receipt (not a copy) along with your written request to the address below. Refunds will be mailed after the conference.

Please complete registration form and mail with full payment to:

WHA '99
University of Victoria, PO Box 3030 STN CSC
Victoria, BC, Canada V8W 3N6
Fax: 250-721-8774, Phone: 250-721-8703, E-mail:
register@uvcs.uvic.ca

WORLD HISTORY BULLETIN

Newsletter of the World History Association

TO THE WORLD HISTORY ASSOCIATION MEMBERSHIP:

A MESSAGE FROM HEIDI

Heidi Roupp, President, WHA

Hello, everyone! 1998 has been a busy one so far. Thanks to the Executive Council, affiliate representatives, and officers of the WHA we have reorganized and extended the work of the WHA. In 1997-98 the WHA has:

- Expanded Membership
- Reorganized the Executive Council
- Completed a survey of world history course offerings in colleges and universities
- Established communication among regional affiliates, and between the regional affiliates and the WHA
- Affiliated the World History Teaching Network
- Affiliated H-World
- Held the largest WHA conference to date
- Initiated long-range conference planning
- Initiated long-range technology planning
- Initiated new financial planning and fundraising

Such energetic activity requires both time and money. This year, for the first time since the organization was founded, the Executive Council HAs voted to increase the yearly dues by five dollars. Since its founding in 1982, the cost of mailing a first class letter has increased from 20 cents to 32 cents, which represents a 60% increase; yet WHA membership dues have remained the same: \$25. Of the \$25, \$21 is spent on the publication of the *Journal* and the *Bulletin*, leaving just \$4 to run the organization. As you well know, the World History Association is a volunteer organization. All of our work is *pro bono*. For years the WHA has ended the year without a nickel to spare. Officers have paid incidental expenses of the organization themselves; and their institutions have provided substantial help with secretarial services, duplicating, and postage. Our expenses have increased. This year we were unable to set aside money for a small contingency fund to pay cost increases or unforeseen expenses. Yet requests for WHA services have increased. Interest in world history is growing. While we would like to sponsor workshops, develop new programs, expand conferences, and provide affiliates with seed money

for new regional activities, the \$5 increase will pay our operating expenses and refurbish our contingency fund. The modest increase was favored by all 14 voting members of the council. The money will be spent to keep the organization viable.

Thanks to all of you who volunteered to write an article or review a book for the *Bulletin*. If you volunteered to serve on a committee last spring, members chairing the committees will be contacting you soon. Eric Martin is organizing a committee for graduate students. Please get in touch with him at Northeastern or through his e-mail at: emartin@lynx.neu.edu if you would like to join the group. If you are considering starting a world history program at your college or university, Tom Davis wrote an article for *Perspectives* in 1996 entitled, "Starting from Scratch: Shifting from Western Civilization to World History." The focus of the article is on the how, not the why. If you have further questions, contact Tom at the Virginia Military Institute, Department of History and Politics, Lexington, VA 24450-0304; or call him at (703) 464-7338.

Bullitt Lowry, the new chair of the nomination committee, is accepting nominations from the membership for the next (1999) council election. He is seeking nominations for Vice-President (President-Elect), Secretary, Treasurer, and three Executive Council positions. Please send nominations to Bullitt Lowry History Department, Box 310650, University of North Texas, Denton, TX 76203-0650; or e-mail him at: blowry@unt.edu.

Also, relating to elections, please mail your ballots for the 1998 elections to Dick Rosen, WHA Executive Director, if you have not done so already. The ballot is the last page of the Spring WHA *Bulletin* and the mailing address is on the ballot. The deadline for submission of ballots has been extended to November 30, 1998.

For updates concerning the annual WHA June 1999 meeting in Victoria, B.C., please check the WHA '99 Web site at www.uvcs.uvic.ca/conference/WHA/99; the WHA Web site at: www.hartford-hwp.com/WHA/; or the Woodrow Wilson Web site at www.woodrow.org/teachers/world-history, for general conference information. If you have panel proposals or specific questions concerning the Victoria conference, please contact Ralph Croizier, History Department, University of Victoria, PO Box 3045,

Victoria, B.C. V8W3P4; phone: (250) 721-7404; or e-mail Ralph: oldcro@uvvm.uvic.ca. The New England affiliate and the Woodrow Wilson Web sites will have new teaching materials posted this fall.

If your university is offering a Master's program or an MAT program in world history, and you have not responded to a previous questionnaire, would you please send me a description of your program? We will include a list of all of these programs in the Spring *Bulletin*. My address is Box Bi6, Aspen, CO 81612; and my e-mail is: roupp@csn.net.

Also, if your school or university has developed a world history Web site, please send me the name of the Web site, a listing of the materials that can be found there, and the Web address. Please send that information in hard copy to the address above.

The 1998-1999 World History Association schedule is as follows:

September 15:
Fall *Bulletin* deadline

September-October:
Mid-Atlantic, New England, Ohio, Rocky Mountain, Southeastern, and Texas affiliate meetings;
organizational meeting for an Illinois affiliate

November 1:
Deadline for 2001 WHA Conference bids
Deadline for Executive Council Committee reports

November 19-22:
NCSS Conference — Five WHA-sponsored panels:
Integrating Human History into a Larger Analytical Framework

The Sundiata Epic: Pre-1500 West African History on a CD-ROM
Active Learning in World History with Technology as the Theme

Using Cultural Landmarks as a Gateway to World History with the Getty Institute and the World History Association

Global Markets and Liberal Democracies: Themes for a Modern World History

November 30:
Deadline for returning ballots for the Executive Council positions to Dick Rosen.
Ballots and list of candidates are in the last section of the Spring *Bulletin*

January 7-10:
AHA Conference — Six WHA-sponsored panels:

World History and the Construction of Grand Narratives

Diverse Strategies for Teaching World History

Foreigners in our Midst: Comparative Case Studies in Imagination

Ibn Battuta and the Cosmopolitan 14th Century

Making Connections: The ReORIENTation of World History

Reinventing Identities: "Aborigines" and "Christians" Under Colonial Imperialism in South and East Asia

January 7:
3:00-6:00 Executive Council Meeting, Marriott, Marshall Room

January 8:
4:30-5:30 Affiliate Meeting, Shoreham, Senate Room
5:30-6:30 Business Meeting, Shoreham, Cabinet Rm.
6:00-7:30 Reception, Shoreham, Executive Room

March 15:
Spring *Bulletin* Deadline

April 22-25:
OAH Meeting: "Building Bridges Between American History and World History," with Jeanne Heidler as the representative of the WHA

June 22-23:
Joint Executive Council Retreat and Board Training in Victoria

June 24-27:
WHA Conference in Victoria: "Colonialism, Its Impact and Legacies"

June 24-30:
High School Institute: "Comparative Civilization & World History"

WHA

CHANGE OF ADDRESS

Send notification as soon as possible to Dick Rosen, Executive Director, World History Association, Dept. of History/Politics, Drexel University, Philadelphia, PA 19104, or send FAX to 215/895-6614.

WHA '99 GOES NORTH

Next year the World History Association's "International Conference" goes north of the border to Canada. The dates are June 24-27, 1999. The place is Victoria, British Columbia, a medium-sized Canadian city that combines natural beauty with historical interest.

Founded in 1843 as the main Hudson Bay Company trading post on Vancouver Island, Victoria became North America's western-most outpost of the British Empire. It also became a terminus for trans-Pacific emigration, at one time having the second-largest Chinatown in North America. The architecture of the city, notably the British-India - inspired Parliament Buildings, reflect those global influences, as do the numerous gardens which flourish in this ocean-moderated climate.

In addition to the natural scenic attractions of the Pacific Northwest, Victoria is close to Seattle and Vancouver, both of which are linked to the island by car ferries and passenger ferries. You can also fly directly to the Victoria International Airport.

In keeping with the city's colonial heritage, the main theme of the conference will be: "**Colonialism: Its Impact and Legacies.**" This should provide an avenue for exploring many of the issues that concern world historians.

Paper proposals on any of the sub-themes (see inside cover for call for papers) are especially welcome, but members should feel free to present proposals on any topic.

One final attraction for those coming from the 49th parallel: currently one U.S. dollar equals approximately \$1.50 Canadian (i.e., knock one-third off all prices listed).

REPORT ON JUNE 1998 SESSION

"INTERNATIONALIZING UNITED STATES HISTORY" AT THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE WORLD HISTORY ASSOCIATION

Ed Davies, University of Utah

On the Thursday afternoon before the annual conference opened, the WHA sponsored a preliminary session of Internationalizing United States History. The flourishing of world history in the past decade has raised the question of where the national history of the United States fits into the emerging global arena. Since so many instructors at all levels in the United States teach such a national history course, it is imperative, first, to raise this question and, second, to encourage these instructors to consider the broader arena as they teach their courses.

The papers delivered by Loretta Lobes of Carnegie Mellon University, Michael S. Neiberg of the United States Air Force Academy, and David S. Heidler addressed the issue of the United States and the larger world. The session drew around 30 participants representing all types of institutions from secondary to university systems. The papers sparked a vigorous discussion by the audience and indicated that many instructors have been engaged in sorting out many of the matters related to integrating the United States into the global arena. Regrettably, a fire alarm in the middle of the session shortened lively exchanges. The planners of the sessions, Jeanne Heidler of the United States Air Force Academy and Edward J. Davies of the University of Utah, are now in the process of setting up a Web site and interactive discussion box to encourage exchanges on this topic. We hope to use this site as a way of announcing conferences where papers on this topic would be appropriate and linking faculty interested in assembling panels for

such meetings. We would also hope to post syllabi for courses which address any aspect of the general issue of the United States and world history. We would like to thank the participants for giving us their e-mail addresses. We hope to post the Web site address some time this academic year, and invite the participants and all interested parties to join us in this enterprise.

WORLD HISTORY ASSOCIATION

PROSPECTIVE SPEAKERS' QUESTIONNAIRE

The World History Association, in an effort to match the diverse resources that are within the organization, is compiling a list of instructors at colleges and universities who are willing to speak to secondary school instructors, as well as faculty at other colleges. These talks can either be on teaching (especially, but not exclusively, on ways to improve and integrate world history courses) or more specialized research interests in the world history field. Faculty at high schools and two-year or four-year colleges and universities who desire outside speakers are also encouraged to communicate their needs to the WHA.

Please take a moment of your time to fill out the form on page 4 and return it to Professor Alan Karras, at the address listed below. Institutions and individuals who wish to invite speakers will then be able to contact the WHA and be given a list of scholars whose expertise best serves their current needs.

Please mail all completed forms, and direct inquiries, to:

Alan L. Karras
University of California, Berkeley
International and Area Studies
Teaching Program
101 Stephens Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-2306

Phone: (510) 643-3185
FAX: (510) 642-9850
E-mail:

karras@socrates.berkeley.edu

FOR PROSPECTIVE SPEAKERS:

NAME:

INSTITUTION:

(address & contact information)

WORLD HISTORY COURSE TAUGHT:

LEVEL:

AREA(S) OF RESEARCH EXPERTISE:

SUBJECTS ON WHICH YOU ARE AVAILABLE TO SPEAK:

TO WHAT AREAS ARE YOU WILLING TO TRAVEL?

Northeast	Mid-Atlantic	Southeast	Midwest
Rocky Mountains	Southwest	California	Northwest
Canada (Maritime)	Quebec/Ontario	Canada (Western)	Europe

In addition to travel expenses, do you require an honorarium? If so, how much?

FOR HIGH SCHOOLS AND SECONDARY INSTRUCTORS:

NAME:

INSTITUTION:

(address & contact information)

LEVEL:

SUBJECT(S)/AREA(S) IN WHICH YOU WOULD LIKE AN OUTSIDE SPEAKER:

In addition to travel expenses, can you offer an honorarium? If so, how much?

DETACH AND MAIL TO ADDRESS SHOWN ON PAGE 3

NEWS FROM AFFILIATES

The Tenth Annual Meeting of the Southeast World History Association October 23-24, 1998 Atlanta, Georgia

The Southeast World History Association (SEWHA) will hold its 10th annual meeting on October 23-24, 1998, at Clayton College and State University, located a few miles from the Atlanta International Airport. The themes of the meeting are "Western Civilization in World History" and "The Art of Teaching World History." Persons wishing to propose individual papers or complete panels should contact:

Alan LeBaron
Department of History, Kennesaw State University
1000 Chastain Road
Kennesaw, GA 30144
E-mail: alebaron@ksumail.kennesaw.edu

1998 Keynote Speaker: Pat Manning of Northeastern University.

SEWHA is a regional affiliate of the World History Association.

Ohio World History Association 2nd Annual Conference Friday, October 16, 1998 Cleveland State University

The Ohio World History Association will hold its second annual conference at the Cole Center at Cleveland State University on Friday, October 16, 1998, from 8:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. "World History — What is it? Why is it?" will focus on issues related to content, pedagogy, and curriculum concerns for instructors of colleges and secondary schools. History professors Donald Ramos (Latin America),

Lee Makela (East Asia), and Mary Bivens (Africa) from Cleveland State University will discuss their innovative team-taught world history course for teachers which includes producing lesson plans for a Web page. Russ Maruna, Social Studies Consultant with Cleveland City Schools, will discuss preparations for the new Ohio Proficiency tests in social studies to begin in 2003. Participants in the TeachAsia Project sponsored by the Asia Society will also share content and methods for college and secondary use. For further information, please contact:

Simone Arias, Cleveland State University: phone (216) 687-5426

E-mail: s.arias@popmail.csuohio.edu

Or, Timothy Connell: phone (216) 464-1441
E-mail: connell@en.com

RESULTS OF THE AFFILIATES THINK TANK

Representatives from all WHA-established and -establishing affiliates attended the "Affiliates Think Tank" on June 18 in Fort Collins, Colorado. Our main task was to explore ways to improve relations between and among the WHA and its affiliates, and we brainstormed on some interesting ideas. WHA President Heidi Roupp asked, "What can the WHA do for the affiliates?" And it was agreed that a first step could be a WHA guidebook of advice and procedures. In other matters, the affiliates promised to work together with the WHA and other affiliates on conferences and projects, exchange information, and promote one another in general. Many questions remained, such as, "Should affiliate constitutions have certain key similarities with the WHA constitution?" Discussions are to continue over the next few years via the affiliates listserve. For information on the Think Tank, e-mail Alan LeBaron: alebaron@ksumail.kennesaw.edu

WORLD HISTORY BULLETIN

Editors • Charles Desnoyers and Ross Doughty
Publications Director • Richard L. Rosen
Book Review Editor • Heidi Roupp
Centered on Teaching • Heidi Roupp
Composition • Maccreations Graphics and Data Services
Typist and Copy Editor • Elizabeth L. Allinson
Editor 1983-1995 • Raymond M. Lorantas

The *World History Bulletin*, newsletter of the World History Association, is published twice per year: Winter/Spring and Summer/Fall. The *Bulletin* is sent to all members of the World History Association. Dues are U.S. \$25.00 per year for regular members (U.S. \$15.00 for students, unemployed, disabled, and senior citizens) and should be sent to Richard L. Rosen, Executive Director, Department of History/Politics, Drexel University, Philadelphia, PA 19104. The World History Association is a scholarly, nonpolitical, nonprofit, professional association and is open to all persons interested in world history. Book reviews and short articles should be sent for consideration to Charles A. Desnoyers, Editor, *World History Bulletin*, Department of History, LaSalle University, 1900 W. Olney Ave., Philadelphia, PA 19141-1199. Notices, announcements, and members' and affiliates' notes should be directed to Ross S. Doughty, Department of History, Ursinus College, Collegeville, PA 19426. The editorial committee and staff reserve the right to edit all material submitted for publication.


NEW ENGLAND REGIONAL WORLD HISTORY ASSOCIATION
Pat Manning, Northeastern University

The NER-WHA (New England Regional World History Association) held its second annual Symposium, a one-day conference, at Worcester Polytechnic Institute on Saturday, September 26. The panels and workshops included, "A Discussion of the Role of Technology in World History" and "Strategies and Problems in Teaching World History Courses." The keynote address, entitled "China and the Global Narrative," was presented by Pamela Crossley, of Dartmouth College.


The World History Center at Northeastern conducted a summer institute entitled "World History for Grade 9," addressing state-mandated materials in world history for the period 500-1800 C.E., for 50 Massachusetts teachers, during the week of July 20-25. Two additional sessions are planned for the 1998-1999 school year.

The World History Resource Center opened at Northeastern during the aforementioned summer institute and will continue on a regular basis, providing teaching materials for K-12 and college level teachers of world history. *The Resource Center* is supported by funding from the Boston Public Schools, the Massachusetts Department of Education, and Northeastern University. The Director is Ms. Julie Gauthier (tel: 617-373-4855), and Web site (with lots of materials up already) is: <http://www.whc.neu.edu>.


**FORT COLLINS MEETING OF THE WORLD HISTORY ASSOCIATION
 19-20 JUNE 1998**




Reception



Meeting Site



Work Group in Action



Curtin Presentation

Continued on p. 20

SUGGESTIONS FOR COMPREHENDING WORLD HISTORY

Theodore H. Von Laue

Let us face reality: our lives are shaped by an ever more tightly interdependent world. We need to adjust our thinking to that reality, including our sense of history. In our interdependent world all history is world history. Human events everywhere, from the distant past to the present, have to be viewed in their full global contexts. It is an unending effort.

Here I state my latest outline of how to think about world history. We need a global overview, aware of all factors at work, visible and invisible. The course of history, I argue, is shaped by circumstances beyond human control, and even beyond human awareness. World history forces us to overcome our cultural conditioning, opening our minds to the legitimacy of cultural otherness, however repugnant to our values. World history should not be driven by the universalized values of Western civilization. It should be a relativist effort, recognizing that different conditions inevitably create different cultural responses. The only universality that counts is compassion for all humanity. Only by attempting to transcend our cultural limitations through an all-inclusive human sympathy can we expect to grasp the dynamics shaping world history. Admittedly, expanding the study of world history according to these relativist convictions is a controversial venture, and never more than in controversial times like the present. But it needs to be explored.

PART ONE

I. At the outset, in order to raise our sensibilities, let me list the basic factors which, in constant interaction, are shaping human destiny, beginning with human nature — both male and female. Aiming to survive, human beings struggle competitively for self-assertion by any means, ranging from saintly selflessness to brutal violence, progressively expanding their skills of body, mind, and soul down to their subconscious depths (as in religion). While sharing responsibility for human survival, men and women differ in their biological functions and therefore in their social roles. Let historians, at any point in their accounts of human progress, honor women for the invisible strength of their vital nurturing qualities all too little appreciated in masculine analyses.

Next we have to analyze the social and political organizations for human survival, ranging from family, clan, city states, nations, to empires. What matters in this category are the human skills for cooperation. The larger the number of people involved, the more complex and subtle have to be the attitudes and institutions within a given community. Historians should always be keenly alert toward the human qualities promoting constructive cooperation at every level of human association.

Coping then with the relations between collective organizations, we enter the realm of trade, diplomacy, and wars, a well-known area of human interaction, but generally kept separate from the less visible contexts just mentioned. In this dimension human beings in their collective identity are engaged in envious comparison: who lives better? who is richer? who is more powerful? The ultimate test lies in warfare; world history is the story of wars, with all-too-little attention given to the softer power of peaceful persuasion that changes human lives over the long run. Who has had more enduring influence: Alexander the Great or Plato, Caesar, or Christ?

And finally, in all our analyses of human events we have to take into account the factors of geography and climate; world history ought to be studied always in the presence of a physical world map. People have forever been at the mercy of their location on the earth's surface, favored in some cases, disadvantaged in others. The influence of climate is commonly overlooked in historical studies. Northerners generally have been more aggressive, more cerebral than people living in hot and humid climates. Human nature and human relations in all their aspects are products of their natural environments.

The influence of climate is commonly overlooked in historical studies.

Inevitably, since the beginning of history the differences in the earth's surface have produced a bewildering variety of human responses, in languages, religions, ways of life, sociopolitical organizations, in what, for short, is called "culture." Let us therefore recognize the legitimacy of each different culture as a creative response to given circumstances beyond human control. In this perspective no people can consider themselves superior or inferior; all had to adjust to the peculiarities of their living space. And all deserve our sympathy no matter how different their ways from ours; world history should be an exercise in human compassion.

And yet, we also have to take into account the cultural inequalities resulting from the differences in the earth's surface. Some people were favored by wealth in their native soil, by access to trade routes or oceans, by insular security, in short by the accidents of geography and regional climates. World history is the story of competitive interaction among peoples shaped differently by the accidents of nature. Thrust together in geographic proximity and eager to assert their identity through peace and war, people were willing to learn from each other, while also advancing their own capacities across the gamut of human re-

sources, ranging from warfare to spiritual strength as trained by religion. Where such interaction lasted through centuries, always at a high price to human lives, the refinement of human skills was indeed remarkable.

II. The largest and oldest area of interaction was Continental Eurasia, stretching from the Pacific to the Atlantic oceans; there the landscape of human history was formed. It prompted prehistoric migrations east and west, fostering contact by trade and war. It also spread infectious diseases, most disastrously in the case of the Black Death in the 14th century, devastating peoples from China to Western Europe. Considering the huge distances and climatic adversities, Eurasian interaction remained fairly slow-paced, except in the case of the Mongol conquests during the 13th and 14th centuries under Genghis Khan, a self-styled "world conqueror," who epitomized the Mongols' impressive response to exceptional adversities. After the Mongol outreach, central Asia furnished other militant conquerors, like the Turks, who moved into the Mediterranean and the Balkans; or the Moghuls, who in the 16th century established an empire in northern India.

Slightly less warlike (because of the climate), southern Eurasia constituted a separate interactive belt, linking East Asia, India, the lands north of the Persian Gulf, through the Mediterranean into North Africa and distant Spain. It was a lively area of commercial, political, and religious innovation. Islam spread out of Arabia from Spain to Indonesia, Buddhism out of India, to the north and east. Maritime trade flourished, conveying cultural achievements from Asia to Europe and establishing prosperous metropolises along the way; in the 13th century Egypt was an advanced center of civilization. Yet that cultural corridor was unstable, politically divided, lacking a territorial unity protecting it from more powerful outsiders.

At any rate, its inhabitants shared the benefits of their exchange of goods, knowledge, and martial skills. All accepted war for the sake of asserting collective identity whether of ethnic, religious, or political groups. Refined throughout millennia, war was part of Eurasian life and ruthlessly exported wherever Eurasians — eventually, Europeans conditioned by their Eurasian neighbors — encountered non-Eurasians, as in the Western hemisphere or tropical Africa. The most creative and long-lasting interaction in Eurasia took place from the very beginning of history at its geographically favored territorial endpoints: in the Chinese Far East and in the Fertile Crescent linking Mesopotamia with Egypt, and reaching through the Mediterranean into Western Europe, where it eventually rose to global domination.

III. Look first, in barest outline, at the Chinese cultural miracle, to illustrate the stimulating effects of heightened interaction under exceptionally favorable geographic circumstances. It started in pre-historical times along the Yellow River among energetic peoples, in endless rivalry between themselves and at war with more primitive invaders from the north and west. They were pioneers in irrigation and the development of a pictographic script. By the fifth century B.C., thoughtful men in the warring states began to reflect on the civic virtues creating peaceful cooperation. Confucius, the most famous among them, set an enduring model for citizenship in the Chinese empire.

That empire was established by the Ch'in dynasty in the year 220 B.C. and lasted in various forms until 1911. It proved, however, to be a vulnerable structure, suffering from frequent changes of dynasties, internal revolts, and external advances, which attracted envious conquerors — the Mongols in the 13th century and the Manchus, who ruled China from the 17th to the 20th centuries. None of them

destroyed the dynamics of Chinese vitality.

All along, the Chinese claimed superiority over all other peoples. China was "the middle kingdom," the center of the world, claiming tribute from all others; as a great Manchu emperor at the end of the 18th century declared, it needed no goods from the foreign barbarians, the Europeans. Where else in the world had there been such extraordinary continuity of governmental organization, language, culture, and history, allowing creative opportunities to the elites? To this day, Chinese historical consciousness is deeply embedded in the popular mind, a separate world with its own style of writing, speech patterns, human relations, and forms of government. And for one painful contrast with Western values: in crowded China at the mercy of natural catastrophes and human conflicts, human life has always been cheap (and women's lives cheapest); humanitarian values rank low in Chinese thinking. But most crucially in global perspective, Chinese civilization lacked the desire for outreach into the world at large. Confucian values, the endless problems of maintaining internal peace, and the collective sense of superiority combined to keep the Chinese centered at home. Thus they eventually fell victim to the other even more impressive miracle of cultural creativity emerging under the uniquely favorable circumstances prevailing in Western Europe.

IV. That miracle started some 3,000 years ago in the Fertile Crescent located on the eastern Mediterranean arching from Mesopotamia to the Nile valley, a small area of intense interaction in peace and war. Two of its creative products deserve special mention. The invention of the alphabet by the Phoenicians facilitated writing and written communication between different languages, a superb tool for transcending cultural differences. Equally important in the long run was the Hebrew invention of an

all-powerful God watching over human relations and shaping not only individual souls at their subconscious depths, but also human destiny. That God became a unique source of strength for the survival of a highly vulnerable people caught among more powerful neighbors.

From the Fertile Crescent cultural innovation spread into Greece, a hotbed of competition among rival cities united by the common worship of their Olympic gods. Greek art, literature, and philosophy soon became an integral part of the heightened Mediterranean interaction under Roman power, which in constant wars added its own accomplishments in law and government. The Roman Empire also universalized and deethnicized the Hebrew God. In competition with the traditional gods, Christianity proved a more effective source of strength where it counted most, at the innermost center of human awareness; it also showed greater appreciation of women. Christians, too, were subject to creative competition: who comes closer to God? They produced a succession of saints and conflicting theologies which sometimes turned violent. Whatever the disagreements, the Christian message became an essential part of life in lands north and east, split into a Western (Catholic) Church under the Roman papacy, and an Eastern Church eventually anchored in Russian Eurasia.

After the collapse of the Roman Empire, the Greco-Roman tradition, fused with Catholic Christianity, spread throughout Western Europe, under exceptionally favorable circumstances, once military security against Eurasian invaders was established. Here, in a relatively small area endowed with a cool climate, fertile soils, and reliable rain favoring food production, rivers and valleys afforded easy communications for the benefit of soldiers, merchants, priests, local lords, bishops, kings, emperors, and His Holiness the Pope. In Western Europe, stretching from Italy to the

British Isles, the Renaissance brought together alert peoples in ever closer contact, enviously watching each other through peace and war. United by the common Greco-Roman tradition, their Christian creed, and, for the elites at least, by the Latin language, they were also sharply divided by a variety of languages, local traditions, and religious and political authorities. Through this chancy combination Western Europe became a supercharged cultural hothouse.

During the next centuries the scale of innovation in every field of human creativity was breathtaking. Relentlessly stimulated by natural circumstances competitive interaction promoted the arts, sciences, and philosophic analyses. Business enterprise advanced into capitalism, giving rise to the industrial revolution. Social and political organization changed from royal absolutism to constitutional government, sometimes in bloody revolutions in evolving nation-states constantly at war with each other. But the nature of wars also changed. The Thirty Years' War was followed by the rise of international law, reducing military brutality and protecting civilians. In the 19th century, after Napoleon's astounding conquests, the frequency of war was reduced.

One aspect, however, deserves special attention because it is commonly overlooked in historical analysis: the role of religion.

All along, life in the rising middle classes became more civilized, aided by growing prosperity. But there is no need here to list the impressive accomplishments of the advancing European civilization; they are well known. What matters here are the dynamics of cultural progress caused by the uniquely favorable circumstances beyond human control.

One aspect, however, deserves special attention because it is commonly overlooked in historical analysis: the role of religion. Although competitively divided,

sometimes even by war, it was also universally effective. The Catholic Church regained spiritual strength through the Jesuits; Protestant creeds proliferated. Everywhere church attendance was part of life, spreading the Christian message through formal ceremonies and the silent techniques of prayer shaping the human subconscious. Ascetic Christianity constrained bodily impulses, transforming physical vitality into cerebral energy and human selfishness into charitable and cooperative citizenship; individual egotism quite unconsciously was enlarged into collective loyalty. This transformation, relentlessly promoted by routine religious observances but generally overlooked, played a crucial role in shaping Western civilization, as effectively as the much studied capitalism. Its values, even after the rise of rationalism, fostered docility in social relations and also a higher standard of living in a growing population, never perfectly and always at risk in times of crisis. In any case, religious values contributed to raising Europeans above all other peoples in their collective pride; they considered themselves superior.

V. From the 15th century onward the power competition within Europe expanded around the world. Turkish domination in the Mediterranean Sea pushed the Portuguese into the Atlantic Ocean down the coast of Africa and around into the Indian Ocean; their small ships were more capable of coping with the Atlantic storms that would easily have destroyed the famous Chinese galleons. Meanwhile the Spaniards financed westward expeditions in search of India and discovered the Western Hemisphere, calling its inhabitants Indians. The discovery of America set off a keen competition among Portuguese, Dutch, French, and English for colonial possessions in that new continent — and beyond. Soon after Columbus, Magellan sailed from the Atlantic through the Pacific Ocean to the Philippines;

GENDER AND WORLD HISTORY: THEORY AND PEDAGOGY

GENDER HISTORY AS GLOBAL HISTORY: THE CASE OF THE NATION-STATE*

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World history was for long regarded as "an illegitimate, unprofessional and therefore foolish enterprise."¹ But as global integration has gradually become part of history, renewed academic efforts are being made within this field. These efforts may be seen as rooted in two traditions: one developing out of grand civilizational studies, the other rooted in the histories of discovery, maritime empires, etc.² In contrast to earlier attempts at understanding the history of the world, today's research is consciously striving at avoiding the trap of Eurocentrism. Looking for autonomous trajectories of development and inter-regional exchange, historians now understand the European expansion from the middle of the 19th century as colliding and overlapping with the dynamics of other regions.

The concern of today's researchers of global history are studies of recurring processes and the dynamics and effects of cross-cultural interaction. Global history research has become an inter-disciplinary field involving a number of different approaches, such as anthropological and ethnohistorical insights as well as comparative macrosociology. "A fundamentally new framework of conception and inquiry, able to capture the life in toto of the whole of mankind since the dawn of time" is needed.³ I will suggest that one of the latest new directions within global history, still scantily developed, may assist in creating "a fundamentally new framework of conception and inquiry,"⁴ namely comparative and cross-cultural studies of women's history and gender analysis.

GLOBAL HISTORY AS GENDER HISTORY

I shall posit that one way of structuring global history is to think of the world as held together through *a gendered order, a gender system*, a basic division of individuals according to biological sex.

One of the most easily perceptible common characteristics of any society, regardless of time and space, is the division of individuals according to sex. Any social group, class, caste, ethnic group, etc., comprises girls and boys, women and men; in fact, the gender division cuts vertically through all horizontal social stratifications.

This is not a new observation. It permeated some Enlightenment attempts at writing global history.

During the late 18th century, a number of German, French, and British historians were looking for explanations for why some peoples developed "civilized" cultures, while others remained "barbaric." If they found skin color to be the most important criterion for the degree of sophistication of societies, their Eurocentric histories also highlighted gender differences within cultures. Although the grown-up man was the central figure in these global cultural histories, analyses of everyday lives were concerned also with the lives of women and children. Some historians even wrote separate women's histories. In his four-volume *Geschichte des weiblichen Geschlechts* (1788-1800), German historian Christoph Meiners showed almost modern insights into the problems of gender history. He exhibited an understanding of the relativity of historical sciences, and of the difference that may exist between lived history and the reconstruction made by historians.⁵ Other historians, in Denmark as well as in Britain, were eager to demonstrate that women's position in society was conditioned by modes of production, as well as by political and religious systems.⁶

Throughout the greater part of the 19th century, gender remained an important element in philosophical discussions of how to create the best society. But, rooted in grand civilizational studies, women's history lost importance as the historical sciences turned to studies of the formation of nations and nation-states, diplomacy, and statesmanship. Not only the global and cultural perspectives, but also the understanding of the gendered structure of societies was lost.⁷

When, during the past decades, the interest in women's and gender history has again led to attempts to analyze the importance of gender within different cultures, historians encounter some of the same problems as their precursor. Although Asian, African, and Latin American historians are now also researching the importance of gender, this approach to the historical sciences is still to some degree dominated by Western researchers and by Western theories of gender. A number of comprehensive syntheses of women's history through the ages have appeared, but only one — a Norwegian-Danish three-volume work — attempts to cover also women's history outside the Western world.⁸ However, cooperation among historians across cultures has been stimulated by worldwide networking, resulting in cross-cultural conferences and journals perceptive of cross-cultural gender differences.⁹ Discussions among historians of different cultures, analyzing worldwide phenomena from their varying perspectives, stimulate analyses of cross-cultural similarities and differences. An early attempt at a gendered approach to global history has inspired this paper.¹⁰

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GENDER AND WORLD HISTORY: THEORY AND PEDAGOGY

SEXING THE SURVEY: THE ISSUE OF SEXUALITY IN WORLD HISTORY SINCE 1500

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Judging by a survey of world civilization textbooks, a certain uneasiness regarding the topic of sexuality prevails in survey courses. Unconscious biases often attend presentations of sexual practices traditionally considered unconventional or immoral in the West, particularly homosexuality. Even more alarming, considering that such courses purport multicultural awareness, textbooks that do cover homosexuality tend to focus on the practice in the East and skim over similar activity in the West. Teachers of world history surveys may blanch at the prospect of yet another subject to incorporate in an already overpacked course, particularly a subject so encumbered with contention and taboo. Nonetheless, coverage of sexual mores across cultures greatly enhances students' understandings of the human condition. Moreover, neglect or partial treatment of the topic distorts the historical record and perpetuates stereotyping. This article seeks to dislodge the prejudices still embedded in many of our textbooks, and suggest ways of achieving an academic objectivity in this controversial area.

McKay, Hill, and Buckler's *A History of World Societies* offers the most sophisticated analysis respecting the issue of sexuality of all the texts I consulted. A section entitled "The Status of Women" begins with a discussion of marriage customs and their related ideological baggage. It then holds up the example of Elizabeth Hardwick, Countess of Shrewsbury, as a woman who transcended traditional notions of women's subordination. The succeeding paragraph concludes by noting the hypocrisy involved in using the law to enforce morality, and cites Pope Pius IV's banishment of prostitutes from Rome in 1566. Pius had to reverse his order within a month after the mass exodus from the city brought a devastating loss of revenue. This latter paragraph, however, begins with an intriguing sequence of observations: "Artists' drawings of plump, voluptuous women and massive, muscular men reveal the contemporary standards of physical beauty. It was a sensual age that gloried satisfaction with both sexes." Then the text hurries on to the Pius perplex, leaving a hint of homosexuality sandwiched between promiscuity and prostitution.¹

Curiously, the authors seem comfortable exploring attitudes about homosexuality in the Far East after this somewhat nervous and vague reportage on the practice closer to home. *World Societies* provides a

detailed examination of homosexuality in Tokugawa Japan. It makes the point that male prostitution at the *kabuki* theaters, rather than same-sex relations between men in general, provoked the ire of moralists and bureaucrats. Left with too much time on their hands during this long period of peace, the samurai became a pleasure-seeking aristocratic class and great patrons of the decorative arts and the theater. Acting, meanwhile, had become an exclusively male profession after the ban of women from the stage in the early 17th century; the actresses' erotic dances and skirts outraged morality, and their high incidence of pregnancy eroded theater-managers' profits. The male actors who took their places on stage wound up doing so offstage as well. The textbook concludes its coverage of the subject by pointing out that samurai patronage of *kabuki* diverted the former warriors from political intrigue and brought business to such a number of commercial concerns that the government did not consider the blatant seduction of audience members by the transvestite players a serious enough social problem to merit suppression.²

This handling of *kabuki* far surpasses that of other textbooks in objectivity and depth of analysis. Duiker and Spielvogel's *World History*, for instance, offers strange value judgments — as well as hilarious double entendre — while assessing the impact of banning women from the stage in Japan to preserve moral values:

The decree had a mixed effect, however, because it encouraged homosexual activities that had been popular among the samurai and in the Buddhist monasteries since medieval times. Yet the use of male actors also promoted a greater emphasis on physical activities such as acrobatics and sword play and furthered the evolution of kabuki into a mature dramatic art.³

As the McKay book demonstrates by quoting the writings of moralists, it was the prostitution rather than the sexual act in itself that disturbed Japanese authorities. Considering the integrity of *World Societies'* coverage, asking for improvement might seem churlish. Nevertheless, in both citations from this text, homosexuality's proximity to prostitution leaves the impression that the practice is only conducted on a cash-and-carry basis.

Incorporation of recent findings in gay history would help eradicate such imbalance and provide further insights into the interconnections between politics, class, gender, and sexuality. Even before Tokugawa, homosexual practices had become an institution among the military aristocracy. The samurai commonly had young male companions accompany them into battle. Chivalric codes defined this relationship;

CENTRAL CONCEPTS OF GENDER ANALYSIS

Women's and gender history internationally seem to have developed through methodologically and theoretically similar, though not chronologically parallel, phases, and to share certain common assumptions.¹¹ Theories of patriarchy have been used to explain gender hierarchies, systematic differences between women and men and changes in gender relations. Patriarchal theories have gradually been broadened or even sometimes replaced by theories on interaction of cultural and biological givens. Many historians now apply theories of a "gender system" or a "gendered order."¹² Introducing post-structuralist analysis as an important tool for historians of gender, Joan W. Scott has been pivotal in the international debate on how to understand the functionings of gender. Scott defines gender as "a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes...gender is a primary way of signifying relationships of power."¹³ The concern of gender history, according to Scott, is not limited to highlighting women's and men's common and gender-specific histories, but should also be to analyze "the often silent and hidden operations of gender that are nonetheless present and defining forces in the organization of most societies."¹⁴

According to this way of thinking, gender is a basic social structure, interacting with all other social structures, be they class, race, religion, etc. In any culture, in any society, gender will have an impact on the socialization of the individual, on distribution of work, on responsibilities and rights in the family and in society. Gender relations are at work in politics and economics, and influence inheritance rules, etc. When society changes, so do gender relations, and changes in gender relations influence other social relations. In this perspective,

gender may be understood as a process. A relationship or a situation may be gendered, de-gendered, or may change gendered meaning.¹⁵ Consequently, the issue of gender as an analytical category is one of the utmost importance and should always be raised in any approach to global history.

In this paper, I shall discuss the interaction of understandings of gender and the concept of the democratic nation-state. The construction of the nation-state has mostly been studied as a phenomenon originating in Western societies, spreading to the rest of the world. But as has been pointed out, the concept of the unitary nation-state was in itself an idea that became rapidly globalized and may be termed a "bearer" of globalization, affecting people in different parts of the world during roughly the same period of time, i.e., the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Images of democracy, freedom, and welfare, to name but a few, have been perceived as examples of cultural flows, as *ideo-scapes*, on par with "ethno-scapes," "techno-scapes," "finan-scapes," and "media-scapes."¹⁶ Studying a limited number of manifestations of the construction of the nation-state, I understand this concept as belonging to cultural flows, to global ideo-scapes, influenced by different understandings of gender, and outlining one of multiple trajectories into modernity.

NATION, SEX, ETHNICITY, AND CLASS

A number of criteria have been operationalized in order to decide who should be eligible for political citizenship in democratic nation-states. A central criterion was sex, as it manifested itself in biologically determined physical characteristics. Nowhere, except for the grand-duchy of Finland, were women given the right to vote at the same time as men. Although women's reproductive ca-

pacity — their physical capacity to bear children — was highly valued, it was never a criterion for granting them political rights.

In the United States, another physical criterion also long meant exclusion from political rights: the criterion of skin color. One might say that physical characteristics, such as the capacity to bear children and skin color, acted as what Eric Hobsbaw has called "visible ethnicity," dividing individuals as more or less worthy, more or less influential members of the nation. This was clearly the case within the British Empire.

But criteria were not always explicitly formulated as physical characteristics. What was made decisive were questions of economic self-sufficiency and intellectual abilities.¹⁷ Such criteria excluded many men — servants, some workers, and, in some cases, black men — and everywhere all women. All these individuals were in different ways economically dependent. Add to this that women and blacks were seen as controlled by emotions and intuition, not by rational reasoning — and thus also fell short when it came to intellectual abilities — and you have another criterion for being included in the nation through political rights.

In a global perspective, it may be ascertained that democratic rights in the nation-state were first bestowed on white men of the upper social strata, then on white male workers and peasants. Colored men and all women, regardless of skin color, were, in that order, the last groups to be accepted as full citizens. It may be said that "history flows faster" in the case of men than in the case of women, although it did not flow equally fast for men of all classes.¹⁸ The growth of democratic nation-states was clearly influenced by the gender system, as well as by class and race.

Such observations seem to confirm the global working of the private/public dichotomy. In any cul-

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samurai sometimes fought duels over their young favorites. Subject to a dynastic imperative, however, samurai had to marry and produce sons. But as long as they preserved the ancestral line, they could do as they wished away from home, including patronizing actors as well as theaters. The young kabuki actors, on the other hand, had a life of rather limited dimensions: they entertained on the stage and in the bedchamber. Moreover, most originated from impoverished backgrounds. They did not defend the realm nor produce sons; hence their low status. As the McKay volume acknowledges, the Japanese accepted same-sex relations; in fact, the subject did not even appear in the legal codes. When the Jesuit missionary, St. Francis Xavier, went to Japan in the middle of the 16th century, he registered his dismay at the high level of homosexual activity among the Buddhist monks. Although prohibited from carnal knowledge of women, the monks found no mention of men in the rules; many took advantage of the omission.⁴

Textbook authors could highlight the differences between Japanese and Chinese culture by exploring the theater worlds of each. High government officials in China had a taste for the young actors of the “pear gardens,” as the theaters were called. These liaisons were officially discouraged, not so much for their homosexual nature, but because they involved the union of high officials with the dregs of society. In fact these gay young actors became known as “officials,” *xianggong*, an ironic reappropriation of the term used to describe high government ministers as well as to address young men in polite society. Of course, the actors, not their admirers, bore the brunt of official disapproval; they were the ones to be intercepted in the streets and beaten in order to discourage these relationships. Yet the practice prevailed and was tolerated as long as men satisfied the dynastic imperative and performed their

family duty.

The backlash that came in 1740, a bit less than one hundred years into the Manchu dynasty, illustrates how political considerations shape attitudes respecting sexuality. The 17th century featured a great proliferation of homoerotic literature as well as contemplation of the subject in scholarly writings that homosexuality had spun out of control to the point that men were forgetting to meet their procreative obligations. Preoccupied as they were with restoring order to a state that had degenerated into social unrest, violence, and thievery, the Manchus had been reviving Confucian ideals. The government emphasized everyone knowing one’s place and fulfilling the duties of one’s station, particularly in regard to family. Having a son to continue the family name and maintain the all-important rituals in veneration of their ancestors was a crucial element in this culture; now it became a vital part of official policy. So in 1740 the Manchus felonized homosexuality along with other sexual behaviors, particularly female un-chastity, which undermined traditional gender roles. Judging by court records, men faced prosecution for sexual misbehavior more than women since men were more important in maintaining patrilineality. Women who strayed could simply be kicked out of the house and replaced.⁵

Sexual practices and notions of masculinity and femininity vary greatly among different societies and historical periods.

Sexual practices and notions of masculinity and femininity vary greatly among different societies and historical periods. Uninhibited analysis of sexual mores, then, can provide valuable insights into world cultures and the dynamics of historical change. Attitudes toward male-male relations in China and Japan, for instance, illustrate the low esteem of women in these cul-

tures. Taking the passive role and dressing up and acting like a woman, rather than engaging in sodomy, appeared to be the offensive aspect of the activity. Moreover, the conventions observed in these relationships show how the strict social hierarchies permeated even the most intimate aspects of life. Elaborate rules of etiquette based on age and social precedence, more so than inclination, dictated the roles performed in the sexual congress. The homosexual traditions of China and Japan also offer a striking view of imperialism’s multi-dimensional impact on non-Western societies. Shame became attached to same-sex relations as a result of the onslaught of Christian missionaries as well as the perceived superiority of Western science, which imposed rigid categories of human sexual behavior.⁶

References to homosexuality are either absent or negative in most textbooks that cover the survey of world history from 1500. This observation even applies to a much-revised offering that is intimidating in the scope of its detail. The classic tome by Edward McNall Burns began its existence as the preeminent Western civilization text back in 1941; expanded into a history of world civilizations; and has been updated by Ralph, Lerner, and Meacham. Notwithstanding the magnitude of the eighth edition, the book only contains one mention of homosexuality: one of the marked “imperfect” racial and social groups” rounded up, tortured, and killed by the Nazis.

At the other end of the spectrum, Greaves, Cannistraro, Zaller, and Murphey’s *Civilizations of the World* has the subject entry, “homosexuals,” in its index, with a breathtaking four references in volume two. The first is in a section on the sexual customs of early modern Europe. Between one paragraph on abandoned children and another on prostitution, the book informs us that Catholic, Protestant, and Islamic leaders denounced and disapproved of homosexuality but

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ture, the gendered division of work and responsibilities has assigned women to the family sphere, *the private*; men to the wider society, *the public*. Although this dichotomy manifests important variations, this overall pattern seems to exist as a global phenomenon.

But so does the deconstruction of the dichotomy of the private family and household as a feminine, apolitical area opposed to the masculine public world of politics (and economics, etc.). As soon as the concept of politics is widened to include any action with the purpose of distributing power and resources in society, the family can no longer be seen as a private institution. It must also be perceived as a channel for political power, especially in societies where such power was restricted to a small elite.¹⁹ This also applies to power embedded in collective actions where women outside elite groups had a possibility of influencing important political decisions. The construction of the democratic nation-state strengthened the possibilities of collective actions, not only from male-dominated fora, such as trade unions and political parties, but also from female-dominated voluntary organizations, be they suffrage or philanthropic.²⁰

These possibilities were seized by groups of women as means of working to obtain political rights within the nation. Two different strategies, building on two different understandings of gender, were applied.²¹

Grounded on natural rights arguments, the equal-rights strategy was built on the assumption that women and men were individuals with basically similar potentials, and consequently with the same rights in the family and in the nation-state. This led among other things to claiming votes for women on the same conditions as for men.

The difference strategy saw women and men as basically different, but with complementary potentials, and with equal importance

to the national home. Women were perceived as mothers and wives in the private world; men as producers, soldiers, and politicians in the public world. Thus, the two sexes did not have the same duties and did not need the same rights in the nation. According to the difference strategy, different functions in family and society should lead to different rights, but different rights should form the foundation of equally important membership in the nation.

Maybe surprisingly, this dichotomous understanding of gender might also, and in fact often did, lead to claims of equal rights. The logic behind the claim that women and men should have the same rights in the nation would then be: that feminine elements were needed in society, in the public arena, to complement masculine influence. In this way of thinking the very difference between women and men was the reason for claiming equal rights.

In this way of thinking the very difference between women and men was the reason for claiming equal rights.

Both understandings of gender and both strategies should, therefore, be seen as analytical tools, not as mutually exclusive entities. In fact, the two often co-existed, not just within a certain group, but also within one and the same individual.

Finally, I will argue for dissolving the dichotomy of state-nation/culture-nation, the political as opposed to the cultural component of the nation, created by Friedrich Meinecke.²² Support for the political autonomy of a sovereign nation-state, the civil/political perception of the concept of nation, is intimately related to the concept of national culture. Shared national history, language, and national symbols, "rooted in a soil of recognizable traditions and forms of expression," an "imagined community," are presuppositions for a voluntarily organized society and for support of political institutions.²³

However, understandings of gender have everywhere been central to this "imagined community" as well as to shared national symbols. Worldwide, also, the two strategies and the two different perceptions of gender outlined above, may be found in efforts to include women in the creation of the modern democratic nation-state. I shall attempt to support these statements by examples of the construction of nation-states as different as Sweden, Norway, India, and Japan.

NATIONAL SYMBOLS — AND THEIR POLITICAL MEANINGS

A global metaphor for the nation-state has been the home. A Nordic audience will recognize such concepts as the Swedish "Folkhemmet." Norwegians share the images characterizing their national anthem, where "the thousand homes" —defended by strong fathers and by mothers who are sometimes fighting just like the men, sometimes weeping — are symbols of common history. Concepts like "fatherland"/"mother tongue" indicate the gendered family as a symbol of the nation. Women as mothers are very visible, not only to French and British rhetoric, but may also be found in Asian cultures, for instance in the widely used concept of "Mother India." In Bengal, anti-British feelings around the turn of the century were imbued with a Hindu nationalism, invoking the mother goddess, Kali, who is also the goddess of strength, to liberate Mother India. When the British pointed to the subjugated position of Indian women as a sign of the uncivilized character of Indian culture, Indian nationalists would cite old Hindu traditions — the *shakti* — where powerful goddesses invested women with strength and steadfastness. In Japan, however, although the family was also here the symbol of

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did little to curtail its practice. Although a capital offense in Tudor England, magistrates did not enforce the law because it did not lead to the more costly evil of illegitimate children. The book then sniffs out the practice in boys' boarding schools and at universities; among servants in rural communities that afforded limited access to the opposite sex; in the court of Elizabeth I and James I, whom it does characterize as homosexual — an unusual characterization for a textbook; and, finally, in the notorious "molly houses" of London.⁸

The next reference jumps to the roaring 1920s, with a paragraph on loosening sexual mores. The book mentions Oscar Wilde as well as Gertrude Stein and Alice B. Toklas — even using the L-word here. The point of the paragraph is that American homosexuals and African Americans found a safer haven in the larger European cities. In the third reference we have the Nazis on the march again to purge this undesirable element along with Jews, gypsies, and intellectuals. Finally, in the fourth mention, homosexuals are fighting back. Yet the men of the Stonewall riots do not even have a full sentence to themselves; they have to share one with the emerging women's liberation movement of the late 1960s. On the other hand, the editors did consider the riots of sufficient import to cross-reference the event in the index under "Gay Rights Movement."⁹

Commendable in the first passage cited from the Greaves volume is the incorporation of the issue of same-sex relations into an analysis of the ways in which society's economic needs affect the legislation of morals. The textbook explains that in spite of the religious and legal injunctions against homosexuality, the authorities could not be bothered to enforce them, distracted as they were by the fruits of extra-marital heterosexual activity: children who had to be supported by the parish. The

paragraph is part of a comparative examination of the societies of the early modern world that surveys social hierarchies, marriage and sexual customs, education, poverty, and crime.

Why isn't James I's sexuality addressed back in volume one with the other aspects of his reign?

On the other hand, although this coverage is so much more responsible than that found in other textbooks, it still could do with some improvement. *Civilizations of the World* has homosexuality in early modern Europe juxtaposed to abused children and wayward women, which conveys guilt by association. Moreover, lumping together homosexuality practiced in hayricks and royal bedchambers gives the impression that homosexuals are somehow all alike. Why isn't James I's sexuality addressed back in volume one with the other aspects of his reign? George Villiers, whom he knighted Duke of Buckingham, would never have been able to achieve the degree of power and do the amount of mischief that he did had James not taken such a strong fancy to him. His continued influence in the royal household had repercussions in the succeeding reign of the unfortunate Charles I.¹⁰ Why are Catherine the Great of Russia's lovers noteworthy and James I's same-sex favorites ignored when both had impact on their respective states?

Treatment of Catherine provides the most arresting example of the old sexual double standard operating in world history textbooks. The empress' domestic irregularities did not differ significantly from most royal households of the time, but as an indiscreet and powerful female personage, her personal life attracted gossip and malicious speculation. Although studies published over the past decade expose the fallacies propounded by her

enemies, some textbook presentations of Catherine retain their residual sexism.¹¹ The traditional attitude of hostility afforded female rulers leaks out in condescending observations from modern pens. For example, in *World History* by Upshur, Terry, Holoka, Goff, and Lowry, the famous equestrian portrait of the empress carries the following caption:

Catherine's awareness that she was not beautiful prompted her to surround herself with handsome young men. The empress had twenty-one known lovers, the last after she had turned sixty. As each lover dropped from favor, she rewarded him with a title, estates, serfs, and money — reputedly based on his sexual performance!¹²

McKay, Hill, and Buckler use the same portrait in illustration. Their caption, in contrast, observes:

Catherine took advantage of her intelligence and good looks to maneuver her husband Peter III off the throne and get herself crowned as Russia's new monarch. Strongly influenced by the Enlightenment, she cultivated the French philosophies and instituted moderate domestic reforms only to reverse them in the aftermath of Pugachev's rebellion.¹³

The Upshur volume presents Catherine as an unprincipled, voracious harridan whose reputation as an enlightened despot was due to "skillful self-advertising, not to her record of accomplishments." The McKay book gives a much more balanced assessment of the empress by detailing the difficulties of her situation and explaining how she had to modify her goals as circumstances arose. It does not flinch from discussing how she exploited her sexuality for political ends, and explains that she lavishly rewarded her lovers when she tired of them to prevent resentments that might have laid the foundation for plots against her. Regarding the 22-year-old lover whom she acquired when in her 60s, the book

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the state, education and ideology stressed filial piety to the father as emperor, indicating a different expression of nationalism. The mother image, strongly supported by state-directed organizations — such as the *Aikoko Fujinkai*, which dates from around 1901; and in the 1930s, the *Dainippon Rengo Fujinkai* — became that of the subservient figure, happy to sacrifice her sons to the needs of the emperor, or taking care of children after her husband had died on the battlefield.²⁴

Within the symbolism of the family/nation-state, women were made bearers of national traditions....

Within the symbolism of the family/nation-state, women were made bearers of national traditions, for instance through the gender-specific habit of wearing traditional dresses. Women, especially Indian but also Japanese, to a much greater extent than men continued to dress in traditional ways, something that manifested itself also in the Norwegian renaissance of wearing the *bunads* since the turn of the century.²⁵

No doubt, many more examples of the home, of mother and father figures, used as metaphors for the nation, may be found in national rhetoric accompanying the construction of the nation-state. My point is that a discourse built on the easily recognizable tradition of perceiving the family as the locus of loyalty, safety, closeness, at the same time clearly indicated the different positions of mothers and fathers, and consequently of women and men in the nation-state.²⁶ The image of the home with a gendered division of responsibilities — locating women in the private sphere and with a narrower space of action, men in public society with a wide range of responsibilities — clearly suggested a division between the public and the private. Limited mobility for women has been expressed in a number of cul-

tural customs, distinguishing individuals within the same social category according to their biological sex. Over the centuries, for example, groups of Chinese women had their feet bound at a very early age, and many Muslim and Hindu women observed *purdah*, some living their lives in the women's part of the house, the harem, or *zenana*. In such cases, women's mobility was physically restricted. In Europe and in the Americas, ideological and psychological approaches taught women and men that respectable women must not appear unescorted except in certain well-defined areas. Failure to respect these boundaries made women more or less legitimate victims of male aggression.²⁷ Such cultural norms affected understandings of citizenship as outlined above, and strengthened the perception of the public as an exclusively male arena. A Norwegian politician in 1890 legitimated his opposition to granting women the right to vote by stating:

...the very word "public" — for how fine and ironic language often is — there is nothing to prevent us from saying that all of us, we are public men, but we know of course that if we linked the word public with the name of a woman, it would be the utmost disgrace... as long as the world has existed... the veil is a garment that belongs to the woman, but never to the man, and that whoever tears a woman's veil is guilty of a shameless deed.²⁸

For all the cross-cultural similarities in the language of symbols, it should, however, not be forgotten that where the family functioned according to a very strict patriarchal power-model, as was very evident in Japan and India, such symbols were prone to uphold women's subordination and men's domination. Although we find globally shared national symbols, we must take cultural differences into account. The same concepts do not necessarily have exactly the same meaning within

different cultures.

TWO STRATEGIES FOR INTEGRATING WOMEN IN THE NATION-STATE THROUGH POLITICAL CITIZENSHIP

The equal-rights strategy and the difference strategy may be seen as global phenomena, occurring wherever a nation-state was being created.

At the end of the 19th century, some women — and men — had begun to protest against gender-based differences in democratic rights within the nation-state. From the 1880s, women members of popular rights movements in Japan raised the issue of suffrage as a universal human right, to be applied also to women. They envisaged a democratic Japan, and worked to abolish gender differences in education and to promote the same economic, legal, and moral rights for women as for men. The Japanese Christian Women's Temperance Union, founded in 1893, not only fought drinking problems and domestic violence, but also state-controlled prostitution, and soon came to support the claim for women's suffrage. However, the Japanese constitution of 1889 abolished women's possibilities of access to the throne for the first time in Japanese history, and even supported polygamy for the emperor in order to secure a male line of descent. From 1890 to 1945 Japanese women were by law prohibited from taking part in party politics. Modeling its political system on Bismarck's Germany, this provision corresponded well to what was the case in a number of German states, where women were also excluded from party politics between 1852 and 1908. The equal-rights strategy did not succeed in the construction of the Japanese nation-state. Even universal male suffrage was not attained until 1925, and the lively, but short-lived women's suffrage movement of the inter-war period was drowned in state-supported promo-

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simply quotes her report that the affair restored her zest for life.

The contrast between the representations of Catherine and her contemporary, Frederick II of Prussia, highlight the gender bias at work in the Upshur volume. It observes that Catherine's foreign policy was "expansionist and unscrupulous" like his. In contrast to its scathing review of Catherine, however, the book not only provides a checklist of Frederick's humanitarian and authoritarian policies alike; it presents his aggressive militarism in tones of admiration: "In a series of brilliant campaigns, he fought his encircling enemies to a standstill."¹⁴ The message that comes across is that powerful, sexually aggressive women are morally bankrupt in all respects while bellicose males are working to some higher purpose.

As for Frederick's sexual behavior, like Catherine's it did not fall within conventional norms. While textbook authors delight in cataloguing the tsarina's sexual appetites, they steer clear of any exploration of the Prussian king's proclivities. The Upshur volume gives the impression of an underlying moral agenda. The only mention of homosexuality comes by innuendo. Here again the caption police need to be called in. One of the illustrations is a reproduction of a period engraving of Frederick the Great standing over his guest, Voltaire, who is seated at a writing table. The *philosophe* has turned around his chair to face the monarch, quill in hand, frozen midair, as if interrupted in the act of composition. Frederick is making a fussy gesture of emphasis with his right hand, and leaning on his walking stick with his left. Voltaire's left hand is extended toward his host in a gesture that suggests, with Voltaire's facial expression, an attitude of benign indulgence. The caption reads:

Frederick II and Voltaire in the Study of the Royal Palace of Sans Souci in Potsdam. Although Frederick appointed

Voltaire a chamberlain in his court and gave him a generous pension, the relationship between the Prussian monarch and the French intellectual was always difficult, largely because both men were too prickly and self-centered. Voltaire left Prussia after two years, and his memoirs contain a scurrilous account of the private life of his former patron.¹⁵

The insinuations probably pass over the heads of most undergraduates unless they happen to know about Frederick's homosexuality. Nevertheless, what sort of message is conveyed by this nudge-nudge-wink-wink treatment of Frederick's private life and the tones of outraged sensibilities regarding Catherine's?

One-dimensional approaches to homosexuality convey a sense of taboo unsuitable to academic inquiry and leave unanswered questions a student may be afraid to ask. Other textbooks covering world history from 1500 to the present that have homosexuality listed in the index have the tendency to discuss the subject in the context of perceived vice and its suppression. *Societies and Cultures in World History* by Kishlansky, Geary, O'Brian, and Wong first mentions the criminalization of homosexuality in Russia as part of Stalin's designs to increase the birth rate through the glorification of the family. The textbook contains more detail than usual on the Nazis' persecution of homosexuals in a discussion of Hitler's regulation of family life. It observes that the Nazis targeted more gay men than lesbians because they considered male homosexuality a greater threat to perpetuation of the "master race."¹⁶ The account begs the question of whether any logic existed behind this belief, insofar as the Nazis can be credited with logical reasoning. Erwin Haeberle's study provides some answers. A sizable proportion of the prominent sexologists in Germany were Jewish, with a great number of outspoken homosexuals among them. Moreover, even the

conservative members of the profession challenged traditional assumptions about sexuality. The work of Magnus Hirschfeld in particular threatened to undermine Nazi policies that relied upon prejudice, ignorance, and sexual insecurity. Not only did the position of the sexologists provide a link between the Jewish menace and homosexuality in the Nazi mind; it allowed the Nazis to incorporate traditional stigmatization of homosexuals in their vilification of Jews, intellectuals, and socialists.¹⁷

Homosexuality and fear of homosexuality have co-existed and continue to be present in most modern societies...

Haeberle's data on the selective persecution of homosexuals — the use of homosexuality as an excuse to send political dissidents to concentration camps while turning a blind eye to the proclivities of useful public figures — brings out a point that is implied but ought to be spelled out in the Kishlansky volume and others. Homosexuality and fear of homosexuality have co-existed and continue to be present in most modern human societies; an underlying homophobia sits ever-ready to be exploited for political purposes. Haeberle points out that many homosexuals liberated from the concentration camps wound up imprisoned under the sodomy law which was not repealed until the late 1960s, and it was not until after this that the persecution of homosexuals by the Nazis became the subject of historical investigation. While acknowledgment of Nazi and Stalinist persecution in textbooks is a significant step in throwing off the censorship of gay history, this coverage leaves the mistaken impression that persecution is limited to extraordinary situations.

Indeed, Duiker and Spielvogel's *World History* perpetuates the sentiment so ably exploited by Nazis and Stalinists — that homosexuality posed a threat to the institution

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tion of women as mothers as well as by war-time policies.²⁹

In India, women's organizations such as the All India Muslim Women Conference and the Women's Indian Association, formed in 1914 and 1917 respectively, may be understood as examples of the equal-rights strategy. Support given to limited women's suffrage in some Indian provinces in the 1920s and for all India in 1935, as well as women's active participation in Gandhi's civil disobedience strategies, may further testify to the existence of equal-rights strategies in the formation of the Indian nation. So would the fact that, even to the embarrassment of Gandhi, who feared being accused of hiding behind women, many women took part in public meetings and in the big salt march of 1930.³⁰

As for Europe and North America, the use of this strategy is well documented, not only in the fight for women's suffrage, but also in numerous discussions of admission of women to the same education and jobs as men. It has also been pointed out, time and time again, that the equal-rights strategy, as mentioned above, might be rooted either in the argument that women had the same potentials as men, or in the argument that women were needed in the nation because of their different qualities from men.³¹

Examples of the difference strategy are also found worldwide.

Examples of the difference strategy are also found worldwide. The biggest Japanese women's organization, Aikoko Fujinkai, worked around the turn of the century to support Japanese authorities, among other things by attempting to make women see their sons as the sons of the emperor, and to prepare mothers to proudly sacrifice their sons for the fatherland. The Japanese tradition of the patriarchal family and the subservient wife may thus be translated into understanding women as contribut-

ing to the national good by sacrificing their sons for the nation. Also Indian nationalists argued that women had a special role as guardians of Hindu traditions. The *swadeshi* movement, expressing its criticism of British sovereignty just after the turn of the century through boycott of British goods, appealed to women as consumers and organizers of protest meetings. If we move into the inter-war years, Gandhi's ideas of femininity are easily translated into the difference strategy. Women should take part in the national struggle, but preferably in other ways than men. They were not too welcome in public protest marches, but all the more when they were seen busily producing Indian cotton cloth and wearing Indian costumes. Gandhi saw the goddess Sita, the faithful, self-sacrificing wife, as the ideal woman. He also found women especially well prepared for *satyagraha*, i.e., nonviolent resistance.

In Scandinavia, the difference strategy manifested itself through the Swedish Women's Association for the Defence of the Nation, and the Norwegian Women's Circles of the Norwegian Defence Association. In both countries, these organizations contributed to strengthening the military defense through large-scale fundraising activities.³² The parallel to Japan may be discerned when conservative Swedish women saw themselves as national mother figures with the duty to educate boys to become soldiers who would defend the nation. National mothers should bring up future generations to love their country, and maybe in contrast to the Japanese Aikoko Fujinkai, to protect the weak, especially the children. Some conservative Swedish women very clearly stated that even without the right to vote, they felt completely accepted as members of the nation.³³

In Norway, the big Norwegian Women's Sanitary Organization in

the 1890s saw it as an important task to educate nurses to assist the Norwegian army in case there should be war with Sweden. The social democrats of these two countries mobilized the masses by promoting the idea of equality and democracy as a better defense of the nation than strong military force. Gender difference was stressed when argumentation for the vote underscored women's potential for creating peace as a special legitimization for women's suffrage.

However, gender-differences in the construction of the nation-state were not limited to symbols and arguments. They also resulted in different channels of influence and power. Men would give voice to their political opinions through membership in political parties, through voting and by supporting the nation as soldiers. They would form voluntary organizations to act as pressure groups for their convictions. Women only slowly gained access to party politics and voting. Voluntary organizations and communal actions, therefore, were very important political instruments for women and often remained so long after women got the right to vote.³⁴

GLOBAL PARALLELS

The similarities found in the importance of gender to the construction of the nation-state may tempt the historian to talk of global patterns. Gender was important for all nation-building, and national symbols were imbued with gendered meanings. Central concepts like "political rights" were not gender neutral, and purposeful political action was needed to make this concept include women. Political actions mostly took different forms for men and women. This happened even in cases where political opinions were gender-neutral, such as in the question of resistance to Western culture in India and Japan, and in Norwegian discontent with the union with Sweden, 1814-1905.

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of the family — by applying it to contemporary society. The only reference in this volume to homosexuality in Europe appears in a section on the post-war era entitled "The Permissive Society." It describes the experimentation with sex and drugs, and the advent of hard-core pornography in European cities during the 1920s, and mentions parenthetically that the Berlin police issued permits to male and female prostitutes. The book then goes on to describe how all hell broke loose after World War II. It represents Sweden as the leader in the "so-called sexual revolution of the 1960s" with its sex education in the schools and decriminalization of homosexuality. Then the book discourses on prostitution, pornography, premarital sex, extra-marital sex, rising divorce rates, and youth rebellion. Once again we have the association of homosexuality with prostitution and other social ills. The book observes, "The new standards were evident in the breakdown of the traditional family."¹⁸

Such coverage reinforces myths and ignores findings in current scholarship. For instance, in a book published two years prior to the Duiker and Spielvogel text, Stephanie Coontz demonstrates that historically speaking, when one looks at the different kinship arrangements across cultures, "the traditional family" never existed. As for the ideal American family of the 1950s that the so-called sexual revolution was meant to have undermined, Coontz remarks, "Contrary to popular opinion, *Leave it to Beaver* was not a documentary." This period had its share of children born out of wedlock, families living in poverty, child abuse, domestic violence, and its own drug problem: discontented housewives on tranquilizers. Regarding the idea that homosexuality undermines family life and reproduction, she found no solid evidence that gay and lesbian activity is any more prevalent than it was in the past. Moreover, cultures that have been tolerant of homosexuality did not

experience any drop in the birth rate. Coontz observes that over two million gay and lesbian parents live in America today, who include some 10,000 lesbians who have added to the general population by using artificial insemination.¹⁹

Much of the textbook coverage of homosexuality not only perpetuates myths; it promotes a particular value system with its partial coverage. The Greaves volume is atypical in that it actually mentions specific people who were homosexual. Yet the book only mentions these figures in passing and, as I already noted, its coverage makes some absurd generalizations by throwing together sexually frustrated peasants and roistering courtiers in the same sentence. In all of these textbooks, homosexuals are shadowing figures and homosexuality seems a dark, impersonal force. The same-sex attractions of James I, Queen Anne, Frederick the Great, and Louis XIV's brother, Philippe, duc d'Orléans, had impact upon the power dynamics of the court and formation of state policy. To shrink from discussing them is not only to miss out on a body of information that aids the understanding of motive and forces of change, it leaves a partial historical record. As the example of male prostitution in early modern East Asia demonstrates, deciphering a society's sexual mores provides great insights into the forces that help shape its values, attitudes, and customs.

Integrating the experience of women and minorities into world history textbooks has enhanced our understanding of world politics, economics, societies, and cultures. Shaking off squeamishness and allowing greater integration of recent findings in gay and lesbian history into the world history curriculum will certainly provide useful new perspectives on the human condition. Sexual practices and attitudes toward them are integral aspects of human experience that should be discussed with the neu-

trality and in the dispassionate manner that one would deal with the impact of image and geography on human behavior. Sexuality's ubiquity as well as the striking variations in sexual attitudes and practices across space and time render it a useful analytical category for cross-cultural comparison that can enhance world history surveys. Moreover, teachers as well as textbook authors should be aware of the subconscious message they convey in their approach toward the subject of sexuality in their courses.

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
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
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TWO APPROACHES TO ISLAMIC SOCIETIES IN THE WORLD HISTORY COURSE

Engaging Students through Fiction and Film*

Philip F. Riley
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In a 15-week semester teaching modern world history I have been able to devote about three classes to colonialism. I have asked my students to engage colonialism through such authors as Rudyard Kipling, Frantz Fanon, or Desmond Tutu. To further engage students I have had them read novels such as Chinua Achebe's *Things Fall Apart*, Kushwant Singh's *Train to Pakistan*, or Stanley Wolpert's *Massacre at Jallianwala Bagh*. Recently, however, I have grown dissatisfied with this approach, not entirely because the novels do not work well examining colonialism, but because — with the exception of *Things Fall Apart* — they do not seem to lead smoothly into a discussion of some of the problems of the post-colonial world of the 1990s. In large part this can be attributed to my choice of novels, but also to the fact that large parts of East Asia seem to be doing quite well economically since gaining their independence.

So, too, it would seem that Southwest Asia, especially India and Pakistan 50 years after independence, have little difficulty finding their way in the late 20th century and, indeed, seem poised for even greater progress in the next century.

Africa, however, appears to be another matter. The

ongoing crisis in Central Africa, and the recent conflicts in Sierra Leone, the Congo, and the deadly famine in the Sudan, coupled with the continuing and ill-understood murderous violence in Algeria, seemed to me worthy of a closer look. Innocent of African literature, I followed a colleague's recommendation and selected an Algerian novelist, Assia Djebar, and her novel, *Fantasia: An Algerian Cavalcade*, to explore colonialism and some of the peculiar conditions of post-colonial Algeria in the 1990s.

In engaging my students with fiction and film, I ask them to do three tasks. First, I ask them to read the novel and to see Gillo Pontecorvo's film, *Battle of Algiers*, made in 1966. If time permits, I show a few scenes of the film in class, but generally I ask the students to see the film outside of class. Second, I ask that we take on the novel and the film for a full class discussion, led by two members of the class. Third, to ensure that everybody is up to speed on the novel, I require all members of the class to send me a 300-word e-mail the day before the scheduled class discussion. In this e-mail I ask two things: 1) that they not give me a summary of the text, but instead a reaction to particular themes or issues raised in the novel; and 2) that they send me three or four discussible questions focused on the text (by "discussible" I mean a question that cannot be answered in one word). These questions then serve as icebreakers for the class discussion. A copy of all e-mails goes to the discussion leaders.

Assia Djebar, born in 1936, is Algeria's premier novelist writing in French. She is also a historian who has taught Algerian history at the University of Algiers. Djebar is a spirited and careful writer who loves word play and musical composition. She first published *Fantasia* in French in 1985, although by that date she seems to have preferred to write in Arabic. Indeed, one of the pressing problems she faces in Algeria today is that even though she would prefer to write in Arabic, political censorship there is such that it is far easier for her to publish outside of the country in French. I do not know all of the reasons for this, but a large part of the problem is certainly that she has frequently criticized the government, and as a divorced female she may not be an exemplary role model in the eyes of the Islamic Salvation Front, the group most responsible for the political tensions in Algeria since 1992.

Fantasia begins in 1830 with the French invasion of Algeria, and through a series of female narrators and flashbacks, Djebar develops the thread of the Algerian struggle for independence through 1962. To assist students, her publishers have included with the text a map of Algeria, a detailed chronological outline of the Algerian struggle against France in the 19th and 20th centuries, and a glossary of Arabic and French terms.

Initially some students find the novel a bit unfriendly because Djebar employs different narrators

* This paper was originally read at the Southeast World History Association Meeting, November 15, 1997, Charleston, South Carolina. The text from which all quotes are taken is: Assia Djebar, *Fantasia: An Algerian Cavalcade*, trans. by Dorothy Blair (Portsmouth, NH: Hememann, 1993). The film referred to in the paper is: Gillo Pontecorvo, *Battle of Algiers* 1966 125 minutes, subtitled in English. My students in History 102H are largely responsible for my thinking, arguments, and approach to this text and film. I am indeed very grateful for their wonderful insights.

and moves back and forth between the 19th and 20th centuries. But once students accept this approach they have little difficulty understanding the text. I have found that Djebbar resonates and engages the students on three levels.

First, her narrative is clear, wonderfully written, and features an abundance of images of war; family relations; and the bittersweet, seductive counterpoint of the allure of French culture and language. Her narrative of the French invasion is, I believe, quite trustworthy, in no small part because as a historian she has carefully studied French documents and the memoirs of the principal French participants of the 19th-century conquest. In the opening chapters she describes the flashpoints of Algerian resistance to the French during the 1840s, when Generals Bugeaud, Cavaignac, and Saint-Arnaud continued the guerrilla tactics the Napoleonic armies had learned in Spain and were then applying to the conquest of North Africa.

A new tactic used to pacify Algeria was what the French called *fumigation*. There were at least four known incidents of these *fumigations* when the French Army drove as many as 1,500 Algerian men, women, and children, along with their animals, into caves. They then ignited brush and kindling at the mouths of the caves, thereby sealing off the entrances and depriving the Algerians first of oxygen and, ultimately, their lives. In constructing her narrative, Djebbar writes of one French officer, an eyewitness of one of the *fumigations*, who comes across the bodies of two Algerian women which are lying a little apart from a group of skirmishers. The Frenchman observes that Arab tribes are always accompanied by great numbers of women who show the greatest zeal in mutilating their victims. One of these women lay dead beside the corpse of a French soldier whose heart she had torn out. The soldier recounts, "Another [woman] had been fleeing with a child in her arms when a shot wounded her: she seized a stone and crushed the infant's head to prevent its falling alive into our hands; the soldiers finished her off with their bayonets." (p. 18) Djebbar's gloss upon this French eyewitness account reads as follows:

Thus these two Algerian women — the one in whom rigor mortis was already setting in, still holding in her bloody hands the heart of a dead Frenchman; the second in a fit of desperate courage, splitting open the brain of her child like a pomegranate in spring, before dying with her mind at peace — these two heroines enter into [our] recent history. (p. 18)

This image of the two dead women and one dead child from the 1840s suggests for Djebbar "an image that prefigures many a future Muslim *mater dolorosa* who, carrion beetles of the harem, will give birth to generations of faceless orphans during Algeria's thralldom a century later." (p. 19)

Two points can be established here. First, Djebbar is determined to show that women, especially female soldiers, were indeed every bit as important as men in

fighting the French of the July Monarchy. This was true certainly in the 1840s, and they were to continue in this role through the 1950s and early 1960s in fighting against the French of the Fourth and Fifth republics.

Second, it is also clear at this point that all narration in the novel is from the woman's point of view. Indeed, it is also clear that one of the narrators of the novel is the author herself. Autobiography is, indeed, the second level of the novel that engages the students and presents them with the cross-cultural collisions that take place continuously between French and Algerian culture. Throughout the novel Djebbar reminds her readers of the tension between French and Arabic culture. One example she uses to explain this tension is an incident between her parents. She writes:

One day something occurred which was a portent that their relationship would never be the same again — a commonplace enough event in any other society, but which was unusual to say the least with us. [For] in the course of an exceptionally long journey away from home (to a neighboring province, I think), my father wrote to my — yes to [my] — mother! (p. 38)

She then goes on to explain that her father had written a postcard to her mother in "his large, legible handwriting. But on the half of the card reserved for the address of the recipient he had written [the word] 'Madame' followed by his own surname...the radical change in customs was apparent for all to see: my father had quite brazenly written his wife's name in his own handwriting, on a postcard...so many masculine eyes, including our village postman, to see!" Djebbar notes that despite the fact that the postman now knew her mother's name, she knew that her mother, though blushing and ill at ease, was actually pleased "my father had written to her in person! This postcard was, in fact, a most daring manifestation of affection. Her modesty suffered...yet it came second to her pride as a wife, which was secretly flattered." (p. 38) Although in this case French postal customs would seem to triumph over Muslim traditions of *purdah*, Djebbar is not an enthusiastic champion of French culture.

Here on another level of engagement Djebbar draws for her audience her ambivalence about France, the French language, and French culture. She admits that "French is the gateway to freedom, a gateway denied to many of [my] countrywomen" (p. iv), further adding:

I cohabit with the French language; I may quarrel with it, I may have bursts of affection [for it], I may subside into sudden or angry silences — these are the normal occurrences in the life of any couple. [But] I am vaguely aware of having been forced into a 'marriage' [with this language] too soon rather like the little girls of my town who are 'bespoke' in their earliest childhood. (p. 213)

If Arabic is her mother tongue, French is her father's language. The first line of her novel proudly announces that when she went to school she walked hand in hand with her father, "a tall, erect figure in a Fez and a European suit." And at 17, in the midst of

her first love affair, she is thrilled that her lover corresponds with her in French: "The language my Father had been at pains for me to learn [now] serves as a go-between in this early stage of my sentimental education." (p. 4)

Clearly Djebar is both attracted *and* repelled by French colonial culture. When she visits French homes she is always aware of the different lives therein. Young French men and women hold hands and even embrace in public. French homes always emanate a different smell, a mysterious light. Frustrated, Djebar admits, "The French are still the *others* and I am still hypnotized by their shores." Above all it is the French language, the language her father taught her, that at times mesmerizes her:

Ever since I was a child the [French] language was a casement opening on the spectacle of the world and all its riches. In certain circumstances it became a dagger threatening me. Should a [French] man venture to describe my eyes, my laughter or my hands, should I hear him speak of me in this way, I risked losing my composure; then I immediately felt I had to shut him out. (p. 126)

Despite the seductive appeal of French culture Djebar rejects France, embracing her Algerian cause and standing unalterably against the French in the war of Algerian independence. At this third level of engagement her narrative again shifts perception and technique. When describing the French conquest of the 1840s Djebar relies heavily upon French documentation of the fighting, particularly for the grim scenes of

fumigations and bloody reprisals. Now, for the war of Algerian independence she employs the oral testimony of women who actually fought alongside the Algerian guerrillas (FLN) against the soldiers of the Fourth and Fifth republics. Students do find this part of the text a bit bumpy, since the author and the translator faithfully keep the style and grammar of the oral interviews and do not try to polish the syntax of these plainspoken women guerrilla fighters. Here again, as in the 1840s, the protagonist is the Algerian woman who fought as *muujahidine*, nurse, messenger. Throughout this costly war, in which at least 800,000 Algerians died, Djebar shows the undervalued role of the Algerian woman. One of her female guerrillas, who had joined a band of FLN *maquis* in the mountains, jubilantly confides that "the men in the mountains got a message to me. Come back here with one of your sisters; we need you up here!" (p. 118). In describing the final act of the war against the French, Djebar does not provide a comprehensive account of what British historian Alistair Horne titles *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962*, but instead she focuses on the human costs of the war. These include the bloody reprisals inflicted by the FLN on their own people. Djebar insists that Algeria prevailed against France not because of the tenacity and resistance of the FLN soldiers, but because of the true teachers of the FLN fighters their mothers:

The Matriarchs whisper to the children in the dark, to the childrens children crouching on the straw mat, to the girls who will become matriarchs in turn...[boys might learn to be soldiers from the fathers but] this matriarch who intones in the corridor, handing on the heroic saga of the fathers, the grandfathers, the paternal great-uncles. The low voice steers the words through the waters awash with the dead, prisoners never to be freed.... (p. 176)

This final part of the text focused on the overthrowing of colonialism serves as a connector for the film, *Battle for Algiers*. Gillo Pontecorvo's film shows in explicit detail how the French military, especially the elite paratrooper units, attempted to break the Algerian insurgency. More important, for my purposes Pontecorvo's 1966 film provides context to Djebars novel in at least two respects.

First, quite early in the film Pontecorvo shows that the FLN leadership decided — certainly reluctantly — that the only way they can retaliate against the French for their use of plastique bombs in the Casbah is to use women to carry bombs against the Air France terminal, the popular Milk Bar, and a café patronized by Europeans. Second, Pontecorvo previews, unintentionally, some of the puritanical habits of the Islamic Salvation Front of today. He does this by including scenes of the FLN guerrillas closing bordellos in the Casbah, an FLN policeman executing an Algerian pimp running a bordello, and finally the orchestrating of a group of children to attack a public drunk.

To be sure, neither Djebar nor Pontecorvo addresses directly the murderous condition of contemporary Algeria. But by depicting the cross-cultural collision between France and Algerian culture and by focusing on the undervalued role of women in Algerian public life, the text and film can, I believe, be useful in engaging students to examine such questions as:

- 1) Can a historian writing fiction capture the ambiguities and complexities of colonialism and cross-cultural contact as accurately and responsibly as traditional historical documentation?
- 2) Assia Djebar defines the French language as the gateway to Freedom, but she rejects this language to write in her native Arabic. Yet, because of state censorship today she is again writing in her Fathers language. In what way is Assia Djebar emblematic of the engaged intellectual living in post-colonial state who is forced to write in the language of their former colonial rulers?
- 3) When France left Algeria in 1962 the French colonial administration turned over control of this North African territory to a government that enshrined in its constitution the principle that Islam is the Religion of the State. Does this constitutional principle suggest certain problems for Algeria or for other states that have enshrined this same constitutional principle?

SUFISM AS AN ALTERNATIVE WAY TO ACCESS THE HISTORY OF THE MUSLIM WORLD

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The number of Sufi titles currently available in the United States (over 200, of which only a small proportion are academic titles) is an indication of considerable public interest in Sufism, but the range of these titles suggests that this interest may not be very well informed. The majority of works translated from the languages of the Muslim world are volumes of poetry, especially the poems of the 13th-century mystic poet, Jalal al-Din Rumi. To judge from numbers of titles in print by and about him, Rumi is the single most popular Sufi in America; he may even be one of the most popular poets of any variety. Given, however, that the second and third most popular Sufis (on the same basis) are Inayat Khan and Idries Shah,¹ there is cause to wonder how well all these readers of Sufi poetry are understanding what they read. Neither Inayat Khan nor Idries Shah are much known in the Muslim world, and are generally regarded by scholars of Islam as having adapted Sufism for a Western public to the extent that their teachings form something quite new, something vague and easy which is not out of place in the company of the various elements which make up New Age religion.

Sufism in the Muslim world is something very different. It is sometimes described as the mystical tradition within Islam, which is not wrong, though a little unfortunate given the subconscious association in many people's minds of "mystical" with "mysterious" or, even worse, with mystification. Sufism might alternatively be described as an optional extra within Islam for those with a special spiritual thirst. Sufis follow a spiritual director, or *shaykh*, who assigns to them various spiritual practices which aim to bring them close to God in this world, not merely in the next. Many of these shaykhs are regarded as *walis*, a term which is often translated as saint but which the Jesuit scholar, Richard Gramlich, renders as *Freund Gottes*, friend of God. Of course, not all Sufis reach the rank of *wali* or enjoy the direct experience of God — sometimes described as mystic union with the Divinity — which Rumi attempts to describe in his poetry. The majority of Sufis perhaps do no more than live a deeper and more intense religious life than do others, within the context of one of the various Sufi brotherhoods, or *tariqas*, which are to be found in almost all Muslim countries in almost all historical periods. These brotherhoods have something in common with the monastic orders of Christianity, but since Sufis marry and work like everyone else and thus are in the profane world as well as distanced from it, most brotherhoods are

integrated into society in a way not found in the Christian monastic orders.

An existing public interest in Sufism, especially a poorly informed interest, is already a reason for teaching students about Sufism. Beyond this, there are at least three more reasons for including Sufism in world history courses. One is that Sufism is very much a world phenomenon. In 1799, a Moroccan shaykh started teaching in what is now Saudi Arabia; within the next century and a half, Sudanese, Indian, Malay, and Egyptian students of his had spread his Order from Tanzania to Turkey, from Beirut and Damascus to Bangkok and Singapore — from where it spread to Milan, Italy.² Local conditions of course have their impact on local developments, but Sufism is one of the main strands which has unified the Muslim world.

A second reason is Sufism's importance for an understanding of the social history of Muslims, and sometimes political history. At a time when discussions of civil society are very much in the air, we can hardly continue to ignore one of the most important institutions of Muslim civil society. For many centuries, the body of Islamic scholars — the *ulama* — played a vital role as intermediaries between rulers and ruled, but the *ulama* were always an elite in one way or another, while the Sufi brotherhoods drew their membership from every class of society — and from women as well as men.³ As well as performing their central spiritual function, these brotherhoods have also been of great social, economic, intellectual, literary, and even political significance. Their importance to Muslim society is very visible during the early colonial era, when popular resistance to colonialization was so often centered around Sufism from Somalia and Libya to Russian Central Asia, it was to the brotherhoods that people turned when they found their independence and way of life threatened. These non-spiritual roles do not follow from Sufism's avowed goal of mystic union with God, but from the structure and size of the brotherhoods, from the prestige and thus power of many Sufi shaykhs, and perhaps also from the absence, until very recently, of other significant social or religious institutions which might rival the brotherhoods' importance.

The third reason for including Sufism in world history courses is that it acts as a useful corrective to the view of Islam as radical and political, a view which few students who have ever seen the television news have any difficulty in appreciating, but which is a partial and incomplete view. Most Muslims who have ever lived have been neither radical nor especially political; for them Islam has been first and foremost a religion — as well as other things, such as a source of inspiration and identity, the basis of a body of law, or the origin of their ethical norms. I would argue that an understanding of Islam as a religion is a necessary prerequisite for a proper

understanding of the social, legal, and political history of Muslims, as well as being a useful thing in itself. An approach through Sufism may make Islam and the history of the Muslim world more easily accessible to students. I will return to this point.

We must first clarify some points concerning the relationship between Sufism and Islam as a whole. For many people, Sufism and Islam are different things. This is not, I believe, correct — at least, when what is meant by Sufism is Sufism as found in the Muslim world, rather than “American Sufism” as represented in many of the various “Sufi Wisdom” books which are currently available.

For many people, Sufism and Islam are different things.

The two principal proponents of the view that Sufism is not Islam are certain varieties of Western scholar and certain varieties of Muslim. For the former Sufism is a little tradition, popular or folk Islam, quite different from the great tradition of Islam proper. For some Muslims, Sufism is degenerate and corrupted Islam, syncretic and superstitious, and to be rooted out. These two views have something in common, and have sometimes reinforced each other, but are derived in different fashions and on different bases.

The scholars’ view is easier to address than that of the Muslim opponents of Sufism, since it is very often simply the product of an incomplete view. There is, of course, such a thing as folk Islam — an illiterate shepherd is hardly going to understand the concept of the Unity of God in the same way as a scholar at the pinnacle of Sunni Muslim religious scholarship, the Azhar in Cairo — and in the same way that there is thus a “folk” conception of the Unity of God, there is also such a thing as folk Sufism — the Sufi practices and beliefs of villagers and the urban poor. There is also a “great tradition” of Sufism, however, often as invisible to researchers in the villages as it is to the villagers themselves: poets, scholars at the Azhar and elsewhere, Sufi shaykhs who wrote as well as led their brotherhoods. This great tradition has produced works of subtlety equivalent to or even greater than those in any other area of Islam, and has informed and enlightened all the other varieties of Sufism which lie between the Azhar and the village. The Sufism of the village is as much a form of what is found in the great tradition as is any other aspect of Islam in the village.

This does not mean that everything which every Sufi does should be seen as Islam. For example, many Sufis visit the tombs of great shaykhs (as do many non-Sufis), and certain details and aspects of these visits vary from place to place and are most likely local borrowings from outside Islam. It is wrong, however, to observe a practice connected with tomb visiting which is reminiscent of, say, Hindu

practice, and then to conclude that the visiting of tombs is a non-Islamic folk survival of Hinduism, and still less to conclude that Sufism is not Islamic.⁴

The difficulty with addressing the view of those Muslims who deny that Sufism is Islamic is that it involves entering a heated debate about what is true Islam, a debate which a Western historian is better equipped to observe than to participate in. Sufism has never been entirely uncontroversial, and there was periodic opposition to many Sufi practices in the pre-modern period.⁵ More general condemnation is, however, largely a by-product of more recent movements aimed at the reform of Islam, specifically of the *Salafis*.⁶ A declared aim of the *Salafis* was to rid Islam of later accretions of error and return to the purity of the original revelation, and in both their method and their results there are some intriguing similarities to the Protestants of the European Reformation. As Protestants condemned the cult of saints in the Catholic Church, so did the *Salafis* condemn the visiting of tombs amongst Sufis, to take an obvious example.

Although Sufis are sure that their beliefs and practice descend from the Prophet, the stringency of the tests of authenticity adopted by the *Salafis* and their successors is such that they see much specifically Sufi belief and practice as clearly inauthentic. It is no easier to judge between these positions than to pronounce on the proper authority of the Pope. Fortunately for the historian, it is not really necessary to judge, save perhaps when teaching or researching the periods of Islamic history where Sufism first becomes visible. Since these periods, Sufism has been an established part of Islam, and therefore if one is interested in teaching the Islam of the last millennium it makes little difference whether or not the origin of Sufism is really Islamic, since the vast majority of Muslims in these centuries considered it to be so.

One consequence of this is that, for our present purposes, it is best to avoid the very earliest periods of Sufism. A second consequence is that, so long as students are warned that the view of Sufism as inauthentic does exist, it is possible and legitimate thereafter to ignore the question of authenticity.

Since *Salafism* is the parent of Fundamentalism, an examination of the conflict between Sufism on the one hand and *Salafism* and Fundamentalism on the other would be of great interest, and would in many ways be more illuminating than, for example, examining Fundamentalism as a reaction to that ever difficult topic, modernity. Unfortunately, whilst this is a fascinating topic for study, there are so far few works available for teaching it.⁷ Similarly, any detailed consideration of the relationship between Salafism and Protestantism — both of which movements had bloody consequences in their early years — must await fuller research.

SUFISM AS A WAY TO APPROACH ISLAMIC HISTORY

One difficulty in making Islamic history accessible to our students is that, for many people, Islam is a religion of the Law. How much more difficult does it become when the Law everyone thinks of — the *Sharia* — seems to be all about the cutting off of hands and the stoning of adulterers. These procedures are instinctively repugnant to students raised in the Judeo-Christian ethic.⁸

Westerners can hardly be blamed for their understanding of the nature of Islamic Law or the *Sharia* when many radical and vociferous Muslims emphasize a fraction of the total of it, calling for the *Sharia* and seeming to mean by it principally the infamous *hudud* punishments of amputation, stoning, and execution. These are in fact only a part of the criminal law of Islam, and that criminal law is itself only a part of the codified law or *fiqh*, and the *fiqh* is only a part of the *Sharia* which in its wider sense is the whole body of teachings covering how a human should live and worship. But rightly or wrongly, the idea of a religion of the Law implies for many of our students sclerosis, opposition to reason, and an absence of the spiritual. This view tends to make Muslims appear profoundly alien, and so to have a negative impact on students' understanding of the history of the Muslim world. A counterbalance of some sort is required, and an excellent counterbalance is Sufism. It is amongst Sufis that the totality of the *Sharia* in its widest sense is most emphasized and most explicit, where Islam is at its most obviously spiritual. This is why people who shudder at the news from Afghanistan or Pakistan happily read Rumi.

Although Sufi shaykhs may be more inclined than many other Muslim religious authorities to look at the spirit rather than the letter of the Law, Sufis usually follow exactly the same rules and practices as other Muslims, often more seriously than is the norm. In addition, they follow a shaykh whose authority derives from the shaykh he himself followed⁹ — thus, incidentally, laying themselves open to charges of following priests or rabbis as the Christians and Jews do, which is forbidden to Muslims. Sufis also have various daily practices (usually revolving around the repetition of short prayers) designed to make them mindful of God at all times and so bring them closer to Him. Their most visible practice is the weekly *dhikr* or *hadra*, during which the followers of a shaykh gather for prayer, using the same or similar short prayers which they repeat in their daily individual practice. The *dhikr* may be performed seated or standing, and if performed standing is often accompanied by rhythmic movements of a more or less restrained variety. The most unrestrained movements sometimes look like dancing, and in the case of one Order involve turning a full circle — that is what the rare but famous whirling dervishes were

up to.¹⁰ Although the *dhikr* is the most spectacular and best-known of Sufi practices, for the individual Sufi it is not the most important element of his or her own religious practice.

Not all the practices just discussed are exclusively Sufi. Prayers used by Sufis are also used by ordinary Muslims, and it is not only Sufis who take their spiritual and religious lives seriously. Much of what a student understands of the religious life of Sufis may thus be applied to non-Sufis. It is not the case that what the average American student can easily recognize as spirituality is a monopoly of Sufis, but

Not all the practices just discussed are exclusively Sufi.

rather that the spirituality of Islam — Islam as a religion — can most easily be taught from a Sufi perspective, since that is where it is most overt, most clearly emphasized, and most accessible.

Specific to Sufis, however, are certain organizational and social structures. Each shaykh teaches a particular *tariq* [path], and he and his followers form a *tariqa*, [brotherhood], the embodiment of that *tariq*. A *tariqa* may consist of a single group of Sufis in a single place, or of several groups in different places, sometimes in different countries. In this case, the shaykh will usually appoint a representative for each locality; this representative is known by different names in different *tariqas*, but is often called a *khalifa*. The organizational structure of *tariqas* varies; it may be very simple a shaykh and one or two *khalifas* — or it may be extremely complex, with different varieties of *khalifas* performing different functions. Although the primary function of the *tariqa* is spiritual, it may serve a variety of other secondary purposes, from trade network¹¹ to resistance cell. Some *tariqas* have accumulated considerable wealth, while some have remained poor.

Mention has also been made of Orders. A given *tariqa* is usually one of a group which all derive from a past shaykh and as a result share much the same practice and approaches, but usually have no organizational links. Thus the "Ahmadiyya Imbabiyah" and the Ahmadiyya Manufiyyah are two different contemporary Egyptian *tariqas* (one known after the Cairo district of Imbaba, and the other after the town of Manufiyyah) belonging to the Ahmadiyya Order, named after Ahmad al-Badawi (1200-76).¹²

APPROACHES AND RESOURCES

Sufism may be approached in terms of the history of individual shaykhs or *tariqas*, in terms of beliefs, and in terms of practices. Once Sufism itself has been understood, students can then look at the Sufi role in specific periods or events, and thus move back to Islamic history as a whole.

Some examination of the history of individual

shaykhs and tariqas is clearly necessary, but no good single history of the Sufi Orders exists.¹³ Even if it did, it might not be very illuminating, since most developments within Sufism tend to be of a fairly minor variety from the perspective of the average student. The precise nature of the mystical Union with God at the end of the Sufi path is clearly of great importance to Sufis nearing the end of that path and has been much disputed, but is hardly likely to interest most students, and anyhow is of little relevance for most Sufis or for Islam as a whole. There are, however, a number of studies of individual shaykhs or *tariqas* which may be used.¹⁴

Some basic background on Sufi beliefs and practices is required, and there are a wide variety of works of the What is Sufism? variety, some better than others, and some positively misleading. One of the best recent general works on Sufism is Valerie J. Hoffman's *Sufism, Mystics and Saints in Modern Egypt* (Columbia: University of Southern California Press, 1995). As well as being a fine scholarly work, this book is also unusually personal, which may enable students to enter an alien environment more easily. An excellent collection is Seyyed Hossein Nasr's *Islamic Spirituality*; the first volume, *Foundations* (New York: Crossroad, 1987), covers Sufi beliefs and cosmology, and is perhaps the most useful. The second volume, *Manifestations* (New York: Crossroad, 1991), covers a variety of Orders, but is somewhat patchy. Students should be warned that the views on the transcendent unity of religions sometimes expressed in these two volumes are untypical both of Sufis and of non-Sufi Muslims.

The primary sources that can be used deal mostly with beliefs and practices.

A variety of primary sources also exists. The *tariqas'* own histories are neither readily available nor of much use for teaching, since they are almost exclusively hagiographies of shaykhs, adding to basic biographies long lists of *karamat* [miracles]. These accounts have important functions as inspirational literature, and also act as legitimizing tools for the successors of the shaykhs concerned, but would have no real place in a world history course, even if they were available in English. The primary sources that can be used deal mostly with beliefs and practices. A recently reprinted work which is a rich source of short texts is Constance Padwick's *Muslim Devotions: A Study of Prayer-Manuals in Common Use* (Element, 1996). This is not so much a study as a compendium with commentary; usefully, not all the prayers and practices considered are exclusively Sufi. There are, as has been observed, many translations of Jalal al-Din Rumi; Farid al-Din Attar's *Conference of the Birds* is another popular work. Poems from either of these 13th-century sources might be used, as might extracts from one of the most enduringly popular Sufi

texts in the Muslim world, Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Ataallah's *Hikam* (late 13th century).¹⁵

As has already been suggested, understanding texts such as these is not always easy. In general, most Islamic texts were not — until very recently — designed to be read in a vacuum; they were, rather, elements in an instructional process, and may easily have different and unintended meanings read into them outside that process. This is true of texts on commercial law, which were studied under a scholar who knew them well rather than read in isolation; how much more true is it of poetry, which usually intends to report extraordinary spiritual experiences (or perspectives gained from such experiences). In a Sufi poem, for example, human love is used as a metaphor for Divine love, and drunkenness commonly refers to spiritual rather than physical intoxication. This point is easily appreciated; what is less easily conceived of is the difference in the meaning of such images for a follower of a *shaykh* engaged in a rigorous and demanding program of spiritual exercises, and for an ordinary American.

Perhaps the two greatest Sufi writers on a less literary level are Ibn al-Arabi (b. 1165) and al-Ghazali (d. 1111). Both have been translated and written on. Ibn al-Arabi is concerned with a level of metaphysical and philosophical abstraction which makes him hard to comprehend, and therefore probably inappropriate for all save the most advanced courses. Al-Ghazali's *Ihya*, on the other hand, is an excellent source of very useful texts on the practices of Islam and their significance.¹⁶

For the Sufi role in specific periods or events, useful material on Sufis in earlier periods will be found in a variety of works.¹⁷ For the modern period, Fred De Jong on the Egyptian attempt to integrate Sufism into the structures of a modern central state is hard to beat,¹⁸ but it is rather too dense to be assigned to most students. I.M. Lewis's *A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa* (Boulder: Westview, 1988) is both a fine work and very readable, with an excellent chapter on The Dervish Fight for Freedom.

NON-TEXT SOURCES

Visual materials may be found on various Web sites, and Nicolaas H. Biegman's *Egypt: Moulids, Saints and Sufis* contains some excellent photographs, as well as some good, basic commentary (though at \$110 for 88 pages, it can hardly be an assigned text). More action might be provided by Valerie Hoffman's video of some of the popular Sufi activities in Cairo.¹⁹ Even better would be a visit to a local Sufi group.

One of the great advantages of using Sufism in a course is that it is often possible to take students to visit Sufis. There are now many Sufi groups in the West, some of which even have Web sites. The link

from what students may have seen in their own neighborhoods to wars in Somalia or to social structures in Ottoman Egypt may not be immediately clear to them, but to the extent that it can be made clear, it will bring Islamic history to life as almost nothing else can.

Sufis are, in general, willing to admit outsiders, so long as the visitors appear reasonably interested and open-minded, or at least so long as their motives do not appear hostile. In the Muslim world, the weekly *dhikr* of a *tariqa* is often very public, and may sometimes be almost a public relations exercise: *tariqas* have to recruit followers, and one way in which this often happens is that a Sufi takes a friend along to the *dhikr*. For obvious reasons, American Sufis are less likely to hold a *dhikr* in a public square than are Egyptian Sufis, but ultimately the same logic applies in America as in Egypt.

The suspicion of the West and its motives, which is unfortunately so often marked in other contemporary Islamic organizations, is more rare amongst Sufis. This does not necessarily mean that a Sufi does not think that there is an American plot to destroy Islam for the advancement of Zionism (or whatever), but if he does he will probably be a lot more polite about it — good manners are a part of Sufi *adab* [code of conduct], and political convictions are far from central to the Sufi identity. Good relations will be also advanced if students are prepared with a few basic points of Muslim religious etiquette.²⁰

Some care must, however, be exercised in selecting a group and understanding how it fits in to the general map of Sufism, both to decide whether a visit is useful, and to properly prepare the students who will visit. Sufi groups in the West can in general be placed into one of four categories.²¹

1. Non-Muslim Sufis

From the time of Madame Blavatsky's Theosophical Society, there have been Sufi teachers in the West whose message is that Sufism is a spiritual path separate from, or separable from, Islam. Such groups may be very interesting for students of New Religious Movements, but are of little use as a route into an understanding of Islam; even if their leaders are of Muslim origin, the groups themselves tell us more about the West. They are usually easy to identify, since their non-Islamic identity is self-proclaimed; any group with more than a few non-Muslim members will fall into this category, and for our present purposes is best avoided.

2. Immigrant Sufis

The closest one can come in America to Sufism exactly as it is in the Muslim world are what may be called "Immigrants' *tariqas*." Where a sufficient number of immigrants from a single area of the Muslim world is present for a distinct community to

exist, they may often bring one or more Sufi Orders with them, often retaining institutional links with the Order in their home country — for example, having shaykhs from home travel to address them. Such groups are the hardest to find (I know of no Web sites!) and are also likely to be less accessible for linguistic reasons — the general language of proceedings will almost invariably be that of the home country.

3. Traditional Sufis

Not all *tariqas* which have established themselves in the West have retained their original ethnic identity. They may have a following drawn from various different parts of the Muslim world, including in some cases a few or many Western converts. Sometimes the *tariqa* may have developed a separate identity from the Order in the Muslim world from which it originally descended. In non-immigrant *tariqas*, English will often be the common language of the members, whose understanding of the West and Westerners will also often be greater (especially if they are themselves Westerners!), two important factors for improving the chances of useful communication with visiting students.

Such groups will inevitably differ in minor ways from their prototypes in the Muslim world, if only because the life of a religious minority in a different culture forces certain pragmatic concessions. These differences are not, however, usually that great.

4. Modified Sufis

What I call "modified" Sufis are sometimes hard to distinguish from "traditional" Sufis, especially since they normally claim to be "traditional." There are, however, certain groups in the West which are no more useful for our current purposes than are non-Muslim Sufis. They can often be identified by an unusual emphasis on the transcendent unity of all religions or by the incorporation of elements drawn from religions other than Islam.

In addition, it is important to distinguish between Shi'i and Sunni Sufis. Most Muslims being Sunni, a Sunni *tariqa* is usually preferable if there is any choice. More explanation will usually be required before a visit to a non-Sunni *tariqa*, since Shi'i practice (Sufi or non-Sufi) includes elements such as public weeping, which will often strike non-Shiis as bizarre. If an introduction to Shi'i Islam is required, it is difficult to do better than Roy Mottahedeh's *The Mantle of the Prophet: Learning and Power in Modern Iran*.²²

Once such a group has been identified and classified, the next step is to request permission from the shaykh to take a small group of students²³ to a *dhikr* or *hadra*. These ceremonies are often followed by a *dars* or lesson, which (if in English!) might be of considerable interest and provide material for later

discussion and elucidation; it might well be possible to arrange in advance for students to ask questions either of the shaykh or of individual followers.

In the absence of an available Sufi group, a possible alternative is an assignment to search the Web and prepare reports on different *tariqas* as represented there. Questions might then be asked of Sufis by e-mail.

Students' reactions to such visits, physical or on the Web, will require subsequent examination and elucidation — especially for physical visits. A good *dhikr* can be a very powerful experience, but may also be profoundly alien to many students — ironically, especially to some students from Muslim backgrounds, whose own understanding of Islam may be more *Salafi* than they realize.²⁴ It is also important to remind students that what they have seen is not the whole of Sufi practice, but only a part of it.

At the end of a course which has included the examination of the history of the Muslim world from the perspective of Sufism, students should be better able to conceive of Islam as a living religion, and so to see the broader social and political history of the Muslim world in a fresher and more revealing light. They will also be better equipped to understand any volumes of Sufi poetry they come across, and to bridge the culture gap between them and any Muslims they happen to meet. While neither of these latter outcomes is a standard objective of the teaching of world history, both are of real benefit in the broader perspective of equipping our students for life in an increasingly multi-cultural world.

ENDNOTES

1. These comments are based on an analysis of the works classified as Sufi and available from Amazon.com in July 1998. Amazon.com's system of classification is not, of course, entirely scientific, but gives a good idea of what is available to the reading public.

2. The Moroccan shaykh was Ahmad ibn Idris. See R.S. O'Fahey's *Enigmatic Saint: Ahmad ibn Idris and the Idrisi Tradition* (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1990).

3. The Arabic *tariqa* is usually translated as brotherhood, but even though Western brotherhoods may have been for brothers, most *tariqas* have been for sisters as well.

4. To be fair, few scholars would nowadays do this, but past positions taken by an earlier generation of scholars, as always, remain with us for some time after the consensus has been modified.

5. Ibn Taymiyya and al-Birgawi are two of the most important early critics of Sufi practices. There is unfortunately no comprehensive study of ibn

Taymiyya available in English, and almost no scholarly work on al-Birgawi in any language.

6. The Wahhabis are of course an interesting exception, preceding the *Salafis*. See Esther Peskes, *Muhammad b. Abdalwahhab (1703-92) im Widerstreit: Untersuchungen zur Rekonstruktion der Fruegeschichte der Wahhabiya* (Beirut: Beiruter Texte und Studien, 1993).

7. Much work on Sufism in the 1950s and 1960s followed a modernization paradigm which assumed that modern rationalism inevitably produced secularism. As we have seen in recent years, this has not happened.

8. "Judeo-Christian" is here used somewhat loosely, since there are strong similarities between aspects of the Mosaic law and the Islamic *Sharia* and it was Christ who so famously stopped the stoning of an adulterer by asking him who was without sin to cast the first stone.

9. Each shaykh has a *silsila* [chain], documenting the shaykh from whom he himself took, from whom his shaykh took, etc., etc., normally going back to the Prophet Muhammad.

10. The "whirling dervishes" were the Mevlevi followers of Rumi. See William Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Love: The Spiritual Teachings of Rumi* (1983) and Ira Friedlander, *The Whirling Dervishes* (1992).

11. In the absence of reliable legal and financial structures, the Sufi *tariqa* is one of the few structures beyond the family which can provide traders with a real reduction in credit risk.

12. In practice, what I call an Order will often also be referred to as a *tariqa*, even though there may have been no organizational links between its various parts for centuries. Any Order started as one *tariqa*, and then — as it spread — parts broke off and became organizationally independent *tariqas* in their own right.

13. A.J. Arberry's Sufism (London: 1950) is one of the classic accounts, but is now badly outdated. It also stops at the 14th century, regarding everything afterwards as "the decay of Sufism" — a decay which subsequent research has more or less established never to have really happened.

14. Martin Ling's classic, *A Sufi Saint of the Twentieth Century: Shaikh Ahmad al-Alawi*, is a very nicely written, if somewhat partisan, account of a great shaykh. Knut S. Vikor's recent *Sufi and Scholar on the Desert Edge: Muhammad b. Ali al-Sanusi and his Brotherhood* (London: 1995) is a more scholarly, if perhaps less entertaining, work. An interesting recent work from within an Order is Hisham Muhammad Kabbani's *The Naqshbandi Sufi Way: History and Guidebook of the Saints of the Golden Chain* (Chicago: Kazi, 1995).

15. This has been translated by Victor Danner as *Sufi Aphorisms*, but is now out of print.

16. A fine short abstract of some sections of his great *Ihya* is the *Inner Dimensions of Islamic Worship*, edited by Muhtar Holland, which is unfortunately no longer easily available. Great care should be taken in selecting translations, because many others are highly unreliable. Those published by the Islamic Texts Society in Cambridge, England, are however of a uniformly high standard.

17. See especially Ira M. Lapidus' *Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), Michael M. Winter's *Society and Religion in Early Ottoman Egypt: Studies in the Writings of Abd al-Wahhab al-Sharani* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1982), and Vincent J. Cornell's *Realm of the Saint: Power and Authority in Moroccan Sufism* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998).

18. *Turuq and Turuq-linked Institutions in Nineteenth Century Egypt: A Historical Study in Organizational Dimensions of Islamic Mysticism* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978).

19. This has yet to be distributed in final form, but previews have been well received.

20. These should, at a minimum, include the need to keep a reasonably low profile, to pass behind someone who is praying rather than directly in front of them, and to dress in a suitable fashion. Different groups in the West may have slightly different views on suitable dress, which can easily be established in advance either by discussion or by observation.

21. Many other systems of classification are of course possible. This system is more fully explored in my "How Traditional are the Traditionalists? The Case of the Guénorian Sufis" (forthcoming in Mikael Rothstein and Reender Kranenborg, eds., *Proceedings of the 11th International Congress of CESNUR*. Århus: Århus University Press).

22. This book also serves as an excellent introduction to modern Iran and the Islamic Republic.

23. The appropriate size of the group to visit depends, of course, on the number of the Sufis assembled. It may be necessary to break a class into groups. Thirty students and twenty Sufis would produce an atmosphere quite different from fifty Sufis and five students — and a request to take such disproportionate numbers of visitors might well be rejected, for that reason.

24. One mark of the *Salafis'* success is that many Muslims whose views a researcher would unhesitatingly classify as *Salafi* do not even know the word, and would describe their positions not as *Salafi* but as true Islam.

WORLD HISTORY AT CHERRY CREEK

HIGH SCHOOL

Englewood, Colorado

Teachers

Beth Montgomery

Kathryn (Gussie) Wyndham

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COURSE RATIONALE

To be a success as an adult, students need to recognize and appreciate the influence cultures have had on each other. World history provides a forum for exploring not only historical cultures, but also for recognizing the influence of various cultures on our world today. For example, students whose life goals include travel, work in business, or missionary work would all find world history relevant to their experiences in the modern world.

Because of the interconnectedness of our world, the study of patterns or lack of patterns among people, environments, time, and place is crucial. Students need to understand that geography and culture had tremendous influence over the decisions people made about how they lived their lives. By developing the skills and perspectives of a world historian, young people can begin to make thoughtful decisions about their own roles in the world in which we live today.

COURSE GOALS

Students in world history need to develop skills and content knowledge. Since world history differs

from United States history and European history in that there is no real linear story that encapsulates all of time and place, the focus should be on raising and answering important questions rather than on telling or memorizing all of human history. The list of periods and regions below represents the parameters of our departmental course description, but our course is an attempt to blend these fairly linear topics into a more comprehensive, thematic, and skill-oriented course suitable for sophomores.

A. Content Goals at Cherry Creek High School.

The department has agreed that all courses in world history must address the following subject areas:

1. Ancient Civilizations of the Middle East
2. Ancient India and China
3. Classical Greece
4. The Roman World and Christianity
5. Medieval Europe
6. The Islamic World
7. The Renaissance and the Reformation
8. The French Revolution and the Napoleonic Age/Age of Democratic Revolutions
9. Industrialization and Ideologies
10. The Russian Revolutions
11. Totalitarianism and World War

Courses may also include one or more of the following additional units:

Prehistory	The Byzantine Empire
Feudal Japan	Growth of Absolute Monarchy
Sub-Saharan Africa	Scientific Revolution and Enlightenment
Latin American Revolutions	

B. Themes

For this world history course, students will study the subjects above, but they will use the following themes to help maintain a more world historical frame of mind. These themes are introduced in the first week of school and become the basis for the oral portion of the final examination at the end of the year. Students use examples from the topics studied to prove that the following themes make sense.

1. Connections and interrelationships among civilizations and cultures are historically normal. Cultural isolation is the exception rather than the rule.

2. Civilizations all consist of various systems: political, economic, social, religious, or philosophical. Yet, in spite of this pattern, these systems differ tremendously from time to time and place to place. Why is that?

3. History is full of examples of optimism as well as of war, disease, and hatred.
 4. Superpowers, or civilizations which had tremendous influence and control over other parts of the world, existed before the United States and the USSR. What happened to them?
 5. Was A.D.1500 a turning point in world history? Did the events which linked the Old World and the New World fundamentally alter human history, or were the changes part of a larger pattern that had been established in the Old World for centuries?
 6. Nationalism is both a creative and destructive force.
 7. Technology has been the basis for many of the significant changes in the ways people in the world live their everyday lives.
- ## C. Skill Goals
1. Students work with primary and secondary sources
 2. Students develop research skills
 3. Students develop reading comprehension and analytical skills
 4. Students develop essay writing skills
 5. Students recognize how art reflects cultural values and concerns
 6. Students develop map reading skills
 7. Students use computers for projects and/or papers and learn Internet use
 8. Students work well in groups
 9. Students learn to ask and answer broad historical questions
 10. Students develop oral communication skills
- ## COURSE DESCRIPTION
- ### First Quarter. Introduction to World History and Early Civilization
- #### A. Introduction to Themes and Ways of Thinking
- Geography: Different views of the world map from different countries activity.
 - Historiography and textbook analysis: How historians limit what they emphasize. What are the most important world events in the last 100 years? (Individual and then group activity.) Who wrote the book? What is in the table of contents? Why did they choose these things? Are they the most important? To whom? This is one source, but it is not the almighty.

- Technology: Go through the textbook and look for examples of technology. How is it presented? Who has it? What use is it? See clips from *Ran* and from *Zulu* to see how technology is used in these films. Develop sensitivity for non-Western cultures.

B. What is a Civilization?

- Building Vocabulary: Government, Economy, Social Systems, Religion — how do these institutions develop? What are the similarities and differences?
- What is cultural diffusion, and how powerful a force is it?
- Ancient Middle East
- India
- China
- Sumer becomes a case study and then other civilizations become focus for structured research project. The goal is to write a descriptive paper on another ancient civilization and then to use that as a basis for debriefing and determining the similarities and differences among ancient civilizations.

C. The Beginnings of Western Civilization

The development of ethics, philosophy, individualism, and large-scale civilization with large-scale military organization.

- Ancient Greeks
- Ancient Jews
- Ancient Romans

Focus on Art: To what extent does the art of ancient Greece and Rome reflect the ideals and values of these people?

Second Quarter. Comparative Religions, Comparative Political Systems: Unifier or Divider?

- Comparative Religious Systems: Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, Islam. Religious systems as different responses to common human questions.
- What themes do all world religions address?
- What are the similarities and differences among world religions?
- What makes each of these religions WORLD religions?
- Art on the Internet research project Class Web page.

- The Crusades: Case study of conflict caused by strong religious belief. Primary sources from the Christian and Islamic perspectives.
- The Medieval World: Europe, Mongols, Japan

Centralization and Decentralization in three societies over time. Define terms: centralize and decentralize. How important is unity and how can unity be achieved in different civilizations?

- Compare and Contrast the Development of Europe and Japan after the fall of the Empire in A.D. 500.
- How did a nomadic civilization become a unified, powerful force in Central Asia? Did it affect the history of Eurasia? (Mongols)

Third Quarter. How did Europe become the dominant world civilization after A.D. 1500?

- Compare and contrast the geography, ideals, technology, and world power status of Ming China, Ottoman Empire, Songhai (West Africa), Aztecs, Renaissance and Reformation Europe. Why did Europe emerge as such a powerful force? How did differing priorities and needs shape this development? In-class essay examination.
- Alternative paths for industrialization: England, on the Continent in the 18th century, Stalin's Five Year Plans, Cold War choices — whose model to follow?
- Imperialism as an extension of industrialization and mass production. Globalization of industry.
- French Revolution and the Age of Democratic Revolutions (U.S. and Latin America). Is this truth? Economic opportunism? Enlightenment fever?

WHA

Further, two different strategies building on different understandings of gender prevailed. One understood women as basically different from men, but nevertheless as important as men to the nation. The other saw the inclusion of women in the nation with the same political rights as men as an expression of the equal potential of the two sexes. Although the difference strategy could lead to the same conclusion, there was a tendency for this strategy to uphold existing gender hierarchies. The difference strategy consequently seems to have been the preference of conservative political forces.

How may we explain such parallels? If we see them as expressions of a universal gender order or gender system, how may the existence of that order be explained?

Basic gender relations ... seem to transcend cultural differences.

Cross-cultural parallels may point to universalities in human behavior. Understandings of gender seem to rest on deep mental structures, regulating feminine and masculine behavior and changing only very slowly. Consciously or unconsciously, these mental structures may influence expectations as to acceptable thoughts, actions, and strategies by the two sexes. Basic gender relations, the very understanding of feminine and masculine identities, seem to transcend cultural differences. A universal gender hierarchy has given rise to theories of patriarchy, seeing the dichotomies man-woman, public-private, strong-weak, and so on, as universalities.

Does this mean that gender was more important to the construction of the nation-state than class, caste, ethnicity, or other social categories?

My answer is, sometimes yes, sometimes no. Constructing a nation-state might result in the problem of competing loyalties. Loyalty to a nation might compete with loyalty to one's class or sex. In

some situations, loyalty to one's sex was stronger than loyalty to one's nation. In Scandinavia, for a long time, and despite the national crisis, leaders of the middle-class women's organizations cooperated sisterly across the Norwegian-Swedish border. For women and men of the Social Democratic parties, the national conflict brought no problems of cooperation. Gender — and class — proved more important than nationality.

Alliance across national borders was also important in Asian nations. Japan found inspiration for political reform in Western cultures, among other things for a modern education of middle-class women. The All India Women's Conference cooperated with British suffragists. But the harder the national conflicts grew, the more problematic became alliances across national divides. Conflicts of loyalty arose. As I understand it, at some point cooperation between Indian and British feminists in the question of female suffrage became extremely difficult. The heated atmosphere between the two nations made loyalty to nation more important than loyalty to sex. No doubt, Western inspiration for changes in the situation of Japanese women was short-lived, and even for one of the prominent women in the Norwegian women's movement, Gina Krog, loyalty to the Norwegian nation in 1905 for a while put a stop to cooperation with Swedish women. Krog's Swedish counterparts were appalled when she characterized Sweden as "a sly, malignant robber." Scandinavian sisterly cooperation entered an extremely cool period. Conflicts between loyalty to gender — and class — and loyalty to nation were evident in a number of European nations at the outbreak of the First World War when socialists and suffragists had to choose which cause to support.

The varying reactions — giving priority to gender, to nation, or to class — may be explained by the

concept of fractured identities. Conceiving historical agents as individuals with a number of possible identities, and consequently with a number of latent loyalties to defend, helps explain changing priorities. One aspect of a person's or a social group's identity will come to the foreground the moment this aspect is threatened or otherwise activated.³⁵ This will explain changing reactions. National crises activated national loyalties, gender conflicts activated loyalties, just as class — and in some nations, caste or ethnic — conflicts brought these loyalties to the forefront.

No doubt, a number of worldwide parallels present themselves in the study of the process of constructing the nation-state. But there were certainly also outstanding differences.

CULTURAL DIFFERENCES

Geyer and Bright have maintained that "the crucial watershed inaugurating 20th-century world history consisted in a series of parallel, simultaneous crises in the organization of power, production, and culture — that is, in the autonomous reproduction — of virtually every region of the world."³⁶ Studying similar strategies within different cultures, highlights variations of the global trajectory.

One of the main differences in the interplay of gender and nation-building was the fact of very dissimilar goals that would have to be reached in order to pave the way for women to acquire political citizenship. In Japan and India, priority was given to safeguarding women's physical and psychic integrity within a culture where the problems discussed were concubinage, child marriages, the total submission under husband and mother-in-law, and prohibition of widow re-marriage. In this setting, to see women as members of the nation in the same way as men was a distant goal for a very small part of the population.

Gender relations in Europe, and

especially in Scandinavia, were totally different. In a number of countries, around 1900, women had gained the right to the same education as men, and married women were no longer lawfully regarded as minors. Part of the women's emancipation movement

The idea to include women in the nation by giving them the vote on the same conditions as men was not a very far cry.

fought for the right of married women to have an economic activity of their own outside the family, and for women to keep their national citizenship also when marrying a foreigner. The idea to include women in the nation by giving them the vote on the same conditions as men was not a very far cry.

Consequently, despite common, deep-seated ideas of gender differences, cultural variations were decisive in the way gender differences manifested themselves in the construction of the nation-state.

Is it possible to find central elements that may help explain culturally different implications of gender for national citizenship? Let me suggest as one important element the very different importance given to collectivity and to individualism. Economic structures may influence priorities given either to the group or to the individual and present conditions favorable or unfavorable to a hierarchical family structure. Ideologically, religion may favor one or the other of these ways of regulating human relations.

In rural societies where social welfare policies were scant, kin and family built the only safety nets in case of need, when sickness, accidents, poverty, or old age threatened the individual. Family and kin were therefore the most important center for all loyalties. This would put an obstacle to any wish for individual rights. In many cases, such a wish would not even arise. With a patriarchal family

and kinship system, individual rights would certainly be more far-fetched for women than for men. In Japan and India, religion may also have strengthened the concept of a stable and strongly patriarchal kinship system and a submissive wife. At the risk of lumping together very disparate cultures, it may be said that hierarchical and fundamentalist religious beliefs, be they within Hinduism, Confucianism, Christianity, Judaism, or Islam, are inimical to accepting women as individuals with the same potentials as men and consequently hesitant to accept women as citizens with the same rights as men.³⁷

Around the turn of the century, industrialization and urbanization had for some time also loosened the ties between family and individual in Western and Northern Europe. At the end of the 19th century, the first steps were taken towards what would later be termed "the welfare state," gradually providing a public safety net around the individual to secure basic needs. In Northern Europe, and especially in Scandinavia, the Lutheran Church had for a long time stressed individual freedom. This added to the weakening of collective kinship ties and made the road to individualism easier. But even here, this road had higher barriers for women than for men.

However, it is important not to see cultures as absolute entities.

However, it is important not to see cultures as absolute entities. Internal factions and conflicts over values and ideas characterize any culture, among these, conflicts over gender relations. Regional differences may be of the utmost importance. The question of loyalty to the family, of collectivity versus individualism, as well as religious and economic circumstances, differed widely from Northern to Southern Europe, as it did within different regions of

Asia and other parts of the globe. Although very different political developments of course played an important part in this question, the Catholic Church and the agrarian economy of Southern Europe may in part explain why women in most Mediterranean countries did not gain political citizenship until after World War II, while women in Northern Europe and the United States attained the right to vote around the First World War.³⁸ As for India, small groups of women got the vote through the Government of India Act of 1935, while a proposal by the Japanese government for restricting voting rights for women in local elections was rejected by the Upper House of the Diet. Japanese women had to wait until 1945, Indian women until 1950, to attain the same political rights in the nation as men.³⁹

CONCLUSION

Sketching gendered patterns of national symbols and looking for common strategies in the construction of nation-states as different as Japan, India, Sweden, and Norway, is, of course, only a small and uncertain step on the way towards global gender history. A multitude of specific and comparative studies shall be needed, clarifying similarities and differences. However, the resulting patterns of thinking, I am sure, will prove extremely helpful in understanding the gendered nature of politics, nationally and internationally.

A gender analysis of global history highlights the importance of gender to central historical processes. The construction of nation-states worldwide involved both sexes, albeit in different ways. As competitive elections became part of political systems worldwide, an arena for political gender relations was created. In fact, gender relations were seen by some contemporaries as indicators of the success of nation-building. At the first session of the Indian National Congress, in 1889, one of the parti-

pants asked political reformers of all shades of opinion never to forget that "unless the elevation of the female element of the nation proceeds *pari passu* with their work, all their labor for the political enfranchisement of the country will prove vain."⁴⁰ Investigating the connection between "the elevation of the female element of the nation" and the construction of nation-states will result in better knowledge of the gender-specific circumstances and possibilities for historical actors, and, consequently, in a better understanding of how societies and nations function.

Gender relations may be perceived as part of cultural flows, interacting with ideo-scapes of democracy, freedom, and welfare. Women and men, globally and within varying cultures, often based their actions on shared understandings of femininity and masculinity. Such understandings might be stable through long periods, in fact, so stable that they were translated into symbols for the nation itself. Although important changes in society, such as the formation of nation-states, affected gender relations in culturally specific ways, global studies of the importance of gender to the formation of nation-states deconstructs the often suggested polarization of women and men as actors within the private and the public arenas respectively. Although political action took gendered forms, both sexes were actively engaged in the process of nation-building, and this process comprised the home and family as well as public parliaments and political parties.

Applying gender analysis to global history indicates that although the histories of women and men have a lot in common, just like the multiple histories of the world,⁴¹ women and men have had some gender-specific historical experiences. Consequently, to study also the hidden operations of gender is important for a thorough understanding of the complicated patterns of historical transformations, at the global as well as at all other levels.

ENDNOTES

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- Development of Feminist Enterprises in Modern Korea, 1860-1910," pp. 120-36. See also Ida Blom: "Das Zusammenwirken von Nationalismus und Feminismus um die Jahrhundertwende: Ein Versuch zur vergleichenden Geschlechtergeschichte," in Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocke Kocka: *Geschichte unter Vergleich. Ansätze und Ergebnisse international vergleichender Geschichtsschreibung* (Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag, 1996), pp. 315-38.
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14. Scott, 1988, p. 27.
15. R.W. Connell, *Gender and Power*, 1987.
16. Arjun Appadurai: "Disjunction and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy," in Mike Featherstone, ed.: *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity* (London: Sage Publications, 1990), pp. 295-310.
17. Leonore Davidoff: *Worlds Between. Historical Perspectives on Gender and Class* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 227-76. For a stimulating analysis of changing understandings of gender and race, see Catherine Hall: "Missionary Stories: gender and ethnicity in England in the 1830s and 1840s," in Catherine Hall: *White, Male and Middle Class. Experimental Feminism and History* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), pp. 205-54.
18. Ladewig Petersen, 1995, p. 25.
19. Although mostly acting as substitutes for men, reigning queens might wield decisive personal power. As mothers, wives, and lovers, other women might seriously influence male kings and princes. Even in the modern world, women may gain political leadership through family positions, such as being widows or daughters of former important politicians. For example: Indira Gandhi, India; Khaleda Zia, Bangladesh; and Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan. See Sverre Bagge and Solvi Søgner in Blom, 1992, vol. 1., pp. 343-59; vol. 2, pp. 15-23; and Else Skjonsberg in Blom, 1993, vol. 3, pp. 273-84.
20. Louise Tilly and Patricia Guerin, eds.: *Women, Politics and Change* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1990). See also Blom, 1992, vol. 2, pp. 511-31, and the massive discussion, especially among American scholars, on gender and social policies. See Erinn Larsen: "Gender and the Welfare State" - Maternalism - a new historical concept? Cand. philol. thesis at the Dept. of History, University of Bergen, Spring 1996. For Norway, see Margrethe Tone Birkenes: "et stille tog..." *Kvinner frivillige organiserte samfunnsaktivitet i Kristiansand 1901-1907*. Cand. philol. thesis at the Dept. of History, University of Bergen, Fall 1995.
21. Joan W. Scott: "Deconstructing Equality-versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of Poststructuralist Theory for Feminism," in *Feminist Studies*, vol. 14, no. 1, spring 1988, pp. 33-50. Rimmen-Nielsen 1992. See also Kari Melby: "Women's Ideology: Difference, Equality, or a New Femininity: Women Teachers and Nurses in Norway 1912-40," in Andreasen, ed.: *Moving on. New Perspectives on the Women's Movement*. Acta Jutlandica LXVII:1 Humanities Series 66. Århus University Press, Århus, pp. 138-54. Kari Melby: *Kvindelighetens strategier. Norges Husmorforbund 1915-40. Norges Lærinneforbund 1912-40*. Dr. Philos. avhandling in history, Universitetet i Trondheim, 1995, pp. 31-61 and 381-411.
22. Oystein Sorensen: "Nasjonalisme, skandinavisme og pangermanisme hos Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson," in *Nasjonal identitet - et kunstprodukt?* in Oystein Sorensen, ed.: *KUL skrifserie no. 30/Nasjonal identitet no. 5* (Oslo: Norges forskningsråd, 1994), p. 211.
23. Oyvind Osterud, "Er nasjonalstaten foreldet?" in *Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift*, vol. 9, no. 4, 1992, pp. 351-364. Benedict Anderson: *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983). Eric Hobsbaw: *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
24. For India, see Basu, 1995; for Japan, see Hayakawa, 1995. Mau-

rice Agulhin discusses the possibility of democratic regimes being symbolized by women, authoritarian regimes by men, in Maurice Agulhin: *Marianne au pouvoir. L'imagerie et la symbolique républiques de 1880 à 1914* (Paris: Flammarion, 1989), pp. 347-49. A very helpful overview of women's history outside Europe and North America is Iris Berger, et al.: *Restoring Women to History: Teaching Packets for Integrating Women's History into Courses on Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Middle East* (Organization of American Historians, 112 No. Bryan St., Bloomington, IN 47408-4199, USA), 1988. Sharon L. Sievers writes on "Women in China, Japan, and Korea," pp. 63-118; and Barbara Ramusak on "Women in South and South East Asia," pp. 1-63. Where nothing else is indicated, the following is built on Sievers, Ramusak, and Blom, 1993. See also Rosemarie Schade and Keith J. Lowther: *Gender Balancing History: Towards an Inclusive Curriculum*, vols. 1-7 (Montreal: Simone de Beauvoir Institute, Concordia University, 1993).

25. Ida Blom: "Nation - Class - Gender: Scandinavia at the Turn of the Century," in *Scandinavian Journal of History*, vol. 21, 1996, pp. 1-16.

26. Blom in Haupt and Kocka, 1996. For a closer analysis of Norwegian national symbols, see Blom, 1996.

27. A long number of explanations for these costumes exist in the different cultures. See Blom in Offen, Pierson and Rendall, 1991. Blom, 1994, pp. 79-97.

28. C.J. Heuch, cited from Eva Kolstad: *Utsnitt av lovforslag, komite-innstillinger og debatter i Stortinget om stemmerett for kvinner*. O. Fredr. Arnesen Bok -og Aktionstrykkeri A/S. Oslo, 1963, p. 163.

29. Hayakawa, 1995; Yukiko Matsukawa and Kaoru Tachi: "Women's Suffrage and Gender Politics in Japan," in Caroline Daley and Melanie Nolan, eds.: *Suffrage and Beyond: International Perspectives* (New York: New York University Press, 1994), pp. 171-83. Marjorie Wall Bingham and Susan Hill Gross: *Women in Japan from Ancient Times to the Present* (Minneapolis: Glenhurst Publications, 1987), pp. 167-72.

30. Basu, 1995. Ramusack in Berger, 1988, pp. 17-26.

31. Olive Banks: *Faces of Feminism. A Study of Feminism as a Social Movement* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981), pp. 61-150. Blom, 1992, vol. 2, pp. 511-31. Smith, 1989, pp. 348-57. Dayle and Nolan, 1994.

32. Blom, 1996.

33. Dagny, 1905, no. 12, p. 238. Quoted in Blom, 1996, p. 8.

34. Birkeland, 1995.

35. Tuija Pulkkinen: "Citizens, Nations and Women: The Transition from Ancient Regime to Modernity and Beyond." Paper for the International Federation for Research in Women's History Symposium, *Rethinking Women and Gender Relations in the Modern State*, Bielefeld, April 1993. See also Peggy Pascoe: "Introduction" and "Race, Gender and Intercultural Relations: The Case of Interracial Marriages," in *Frontiers*, vol. 12, 1/1991, pp. 1-18, and Gerda Lerner: "Reconceptualising Differences Among Women," in *Journal of Women's History*, vol. 1, no. 3, Winter 1990, pp. 106-122.

36. Geyer and Bright, p. 1045.

37. Blom, 1992, pp. 514 and 528.

38. In Spain, women got the vote

in 1931. But that was a very special case. There had been little fight to obtain a right that was in the eyes of many radical Spaniards compromised by the existing political regime. Mary Nash: "Political Culture, Catalan Nationalism, and the Women's Movement in Early Twentieth-Century Spain," in *Women's Studies International Forum*, vol. 19, 1-2/1996, pp. 45-54.

39. Mitsukawa and Tachi, 1994; Basu, 1995; Hayakawa, 1995; Blom, 1993.

40. Basu, 1995, p. 97.

41. Geyer and Bright, p. 1058.

WHA

HAWAII 6TH GRADERS WIN WHA PRIZE AT NATIONAL HISTORY DAY COMPETITION

Three sixth grade students from Kapunahala Elementary School in Kaneohe, Hawaii, were the recipients of the World History Association Prize at the 1998 National History Day program held at the University of Maryland this June. The overall theme of the 1998 National History Day program was "Migrations in History." Landen Buckley, Matthew Hara, and Christopher Yamashita won the WHA Prize in the Junior Group Media Division for their 10-minute video entitled "The Silk Road: Pathway for Migration of Ideas and Culture During the Han Dynasty." What follows are a description of the National History Day program by Mr. Tim Connell, the WHA's liaison with the National History Day organization; an introduction to the boys' prizewinning project by their faculty adviser, Ms.

Irene Yamashita; the annotated bibliography detailing the research materials used for the project; and the text of the script written by the boys for the video.

About National History Day
by Tim Connell, Laurel School,
Shaker Heights, Ohio

National History Day is a yearly competition at the local, state, and national levels that in 1997 attracted over 600,000 student entries. There are two divisions to the competition: the junior level (grades 6-8) and senior (grades 9-12). Students' presentations can be essays, projects, media presentations, or performances. Except for the essays, students may choose to present their ideas either as individuals or in groups of up to five students. There is a yearly theme that serves as the focus for student work. For 1998, the theme was "Migrations in History," and next year it will be "Science, Technology, Invention: Impact, Influence, and Changes." Every year the World History Association presents a \$250 prize at the national competition for the best entry on world

history using a cross-cultural theme. For more information, teachers should contact Dr. Cathy Gorn, Executive Director, National History Day, University of Maryland, 0119 Cecil Hall, College Park, MD 20742. Tel: (301) 314-9739; FAX: (301) 314-9767.

About this Project
by Irene Yamashita, Kapunahala Elementary School, Kaneohe, Hawaii

Landen Buckley, Matthew Hara, and Christopher Yamashita were the scriptwriters, camera operators, editors, and narrators for this 10-minute video.

They captured the history of the Silk Road, starting with the Han Dynasty in 206 B.C. It was a challenge for them to gather primary sources, because the materials were printed in Chinese dating back many centuries. We therefore went to the Academy of Arts in Honolulu to study and observe a rare collection of artifacts from the Han Dynasty. The students

videotaped these objects and also interviewed the docent, who was very knowledgeable about Chinese history. The greatest challenge these sixth graders faced was researching all of the various primary and secondary resources, and synthesizing that information to produce a well-researched script. Throughout the project, they constantly faced difficulties in learning to work together and stay focused on their task. However, when they finally reached production, the fun started. The boys enjoyed videotaping with a digital camera and editing on 3/4" UMATIC decks. The final video was edited digitally on the Media 100 by the savvy young producers.

It was an ordeal winning first place in Hawaii's History Day and competing in the National History Day in Maryland, but it was worth the pain because the experiences they gained are for a lifetime. The building of personal relationships, commitment, and perseverance are life skills that will help them in the choices they make throughout their lives. It's rewarding for me to see how the experience of participation in National History Day has broadened their experi-



Landen Buckley, Chris Yamashita, Matthew Hara
at National History Day, University of Maryland, College Park.

ences and expectations. Hearing them say, "We want to do it again next year!" makes me think that this is what teaching is all about. Successful learning experiences foster positive attitudes for lifelong learners.

Annotated Bibliography

SILK ROAD: PATHWAY FOR MIGRATION OF IDEAS AND CULTURE DURING THE HAN DYNASTY

We chose to do our History Project on the Silk Road because it was a unique topic and we thought it would be interesting to see how it affected civilizations and the way we live today. One of the first things we did was collect information from interviews, books, and videos. We had the difficult task of finding primary resources. We first interviewed an expert Silk Road tour guide named Mrs. Traudl Li. Mrs. Li gave us a general idea about the history of the Silk Road in all the different dynasties. We also interviewed Dr. Tao, who is a professor of ancient Chinese history at the University of Hawaii, Manoa. Dr. Tao showed us maps and pointed out specific important places. Dr. James Landen Buckley, Chris Yamashita, Matthew Hara, and Ms. Irene Yamashita; after winning the World History Award at National History Day.

We decided to choose the Han Dynasty because that was the start of the Silk Road. We gathered

some information from books and tapes. We also watched a video series called *The Silk Road*. These videos helped us get a closer look at the Silk Road since we could not go to China. From these videos we could see how the ancient civilization lived, traded, and traveled. This eventually helped us with our script. We also visited the Honolulu Academy of Arts to observe and study some primary sources. We videotaped artifacts during the Han Dynasty. A docent named Betsy Robb showed us around and shared some interesting information about the museum's art pieces.

After months of research and collecting all information, we wrote our script for our video project. First we needed to divide up the six main topics in our script. Each of us chose two topics. We went through about five drafts before finalizing our script. We recorded our voices and then needed to decide on some background music. We used a

script. To edit, we used a 3/4" videotape editing system, which really helped. We knew quite a lot about all the equipment we worked with. It was exciting to see the final product when it was completed.

Doing this project helped our group understand and learn about ancient civilizations and how ideas are passed down. When we first started, we didn't know anything specific about the Silk Road. We only knew that it had to do with silk. Now we feel like experts. We now know how good a life we have compared to the travelers who took great risks to make a living. We think we should thank the founding fathers of the Silk Road whose explorations brought new ideas and cross-cultural relationships and understanding.

Primary Sources

Bronze Death Mask, Liao Dynasty (ca. A.D. 907-1125). Honolulu Academy of Arts.

We learned that death masks were put on corpses to give them a happy journey to the next life.

Buddha (ca. A.D. 100-200). Honolulu Academy of Arts.

We learned that silk is a much different fabric than the Roman toga. The toga is much heavier and thicker.

Crouching mythical beast, Six Dynasties Period (ca. A.D. 300-500). Honolulu Academy of Arts.

This crouching beast was put in places to keep evil spirits away. It was usually put in tombs.

Man playing instrument, Han Dynasty. Honolulu Academy of Arts.



digital camera and a HI 8 camera to record shots of pictures and artwork to use in our video. Now we needed to match the video with the audio in our script.

Editing the video was one of the hardest parts, next to writing the

We learned that the Chinese made an instrument called a "qin."

Man (scholar), Han Dynasty (ca. A.D. 100-200). Honolulu Academy of Arts.

We learned that there were scholars during the Han Dynasty.

Mirrors with Daoist immortals and animals, Three Kingdoms Period (ca. A.D. 220-265). Honolulu Academy of Arts.

We learned that back then they used to shine bronze plates during the Han Dynasty to use as a mirror.

Pendant, Han Dynasty. Honolulu Academy of Arts.

This pendant had a symmetrical design and it required skilled craftsmen to make it. We learned that they had tools in the Han Dynasty to make exquisite jewelry.

Pendant, Han Dynasty. Honolulu Academy of Arts.

We learned that Han women wore gold and jade jewelry.

Pendant, Han Dynasty. Honolulu Academy of Arts.

We learned that jade and gold were the most valuable stones in the Han Dynasty.

Tomb Sculpture, from the Eastern Han Dynasty (ca. A.D. 1-100), Sichuan Province. Honolulu Academy of Arts.

This farmer helped us learn about what tools they used when they farmed.

Tricorn (beast), Han Dynasty. Honolulu Academy of Arts.

This mythical beast, similar to the unicorn, was put at the front of entrances to scare away the evil spirits so the structure would be blessed.

Watchtower models, Han Dynasty. Honolulu Academy of Arts.

We learned that watchtowers were placed along the Silk Road to

warn travelers of enemies.

Warrior, Han Dynasty. Honolulu Academy of Arts.

From this artifact we learned about what kind of armor and weapons warriors used during the Han Dynasty.

Secondary Sources

Boulnois, Luce. *The Silk Road*. E.P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1996.

We used photographs in this for our video. We used this book to find out about Changan and when Wu-di sent him on two expeditions. Also, we found out how he discovered heavenly horses.

Braunstone, David M. and Irene M. Franck. *The Silk Road: A History*. New York: Facts on File, 1986.

This book was used for learning about the oasis city, Loulan, and the Jade Gate. It also told us about the beacon stations and what they looked like.

Cameron, Ian. *Mountains of the Gods*. London: Century Publishing, 1984.

Pictures and paintings of places along the Silk Road from this book were used in our video.

Carter, Alden. *China Past — China Future*. New York: Franklin Watts, 1994.

From this book we were able to find information on geography. We also used it for pictures of geography and places. We were able to find the location of Kushan.

Gruen, Erich S. "Ancient Rome." The World Book Encyclopedia. Volumes Q-R, 1991, pp. 436-449.

We used this book for shots in our video.

Hudson, G.F. *Europe and China*. London: Edward Arnold

and Company, 1931.

We used this book as a reference on the traveling of silk. We learned that the Romans were very eager to get the precious silk.

Kang Pai, and Wu Ju-Sung. *Chung-Hua Ku Wen Ming Ta Tu Chi*. Hong Kong: Tsung tse hua jen Tsui, 1992.

We found a drawing of Emperor Han Wu Di in this book, so we used that picture for our video.

Kotker, Norman. *The Horizon History of China*. New York: American Heritage Publishing, 1969.

The pictures in this book were about heavenly horses and Buddhas which eventually went into our video.

Kranz, Rachel. *Across Asia By Land*. New York: Facts on File, 1991.

Geography was an important part of our script. This is what the book was mostly about. It also talked about some oasis cities.

Kublian, Hyman. *China*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972.

We used this book for reference on the Silk Road's oasis cities. It also talked about the Stone Tower and its meeting places important to trade. It also helped us to understand where goods traveled once they reached this point in the Silk Road.

Lattimore, Owen. *Inner Asian Frontiers*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1962.

From this book we learned about the people along the Silk Road. We learned about the Jade Gate and about who traveled along the Silk Road. We also learned about the terrain and the goods traded.

Liu, Xinnu. *Silk and Religion*. Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1996.

We got from this book an explanation of the different

religions. We learned about Buddhism and how it traveled from India to Central Asia.

McLenighan, Valjean. *China A History to 1949*. Chicago: Children's Press, 1983.

This book gave us information on the Silk Road today. We used this book to find out about nomads and their lifestyle that they adopted to the conditions along the Silk Road. We also videotaped pictures of nomads and other people, terrain, and trading between caravans.

Reid, Straun. *The Silk and Spice Routes Exploration By Sea*. New York: Unesco Publishing, 1994.

Reading this book taught us about the sea traders and what islands they stopped at to trade. It also taught us about the route they took. There were also several great maps in this book.

"Roman Coins," Gryphon Numismatics Ancient Coins.

Video Script The Silk Road: Pathway for Migration

For thousands of years the Silk Road served as a famous trading route and a pathway for the migration of people, ideas, religion, and culture. This rich exchange would influence the East, the West, and the rest of the world.

The Silk Road began in 138 B.C. during the Han Dynasty. C.G. Han Dynasty 206 B.C. to A.D. 220. It wasn't called the "Silk Road" until the 19th century when a German geographer, Baron Ferdinand von Richthofen, gave it its name because, historically, silk was the most important good traveling on this trade route.

For 2,000 years, the process of making silk was a guarded secret known only to the Chinese, and because of this, silk was in great demand. Silk brought prosperity to China, and with it, the power of

trade. Everyone came to them for silk, goods, and ideas.

It was through the trading of silk that provided the pathway for China's expansion into new territories beyond its Great Wall. Explorations along the Silk Road also helped China conquer its barbarian neighbors. Ultimately, the Silk Road opened the pathway for trade with the powerful Roman Empire in the West.

For these reasons, the migration of people, ideas, culture, and religion along the Silk Road provided the greatest intellectual and cultural exchange that would eventually influence the entire world.

Traveling on the road was a difficult task because it started from China's ancient capital, Chang'an, and extended 5,000 miles west, ending in the Roman Empire. It was too difficult for anyone to complete the crossing of the entire Silk Road, so goods and ideas were passed from one traveler to another. The greatest obstacles travelers faced were the treacherous terrain, extreme weather conditions, and limited supplies of food and water.

To begin the journey, travelers would leave the Great Wall's protection when they passed through Yumen, known as the Jade Gate. At this point they entered Central Asia's Tarim Basin. The Takla Makan Desert, which means "Nothing living ever returns," is located in the center of the Tarim Basin, because a sudden sand storm could bury a whole caravan or even an entire city.

Beyond the Tarim Basin lay the oasis cities. One of them was Loulan, which was an important oasis city because it provided shelter for travelers during the years when the Silk Road was the most important route westward.

Past the oasis cities lie the Pamir Mountains, also known as the "Roof of the world." Parts of the Pamir were so narrow that it had to be crossed by foot. Once travelers passed the Pamirs they came to Stone Tower, a central meeting place for merchants from

China, India, Persia, and Bactria. From this point, goods traveled south through Bactria and on to India. Some goods went north, but most went through Persia. Persia traded with the Greeks, who took the goods west to Rome.

Silk was a great sensation in Rome, and silk garments became highly fashionable among Roman aristocrats. In fact, the Roman Empire spent so much of its wealth and gold on silk and luxuries from the East that the Roman Emperor Tiberius passed a law forbidding Roman men to wear silk.

The demand for silk drove prices up, and the cost of silk rose each time it was traded along the Silk Road. Westbound traders capitalized on silk as being a highly prized commodity in the West, and took back luxury items and new foods to trade with China. The Chinese desired luxuries from the West such as green and white jade, blue lapis lazuli, colored glass, and powerful Central Asian horses. New foods such as cucumbers, figs, and grapes from Bactria were introduced to China as a result of the silk trade.

Besides silk, the migration of people traveled along the Silk Road. Nomads were the earliest people to migrate on the Silk Road. They migrated from Mongolia, Turkey, Persia, and other countries. They lived in tents and kept moving with their herds while following changing weather patterns. Eventually, they settled on the outskirts of the Takla Makan Desert, and developed their own language, music, and writing. Today, you can still find Turkic Uighers living in isolated cities in the outskirts of the Takla Makan Desert.

Nomads served as agents of change as they brought many goods and knowledge of different lands, people, culture, and religions. They traded in oasis cities with local farmers who bought raw materials such as tin, copper, and turquoise from Iran; gold from the Altai Mountains of Mongolia; lapis lazuli and rubies

form Afghanistan; furs from Siberia; incense from Arabia; and cotton from India. Nomads also traded their own products, which included wool, animal hides, and livestock.

Religious influences also migrated to China with the help of pilgrim missionaries. The teachings of Buddha migrated from India during the 1st and 2nd centuries A.D., and before long, Buddhism became China's main religion, where it still is practiced by many today. Other religions migrated along the Silk Road, such as Taoism, Confucianism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, and these new religions spread throughout Asia.

Today, you can still see the gallery of 1,000 Buddhas displaying elaborate sculptures carved into the mountainside. Long ago, travelers would pay homage and pray to them for a safe journey while traveling on the Silk Road.

Goods and ideas also migrated from the East and the West through merchants who traded along the Silk Road. Merchants took many of China's ideas and inventions to other countries. Four primary inventions that China contributed to the world were: the magnetic compass, paper, printing, and gunpowder.

The Chinese invented the first compass during the Han Dynasty.

The compass was used for navigation and military purposes. The application of compasses evolved and migrated to the West via Arab intermediaries. As a result, the compass helped navigate merchant ships which increased commercial trade and expansion.

The Chinese invention of papermaking transformed printing and technology. The Chinese idea of paper money was useful because large sums of money could be easily transported without the risk of theft by bandits. The idea for paper currency eventually reached the West.

Gunpowder was another significant contribution from China. Chinese gunpowder was first used in warfare. They invented explosive grenades to scare off the enemy. The development of the cannon, barrel gun, crossbow, stirrup, and heavy armored horsemen were vital military inventions that were eventually adopted by other countries.

As exchange continued to flourish between the East and the West, direct trade between China and Rome was not possible. The land between these two great empires was controlled by the Parthians and the Kushans. The Parthians and the Kushans also prospered by taxing caravans passing through their territories in exchange for protection. They

bought goods from the incoming merchants and resold them at a profit to other caravans.

With the four main powers in control, the Silk Road experienced peace and security and continued to be heavily used for the next 1,600 years, up until the 15th century. The sea routes opened up trade directly between Europe and Southeast Asia. New routes caused overland trade to decrease because merchants could avoid paying middlemen along the Silk Road.

The Silk Road today still exists and is now paved with asphalt. Although it is not being heavily used by travelers, it played an important part in shaping history. Many of today's technologies and ideas were a result of the achievements from these ancient civilizations. Our ancestors migrated on trade routes to exchange goods and ideas, and by studying trade routes we can understand the origins of institutions and services we use today such as rest stops, motels, tolls, guidebooks, and maps.

Trade routes are the pathways linking our past to the present. Our heritage represents the diversity of intellectual and cultural exchange through the influences of migration.

WHA

EDITORS' NOTE: NEW DEADLINES FOR BULLETIN SUBMISSIONS

Beginning with this issue of the *World History Bulletin*, deadlines for submission of all copy (articles, announcements, and advertisements) are September 15th for the fall issue and March 15th for the spring issue. All materials for publication should reach the editors not later than these dates.

from there one of his ships returned to Spain via the Indian Ocean. From then on Europeans circled the earth, starting a worldwide exchange of plants, animals, mineral wealth, and people, for their own benefit, always fighting each other for colonial conquests.

Thus ever more parts of the globe were occupied by Europeans: the Western Hemisphere and the lands along the sea route to East Asia: India, Indonesia, the Philippines. No other people could match their power. In the 19th century China and Japan were pried open — the Pacific Islands, Australia, and New Zealand foremost — settled by Englishmen; even sub-Saharan Africa, least attractive because of its climate, diseases, and black peoples, fell under the white man's control. The major European states acquired colonial empires, the British foremost. Thus began a new phase in world history, in the human experience. The entire world became a single unit of militant interaction, with the non-Europeans always at the mercy of the Europeans.

At this point we need to stress a significant aspect generally overlooked in the studies of European expansion: the clash of cultures. In the Western Hemisphere and around the world, the Europeans innocently and ignorantly encountered utterly alien peoples, hostile and obviously inferior or even barbaric by comparison. All posed a profound psychological challenge, testing the gut reactions, the very identity, of the conquerors. Inevitably the latter started from the rules prevailing in Eurasian warfare: display your superiority. They showed no mercy to the Amerindians; they took advantage of the African slave trade; throughout, they ruthlessly exploited the native peoples, worst perhaps under Belgian rule in the Congo at the end of the 19th century.

The intellectual assessment of the cultural differences produced a rampant racism. As Darwin said in 1871: "the civilized races will almost certainly exterminate and re-

place throughout the world the savage races." In Argentina he had encountered a general ready to exterminate the Indians. Wiping out the inferior races was widely accepted as a natural law by the end of the 19th century (conveniently forgotten now). Admittedly, there was evidence of a contrary tendency: some Christians preached charity on behalf of the natives, including Las Casas in the early 16th century, missionaries in the following centuries, and Albert Schweitzer in the early 20th century. And more generally, as the European domination of the world became more secure, European humanitarianism asserted itself; the Europeans abolished the slave trade and gradually softened their cultural arrogance. But the culture shock of encountering totally incomprehensible ways of life persists to the present, with the Europeans, including now the Americans — both together now called Westerners — determined to impose their values on all humanity. In any case, as world historians let us not impose contemporary values upon the callousness of the early encounters between Europeans and non-Europeans. Let us recognize that cross-cultural adjustment has been a slow learning process, far from completion even today.

By the end of the 19th century the Westernization of the world was fully underway, driven not by capitalism but by the popular craving for national prestige. The sense of collective superiority enlarged every citizen's self-esteem even if it demanded sacrifice of income or possibly of life. It built social and political cohesion just when social relations grew more complex. And it triumphantly spread the Western ways of life around the world: constitutional government and civil liberty from the liberal countries in northwestern Europe, and more generally the skills of literacy, technology, and health care, even a desire for worldwide recognition matching Western pride. In this manner the non-Western world was covered by

a Western overlay that undermined the sovereignty of traditional cultures and subverted their inherited creativity. Traditional ways continued to simmer below; protest was widespread, taking different forms in different parts of the world. Everywhere the Western impact produced long-lasting cultural disorientation, leaving the colonized peoples — the majority of humanity — suspended in the miseries of profound existential uncertainty. Effective resistance was possible only on Western terms, further subverting the traditions that were to be preserved, except in the unique case of Japan.

Here, people on a group of small islands, after age-long close interaction with China and briefly, in the 16th century, with Europeans, withdrew into isolation while remaining in intense competition among themselves. When, under European pressure, the Japanese reopened their country in the late 19th century, their collective skills enabled them to absorb essential European achievements without loss of their cultural continuity. They soon established their presence in world affairs — a cultural miracle in its own way.

VI. At this point, entering the modern era (with high-altitude perspective beyond ground-floor sensibilities), we have to give special attention to the United States as a uniquely privileged latecomer in world history. Located across the Atlantic, it was reasonably safe from the European power struggles. Its neighbors, British Canada and Mexico, were no threat; its indigenous population was powerless. Starting afresh after declaring its independence in 1776, it was unburdened by the past, running its government by elected officials, in a land of opportunity and freedom. Drawing on the solid qualities developed in the most secure country in Europe — insular England — it exploited the resources of an open continent stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Westward expansion in search of natural re-

sources and wealth trained self-reliance, habits of hard work, and a sense of spontaneous social cooperation that impressed de Tocqueville; nothing like it existed in Europe. Those qualities also helped in solving the problems of adding ever new states to the federal union. Consensus, however, broke down over the issue of slavery. Yet the embittered Civil War, pitching the North against the South, remained free of foreign intervention. It abolished slavery but not discrimination against African Americans; American society remained white, rejecting even workers from China.

Consensus, however, broke down over the issue of slavery.

After the Civil War, amidst economic ups and downs, the country rapidly progressed. By the end of the century it had built more railways than the rest of the world; it was leading in key technological inventions, its wealth attracting and integrating more European immigrants. In 1898 the United States joined the European outreach, stretching across the Pacific to annex the Philippines after a war with Spain, while proclaiming its triumphant ideology of freedom and democracy.

The American ideals have radiated around the world, but in world historical perspective they need to be tied to the exceptional conditions shaping the United States. What stands out in any comparative approach is the voluntary conformist, the self-discipline, of American society, despite regional diversity and persistent social tensions; in this large country only two political parties competed. And while the complexity of American society increased, the sense of freedom prevailed, a sense of freedom sustained by the subconscious submission to the rules and practices of peaceful cooperation for the greater glory of the country.

The American sense of freedom is a very peculiar psychological

molecule composed of all the factors creating the American exceptionality (including huge unpopulated expanses). Admittedly, it covered many flaws, as African Americans well know, but it also helped to make immigrants into proud Americans, a unique asset for building social and political cohesion. Yet universalized as part of the American mission of superiority it posed a danger in countries lacking the hidden substructure of American life; unconstrained by unconscious civic conformity freedom tends toward anarchy. American social scientists and historians seem hardly aware of those substructures sustaining their society and their convictions. And, more significantly, Americans should realize that the exceptionality of their collective experience cannot be transferred to other peoples around the world.

Back now to the worldwide contexts. By comparison — and world history should always employ a comparative relativist approach — the United States had no rivals. England, despite its worldwide empire, was tied to its small island. The continental countries were handicapped by pressure from their neighbors, which created authoritarian governments and divided peoples the farther east we look. What could be more disadvantaged than the Russian empire, the largest country in the world, where autocratic tsars ruled over soil-bound anarchic peasants and a small Europeanized intelligentsia suffering from the country's backwardness? But while we study the visible aspects of any country, let us be aware that, like the United States, all countries (or cultures) have their hidden psychological substructures shaping their destiny. Unfortunately, they are commonly unexplored by historians or social scientists.

And now at last let me openly affirm my determinist bias. It is circumstances beyond human control, I argue, that have shaped the course of world history. Unusually favorable geographic and climatic

circumstances created the European cultural hothouse and thus the Western ascendancy around the world. In this all-inclusive perspective the resulting inequalities were not the products of human design but of the differences in the earth's surface, or, I am tempted to say in order to reduce the widespread inter-cultural tensions, of Mother Earth. She should teach humility to Westerners all too proud of their superiority and all too ready to condemn the others for their undeserved miseries.

At the same time, however, we still should praise the assertive creativity that enables human beings to make the most of the conditions imposed upon them by Mother Earth and to overcome the insecurity of the ever changing flux of events. People were not free to shape their future; they merely responded to ever evolving challenges, trying to impose their control over them, often successfully, and sometimes disastrously overtaken by their incomprehension of the realities they faced.

PART TWO

VII. Such incomprehension was alarmingly common in the next stage of world history, the explosive impact of globalism in the 20th century. That century, now coming to its close, deserves here more detailed attention, because its enormity is still poorly understood.

The transition from worldwide Westernization to modernizing globalism seems but a short step, but it involved vast changes in the human experience. By the end of the 19th century the European political rivalry, always driven by patriotic pride together with the message of liberal democracy, began to expand around the entire world, gradually transforming it into a political hothouse unprecedented in human experience. Countries, peoples, individuals, all were suddenly viewed — and judged — in perspectives widened out to cover the entire world far beyond the parameters of traditional life, far beyond the men-

tal horizons of statesmen, let alone of ordinary citizens.

British imperialism led the way, globalizing British civic values. Yet British power also spread a racist counter-trend commonly overlooked in historical accounts. As Lord Rosebery, a prominent liberal statesman, observed in 1893: "We have to remember that it is part of our responsibility and heritage to take care that the world, so far as it can be moulded by us, shall receive the Anglo-Saxon, and not another character." In 1901, another Englishman added a racist slant, arguing that "a high state of civilization" is the product of "the struggle of race with race," with only "the physically and mentally fitter race" surviving; similar voices were also heard in the United States. Envious comparison spread these convictions around the Continent, especially in the newly united Germany, where the monarchical government pleaded for a place in the sun of global prestige, and nationalists dreamed of enlarged living space for the Aryan race. Russian revolutionaries began to think about a worldwide revolution of all the exploited peoples, while in India one Westernized intellectual exclaimed: "This is the great ideal before us... Up India and conquer the world with your spirituality."

Thus, at the beginning of the 20th century a megalomaniac globalism emerged. Its message was clear: Conquer the world by whatever means. In the process, the means of European power politics were adapted to the racist brutality of colonial expansionism. At the beginning of the 20th century a reckless arms race was under way, preparing for war on land as on the oceans. Disputes over colonial territories edged toward military confrontation. In early August 1914 war broke out, the first world war, which left no part of the world unaffected. At its end in 1918 the Russian empire had collapsed, Germany and its allies were defeated; even the victors were exhausted by over four years of war. Who had foreseen that the once prosperous

Europe would be dethroned in such a short time from its former preeminence, and its place taken by the United States, undamaged by the war's destruction and eager to make the world safe for democracy?

Consider the war's appalling human sacrifice.

Consider the war's appalling human sacrifice. In 1916, during the Battle of the Somme on the Western Front in France, the British lost 60,000 men in one day, and 400,000 altogether, like the Germans (the French lost half as many). The total casualties of the war are estimated at 37 million. What did human lives count when the fate of their country in the competition for global power was at stake? Consider also the political effort to mobilize the entire population; nobody could escape serving the war effort. Weapons became more sophisticated; tanks broke through battle lines, airplanes fired from above, even on civilians (like the German Zeppelins over London); poison gas was blown into the trenches. Brutality was rampant; in 1917 the Turks massacred over a million Armenians. Never before had human beings butchered each other on such a grand scale. What had happened to civilization?

After the war the United States withdrew into political isolation, while beginning to spread its lifestyle and Hollywood movies to Europe and elsewhere. The European victors, England and France, though suffering from the strains of the war, preserved their guiding ideals. These countries also furnished leadership for the League of Nations (originally proposed by the United States) as an agency to promote peace and international cooperation — at a time of rising tensions. The ideals of freedom and democracy, together with the ambitions and brutalities popularized by four years of fighting, inspired worldwide agitation. The colonial peoples stirred; more ferociously, the defeated countries mobilized

for escape from political inferiority. Thus World War I led to even more uncontrolled craving for global domination, eventually ending in World War II. The Russian empire in its Eurasian vastness had collapsed, ruined by military defeat, foreign invasion, and a merciless civil war. Under these extreme adversities patriotic Russian intellectuals were determined to realize their cherished vision of Russian superiority with the help of utopian Marxism and its "scientific" laws of history. Thus began a ruthless experiment, starting in utter ignorance, of recasting Eurasia's ethnically and regionally divided human raw material into effective citizens. The communist dictatorship brutally suppressed the traditional spontaneity of backwardness for the sake of creating a powerful state, called the Soviet Union. It posed as a universal model while stifling all comparison with Western freedoms. And it stirred up embittered ideological and political opposition farther west in Europe.

In the post-war years, Italy, though counted among the victors in the war, suffered from widespread popular disorientation. Aroused from their traditional passivity and torn between nationalism and communist internationalism, its peoples wondered about their place in the world. Soon an anti-communist leader emerged, Benito Mussolini, leading a close-knit team of blackshirted army veterans known as fascists. What was needed in the post-war turmoil, Mussolini preached, was "authority, direction, and order," all providing psychological security to the distraught masses. In 1925 he emerged as dictator, proclaiming that fascism "rejects the pacifism which masks surrender and cowardice. War alone brings all human energies to their highest tension..."; it leads "to the highest expression of human power, which is empire." In pursuit of these goals Mussolini established a "totalitarian" regime that sought to invigorate all aspects of life (the term "to-

talitarianism" was coined by him). Inevitably the lives of his opponents were at risk, as was international peace; Mussolini had his eyes on conquering Ethiopia.

Meanwhile, the post-war agitation had spread to the Far East. The age-long rule by Chinese emperors had collapsed in 1911, giving rise among Chinese intellectuals to profound despair. As one of them wondered in 1915: was China fit to live in the modern world? The post-war years promoted heated discussion of cultural transformation away from imperialist domination: was China to follow the communist or the Western liberal path? But how to mobilize the Chinese, the most numerous people in the world, for political action? Their society, according to the nationalist, Sun Yat-sen, resembled a sheet of loose sand. Yet, Sun Yat-sen voiced high hopes in 1923: "We will rise and smite that imperialism. Then we will be truly 'governing the state and pacifying the world.'" China was ready, whether under nationalist or communist rule, to join the mounting global power competition, imperiled by its small neighbor, Japan.

That well-organized country had established its naval strength in the Far East after the end of the war. It had increased its participation in world trade, opening itself to the victors' political ideals, but at risk of increasing cultural disorientation; in the 1920s, American lifestyles undermined the discipline of Japanese society. Soon anti-Western sentiments created a dictatorial regime under the emperor's auspices, prompted by extravagant Western-inspired ambitions. Already in 1927 the Japanese prime minister, Tanaka, had predicted that from Manchuria and Mongolia, Japan would penetrate all of China, and hence "proceed to conquer India, the Archipelago, Asia Minor, Central Asia, and even Europe"; Japan was joining the mad race for global domination, starting its advance into Manchuria in 1931. The stage was set for the horrors of the 1930s.

VIII. In 1931 the world was shaken by the Great Depression. Starting in the United States it imperiled world trade, pushing many states to the verge of bankruptcy. Unemployment and poverty spread, arousing popular anger and encouraging the militancy of political radicals. The world's political climate darkened, leading to the most atrocious events of the 20th century, challenging to this day the comprehension of Western observers. How are we to explain Stalin and Hitler?

In the Soviet Union Stalin, always impressed by American superiority, was now in command, legitimately determined in the face of heightened aggressiveness in world politics to save his vulnerable country from the fate of the tsarist empire. In 1931 he stated his conviction in plain non-Marxist terms: "We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this lag in ten years. Either we accomplish this or we will be crushed." Preoccupied with his country's weakness he attempted to recultivate, no less, Eurasia's backward people into disciplined modern citizens.

The atrocious human price is well known.

The atrocious human price is well known. It proceeded by the same logic as the sacrifices of World War I: What did human lives count when the fate of their country was at stake — except that in Eurasia life had traditionally been cheap. And yet, Stalin's improvised and much maligned experiment made remarkable progress, thanks to his ruthless willpower and the communists' sense of social dynamics. There was a need for speedy action.

In 1933 Hitler began to mobilize Germany, burdened by defeat, by domestic division under the uncertain Weimar constitution, and by the Great Depression, for victory in the struggle for world power. Hitler was one of the rare examples in modern history of a man of lowly

birth gifted with unusual political sensibilities and carried by the drift of the times to extraordinary power. There was a huge pile of political dynamite waiting to be exploded by an unscrupulous innovator.

Brutalized by four years of trench warfare he absorbed the rawest ambitions of Western European imperialism, adding to its racism the militant anti-Semitism popular in Vienna, where he had grown to manhood. Benefiting from a charismatic touch and moved by a keen awareness of the popular yearning for national greatness, he attracted devoted followers and large crowds of supporters. Appointed Chancellor of Germany, he was ready to liberate the Germans, "the highest guardians of humanity on this earth," from their economic, political, and spiritual misery.

Idolized as the *Führer*, he quickly set up a totalitarian regime; compared with the Soviet Union it remained relatively mild, thanks to Germany's civic resources. Communists and party leaders uncongenial to Hitler were eliminated; in 1935 the Jews lost their right to German citizenship, bloodily attacked in 1938. Repudiating the penalties imposed by the victors after World War I, Hitler built up Germany's military power to unmatched strength. He also formed close ties with Mussolini and with the Japanese, establishing the German, Italian, and Japanese Axis in world politics. Fascist Italy was conquering Ethiopia and Japan advanced into China, while Hitler watched for opportunities to expand Germany's living space.

In 1938 he annexed Austria, and in 1939, with the connivance of the British government utterly uncomprehending of Hitler's ambitions, dissolved Czechoslovakia for the sake of its German minority. Later that year his army moved into Poland — woe to the Polish Jews! — dividing that country with the Soviet Union. In response to that eastward expansion France and England declared war on Germany, enabling Hitler to conquer Western

Europe, including virtually all of France, in 1940. While England sought support from the United States, Hitler also took over Denmark and Norway. And on June 22, 1941, his armies invaded the Soviet Union, quickly advancing eastward; misjudging Hitler's plans, Stalin had been disastrously unprepared. Now Hitler, risen from obscurity to super-Napoleonic dimensions, was master of Europe. His ambition even crossed the Atlantic: In support of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, he, together with Mussolini, declared war on the United States in December 1941. Now in his mind the stage was set for German domination of the world and for the final extermination of the Jewish race. Under the circumstances, what else could one expect? Thus began the Second World War.

That war, raging across much of the world, tested the unrealistic ambitions of the aggressors against the hidden realities of global power. Hitler contemptuously misjudged Soviet resilience; the Axis leaders despised the United States for its degenerate lifestyles. How little they knew!

The course of World War II is well known, but a few aspects of historical significance deserve a brief comment. The war's brutalities exceeded those of World War I, foremost in the leveling of cities by bombardment from the air, despite long-standing international agreements protecting civilians in case of war. But the slaughter of civilians, especially of Jews, on the Russian front was hardly less intense. Next, referring to Stalin's frenzied promise of 1931 to overcome his country's weakness in ten years, the feat was accomplished in 1943 at Stalingrad. The Soviet Union had survived the German attack; the Red Army was advancing toward victory over Germany, with some superior weapons of its own. The terrible efforts of the 1930s had paid off in a war that led the Soviet Union to unparalleled strength (for a time). Finally, and most important, the megalomaniac

aggressors, ignorant of their enemies' resources, had been crushed. Hitler, irrationally believing to the last in a saving miracle, committed suicide; Mussolini was captured and shot. By May 1945 in Europe that horrible phase of history begun in World War I ended, but not yet in Japan.

As the American forces approached the Japanese home islands, they were readying an utterly novel weapon, two atomic bombs, the most devastating tools of destruction ever. Developed during the war at great expense, in unwarranted fear of being anticipated by Germany, the question facing President Truman and his advisors was: Should they now be used? Some nuclear scientists, dreading the inhuman carnage, were opposed. But should the huge costs of these weapons be wasted? Could there be a non-military application to demonstrate their unprecedented destructiveness to the Japanese — and to Stalin, always on American minds? In the end, dreading the casualties of invading Japan by traditional means, President Truman allowed the elemental momentum of four years of war to provide the answer. On August 6th the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, killing more than 71,000 people and wiping out 98 percent of the city. Three days later, the second bomb was dropped on Nagasaki, killing over 73,000 people and destroying almost half of the city (the radiation effects of both bombs subsequently affected hundreds of thousands more). The blinding flash of these two nuclear explosions ended the inhumanities of the Second World War. What did human lives count in the contests for global power? The total casualties of that war are estimated to amount to some 55 million, with the highest percentage lost in the Soviet Union.

IX. But let us not forget the roughly six million non-combatant victims of the Holocaust. While we deplore its utter inhumanities, we should be equally concerned with

the causes of what is considered the biggest crime in history; how could it have happened? Its roots go back almost 2,000 years, to the split between Jews and Christians. The Jews continued their claim to be God's chosen people; the Christians appropriated that sacred privilege for themselves. Henceforth, Jews and Christians were divided by the irreconcilable conflict at life's spiritual center: Who was closer to God? Thus the Semitic creed provoked anti-Semitism, and anti-Semitism strengthened the Jewish identity, in a vicious cycle through the centuries. At the start Jews persecuted the Christian heretics, but, after Rome dispersed the Jews from their Holy Land, Jewish political power ended. Henceforth the Jews in self-defense concentrated on their non-political survival skills, above all the tight cohesion of their religious community consolidated by inter-marriage within their faith, and aided by commercial talent and intellectual alertness. Suppressed in, or driven out from, Christian lands they impressively strengthened their identity despite minor internal diversions, an accomplishment unique in history.

In modern Europe anti-Semitism was widespread, but in countries with strong national self-confidence, such as England and the United States, Jewishness was no major challenge. But where people suffered from an existential sense of inferiority, as in Central and Eastern Europe, Jewish self-affirmation, deprived of constructive interaction with their neighbors, constituted a psychological and often an economic threat; the subtle power contest of religious, economic, and racist confrontation sometimes led to bloody anti-Semitic pogroms. In his quest for German greatness Hitler then mobilized that raw anti-Semitism, reviving the imperialist impulse inherited from the late 19th century for wiping out inferior races. He was supported by the widespread anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe; not surprisingly his worst extermination

nation camps were located in Poland. But he also enlisted broad support in Germany. Moral sensibilities there were never as strong as in England or the United States, untouched by war; in addition the brutalities of the Second World War heightened the German indifference to the Jewish fate; Hitler had his way to the last days of the war. Yet the unspeakable horrors of the Final Solution produced the opposite of what Hitler had planned: after the war Jewish self-confidence and survival-power rose to new heights, constructively spreading its benefits, in a predominantly secular age, across religious and ethnic boundaries. But the conflict between Semitism and anti-Semitism still lingers where religious traditions matter; descendants of the Holocaust are prepared to defend the state of Israel with nuclear weapons.

X. In any case, after four years of the most embittered fighting in all of history the megalomaniac competition for imperialist domination, the opening phase of globalism started before World War I, had ended; a sobering realism spread around the world. Henceforth the global scene was dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union; both had demonstrated their military superiority over their deluded and ignorant challengers. Before Stalin's death the Soviet Union had developed its own nuclear weapons, providing its territories, for millennia open to foreign invasion, with a novel security — a major landmark in Eurasian history. But Stalin had cause to worry about his country's safety; his country still suffered from the devastations of war and its unresolved backwardness. By contrast, the United States had triumphantly risen to unprecedented global preeminence. Both countries, now considered superpowers and in (unequal) competition with each other, had to cope with the massive self-assertion rising among the colonial peoples and in China, all intensely politicized by the impact of the war.

Thus began yet another phase in world history, distinguished not only by impressive advances in science and technology but also in industrial productivity; standards of living rose in the leading countries and around the world generally. Politics in the expanding global hothouse, however, while not as turbulent as in the preceding age, were marred by profound uncertainties.

The world was now divided between two superpowers in a cold war of nuclear confrontation, both offering sharply divergent prescriptions for human progress and political power. Their rivalry escalated political agitation around the world

The world was now divided between two superpowers in a cold war of nuclear confrontation....

to new heights. A profusion of new states emerged, especially in Asia and Africa; their number rose from 59 in 1950 to 159 in 1991 (185 in 1996), adding to the complexity of international relations. Radio, film, television, new means of communications pioneered in the United States, promoted worldwide envious comparison favoring the rich. The United States stood out as the universal model even where officially repudiated, radiating its ways of life as a subtle form of power. The standard of living rose significantly in the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and Southeast Asia, though hardly in Africa; the world's population proliferated, burdening the human habitat on earth. In the intensified global interaction the mounting complexity of world affairs promoted profound, or even disastrous, misjudgments on the part of statesmen and their supporters.

Yet in one respect a crucial advance occurred. After 1945 universal ideology of worldwide cooperation emerged, institutionalized in the United Nations. Its charter proclaimed this message: "To save succeeding generations from the scourges of war, and to reaffirm faith in the fundamental human

rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women, and of nations large and small...to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom." Derived from the aspirations of the world's most privileged nation, the U.N. offered an organizational framework for peacefully coping with the accelerating tensions of globalism — if only its founding members and its rapidly proliferating constituencies could agree. However limited in power, the U.N. and its agencies became an indispensable agent in global politics.

In that setting the United States stood out as a superpower by its military might, its technological leadership, and its ways of life, all subtly shaping global society. It helped to rebuild Western Europe and even Japan after the war, spreading its wealth abroad. Yet in trying to contain its Soviet rival it committed a profound blunder, now openly admitted, in the Vietnam War. And concentrating on the ideological and nuclear challenge, it never grasped the fact that its own preeminence inspired its enemy — or, put more bluntly, that it bore some responsibility for the Soviet ambitions. Even now, who understands the invisible moral dynamics of globalism?

However powerful, the United States did not escape the impact of globalism. Open to all, it had to cope with immigrants and their cultures from all over the world; at home it had to adjust to African Americans demanding civic equality. The cohesion of American society weakened; immersed in the boundlessness of the larger world, Americans suffered from economic and psychological insecurity; the gap between rich and poor widened. And as the East Asian countries gained in prominence, the American preeminence was scaled down. Yet after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States remained the sole superpower.

The fate of the Soviet Union of-

fers a key example of the unpredictability of events in the global setting. After 1945 it gloried in its power, attaining equality in nuclear

The fate of the Soviet Union offers a key example of the unpredictability of events in the global setting.

weapons and pioneering exploration of outer space; scientific triumphs signified Soviet superiority — at the expense of all the amenities that civilize life. Admittedly, the atrocities of Stalin's successful effort to protect the Soviet peoples from foreign domination were now considered an embarrassment; under Khrushchev Stalin's corpse was removed from Lenin's tomb. Yet the increased external security achieved under Stalin slowly promoted comparison with the capitalist world outside, undermining the fake superiority claimed by the communist ideology. Under Brezhnev the Soviet experiment lost momentum; corruption and stagnation spread. Gorbachev's *perestroika* offered no remedy; his ambiguous efforts to restore public initiative aroused the anti-communist opposition long simmering among the satellite states, national minorities, and the public in general. Countering the trend by military action was foredoomed; as Gorbachev sensed, violence would lead to chaos. And thus he scaled down Soviet power abroad and unwittingly let the Soviet Union fall apart peacefully — an outcome not predicted by foreign policy experts around the world. The collapse of the Soviet Union ended the most enduring Westernizing anti-Western — and most utopian — regime created after World War I.

Now another experiment began: How to build effective governments in the Eurasian vastness.

Now another experiment began: how to build effective governments in the Eurasian vastness.

Meanwhile another communist experiment had run its course. Af-

ter World War II, Mao Zedong, a product of the post-World War I political agitation in China, set up his own regime. Following the Marxist-Leninist line he proclaimed: "We have begun to stand up... We have stood up... We will emerge in the world as a civilized nation with a high culture." He aimed at awakening the Chinese masses, ready for that purpose to exterminate 2 million traitors; human life was cheap in China. Endless struggle sessions followed, trying to recast traditional thinking. With Soviet help a Five Year plan of industrialization was started, in the face of increasing difficulties and disunity. After wavering between high hopes — China would catch up to Great Britain in 15 years — and down-to-earth realism — a Communist China could only be realized in 10,000 years — Mao grew impatient. In 1957 he organized The Great Leap Forward, brutally forcing the Chinese into Peoples Communes in order to raise productivity — a total failure, compelling him to withdraw for a term. In 1964, however, after China exploded its first atomic bomb, the Cult of Chairman Mao restored him, ready in 1966 for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (in the course of which Mao ended his relations with the Soviet Union). In theory, that ill-considered venture was to create an advanced communist China on Chinese terms; in practice, it amounted to three years of virtual civil war with millions of lives sacrificed, before a chastened Mao managed to restore order. What incredible ignorance to try to raise nearly a billion human beings resembling a sheet of loose sand to the spontaneous discipline required for effective modernity! In the 1980s at last, Deng Xiaoping allowed a freer reign to the remarkable entrepreneurial talents of the Chinese people, yet always afraid of their anarchic tendencies and willing to employ force, as at the Tienanmen massacre of pro-democracy students in 1989. But did these idealist advocates of democracy have

any understanding of the subconscious submission to law and order that make democracy possible? Ignorance of the cultural substructures that uphold the much admired Western institutions is part of the contemporary state of mind, in the United States and elsewhere.

That ignorance was even more evident in the process of decolonization started soon after the end of World War II. Under the ideals of the U.N. Charter, the colonized peoples hopefully began to set up independent states, starting in India and Pakistan in 1947, where, as a result, Hindus and Muslims massively massacred each other. In the 1960s, decolonization extended into Africa. There the new states arose within boundaries set by colonial rulers unaware of the local realities; they followed political ambitions derived from their European masters. Soon inexperienced local rulers, guided by Soviet or Western advice, took charge of their divided and utterly unprepared subjects, often in the chaos of tribal war and large-scale violence — life in tropical Africa was cheap.

The gap between traditional ways and the demands of modern statehood was huge, as were the obstacles imposed by climate and geography, all beyond the comprehension of self-centered Westerners. It became increasingly obvious that their well-meant efforts of "structural adjustment" foisted unsuitable Western institutions and practices on uncomprehending people. Their economies were turned to exports benefiting the rich countries; productivity for local use was neglected; debts accumulated by foreign investments could not be repaid. After some initial improvements, the African economy deteriorated. Admittedly, conditions varied in different parts of Africa; some cities began to look modern. Endowed with a lively self-consciousness, Africans fell easy prey to Western attractions, eager to escape humiliation by facile imitation, most extreme perhaps in the case of Mobuto Sese

Seko in Zaire. But overall, the bulk of the African people sank into abysmal poverty.

What needed to be done was not only building a new African society from the Westernized top down, but also up from the ground floor of traditional life, slowly adapting the inherent creativity of the common people to the new conditions filtered in from the outside. But the obstacles were huge; nowhere else in the world did the cultural and environmental factors shaping society clash so sharply as in sub-Saharan Africa. In the perspectives of world history it was a tragic collision, caused, as argued before, ultimately by geography and climate, by Mother Earth.

XI. And now, in conclusion, a brief "guesstimate" of the global condition at present and in the foreseeable future. What stands out is the intensified global interaction and interdependence. Global networks are spreading in all aspects of life, dispersing cultural skills and accomplishments for the common benefit. All required peaceful cooperation beyond the jurisdiction of governments, offering hope for calmer times ahead. Yet governments and states are still crucial, providing the core of stability needed for the conduct of international relations. Where government breaks down, all ties to the international community are endangered. Human life still operates on the ground floor of civic communities.

And here danger broods, fed by the economic, political, and psychological tensions created by the global impact. Worldwide envious comparison foments discontent in the poor countries; everywhere interdependence breeds a sense of existential insecurity. All people suffer from the global overload. Too many stimuli, too much information, too many demands for attention overburden human minds. At a time of increased need for enlarged perspectives people shrink back

into hardened traditional convictions that seem to offer psychological security, while increasing social divisiveness; they lack a common faith.

The fast-growing global interaction is essentially promoted by the desire for material gain; it lacks a spiritual base such as held traditional societies together. The existing religions, while containing some universal aspirations, are tied to separate cultural traditions established millennia ago. They divide rather than unite humanity, preventing the emergence of a globally updated theology. Meanwhile, spiritual disorientation and anarchy are giving rise to narrow local cults, even including witchcraft. In the absence of universal spiritual restraints all power struggles, whether ethnic, religious, or political, become more intense. Nuclear world wars are unlikely, but local violence is increasing. On the ground floor of life alienated individuals, craving material gain and public attention, resort to corruption, crime, and even terror. How much attention, energy, and resources can be given under these conditions to the impact of the still growing human population upon the resources of their earthly habitat? Let us always keep in mind that, while the need for peaceful global cooperation increases, the geographic, climatic, and cultural diversity of the world continues to cause trouble underneath the uniformities of modernity.

Are these observations unduly pessimistic? A rational pessimism rather than an ideological optimism fosters human alertness and creativity. A proper world history should teach constructive values, giving human beings better control over their destiny.

Summing up, let me affirm the basic message of this compressed survey of world history. Attempting an all-inclusive world history suitable for the inescapably ever tighter global interaction, we should try to represent all peoples, all governments, all political

movements, as legitimate products of their given circumstances. World history should be a relativist effort, stressing the legitimacy of all diverse formative factors at work. Human beings depend on circumstances beyond their control; their responses are determined by their physical setting and by the confluence of unforeseen events. Proper world history therefore should add a large dose of humble determinism to our sense of reality; humility rather than pride enhances our creative power over our destiny. Let us therefore not impose our American — or Western — perspectives on the human experience; let us rather find common ground beyond all cultural tensions. Let us enrich our historical relativism with human compassion, with a transcendent universal love for all humanity, including rogue states and brutal dictators. They are shaped in response to world pressures; we ourselves, setting the model for the world, share responsibility for their actions.

Alas, constructive world history promoting peaceful cooperation in our divided world poses a profound moral and intellectual challenge.


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The 19th Annual Berlin-Prague Seminar organized by Bradley University will be held at the European Academy of Berlin on 20 June - 26 June 1999; and the Prague University of Economics on 27 June - 3 July 1999. The seminar is intended to inform college faculty about a wide range of issues facing contemporary Germany and the Czech Republic. Past presentations have focused on politics, foreign policy, history, economics, societal issues, the media, and art. Participants may choose to attend one or both segments of the seminar. For further information, contact:

Dr. Charles Bukowski, Director Institute of International Studies Bradley University Peoria, IL 61625	Phone: (309) 677-2450 Fax: (309) 677-3256 E-mail: cjb@bradley.bradley.edu
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ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN HISTORIANS 1999 MARY K. BONSTEEL TACHAU PRE-COLLEGIATE TEACHING AWARD

The Organization of American Historians has established an annual award to recognize the contributions made by pre-collegiate teachers to improve history education. The award, to be given for activities which enhance the intellectual development of other history teachers and/or students, memorializes the career of the late Mary K. Bonsteel Tachau, University of Louisville, for her path-breaking efforts to build bridges between university and pre-collegiate history teachers.

Nominations for the 1998 award are due December 1, 1998.

The award will be presented at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the OAH in Toronto, Ontario, Canada, April 22-25.

ELIGIBILITY: Pre-collegiate teachers engaged at least half-time in history teaching, whether in history or social studies, are eligible.

CRITERIA: Successful candidates shall demonstrate exceptional ability in one or more of the following kinds of activities:

1. Initiating or participating in projects which involve students in historical research, writing, or other means of representing their knowledge of history.
2. Initiating or participating in school, district, regional, state, or national projects which enhance the professional development of history teachers.
3. Initiating or participating in projects which aim to build bridges between pre-collegiate and collegiate history or social studies teachers.
4. Working with museums, historical preservation societies, or other public history associations to enhance the place of public history in pre-collegiate schools.

Continued opposite page

5. Developing innovative history criteria which foster a spirit of inquiry and emphasize critical skills.
6. Publishing or otherwise publicly presenting scholarship that advances history education or historical knowledge.

Initial Nomination (May 1-November 1): Candidates may be nominated by any person familiar with the nominee's professional accomplishments or standing. If candidates nominate themselves, one professional reference must submit a two-page letter indicating why the teacher merits the Tachau Pre-Collegiate Award.

Submission of Application Packet (May 1-December 1): Candidates should submit one application packet (no more than 25 double-spaced pages) that includes copies of the following, in the order given:

1. A **cover letter** written by a colleague indicating why the teacher merits the Tachau Pre-Collegiate Teaching Award (no more than two pages).
2. **Curriculum vitae** (no more than five pages).
3. **Samples** of the nominee's written work. These submissions should include article reprints, reports by classroom observers, course outlines, research proposals, and/or other evidence of excellence in some or all of the areas mentioned in the "Criteria" section (no more than 15 pages).
4. A **narrative**, prepared by the nominee, describing the goals and effects of the candidate's work in the classroom and elsewhere for history education (no more than three pages).
5. **Names, addresses, and telephone numbers** of at least three professional references, including the writer of the cover letter, at least one of whom must be a colleague or supervisor (one page).

AWARD: The successful candidate will receive a certificate, a cash award of \$750, a one-year OAH membership, and a one-year subscription to the *OAH Magazine of History*. If the winner is an OAH member, the award will include a one-year renewal of membership in the awardee's usual category. Finally, the winner's school will receive a plaque suitable for permanent public display.

ONE COPY OF EACH ENTRY MUST BE MAILED DIRECTLY TO:

Mr. Eric Rothschild
(Committee Chair)
32 Donellan Rd.
Scarsdale, NY 10583


Professor Kenneth T. Jackson
603 Fayerweather Hall
MC 2538
Columbia University
New York, NY 10027

Dr. Linda K. Miller
Fairfax High School
3500 Old Lee Hwy
Fairfax, VA 22030

Past Mary K. Bonsteel Tachau Pre-Collegiate Teaching Award Winners

- | | |
|------|--|
| 1995 | Gloria Schuster Sesso, Half Hollow Hills Central High School East, Dix Hills, New York |
| 1996 | Tedd Levy, Nathan Hale Middle School, Norwalk, Connecticut |
| | Linda Karen Miller, Fairfax High School, Fairfax, Virginia |
| 1997 | Ron Briley, Sandia Preparatory School, Albuquerque, New Mexico |
| 1998 | Steven Z. Freiberger, Chatham High School, Chatham, New Jersey |

**ALL ENTRIES MUST BE CLEARLY LABELED
"1999 MARY K. BONSTEEL TACHAU PRE-COLLEGIATE
TEACHING AWARD ENTRY"**



**CALL FOR PAPERS
OSLO, NORWAY, AUGUST 6-13, 2000**

The International Federation for Research in Women's History/Fédération Internationale pour le Recherche en Histoire des Femmes (IFRWH/FIRHF) invites proposals for its conference, to be held in Oslo, Norway, in conjunction with the International Committee of Historical Sciences, August 6-13, 2000. The IFRWH/FIRHF will hold one and a half days of sessions on the following theme:

**CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN SITES OF CULTURAL CO-EXISTENCE:
PERSPECTIVES FROM WOMEN'S HISTORY**

We seek papers that focus on gendered histories of conflict and cooperation in sites where women, and men, of competing cultures share geographical or geo-political space. The sessions will range widely across time and place, and may include analyses of women's responses to and experiences of historical situations like the following:

- 1) Conflict and/or cooperation between indigenous peoples and settlers in colonial and post-colonial societies
- 2) Conflict and/or cooperation between women of distinct national, ethnic, or religious traditions in the same or neighboring countries, including situations which were the outcome of war or imperial restructuring and those characterized by large refugee populations
- 3) Conflict and/or cooperation by large refugee populations; relations have been shaped by differences of race, class, sex, ethnicity, region, or sexual orientation

The planning committee — Prof. Nancy Hewitt, Rutgers University, USA; Prof. Mrinalini Sinha, Southern Illinois University, USA; and Prof. Ida Blom, University of Bergen, Norway — will accept ONLY SINGLE PAPER PROPOSALS. Proposals should consist of a one-page summary of the research to be presented and a short (1-2 page) vita. The planning committee will organize sessions that reflect work on similar topics from a range of national/regional/cultural perspectives. Suggestions regarding work that complements your own but which is focused on a different area of the world will be welcomed by the committee.


Proposals should be sent in TRIPPLICATE TO:

Prof. Nancy A. Hewitt
Department of History, Van Dyck Hall
16 Seminary Place
Rutgers University
New Brunswick, NJ 08901 USA


The final deadline for proposals is March 15, 1999.

Questions regarding the conference, BUT NOT THE PROPOSALS, may be sent by e-mail to hewitt@acpub.duke.edu

The IFRWH/FIRHF does NOT have funding available to defray costs of travel to or accommodations at the conference. Please appeal to funding sources available through your university or home country. Thank you.



World History Association



BULLETIN BOARD

CALL FOR PAPERS

The **Vermont Historical Society** invites proposals for a conference on ante-bellum Vermont (1820-50) to be held August 2-3, 1999, in Montpelier, Vermont. Papers relating to Vermont's political, economic, cultural, and social history between 1820 and 1850 are requested. A certificate and \$200 will be offered to the best paper by a senior-level or graduate student. Participants will have the opportunity to have their papers published in a special issue of *Vermont History*. Applicants should submit proposals of 500 words in length or less, and include a one-page curriculum vitae. Deadline is January 15, 1999. Contact:

Vermont Historical Society
109 State St.
Montpelier, VT 05609-0901

WHA

CALL FOR PAPERS

**American Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies,
Philadelphia, April 12-16, 2000**

The American Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies (ASECS) is announcing early its annual meeting to be held in Philadelphia on April 12-16, 2000. The theme for the conference is "The Eighteenth Century Seen Around the World," and the Society intends to use this conference to invite and encourage participation in ASECS by scholars with research specialties across the globe. Philadelphia was the second largest city in the eighteenth-century British empire, and to this day its libraries are among the finest in the country for the study of the period. The Library Company is among the most famous and it will be one of our hosts. In celebration of the new century, exhibitions will be held at the Philadelphia Museum of Art (on Rome in the 18th century), Van Pelt Library, and the American Philosophical Society, etc.

By tradition, ASECS has served an important role in fostering interdisciplinary communication and scholarship among specialists in literary criticism, history, philosophy, art history, and music whose work falls within the long, Euro-American eighteenth century. With the Philadelphia meeting, the Society wishes to expand further its integrative tradition by encouraging the submission of papers and panels from scholars working in Asian, African, Middle Eastern, and American traditions during the long eighteenth century (late seventeenth to early nineteenth centuries). The Society especially wishes to encourage the submission of panels that include papers representing diverse cultures and geographic regions, and also, but not necessarily, papers and panels focusing upon interaction between the Euro-American world and other parts of the world.

Formal details on the submission on panels and papers will be announced in the spring of 1999. At present we would welcome preliminary submissions so that the program committee may better gauge the strength of interest within various regions and fields. For further information on ASECS, please see our Website at: <http://calliope.jhu.edu/associations/asecs/>. Submit ideas to asecs@wfu.edu or to 2000@ccat.sas.upenn.edu which will reach the present organizing committee.

WHA

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College of Arts and Sciences
Drexel University
Philadelphia, PA 19104

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Think Globally



Join the WHA

The *World History Bulletin* is sent only to members of the World History Association. Yearly dues (January through December): \$30.00 (for students, unemployed, disabled, and retired: \$15.00).

Name _____

Mailing Address _____

Affiliation, if any

I have enclosed \$ _____ for the dues of the World History Association

Mail to: Dick Rosen, Executive Director
History/Politics Department
Drexel University
Philadelphia, PA 19104

e-mail: rosenrl@post.drexel.edu

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WHA Notes: Important Membership Information from the Executive Director

WHA dues are payable on a calendar year basis. During each year, members will receive two issues of the *Journal* and two issues of the *Bulletin*. Many members have had questions regarding the timing of dues notices. Notices for 1999 dues are mailed in October, 1998, and January, 1999. If your address has changed, please send notification to Dick Rosen, Executive Director, World History Association, at the address shown above. Your cooperation will save the WHA time and money.

The *Bulletin* will appear in May and November. Please note the label which is affixed to the *Bulletin*. It contains both your membership number and the expiration date of your membership. If you find this information in error, please notify the Executive Director immediately.