

# *World History Bulletin*

Spring 2009

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**H. Micheal Tarver**

*Editor*

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# Editor's Note

**ARKANSAS TECH**  
A CENTURY FORWARD



April 2009

Dear Readers,

As noted on the World History Association website, the organization has entered into a contract with Cambria Press to produce, in printed book form, a collection of selected papers from its 18<sup>th</sup> Annual Conference. All papers presented for consideration will be peer-reviewed and must meet certain minimal criteria in order to be reviewed:

1. They must focus on one or both of the conference's themes: trade and religion in world history
2. They must be world historical in scope and importance.
3. They must have been presented at the conference.
4. They must be original studies based on primary-source research and not previously published in any other print or electronic medium.
5. It is expected that any submission will be an expanded and polished version of the paper presented at the conference.
6. They must include all appropriate scholarly apparatus, including endnotes and bibliography (in accordance with rules set out in the *Chicago Manual of Style*, 15<sup>th</sup> edition).
7. All spelling must conform to American standards; the typescript must be submitted electronically in MS Word and in 12-point, Times New Roman font; both the rules and standards of the *Chicago Manual of Style*, 15<sup>th</sup> edition and the Cambria Press Guidelines (available from the general editor on request) must be followed without exception.
8. Papers should range in length from about 5000 to roughly 7500 words in length, exclusive of endnotes and bibliography.

Papers falling outside of this range will be considered, but there will be a significant burden of proof on them to justify their length.

In judging a paper's suitability for inclusion in this collection, the editorial board will consider not only the degree to which it meets these criteria but also the clarity of its prose.

In order for this book to be to be printed in time for the 19<sup>th</sup> Annual Conference in San Diego, California (June 24-27, 2010), the WHA must establish and maintain a strict schedule:

1. Potential authors should contact the general editor, Alfred J. Andrea, at [aandrea@uvm.edu](mailto:aandrea@uvm.edu) for a copy of the Cambria Press Guidelines as soon as possible and certainly no later than mid-July.
2. Polished and expanded papers, and a one-page CV, should be submitted electronically to the general editor no later than September 1, 2009.
3. Authors will be contacted regarding the editorial board's decision no later than October 15, 2009. Authors whose papers have been accepted will be asked to sign a Contributor's Agreement at that time.
4. If any revisions are required, revised papers are due no later than November 15, 2009.

Note that constraints of space or balance might force the editorial board to reject a paper it would otherwise wish to publish. Likewise, if the number of acceptable submissions is not sufficient to produce a book of approximately 200 pages in length, the editorial board reserves the right to not produce the book.

Because of personal time constraints, this issue of the *Bulletin* is shorter than usual, although Dorothea Martin has arranged an outstanding Focus Issue section as our Guest Editor.

*In closing, I would like to note that this issue marks the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the World History Bulletin, and I wish to thank everyone who has made that possible, especially those tireless individuals who served as its Editors before I took over this rewarding responsibility.*

-- Micheal

## **World History Bulletin**

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# **LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR**

Dear WHA Members,

It was my pleasure to meet with many of you during the AHA 2009 Conference in New York and finally connect familiar names with faces. For those who may not be aware, I have taken over as the Executive Director of the WHA from Kieko Matteson. Kieko's long dedication to the WHA has been crucial in building and maintaining the organization. Her assistance during the transition has been most appreciated.

My thanks to the Executive Council for their support, Anand Yang for his leadership, and my special gratitude to Michele Foreman, Al Andrea and Carolyn Neel for their overall guidance and kind words of encouragement.

As Executive Director, I am excited by the future of the WHA with the outlook for further achievements. I look forward to hearing your thoughts on how we may better serve your member needs and improving the organization.

Please take a moment to learn more about the June WHA Conference in Salem, Massachusetts by going to our website—[www.thewha.org](http://www.thewha.org). Carolyn Neel, Al Andrea, the Conference Committee, and organizers at Salem State have been putting their time and talent to ensure a fantastic conference you will definitely want to attend.

See you in Salem,

Winston Welch  
Executive Director  
WHA

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# Affairs of the Organization

## **Business Meeting Minutes World History Association January 3, 2009 Hilton Hotel, New York City (Meeting Room, Concourse D)**

In attendance: 15 people, 9 non-executive committee members.

President Anand Yang addressed the meeting with a number of points of interest from the Executive Council meeting on 1/2/09. He introduced and welcomed Winston Welch, the new WHA Executive Director. He can be contacted in Hawaii at [www.thewha.org](http://www.thewha.org).

Anand then strongly encouraged members to attend the WHA Annual Meeting in Salem Massachusetts in June 2009, and to register at the Peabody Marriott hotel, with which the WHA has a contract for a certain amount of rooms. Anand praised Al Andrea (Conference Committee chair) and Carolyn Neel (Program Committee chair) for their work on the annual meetings, both for revenues generated and for the high academic standards of the program. The WHA is enormously dependant on the revenues from the annual meetings, so it is of utmost importance to have well-attended meetings.

Anand thanked Treasurer Carolyn Neel as well as departing Executive Director Kieko Matteson for their work on producing a budget that has both clarity and transparency. We have an operating balance of approximately \$33,000 at the moment. The WHA endowment lost "only" 24% in this year's economic recession.

The three WHA publications are doing well, Anand reported. He particularly commended Micheal Tarver as editor of the *World History Bulletin*, and noted that *World History Connected*, the electronic journal, has a new editor, Marc Gilbert of Hawaii Pacific University.

The biggest news from the Executive Council meeting was that, under the guidance of Pat Manning and David Christian, the WHA has joined with other world history organizations to form the Network of Global and World History Organizations with the slightly-unwieldy acronym of NOGWHISTO. This new network of organization will allow the member societies to join the mega-international organization of CISH (Comité International des Sciences Historiques/International Committee of the Historical Sciences, which is part of UNESCO -- United Nations' Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. The next CISH conference will be in Amsterdam in summer 2010, during which NOGWHISTO will hold a concurrent meeting,

and be introduced to the wider audience in CISH. The members of the Executive Council approved the paying of dues to NOGWHISTO of \$500 a year and \$1 per member because they recognized the importance of having the WHA belong to an international organization of academics.

Al Andrea had two comments: one, that the WHA was going to begin asking members to remember the WHA in their wills and trusts as another form of long-range fund-raising; and two, that the 2010 WHA Annual meeting will be in San Diego, hosted by California State University San Diego and Southwestern Community College, and the 2011 WHA Annual conference will be hosted by Beijing Normal University in China.

Anand Yang closed the meeting at 5:45 and invited members to attend the WHA Reception.

*Respectfully Submitted,  
Ane Lintvedt, Secretary*



## **Executive Council Meeting Minutes World History Association January 2, 2009 5:15 p.m. Hilton Hotel, New York City (Meeting Room, Concourse D)**

In attendance: Officers: Anand Yang, President; Al Andrea, Vice President; Carolyn Neel, Treasurer; Ane Lintvedt, Secretary; Winston Welch, Executive Director. Council Members: William Zeigler, Marnie Hughes-Warrington, Pat Manning, Laura Mitchell, Laura Wangerin, Craig Lockard. Late comers: Kerry Ward, Heather Streets. Others in attendance: John Meers, Nancy Joreczak. Absent: Joel Tishkin, Craig Benjamin, Jerry Bentley, Micheal Tarver, Jonathan Reynolds

The Executive Council meeting began at 5:15 p.m. in the NYC Hilton. Al Andrea opened the meeting and introduced the new Executive Director Winston Welch, and thanked retiring director Kieko Matteson for all her help and guidance. Winston asked that anyone with ideas or issues please contact him at the WHA offices in Hawaii. Winston noted that there would be an opening for a new Administrative Assistant, and asked for help in updating that job description.

Al Andrea also introduced new council

member Marnie Hughes-Warrington, and noted that, due to short notice of election results, neither newly-elected council members Joel Tishkin nor Craig Benjamin could attend this meeting. Thanks were offered to retiring council members Adam McKeown, Jen Laden, and Laura Mitchell for their service.

(N.B. The 2008 committee reports were submitted and distributed ahead of this meeting. The following discussions were limited to particular areas of concern or to questions or motions raised.)

**1. Treasurer's Report, Carolyn Neel.** Carolyn said that the WHA shows a balance of approximately \$25,000, thanks to the proceeds of the very successful London WHA meeting in June 2008 and an increase in the number of members. She is concerned that the poor state of the US economy will impact both attendance at conferences and maintaining and increasing membership, and will therefore impinge negatively on the WHA's financial status. Carolyn and Winston Welch are proceeding to locate an accountant to do a financial audit of the WHA's finances, and warn that it will be an expensive procedure, perhaps around \$10,000.

**2. Affiliates Report, Chair David Christian** asked to resign his post, since he is moving back to Australia. Several people affirmed the request to place stronger links to regional affiliates onto the WHA website, and suggested that the WHA membership form include a space to indicate interest or even add membership dues to a regional affiliate. There was some discussion that this would be difficult to coordinate, especially on the regional levels.

**3. Conferences Report, Al Andrea.** Al requested that we stress to anyone attending the Salem MA conference in June 2009 that they should make reservations in the Peabody Marriot hotel, with which the WHA has a contract for a specific number of rooms. If those rooms are not filled, the WHA will pay a substantial penalty to the hotel. Al also requested information on potential exhibitors, as well as donations for the World Scholars' Travel Fund. San Diego CA will be the site of the 2010 conference, and Beijing, China will be the site of the 2011 conference.

**4. Program Committee, Carolyn Neel.** The deadline for the Salem conference Call for Papers is January 15, and will likely be extended to no later than February 2, 2009.

**5. Fund Raising, Al Andrea.** Al reminded people to use and to recommend to others to uses the Amazon.com link on the WHA website. ([www.thewha.org](http://www.thewha.org)). He also noted that there will be two social receptions at the WHA meeting at Salem in June 2009 sponsored by publishers. Winston Welch inquired if it would be useful to

send out quarterly reports to the Executive Council, and the response was affirmative. Al Andrea then asked for a discussion of “marketing” the idea of asking WHA members to make bequests in their wills or estates for the WHA, as do most colleges and academic associations. The discussion included suggestions of placing reminders in the *World History Bulletin*, on the website, in *World History Connected*, and/or in the *Journal of World History*.

**6. Nominations Committee.** Anand Yang noted that Kieko Matteson will replace Pamela McVee as head of the Nominations Committee.

**7. Student Paper Prize, Laura Wangerin.** There were 20 papers submitted for the 2008 prize. Information, including deadlines, is posted on the WHA website, H-net World listserv, and with Phi Alpha Theta.

**8. Teaching Committee, Ane Lintvedt.** Ane commented that it bears watching whether, under the new Obama administration, the Department of Education authorizes NAEP (National Assessment of Educational Progress) to begin the process of creating a national high school exam for World History. NAEP made a call for proposals in late summer 2008, but the call was withdrawn.

**9. Website Committee, Jonathan Reynolds.** There was a request to make the links to the Affiliates of WHA more visible on the website, and that the WHA site have a link to the World History Network, and vice-versa. Winston Welch asked if there was a single logo for the WHA, and was answered that the logo on the website was the agreed-upon logo a number of years ago. Winston also said that he was planning to give passwords to those who needed to do regular updates to edit a particular part of the website. Winston also noted that he was thinking about ways to use the power of the web for the site, including videotaping parts of the WHA conferences and making them available as downloads, for example.

**10. Book Prize.** Anand Yang, Merry Wiesner-Hanks, and John Thornton will be on the committee which will announce its prize in June at the meeting in Salem, MA.

**11. Endowment.** Carter Findley sent a report that the WHA Endowment has fallen by one-third, but the principal is unaffected. Winston Welch added, on a financial note, that he will be looking to consolidate banking accounts in order to minimize the fees accrued by the WHA.

**12. Membership, Laura Mitchell and Nancy Jorcak.** A discussion on ways to increase membership ranged across issues including reaching out to community colleges; increasing the non-US membership; reaching teachers at the AP Reading and at NCSS, and contacting librarians at their association meetings. Suggestions included: using affiliate chapters to contact community colleges in their regions; raffling a subscription to ABC-Clio's online encyclopedia of World History to one new subscriber at the AP reading; providing a line on the registration and

membership forms, and perhaps in the *Bulletin*/website/*WHC*, for giving a gift membership; preparing a packet about “how to teach an introductory survey in world history” for community college teachers. Ane Lintvedt suggested that those of us who attend the AP reading could caucus before the meeting to strategize how to contact the hundreds of readers. Al Andrea noted that Southwest Community College is co-sponsoring the WHA meeting in San Diego in 2010.

Marnie Hughes-Warrington commented that it is the scholarship exemplified in the *Journal of World History* that attracts foreign members, and that she thought it would be effective if the editorial board of the *JWH* became more active in foreign communities of scholars, as the editorial board of the *Journal of Global History* has done. She also noted that teaching panels at our annual conferences that addressed teaching at the Master's degree level would be more useful to foreign scholars than teaching panels aimed at US k-12 levels. Laura Wangerin wondered if the *JWH* could be offered in an electronic form at a reduced cost as an added attraction to both foreign scholars (less expensive by saving mailing fees) and to those who prefer to avoid paper copies of journals.

**13. Report from the WHA delegates to the Dresden Meeting about the founding of NOGWHISTO. Pat Manning and Matthias Middell.** Pat Manning reported on the successful formation of an international Network of Global and World History Organizations (NOGWHISTO) which took place at a meeting in Dresden, Germany in June 2008, with the WHA as one of the constituent organizations. Pat Manning and David Christian represented the WHA at this meeting. NOGWHISTO has applied to become a member of the CISH (Comité International des Sciences Historiques/International Committee of the Historical Sciences), which is a UNESCO-affiliated international organization of historians. (UNESCO = United Nations' Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.) Being part of CISH will entitle the WHA and its members (as part of NOGWHISTO) to participate in the international meetings of CISH (meetings every 5 years) and have exposure to an international academic organization. (Note: The WHA applied to CISH in 2000 and was denied membership on the grounds that the WHA was an organization solely of historians of the United States.) The Executive Council voted electronically, before this meeting, to endorse NOGWHISTO and to authorize the paying of fairly minimal dues. (\$1 per member and a \$500 flat fee per year.)

Matthias Middell, from the University of Leipzig, was elected to be the NOGWHISTO coordinator, and outlined six points to the Executive Council. (1) In the 2010 CISH meeting in Amsterdam, World history will be a topic at the conference for the first time since 2000. (2) The NOGWHISTO website was functional as of Jan 2, 2009 at [www.nogwhisto.org](http://www.nogwhisto.org). It should be linked to the WHA website and vice-versa. (3) NOGWHISTO is not competing with WHA for

members: individuals cannot be members of this organization. (4) NOGWHISTO member organizations should work to encourage other organizations to join, even if they are very small. There are efforts underway to form a Nigerian world history association, for example. (5) The dues structure, which is based in large part on numbers of members, was constructed to allow small organizations to be able to afford to join. (6) Matthias will send a letter to the General Secretary of CISH after this meeting to formally apply for membership in CISH.

Several questions were asked of Pat and Matthias dealing with the 2012 meeting of CISH in Amsterdam. NOGWHISTO will have a meeting in Amsterdam concurrent meeting with the CISH meeting, and NOGWHISTO will be asked to introduce itself and its constituent organizations to the CISH General Assembly in a plenary session. Matthias recommended that this time be used to present what World and Global History is, as well as presenting the strengths of the organization, or we could consider offering a series of panels on a common academic theme, e.g. oceans.

When asked if the WHA would represent, be asked to represent, or be pigeon-holed as a North American world history organization, Pat Manning replied no, and Matthias replied that the organizations were linked by interest in a topic, and not by national identification.

Anand Yang asked if k-12 teachers would feel that, although \$1 of their dues were going to NOGWHISTO that they would receive no benefit from it. Pat commented that the teaching community could become very involved in discussions with other countries' departments/ministries of education as they thought about teaching world history, and Matthias noted that in 2000, UNESCO had looked for a constituent organization to help further the study of world history but had no such member organization. He noted that NOGWHISTO could become an authority on this topic for CISH and UNESCO. Ane Lintvedt and Nancy Jorcak thought that teacher-members would not resent the expenditure, and would appreciate the attempts to widen both access to information and discussions about teaching in a global context.

Anand Yang concluded the discussion by saying we should be clear that the WHA has committed \$1700 a year to join NOGWHISTO, and that this membership entitles the WHA to participate in a global history conference and gives the WHA, as part of NOGWHISTO, recognition on a world stage. He concluded by saying that he was excited by the opportunities NOGWHISTO presented, and looked forward to greater cooperation with the other organizations within NOGWHISTO.

The Executive council meeting adjourned at 6 p.m.

*Respectfully Submitted,  
Ane Lintvedt, Secretary*

## Two Chinese Graduate Students to Present Papers at the WHA Conference

The theme "Merchants and Missionaries: Trade and Religion in World History" struck a chord with two Chinese graduate students from Beijing, Ms. Huang Shuo of Capital Normal University and Mr. Gao Hao of Peking University. Each will present a paper in the session "Making the Other Meaningful: Missionaries and Merchants in Mesoamerica and the Middle Kingdom" at the Eighteenth Annual WHA Conference in Salem, Massachusetts, 25-28 2009.

Ms. Huang's paper "Colonial Trade and Baroque Art in Spanish America," is a study of how Roman Catholic missionaries to Mexico from the 16th through the 18th centuries helped shape the self images and self expressions of some of Mexico's indigenous peoples. Mr. Gao's paper, "Missionaries, Merchants, and Sino-British Communication in the 18th Century," studies the manner in which Jesuit missionaries and British merchants helped shape two quite different British views of China in the 18th century.

Ms. Huang, who has already garnered a number of academic honors, is currently conducting thesis research on the topic of the Italian Renaissance's influence on French art. She has taught world and Chinese history at a Beijing high school, is a nationally recognized artist on the urheen, a traditional Chinese musical instrument, and is fluent in French, as well as English.

Mr. Gao, who can be seen in this photo taken in Beijing's Olympic Stadium, has served as translator and assistant for none other than Shaquille O'Neal and Damon Jones. Like Ms. Huang, he is the recipient of numerous academic awards, and his current thesis research centers on Irish educational reform in 1960s and its influence on Ireland's economic takeoff. In 2007 he studied at University College in Dublin.

Be sure to welcome them warmly to the USA when you see them at Salem this summer.



## List of Affiliates

### Council of the Affiliates

Chair: David Christian, San Diego State University,

David.Christian@humn.mq.edu.au

Affiliates weblog: <http://whaaffiliates.blogspot.com>

### **California World History Association**

Contact: David Christian, David.Christian@humn.mq.edu.au

### **Europe World History Association**

Contact: Matthias Middell, European Network in Universal and Global History (ENIUGH)/ Karl-Lamprecht-Gesellschaft, University of Leipzig, Centre for Advanced Study, middell@uni-leipzig.de

Web sites: [www.geschichte-transnational.clio-online.net](http://www.geschichte-transnational.clio-online.net) and [www.uni-leipzig.de/zhs](http://www.uni-leipzig.de/zhs)

### **Florida World History Association**

Contact: Wilfred Bisson, bissonmw@cfl.rr.com

Web site: <http://flawha.org/>

### **H-World**

Contacts: David Kalivas, [kalivas@comcast.net](mailto:kalivas@comcast.net) or Eric Martin, [elmartin@lcsc.edu](mailto:elmartin@lcsc.edu)

Web site: <http://www.h-net.org/~world/>

### **Hawaii World History Association**

Contact: Marc J Gilbert, [mgilbert@hawaii.edu](mailto:mgilbert@hawaii.edu)

### **Mid-Atlantic World History Association**

Contact: Sherri West, Brookdale Community College, [swest@brookdalecc.edu](mailto:swest@brookdalecc.edu)

Web site: <http://www.mawha.org/>

### **Northeast Regional World History Association**

Contact: David Burzillo, The Rivers School of Weston, [d.burzillo@rivers.org](mailto:d.burzillo@rivers.org)

### **North West World History Association**

Contact: Heather Streets, Washington State University, [streetsh@wsu.edu](mailto:streetsh@wsu.edu)

### **Ohio World History Association**

Contact: Tim Connell, Laurel School, [tconnell@laurelschool.org](mailto:tconnell@laurelschool.org)

### **Rocky Mountain World History Association**

Contact: David Ruffley, Pikes Peak Community College, [dlrwy@yahoo.com](mailto:dlrwy@yahoo.com) or [davidruffley@adelphia.net](mailto:davidruffley@adelphia.net)

### **Southeast World History Association**

Contact: Jared Poley, Georgia State University, [jpoley@gsu.edu](mailto:jpoley@gsu.edu)  
Web site: <http://www.sewha.org/>

### **World History Association of Texas**

Contact: Lydia Garner, [lg11@swt.edu](mailto:lg11@swt.edu)  
Web site: <http://www.txstate.edu/history/what>

### **World History Association - Beijing**

Contact: Liu Xincheng, Capital Normal University, [shicheng64@263.net](mailto:shicheng64@263.net)

### **World History Network, Inc.**

Contact: Pat Manning, University of Pittsburgh, [planeterra@comcast.net](mailto:planeterra@comcast.net)  
Website: [www.worldhistorynetwork.org](http://www.worldhistorynetwork.org)



# **Phi Alpha Theta / World History Association Paper Prizes in World History**

## **2009**

**Entries must be e-mailed or postmarked by June 30, 2009**

Phi Alpha Theta and the World History Association, with a generous subvention from Pearson Prentice Hall, Inc., a publisher of history textbooks, are co-sponsoring two student paper prizes in world history, each of \$400, for the best undergraduate world history paper and the best graduate-level world history paper composed in the 2008-09 academic year. To qualify students must be members of **either** The World History Association **or** Phi Alpha Theta.

All submitted papers must be no longer than 30 typewritten (double-spaced) pages of text, exclusive of the title page, endnotes, and bibliography. A letter or e-mail from a relevant history faculty member must attest to the fact that the paper was composed during the academic year of 2008-2009.

The Committee will judge papers according to the following criteria: world historical scope; originality of research; depth of analysis; and prose style.

For complete information regarding the competition and submission rules, visit <http://thewha.org/> and <http://www.phialphatheta.org/>

# Focus Issue and Teaching Forum

## *Asia in World History*

Dorothea A.L. Martin

*Guest Editor*

### East-West Stimulus and Response: The [Cotton] Fabric of the Modern World

Dorothea A.L. Martin  
*Appalachian State University*

As the world enters a new phase of globalization in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, attention is again turned to Asia, much as it was 500 years ago when ocean voyages sparked a new era of interconnectedness. World History textbooks of today mark this early era with words such as “the Globe Encompassed or World Entangled.” In that earlier period, the drive to directly reach the Asian sources of the spice and silk trade motivated small European and Mediterranean powers to launch their “Age of Exploration.” Over the ensuing 300 years, until the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, Asia remained the economic core area of global production, serving as the workshop of the world, exporting more of its goods to other regions than it imported. Recognition by Western scholars of the scale and volume of this handicraft production has often been overlooked. New visions of global history, shaking off the Eurocentric perspective of “the Rise of the West” have, on the one hand, forced historians to re-Orient [to borrow from A. G. Frank] and, on the other hand, to critically revisit Wm. H. McNeill’s work while learning more about alternate interpretations of the role of both Asia and the West in the emergence of the Modern World. As McNeill’s own essay in the inaugural issue of the *Journal of World History* put it, a major failing of his work went beyond its Eurocentrism to “its inadequate attention to the emergence of the ecumenical world system within which we live today.”<sup>1</sup>

Unfortunately, the academic discipline of history on the whole has been slow to acknowledge the value of world historical perspectives and even slower in its academic preparation of future teachers at both the secondary and post-secondary levels. The result is the continuation of world history perspectives that are mostly focused on Europe [and its ancient predecessors]

and North America [after Columbus], with only a brief nod to the “other” peoples who have little or no history of their own and matter only as they “respond” to the “stimulus” offered by their “encounters” with the dynamic West.

The recent series of teaching-focused articles on both regional and topical issues offered in the *World History Bulletin* and the series in *Education About Asia* are an attempt to provide teachers with the materials, resources and insights on how to move beyond their training and explore both the theoretical and practical content that can help them in their classrooms. Actually, the demands of various States’ standard course of study guidelines make secondary teachers more willing and able to move beyond the limits of their training than are most historians more narrowly trained for college and university teaching. This latter group has followed a pattern of narrowly focusing on smaller and smaller time periods, single geographical locations and on the archival research

needed to meet the criteria for advanced degrees. When required to teach introductory survey classes in world history they find themselves uncomfortable with “big” history and sometimes overwhelmed by the energy required for global conceptualization and course preps that deviate beyond their North Atlantic comfort zone.

Training in Asian history and culture, does not automatically make teaching world history come with the ease our US and European history colleagues seem to think it should. [The same applies to scholars in Latin America, African, Middle Eastern, etc. area studies] Less than a decade ago, area studies were under attack as having outlived their usefulness, having lost their relevance to the emerging global discourse. Much of this critique was coming from those eager to minimize differences, toss off the cloak of the “otherness” for various “civilizations”, and see the commonalities as the earth became more “flat.”

This trend, too, seems to have rested on an

assumption of the victory of the Western model of political and economic systems and even, perhaps, an end to history, as it had previously unfolded. History, however, re-started with the emergence of China and India as new economic and military powerhouses and the rise of militant Islam. Old questions in new contexts are again being asked such as why do these newly emerging economic powers have to assert their nationalism and cultural chauvinism? Or why do many post-industrial countries find it necessary to bash the success of these newly emerging powers while at the same time scrambling to figure out how best to profit from them? Perhaps our ability to understand these questions can be aided by a look at the interactive stimulus and response that helped shape the emergence of the modern world.

Commonly overlooked in constructing the narrative of the growth and development of

*History, however, re-started with the emergence of China and India as new economic and military powerhouses and the rise of militant Islam.*

modernity is the mutual nature of the stimulus and response that helped launch it. A brief look at three points in global time

can give us some useful perspectives. These three periods of time— the late 17<sup>th</sup> century, the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century and the late 20<sup>th</sup> century - can all be identified as periods of inter-regional stimulus and response. The first of these periods is usually seen as the time when the foundations and conditions for early industrialization were taking place and the second is viewed as the period when industrialization moved beyond Great Britain and when that nation launched a scramble for new imperial holdings. How the third period, our own time, will be interpreted, well, it is too soon to tell. Although historians are apt to keep reaching into the past to find precursors for the eras they investigate, there is widespread agreement that the mechanization of cotton textile production that launched the Industrial Revolution and ushered in the era of European dominance. Other factors were clearly important for Europe’s, especially Great Britain’s, lead in the Industrial Revolution - accumulated capital, good resources, improved agricultural output, banking

and government support, etc. - but most of these were present in other parts of the world in the same period but did not trigger an industrial revolution. On the other hand, the technological knowledge need had been available in Britain for some time, but an additional stimulus was needed. Viewing the topic from a more global and world historical perspective, we can see what triggered the industrialization process. Because of the pivotal role of cotton textiles in East – West relation for the time periods noted above, I'll use it to follow a "thread" that links their relations in the modern era.

In the pre-modern era, silk was the textile that defined the trade relationships linking East to West. Cotton serves that role in the modern period. By the late 17<sup>th</sup> century, it was less the luxury spices and silks that captured the imagination and interest of all segments of European society and more of a growing interest in cotton textiles. Demand in Britain was so great that it threatened the viability of linen and woolen goods production, taxing of the latter being of such importance since the 14<sup>th</sup> century that the Lord Chancellor of the House of Lords sat on a symbolic sack of it.<sup>2</sup> English imports of high quality and low cost Indian cotton goods grew steadily throughout the 17<sup>th</sup> century. The British East India Company increased its purchases of cotton textiles from 4.2 million square meters in 1664 to 26.9 million by 1684.<sup>3</sup> Indian cotton handicraft exports at this time were the largest in the world going not only to Europe but also to East and Southeast Asia, as well as East and West Africa where the brightly woven and dyed calicos helped stimulate the slave trade. Production for the Indian domestic market also increased demand. Most of the goods exported were paid for in specie. Some say the Mughal Empire set an early trend of becoming a victim of its own success. The decline of imperial power after the death of Aurangzeb in 1707 saw the rise of more powerful local elites many of whom expanded their control of land to grow more cotton for the thriving textile industry. Beyond workshops, peasant households supplemented substance production by spinning and weaving cotton.

Wool merchants in Britain cried foul, claiming that India had an unfair competitive advantage because of lower wage costs. Initially, the British government's response was a ban on cotton goods from India. [I should also point out that recent work has shown that lower wages in India's handicraft industry did not reflect a lower standard of living but rather reflected the lower cost of food in India because of the higher levels of agricultural productiveness in India compared to Europe at this time.<sup>4</sup>]

Demand for cheap cotton goods didn't go away. Aggressive members of the new merchant class, some of whom were making large sums for

their work and investments in the East India Company, gained more control of Indian lands through the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Since there was no corresponding block on raw cotton, imports shifted to primary product, starting Britain on the path that led to the ever greater mechanization of the cotton textile production in response to the pre-existing demand. The pace accelerated once steam was harnessed to drive the process and pushed the growth of industrial and military might that gave Great Britain the edge needed for the global reach of empire by the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century. Britain, and the other European powers that trailed then in the industrializing process, became the new force or stimulus to which others now had to respond.

The late 17<sup>th</sup> century "stimulus" of cotton textiles imports from India was, of course, part of a

wider increase in the volume of trade goods from Asia. Tea became Europeans' favorite beverage and porcelain ware or its Delft knock-off, to drink it from increasingly became part of even the poorest households. Baroque and Rococo furnishings and fashions were layered in fabrics, many made to design specifications submitted to Asian producers. Around 1700, it is estimated that Europe, India and China with fairly equal populations were producing in equal shares approximately 70% of global economic activity. But by the mid- 19<sup>th</sup> century, India's response to the British mechanization of cotton textiles was a severe reduction of handicraft cotton production and a corresponding rise in the use of land to grow cotton for export. As was the earlier case in Britain, Indian businessmen could not resist importing from Britain cheap cotton goods made of Indian cotton resulting in the eventual "de-industrialization" of India's once mighty handicraft production sector.<sup>5</sup> By the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, India was under direct British control and rapidly lost its share of global production. From the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century forward, repeated famines, constructed by the redirection of land from subsistence food production to commodity, cost millions of Indian lives.

The growing issue for Britain was to find and secure markets for the new manufactures, cotton goods as well as other products. The China market loomed large but remained restricted by the limits of the Canton System. A British merchant, perhaps one of the first to express aloud the benefits of gaining access to China's interior markets, opined that if only the Chinese added an inch to their traditional garments, it would keep the mills of Lancaster humming for 100 years. Could the baggy pants styles of American youth today be driven by a similar vision in reverse?

Inside China, handicraft production of cotton textiles thrived throughout the 17<sup>th</sup> and into the 18<sup>th</sup> centuries, mainly centered in the

Shanghai region. Manufacturers produced three main grades, the best being called "standard cloth." These were marketed by brokers throughout wide geographical areas, being sold in places that were over 800 miles apart – what would have been international distances in Europe. Demand for cotton goods ebbed and flowed with economic good and hard times. By the time the Manchu Qing dynasty took control, there was a decline in demand for standard cloth and more call for the "mid-loom" and "small cloth" both of which were cheaper.

To keep up with demand, new technology in cotton textiles easily spread among China's regions to improve production efficiency and China imported more raw cotton from India when that area shifted to primary production from secondary manufacturing in the late 18<sup>th</sup> and early 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. As Mark Elvin points out in his seminal work *The Pattern of the Chinese Past*, "[B]etween 1785 and 1833, the single province of Kwang-tung [Guangdong] imported on average from India each year six times as much raw cotton as all of Britain used annually at the time of Arkwright's first water-frame."<sup>6</sup> Historians often point to Britain's tripled consumption of raw cotton between 1741 and the early 1770s when effective machine spinning of fibers first spread. For those who disparage China for not launching its own Industrial Revolution, it is important to note that had China adopted the new mechanized technology there would not have been enough raw cotton resources in the entire 18<sup>th</sup> century world to reach the tripling of its already high level of cotton goods output. It is little wonder that China's merchants had no interest in buying cotton manufactures that British merchants offered in the Canton System of trade, when they could earn higher profits by commanding hard currency for their own exports. But that was reversed by the increase in the opium trade; the balance of payments quickly turned in favor of Britain.

The stimulus of the West and response of the East under the conditions of the new imperialism of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, enabled by the military might and economic leverage of Britain and other foreign powers to make India a British Crown colony, to carve China into spheres of influence and divide Southeast Asia between Spain, the Netherlands, France and later the USA. Japan is often held up as the example of how others in Asia "should" have responded by embracing the West. But this embracing was less about any acknowledgement of the superiority of the west and more about the struggle for smaller Japan's own survival in the face of clear military danger. [See Masako Racel's paper in this section] In China, the response to the external threat resulted in a century of rebels, revolts and revolutions that ended only with the founding of the People's Republic in 1949.

The role that Communist rule of China under Mao Zedong played in laying the foundations for the economic growth of the second 30

years from 1979 to the present is the subject of much debate. For purposes of this paper, however, suffice it to say that the recent steady double-digit growth of China's manufacturing sectors may have again reached the levels where they can command the resources, both materials and labor, to be acknowledged as the global workshop. Cotton textiles once more play a significant role in this process. As those of us in the American South are very aware, the demand for cheap cotton textiles has been quickly responded to first by China and to a lesser extent India. Cheaper labor, fewer safety regulations, government support, and even cheaper energy cost have made factories in Asia today the largest producers and consumers of cotton staple and textiles. Wal-Mart alone weighs in as China's largest single buyer, out pacing several other nations or regions of the world. In 2008, "China, India, Pakistan, Turkey the USA and Brazil lead the world in both the production and consumption of cotton."<sup>7</sup> The USA, as did India in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, now exports more cotton staple than is used in its domestic production, a clear reflection of the reality of the transfer of textile production.

In spite of a slowing global economy, India is projected to increase both its output and consumption of cotton over the next year while China will remain the largest consumer of this resource at 51 million bales [of the 86.2 million bales consumed by Asia's four main textile producers]. Faced with an economic downturn and fewer exports, China has begun refocusing attention on expanding its domestic market growth and infrastructure developments.

Many have raised the issues of the sustainability of this level of growth, speculating that there will not be enough resources to go around – especially energy resources – to reproduce the industrial revolution in Asia with its large population. But, this might be the opportunity for Asia's new leaders to respond with innovation in the area of renewable and "green" energy technology. Others point out that "historically, rapid internal economic growth has propelled states to redefine and expand ...more robust military capabilities to pursue and defend" their global interest.<sup>8</sup>

It is this similarity to other historical periods that is at the root of the China bashing – have not other global economic powers also secured their place through force of both money and arms? But nationalism in the world of the 21<sup>st</sup> century is not the same as that of the earlier periods and China's and India's internal circumstances are unique to their own historical realities. Writing in the *New York Times* Jan. 1, 2009, Gurcharan Das pointed out that "[B]oth the Chinese and the Indians are convinced that their prosperity will only increase in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In China it will be induced by the state; in India's case, it may well happen despite the state. Indians expect to continue their relentless march toward a modern, democratic, market-based future.... Indians are painfully aware that they must reform their government bureaucracy, police and judiciary —

institutions, paradoxically, they were so proud of a generation ago. When that happens, India may become formidable, a thought that undoubtedly worries China's leaders."<sup>9</sup>

As both these countries move to more sophisticated high tech and service industries, however, modern production of cotton textiles is moving to other parts of Asia with more products either being produced or assembled in Vietnam, Cambodia, etc. Can this again be the leading industry to create modernity with rising per capita incomes, greater urbanization, and a more highly skilled work force? Will economic control in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, once again in the hands of Asian actors, help spread textile activity to these areas to exploit lower labor cost and safety standards and evade environmental regulation? One can hope that new international institutions such as the WTO and reevaluation of the post World War II Bretton Woods system of international oversight of global monetary funds could exert some control or guidance over the process using diplomacy rather than force of arms used in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries by the West to secure its economic dominance.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> William H. McNeill, "The Rise of the West After 25 Years," *Journal of World History*, Vol.1, No.1, 9-10.

<sup>2</sup> See *The English Wool Market c1230-1327* by Adrian R. Bell, Chris Brooks and Paul R. Dryburgh, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2007.

<sup>3</sup> Robert Tignor, et al., *Worlds Together Worlds Apart*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, Vol. Two, 577.

<sup>4</sup> Cf., "Rethinking Wages and Competitiveness in the 18<sup>th</sup> century: Britain and South India," by P. Parthasarathi, in *Present & Past*, 158 (Feb.1998), 79-80.

<sup>5</sup> Robert Tignor, et al., *Worlds Together Worlds Apart*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, Vol. Two, 673.

<sup>6</sup> Mark Elvin, *The Pattern of the Chinese Past*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 1973, 313-314.

<sup>7</sup> Jim Borneman, "Cotton Data Provide Insight into Continuing Trends in a Changing Global Textile Marketplace," *Textile World -Cotton Numbers Revisited*, [http://www.textileworld.com/Articles/2008/December\\_2008/Features/Cotton\\_Numbers\\_Re...](http://www.textileworld.com/Articles/2008/December_2008/Features/Cotton_Numbers_Re...) accessed 1/6/2009.

<sup>8</sup> M. Taylor Fravel, "Rising Power, Territory and War," in *Precis*, MIT Center for International Studies, Fall 2008, 2.

<sup>9</sup> Gurcharan Das, "The Next World Order," accessed 1/3/2009 at [http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/02/opinion/02das.html?\\_r=1&th&emc=th](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/02/opinion/02das.html?_r=1&th&emc=th)

## Motivations for the "Westernization" of Meiji Japan: A Sin of Omission in World History Survey Textbooks

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In the periodization of Japanese history, Japanese and Western historians alike generally identify the Meiji era (1868-1912) as the beginning of modern or "Westernized" Japan; while its immediate predecessor, the Tokugawa era (1603-1868), is typically depicted as a feudal age. This perception is reinforced by the treatment of Japanese history found in most college-survey world history textbooks.<sup>1</sup> According to these texts, Tokugawa era Japan was populated by a Shogun, Daimyo, and samurai wearing kimonos, sporting topknots, and carrying swords. In stark contrast, Meiji era Japan is represented by images of modernization punctuated with the Japanese adoption of Western dress, architecture, and technology. Modern Japan is often presented as a success story whereby it fended off Western imperialism by modernizing and "Westernizing" itself to become "the only non-Western nation to successfully industrialize and achieve a Western standard of living before World War II."<sup>2</sup> Phillip Adler in his *World Civilizations* (5<sup>th</sup> edition) states:

Japan seems on the brink of being reduced to yet another helpless victim of Western imperialism, but at this point, a decisive difference emerged. Some of the daimyo and samurai faced the causes and consequences of Japanese impotence squarely: they decided to imitate the West as rapidly as possible. . . .

. . . one major reform after another came out of the imperial capital in Tokyo (formerly Edo). All were modeled on the West. . . . [T]hey systematically carried out reforms, even at the expense of cherished tradition.<sup>3</sup>

By definition, survey textbooks must condense complex historical processes into simple and accessible forms, but such simplifications may lead students to think that Japan's rise as a world power was accomplished by "imitating" "superior" Western civilization and abandoning the traditional way of life. What most textbooks fail to address are 1) the Meiji government's reliance on traditional elements to pursue its Westernization policies, and 2) the motives behind adopting Western institutions and technologies. By understanding these two items, one can approach Meiji Japan as more than a case of Western "imitation."<sup>4</sup> Indeed, teachers can use the story of Meiji Japan to explore the meanings of "Westernization" and illustrate an important historical process whereby foreign and tradition-

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October 1900 Group Portrait of Meiji Emperor and the Imperial Family, Kasai Torajiro, artist. U.S. Library of Congress.

al elements are synthesized into a new hybrid society.<sup>5</sup>

**The Meaning of the “Meiji Restoration”** - In Western studies, the dissolution of the Tokugawa Shogunate and the establishment of the Meiji regime in 1868 is known as “the Meiji Restoration.” Interestingly, there is no exact equivalent term in Japanese for “the Meiji Restoration,” even though this is normally the translation applied to the Japanese identification, *Meiji Ishin*.<sup>6</sup> For Japanese, this term (*Meiji* is the reign name, while *Ishin* means “complete renewal”) implies a sense of revolutionary change that swept across the country. Indeed, specialists debate over whether to call it the Meiji Revolution or the Meiji Restoration.<sup>7</sup>

The term “restoration” is still a useful one in a sense that the authority of the Emperor was “restored” and played a central role in promulgating the reforms. Yet, curiously, many textbooks do not place much emphasis on the role of the Emperor or related institutions in their coverage of the Meiji era. This may be ascribed to the fact that the Meiji system is more accurately defined as an oligarchy, whereby the handful of leaders who formulated the reforms were the real administrators of the state. Emperor Mutsuhito, posthumously known as the Meiji Emperor, was an inexperienced, sixteen-year old ruler at the time of the Restoration, making it unlikely that he was the source of new ideas and reforms coming out of the imperial capital. Instead, it is more likely that the invocation of the Emperor’s name provided the Meiji oligarchs with the necessary aura of legitimacy in inaugurating and implementing reforms, and supplied the focal point for the formation of nationalism.

The use of tradition, especially Shinto elements, for modernizing purposes is illustrated by the famous *Five Article Charter Oath* (1868), which marked the beginning of the Meiji era. These were presented at the Imperial palace by the Emperor as an oath to the gods of heaven and

earth.<sup>8</sup> According to Shinto mythology, the Emperor descended from the sun goddess, *Amaterasu*, and therefore, his role included being the chief priest of the Shinto religion. The *Charter Oath* unequivocally declared that “[e]vil customs of the past shall be broken off” and “[k]nowledge shall be sought throughout the world so as to strengthen the foundation of imperial rule.”<sup>9</sup> Those who attended the ceremony, including daimyo, nobles and even the shogun’s retainers, all signed the oath, thereby switching their allegiance

from their previous feudal lords to the Emperor.

The early Meiji period is noted for the “invention of traditions.”<sup>10</sup> The formation and propagation of a new nationalistic form of State Shinto was started during the Meiji era. Because Japanese forms of Shinto and Buddhism shared a long and commingled history, the Meiji government issued a decree (1868) to separate the two almost indistinguishable religions in an effort to elevate Shinto, especially its elements of Emperor Worship, above Buddhism in order to promote their Emperor-centric ideology.<sup>11</sup> Known as the Great Promulgation Campaign, the early Meiji government promoted the “Great Teachings” of Shinto (i.e. imperial mythology) between 1870 and 1884. Though the campaign was not particularly successful at this stage, it demonstrates the early Meiji government’s attempt to invoke traditional Japanese elements to create a sense of national unity while pursuing “Westernization” policies.<sup>12</sup>

**Motives for the Meiji Reforms** - As most textbooks point out, the series of reforms initiated by the Meiji government were truly comprehensive and mostly modeled on the West. However, many textbooks do not discuss Japan’s motivation in its drive toward “Westernization.” The spectacular rise of Japan to world-power status in the twentieth century blinds most observers from recognizing that, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, Japan held only a semi-colonial status similar to many other areas before they fell completely under colonial control.

Following the arrival of Commodore Matthew Perry (1794-1858), Japan’s isolationist policies ended in 1854 through coerced “friendship” treaties with the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia and the Netherlands. In July 1858, the U.S. Consul General, Townsend Harris, persuaded Japan to sign a so-called “unequal” treaty, which was characterized by 1) lack of tariff autonomy and 2) granting of extraterritorial rights to foreign citizens. Harris

secured the treaty with Japan by appealing to the Japanese fear of British imperialist designs and by promising not to sell opium in Japan.<sup>13</sup> Since the 1854 treaties granted most favored nation status to the countries involved, all the concessions made on the later treaties were extended to all the signatories of the previous treaties.

The lack of tariff autonomy and granting of extraterritoriality to foreign citizens meant Japan lost full sovereignty. The unequal treaties set low tariff rates without a provision for the possibility of adjustments. After the signing of these treaties, foreign made goods, most notably cotton products from Great Britain, flooded the Japanese market. Since Japan lost its ability to adjust tariffs as needed, the native cotton textile industry, which had provided commoners clothing for centuries, appeared to be on the verge of extinction due to its inability to compete with cheap machine-made foreign goods. On the other hand, Westerners saw Japan (as well as China) as a supplier of cheap but high quality raw silk (silk thread). During the late Tokugawa and early Meiji era, Japan, like many other nations affected by imperialism, appeared to be turning into an exporter of raw materials while serving as a market for Western manufactured goods.<sup>14</sup> Japanese leaders saw the protective tariffs as the key to the Western power’s economic prosperity and found it unfair that the Western powers enjoyed such economic protection while making it extremely difficult for Japan to foster its own fledgling industries.<sup>15</sup>

Additionally, these commercial treaties resulted in a gold drain and hyperinflation that characterized the late Tokugawa era and early Meiji era. The treaties furnished foreigners “with Japanese coin in exchange for theirs, equal weights,” and allowed “coins of all description (with the exception of Japanese copper coin) . . . [to] be exported from Japan.”<sup>16</sup> Since the Japanese exchanged gold and silver at ratio of one to five while the rest of the world exchanged one to fifteen, the foreigners were able to make handsome profits just by exchanging coins. This caused a serious drain on Japanese gold reserves. The Shogunate’s attempts to mitigate this issue only made the situation worse by generating hyperinflation. The high demand for Japanese silk in foreign markets also exacerbated the ongoing inflation.<sup>17</sup>

Granting of extraterritoriality to foreign citizens meant that foreigners were to be tried under their own law (usually in an embassy court) rather than by the law of land. The Westerners oftentimes abused these privileges and acted like colonial masters, since the foreign courts at the treaty ports tended to favor their own countrymen, while underplaying Japanese claims. Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901), generally known as the foremost Japanese advocate of Westernization, wrote in 1875:

Those who haughtily ride about on horses or in carriages, scattering everyone in their way, are almost all

**Westerners.** When they get into an argument with anyone, be he a patrolman, a passerby, or carriage-bearer, the Westerners behave insolently; they punch and kick at will . . . . Many [Japanese] simply swallow their anger and do not report such incidents. And even when there are grounds for litigation over some business dealing, to press charges one must go to one of the five ports, where one's case will be decided by their judges. Since in these circumstances it is impossible to obtain justice, people say to one another that, rather than press charges, it is better to swallow one's anger and be submissive.<sup>18</sup>

Since extraterritoriality was justified on the grounds that Japan was not civilized enough, it became the obsession of the Meiji leaders to match the West in order to remove the rationale behind the unequal treaties.

Most importantly, the Meiji reformers feared that if not reversed these conditions might lead to further loss of sovereignty and colonization of Japan by the Western powers. Fukuzawa Yukichi wrote:

[t]hose who have any concern for their country at all must carefully consider some facts of world history, both past and present. Whose country was present day America originally? Is it not true that the Indians who owned the land were driven away by the white men and now the roles of master and guest are switched around? . . . What about in countries of the East and the islands in Oceania? In all places touched by the Europeans are there any which have developed their power, attained benefits, and preserved their independence? . . . Wherever the Europeans touch, the land withers up, as it were; the plants and trees stop growing.<sup>19</sup>

This sentiment is magnified when considering its issuance from a person widely recognized as one of Japan's "foremost proponent[s]" of Westernization.<sup>20</sup> Fukuzawa saw the "West" as both a model Japan should emulate and as a threat to Japan's independence. For Fukuzawa, Westernization was required to preserve national sovereignty: "There is no other way to preserve our independence except through adoption of [Western] civilization. We must advance toward civilization solely for the purpose of maintaining our national independence."<sup>21</sup> The motivation for Westernization was, therefore, anti-Western in its essence.<sup>22</sup> Meiji leaders sought to create *fukoku-kyōhei*, a rich nation with a strong military, by adopting Western institutions and encouraging the Japanese to adopt Western appearances in order to convince the foreign powers that Japan was just as civilized as they and therefore, should be treated as equals.

**Patterns of Meiji Westernization** - For the general population, Westernization meant the adoption of "Western" food (such as beef, milk, bread, and beer) as well as attire and appearance, including what the Japanese called *zangiri-atama*, a short loose haircut which was considered the very symbol of civilization. For Meiji leaders, Westernization was a necessity for the revision of the unequal treaties and for the very survival of Japan. The reforms worked to give the appearance of Western society by recognizing the equality of all people and abolishing the feudal class system that divided people into warriors, farmers, artisans, and merchants. This elimination of the class system also had the practical effect of enlarging the pool of potential soldiers and helped to strengthen the country. Western style education, police, legal and banking systems were all introduced during the Meiji era. The Meiji government also projected its new modern appearance by establishing both a constitution (1889) and a bicameral parliament called the Diet (1890).

Certainly, these reforms were modeled on the West; but, the West was never perceived as a single monolithic entity by Japanese leaders and intellectuals. The Japanese government sent officials and students to the United States and several European countries. Various different political, social, economic, and educational models were carefully examined and, after careful comparison, those appearing to be best suited to Japanese society were adopted. The Japanese government also hired many foreign experts as advisers with an estimated 3000 foreigners hired between 1858 and 1890.<sup>23</sup> The foreign advisors helped to "expel" their fellow imperialists by training Japanese leaders to take their place.<sup>24</sup>

The fad for things Western was strongest during the 1870s and early 1880s. Starting around the mid 1880s, however, there developed some conservative tendencies that began emphasizing Japanese or "Eastern" traditions. What resulted was a blending of Western and Eastern traditions. One of the best examples of this trend can be found in the area of education. When the Meiji government introduced a modern education system in 1872, the basic structure of education was based on the French model with a curriculum heavily influenced by the United States. In the 1880s, conservative elements in the government exerted their influence and added Shinto and Confucian based morals to the compulsory education curriculum.<sup>25</sup> In 1890, the "Imperial Rescript on Education" (that is, the Emperor's words to students) was issued and became the basic moral guideline until the end of the WWII. This imperial rescript clearly contained elements of State Shinto, stating: "Our Imperial Ancestors have founded Our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting" and "should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth." It also

emphasized the Confucian virtues of filial piety, loyalty, faithfulness, etc. What began to emerge was a Western-style education system with a uniquely Japanese twist.<sup>26</sup>

The Meiji Constitution of 1889 was based on the German constitution's grant of significant powers to the Kaiser rather than the British model of a limited monarchy. It too provides an example of how the Japanese combined traditional and foreign cultures. The constitution declared that the "sacred and inviolable" Emperor came from "a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal." To the Emperor, it granted sovereignty, referring to the Japanese people as "subjects" rather than "citizens." For the Japanese people, the constitution guaranteed freedoms "within the limits of the law." For example, Japanese subjects were granted freedom of religion "within limits not prejudicial to peace and order, and not antagonistic to their duties as subjects."<sup>27</sup> With State Shinto firmly established from the 1930s until the end of World War II, this meant serious limitations on religious freedom for those who refused to revere the Emperor as god-king on earth. While the constitution was technically based on a Western model, what the Meiji leaders had chosen was to combine an autocratic constitution of the German Second Reich with Shinto to create an Emperor-centric system.

**Removal of Unequal Treaties** - Shortly before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, Japan, having instituted various Western law codes culminating in a Western-style constitution, was able to negotiate to remove extraterritoriality. Japan gained control over its own tariff rates in 1911, shortly after its annexation of Korea. Indeed, as early as 1876, Japan had secured its own unequal commercial treaty with Korea, while working to remove the unequal treaties imposed on itself by Western powers. By so doing, Japan tried to bring Korea, a tributary state to China, into its own sphere of influence. Okakura Kakuzō explained the rationale in 1904, writing that "[a]ny hostile power in occupation of the peninsula might easily throw an army into Japan, for Korea lies like a dagger ever pointed toward the very heart of Japan."<sup>28</sup> Both the Sino-Japanese (1894-1895) and Russo-Japanese (1904-1905) Wars were fought in order to gain control over Korea and its vicinity. Thus, it may be said that Japan regained full sovereignty through international affairs, at the expense of Korea, rather than other aspects identified with the West or "civilization."

## Conclusion

Instructors of World History can use Meiji Japan as an opportunity to explore the meaning of the term, Westernization. Simplified treatment of the era may lead students to believe Westernization to be the abandonment of old traditions in favor of new and superior cultures without consideration of other causal factors. The case of Meiji Japan illustrates otherwise by illu-

minating a common world historical process where cross-cultural encounters result in an amalgamation of foreign ideas with traditional elements.

By exploring the true Japanese rational for Westernization, students will be exposed to the often overlooked perspective that Westernization does not mean blind imitation. The Westernization of Japan was motivated by the Meiji government's desire to establish an equality with the West that would free the nation from its semi-colonial status. The Meiji leaders sought to recover full autonomy by hiring Western consultants, sending students and officials overseas for study, instituting Western institutions and adopting a "civilized" or Western outward appearance. Numerous primary sources available in English, such as the *Charter Oath*, the Meiji Constitution, and the works of Fukuzawa Yukichi illustrate how the pursuit of Westernization in Japan was not out of a desire to become like the Westerners as much as it was a means to recover the absolute sovereignty lost between 1858 and 1911.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Introductory college level survey textbooks examined here include Philip J Adler, and Randall Lee Pouwels, *World Civilizations*, 5th ed. (Belmont, CA: Thomson/Wadsworth, 2008); William J. Duiker, and Jackson J. Spielvogel, *The Essential World History*, 3rd ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson, 2008); Craig A. Lockard, *Societies, Networks, and Transitions: A Global History* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 2008); Jerry H. Bentley, and Herbert F. Ziegler, *Traditions & Encounters: A Global Perspective on the Past*, 3rd ed. (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2004); Robert L. Tignor, *Worlds Together, Worlds Apart: A History of the Modern World from the Mongol Empire to the Present*, 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2008); Anthony Esler, *The Human Venture: A World History from Prehistory to the Present*, 5th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ.: Prentice Hall, 2003); Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, *The World: A History* (Upper Saddle River, NJ.: Prentice Hall, 2006); Robert R. Edgar, *Civilizations Past & Present*, 12th ed. (New York: Pearson/Longman, 2008); Albert M. Craig, etc., *The Heritage of World Civilizations*, 8th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2009).

<sup>2</sup> Lockard, 703.

<sup>3</sup> Adler, 606. In somewhat contradictory manner, Adler also states "the ancient regime and the traditional values of the people were held in high esteem," and "reformers supported the Shinto faith." See Adler, 607.

<sup>4</sup> A good source that approaches this very issue is Tessa Morris-Suzuki, *The Technological Transformation of Japan: From the Seventeenth to the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

<sup>5</sup> This is a process not unknown in world history. Ancient Romans borrowed from the Ancient Greeks, and created a Greco-Roman hybrid civilization that remained fundamentally Roman. Japan in the seventh and eight centuries borrowed generously from China during its extended Taika Reforms, and created a hybrid civilization that remained fundamentally Japanese.

<sup>6</sup> Japanese historians have used three terms to explain the process of the "Meiji Restoration." The *Taisei Hōkan* of October, 1867 refers to Shogun's returning sovereignty to the Emperor. The *Osei Fukko* of December, 1867, refers to "restoration of the imperial rule." The *Meiji Ishin* is applied to after the establishment of the new government in 1868.

<sup>7</sup> Kenneth B. Pyle, *The Making of Modern Japan*, 2nd ed. (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and Company, 1996), 71-74.

<sup>8</sup> Donald Keene, *Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852-1912* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 137.

<sup>9</sup> "The Charter Oath," (April 1868), in *Sources of Japanese*

*Tradition*, Vol. 2, 1600 to 2000, 2nd ed. edited by William Theodore de Bary, Carol Gluck, and Arthur E. Tiedemann (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 672.

<sup>10</sup> Stephen Vlastos, ed. *Mirror of Modernity Invented Traditions of Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

<sup>11</sup> Prior to the Meiji Era, the central focus of Shinto was not Emperor Worship; instead it was an informal system of beliefs in indigenous deities and spirits, including those of nature, one's own ancestors and the Imperial family.

<sup>12</sup> Hane Mikiso, *Modern Japan: A Historical Survey*, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 108-109; De Bary, etc., *Sources of Japanese Tradition*, Vol. 2, 790-793; Helen Hardacre, *Shinto and the State, 1868-1988*. (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1989), 42.

<sup>13</sup> China had been forced by the British to sign the *Treaty of Tianjin*, legalizing the opium trade, in June, 1858. Since the United States signed the treaty prohibiting the opium trade first, all other nations, including Great Britain, signed essentially the same treaty due to most favored nation status. Pyle, 65; Marius B. Jansen, "The Meiji Restoration," in Marius B. Jansen, ed., *The Emergence of Meiji Japan* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 152.

<sup>14</sup> Hane, 69-70, 142-144; Morris-Suzuki, 86-88. Raw silk continued to be Japan's leading export goods until 1930s. During the early Meiji era, cotton textile products constituted as much as 36 percent of all money spent on foreign imports. In 1878, alarmed by Japan's dependency on foreign cotton goods, the Meiji government encouraged development of a domestic cotton industry by importing machines and creating model factories. Japan's cotton textile production rapidly increased in the 1880s and 1890s. From 1896, Japan exported cotton goods overseas with exponential growth occurring during WWI. By the middle of the twentieth century, cotton had become Japan's leading export commodity. Through investment in the cotton textile industry, Japan avoided many of the issues inherent to economic and political imperialism as typified by the experiences of colonies such as India and Egypt.

<sup>15</sup> Marius B. Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 375.

<sup>16</sup> The Harris Treaty of 1858 in David J. Lu, *Japan: A Documentary History*: vol. 2, *The Late Tokugawa Period to the Present* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 288-292.

<sup>17</sup> Hane, 70; Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan*, 314.

<sup>18</sup> Fukuzawa Yukichi, *An Outline of a Theory of Civilization* (1875). Translated by David A. Dilworth and G. Carmen Hurstfluent figure who published numerous books and pamphlets, founded Keio University, and started a newspaper, *Jiji Shimpō*; but, he was not a Meiji governmental official.

<sup>19</sup> Fukuzawa, 188-189.

<sup>20</sup> Edgar, 790.

<sup>21</sup> Fukuzawa, *An Outline of a Theory of Civilization*, quoted in Hane, 111.

<sup>22</sup> Pyle, 78.

<sup>23</sup> Hane, 84-101; Pyle, 77-80. For example, the army was based on the German model while the navy was based on the British model. Legal and police systems reflected the French type, while financial institutions combined the American (Federal Reserve), British (Postal Savings System) and Belgian (Bank of Japan) models.

<sup>24</sup> Before the establishment of the Meiji regime, a popular slogan called for "Expel the Barbarians." During the Meiji era, the Westerners were no longer considered "barbarians," but the Meiji reforms essentially aimed for the same goal of ridding Japan of foreign presence.

<sup>25</sup> Hane, 101-105; Pyle, 88-92.

<sup>26</sup> "Imperial Rescript on Education" in Lu, 343-344; Hardacre, 121-124; Carol Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 102-127.

<sup>27</sup> The Meiji Constitution," in *Sources of Japanese Tradition*, Vol. 2, 745-748.

<sup>28</sup> Okakura Kakuzō, *The Awakening of Japan* (New York: Century Co, 1904), 208. This phrase, "A Dagger Pointed at the Heart of Japan" was supposedly coined by a Prussian military adviser to the Meiji government and popularized by Yamagata Aritomo (Prime Minister from December 24, 1889, to May 6, 1891, and November 8, 1898, to October 19, 1900).

## Chinese Intellectuals' Ordeal: The Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957 Revisited

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In the summer of 1957, a political storm swept across urban China. In the so-called Anti-Rightist Campaign, more than 550,000 Chinese citizens became targets of a state-sponsored inquisition. For criticizing the Communist Party and the government, these people received the label "Rightists" and consequently paid a heavy price. The so-called Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957 was a pivotal event in the history of the People's Republic of China. It was also a watershed event in the history of the Chinese Communist Movement. Fifty-one years later, students of modern Chinese history are still asking questions about the savage persecution of Chinese intellectuals in that fateful year.

**From Rectification to Persecution** - At first sight, the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957 seems to have resulted from an effort of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), especially its Chairman Mao Zedong, to invite constructive criticism from the country's intellectuals. A close examination of the events in 1957 reveals, however, that this massive inquisition not only stemmed from the fast-changing political situation in China and the rest of the world, but from the complex dynamics of the Chinese revolution.

In April 1956, at a meeting of top communist officials, Mao announced a seemingly liberal policy toward China's intelligentsia. In his speech, Mao described the relationship between the CCP and intellectuals as one of "long-term coexistence" and "mutual supervision." Such a gesture was probably motivated by Mao's desire for greater political control, especially to secure the allegiance of the country's educated population. Mao's words sounded both comforting and encouraging to Chinese intellectuals who, after having experienced the political regimentation of the early 1950s, took Mao's words as a sign of some political relaxation.

In early 1957, Mao began talking about a rectification campaign that would let "a hundred flowers blossom," meaning that it would open a door for intellectual debate and even criticism of the Communist Party and the government. There is evidence that the origins of the rectification campaign lay in Mao's displeasure about the growing bureaucratic tendency in the new government and resistance among the top CCP leaders to his overzealous plan for rapid economic growth and social transformation. The proposed rectification was in effect Mao's tactic for regaining control over the decision-making process in the government. At several meetings of CCP leaders, he urged his colleagues to embrace criticism from outside the party and named bureau-

cratism, sectarianism and subjectivism in the government as the targets. Mao was also apparently concerned about what was happening in the international communist movement. At the Russian Communist Party's Twentieth Congress in January-February, 1956, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev openly denounced Stalin, which was followed by anti-government riots in Poland in June and the

Hungarian Uprising in October. Rectification

The Anti-Rightist Campaign lasted for six months (not including the makeup phase in 1958 when more people were branded Rightists).

was thus also intended to immunize the Chinese Communist Party from events similar to those in Eastern Europe. Pushed by Mao, the CCP's central committee announced the Rectification in the spring of 1957 and invited criticism from intellectuals, including members of China's eight small political parties.

Within very short time, the rectification campaign was getting out of control. Thousands of letters poured into the office of Premier Zhou Enlai, and hundreds of thousands of big-character posters carrying criticisms covered the walls on college campuses. Intellectuals not only complained about the work style of party members and officials, but, in some cases, questioned the legitimacy of the communist state. In some cities, students took to the streets to protest the government's wrongdoings and even asked the Communist Party to step down. Mao was caught by surprise and was apparently furious. On May 15, he circulated an article titled "The Situation is Changing" among CCP officials. In his writing, Mao labeled outspoken intellectuals "Rightists" and called their criticisms "wanton attacks" on the party and the socialist system. On June 8, Mao unleashed his counteroffensive. An editorial titled "Why Is This Happening?" in the *People's Daily*, the official organ of the CCP, fired the first volley on the critics. Mao then wrote two more editorials for the *People's Daily*, "Recent Bourgeois Orientation of *Wenhuibao*" and "*Wenhuibao*'s Bourgeois Orientation Should be Denounced,"<sup>1</sup> in both of which Mao characterized the criticism of the CCP as a hostile attack intended to overthrow the Communist Party.

What followed was a nationwide assault on intellectuals who may or may not have openly criticized the Communist Party. The Anti-Rightist Campaign lasted for six months (not including the makeup phase in 1958 when more people were branded Rightists). By mid-1958, over half a million Chinese citizens, most of them well educated, had become Rightists. The CCP claimed a thorough victory in its battle for ideological control. The Rightists were discredited, silenced and punished. Mao was thus in a position to launch another gigantic campaign aimed at creating an economic miracle.<sup>2</sup>

**Who Became Rightists?** - Who, then, were branded Rightists in 1957? Whereas circumstances varied from one person to another in the

summer of 1957, victims of the Anti-Rightist Campaign can be roughly put into four categories.

First, there were people like Zhang Bojun and Luo Longji, representatives of China's small democratic parties, especially *Zhongguo Minzhu Tongmeng* (abbr. Minmeng, or Democratic Alliance of China). Zhang was the first vice

chairman of the Minmeng and Minister of Communication in the new gov-

ernment. Luo, a returned student from the United States, was vice chairman of the Minmeng and Minister of Forestry. These people had received professional training in fields such as political science, law, economics and sociology. They saw the seeming relaxation in 1957 as an opportunity to promote democracy and expand their own democratic parties. It never occurred to them that their words and actions would be interpreted as a conspiracy to overthrow the CCP and the socialist state. Zhang Bojun, for example, proposed the idea of a political planning institute, an agent that would help the Communist Party to move toward a modern ruling party and help China develop a multi-party political democracy. Luo, a vocal critic of the Guomindang, the CCP's predecessor, questioned the legality of the political campaigns in the early 1950s and called for redress of the excessiveness in them.<sup>3</sup>

The second group of Rightists came from the rank and file of the CCP. Most of these people joined the CCP during the Japanese War or civil war. As insiders, these people were well aware of the growing problems in the CCP and the government. As members of the political establishment, they did not have an independent ideology but, rather, tended to have an idealistic view of the revolution. They openly criticized the signs of moral degeneration in the CCP and tried to bring the party's attention to the grievances of the Chinese people. Wang Meng, a young member of the CCP and writer, criticized the moral decay in the party in a short story titled "The Young Man New in the Organizational Department." Other prominent Rightists within the party, such as Feng Xuefeng, Ding Ling, and Ai Qing, were unhappy about the CCP's increasing intervention in literature and art and the politicization of their fields. As CCP members, these people were also likely to become victims of the factionalism inside the party, which was intensified in the 1957 campaign. Ding Ling, for example, received the Rightist label because of the personal animosity between her and Zhou Yang, her boss and chief of the CCP propaganda department.

The third group of Rightists consisted of college and even high school students. Enthusiastic but naïve, these young people called for democracy and freedom of speech in Chinese society as well as on college campuses. At Beijing University, vocal students attacked the totalitarian orientation of the CCP as a threat to a socialist

society. They urged the government to establish the rule of law and expand democracy. These students tended to be the most idealistic elements on college campus and most loyal to the new state. Some, like Lin Zhao, a student at Beijing University and one of the most outspoken critics of the CCP in 1957, even participated in the land reform of the early 1950s, during which she witnessed the violent liquidation of the landlord class in rural China and experienced qualms of conscience. She nevertheless adhered to her faith in a socialist democracy in the face of growing political tyranny.

The fourth group of Rightists was made up of scholars and scientists, many of whom had studied in the West and were leaders in their respective fields. These people were concerned about the lack of professionalism in the new government and growing encroachment of the party upon their professions. Professor Huang Wanli at Qinghua University, for example, opposed the construction of the Sanmenxia Dam on the Yellow River for its possible long-term environmental damage. Huang was branded a Rightist because the project was designed by Soviet engineers and, at the height of the Sino-Soviet alliance, even indirect criticism of the Soviet Union was a crime.

It is worth noting, however, that the vast majority of the 1957 Rightists were ordinary government officials and school teachers. These people were relatively well informed and interested in politics. They were punished because of their honest opinions about the problems in their own work places. A significant number of victims in the campaign were produced by the factional struggle within the CCP. Some scholars received the Rightist label because they defended their colleagues who were under fire during the crackdown. Some people got into trouble even for things totally unrelated to the rectification. Others were labeled Rightists to fulfill the Rightist "quota" in their work units.

Consequences of being a Rightist were invariably grave although punishment varied significantly. Most Rightists lost their jobs, had their salaries reduced or were subject to forced labor. Mao personally ordered Rightists to receive *laodong jiaoyang*, meaning reform through "supervised labor." In theory it differed from *laodong gaizao* [reform through forced labor] in that the Rightists were not treated as criminals, and unlike convicts, they still received a salary from the state. In reality, many Rightists received extremely harsh treatment on farms in remote areas and never returned to their families. Moreover, while ordinary criminals had a specified prison term, the length of punishment for a Rightist was not definite. More than half of the 550,000 Rightists were sent to labor camps, farms, and mines in remote areas. Even though some of them were later rehabilitated, the political stigma continued to stay with them. Their relatives suffered also in a heavily charged political atmosphere. Their children were subject to political discrimination in matters ranging from edu-

cation to employment. Direct and indirect victims of the Anti-Rightist Campaign thus numbered as many as three million.

**Mao's Motives** - What exactly happened in the summer of 1957? What caused the about turn of the CCP? What was exactly on Mao's mind? How could the Rectification Campaign have gone so wrong? The CCP's official explanation was marked by simple arbitrariness: In the summer of 1957, rightwing Chinese intellectuals staged a coup to overthrow the Communist government by taking advantage of the CCP's generosity. Based on this assessment, the CCP's counterattack was both necessary and justifiable. This position was so preposterous that even the post-Mao Chinese government found it necessary to discredit it by overturning over 99.9 percent of the Rightist cases.

A key issue of the 1957 campaign concerns the causes of the transition from the early rectification to the persecution of outspoken intellectuals. Scholars have tried to tell whether Mao Zedong intentionally led or misled the intellectuals into an ambush or the rectification, a well-meaning campaign, led to unanticipated results that necessitated the crush of dissent. The conspiracy thesis points to a premeditated plan on the part of Mao to solve the intellectual problem. One piece of evidence offered in support of this view is Mao's talk at a party leaders' meeting in January, 1957, in which he compared inviting criticism to baiting ants out of their holes. Yet later in the same year, Mao published his famous speech titled "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People" in which Mao called for genuine cooperation between the CCP and China's urban intelligentsia. Mao's speeches inside the CCP also suggest that he was aware of and unhappy about the educational deficiency of the CCP rank and file. Because of this, Mao wanted to establish a better working relationship with what he called the democratic personnel, i.e., China's minor political parties that were composed of well educated people. He seemed to have wanted to win the good will of the intellectuals through the rectification campaign.<sup>4</sup>

Yet Mao did harbor very strong suspicion toward the urban intelligentsia. Well before the crackdown, on January 18, 1957, at a meeting of provincial and municipal CCP secretaries, Mao made a speech in which he characterized the criticism of the party on college campuses as malicious. "They [Professors and students] did not speak out in the past. Now the rectification campaign gives them a chance and they are coming out in the open." Mao wanted his critics to "keep making mistakes, voice wrong opinions thereby exposing and isolating themselves." Later that month, Mao told the party secretaries to step back and allow liberals to openly oppose the CCP. "The more erroneous their opinions, the greater their mistakes, the better," Mao calculated, "because they will be more isolated and will educate the people by a setting a negative example."

"In dealing with the liberals...We'll counterattack, not attack first."<sup>5</sup> Thus, while Mao may not have conceived a comprehensive plan to round up political opposition among intellectuals, his approach was Machiavellian.

A more plausible explanation, on the other hand, focuses on the dynamics of the political situation in 1957. As a great strategist and cold autocrat, Mao simply changed the objectives of his rectification campaign when intellectuals' criticism went beyond his tolerance. He called the rectification campaign to gain a moral high ground in pushing forward his revolutionary agenda in social and economic development. Yet he was also ready to strike in the other direction at a moment's notice. In fact, he soon realized that the rebellious intellectuals posed a more immediate challenge to him and found that, by attacking intellectuals, he could achieve even greater control over the direction of the Chinese revolution. Adjusting tactics according to changing circumstances was indeed Mao's forte.

**A Clash of Two Cultures** - In retrospect, the reign of terror in 1957 went beyond even the machinations of Mao. It represented a clash of two principles, each couched in a cultural matrix. The Chinese Communist Movement was rooted in China's agrarian grievances and associated with international communism. For twenty-two years between 1927 and 1949, the CCP had been separated from urban China and had little connections with the West even after its military victory. The core of the CCP was composed of radical intellectuals who had limited knowledge of the modern world. None of the members of the CCP's politburo had a bachelor's degree. Deng Xiaoping, the CCP's secretary general and key figure in the crackdown, did not even graduate from Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow.<sup>6</sup> The rank and file of the communists came largely from rural masses and had even less understanding of the modern urban world. Apart from its nationalist credentials and its control of a huge army, the party had little capital in commanding the respect of the urban intelligentsia. The fury of Mao in 1957 and later years was understandable in light of the huge educational gap between the rulers and the subjects. Intellectuals' contemptuous remarks about Communist officials and demand for power-sharing must have been frightening and infuriating to many communists.<sup>7</sup> Thus the persecution of the intellectuals in 1957 resulted as much from China's new rulers' educational deficiency as from their radical ideology.

Moreover, the brutal reality of the Chinese revolution determined the absolute nature of the Communist power and Mao's complex and destructive mentality. Previously, during WWII and the Chinese civil war, Mao and his comrades had managed to convince many Chinese intellectuals that they were committed to a coalition government and political tolerance. What many intellectuals failed to realize was that democracy was impossible under a revolutionary party whose

ascendancy was accompanied and made possible by the brutal tactics against both external and internal enemies. Well before coming to power, the Communists were looking for ways to deal with intellectuals. In 1947, when the tide of the Chinese civil war turned in favor of the Communists, Mao Zedong instructed his party to isolate the right-wing bourgeoisie after seizing power because it would be the greatest obstacle to the establishment of party dictatorship. The Communist state, in Mao's own words, was the people's democratic dictatorship. "Democracy" was limited to opinions acceptable to Mao while dictatorship could be exercised whenever Mao found it necessary. It was not because Mao and the CCP were unwilling to practice democracy; they were simply incapable of genuine democracy because it had never been a part of Mao's and the CCP's experience.

As an agrarian revolution, the Chinese Communist movement represented the mentality and aspirations of China's four hundred million peasants. The political ideal of Chinese peasantry was egalitarianism that was often characterized by a deeply ingrained jealousy toward the economic, social and intellectual elite. Such jealousy in China's rural proletariat had a very destructive nature, a quality that was intensified by the decay of social order in rural China and the growing gap between the village and the city in modern times. Neither the peasant class nor its representatives had the intellectual capacity to appreciate the plurality of the urban world. Rather, they often demonstrated an intense desire for a utopia and propensity for violence.

China's small urban intelligentsia, in contrast to the Communists, represented the country's limited modernization. Representatives of this class had been immersed in the traditional Chinese culture but were largely western educated. They had not only a considerable amount of knowledge of the outside world but also expertise on modernization as well. A considerable number of these people also belonged to the eight small democratic parties including the Minmeng (Full name Zhongguo Minzhu Tongmeng or Democratic Alliance), Minjian (Full name Zhongguo Minzhu Jianguohui or Democratic Reconstruction Society), Jiusan Xueshe (September Third Society), Minge (Full name Zhongguo Guomindang Geming Weiyuanhui or Left wing Nationalist Party) and Zhigongdang (Full name Zhongguo Zhigongdang or Social Justice Party). None of these parties had a comprehensive political platform of its own. As allies of the CCP in the 1940s, every one of them had claimed allegiance to the new state in the 1950s. Between 1949 and 1957, the majority of intellectuals, despite their concern about the growing tyrannical orientation of the CCP, remained supportive of the new government and probably saw the radical policy and ignorance of the new rulers as a necessary evil.

Criticism from these intellectuals in the summer of 1957 was well meaning and constructive. Yang Zhaolong, a well-known jurist, for

example, was concerned about the slow progress in the rule of law in China. Yang urged the government to speed up the making of the code of criminal law, the code of civil law and code of litigation. These codes would regulate China's legal system and help the government avoid unnecessary arrest, trials and incarceration. Scholars like Yang admonished the CCP that governing without clear legal rules would only diminish people's faith in the government while damaging the socialist democracy and rule of law.<sup>8</sup>

Many intellectuals were obviously troubled by the totalitarian quality of the communist state. The best expression of this concern was dangtianxia [the party's private domain] a term coined by Chu Anping, editor of *Guangming Daily*, the official newspaper of the Minmeng. Chu discussed this term openly at a symposium called by the Ministry of United Front on May 21, 1957, and criticized Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai for excluding the democratic parties from the decision-making process in the new government. He lamented the CCP's encroachment upon the public domain, saying that every work unit in China had a party boss, that every decision had to be approved by the party and that many party members were unqualified for their positions. Dangtianxia, Chu suggested, was the ultimate source of sectarianism in Chinese society.<sup>9</sup> For his audacious honesty, Chu was soon silenced as one of the worst models of anti-CCP elements.

Intellectuals' criticism of the CCP's one-party rule reflected their yearning for democracy and their desire to help China develop a multi-party parliamentary system. They were thus asking the country's new rulers to accept a system that was very alien to the latter's experience. To the intellectuals, democracy was an end in itself while to Mao, it was merely a means to achieve greater control. Power-sharing was the last thing Mao wanted. The new democracy that he had talked about in the 1940s was a scheme of political expediency from the outset and had become an empty shell by 1956. Deep in his heart, Mao was contemptuous of intellectuals and his anti-intellectualism was not only a manifestation of his personal ego but also of the Chinese communist movement's rural background and xenophobic mentality of China's peasantry.

**Consequences** - The Anti-Rightist Campaign proved extremely devastating to the Chinese nation as well as to Chinese liberalism. In 1956, China had only 42,000 college professors, 31,000 engineers and 63,600 technicians. Only 3.84 million people in China had received education beyond middle school. The college-educated population was indeed China's most precious asset. These professionals could have helped the communists establish a system that was more in tune with the modern world. Like intellectuals in many countries, they were the barometer in Chinese society. During the Anti-Rightist campaign, 14 percent of this group was branded enemies of the regime. This was not only a blow to

the victims, but also a blow to the fortune of the nation. By suppressing and marginalizing intellectuals, Mao squandered his resources and political capital, forfeited his moral authority and would soon lose the Mandate of Heaven.

In retrospect, the series of political campaigns in the early 1950s enabled the CCP to achieve two interrelated goals: ideological dominance and total economic control. In the name of socialist revolution, the party monopolized speech and the press. Through the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957, Mao and his supporters removed the challenge to the CCP's authority from liberal strongholds such as the Minmeng. By striking the Minmeng, the CCP also silenced the other seven democratic parties and, in fact, the entire Chinese intelligentsia. The 1957 inquisition opened the door for more radical domestic policies such as the Great Leap Forward of 1958-59 and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966-1976. The Maoist despotism would continue until the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976.

Through the 1950s, Mao and the CCP demonstrated their ability to mobilize the masses to defeat the educated elite. They were able to do so because Mao still commanded the loyalty of the majority of the Chinese population and his party had accumulated much political capital through its struggle for power. They were also assisted by the cold war atmosphere that they used dexterously to create public hysteria about the enemies from within. With the opposition outside the party totally crushed, the party seemed to be in a position to do anything it liked. In 1956, Mao's idea about China's economic and social transformation faced growing skepticism inside the CCP. Through the persecution of intellectuals, Mao silenced dissenting voices in his own party. Here lies the paradox of the Chinese Communist Movement: In the two decades after the Anti-Rightist Campaign, no other social group or political force could ever question the infallibility of Mao. Yet at the same time, no one was able to offer any good counsel to the power center. Thus Mao became increasingly imprisoned by his own megalomania and the Chinese revolution behaved like runaway train heading towards a cliff.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> *Wenhuiba* was a liberal newspaper published in Shanghai.

<sup>2</sup> In 1958, Mao started the disastrous Great Leap Forward.

<sup>3</sup> Zhang Yihe, *Wangshi bingbu ruyan* [Indelible memory] (Beijing: Renmin wenxue Press, 2004), pp. 48-49, 268-270.

<sup>4</sup> Mao Zedong, "Talk to a Conference of Party Member Cadres in Tianjin Municipality," pp. 275-296. Roderick MacFaquhar, Rimothy Cheek and Eugene Wu ed., *Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao: From the Hundred Flowers to the Great Leap Forward*. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press 1989; Mao, "Talk at the Conference of Party Member Cadres of Shandong Provincial Organs," *Ibid.*, 297-320.

<sup>5</sup> Mao: Mao Zedong Xuanji [Selected works] vol. 5 (Beijing: People's Press, 1977 ), pp. 334, 335, 338; also see Du Guang, "Fanyou yundong ya minzhu geming" [Anti-Rightist Campaign and the democratic revolution], *Dangdai zhongguo yanjiu* [Modern China studies], vol. 14, no. 3 (2007): 68.

<sup>6</sup> Maomao, *Wode fujin Deng Xiaoping* [My father Deng Xiaoping] (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Press, 1993), vol. I, p. 152.

<sup>7</sup> Zhao Ziyang, the Chinese premier ousted in 1989, acknowledged his aversion to criticism in 1957 when he was an official in Guangdong province. See Li Su, "1949 zhihou: zhonggong lingxu zhongsheng xiang" [CCP leaders after 1949], <http://www.cnd.org/my/modules/wfsection/article.php?3Articleid=17627>.

<sup>8</sup> Shanghai *Xinwen ribao* [Shanghai News Daily], May 9, 1957; also see Zhu Zheng, *Zhongguo xiandai zhishi senzi de xiaoshi* [Disappearance of intellectuals in modern China], *Modern China Studies*, vol. 14, no. 3 (2007): 86.

<sup>9</sup> Zhang Yihe, *Wangshi bingbu ru yan*, pp. 48-50.



## Southeast Asia in World History

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This brief essay will introduce a number of points at which the largely ignored region of Southeast Asia can be usefully integrated into a standard world history curriculum. Every semester I teach at least one section of modern world history: a required course for my university's 18,000 undergraduate students. As anyone who has taught such a one semester course will understand, there simply isn't time to delve deeply into the history of any country or region. Instead, we attempt to develop unifying themes that enable undergraduates to connect otherwise dispersed narratives and weave them into a coherent whole. This is a difficult job for both teachers and students. So, how can Southeast Asia be integrated into instruction to assist students and teachers create that coherent whole?

While Southeast Asia may seem peripheral in global events, and even to developments between Asia's major civilizations, the region possesses an important characteristic that lends itself to world history. Southeast Asia has always been a regional crossroads that accepts religious, cultural and philosophical infusions from outside and syncretically integrates them into its own pre-existing cultural sensibilities. The eleven countries of the region (the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, East Timor, Singapore, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Burma/Myanmar) comprise a mosaic the complexity of which is greater than any other part of the world. Southeast Asia has incorporated Buddhism, Hinduism, Confucianism, Islam, and Christianity, even as it continues to maintain a healthy indigenous base of animistic belief in the power of a large pantheon of spirits and natural forces. The island states are part of the larger Malay-Polynesian family of languages while the mainland states speak a variety of tonal languages such as Thai-Lao and Vietnamese as well as the

Mon-Khmer family of languages, Burmese, and a variety of lesser languages. At various times, the influence of India, China, and Europe have seemed to overwhelm Southeast Asia only to recede, leaving behind trace reminders of their presence even as aspects of their cultures have been thoroughly integrated into the larger whole of the region. At the same time, Southeast Asia has often been a key player in the global economy and has reflected a variety of political developments while offering variations that are useful for a world history curriculum.

All too frequently, world history texts do not use Southeast Asia as a counterpoint to other nations of the region nor to exemplify global trends. While the purpose of this essay is not to critique college level world history textbooks, I should note that for my classes I have adopted *Worlds Together, Worlds Apart* by Robert Tignor, et al. I decided on this textbook for two major reasons the first is its chronological and thematic approach. Most textbooks break their narrative into individual country or region chapters thereby forcing students to make connections between a series of seemingly discrete information blocks that chapters represent. The Tignor volume, on the other hand, encompasses an entire global analysis within each chapter organized by blocks of time rather than geographic areas. This chronological approach makes the comparative task and thematic analysis easier for both students and teachers. As an Asianist, I also appreciated its substantial narrative devoted to Asia.

Still, even this comprehensive textbook only makes scant reference to Southeast Asia. Volume two covers the modern era and in this opening chapter (number 10) that reviews the major contents of the first volume; Southeast Asia is given a very competent general analysis. The remainder of the volume, however, says surprisingly little about the region preferring to limit its analysis merely to the colonial Dutch in Indonesia (in chapters 13 and 17) and, more recently, the French and American wars in Vietnam (in chapter 20). In one other instance a third Southeast Asian nation is mentioned, but the text is incorrect. Chapter 17 claims (pp. 748-749) that turn of the century Filipinos were bitter with the United States at the time of the Spanish-American war because the Americans did not keep their promise to make the islands independent if they joined the US war against Spain. The authors also claim that Filipinos launched a war for independence against the United States. In fact, Filipinos rose against Spain in 1896, two years before the Spanish-American war began. As well, Commodore John Dewey did promise American assistance in gaining independence which reignited the rebellion, but when fighting broke out between the two allies, Filipinos had already declared independence, formed a government, and adopted a constitution. Instead, it was US forces who attacked the Filipinos – just the day before the critical and uncertain vote on the peace treaty ending the war with Spain. The vote went the administration's way as news of the "Filipino

"treachery" reached the legislators en route to the Senate chamber. The full implication of this imperialist era manipulation offers obvious opportunities for interesting classroom discussions that might make use of numerous current parallels in world affairs.

So, if the 1899-1902 American war on the independent Filipino government could be used in the teaching of world history, what other lessons might we draw from the region and its history?

#### Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Era -

While many world history courses covering the "modern era to the present" start around 1500, it is not uncommon for instructors to give some critical background that often includes the Mongol conquests of the 1200s that so fundamentally reshaped much of the world. Mention is often made of the failed Mongol invasions of Japan especially in regard to the myth of the protective god of the wind or "kami kazi" that saved that island nation. However, little mention is made of two failed Mongol invasions of Vietnam. The first invasion came in 1257 after the Mongol ambassador was imprisoned by the Vietnamese king. In this instance, the Mongol force sent to punish the upstart kingdom was too small and was repulsed. Later in 1285, Kublai Khan dispatched a force of 500,000 men under the command of his son Prince Toghani and General Sogetu against Vietnam and the state of Champa, located in the central region of today's Vietnam. Both kings fled their capitals but led guerrilla resistance movements that resulted in heavy Mongol casualties including the death of General Sogetu and the humiliation of Prince Toghani. This historical example from Southeast Asia could be used to illustrate the limits of Mongol power, perhaps better than the freakish event of a fortuitous storm that saved Japan from invasion. The Vietnam/Champa example also illustrates the futility that even a strong nation is likely to encounter if it attempts to subject its will on a united people. Like Ho Chi Minh, the royal guerrilla resistance leader of the late 1200s, Prince Tran Quoc Taon, is still venerated and treated as a deity.

In addition to the Vietnamese/Champa case, the Mongols were also indirectly responsible for the emergence of the Thai peoples in Southeast Asia. In 1253 Mongol armies conquered the Thai state of Nan Chao located in today's southwestern Chinese province of Yunnan which drove the Thai people to migrate en masse into Southeast Asia. This population movement was further facilitated by the Mongols who destroyed the Burmese kingdom of Pagan in 1287 thereby keeping a dangerous rival at bay until the Thais had the opportunity to establish themselves. In this manner, the Southeast Asian example parallels the rise of both the Turkish Ottoman Empire and the Saffavid Empire in what is now the modern state of Iran. In these other cases, Mongol conquests had sufficiently weakened Arab regimes and allowed other peoples to emerge.

Here, again, Southeast Asia provides an example to further highlight the themes of a world history analysis.

A pre-1500 discussion of the role of Southeast Asia in a world history curriculum should also include mention of another Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1407 under the Ming dynasty. Since the Ming was founded after the collapse of Mongol rule in 1368, this dynasty is frequently stereotyped as reacting against foreign rule by turning inward in fear of the hostile non-Chinese world. Whatever validity this stereotype may or may not have, the rule of the dynasty's third emperor, the Youngle Emperor, was a brilliant exception. This was the era when the emperor sent Admiral Zheng He on seven massive naval expeditions to explore the world and Chinese sailors visited lands as far away as east Africa. The expeditions also intervened in local affairs wherever they went, extending China's influence far beyond its borders.

A concurrent invasion of Vietnam, however, turned out to be as much a disaster for the invading Ming as had the earlier Mongol incursions. Faced with a Chinese occupation plus a policy of enforced Sinicization, the Vietnamese took to the jungles once more. This time the resistance army was led by an aristocrat landowner Le Loi whose fighters finally expelled the Chinese in 1428. After achieving victory Le Loi founded a dynasty that adopted Chinese administrative structures and Confucian philosophy to strengthen Vietnam against future invasions. Though seemingly ironic, the Vietnamese strategy is not unusual. Many East Asians, including the peoples of Korea, Japan, and Manchuria, also assiduously borrowed from the Chinese model to strengthen their regimes. Nor is the borrowing of political institutions unheard of in world history. More recently, the peoples colonized by eighteenth and nineteenth century European imperialists grafted western institutions on to indigenous political patterns as a necessary step to strengthen themselves and regaining independence.

**Southeast Asia as a Religious Crossroads -** In the pre-modern era, Southeast Asia had been a fertile ground for Hinduism and Buddhism although both religions became infused with substantial amounts of Southeast Asian mysticism. Both religions were introduced by Indian merchants, but the former also owed much to religious scholars and missionaries for its acceptance by early Southeast Asian rulers who were particularly drawn to the Hindu conception of role of the king and his relationship to the source of heavenly power. Later, most of Southeast Asia accepted Theravada Buddhism which, like Hinduism, emphasizes the sullen nature of this world and the need for release from the cycle of rebirth by improving one's karma. In Theravada, the priestly monks hold a position of strong social prominence. They are active in their local communities where the temple serves as a center of numerous civil as well as religious activities. Especially prominent monks can exercise important levels of

political prominence as advisors to the rulers. Today, Theravada Buddhism is found throughout mainland Southeast Asia (Burma, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia) except for Vietnam which adopted Mahayana, the other major branch of Buddhism that was introduced by the Chinese.

Chinese culture could not abide the idea of abstinence from such earthly pleasures as sex (how else can one maintain a large family lineage), food, and prosperity and so syncretically reinterpreted Buddhism to create Mahayana. Nor could the Chinese accept Theravada's strong devotional demands that only the privileged can fulfill in order to break the cycle of rebirth. In fact, Mahayana is often called the "greater vehicle" which denotes how it is more democratic and less demanding than Theravada. Importantly, too, in the ninth century the Chinese broke a connection between religion and political power by initiating strong anti-Buddhist purges. By following the Chinese religious model of government control of religious institutions, Vietnamese rulers insured that their grasp on power would not be threatened by any religious institution. This Chinese political ethic that mistrusts and seeks to control religious institutions helps to explain why both of today's governments do not accept western notions of "religious freedom."

Islam first appeared as early as 1000, but was not generally accepted in Southeast Asia until the thirteenth century. Three factors seem to have been critical to Islam's eventual success. The first was the conversion of Indian merchants from Gujarat and the Coromandel Coast who brought their religion with them on trading visits. A second factor was the work of Sufi mystic missionaries. It was this quality of mysticism that helped assure Islam's acceptance since Sufism's beliefs seemed compatible with indigenous religiosity. And finally, the founding of the port city of Malacca by a prince from the adjacent island of Sumatra in 1402 and his conversion gave Islam a firm base. Malacca soon became an economic success as Southeast Asia's primary port controlling much of the valuable spice trade.

Islam spread rapidly throughout the Indonesian archipelago along the route of merchants active in the spice trade. Somewhat later, the conversion of Mataram in central and eastern Java in 1525 gave Islam the added support of a state wealthy from a substantial rice economy as well as merchant activity. Mataram became a bastion both for Islam and resistance to Dutch colonial intrusions until it was finally subdued in the 1770s. When Spaniards entered Manila Bay in 1570, their native rival was a nominal Muslim named Rajah Soliman who they had to subdue in battle. The Spanish experience shows that by the time Europeans arrived, Islam had already established itself across Southeast Asia and may only have lost ground subsequently in the Philippines where the religion was still very new.

Much has been made of the very relaxed practice of Islam in Southeast Asia. In fact, the region's Muslims did not at first seem to practice their religion with great rigor. The religion's rela-

tive newness, the influence of Sufi mysticism, and the lack of religion teachers resulted in a practice of Islam that varied greatly from its Middle Eastern roots. Ironically, however, Christian Europeans may have unintentionally increased island Southeast Asia's commitment to their new religious identity.

Early Portuguese merchants and, especially, Spanish colonizers brought a strong measure of religious intolerance stemming from centuries of struggle against the "Moors" who occupied the Iberian Peninsula. In Spain the bitter struggle was known as the "Reconquesta" and Philippine Muslims were dismissively referred to as "Moros" by Spanish officials who sent numerous expeditions to the southern islands in futile efforts to subdue the resistive population. Meanwhile, fleets of Muslim raiders regularly pillaged Christian areas gathering loot and taking hostages to sell on the international slave market. It was not until the mid-nineteenth century and the introduction of steam powered patrol boats that outran the Muslim *vintas* that Spain gained a clear advantage in its struggle for control. But, hundreds of years had left their mark. For Philippine Muslims the term "slave" became synonymous with Christian Filipinos, while Muslims were characterized as "pirates."

For the rest of Islamic Southeast Asia, the merchant activity that spread the religion similarly motivated Portuguese explorers to make their way to the region where their aggressive actions soon elicited enmity. In 1511, Alfonso de Albuquerque took the port of Malacca from the "Moors" not just to strengthen Portugal, but also to weaken Cairo and Mecca by breaking their hold on the spice trade. The Portuguese then established a number of trading outposts throughout the Spice Islands to dominate the trade. Still, neither the Portuguese nor later the Dutch directly challenged the religious beliefs of the local population; their primary interest was in trade not religion.

It was only in the Philippines where Spanish colonizers impose religious uniformity that Christianity took firm root. In addition to Spain's fierce religiosity, the link of church and state was transferred from the Iberian Peninsula to its Southeast Asian possession. In 1565, the original colonizing expedition was led by two men, Captain-General Miguel López de Legazpi and his navigator Fr. Andrés de Urdaneta. This symbolic linkage of church and state characterized Spanish colonialism. Throughout the colony's long Spanish occupation, most Spaniards remained in Manila while the hinterlands were controlled by missionary priests, or friars, who administered the archipelago's towns in exchange for an annual royal subsidy that supported their religious work. Spain needed the archipelago as a buffer to protect Manila which became extremely valuable in a global trade circuit that enriched the empire. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Protestantism arrived in Southeast Asia, but was largely limited to minority groups such as the Shan and Karen in Burma and some of the immi-

grant Chinese population of Malaysia. For most of the colonial era European colonizers had other agendas rather than proselytizing their religious beliefs.

**Southeast Asia in the Global Economy** - From the first Portuguese explorers through the early decades of the nineteenth century, Southeast Asia played a critical role in Europe's economic rise. The Portuguese dominated spice trade, which fell to the militarily stronger Dutch in 1641, brought great wealth to the merchants who controlled the traffic. European control of the spice trade also led to a reversal of economic fortunes vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire. But it was the Spaniards who created a truly global economy using Manila as their base. Thanks to a Ming dynasty decree of 1430, all taxes in that country were to be paid in silver. At first, silver was imported from neighboring Japan, but that source could not meet China's huge demand. Once Spain established itself in the "New World," she began extensive mining operations to extract gold for export to Europe. But, mines in the Americas yielded far more than gold. Many mines in Mexico, Bolivia, and Peru were also rich in the silver that the Chinese so desperately wanted. Now, Europe had an item for exchange with China.

In 1571, only one year after the founding of Manila, the first galleon loaded with silver made its way to Spain's Asian outpost. Silver was off loaded and Chinese junks took the precious metal in exchange for rich silks, pottery, perfumed woods, and many other products that were then shipped to Mexico and onward to Europe. This galleon trade brought one ship per year from Acapulco and back. That one voyage subsidized the Spanish community in Manila and made the colony a profitable venture. The galleon trade also created a complete circuit connecting Europe, the Americas and Asia in a true circular world economic exchange.

From these early times until the early decades of the nineteenth century, Southeast Asia remained a profitable venue for exotic spices and Chinese luxury items, but the rise of free trade and modern capitalism was destined to remake the region as it would the rest of the globe. With the publication of Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations* in 1776 (a truly revolutionary year) the mercantilist royal companies that dominated Asia's ports and exports were faced with declining fortunes and abolition. By the 1820s Spain's galleon trade had ended. British and Dutch royal companies were phased out and a new more economically intrusive form of colonialism began.

As was also true in Africa and India, the colonies of Southeast Asia increasingly lost their political autonomy to colonial officers who oversaw the economic exploitation of the country. Whether it was tobacco, hemp, and sugar in the Philippines, rubber and tin in Malaya, coffee, sugar, and rubber in Indonesia, or rubber and rice in Vietnam, the region was transformed into a producer of raw materials for the new industrial economy. In a few short years, formerly self-suf-

ficient villages were reduced to production centers for agricultural export crops. This agricultural monoculture left villagers exposed and vulnerable to market fluctuations and devastating plant diseases and insects. Concurrently, sizeable immigrant populations were introduced from China and India while internal population shifts further disrupted lives. In the new economy, European usually owned the largest operations while immigrant Chinese filled a secondary role in the colonial economy and the natives either labored in the fields tending the export crops or grew foodstuffs that fed the agricultural laborers.

**Political Change and Nationalism** - Although the native population had been subordinated economically and politically in most of Southeast Asia, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries two countries, the Philippines and Vietnam, offered spirited resistance to colonial rule and sparked the rise of modern nationalism. The Philippines was the first to start a modern nationalist movement and revolution. The advantage this colony enjoyed was the economic role played by Chinese mestizos who took the lead in developing the hinterlands for the new capitalist free market economy. Manila's Spanish population evidenced no desire to leave the comfort of their sumptuous homes safely tucked inside the protective walls of Fort Santiago. Instead, it was the Chinese mixed bloods who had been long confined to a Manila ghetto called the Parian, who ventured forth to develop the country. Having been raised by their Filipina mothers, this group had an understanding of the local culture that they put to good use when dealing with the farmers in the countryside. While there were some Spaniards who created haciendas and agricultural enterprises, the new wealthy were the mestizos.

As the mestizo group became wealthy, they sent their sons to universities in Manila and, especially, Europe. Soon, a new generation of mestizos, along with the sons of a few native elite families, were reading the philosophers of the French Enlightenment and learning to live in a European society that did not discriminate against them as did the colonials back home. Much of their agitation was led by a young medical doctor Jose Rizal whose talents extended to writing deeply sarcastic prose. His 1886 novel *Noli Me Tangere* (variously translated from the Latin as either *The Social Cancer* or *Touch Me Not*) held the Spaniards up to unrelenting ridicule and dissected the pernicious nature of colonial domination.

Returning to the Philippines, Rizal attempted to establish a reform society but was arrested the following day and sent into exile. This example led one of the reform society members, Andres Bonifacio, to found a revolutionary society, the Katipunan, dedicated to gathering weapons for an uprising that would expel the Spanish colonizers. The discovery of the existence of the Katipunan precipitated the 1896 revolution mentioned earlier in this essay. American military power eventually over-

whelmed the fragile Philippine Republic and a conscious American colonial policy of attraction soon won over all but the most intransigent nationalists. Nevertheless, the early revolt lived on the Filipino consciousness and independence was sought throughout the American colonial period.

For their part, the Vietnamese had a long tradition of resisting Chinese invaders and the French were confronted with a series of movements that spanned the entirety of their colonial rule. The series began in 1884 with a Royalist revolt loyal to the Vietnamese imperial line and a near simultaneous peasant rebellion led by the colorful leader De Tham, the "Tiger of Yen-The." While these were eventually squelched, an underground party that patterned itself on China's Nationalist Party of Sun Yat-sen emerged in the 1920s. That movement was also suppressed by the French secret police, but was soon replaced by a communist party founded by Nguyen Ai Quoc, a young idealist who had tried to petition the delegates of the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference to grant his country independence based on Woodrow Wilson's 14 Points. The young man and his petition were dismissed and he turned to socialism. After training in Moscow he returned to Asia where he spent much of his time in China. At the end of World War II that same young man, now two decades older, changed his name to Ho Chi Minh and continued to lead his country's fight against the French and then the United States until his death in 1969.

The other colonized countries of Southeast Asia later reflected the Philippine and Vietnamese struggles and their nationalist development followed paths that adopted strategies from each. Indonesia, for example, combined the nationalist agitation of the Philippine example with the armed resistance of determined Vietnam guerrilla forces when the Dutch attempted to reimpose its colonial rule after World War II.

In Southeast Asia only Thailand avoided colonial rule which makes it an especially valuable addition to a world history curriculum. In the Thai case, the country was fortunate to have two factors that allowed the country to maintain its independence; its geographic position between two European rivals and the wise diplomatic and modernizing policies of two of its kings, Mongkut and Chulalongkorn. Located between British dominated Burma to the west and British Malay to the south and French Indochina to the east, Thailand was able to play one European power off against the other. For their parts, the British and French came to a mutual understanding that neither country would interfere with the Thai kingdom so that a costly colonial war could be avoided. At the same time, the kings initiated a series of internal reforms designed to strengthen the country. Their modernizing policies, like the Japanese under the Meiji, sought to bring the country up to contemporary standards that would therefore be instrumental in minimizing conditions that might otherwise invite intervention. Advisors from the two rival European countries,

and nationals of still other European countries, were contracted to oversee the reforms thereby giving a number of countries an interest in maintaining the status quo. In all cases, however, the reforms were top-down edicts promulgated in a manner that was not dissimilar to Japanese reforms, and no political reforms were allowed that might challenge the position of the Chakri dynasty. The Thai example was unique in Southeast Asia and can be used to illustrate the complex manner by which the colonial enterprise manifested itself on a global scale.

For all of Southeast Asia, World War II was a watershed. Nationalist movements were accelerated even as the colonizers were shown to be vulnerable to the Japanese war machine. By 1945 an exhausted Europe was no longer in a position to exert its will upon formerly subject peoples. Both the Dutch and French attempted to reassert themselves but failed. The non-communist Indonesian leader Sukarno was assisted by the United States that pressured The Netherlands to abandon its effort to subdue its former imperial possession. On the other hand, the tragedy of the Vietnamese revolution was its communist leadership under Ho Chi Minh that earned the enmity of US president Harry S. Truman who extended American support to the ultimately disastrous French war.

**Southeast Asia Today** - With the legacy of colonialism behind them, the contemporary nations of Southeast Asia are all members of the global community. Their common regional body the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a leader in regional affairs and is the host of the annual Asia-Pacific Regional Forum that expands to include India, China, Japan, Korea, the European Union, and the United States. The region went through a severe economic shock in 1997 that brought leadership changes to the governments of Thailand and Indonesia, but Southeast Asia has rebounded and is again a region of economic mini-dragons. With the exception of Burma, renamed Myanmar, the region is also an area of democratic reform and educational progress that bodes well for the new century.

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## Family Law as Metaphor in Colonial Politics: A Helpful Tool in World Historical Analysis

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*Let the women of a country be made virtuous and intelligent, and the men will certainly be the same. The proper education of a man decides the welfare of an individual; but educate a woman, and the interests of the whole family are secured.* - Catherine Beecher\*

*...when women make money, they bring benefits to the whole family, particularly the children. Thus lending to women creates a cascading effect that brings social benefits as well as economic benefits to the whole family and ultimately the entire community.* - Muhammad Yunus+

The “Woman Question” has lain near the center of modernization discourse since it first began in the nineteenth century. Over the last twenty years numerous studies of 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century imperialism have found that laws defining and dependent on personal status—that is, family law, various kinds of protective labor legislation, emancipation, and suffrage—were hotly contested in colonial regimes as diverse as India, Algeria, the Dutch East Indies, and Soviet Central Asia, to name a handful of examples. This essay will focus on the Netherlands Indies (Indonesia) and British India. Indonesian nationalists felt a particular kinship with Indian nationalists, and borrowed some of their imagery and methods, so we might expect the modernization and nationalization discourse in the two countries to be somewhat similar.<sup>1</sup> In addition, it is my hope that readers at every level of teaching and research will be able to access some relevant materials for their own teaching or research, and materials on British India are among the most easily located for most WHA members. The English-language literature on the histories of women, the economy, and the law is very extensive for British India, while much of the primary source literature is also in English. The history of women and the

economy of late colonial Indonesia, on the other hand, is much less developed. Much of the relevant secondary literature and almost all the primary source literature are in languages<sup>2</sup>—Dutch and Bahasa Indonesia—that are much less commonly used by WHA members and are rarely collected even in research libraries outside the Netherlands and Indonesia. As a specialist in Dutch colonial history, I hope that choosing the Indonesian example provides readers with an introduction to the emerging English-language literature on Indonesian women’s history, a fascinating but less well-known corner of world history.

Using protective legislation, imperialist governments throughout the modern period justified their rule over colonial subjects as protecting and emancipating women. It was this kind of legal intervention initiated on behalf of “native” women that Gayatri Spivak has famously characterized as a pattern of white men “saving brown women from brown men.” Such imperialist interventions did not develop in a vacuum. They appeared partly in response to the complaints of the colonized (usually elite men), partly in response to the concerns of colonial administrators,

and in contexts of rapid social and economic change. Tied as it typically was to industrial expansion, imperial rule often required considerable re-negotiation of the division of social and wage labor within the family. More recent scholarship has attended to the degree to which male colonial elites—the self-same “brown men” mentioned by Gayatri Spivak—mobilized for and against changes in women’s legal status and opportunities in the name of protecting women and/or the nation.<sup>3</sup> This synthetic paper explores the role of nationalist and modernization discourse in two attempts at reforming marital laws and two attempts at creating protective legislation for women industrial workers, one of each in British India and the Netherlands Indies (henceforth Indonesia).

**Reforming Marital Law** - Debates over marital law were as much about ethnic identity and definitions of progress as about justice. The “Woman Question” was central not just to colonial policy but also to traditionalist, reforming, and nationalist goals of conquered peoples, and in most cases the heart of the debate lay in discussions of appropriate motherhood. Since all parties imagined appropriate mothers as wives, marital legislation provoked heated debate and revealed divisions among both colonizers and colonized. Perhaps the most famous of these struggles over personal status law played out in India, where in the Hindu Widows Remarriage Act of 1856 the British Empire sought to reform the legal system on behalf of (elite) Hindu widows by granting all Hindu widows the right to remarry and to the usufruct, in some cases, of a small portion of their deceased spouses’ estates. This attempt at reform split Hindu elites between those outraged at

imperialist interference in the most intimate details of marital life and those supportive reformers who had deplored both sati and the mistreatment of widows. Lost to the nineteenth century debate were the many Hindu women living under British rule for whom local custom had previously granted them not only usufruct but ownership of their husbands’ entire estates, including immovables. The Hindu Widows Remarriage Act actually took away many lower caste widows’ earlier right to ownership of their husband’s land and marital estate, thus creating greater poverty among single mothers.<sup>4</sup> Indeed, Janaki Nair suggests that preventing widows from alienating inherited land may have been one of the motivations behind the particular wording of the Act.<sup>5</sup>

Eighty-one years later the government of the Netherlands Indies (Indonesia) drafted a voluntary marriage law intended to serve the very small number (at that time 3% of the total European population in Indonesia) of European women who had married or would marry native

*Indian women never made up as large a percentage of industrial workers as, for instance, Japanese women.*

Indonesians, nearly all of these being men educated in the Netherlands. By law, such women became Muslim upon marriage, and the government wanted to protect European women—and some elite Indonesian women, if they so chose—from polygynous marriages.

By this time colonial governments knew that changes to personal law were likely be contentious, so the Draft was limited in scope. It was circulated privately among representatives of women’s groups and then revealed for public comment, especially from Islamic organizations.<sup>6</sup> Although the small group of Indonesian women activists with whom the government spoke generally liked the proposed measure, they warned that it was unlikely to meet with universal favor.<sup>7</sup> It is perhaps important to mention here that although Indonesia was and remains 90% Muslim, most women’s organizations at the time were secular. There were active and vocal women’s branches of political parties, radical nationalists, teachers’ collectives, and organizations for the wives of civil servants.<sup>8</sup> Even Islamic women’s organizations differed widely among themselves, with some existing to support women’s responsibilities as Muslim mothers and some creating women’s prayer groups, study groups, and mosques. Moreover, although their membership numbers were not large, Indonesian women’s organizations were accustomed to working together to discover and support consensus issues. They had been meeting regularly in national congresses for nine years, and already knew that the one thing all groups had in common was a commitment to nationalism.<sup>9</sup>

Mainstream (male-dominated) Islamic organizations were even more upset than the women’s organizations had predicted. Although

some Muslim women's organizations opposed polygyny and wanted to reform divorce, even the most feminist of these ended up opposing the measure. First, Muslim scholars and leaders universally disagreed that the state had any authority to make Muslim law. Second, the law itself was not based in the existing measures available for Indonesian women to protect themselves against polygyny—Indonesian women generally were able to insist on a prenuptial agreement that would end the marriage in case of a second wife. Muslim women's organizations preferred to reform the sharia through its own traditions, not Dutch ones. Finally, though opponents rarely said so openly, family law was the only sphere in which the sharia was permitted to work. Other aspects of civil and criminal law were the province of westernized courts. Thus, even the most tangential suggestion of eliding the existing system of Muslim jurisprudence was perceived as an attack on Islam as a whole.<sup>10</sup> From the 1920's to the end of the colonial period, women's organizations preferred to present a unified front when dealing with the state. Because the various Muslim women's organizations in the Netherlands Indies came out against the measure, the entire mainstream of women's movements among native Indonesians withdrew any support for the new law.

Where the Hindu Widows Remarriage Act had increased divisions between progressive and traditional Indian factions, the Draft succeeded in uniting Muslim organizations, nationalists of all parties, and all the Indonesian women's organizations that were not run by European women. How did this law, which would have had only a minor impact on very small numbers of elite women, come to be universally opposed? Most Indonesian women's organizations and many men's organizations thought polygyny was old fashioned and wanted some kind of marriage reform. After all, the most popular Muslim model of progressive reform was, for Indonesians of the 1930's, Turkey and its entirely secular civil code. What was so offensive about a change that would affect only a tiny number of Indonesians? Locher-Scholten says that for Indonesians the debate was about the role of religion in maintaining some form of cultural autonomy. Indonesians wanted to pursue modernization on their own, reforming from within and from below. I suggest that in 1856 educated Indians were still debating whether modernization was a good thing, and that Indian nationalist sentiment was only in its infancy. By 1937 almost all educated Indonesians supported modernization and envisioned themselves, despite their enormous cultural and geographic diversity, as a nation-state. They had at least two good non-Western examples, Turkey and Japan, to model themselves upon. They did not need Dutch help. Locher-Scholten describes the 1937 Draft as having been a "litmus test of the ambivalences of colonial modernity and state formation along modern lines."<sup>11</sup> I would make the additional argument that the proposed legislation gave

Indonesians a public forum where they recognized the degree to which nationalism was now the shared ideology of the subjects of the Netherlands Indies.

**Protecting Working Mothers** - If marital legislation was argued in terms of modernization and nationalism, protective labor legislation was argued as if the only thing that mattered was its potential compatibility with the nuclear family. Competing visions of the appropriate division of labor within families provided the context for debates about workplace protections for women. During the first few decades of the twentieth century it began to occur to colonial governments that perhaps they should encourage an ideology of domesticity among their colonial subjects, a topic that western-educated Indians and Indonesians and colonizing women had already been exploring for some time. As Walsh's work on Indian domestic manuals has pointed out, whether written for Indian, British, or North American women, the metaphorical language and ethical message of the genre as a whole was that the housewife would create order, discipline, and, most importantly, civilization. Only an appropriately educated wife could incorporate the kind of household management techniques that were considered necessary to inculcate the core virtues of thrift, cleanliness, honesty, hard work, and energetic devotion to duty so important in the modern work force.

Few colonized subjects could be expected to live in ideal nuclear families in which the husband worked outside and the wife and mother inside the home. Indeed, even the economies of the home countries of all the empires relied heavily on paid female labor.<sup>12</sup> Debates over protective labor, however, typically attended not to the necessities of survival among subject colonial women, but to whatever the debaters themselves considered the natural, indigenous pattern of life among the colonized. Our two instances of marriage law showed us how very different the responses of the colonized could be to changes made with similar intent. On the other hand, two debates concerning the protection of women workers demonstrated nearly identical ranges of opinion and ended up with almost identical results.

Indian women never made up as large a percentage of industrial workers as, for instance, Japanese women. There were several reasons for this. Indian industrial workers tended to be migrants, and it was harder for women to leave home than men. Indeed, like Russian peasant women of the same era<sup>13</sup>, Indian peasant women were often expected to take on the agricultural labor of departed husbands and brothers.<sup>14</sup> Second, Indian women married very early; unlike other industrializing countries, India did not have a large pool of unmarried young women who could leave home to work in industry for a few years to save up money for marriage. Instead, Indian teenagers almost always had small chil-

dren, still too young to do any productive work.<sup>15</sup> Finally, there was a strong tendency to hire men to run any kind of machinery. Nevertheless, during the first four decades of the twentieth century Indian women made up nearly 40% of workers on tea plantations, 25-35% of coalmine workers, and 10-20% of textile workers. We will pass over for today legislation concerning Indian tea plantations, where laws "protecting" women are most analogous to the kinds of protective legislation introduced in the early nineteenth century that tried to increase fertility among enslaved women after the British government banned the importation of Africans.<sup>16</sup> Plantation workers, or coolies, as they were referred to throughout India, lived in conditions very near chattel slavery. If they tried to leave, they were forcibly returned. Death rates were high, and labor legislation did not so much attempt to protect women as bar their access to contraception.

Instead, we will focus on women coal miners, because the Indian government made various attempts between 1901 and 1931 to regulate women's and children's work in this industry.<sup>17</sup> In Great Britain, of course, efforts to regulate women's and children's work in the mines stemmed from a combination of a genuine desire to protect women and the growing strength of (male-dominated) labor movements seeking to create a living wage that would pay a working man enough to support himself and his nuclear families. The low wages of women and children undercut men's opportunities for employment.

Potential bans against women working were discussed entirely on the basis of the appropriate role of women in the Indian family. Colliery owners, of course, had opposed it on the grounds that mining was easier and less degrading to women than traditional work. "Doctrinaire reformers" would only "interfere" and harm the "industrial and social welfare of the country" by insisting on returning women to it. Managers of mines explained that having families work together in mines was "in entire harmony with the time-honoured traditions of Indian social life." Nationalists, on the other hand, argued that having women work underground degraded Indian civilization, while a very small number of Indian feminists argued that since women were the equals of men they should be entitled to the same kinds of work. Missing from the conversation seems to have been the voices of Indian mine workers (both female and male); the individuals one would have thought had the strongest interest in the decision. This may have been because the proposed bans were never likely to have much impact on the working conditions of miners.

Indian coal mines employed whole families and paid them as families rather than as individuals. According to Janaki Nair, "men cut coal and women loaded it into tubs". Thus, protective legislation for women could only slow labor for men. Moreover, initial attempts at reforming the labor conditions in mines happened during a period of labor shortage. It should be no surprise.

then, that protective mining legislation took a very long time, and seems to have been stimulated by government's sense that they ought to be seen to be doing something for women and children, rather than by any intention to provide protections. Thus, the 1901 Act to Provide for the Inspection of Mines did no more than award the Chief Inspector of Mines the right to prohibit women's and children's employment if he thought they were in immediate serious danger.<sup>18</sup> But it provided no sanctions for failing to protect women and children, and did not define safe working conditions. As late as 1923 the Indian Mines Act failed to set any limits on the hours women could work, and women continued to work underground. The actual ban on women's labor underground was not passed until 1929, at a time when the supply of male laborers had increased and coal cutting machinery had drastically reduced the need for male coal cutters. In other words, it was apparently impossible to provide protective legislation for women in mines until the point at which women were rapidly being phased out of the industry.

In the Netherlands Indies it was also the case that debates on laws protecting women workers had little to do with protecting individual women and a great deal to do with imagining a better society. Els Locher-Scholten's study of "protective" legislation for women night laborers in twentieth century Java found Batavian regent Achmad Djajadiningrat arguing that women should no longer be allowed to work nights and very long hours because such a work schedule damaged the family. According to Locher-Scholten, opponents of night labor shared an understanding of Indonesian women as belonging to home and hearth, working only out of dire necessity. Against this bourgeois depiction of the Indonesian Angel of the House, the employers in the sugar, tea, and coffee industries—the largest employers of female night laborers—argued that the Indonesian family was fundamentally different from the Dutch family; that Indonesian women normally worked outside the home; and that legislation protecting them from night work would infringe on customary law (*adat*) and Indonesian family life.<sup>19</sup> Thus the debate over protecting women workers was also a debate over whose vision of Indonesian family life would be deemed accurate. Did Indonesian families, like ideal modern Dutch families, rely on a housewife to provide a constant presence and moral center? Or were they fundamentally alien in their structure, naturally considering women as wage-earners? The government refused to choose between the two; women's night labor was formally outlawed, but special industries that could demonstrate a need for it were either exempted from the law or permitted to request (and invariably granted) an exception. Thus, lip service could be paid to the ideal of domesticity, but all the industries employing large numbers of women night laborers could continue doing so.

**Conclusion** - The Woman Question was inseparable from debates about modernization. On the one hand, nineteenth century European and North American activists who sought social and political change on behalf of women in those regions were often considered too radical, their demands unreasonable. On the other hand, the perceived social, legal, and educational superiority of Western women proved, to many contemporary minds, the superiority of Western culture. Just as people discussed industrial manufacturing, railroads, and the telegraph as technological hallmarks of modernization, so also they spoke and wrote about women's increasing status and contributions as indispensable social and economic supports for modernization. Writers diagnosed nations' degrees of modernization and civilization on the basis of their own perception of its treatment of women,<sup>20</sup> a mental habit still common today.

Outside Europe and North America it was also common to discuss modernization and progress in terms of women. Reformers and industrialists all over the world favored modernization of one kind or another, but debated its preferred implementation. To what extent did modernization also require Westernization? To what degree would social relationships need to change to permit modernization? Could modernization be achieved without changing traditional family values, particularly without changing women's roles? Ought women's roles, perhaps, to change? Were colonized people's families "naturally" more prone to relying on women's work (because, one presumes, the men in the family could not be relied on to support them)? I note that if we substitute the word "development" for "industrialization" these questions still provoke lively discussion.

Debates about family law and personal status come up frequently in world history teaching and research. A crucial concern of any new regime, but most particularly a colonizing one, is ideological legitimacy. Particularly in a world era where conquest for its own sake was no longer quite respectable, colonizing regimes had an urgent need to create images of themselves and their conquered peoples which legitimized the existing hierarchy. At the same time, conquered peoples had a similar urgent need to define themselves over and against their conquerors, to actively decide how to maintain their culture in the face of superior military and institutional firepower. Colonizing powers used their own women—well, a wishful vision of their own women—to demarcate the lines between their own race and the colonized as well as the line between civilization and barbarism. Elites among colonized peoples also used the control of women's work, reproduction, and behavior as important signifiers of cultural continuity and moral superiority. The creation of a nationalist self-image required the creation of a nationalist vision of the family to set in opposition to the vision colonizers attempted to impose. In any dis-

cussion of industrialization, modernization, westernization, or development, the image of Women will be strategically deployed by all sides. Reforms aimed at women, especially as members of families, often serve as a pretext for participant groups to jockey over the direction of social change and the right to define cultural authenticity.

\* Catherine Beecher, *Treatise on Domestic Responsibility* (Boston: T.H. Webb and Co., 1842 p. 37.

<sup>1</sup> Muhammad Yunus, *Creating a World Without Poverty: Social Business and the Future of Capitalism*, New York: PublicAffairs, 2007, p. 55.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Frances Gouda, "Good Mothers, Medeas, or Jezebels: Feminine Imagery in Colonial and Anticolonial Rhetoric in the Dutch East Indies, 1900-1942," 236-254 in Julia Clancy-Smith and Frances Gouda, eds., *Domesticating the Empire: Race, Gender, and Family Life in French and Dutch Colonialism*. Charlottesville and (London: University Press of Virginia, 1998) 245-246.

<sup>2</sup> An extremely important exception is the collection of letters written by Raden Ageng Kartini, by most Indonesians considered the foundress of Indonesia's feminist movement. Joost Cote's translation of 1992 (*Letters of a Javanese Princess: Kartini's Letters to Stella Zeehandelaar 1899-1903*, rev. ed. Clayton, Vic.: Monash Asia Institute, 2005) has perhaps the more authoritative translation and introduction. However, Agnes Louise Symmers' translation of 1920 is, according to this author's understanding, now out of copyright, and has been published in several editions, including one by W.W. Norton in 1964, the original Alfred Knopf edition of 1920, and two editions in 2005 and 2007 from Kessinger Publications. Kartini Day (April 21) is a national holiday in Indonesia.

<sup>3</sup> See Judith Walsh, *Domesticity in Colonial India: What Women Learned When Men Gave Them Advice* (Langham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004) for middle class Indian men's desire to improve their wives' education. For early male activism on behalf of women, see Geraldine Forbes, *Women in Modern India* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996) and Radha Kumar, *The History of Doing: An Illustrated Account of Movements for Women's Rights and Feminism in India, 1800-1990* (Delhi: Kali for Women, 1993). Both detail the crucial roles played by such early male activists as Ram Mohan Roy and Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar on behalf of women.

<sup>4</sup> Janaki Nair, *Women and Law in Colonial India* (New Delhi: Kali for Women in collaboration with the National Law School of India University, 1996), 65. But for the classic account see Carroll's article in Jayasankar Krishnamurti ed., *Women in Colonial India* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988).

<sup>5</sup> Nair 64-65. While some of Nair's conclusions are based on her own readings of colonial law, in this instance she bases her conclusions on the specifics evidenced in Carroll (1988); Prem Chowdy, "Customs in a Peasant Economy," 302-336 in Kumkum Sangari and Sudesh Vaid, eds., *Recasting Women: Essays in Indian Colonial History* (Delhi: Kali for Women, 1990, published the same year in the US in New Brunswick, NJ at Rutgers University Press)New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1990); and Rosalind O'Hanlon "Issues in Widowhood: Gender and Resistance in Colonial Western India", 62-108 in Douglas Heynes and Gyan Prakash, eds. *Contesting Power: Resistance and Everyday Relations in South Asia* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1991. In the US this book was printed in 1992 by the University of California Press at Berkeley). Combined with Nair's *Women and Law* these four works make a good introduction to the extensive English-language literature on the history of marital and property law in the colonial period.

<sup>6</sup> Els Locher-Scholten recounts the details of the proposed legislation in "Marriage, Morality, and Modernity", in her *Women in the Colonial State: Essays on Gender and Modernity*

*in the Netherlands Indies, 1900-1942* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2000) 187-218.

<sup>7</sup> Locher-Scholten (2000) 199.

<sup>8</sup> Hatley and Blackburn in 47-49, "Representations of Women's Roles in Household and Society in Indonesian Women's Writing of the 1930's," 45-67 in Juliette Koning, et. al., *Women and Households in Indonesia: Cultural Notions and Social Practices* (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 2000).

<sup>9</sup> Locher-Scholten (2000) 160-161.

<sup>10</sup> Locher-Scholten (2000) 200-201.

<sup>11</sup> Locher-Scholten (2000) 210.

<sup>12</sup> It was generally believed that even a working wife, however, could improve her family's economic and social standing by careful management of household resources, a set of tasks most legislators assumed were physically easy to perform and not at all tiring. To be fair to the middle and upper class men making these assumptions, women authors of household manuals, novelists, and apparently most middle class women sought to give precisely that impression. For the last couple of hundred years, part of the art of good housewifery has been to make it seem effortless.

<sup>13</sup> This subject has been extensively researched, but Jeffrey Burns, *Peasant Dreams, Market Politics: Labor Migration and the Russian Village 1861-1905* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998) and the first four articles in Beatrice Farnsworth and Lynne Viola, eds. *Russian Peasant Women* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) are particularly helpful.

<sup>14</sup> Samita Sen, "Introduction," *Women and Labour in Late Colonial India: The Bengal Jute Industry. Cambridge Studies in Indian History and Society 3*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

<sup>15</sup> Tirthankar Roy. *The Economic history of India, 1857-1947*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.

<sup>16</sup> Barbara Bush, *Slave Women in Caribbean Society: 1650-1838* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), pages 29-30 and Verene Shepherd, ed. *Women in Caribbean History: The British Colonized Territories* (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 1999).

<sup>17</sup> 104. Except where other writers are specifically cited, the discussion of coal miners comes entirely from chapter four of Janaki Nair, pages 104-109.

<sup>18</sup> Nair 104-105.

<sup>19</sup> Locher-Scholten, "Female Labour in Twentieth Century Java" 77-103 in Locher-Scholten and Anke Niehof, *Indonesian Women in Focus*, 77-79. Leiden: KITLV Press, 1992.

<sup>20</sup> Nira Yural-Davis, *Gender and Nation* (London: Sage Publications, 1997) discusses the biological and symbolic importance of both women and gender ideology in modern attempts to define national norms and criteria for citizenship.

sources and situate them in a larger historical context, have become increasingly more common in K-16 education, thus giving many history students the opportunity to work with primary sources. While these types of questions measure student knowledge of historical methods and skills much more accurately than other more traditional forms of assessment, they often pose the greatest difficulties for students. For students to be successful at these cognitive tasks, the history teacher must model the methodologies and processes that are an inherent part of historical scholarship.

As we know, a major component of "doing" history is the ability to analyze primary sources, which according to cognitive researchers is a skill that students must be explicitly taught to do. Sam Wineburg suggests that historical thinking is an active process that requires readers to form a dialogue with the source under study.<sup>1</sup> He asserts that students must be taught how to actively engage the text. Often students feel much more at ease with this process through an analysis of a visual image and are able to question and consider visual media more easily than textual sources. By examining a visual source, such as a painting, drawing, or photo this analytical process validates students' existing skills and builds upon them. This is in no way a call for the exclusion of textual sources in the classroom. Instead, the goal is to engage with students' knowledge and experiences and develop their critical thinking skills.

Generation Y students are arguably more greatly impacted by visual rather than textual stimuli in modern culture. They absorb media and especially video game images at increasingly higher rates. They are knowledgeable about the genres, conventions, and messages of visual sources. Such is the extent of this cultural shift that one scholar recently quipped that American children now more readily choose to enjoy the "great indoors" rather than to go outside and play.<sup>2</sup> And yet they are rarely asked to critically examine what they are seeing. Thus, while they have become masters at absorbing information, their analytical ability to transform this information into critical understandings of the contemporary world has become seemingly diminished. This should not be surprising. Reality TV, for example, does not ask viewers to really *think* about what they are watching but rather to *experience* the drama played out on the screen in the safety of their homes. The challenge, for teachers, is to shift students' general viewing habits from one of pleasure seeking to one of knowledge acquisition. Educational research suggests a solution whereby teachers actively engage students' existing schema to move them into deeper understandings of the disciplinary knowledge and practice.<sup>3</sup> By incorporating students' familiarity and expertise with visual images, teachers can use these sources to support student learning and prepare them to deepen their analytical abilities.

This article proposes the utilization of a tem-

plate to teach students the analytical skills necessary to engage them in a thoughtful visual analysis of a primary source. This strategy encourages students to slow down the process by which information is received so that they can more easily parse what they are seeing and thus, hopefully, to begin reading images with a critical eye. We call this the "Six C's of Primary Source Analysis": Content, Citation, Context, Connection, Communication, and Conclusion.<sup>4</sup> Although we believe this template can be used with any primary source, we will model visual analysis through an examination of one piece of colonial architecture in New Delhi. By studying the colonial city, the lesson deepens students' content knowledge and at the same time allows them to practice the thinking skills they need to "read," or analyze, the city and its objects as text.

The examination of a city as a historical text supports a multi-faceted analysis while also building upon students' existing knowledge. The city has been a significant site for organizing diverse social activities and therefore serves as an excellent site of historical enquiry. The teacher can utilize a city to model the analytical categories that will be employed in the course and consider the ways that social, political, economic, cultural, and environmental categories are interrelated within a specific space. The city can also serve as a way to examine interactions between people and groups to better comprehend the way a culture and its identity are important factors in organizing power relationships.

All built environments have a politics. Landscapes and cities encode information and communicate ideas.<sup>5</sup> A city, according to James S. Duncan, is "one of the central elements in a cultural system for an ordered assemblage of objects, a text, it acts as a signifying system through which a social system is communicated, reproduced, experienced, and explored."<sup>6</sup> But a city is also more than the sum of its parts. Government buildings, parks, streets, theaters, cemeteries, and monuments carry specific meanings that add to the whole. Hence, cities are sites where power is located and the objects they contain are the transmitters that encode and manifest this power. Anthony King, in a rigorous study of urbanization at New Delhi, shows that colonial capitals are perhaps the best illustrations of the textual nature of cities because their languages of control and their concretization of colonial power relations are persistently employed and performed.<sup>7</sup> The pervasiveness of these messages of control and domination make the examination of the colonial built environment particularly useful in the classroom.

New Delhi, Britain's last imperial capital in India, was built between 1911 and 1931 to symbolize a new direction in British imperial politics. From a politics of "domination without hegemony," as Ranajit Guha has claimed, Britain slowly adopted a more conciliatory approach in India in the early twentieth-century, even stating in 1917 that the purpose of British rule was to prepare



## Architecture and Visual Literacy: Reading the Indian Colonial Built Environment

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Document-based questions (the dreaded DBQ in Advanced Placement speak) challenge students to do the work of historians by analyzing and organizing primary sources into a coherent narrative. These assessments, which measure students' ability to read texts, maps, charts, and other visual

India for responsible government.<sup>8</sup> During the first three decades of the twentieth-century, the Raj, Britain's imperial government in India, began to offer political reforms that gave Indians greater political control. Yet while these reforms were certainly progressive, they were also designed to more closely bind Indians to the British Empire. For independence would be given only when India was deemed ready for it by Britain and only after Indian anti-colonialism had ended. As the pre-eminent symbol of this imperial center, New Delhi crucially disseminated this double narrative of promised liberation and continued colonial dependency. The large government structures, parks, clubs, parade avenues, and monuments acted as disseminators of this highly ambivalent message, which promised freedom while curbing it. Thus, students who read particular objects in this imperial city are exposed to some of the deeper contradictions of late-colonialism in India.

The ambiguities and complexities of late imperialism are especially difficult to grasp for students who tend to see the world in stark contrasts: right / wrong, fair / unfair, red states/ blue states, etc. Thus, when studying empires it is tremendously easy for them to fall into overly reductive analyses that separate imperialism into those that colonize and those that are colonized. Such binaries had become accepted by Britain in the twentieth-century. How can students meaningfully pull apart images of this complex moment in British-Indian history? The "Six C's" provide some guidance. The images below show one of the four dominion columns given to India in February, 1931, by Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, the great dominions of the British Empire. The columns are located between New Delhi's Secretariats, the primary government structures designed and built by Herbert Baker to house the various departments of Britain's government during late colonial rule in India. They are now used for similar purposes by the Indian government.

**Content:** The first C that must be addressed is content—what is the student looking at? Here, students can answer some extremely simple questions. What type of primary sources are they

looking at? Photographs. What is the primary subject of the photograph? In Figure 1, the focus is on a column placed in front of a large building. On top is a ship, an East Indiaman, floating on a globe of the world. The ship and the globe represent Britain's vast maritime trade with its colonies, truly an empire where the sun never set. Figure 2 is a close-up of the same column. What can be seen in the close-up is an image of what looks to be a crest and above is some writing. The words say "Canada to India MCMXXX." Not much seems to be happening in the images, but there are some interesting possibilities that lead to more complicated questions. These latter questions lead us into other areas of enquiry, but first the primary sources need to be properly cited.

**Citation:** Properly citing sources, whether primary or secondary, has seemingly become a lost art for many students entering college. Worse, plagiarism has become epidemic on many college campuses. One easy culprit to spot for this problem is the internet with its wikiblogs and vast electronic resources—some good, some bad—that are simple to cut and paste from. Practicing proper citation early in students' educational lives will aid them as college students. In the above case, the photographs were taken by one of the authors of this article in 2003 during a research trip to India. The columns were originally conceptualized in 1920 by Herbert Baker and were later unveiled during New Delhi's inaugural ceremonies in February 1931. Considerations of authority lead to higher-level questions. For example, what is the relationship between the author and the subject? This information, as well as knowing who the creator of the source was, and the time period in which it was created allows us to situate the source in the proper historical context.

**Context:** Understanding historical context is one of the most important aspects of analyzing an image. As with many types of image analyses by students, teachers need to provide some background information. What was going on in the locality, the region, or the world when the object in the image was created? Why is the object in the image important for the topic under study? In this case, the dominion columns were designed and built during the height of Indian anti-colonialism when Indian nationalists placed tremendous stress on the workings of the British colonial government through civil disobedience, such as refusing to pay taxes, or through boycotts, such as refusing to purchase British-made textiles. This pressure forced the British to begin thinking of new ways to encourage Indian consent to British rule or, in other words, to collaborate with the British imperial government in their own domination. Here, we have entered into one of the deeper insights made by Marxist scholars, most notably Antonio Gramsci, about the flow of political and economic power throughout society. As Antonio Gramsci long ago argued, hegemony is a powerful system of socio-political control in that it effectively encourages peoples' consent to the state's coercive measures. Britain itself exemplified how hegemony, when properly employed, encouraged average citizens to accept the status quo because the benefits of belonging outweighed Britain's coercive tendencies.

**Connections:** While images can be used as a hook to begin a lecture topic, they seem to work best as part of an ongoing lecture or curriculum unit. Student learning will occur best when the object depicted in the image connects to something the students have already learned or are in the process of learning. Images of these particular dominion columns should be shown during a curriculum unit on anti-colonialism or the end of empire. They offer insights into the lengths the British were willing to go in order to keep their Indian Empire as well as the limitations and contradictions caused by the offer of responsible government. Discussions about responsible government in India, for example, were quite different from earlier discussions about responsible government in Anglo-Saxon-dominated Canada or Australia. The columns also offer an opportunity to make connections across the world history curriculum by linking these symbols of authority to Ashoka, a third century Mauryan Emperor who inscribed his law code on pillars placed throughout India. Herbert Baker explicitly modeled his columns after Ashoka. By making this connection, he seamlessly wove Britain into the fabric of Indian history not as an alien force but as the rightful heir to Ashoka's ancient experiments in law giving. Here, we see a wonderful example of how two empires from very different epochs used similar architectural strategies to both represent and legitimize their imperial rule through public monuments.

**Communication:** Considerations such as audience and purpose are critical for understanding the relevance of the source. By asking good historical questions of the source, we can begin to consider the features and the message that it



Figure 1 Dominion Column Given by Canada to India in February, 1931




Figure 2 Close up of the same Dominion Column

intended to convey to Indians as well as Britons. Of all the spaces where the dominion columns could have been erected, why did Herbert Baker decide to locate them directly in front of his Secretariats? If there is a message encoded in these columns—and there is—who is the message meant for? And, lastly, how did the columns go about changing human behavior through their message? The unveiling of the columns in February, 1931, served as the opening ceremony of the inauguration of New Delhi, which over time had come to represent a new kind of British Empire for the twentieth-century—one that taught responsible government. The dominion columns pictured above represented Britain's promise to India that British rule would one day lead to Indian responsible government. Their placement in front of the Secretariats connected this promise to what made responsible government function—the workings of various government departments that maintained the stability and health of the state. And yet the dominion column's encoded message communicated another, much more pointed warning directed at the Indian independence movement. The political rights Indians had won over the last three decades under British rule were tenuous and the progress made by India toward independence could be easily lost without Britain's continued help, guidance, and imperial protection. In other words, the dominion columns suggested that Britain was the proven friend of India and Indian nationalists who destabilized colonial government through civil disobedience were the true enemies of India. The message was clear, Indian nationalists needed to stop disobeying and to begin cooperating with the British government.

**Conclusion:** Answers to the above questions help students make important historical conclusions about why someone would want to create these columns. In this case study, the dominion columns served as an example of the ways in which the British Empire tried to redefine its imperial mission in India in response to a dynamic and remarkably diverse all-India independence movement. This redefinition allowed colonial policy makers to proclaim that Britain's imperial position had not become weakened in India but that its imperial role had merely changed, from one of colonial master to one of political educator.

The contradictory nature of colonial rule in New Delhi can be made explicit in the history classroom through an analysis of the city's architectural features. With the "Six C's" teachers can implement a tool that provides students with an understanding of the visual source and how the dominion column represented Britain's colonizing mission in India. The "Six C's" allow students to build upon their existing skills of meaning-making with visual imagery and deepen their understanding by slowing down the analytical process. By engaging students in discussions about the construction of an image, and breaking these into distinct components, students can better analyze visual images as well as be effective

communicators of ideas. With repetition, students will become more expert at analyzing visual primary sources and will internalize the critical thinking skills that are at the heart of this process. The template of the "Six Cs" not only provides a method for students to thoroughly analyze a primary source, it also develops students' ability to communicate their ideas. When this exercise is done in pairs, groups, or as a whole class, students work with others to acquire the language necessary to be successful in a writing task, such as a DBQ prompt. With the "Six C's of Primary Source Analysis," students are challenged to think historically by modeling the methods of questioning and reflection that is inherent to our discipline.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Sam Wineburg, *Historical Thinking and Other Unnatural Acts: Charting the Future of Teaching the Past*. (Philadelphia:

Temple University Press, 2001), 82.

<sup>2</sup> Richard Louv, *Last Child in the Woods: Saving Our Children from Nature-Deficit Disorder* (Chapel Hill: Algonquin Books, 2005).

<sup>3</sup> Elizabeth Mirt Moje, et al. "Working toward a third space in content area literacy: An examination of everyday funds of knowledge and Discourse," *Reading Research Quarterly*. Vol. 39 (2004).

<sup>4</sup> A copy of the "Six C's" template can be found at the end of this article. A pdf version also can be found by visiting the University of California, Irvine, History Project website at: [www.humanities.uci.edu/history/uichp/wh/](http://www.humanities.uci.edu/history/uichp/wh/)

<sup>5</sup> James S. Duncan. *The City As Text: The Politics of Landscape Interpretation in the Kandyan Kingdom* (Cambridge University Press 1990), 4. Duncan shows that the social-spatial and physical-spatial relationship of objects within Kandy—a capital in southern Sri Lanka—operated as a language about Buddhist kingship.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 17

<sup>7</sup> Anthony King. *Colonial Urban Development: Culture, Social Power, and Environment* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976).

<sup>8</sup> Ranajit Guha. *Dominance Without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India* (Harvard University Press, 1997).

## Focus Issue Author Bios

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**James Geddes** taught 9 years in Southern California before teaching at Woodstock. He holds a History, BA from the New York Regents and a Ms.Ed. from National University.

**Nicole F. Gilbertson**, Ph.D. is the Site Director of the University of California (Irvine) History Project. She directs professional development programs for k-12 teachers in U.S. and world history.

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**Paul A. Rodell**, Ph.D. specializes on the Philippines and Vietnam at Georgia Southern University. His published research topics include religion, local history, nationalism, modern Philippine culture, Islam in the Philippines and the region, and contemporary politics.

**Charles Weller** has a Ph.D. from Al-Farabi Kazakh National University. He currently works with Asia Research Associates (ARA) on historical cultural research. His teaching and publishing experience includes eight years in Kazakhstan and three years in Japan.

## Of Interest to WHA Members

**From Thomas Hall (Book Review Editor, *Journal of World-Systems Research*):** Kardulias, P. Nick and Thomas D. Hall. 2008. "Archaeology and World-Systems Analysis." *World Archaeology: Debates in World Archaeology* 40:4:572-583. Abstract: Many archaeologists have criticized world-systems analysis (WSA) for being overly economicistic, ignoring individual actors and importing modern analyses to ancient settings where they are inappropriate. Those criticisms are directed largely at Immanuel Wallerstein's original formulation that was explicitly developed to explain contemporary global inequalities within and among states. In that sense there is validity to these charges. We argue, however, that most of these critiques of WSA have been misplaced. They seem to be rooted in lack of attention to modifications and extensions of WSA over the last three decades intended to address these issues, and often demonstrate a lack of familiarity with a host of WSA studies since 1974. We further argue this newer comparative WSA is a work in progress, which can be useful to archaeologists in the study of regional interactions and long-term development, and to which archaeologists are the most qualified to contribute in order to further the modification and development of WSA.

# Central Eurasia in World History: An Annotated Resource Guide

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## Introduction

Andre Gunder Frank sums it up best when he "argue[s] in *The Centrality of Central Asia* [that] this region has been central to Afro-Eurasian history for several thousand years, at least for over a millennium and a half before, and still after, the beginning of the Christian era..."<sup>1</sup> David Christian, in his work on "Inner Eurasia as a Unit of World History," echoes the point with added detail:

...agrarian civilizations appeared later there than in Outer Eurasia. And that in turn explains why historians have tended to neglect the region. All too often, they have treated Inner Eurasia as a marginal region, of interest only when its barbarian peoples conquered their civilized neighbors in Outer Eurasia. This view is misleading. ...Despite everything, Inner Eurasia has played a pivotal role in Eurasian and world history (181-83; see biblio ref below).

I would, however, differ with Christian when he predicts in his conclusion to the above named article that Inner Eurasia will cease to have significance as a distinct entity of focus within world history in an increasingly technologically globalized world.<sup>2</sup> But both time and space prevent me from going into further detail here on that and many other matters raised by not only Frank and Christian, but McGovern, Gronbech, Bregel, Adshead and others as listed in the 'Essential Resources' section below. I will make it my aim to submit an article sometime within the coming year on 'Central Eurasia in World History' to the *Journal of World History* interacting with, streamlining and hopefully somehow furthering the crucial discussion raised in these seminal pieces.

At present, the task is primarily bibliographical, providing what seem to me helpful resources for focusing on Central Eurasia within a world history survey. It should be noted that 'terminological chaos' has contributed to neglect of the region since one finds 'Inner Eurasia', 'Central Eurasia', 'Inner Asia', 'Central Asia', 'Middle Asia', 'Asian Heartland', 'Turkistan' or 'Turkestan', 'Turko-Mongolian' and/or 'Turko-Persian' worlds, 'Eurasia', 'Eurasian Steppe', 'Russian Steppe', 'Russian Central Asia', 'Soviet Central Asia', 'Islamic Central Asia', 'the Caspian Region', etc, all being used to refer at times to the same essential construct while at other times, in contrast, they are employed to make technical distinctions between various proposed constructs. As with most other proposed 'units' of study, the situation is complicated by the researcher's paradigmatic approach, whether geographical, cultural and/or political, all of which are dynamically interrelated and fluxuating continuously over time. I will use the term 'Central Eurasia' here in a broad, flexible manner, attempting to take in all the above.

Two final notes of introduction: First, the arrangement of materials here does *not* follow an alphabetical listing of authors, but rather an eclectic 'method of madness' which combines (my own arbitrary judgment of) priority interlaced with topical as well as chronological considerations. Second, All URLs are underlined, for which "[http://](#)" should be assumed. On the contrary, if "[www.](#)" is *not* listed as part of the URL, then it *should not* be included.

My thanks to all those on the Central-Eurasia-L scholar's email network who kindly responded to my request for suggestions of material, including: Peter B. Golden, Christopher Atwood, Shoshana Keller, Shannon O'Lear, Lawrence Markowitz, Andrew Hale, Jeremy Tasch, Albert Dien, Gary M. Mukai, Dan Waugh, Artem N. Yermilov, Islail Ozsoy, N. Borofka, Muzrob Tashmukhamedov, Akram Khabibulleav, Mohammad Karim, Silvana Malle, Jeannine Davis-Kimball, Fiona Kidd, Karen S. Robinson, Stacie Giles, Laurence A. Jarvik, Sylvia Onder and Nathan Light.

## Historical Source Documents:

Weller, R. Charles. "Herodotus on the Central Eurasians." ([www.ara-cahcrc.com/CAHCRC/Herodotus-on-CA.pdf](http://www.ara-cahcrc.com/CAHCRC/Herodotus-on-CA.pdf)).

Wakeman, Charles Bunnell. 1990. *Hsi Jung, the Western Barbarians: An Annotated Translation of the Five Chapters of the T'ung Tien on the Peoples and Countries of Pre-Islamic Central Asia*. PhD thesis, University of California, Los Angeles.

Levi, Scott and Ron Sela, eds. 2009. *Islamic Central Asia: An Anthology of Historical Sources*. Indiana University Press.

(See also *Silk Road Seattle* project under "Silk Road", Crosscultural Contact and Exchange" section below for an important set of historical texts available on the internet.)

## Historical Maps/Atlases:

Abazov, Rafis. 2008. *The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of Central Asia*. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. A handy reference at a very affordable price (less than \$15), especially when compared with Bregel's work below (over \$200), though both are roughly the same length. Both are valuable resources. Abazov is a Central Asian native on staff at Columbia University. Both he and Bregel have a thorough knowledge of the field.

Bregel, Yuri. 2003. *An Historical Atlas of Central Asia*. Brill Academic Publishers. (See comments on Abazov above.)

Investigating Central Asia Through Maps, produced by National Geographic Expeditions, complete with lesson plans, etc: [www.nationalgeographic.com/xpeditions/lessons/05/g68/investigating.html](http://www.nationalgeographic.com/xpeditions/lessons/05/g68/investigating.html)

Perry-Castenada map collection: <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth.html> Probably the most in-depth collection of historical maps for Central Eurasia available on the web.

## Photo Collections:

Thomas Cole, *Photographs of Central Asia*: <http://www.tcoletribalrugs.com/zphotostart.html> Includes a nice collection of both "Historical" and "Contemporary" photo albums.

[www.PhotoCentralAsia.com](http://www.PhotoCentralAsia.com) by Andrew Hale and Kate Fitz Gibbon. A good collection.

*The Best of Central Asia in Photos*: <http://www.uncorneredmarket.com/2008/01/the-best-of-central-asia-in-photos> Including galleries of 'Central Asian Food and Markets', 'People of Central Asia' and 'Landscapes and Cityscapes'.

Caucasus and Central Asia Photo Source: <http://www.patkerphoto.com> Appears to take a socio-political angle, emphasizing human rights stories, etc.

## **Central Eurasian Studies Societies, Mailing Lists, Bulletins, Journals, etc.:**

*Association of Central Eurasian Students* (ACES) hosted by Indiana University, Bloomington: [www.indiana.edu/~aces](http://www.indiana.edu/~aces)

*Central Eurasian Studies Society* (CESS) hosted by The Havighurst Center, Miami University, Ohio: [www.cess.muohio.edu](http://www.cess.muohio.edu)

*Central Eurasian Studies Review*: Official bulletin of CESS: [www.cesr-cess.org](http://www.cesr-cess.org)

*Central Asian Survey*: Official journal of CESS.

*The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*: Journal of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program: [www.jspd.eu\cefq](http://www.jspd.eu\cefq)

[Central-Eurasia-L@lists.fas.harvard.edu](mailto:Central-Eurasia-L@lists.fas.harvard.edu) mailing list. (Send message w/ 'subscribe' in text for subscription.)

*Central Eurasian Studies World Wide*: [cesww.fas.harvard.edu](http://cesww.fas.harvard.edu)

## **General Resource Websites & Articles:**

Weston, David C. 1988. "Resources for Teaching About Inner Asia." Bloomington, IN: Social Studies Development Center. (See also by the same author, "Teaching about Inner Asia" at: [www.ericdigests.org/pre-9211/asia.htm](http://www.ericdigests.org/pre-9211/asia.htm)).

*Inner Asian and Uralic National Resource Center*: [www.indiana.edu/~iaunc/](http://www.indiana.edu/~iaunc/) Hosted by Department of Central Eurasian Studies, Indiana University, Bloomington. Probably the best single resource site available at present. Contains K-12 as well as other teaching resources "For Educators," including an "Investigating Central Asia Through Maps" resource produced by National Geographic Expeditions complete with lesson plans, etc, an online photo gallery, books and other loanable resources, related website links, etc.

SSRC Eurasia Program's *Online Histories of Central Asia* project: As per "a web-based resource for teaching materials and curriculum. The intended audience for this is mid- to upper-level university courses in World History, Asian History, or any other applicable course. The site contains a very rich and diverse content that can be used in whole or in part to enhance the curriculum of existing courses, or to help professors and lectures develop new courses. (Site to be launched in Fall 2008; no URL available at the time of writing this article. Contact Alisha Kirchoff: [kirchoff@ssrc.org](mailto:kirchoff@ssrc.org) or Thomas Asher: [asher@ssrc.org](mailto:asher@ssrc.org) at SSRC for further info.)

*Central and Inner Asian Studies*, University of Toronto: [www.utoronto.ca/cias/index.html](http://www.utoronto.ca/cias/index.html) Basic info on various nations and peoples in the area, including a small, but nice developing photo gallery

*UNESCO (Soviet) Central Asia*: [www.unesco.org/webworld/focus\\_central\\_asia/index.html](http://www.unesco.org/webworld/focus_central_asia/index.html)

*National Geographic "Central Asia"*: [travel.nationalgeographic.com/places/regions/region\\_centralasia.html](http://travel.nationalgeographic.com/places/regions/region_centralasia.html) Along with basic information on the region, contains maps and photos.

## **World News Focus on Contemporary Central Asia:**

[www.Eurasianet.org](http://www.eurasianet.org) – Along with each of the five former Soviet republics the site also covers Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Mongolia and Turkey, offering a "Daily Digest" of brief, paragraph-length summaries of news items for each country drawn from BBC, Interfax and RFE/RL. A wide array of materials are included under "Resource Links" covering Human Rights, Local Press, Maps, Stats & Info, Arts & Culture, Travel, Brief History, etc. Offers the *Eurasia Weekly Update* as a sign-up email list which can even be sent to handheld devices <http://www.eurasianet.org/palm.shtml>

[www.CentralAsiaStar.com](http://www.CentralAsiaStar.com) – Part of the *World News* network offering breaking news on broader Central Asia, including bordering (i.e. northern) areas of the Middle East. Contains multiple *World News* network links for specific regions and countries within the area, such as the Caspian Sea basin, Kazakhstan, etc.

*The Roberts Report on Central Asia and Kazakhstan*: <http://www.roberts-report.com> Offers up-to-date "analysis of the political economy of greater Central Asia" by an associate professor of international development at George Washington University who formerly served in the Democracy and Conflict Resolution department of the USAID office in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

## **Essential Resources w/ Specialized Focus on Central Eurasia in World History:**

Gronbech, Kaare. "The Steppe Region in World History." In *Acta Orientalia* XXIII. Oslo. 1958, pp 43-56. (Reprinted in C. Edmund Bosworth, ed. 2007. *The Turks in the Early Islamic World*. Burlington, VT and Aldershot, Hants, Great Britain: Ashgate Publishing Co., pp 1-14.) Aims to elucidate "not only the general geographical aspect of the steppe area and its climatic conditions, but also the special kind of material culture imposed on the population by those external conditions, and the peculiar political consequences of the nomadic way of life" which underly its place and role in world history (56).

McGovern, William Montgomery. "Central Asia in World History." In idem. [1939] 1965. *The Early Empires of Central Asia: a Study of the Scythians and the Huns and the Part They Played in World History, with Special Reference to the Chinese Sources*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, pp 1-26.

Christian, David. "Inner Eurasia as a Unit of World History." In *Journal of World History*, Vol 5, No 2, 1994, pp 173-211. (Available online at: [www.uhpress.hawaii.edu/journals/jwh/jwh052p173.pdf](http://www.uhpress.hawaii.edu/journals/jwh/jwh052p173.pdf)).

Frank, Andre Gunder. "The Centrality of Central Asia" (incl. "Comments on Andre Gunder Frank's *Centrality of Central Asia*" by S. Ballad, T. Bartfield, L. Krader and M. Haider and a final rejoinder by A.G. Frank). In *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, Vol 24, No 2, 1992, pp 50-82 and *Studies in History*, Vol 8, No 1, 1992, pp 43-97. (Also published in same year by Amsterdam: VU University Press.) Frank combines his reflections from this article on Central Asia with his reflections on China in a paper entitled "ReOrient: From the Centrality of Central Asia to China's Middle Kingdom," which appears in Korkut A. Erturk, ed., 1999, *Rethinking Central Asia: Non-Eurocentric Studies in History, Social Structure and Identity* (New York: Ithaca Press), pp 11-38.

Hall, Thomas. "Andre Gunder Frank and the Centrality of Central Asia Revisited: Past Lessons for Future Possibilities." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Montreal, Quebec, Canada (available online at: [www.allacademic.com/meta/p103033\\_index.html](http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p103033_index.html)). As per the abstract: "I argue that there is much more to be learned from the history of Central Asia that is germane to today's and tomorrow's struggles and, most significantly, [that] many of those lessons are and will continue to be useful in regions other than Central Asia."

Golden, Peter B. 1998. *Nomads and Sedentary Societies in Medieval Eurasia*. (M. Adas, ed. Essays on Global and Comparative History series). Washington D.C.: The American Historical Association, 1998. Both this and Liu immediately below constitute short booklets designed as teaching aids to help place these traditions in broader Eurasian and ultimately world historical perspective.

Liu, Xinru. 1998. *The Silk Road: Overland Trade and Cultural Interactions in Eurasia*. (M. Adas, ed. Essays on Global and Comparative History series). Washington D.C.: The American Historical Association. (See comments on Golden immediately above.)

Christian, David. "Silk Roads or Steppe Roads? The Silk Roads in World History." In *Journal of World History*, Vol. 11, No. 1(2000), 1-26. (Available online at: [www.learner.org/channel/courses/worldhistory/support/reading\\_9\\_3.pdf](http://www.learner.org/channel/courses/worldhistory/support/reading_9_3.pdf)).

Bregel, Yuri. 1980. "The Role of Central Asia in the History of the Muslim East." Institute of Asian and African Affairs, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. (Occasional Paper #20, February 1980, New York: Afghanistan Council, The Asia Society). A highly insightful work which, despite its lack of publicity as well as explicit reference to a larger world historical context, nonetheless places Central Asia within its broader Muslim eastern setting.

Canfield, Robert L. "Introduction: the Turk-Persian Tradition." In idem, ed. [1991] 2002. *Turko-Persia in Historical Perspective*. Cambridge University Press, pp 1-34. I include this reference because of its importance, concisely stated, for the historical development of 'the Turk-Persian Tradition' via dynamic interaction between the Central Asian and Middle Eastern worlds resulting, as it does, in a central shaping force within world history.

Gross, Jo-ann. "Approaches to the Problem of Identity Formation." In idem, ed. 1992. *Muslims in Central Asia: Expressions of Identity & Change*. Duke University Press, pp 1-23. Gross surpasses many others in her fair and balanced treatment of the various options in 'approaches to' this complex and highly debated, yet vital subject within Central Eurasian studies.

Togan, Isenbike. "In Search of an Approach to the History of Women in Central Asia." In K.A. Erturk, ed. 1999. *Rethinking Central Asia: Non-Eurocentric Studies in History, Social Structure and Identity*. New York: Ithaca Press, pp 163-95. Togan offers here important balance for gender studies in Central Eurasian history.

Adshead, Samuel A.M. 1993. *Central Asia in World History*. Palgrave Macmillan. According to McNeill and McNeill (*The Human Web*, Norton, 2003, p 332), Adshead's work is "provocatively idiosyncratic," but, whatever its deficiencies, it remains the only full-length work to-date attempting explicit treatment of Central Eurasia in world historical perspective. Adshead also authored *China in World History* (NY: St. Martin's, 1988), and *Tang China: the Rise of the East in World History* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

Findley, Carter V. 2005. *The Turks in World History*. Oxford University Press. Focused, quite obviously, on the 'Turkic' as well as 'Turkish' dimensions of Central Eurasia as opposed to the Mongolian, Persian or other aspects. But a justifiable approach which contributes significantly toward understanding the place and role of Central Eurasia in world history, even if the author does not keep his eye consistently upon the larger world historical context.

#### **Helpful Overviews of Central Asian History:**

Weller, R. Charles. "Overviews of Central Asian History": [www.ara-cahrc.com/CAHCRC/CA-History-overviews.pdf](http://www.ara-cahrc.com/CAHCRC/CA-History-overviews.pdf) Various brief chronological lists of political dynasties and religious movements spanning the entire sweep of Central Eurasian history.

Allworth, Edward, Gavin R.G. Hamblly and Denis Sinor. "Central Asia, history of ." In *Encyclopædia Britannica*. (23 p; also available from Encyclopædia Britannica Premium Service: [www.britannica.com/eb/article?tocId=9108340](http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?tocId=9108340)). Written by three notable authorities in Central Asian studies; a worthy and helpful, flowing overview which serves to supplement and provide continuity for the typically dissected and piecemeal narratives of world history texts.

"Introduction: Facts About the Region – History." In Noble, John, John King and Andrew Humphrey, eds. 1996. *Lonely Planet: Central Asia*. Sydney, Australia: Lonely Planet, pp 11-37. No doubt a popular treatment in which the authors lack expertise, but they appear to have done enough homework that the overview remains helpful as a brief, introductory survey set forth in singular, flowing fashion. It is especially useful when combined with the EB article above. (I herein reference only the 1996 edition of Lonely Planet as it is the only one I am familiar with.)

#### **Essential Standard References for Central Asian History:**

Sinor, Denis. 1997. *Inner Asia*. RoutledgeCurzon. (217 p) Probably the best single-volume reference available, though it'll cost you dearly! Painfully worth it, however, as Sinor is a long-time, undisputed expert in the field.

Grousset, René. [1939] 1970. *The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia*. Rutgers University Press. (717 p; 'The' classic reference in the field translated from French, though it is now dated and only covers down to the Chinese defeat of the Zhungars/Oirats and takeover of Manchuria, ca. 1760).

UNESCO *History of the Civilizations of Central Asia*. 1994-2002. 7 vols. The most in-depth treatment of Central Asian history by an international team comprising top scholars in their fields. See [www.unesco.org/culture/asia](http://www.unesco.org/culture/asia) for an overview of the entire project, including project description, profile of each volume with table of contents, sample online chapters, etc.

Thrower, James. 2004. *The Religious History of Central Asia from the Earliest Times to the Present Day*. Edwin Mellon Press. Together with Foltz below, provides focus on religious-cultural history, as opposed to the more commonly emphasized political, social and economic aspects.

#### **The 'Silk Road(s)':**

*Silk Road Seattle* project, hosted by University of Washington: <http://depts.washington.edu/silkroad> As per the website: "Silk Road Seattle is an ongoing public education project using the 'Silk Road' theme to explore cultural interaction across Eurasia from the beginning of the Common Era (A.D.) to the Seventeenth Century. Our principal goal is to provide via the Internet materials for learning and teaching about the Silk Road." Includes a very nice collection of historical texts.

[www.SilkRoadFoundation.org](http://www.SilkRoadFoundation.org) Along with basic information and study resources, offers a useful set of maps and a brief timeline.

Foltz, Richard C. 1999. *Religions of the Silk Road: Overland Trade and Cultural Exchange from Antiquity to the Fifteenth Century*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Wood, Frances. 2004. *The Silk Road: Two Thousand Years in the Heart of Asia*. University of California Press.

Liu, Xinru and Lynda Shaffer. 2007. *Connections Across Eurasia: Transportation, Communication and Cultural Exchange Along the Silk Road*. McGraw-Hill.

(See also X. Lui as well as D. Christian above under 'Essential Articles'.)

#### The Russian Expansion into and Interaction with Central Asia, 1500-1917:

Hopkirk, Peter. 1992. *The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia*. Kodansha International. Not strictly an academic study; a bit sensational as done by a former reporter of *The Times* newspaper in London, but based solidly upon historical fact, highly valuable for placing 19<sup>th</sup>-century Central Eurasia within its larger world historical context.

Bacon, Elizabeth E. [1966] 1980. *Central Asians Under Russian Rule: A Study in Culture Change*. Cornell University Press. A classic study on the subject.

Brower, Daniel R. and Edward J. Lazzerini, eds. 1997. *Russia's Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700-1917*. Indiana University Press. Both this and Geraci and Khodarkovsky immediately below are important collections of papers covering Tsarist Russia's key interactions with and varied approaches to relations with all the various peoples it encountered throughout most its course of imperial expansion. A significant amount of space is devoted in each one to peoples and realms lying within Central Eurasia.

Geraci, Robert P. and Michael Khodarkovsky, eds. 2001. *Of Religion and Empire: Missions, Conversion, and Tolerance in Tsarist Russia*. Cornell University Press. (See comments on Brower and Lazzerini immediately above.)

Yemelianova, Galina M. 2002. *Russia and Islam: A Historical Survey*. Palgrave Macmillan. An important study by an indigenous scholar.

#### Soviet Central Asia:

Rywkin, Michael. 1990. *Moscow's Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia*. Rev. ed. M.E. Sharpe.

na. 1984. *Soviet Central Asia, Continuity and Change*. (Papers from the conference at Oksbol, Denmark, Feb 16-17, 1984.) South Jutland University Press.

#### Post-Soviet Central Asia:

Atabaki, Touraj and John O'kane, eds. 1998. *Post-Soviet Central Asia*. Tauris & Co., Ltd.

Malik, Hafeez, ed. [1994] 1996. *Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects*. New York: St Martins Press.

Ahrari, Mohammed E. and James Beal. 2002. *The New Great Game in Muslim Central Asia*. University Press of the Pacific

Aminch, Mehdi Parvizi and Henk Houweling, eds. 2005. *Central Eurasia in Global Politics: Conflict, Security and Development*. Brill Academic Publications. A good study in tandem with Malik above.

<sup>1</sup> "Re-Orient: From the Centrality of Central Asia to China's Middle Kingdom." In K.A. Erturk, ed., 1999, *Rethinking Central Asia: Non-Eurocentric Studies in History, Social Structure and Identity*, Ithaca, p 12. (See 'Essential Resources' section above.)

<sup>2</sup> For a relevant response see esp. "Foundations of the Western Modernist View of Nations" in Ch 3 of Weller, 2006, *Rethinking Kazakh and Central Asian Nationhood: A Challenge to Prevailing Western Views* (Los Angeles: Asia Research Associates), pp 54-60.

## Teaching World History in an Indian Classroom

James Geddes

Woodstock School (*Uttarakhand, India*)

Standing in front of a class of 15 students at my new school, I thought I had achieved the teaching equivalent of nirvana, but I soon discovered it was more like Dante's 9<sup>th</sup> circle in the inferno...for both me and them.

I began the first class with my usual statements about history being someone's story and, like any story, everyone had their own version. Promising to try to not give them my slant on the story, I hand out the text for the year while further noting this was one particular take on history, but we would also look at different perspectives. I then took a moment to ask, "Are there questions about what we will do this year?" After what seemed a long period of silence, one student did raise their hand and very politely asked me "What does 'perspective' mean?"

Another then voiced "When do we work on revisions?" quickly followed by, "What do we need to take notes on in class?"

I answered the last question first. When I pointed out they should take notes on the important material during our discussions, lectures and/or activities, I looked out on a sea of glassy eyes, and blank faces until someone commented, "So you'll write everything we need to know on the board?" At that point our period came to an end and they dutifully filed out to their next class. This was not what I had expected from the students at this "Indian" school.

Coming to India had been prompted by two desires: one mine, one my

wife's. I greatly enjoy traveling and living in other places because for most of my life I lived only a few years in any one place. However, the most compelling reason was my wife's desire to return to and contribute to her alma mater – Woodstock School.

The school was originally founded in 1854 as the Protestant Girls School. Under the U.S. Presbyterian Church, it slowly evolved into a girls' finishing school. It did allow boys to attend classes up to the age of twelve-years-old. By the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, the school had become a women's college and teacher training institution. After World War I a new emphasis was placed on creating a co-educational kindergarten through high school institution for various missionaries' children. By the 1950's the school had developed a program which awarded its students the equivalent of a Senior Cambridge credential, or American high school diploma. It received U.S. accreditation from the Middle States Association of Colleges and Secondary School (MSA) in 1959, and has maintained that status ever since. When the missionary population declined in the 1970's Woodstock refocused toward becoming an international school which prepared students to be global citizens with a broad world view. To accomplish this the school became a college preparatory school offering the Cambridge International General Certificate of Secondary Education (IGCSE)<sup>1</sup> program in grades 9 and 10 and the American College Board Advanced Placement (AP)<sup>2</sup> program in grades 11 and 12. It also developed an Indian-style Mark Sheet<sup>3</sup> recognized as equivalent to the Indian School Certificate Examination by the Association of Indian Universities.<sup>4</sup> Proof of Woodstock's achieving its goal became evident when the MSA recognized Woodstock's outstanding educational program, international attributes, and global vision by awarding it the

distinction of being the second school to achieve status.

I was hired with the specific responsibility of instituting the Advanced Placement Program's World History course and teach the IGCSE history curriculum. Based on previous experience with AP students I arrived ready to engage students with in-depth discussions and invigorating seminars about the global community and various civilizations through the ages. I understood the IGCSE history curriculum a little but found it more than I expected, and more difficult to accomplish than my old California World History 10 classes. I did not feel daunted in the least by any of this. I thought I fully understood the Woodstock "student," being married to one.

However, after my first class' discourse I went straight to my department head. There I learned that since these students were primarily the products of 8 to 10 years of Indian education they expected only three things from me.

1. Write the questions on the board.
2. Write the specified answer for each question.
3. Continue to correct the errors on the re-writes until they were writing the exact same question and answer I had previously written on the board.

Teachers in the Indian school system expected only three things from their students: That they:

1. Take down what they wrote on the board.
2. Work quietly and ask no questions.
3. Be prompt and polite.

This was not what I envisioned. While I certainly expected them to be prompt and polite I did have a problem with the other two expectations of Indian teachers. My view of the teacher's role is to help students understand the subject, think through the material, and come to their own conclusions. I do not always write copious notes on the board, but key words or phrases I want students to reach for understanding and to make links between areas. It soon became apparent that questions and a certain level of noise was to be expected in a lively engaged classroom. So, the next class began with an outline of what I expected from them. I explained that in this history class there are no "wrong" answers, only positions that one cannot back up with historical facts to support a point of view.

My classes are built on the concept that students should be actively involved in their learning, they should ask questions, and come prepared to present arguments/ideas about the topic. To facilitate this, I needed to help them become familiar with new practices in reading, writing and studying. Prior to coming to class students were directed to read the assigned material, take notes on their own, prepare questions, and identify areas needing clarification. We would spend time in class reviewing their work and discussing materials in either groups, or as whole class.

Since reading is their primary information source, and they would be doing this on their own, we began with their textbooks. Comparing the textbook used in class with some of those I found in the local bookstore showed marked differences in the approach to presenting history. Students in Indian schools purchase their text books at the local book store. The books and in some cases the curriculum are approved by one of the following agencies: the India National Council for Education, Research, and Training (NCERT);<sup>5</sup> Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE);<sup>6</sup> or Council for Indian School Certificate Examinations (CISCE). In addition, each of the states and territories may approve additional texts for their locale. One Indian textbook assigned 10 pages to the Renaissance; my text devoted about 25 pages to it. Additionally, the books varied in size 5x7 inches for the Indian text versus 8 ½ x 11 inches for mine. The Indian textbooks also provided a short synopsis of events without dealing with social and political context.

Due to these text differences the students needed guidance. I wanted to help them prepare for the classes by showing different ways to take notes that benefited their understanding, but did not bog them down in copying copious paragraphs from the book. So the first few reading assignments took place in class, showing various methods for their note taking, understanding how to read and analyze sources, as well as how to use their notes as study guides. For taking notes the final decision about what format they

would use was left to them; however, notes would be checked each class and if I saw they were having difficulties, we would meet after school to work on one specific method for their use the rest of the course. This helped get everyone on task for class. We seemed to progress nicely until one student wanted to know if this would cover their mark sheet requirements. This new input had me running to the department head to find out what a "mark sheet" even was, let alone if the course met the requirements.

The Indian Mark Sheet lists the courses students should take if they want to apply to attend a college or university in India. It is set up by the NCERT, but, as noted earlier, each state decides what it will take from that to apply to their respective curriculum. The topic areas include, Mathematics, Science, Language, English, and (what I was concerned with) Social Studies.

The way the courses are arranged, students taking a IX, X, XI, or XII level course receives a smattering of Geography, Civics, and History, both Indian and World. I felt very safe on the aspects of geography and the histories, but not at all sure about the civics section. After looking at the related documents, this too, presented no problem. In the class there were discussions about various types of government and governing which would meet the needs for the student's mark sheet. In addition, the school made it a point to insure that someone familiar with the Indian system reviewed courses so they could meet the requirements.

As for the AP World course, the textbook's size was not the only obstacle. Most of the students in the AP World History class had come from years of schooling in an SAARC school system. In a mirror image of their Western counterparts, these Asian students were steeped in Asian focused history every year. They had spent hundreds of hours in school gleaning all the information about Asia's long history and historical viewpoints. They pointed out areas they felt misrepresented, treated too lightly, or completely overlooked in the textbooks I had. There were always declarations such as:

- "There needs to be more about the Dravidians."
- "What about Tipu Sultan, and the kingdom of Ayutthaya?"
- "The British never ruled Nepal or Bhutan!"
- "This isn't really what happened!"
- "There should be more about the different peoples of India"
- or
- "You forgot about the Parse's."

We took time to look at some of these areas, but also tried to decide the length of time needed if we were to consider fully every aspect of each period covered. I pointed out we did not spend a great deal of time on the American, French or Haitian Revolutions, but we did discuss revolutions. Therefore, how might we incorporate some of their ideas and knowledge in the overall picture developed in the class? It was pointed out that history is open to interpretation, and individuals may evaluate the material in light of their own knowledge. Most students concluded that it was acceptable to group material to make it fit within the framework, but when possible make a point to bring in other information to add to the course. I even tried to arrange some time during the class to expand beyond what the text had so they could demonstrate their knowledge, and I always acknowledged where I needed to become better acquainted with this historical material.

Now came the difficult part of accomplishing the scope and sequence of the course. The school's goal is to ensure students receive an educational experience that meets both regular high school and "college-level preparation" requirements. I also had to deal with the three-pronged skills problem: (1) new students needing to be able to read, understand, and discuss materials from the textbook, and other sources provided; (2) taking and effectively using notes to help them better prepare for class discussions and activities; and (3) leading students to think about the material. To accomplish this I adopted the Advanced Placement World History concepts of "habits of the mind"<sup>7</sup> that were not part of the student's normal pedagogy. These new concepts were brought in with the understanding that most of them would not feel competent to take the external end of course exam unless they really believed they knew the answers to the questions.

This presented quite a problem for some of the Asia students because they were used to a system where the final external exam was the "REAL"

test. In their Indian schools, they could take notes, or not. Study during the semester, or wait until just before the exam date and cram. One student even admitted to the fact that they usually slept in their Indian School classes. They could do this because under the Indian system their final course grade was weighted eighty percent on their external examination in the CBSE, or ISCE curriculum. When I explained the external examinations had no weight in their final course grade, they did not understand why it would not play a greater role in their grades. Explaining that this course was not so much a “fact and figures” cram session for a test, but a way to help them learn to think, analyze, and evaluate material has been a slow process with much discussion before they really “get it.”

If helping students read and understand the material proved challenging, then involving the students in discussions and thinking about interpreting the material took even more work than I expected. The students deferred from taking an active part in class, even when called upon. Their answers tended to be short, simple responses, almost echoing what they read, or wrote in their notes. Why? After reflecting on this for a day or two I realized the lack of response was the result of a double-whammy. First, most of them were English Language Learners, so they both felt uncomfortable expressing ideas in English, and their content vocabulary was fairly restricted. Another problem was the teacher. Without thinking about the groups I was dealing with I had continued to use my standard multi-syllabic vocabulary in lecturing, discussions and explanations of the subject. The students, being good products of their former systems did not question, or ask for clarifications. Some sat with their translation dictionaries trying to figure out the spelling so the word could be translated to their language; others just sat. Realizing I needed to address this challenge caused a change not only in what I would say, but how I phrased it. I also needed to give the students’ permission to openly challenge my vocabulary by asking for definitions they could understand. I found this not only helped the students, it also made me review my materials and simplify the verbiage. This did not mean any “dumbing down” of the subject, just clarifying the concepts and ideas in such a way the students were able to grasp the material and begin using it to formulate ideas and constructs about history and its implications relative to the events under consideration. I also found it helped me become a better instructor/guide because, if the students became active participants in class, this led to real opportunities for those “teaching moments” we all hope and pray for during the year.

When these moments happened I began to emphasize the idea of applying their knowledge about the topic to how they could interpret the events, people and interactions covered. I could now concentrate on really having the students use the material to think things through for a logical and provable theory of their own, as well as looking at others’ ideas in a critical manner. Once they were able to begin this I further pursued the critical thinking skills both the IGCSE and AP felt were needed to succeed in their respective examinations. This was one area the students consistently pushed throughout our time together. I tried to instill in them the idea of study for study and learning’s sake, but they were always focusing on the end of the year and “Would this be on the exam?”

Once I accepted that their driving force was the exam, I decided to change tactics somewhat. In Indian schools a student’s external examination counts for 80 percent of their final grade. While I do not and will not teach to an examination, I could in all honesty explain that the material covered was germane to the examination. I also explained I had no way of knowing the specifics about any of the external examinations they would take. It was also pointed out that the material we covered was part of the core subject matter put forward in both the IGCSE and AP course syllabi, so logically it should be on their examinations in some form. I also promised I would assist them in preparing for those tests by styling my own assessments after the respective test styles of their external examinations. Once they had taken one of my assessments and shown copies of the two external examinations, students gained confidence in their abilities and things began to move more smoothly. I made progress in the direction I really wanted to go; students began to “THINK!”

Using “Habits of the Mind” was one area I felt would develop over time. Especially since the material in the course, as well as in class, work,

would consistently bring these into use through questioning, short debates and the use of inner and outer circle practices. Here again I found myself facing some of the same problems as before, but this time with a new twist. Once they understood how their classes were organized, they wanted to limit the topics we would cover to only a few they believed would be on the external test. This was especially true for the IGCSE students because that external exam allows Indian students to answer questions from three specific time frames. They felt we should concentrate on just those three areas, and forget the rest of the history material in the course. While I understood their attitude, I pointed out the need to consider all the areas in the syllabi for its historical continuity, as well as the fact they would probably need this overarching view of the world in their next social studies course. I also hoped to instill in them an appreciation for history as a way of opening the world-at-large to them. To accomplish this I decided to take those AP World History “Habits of the Mind” and apply them to various historical times and places. To do this I focused on one of the seven habits at a time during the first half of the year, and always included the habit dealing with point of view. That particular aspect was constantly worked over and incorporated into every class activity because I want the students to firstly, evaluate and critique the point of view of the material they use. Secondly, they need to look at how they used this material to develop and promote their own point of view.

While the students initially felt uneasy either answering or asking questions without being personally identified, as time went on and they discovered their supported opinions were taken seriously, they began to become more actively involved. Later began to challenge each other to give reasons for their ideas. (Granted this is near the end of the 3<sup>rd</sup> quarter only a few weeks prior to the external exam, but they did it!) It also took time for them to begin to understand how these “habits” could not only aid them in becoming better students of history, but could also be applied to other areas of study as well.

By the end of the first year, I felt I had developed a methodology that would help both me and my students work in an interesting and enlivening atmosphere that promoted learning and thinking while delivering content which would enable them to feel confident about both what they learned and how to achieve on their external examination. I also feel the students appreciated these efforts since I have received feedback from them that pointed out:

It was really new and I never (had) encountered it (this learning style) before. In my previous school, it was not as same as Woodstock. I could just memorise (sic) everything just the day before the exam day and I could easily get full marks. I now realized it is not the right way to study (history).

Indian educational methodology and pedagogy are beginning to undergo changes. The government encourages colleges and universities to incorporate more cooperative learning strategies, instructional designs, and greater student interactions and participation within the class than had previously been used. This move will enable students coming to our school to more quickly integrate into the classroom environment and participate in an active and positive manner with their peers. It will also make for even more enjoyable and enlivened learning as both they and I continue to explore what and how we learn World History together.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> For more information on International General Certificate of Secondary Education (IGCSE) (taken in over 100 countries worldwide and internationally recognized as being equivalent to the GCSE in the United Kingdom) visit their website: [www.cie.org.uk/qualifications/academic/middlesec/igcse/recognition](http://www.cie.org.uk/qualifications/academic/middlesec/igcse/recognition).

<sup>2</sup> American College Board Advanced Placement program is a college level course taught in the secondary school. For more information visit their website: [apcentral.collegeboard.com/ap/public/courses/index.html](http://apcentral.collegeboard.com/ap/public/courses/index.html)

<sup>3</sup> Indian Mark Sheet is a form prepared by the school which shows how a Woodstock student meets the requirements to attend an Indian Secondary School beyond 10<sup>th</sup> grade, or an Indian University. See Sample at figure 1.

<sup>4</sup> Council for The Indian School Certificate Examinations (CISCE) is a nationally organized government related agency that ensures that the Cambridge examinations meet the needs of Indian schools. For information about the CICSE visit their website: [www.cisce.org/Index.asp](http://www.cisce.org/Index.asp)

<sup>5</sup> National Council for Education, Research, and Training (NCERT) is an advisory group set up by the Indian government to help both the national and state governments develop educational materials for both students and teacher training. More information is available at their website: [www.ncert.nic.in/index.htm](http://www.ncert.nic.in/index.htm)

<sup>6</sup> Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) was initially set up to monitor the quality and standard of education in institutions attended by students whose parents worked for the government. Its role and areas of responsibility have expanded since its inception. For more information visit their website: [cbse.nic.in/welcome.htm](http://cbse.nic.in/welcome.htm)

<sup>7</sup> Habits of the Mind is a term used in AP World History course description to explain what practices teachers will want to instill in their students as part of their study of History. More information is available at the AP World History Course Description site: [www.collegeboard.com/student/testing/ap/sub\\_worldhist.html](http://www.collegeboard.com/student/testing/ap/sub_worldhist.html)



## The Kushans in World History

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Despite the significant gains in inclusivity made by world history over recent decades, certain groups and processes are still largely absent from mainstream textbooks and courses. The earliest and arguably most significant ‘Silk Roads Era’ (c.50 BCE to 250 CE), for example, is often paid lip service only in text books, and key players in these cross cultural exchanges – particularly the powerful Kushan Empire – are inexplicably absent.<sup>1</sup> During the first two centuries of the Common Era the Kushans dominated the politics, culture and economy of a vast area of Inner Asia, stretching from north of the Amu Darya to the Ganges Basin, and from the Iranian plateau to the Tarim Basin. The powerful Kushan kings created stable conditions at the heart of Central Asia, allowing for the great flowering of trans-Eurasian mercantile and cultural exchange that occurred along the Silk Roads. With the bulk of trade between Rome and China passing through their territory (the ‘Crossroads of Asia’), the Kushans were one of the key powers of an era in which much of Afroeurasia was controlled by just four dynasties – those of the Han, the Romans, the Parthians and the Kushans. The intention of this brief paper is to alert world history teachers to the significance of the Kushans, and to provide a brief outline of their political history.

Despite their world historical significance, evidence for the Kushans remains problematic. They produced no body of literature, and only a few fragmentary inscriptions are known. Yet both the Yuezhi, a tribal confederation from which the Kushans were descended, and the Kushans themselves, are frequently mentioned in the literature of contiguous societies, including Chinese dynastic annals, Indian, Tibetan, Persian, Manichaean and Sogdian texts, Arabic histories and several

Greco-Roman sources, and it is from this often incidental evidence that much of their history has been reconstructed.

Few examples of Kushan monumental architecture have survived, although later Chinese sources attest to their construction of impressive palaces, Buddhist stupas and dynastic sanctuaries. During the twentieth century, archaeologists began to uncover evidence of major urban and irrigation development which occurred under the

Kushans. The most substantial evidence for the Kushans is numismatic. Kushan coins have been discovered in their

thousands throughout the extent of their territory. They provide evidence of early cultural influences on the embryonic empire; of military and political expansion; the genealogy of royal succession; religious and ideological beliefs; their economic domination of the region; and of the eventual dissolution of Kushan society in the third century CE. Numismatic evidence also facilitates the division of Kushan history into four distinct periods.<sup>2</sup>

**The Yuezhi/Tocharians** - The Kushans were descended from a tribal confederation known as the Yuezhi to the Chinese, and as the Tocharians to a number of others, because they probably spoke the Indo-European language of Tocharian. The identification of the Yuezhi as Tocharians is reinforced by the fact that the second century CE Greek geographer Ptolemy lists five separate Tocharian variant groups, situated at different places and with different spellings, at locations across Central Asia. These ‘peoples’ are clearly identifiable with Han Chinese accounts of the route that the Yuezhi followed during their migration to Bactria between 162 and 130 BCE. The ancestors of the Yuezhi were Indo-European pastoral nomads who migrated eastwards during the Bronze Ages and settled eventually in the Gansu Corridor and Tarim Basin of western China.<sup>3</sup>

The Yuezhi/Tocharians are mentioned in Zhou Dynasty Chinese texts where they are named as tribute bearers and wealthy suppliers of jade and steppe ponies to the Zhou Court. Centuries later, Early Han historians describe the Yuezhi as the most powerful of several groups dwelling along the northwestern borders of China. In 162 BCE however, the Yuezhi were crushingly defeated by their enemies the Xiongnu near Dunhuang, and were forced to move away from the Gansu in what became a thirty-year migration. The various tribes that constituted the Yuezhi confederation eventually concluded their ‘long march’ in northern Bactria (present-day southern Uzbekistan), settling in river valleys just to the north of the Amu Darya in about 130 BCE. The Yuezhi migration had a significant impact on the wider geo-politics of Central Asia. As they moved into regions already occupied by pastoral-

*During the first two centuries of the Common Era the Kushans dominated the politics, culture and economy of a vast area of Inner Asia, stretching from north of the Amu Darya to the Ganges Basin, and from the Iranian plateau to the Tarim Basin.*

ists or agriculturists they set in motion a domino effect, and various groups of Sakas (or Scythians) in particular were uprooted and forced to undertake their own substantial migrations. Some headed south and settled in Kashmir, while others eventually moved into the Upper Indus and Punjab. Here they established a series of powerful Saka or Shaka Kingdoms that were so important to early Indian history that an entire era was dated from their formation (the *Shaka Era* of 78 CE).

Of even greater significance to world history is the fact that the migration of the Yuezhi was directly responsible for the opening up of extensive Silk Roads trade and trans-Eurasian cultural interaction. In 138 BCE the Han emperor Wudi (140-87 BCE) sent his envoy Zhang Qian to follow the Yuezhi in an attempt to form an alliance against the Xiongnu (who were now so powerful they were causing enormous problems for the Chinese). Although Zhang Qian, after an epic 13-year journey that included a decade as captive of the Xiongnu, was ultimately unsuccessful in eliciting support from the now happily-resettled Yuezhi, the information he brought back to the Han court persuaded Wudi to adopt an aggressive, expansionist policy that led eventually to the incorporation of much of Central Asia into the Han Empire by the early first century BCE. This in turn brought Han commercial interests into contact for the first time with the traders of India, Parthia, and eventually Rome.<sup>4</sup>

Perhaps in c.80 BCE the Yuezhi left their strongholds in northern Bactria, crossed the Amu Darya and occupied present-day Afghanistan. At about the same time they divided into five tribal sub-divisions called *yabghu* which each occupied strategic regions of Bactria. In 45 CE, a prince of one of the *yabghu* (Kujula Kadphises of the *Guishuang* - hence ‘Kushan’ - *yabghu*) reunited the tribes into one powerful confederation and began to build the Kushan Empire. Archaeologists have uncovered evidence of increased architectural and irrigational development during this period, particularly in southern Uzbekistan and northern Afghanistan. Urban sites such as Kampyr Tepe on the northern bank of the Amu Darya, Payonkurgan near the major Termez to Samarkand road, and particularly the palace at Khalchayan in the upper Surkhan Darya, all provide evidence of Yuezhi/Kushan subjugation of the region.

**The Early Kushan Kings** - The career of Kujula Kadphises (c.45-85 CE), first king of the Kushans, is described in the Annals of the Later Han Dynasty, the *Hou Hanshu*. In a response to the occupation of the Kabul Valley by the Indo-Parthian ruler Gondophares (r. 20-46 CE), Kujula led Kushan forces over the Hindu Kush, conquer-

ing the Kabul Valley, then Kashmir, Peshawar and the Swat Valley. The *Hou Hanshu* reports that Kujula died 'aged over 80', and was succeeded by his son who continued his father's policy and conquered much of northwestern India. Kujula Kadphises described himself on his coins as *Maharaja Rajarajasa Devaputra Kujula Kara Kadphises*, or 'Great King of Kings. Son of Divine Being. King Kujula Kadphises'.

Kujula was a contemporary of several Roman Emperors, and numismatic evidence demonstrates Roman influence on early Kushan coinage. One series of copper tetradrachms issued by Kujula display an obverse bust closely modeled on that of Emperor Augustus, with a curule chair on the reverse. This suggests that by as early as the mid-first century CE the Romans were already involved in the silk and luxuries trade with India, Central Asia and China, along both the sea routes from Alexandria to Barygaza or Arikamedu (as described in the first century CE sailors handbook, the *Periplus of the Erythrian Sea*), and the overland 'Silk Roads' through Parthia, Central Asia and into western China. The Kushans, with a substantial empire straddling most of the major east-west and north-south trade routes, were ideally positioned to benefit from the trade. In 77 CE, Pliny the Elder, in a speech to the Roman Senate, provided evidence of the financial extent of that trade: 'And by the lowest reckoning, India, China and Arabia take from our Empire 100 million sesterces (roughly 10 million gold aurei) every year. That is the sum which our women and our luxuries cost us!'<sup>5</sup>

Kujula and his successors were in turn exerting Kushan influence on the western borders of the now greatly expanded Han Empire. In 32 CE the Han appointed General Ban Zhao to the position of Protector General of the Western regions, in response to repeated Xiongnu incursions. Ban Zhao may have sought Kushan assistance during the latter part of Kujula's reign, and may even have permitted the Kushans to exercise economic control over Kashgar and other Tarim Basin states. In 88 CE, however, the Kushans attempted to send an envoy to the Han court at Xian, proposing a formal alliance and seeking the hand of a Han princess. Ban Zhao, apparently affronted by the 'barbarians' impudence, refused to allow the envoy passage through the Tarim to China. In response, in the year 90 the Kushans sent a force of 70,000 archer warriors across the Pamirs to attack Ban Zhao. The Kushan forces, exhausted by the difficult crossing and by the policy of Ban Zhao which effectively denied them supplies, were eventually forced to withdraw without offering battle.

Kujula was succeeded by his son Vima Taktu (c.85-100 CE) and grandson Vima Kadphises (c.100-127). The *Hou Hanshu* names only Vima Kadphises as Kujula's successor, but the existence of a third member of the dynasty had long been suspected. The identification of King Vima Taktu is the result of an extraordinary discovery made in war-torn Afghanistan in 1993.

At a site known as the Kafir's Castle in Rabatak, local people dug up a stone inscription in Bactrian script, in the name of Kanishka. Kanishka is the successor of Vima Kadphises, the first of the so-called 'Great Kushans', and one of the most important monarchs in the history of ancient Central Asia. The inscription refers to the first year of Kanishka's reign, and names the genealogy of his royal line as Kujula Kadphises (great grandfather); Vima Taktu (grandfather); and Vima Kadphises (father).<sup>6</sup>

Kujula Kadphises and his son Vima Taktu (c.85-100 CE), issued coins largely based on the Greek monetary practices already in place in Bactria and northern India. With the accession of Vima Kadphises however, Kushan coins began to take on their own distinctive character. Vima Kadphises not only minted the first gold issues, but also started the practice of engraving an image of the king on the obverse, and a deity on the reverse. The gold used in the extensive gold coinage of Vima Kadphises and his successors might well have come from the millions of gold Roman coins which Pliny had indirectly lamented were disappearing into Central Asia. The Kushans would have collected substantial numbers of Roman gold coins (perhaps through their role as middlemen in the lucrative silk and luxuries trade) and re-minted them as the Kushan gold issues.

Since the 1950s a number of inscriptive fragments have been discovered throughout Kushan territory, many of them using the so-called 'Bactrian Script'. This script utilizes the Kharosthi alphabet, but expressed in Greek letters, and the actual language is perhaps a Sakan variant that may have been spoken by the Kushans. In what is thus a quintessential example of linguistic syncretism, the Kushans (whose ancestors spoke the Indo-European *centum* branch language of Tocharian), appear to have adopted a Sakan dialect, expressed it in a Kharosthi alphabetical and grammatical structure, and then inscribed it in Greek characters!<sup>7</sup>

**The Great Kushans -** With the accession of Kanishka (c.127-153 CE), Kushan history entered its third and most significant phase, that of the 'Great Kushans'. Kanishka introduced a new dating system, engraving his coins and inscriptions from the 'Year 1' of a new 'Kanishkan Era'. This had led scholars to conclude that Kanishka was the founder of a new dynasty, but the Rabatak inscription shows that his reign represented a continuance of the genealogical line begun by Kujula Kadphises. A genealogical link can also be demonstrated between Kanishka and his successors, down to at least the second quarter of the third century CE, which means that the Kushan family dynasty established by Kujula was able to provide stable hereditary rule for about two centuries. Kanishka presided over a huge, wealthy, multicultural and relatively peaceful empire in an era that might well be termed 'the Golden Age' of ancient

Central Asia.

Kanishka and his successors, Vasishka, Huvishka and Vasudeva, continued to issue the standard range of copper and gold coins established by Vima. The remarkable weight consistency maintained by the Kushan minters is further evidence of stability and strong central government. The coins, which depict Iranian, Greek and Indian deities, suggest a tolerant and broadminded approach to religion, although the overwhelming preponderance is of gods from the Zoroastrian pantheon. The standard Kanishkan obverse royal portrait is commonly the king sacrificing over a small Zoroastrian fire-altar, indicating the centrality of Iranian spirituality to the 'Great Kushan' monarchs.<sup>8</sup>

Yet Kanishka is also recognized as a great patron of Buddhism, and the depiction of the Buddha and Bodhisattvas on some of his gold and copper coins is amongst the first ever physical representation of the Buddha. Kanishka is venerated in Buddhist tradition for having convened a great Buddhist Council in Kashmir which, we read in the account of seventh century Chinese Buddhist pilgrim Xuanzang, was responsible for the composition of '300,000 stanzas, 660,000 words (syllables) which completely explain the three Pitakas ... The great meaning of the scriptures has once more become clear, and the subtle worlds have again been elucidated'. Xuanzang claims that Kanishka had these new scriptures transcribed on copper plates, which were in turn housed in stone coffers and deposited inside a tremendous stupa over 400 feet high. This new Sanskrit version of the Sutras was at least partly responsible for a great surge in the popularity of Mahayana (or 'Great Vehicle') Buddhism, which was then carried across Central and East Asia by pilgrims using the Silk Roads.<sup>9</sup>

In addition to demonstrating a syncretic approach to coinage, language, and religion, the Great Kushans were extensive collectors of a wide range of Eurasian art.

Excavations of the royal palaces at Kapisa (near Bagram in Afghanistan) and Taxila (near Rawalpindi in Pakistan) have unearthed an array of art objects collected by the Kushan monarchs. In addition, the discovery of two merchant warehouses at Bagram stocked with high value objects including Roman bronze and glassware, gold jewelry, carved bone and ivory figures from India, and Chinese lacquer goods, demonstrates the volume and wealth of art exchanges taking place along the Silk Roads under Kushan patronage.

The 'Great Kushan' kings were also patrons of important indigenous art schools, sponsoring major workshops in Gandhara and Mathura. The output of these schools not only reflected a cultural synthesis almost unique in art history, but also profoundly influenced the subsequent development of Asian art. The religious and secular sculpture of both Gandhara and Mathura was created by the combined talents of Bactrian, Indian and Greek artists who placed themselves at the

service of a resurgent Buddhist spirituality, and created for it a whole new iconography. The physical representation of the Buddha and Bodhisattvas which resulted – a synthesis of Bactrian, Iranian, Indian and Hellenistic cultural influences – then spread along the trade routes, penetrating India as far south as Sri Lanka, and through China into Japan, Korea and South East Asia.

**The Later Kushans and Conclusion** – Following the death of the last of the ‘Great Kushans’, Vasudeva in c. 225, the Kushan Empire entered a period of decline. The new and formidable power of Parthia, Ardashir, led his Sasanian forces into Kushan territory soon after 226 CE. By 262 Begram and Taxila had been destroyed, and the northwestern areas of the former Kushan Empire incorporated into the Sasanian state of *Kushanshar*. Vasudeva’s successor sent an embassy to the Chinese Wei Court in 230, seeking an alliance against the Sasanians, but to no avail. Kushan coinage of the new *Kushanshar* province merged with the gold scyphate dinars of the Sasanians to become the influential Kushano-Sasanian issues. Sasanian kings emphasized the Kushan connection by using Bactrian-script to proclaim themselves as *Kushan Shah*, or ‘King of the Kushans’.

In India, the rise of small but powerful states undermined Kushan power, although Mathura may have remained under Kushan control until c. 285 CE. The cultural development of these states was also strongly influenced by their Kushan heritage. The Yaudheyas issued coins which directly copied the copper denominations of Huvishka, while the Western Satraps issued a long series of Kushan-influenced silver drachmae. The extensive gold coinage of the Guptas themselves, who emerged under Chandragupta to fill the political vacuum formed in northern India following Kushan disintegration, was also influenced by the Kushans. Furthermore, an inscription from Allahabad dated c.335 CE, which lists foreign kings who paid tribute to the Guptas, uses Kushan titles to describe the Gupta rulers – ‘Descendant of the Son of Heaven’; ‘King of Kings’ – indicating not only the possibility of continuing contact between the Guptas and Kushan remnants, but equally the pervasive legacy of the Kushans in India.

Thus, while the disintegration of the great Kushan Empire occurred quite quickly, and might have brought to an end the ‘Golden Age’ of ancient Central Asia, the cultural, political and economic achievements of the Kushans continued to influence their regional successors for cen-

turies. The evidence for the Kushans might be sparse and inconclusive, but is, I would suggest, sufficient to demonstrate the significance and cultural legacy of an extraordinary civilization that dominated Central Asia for some two hundred years, and which influenced the world around it more than any other people before the rise of Islam. For this reason alone the Kushan Empire needs to find a place in all world history courses and text books that are genuinely committed to understanding the extraordinary levels of trans-Eurasian cultural exchange that occurred during the first two centuries of the Common Era, a period of global historical significance that could, with some justification, be called ‘the Kushan Era’.

#### ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Exceptions to this rule are David Christian’s *A History of Russia, Central Asia and Mongolia vol. I. Inner Eurasia from Prehistory to the Mongol Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); and more recently Xinru Liu and Lynda Shaffer’s *Connections Across Eurasia. Transportation, Communication and Cultural Exchange on the Silk Roads* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2007).

<sup>2</sup> Two brief, general introductions to Kushan history are A.K. Narain’s “Indo-Europeans in Inner Asia”. In *The Cambridge History of Inner Asia*, edited by D. Sinor. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990; reprinted 1994); and Craig Benjamin’s “An Introduction to Kushan Research”. In *Worlds of the Silk Roads: Ancient and Modern*, edited by David Christian and Craig Benjamin (Silk Roads Studies Series II – Turnhout: Brepols 1998) 31-50.

<sup>3</sup> See Craig Benjamin, *The Yuezhi. Origin, Migration and the Conquest of Northern Bactria*. (Silk Roads Studies Series vol. XIV – Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols 2007).

<sup>4</sup> See Craig Benjamin, ‘Hungry for Han Goods? Zhang Qian and the Origins of the Silk Roads’, in Gervers, M. and Long, G., *Toronto Studies in Central and Inner Asia* vol. VIII (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007) 3-30; also Xinru Liu, *Ancient India and Ancient China, Trade and Religious Exchanges AD1-600*. (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988).

<sup>5</sup> See Benjamin 1988

<sup>6</sup> N. Sims-Williams and J. Cribb, “A New Inscription of Kanishka the Great”, *Silk Roads Art and Archaeology* 4. (1995/6) 75-142.

<sup>7</sup> See N. Sims-Williams. *New Light on Ancient Afghanistan. The Decipherment of Bactrian*. (London: SOAS, University of London, 1997) 4-5.


<sup>8</sup> For an excellent general introduction to Kushan coinage and divine images, see E. Errington et al. eds., *The Crossroads of Asia. Transformation in Image and Symbol in the Art of Ancient Afghanistan and Pakistan*. (London: The Ancient India and Iran Trust, 1992).

<sup>9</sup> Errington et al.



The Southeast World History Association (SEWHA), a regional affiliate of the World History Association, invites submissions for its Twenty-first Annual Conference at Roanoke College (Salem, VA) from 29 to 31 October, 2009. The conference organizers welcome proposals that connect world history research and teaching, as well as focused paper topics dealing with world history themes or pedagogical issues.

The deadline for submissions is 1 July 2009. Proposals are welcome from educators and students of world history at all levels and should not exceed 250 words. Complete panel proposals are especially welcome. Include contact information on the proposal. Submit proposals electronically to [chill@hamilton.edu](mailto:chill@hamilton.edu) or in hard copy to Dr. Christopher Hill, Department of History, Hamilton College, 198 College Hill Road Clinton, NY 13323. For additional information regarding the conference contact Dr. Robert Willingham at [willingham@roanoke.edu](mailto:willingham@roanoke.edu), or at 540.375.2422.



**CALL FOR CONTRIBUTORS:** The *World History Bulletin* is seeking quality essays for Volume XXV Number 2 (Fall 2009). The theme for the Issue will be Eastern Europe in World History, with David Krueger and Alexander Mirkovic serving as Guest Editors. Deadline for submissions is 15 September 2009, and submissions should be sent to [mtarver@atu.edu](mailto:mtarver@atu.edu). See <http://www.thewha.org/WHB.pdf> for essay guidelines. **Lesson plans are especially welcomed.**

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# *An Update on the World History Association's 18th Annual Conference*

## *Salem, Massachusetts, 25-28 June 2009*

Plans for the 18th Annual World History Association (WHA) Conference, 25-28 June 2009 ("Merchants and Missionaries: Trade and Religion in World History") have progressed far since last report, with a number of local civic, academic, and historical organizations joining in making this a conference not to be missed or forgotten. To find out more about the cultural attractions of Essex County, see [www.essexheritage.org](http://www.essexheritage.org).

The Mayor of Salem, Massachusetts, Kim Driscoll, plans to declare the week that the WHA meets in her city as "World History Week," and she is further planning a special "Taste of Salem" reception for the conferees. To learn more about Salem go to [www.salem.org](http://www.salem.org).

Dr. Emily Murphy of the National Park Service's Salem National Maritime Historic Site is planning to lead special guided tours of sites of world historical significance for conferees and their families for nominal fees of \$5 per person, and if there is sufficient interest, she plans to organize at no cost to participants, a Junior Ranger Program for conferees' grade-school age children, in which they will learn about life before the mast on Salem's sailing ships and receive a Junior Ranger badge. This experiential program is something that every child will enjoy. To learn more about the Salem National Maritime Historic Site, go to [www.nps.gov/sama/](http://www.nps.gov/sama/).

An optional Thursday tour by bus from Salem to the Charlestown Naval Yard (in the shadow of Bunker Hill) to visit the 1797 frigate USS Constitution at Charlestown Naval Yard (see [www.ussconstitution.navy.mil](http://www.ussconstitution.navy.mil)) will be underwritten by the Salem State College's Alumni Association and is open to the first 45 to sign up. The WHA will soon put up on its web site a sign-up sheet. Conferees who participate in this free program will receive a special guided tour of the ship, visiting areas normally closed to the public. Leading the tour and also offering a lecture on "Old Ironsides's Role in World History" will be Dr. Margherita Desy, official historian of the ship.

A number of local organizations have offered their sites as conference venues. The world-famous Peabody Essex Museum, the USA's first world history museum, with roots going back to 1799, offers free admission to everyone with a WHA conference badge—a saving of \$15 per person. Moreover, PEM has offered the WHA free use of one of its galleries as a site for a pair of afternoon sessions. Go to [www.pem.org](http://www.pem.org) for a virtual tour of this extraordinary maritime museum.

Also offering their facilities are the House of the Seven Gables, Endicott College, with a spectacular sea-side location, and the Salem Athenaeum (1810), on picturesque Essex Street. It and nearby Chestnut Street are famous for their colonial and early Federal-style buildings, making them two of the most beautiful streets in America. The WHA hopes to provide optional architectural tours of both streets.

Among the many activities planned for the conference is a screening of a locally made documentary, "Traces of the Trade: A Story from the Deep North," which studies the effects of slavery on the North Shore, as part of a proposed world history film series.

The conference exhibition promises to be the largest and best ever. A large number of publishers and other exhibitors have expressed a desire to participate in the conference. Several have already pledged patronage of receptions and refreshment breaks.

Salem State is planning to hold, in conjunction with the conference, a five-day AP World History Institute and a five-day graduate-level summer seminar on world history. The latter will include a special one-day workshop for teachers on the transit of religions along the Silk Road led by Professor Morris Rossabi of Columbia University, a distinguished authority in the field and someone dedicated to teacher training and superior secondary school history education. Further information on these two educational opportunities will appear soon.

As suggested above, the WHA is highlighting this as an opportunity for a family vacation. Unhappily, the Red Sox will not be in town, but one can still visit Fenway Park for a tour of America's most beloved baseball park and its Green Monstah. Fast ferries connect Salem with nearby Boston. There is also a fast and inexpensive train service between Salem and Boston's North Station. The Italian North End, the Freedom Trail, Quincy Market and Faneuil Hall, Frederick Law Olmstead's Emerald Belt, the Boston Garden's Swan Boats and "Make Way for Ducklings," the Museum of Fine Arts and the nearby Gardner Museum, which is housed in a Venetian-style palazzo, Newbury Street (Boston's Soho), nearby Harvard Square (easily and inexpensively reached from Boston on the Red Line train): These are only a few reasons to travel to Boston from Salem, but look at [www.boston.com](http://www.boston.com) for more. And have we mentioned such important sites along the North Shore as the Lowell Industrial Historic Park, dedicated to preserving the history of the US's industrial revolution, and the Saugus Iron Works National Historical Site? In fact, 25 National Historical Parks and Sites are within easy commuting of Salem. Then there are the great seafood restaurants along the North Shore featuring lobster, clams, and a wide variety of nature's oceanic bounty. Conference tote bags will contain plenty of suggestions where conferees can dine al fresco and well along a rugged sea shore. Well, one restaurant is worth mentioning: A special local favorite is the Barnacle Restaurant in nearby Marblehead, where the clam "chowdah" is fantastic and the ocean view spectacular.

World History scholars will want to plan extended visits in order to take advantage of the rich academic resources of the area. Harvard University's holdings and museums are incomparable. Of particular relevance to this conference is Harvard's Sackler Museum, which houses Buddhist treasures carried off from Dunhuang in 1924 by Langdon Warner, a dashing and highly controversial Indiana Jones prototype. Boston College, Boston University, MIT, the Academy of Arts and Science, the Massachusetts Historical Society, the Peabody Essex Museum's Phillips Library, and a host of other archival sites are also easily accessible.

On-line conference registration, as well as a down-loadable poster and a brochure and information regarding accommodations, are available on the WHA home page at [www.thewha.org](http://www.thewha.org). Every effort has been made to keep the conference fee for WHA members as affordable as possible. By the time this issue of the *Bulletin* arrives, pre-registration (and its discounted rates) will have ended. Regular and On-Site registration is still available for both members and nonmembers. Please note that nonmembers pay a surcharge of \$65 for registration. This is only equitable in that WHA members bear the brunt of conference overhead expenses through their dues (which range from \$30 to \$60 annually). Moreover, the surcharge acts as an inducement for nonmembers to join the WHA. The \$50 conference fee charged students, whether they are members or not, is well below the cost of supporting each of these conferees, but they are the future of world history studies, and the conference must be made affordable for them.

Conferees are also encouraged to reserve early the limited number of conference hotel rooms, which are being offered at considerably reduced rates. Conferees bringing families and those desiring business-level amenities should consider the nearby Peabody Marriott, located about 3 miles away from Salem, which will necessitate an automobile.

# BOOK REVIEWS

Peter Dykema  
Book Review Coordinator

**Spencer C. Tucker and Priscilla M. Roberts, eds.** *Encyclopedia of the Cold War*. 5 vols. ABC-CLIO, 2008. xxviii + 1969 pp. \$495.

**Jason M. Brown**  
Arkansas Tech University

Dr. Spencer C. Tucker, a prolific editor of military-history encyclopedias, recently completed yet another, this time addressing the Cold War. It contains a staggering 1969 pages, with 1300 entries in the first four volumes and nearly 200 primary source documents in the fifth (the latter being edited by Dr. Priscilla M. Roberts). The three introductory essays are highly recommended, especially the one containing the personal remembrances of John S. D. Eisenhower, although Tucker's "Origins" and "Course" of the Cold War essays – as well as many of the entries – are in content and sympathy on the American side. While this content bias will dissatisfy those preferring a more balanced, global perspective, those wishing to view the conflict through Western eyes can expect untold benefit from this encyclopedia.

The individual entries are generally well-written and informative, although the careful reader will note that the better ones were almost all authored by Dr. Tucker, Associate Editor Dr. Paul G. Pierpaoli and the three Assistant Editors. Overlap is kept to minimum, with entries usually keeping well to the topic at hand. The encyclopedia's strength follows its editor's expertise, featuring extensive, detailed coverage of warfare, biography, diplomacy, and national histories.

Other areas were rendered less successfully. The coverage of popular culture suffers from its subject's breadth: while "Film" is a fantastic survey, "Music" lacks organization and focus. The technical entries rely too heavily on acronyms and specialized terms for the introductory reader to follow, with "Small Arms," "Machine Guns," and "Tanks" being the worst offenders in this regard. Difficult intellectual topics like "Human Rights" and "Nationalism" tend to be impenetrable due to the obtuse definitions that began these articles, which had the effect of confusing all subsequent discussion.

An encyclopedia should be objective and without error, especially if designed for readers with minimal background knowledge. Thankfully, errors in this work are scarce and, even when they appear, are limited to mere oversights, with the exception of the "McCarthy Hearings," which states that the United States

Supreme Court "changed the law" to protect future congressional committee witnesses when that body did not and cannot perform such an action. Of more concern is the editorializing that frequently seeps into the entries. While the authors went to great lengths to present traditional villains as moderately as possible, they did not always extend the same balance to the traditional heroes. Moralizing by adjective appears most often, as when the United States military "shamefully" covered up the My Lai Massacre in Vietnam. Word choice is also allowed to color events unnecessarily, as in "Refugee," when the United States is said to "violate international norms" by accepting political but not economic refugees, even though no such norms were established in either the phrase's context or – to this reviewer's knowledge – contemporary international affairs.

This encyclopedia shines as a reference for students. The fourth volume includes a glossary, chronology, and military rank comparison chart, guiding the introductory scholar by organizing the forty-year conflict and clarifying uncommon terms and acronyms. The "See Also" lists following each entry are quite thorough; although because no connections are made between the Documents volume and the other four outside the index, one could read the Kitchen Debate entry and never know that there was a transcript available. The black and white maps, while far from attractive, are suitable for transparencies and photocopied handouts. The inclusion of a complete list of entries, all of the maps and the index in each of the four regular volumes makes this encyclopedia perfect for group projects, as students can search the contents of other volumes without having them on hand. English-only speakers should be forewarned, however, that no pronunciation guides appear in this work, a shocking omission given the number of non-English words and letters that appear therein. Although the encyclopedia's price potentially limits it to the library bookshelf, its exhaustive coverage of the Cold War from the American perspective makes this a praiseworthy resource for any high-school history class, university student, or casual reader.

**David Day.** *Conquest: How Societies Overwhelm Others*. Oxford University Press, 2008. 237 pp. \$24.94.

**Georgena Duncan**  
Arkansas Tech University

*Conquest* deals with the most constantly recurring factor in history, which is a relentless march of peoples, often colliding and quarrelling over possession of land and assets. Certainly the pattern of movement is not unique to modern history, but stretches back before recorded time, and probably back into species history itself. David Day is concerned with modern conquest history, emphasizing the sixteenth century onwards, covering the European explosion into North and South America and across the Pacific into the Pacific Rim. The early chapters cover the process of staking, or more simply announcing, claims, putting claims on maps, and naming geographic features. In this early stage conquest is a rather bloodless affair expressing serious intents, but providing somewhat comic footnotes. The mid-section of *Conquest* concerns the next stage, in providing government, pushing aside the savages, and defense of the claimed territory. The last part of the book, concerning foundation stories, claiming land for agriculture, peopling the claimed lands, and pushing aside or annihilating the original inhabitants is the most gripping. This is when conquest becomes an actual bloody reality on the ground.

Day uses three conquest examples at length in each of these sections: Australian/Aboriginal, Japanese/Ainu, and United States/Native American. Other conquest patterns in Turkey, Greece, China, Indonesia, and more limited areas of Africa, are also used as examples. One of Day's more unique recurring comparisons is stripping much of Nazi ideology away and viewing the eastern expansion of the Third Reich into Poland and Russia as a part of the usual rituals of western conquest. This produces a rather unsettling similarity to other less ideological-driven conquests. Also compared is the Israeli conquest of modern-day Israel. Although Israel has several unique features, Israeli claiming, foundation stories, and interaction with Arab Palestinians settles quite easily into modern-day conquest patterns. In these two latter instances ideology and religion play a lesser role than would be expected in actual conquest patterns, although the outcomes are greatly influenced by ideology in the case of the Nazis and religion in the case of the Israelis. No other nation has been so ideologically and industrially systematic about destroying conquered peoples as was Nazi Germany. No other nation has worked so hard in reasserting a two thousand year old claim as the Israelis.

As any student of conquests would realize, the fate of the resident "natives" of newly conquered lands is never pleasant. Day's chapter on this is simply called "The Genocidal Imperative." Historically, being overrun by a conquering peo-



ple ensures not only displacement, loss of land and wealth, but also, in the end, life. While conquerors may not begin the process with a conscious process of annihilation, time and circumstances usually bring at least an on-the-ground attempt to annihilate the "natives." One weakness of Day's argument in looking at this process in the modern period is failing to distinguish between successful conquests which literally repopulated the desired area, and conquests which imposed only control over the ruled people. The so-called "first" empires of the Spanish, English, French, and Portuguese encountered new lands which were not densely populated. Modern estimates raising Native American population numbers fail to show a population density comparable to Africa or Asia. Disease, labor conditions, and war further thinned these populations which allowed incoming peoples to claim the land. This applies whether the researcher is looking at the Aborigines, Ainu or Native Americans, populations which were effectively thinned and overrun. In looking at later conquests in India and Africa, or the continuing difficulties in the Balkans, Middle East, and Asia, the conquest is not so clear. These were densely populated areas where the conquering force essentially formed a minority population devoted primarily to government and armed defense, with only a little agricultural or family-type settlement. These conquests have largely been swept away in Africa, India, and Asia, although not without economic and genocidal consequences.

It is these densely populated lands, however, which will make an interesting study. The impact of conquest/imperialism on Africa and Asia is still playing out. Certainly the modern movement of people flowing in to meet economic needs caused by declining European birthrates, and the movement of Asian and Muslim peoples into the western world will play out very differently from the formalized patterns which Day's study emphasizes. It will be interesting to see how these newly established "minority" populations fare in the future, and how the process of historical change will be dealt with by ethnic societies.

Day ends on a hopeful note, which his very history of conquest would seem to question. The author finds hope in the human rights regulations of the European Union and the current guilt which Americans and Australians feel sporadically about their native populations. Guilt is only possible when the victory is total, and there is no longer any reason to fear the remnant population; it does not indicate a true change of heart. Human history is the story of movement and conquest. All flora and fauna show this pattern, with species advancing and retreating, and often obliterating overrun species. One only has to look at kudzu in the South to become aware of the pattern, or English sparrows and starlings. It does remove some of the uniqueness of human experience to view human movement in this light. Looked at in this broader pattern, Day's hopefulness for better treatment of the still moving hordes of people around the globe grows dimmer.

**N. Harry Rothschild. *Wu Zhao: China's Only Woman Emperor*. Library of World Biography. Pearson Education, 2008. 236 pp.**

**John Hantke**  
*Arkansas State University*

In this welcome addition to the Library of World Biography, N. Harry Rothschild provides a captivating account of the life of Wu Zhao (624-705). Living during the reign of the Tang Dynasty (618-907), Wu Zhao rose to the top position in a country that had no precedent for such gains by a woman. Born to a lumber merchant (later imperial official) and a lady from a great house, Wu Zhao's background was far from poor, but her family's social status would never have allowed her to rise to the heights of power in China that she attained. Rothschild focuses his book on Wu Zhao's political and religious maneuverings during her rise to Tang Empress and over the course of her 15-year reign (690-705).

Wu Zhao was known for her beauty. This beauty, among other talents, allowed her to become one of the concubines of the Emperor Taizong. Upon his death in 649, Wu Zhao used her wiles to become a concubine and later wife of the new Emperor Gaozong, rear his children, and eventually become the sole ruler following Gaozong's demise. Rothschild paints a picture of political wrangling that enveloped every aspect of court life. Wu Zhao spent many years locked in a battle within the harem for the favor of the emperor. Many of the high ranking concubines were of noble and great houses that had much influence in the Middle Kingdom. In the court, the advisors were also drawn from these great houses and had strong reason to maintain their influence over the emperor. Wu Zhao had to overcome the "old guard," the current empress, and conniving concubines in her climb to power. Rothschild gives a clear example of the inner workings of the harem, its connection to the emperor, and how Wu Zhao manipulated the system to gain what she wanted. She deposed Gaozong's wife, the Empress Wang, through political maneuvering, as is evident by the accusation that Wang had killed her own child. Furthermore, as she conspired to become the empress, Wu Zhao worked with Gaozong to convince members of the "old guard" to back the emperor's decision to supplant the old empress with a new one, herself, Empress Wu.

During her own reign, Wu Zhao promoted Buddhism and eventually embraced it as the state religion over Daoism. All the while, she was building temples to promote her beliefs, endowing monasteries, and giving titles to her parents and ancestors so as to increase her social position. At the height of her power, she added the Buddhist label "Golden Wheel" to her official title. According to Rothschild, religion was a very potent force that Wu Zhao skillfully employed. Religion, in the right hands, could change the course of a nation, as was evident by the growing

importance of Buddhism.

Wu Zhao also manipulated the Confucian system of government in her favor. As in the example of the rites of *feng* and *shan*, she used her position as a devoted wife to pressure her way into the holy Daoist rite signifying that a ruler has brought serenity and prosperity to the nation. Her participation in this rite, as a woman, was something which had not been previously done nor considered. But through her manipulation of Confucian doctrine, Wu Zhao performed this act with Gaozong in order to bolster her social position. Wu Zhao was not without merit as a ruler. During her reign, the ethnic majority and minority groups that existed within her kingdom lived more harmoniously. She established peaceful relations with the border states that had often given China so many problems, and, in general, the state was in good condition throughout her reign.

N. Harry Rothschild's *Wu Zhao* is a valuable resource book for the classroom. Its application as a textbook would not utilize its full potential, because it does not give details about the entirety of society during the time of the Tang Empire. But as a micro-historical biography, it is an amazing book that examines a specific aspect about Tang society. A problem that the book presents is its lack of specific references. On p. 215, in a section called "A Note on the Sources," Rothschild writes that, for his reference materials, he primarily used the four books, *The Empress Wu* by C.P. Fitzgerald, *Zetian benzuan* by Hu Ji, *Sokuten Buko* by Yasunori Kegasawa, and *Wu Zetian pingzhuan* by Zhao Wenrun and Wang Shuanghuai. There are no endnotes or footnotes that give a clear picture of where the author gets the information that he discusses. This is not to challenge the author on his knowledge of the subject, as it is clearly evident that he is more than capable of writing a strong monograph about Wu Zhao. However, students and readers will find it difficult to pin down exactly what sources Rothschild is using and where the said sources are being used in the book. The final verdict is thus: I would not recommend the use of this book as the exclusive textbook, even if the course is specifically about Tang-era China. As a supplemental reading, however, it is a great source on Wu Zhao, religious and political workings during the Tang Dynasty, and the general state of women and their role in this period of Chinese history. In this light, the book's value lies in the understanding that while women were not as valued as men in Chinese society, it did not prevent them from being influential or wielding power. Wu Zhao showed that women could be just as much a representative of the great houses as the men were.



**Shawn William Miller.** *An Environmental History of Latin America. New Approaches to the Americas.* Cambridge University Press, 2007. xiv + 257 pp. \$23.99.

**Fabio López Lázaro**  
Santa Clara University

Shawn Miller's highly readable and useful survey joins other eminent textbooks published in this series, such as Herbert Klein's on slavery and Susan Socolow's on gender. The volume complements and improves on the world environmental history series published by ABC-CLIO. Miller's study is more than an intellectually stimulating summary of the secondary literature; it challenges the reader to interpret the dialectical relationship between Latin America's nature and culture in a world historical context. Miller's accomplishment is that he corrects surprisingly common misconceptions, many of which still trouble environmentalists, students, and even senior scholars. Insightful revelations abound about pre-Columbian, colonial, and modern Latin American agriculture, beliefs, and urban history. But Miller's approach also destroys the frustratingly common Edenic myth which romanticizes the pre-1492 Neotropics. The United States' "rather singular ... early worship of wilderness" (202), for example, still hampers our own American students' ability to resist the temptation to see Latin America's history in simplistic terms as the facile, moral story of how a non-Western paradise populated by humans in "brotherly harmony" with nature was degraded by a Western civilization which even Miller admits was "driven not by friendship" with nature but "by fear" of it (27). Miller warns his readers not to fall into the trap of dichotomizing European-Indian ecological history into a conflict between "monolithic cultural attitudes towards nature" (75), despite on occasion engaging in fairly broad, though not unsubstantiated, polarizing generalizations (e.g., 163).

Miller's approach is refreshingly novel for a survey because it makes nature an equal protagonist with both "European" and "Indian" cultures, negating the moral essentializing of either group's actions. This gives his early chapters on pre-Columbian and colonial Latin America (45% of the book) a dialectical sophistication that raises the reader's awareness of how native American societies were as ecologically intrusive and manipulative as European ones and ultimately similarly plagued by ecological errors. The "Pristine Myth," Miller warns, incorrectly "portrays the Indian as proto-ecologist" (9 and 26). Nature exerted itself devastatingly even if diversely on humans regardless of their origins. The wide-open spaces and pristine tropical jungles which nineteenth-century progress took to be virgin were both the product of pre-Columbian agricultural practices and the result of nature's destruction of native American populations through epidemics after 1492, "the most significant environmental event" in post-contact history (76). Remarkably (for many readers) the colonial

"balance-sheet" in terms of nature turns out to be quite positive: European-based kings "tempered rapaciousness" through monopolization of natural resources, allying themselves with the poor—not the entrepreneurial—in exchange for colonial loyalty. Thus imperial monarchs proved to be "abler stewards of the poor and of nature than their independent, single-minded successors" in the post-independence world of unregulated exploitation in the 1800s and early 1900s (104). Stereotypes fall on all sides in Miller's deft reading of the evidence, improving on Alfred Crosby's seminal treatment of the subject, still a common college textbook.

The book's other great strength is, ironically, its only significant weakness. As a survey, there is simply nothing to compare with its succinct coverage, choice of examples, and expository clarity; however, the lack of precise references to key pieces of evidence or points of polemical debate limits the book's applicability to higher-level teaching or research. The chapter bibliographies are indeed only useful for "further reading," as stated. Serious investigation of Miller's most controversial conclusions can not begin with his book, but must reconstruct backwards from the bibliographic suggestions the sequence of research questions leading to Miller's specific interpretations.

Nevertheless, teachers and scholars interested in disseminating an up-to-date, balanced enquiry into the dialectical relationship between nature and culture in Latin America should choose Miller's book. World historians will benefit from his synthesis of the latest research as well as his conclusions presenting current ironies. Two will suffice as examples: the over-confident but unsustainable oil-dependent industrial agriculture which rich countries cultivate; and the ecologically degrading "Indian" and nature-worshipping ecotourism which reproduces some of the worst excesses of the monocultural history of sugar and banana plantations. Scholars will appreciate Miller's less-than-happy assessment of sustainable agriculture as the compromise between the continuing, powerful appeal of a nineteenth-century-style utilitarianism and the religion of "radical" environmentalism. Miller's book sums up how our modern hypocrisy of "recycling trash at home and saving rainforests abroad" prejudices the fundamentally unequal socio-economic relationship Latin America has with the rest of the world. Financially-determined dependence on either exploiting or exporting its natural resources is undermining Latin America's better ecological judgment. "Whether or not we can have both" nature and culture without degrading either remains, for Miller, the "burning question, particularly for Latin Americans, whose yearning for material equality has paralleled their growing unease about the state of their homes' ecological foundations" (195).

**Sheila Fitzpatrick.** *The Russian Revolution.* Oxford University Press, 3rd ed., 2008. \$19.95 (paper). viii + 224 pp.

**Alexander Mirkovic**  
Arkansas Tech University

Originally published in 1982, this third edition of Sheila Fitzpatrick's account of *The Russian Revolution* offers a good opportunity to review it from the standpoint of World History. I will focus in particular on whether or not Fitzpatrick's account goes beyond the traditional Western Civilization narrative framework; the degree to which it provides cross-cultural comparisons; and finally, how it relates to the traditional framework of national histories. Before tackling these issues of interest to the readers of the *Bulletin*, a short summary of Fitzpatrick's account could be useful.

Sheila Fitzpatrick made her name in the field of Russian and Soviet studies by applying the method of social history to the early days of the Soviet state. She argued that the workers, the main supporters of the revolution, became upwardly mobile, creating a new elite in the process. It was only later, especially during Great Terror of 1937-38, that this new class became culturally conservative, philistine, puritanical, and, to use Trotsky's phrase, a bureaucracy. The Russian Revolution for Sheila Fitzpatrick starts in 1917 and ends in 1937, and the main culprit that brought the revolution to its end was the so-called "Thermidorian Reaction" by the new class of Stalinist bureaucrats. Sheila Fitzpatrick came to these conclusions early in her career, and she has not wavered since. At the same time, a veritable army of her students continues to spread this way of thinking about the Russian Revolution. The third edition of this book, even though not really different from the previous editions, is a good indication of the author's popularity and influence.

Fitzpatrick's account owes a lot to Trotsky's interpretation of his battle with Stalin. One could follow genealogical lines from Trotsky, to Sheila's distinguished father Brian Fitzpatrick, also a historian, continuing to Sheila herself. The difference between Trotsky's account and Fitzpatrick's interpretation is that she distinguishes between the early or revolutionary Stalin, who dismantled the NEP and introduced Socialism in One Country, and the late conservative Stalin, who started the Thermidorian reaction in order to please the new class of technocrats and managers. It is certainly unusual to talk about two revolutions, Lenin's and then Stalin's, but Fitzpatrick makes a good case for it. The radicalism of Stalin's First Five Year Plan is difficult to comprehend, and revolution is certainly an appropriate word for it. It was Stalin, after all, who recruited this new privileged class from the sympathetic workers during the First Five Year Plan (1928-1932).

How does, then, Sheila Fitzpatrick's popular



interpretation of the Russian Revolution stand up to the scrutiny of the world history view point? I am afraid that it is completely outside of the paradigm. World history has much to do with opposition to grand narratives, including opposition to the grand narrative of Western Civilization. Fitzpatrick chooses Crane Brinton's *Anatomy of Revolution* (1965) as a narrative frame of her account. Taking the metaphor from medical pathology, Brinton famously compared revolutions (the English, the American, the French, and the Russian) to a disease, "a kind of fever." This comparison makes sense only within the framework of the history of ideas from "Plato to NATO" that we call Western Civilization, of which Crane Brinton was the master. By firmly situating the Russian Revolution within the framework of Western Civilization, Fitzpatrick not only defined Russian and Soviet culture in a way that many scholars today would object to, but also went against her own stated research goals of evaluating the Russian Revolution as a social historian, without much reference to ideological and political superstructure. This narrative choice made sense in the Cold-War environment, as it was famously done by Andrzej Wajda in his 1983 movie *Danton* which compared Stalin with Robespierre and Danton with Trotsky. Nowadays, the narrative framework of Brinton clouds some of the main concerns of World History, in particular, the attempt to understand the Russian Revolution within the framework of the global industrial world system, forced and voluntary modernization (Westernization) of the developing world, and the wild and the mild opposition to the afore-mentioned processes. Ironically, Fitzpatrick's narrative choice perpetuates the image of Russia as an appendix of Western Civilization. When one compares Fitzpatrick's account with, for example, Richard Pipes' account we see that both scholars operate within the paradigm of Western Civilization and cannot imagine the world in a different way. Both Fitzpatrick and Pipes essentially judge Russia by the standard of what they see as the crucible of Western Civilization. This standard is different for Pipes from what it is for Fitzpatrick, but the procedure is the same. It places the Russian Revolution in the addendum of the Western Civilization narrative. World Historians generally see the Occident and the Orient not as homogeneous categories, but rather rhetorical devices used to gloss over the great diversity of world cultures, including the Russian and the Western.

Secondly, one of the main purposes of Fitzpatrick's narrative is to oppose the totalitarian model of interpretation of the Russian Revolution advocated during the Cold War Era. The totalitarian model, as it was conceived during the Cold War Era, is not of much interest to world historians. Rightfully, Fitzpatrick objects to "the demonized conflagration of Nazi Germany and Stalin's Russia" as was done during the Cold War era (6), but she avoids comparisons of any kind (except with the French Revolution following Brinton's model). However, comparisons are the bread and

butter of World History. In order to gain a wider, global, perspective one does not have to compare the Soviet Union only with Nazi Germany. To better gauge the station of the Russian Revolution in World History, one could make comparisons with the Young Turks' Revolution, or Ataturk's Anti-Western Rebellion in the Ottoman Empire; or, alternatively, with Taisho liberalism and Early Showa militarism in Japan. None of this is among Fitzpatrick's stated goals for this volume and should not be counted as a shortcoming of the book. However, it makes the volume much less appealing to World Historians.

Furthermore, Fitzpatrick makes very little distinction between Russia and the rest of the Soviet Union, where Russians represented only about a half of the population. This is openly stated: "this third edition is essentially of history of the Russian Revolution as experienced in Russia" (13). It is therefore no coincidence that non-Russians in the Soviet Union are completely excluded from Fitzpatrick's account, even though the author herself admits that now "a lively and valuable scholarship on the non-Russian areas and peoples has developed" (14). The exclusion of the latest scholarship on non-Russians in the Soviet Union is just puzzling. Going beyond national histories is one of the main tasks of World History and also here Fitzpatrick's volume offers very little. Fitzpatrick's reference to nationality policies during the revolution is reduced to a blank characterization that "Lenin had cautiously endorsed the principle of national self-determination" (69). Apparently, either the author or the editors at Oxford University Press missed an opportunity to revise the account and include various national points of view. Again, including non-Russians is not among the stated goals of the author, but such a choice makes this volume of little interest to world historians.



**Anne Walthall, ed. *Servants of the Dynasty: Palace Women in World History*. The California World History Library. University of California Press, 2008. 381 pp.**

**Jared Poley**  
*Georgia State University*

This collection of essays, edited by Anne Walthall of the University of California, Irvine, brings together fifteen contributions that trace the myriad ways that women were incorporated into structures of political rule. The contributions provide a global vision of the women who "lived and worked in palaces" and who "fulfilled diverse roles and served in many capacities" to support, administer, and perform the cultural and biological duties of reproducing monarchical power (1). The collection ranges considerably, including essays on Southeast Asia, on the Maya and

Aztecs, on the Byzantines, Ottomans, and Mughals, and on Benin. Ivan IV's Russia, Song and Qing China, Chosōn Korea, and Shogunate Japan are represented. Two essays on France give readers insight into European "palace women." The earliest material examines classical Mayan society (250–900 CE); the latest considers the wives of the contemporary Oba of Benin. Together, the essays place the history of women and of gender at the heart of a long-lasting global political structure: monarchy.

Acknowledging that the studies included in the volume may be dismissed by some as being another version of the history of the elites, Walthall reminds us that "palaces play a social role disproportionate to the number of people they contain," and the contributions convincingly indicate the multiple ways that power relations were shaped, but also represented, by historical actors (2). There are three themes that emerge across the essays. The first indicates the ways that palaces provided spaces of interaction and of representative rule that were impossible without the mothers, wives, and lovers of kings. The second takes up the important question of the types of work undertaken by women in terms of their productive, rather than their reproductive, roles. A third theme considers the issue of the "public" nature of women, royal families, and of rulership.

By considering women and gender as core elements in a deep structure of world history – monarchical and hereditary systems of rule – the volume provides a welcome analytical framework. The difficulty of finding texts that speak directly to questions of gender and power in world history suggests that this text will find a wide audience, and deservedly so. While edited collections by their nature are diverse and rarely uniformly of interest to any single reader, this particular volume does offer the virtue of a particularly strong introduction and theoretical overview (by Walthall), and the volume offers a helpful range of historical methods that will make it a useful one in graduate seminars or in advanced undergraduate courses. The geographical range of the volume also means that particular chapters will find a home in classes with an area focus, and the entire work will be of considerable value to women's studies courses. The essays themselves provide such a rich and diverse vision of the past that much of the content will no doubt find its way into any number of lectures, even at the survey level.

Walthall asks in the introduction: "What can a study of palace women contribute to our understanding of configurations of power, and indeed of the nature of political power, in a system of hereditary rule?" (4) The answer, of course, is: a lot. And the text also indicates that a study of women or of gender, when placed at the heart of a world history analysis, will similarly provide a wealth of knowledge.



**Rita Krueger. *Czech, German, and Noble: Status and National Identity in Habsburg Bohemia*.** Oxford University Press, 2009. \$65.00 (hardcover). xiii + 290 pp.

Alexander Mirkovic  
Arkansas Tech University

It has become somewhat of a cliché among academics to argue that modern national consciousness was invented by middle-class intellectuals during the nineteenth century. A good number of scholars currently support the validity of this thesis, especially in the case of Eastern Europe. Yet, surprisingly, on the level of popular culture this certainty has not yet trickled down. Every year I teach hundreds of students who were authoritatively told by their teachers that “our” national liberties go all the way back to *Magna Carta*. Is it then the case that all “other” nations, except for the Anglo-Americans, were actually invented by the bourgeois revolutionaries? Are the United States and Great Britain the only nations that can trace their origins beyond the imagination of the romantic nationalism of the nineteenth century? This double standard points to a deeper scholarly problem and the related debate on how old “nationalism” is. I have always been suspicious about the notion that the national consciousness was created “ex nihilo” by the romantic bourgeois intellectuals. Not that they did not play a major, even decisive, role. This is a given. But was there a deeper connection, for example, between the obsessive desire of Enlightenment philosophy to study and classify everything, and the emergence of modern nationalism? It is, therefore, refreshing to review a book that sees roots of modern Czech nationalism not only in the well-studied Pan-Slavic nationalist movement, but also traces those roots back to the Enlightened German and Czech aristocracy (if this ethnic division actually made any sense for the Bohemian nobility). This is very important, because Eastern European nations have often been victims of the prejudice of scholars of nationalism who, somehow, always imagined that nationalism in this “other” and “irrational” Europe was always more “invented” and more “violent” than nationalism in the West. Rita Krueger sees the beginning of the transformation from the old regime to the nation state in the behavior, habits, and activities of the Bohemian nobility’s fascination with Enlightened ideas and ideals. This is not only a refreshing thesis, but also a well argued one.

Rita Krueger looks at aristocratic voluntary associations in Bohemia – salons, scientific societies, arts, museums, charitable and literary societies – and concluded that activities of these organizations “depended on the belief that Bohemia was a cohesive, independent, cultural, and political unit.” These aristocratic institutions “worked to shape and propagate that belief.” Disciplines such as folklore, cartography, botany, and archeology, fostered by its aristocratic members, in fact, created an “imagined community” of

Bohemia. This task was then continued in the later part of the nineteenth century by the “fathers of the Czech nations” such as Frantisek Palacky, the founder of the movement called Austro-Slavism, which agitated in favor of a separate Slavic (Czech) federal entity within the Austrian and later Austro-Hungarian Empire. In fact, Palacky features prominently in Krueger’s book, not just as a representative of the Czech revolutionary bourgeoisie, but primarily as someone who early in his career, as a middle-class son of a school teacher, was patronized by leading noble households of Bohemia. It was in these aristocratic households that men like Palacky picked up the idea of “eternal Bohemia,” an idea that was essential for any future national movement. The consequences of Krueger’s argument are eye-catching. If such seemingly objective scientific disciplines such as botany could contribute so much to the creation of an imagined community that is a nation, the students of nationalism should have another look at the history of science, and such well known Enlightenment compendiums, such as the *Encyclopedie* or Carl Linnaeus’ great project of taxonomy of natural history and the consequent introduction of the “scientific” notion of “race.”

Are there any drawbacks to this otherwise excellent book on the early development of Bohemian and Czech nationalism? It seems that the book is a revised version of the author’s doctoral dissertation and this particular genre has its somewhat restrictive customs. Lip service is often paid to accepted and required scholarly authorities, such as Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities*, Eric Hobsbawm’s *Invented Traditions*, and Miroslav Hroch’s *Social Precondition of National Revival in Europe*. Any history of nationalism has to deal with these classics of the discipline. This is not news. However, Krueger’s argument goes beyond what was suggested by these three classics. She does not see the origins of Bohemian nationalism in the “print capitalism” or the false consciousness of the reactionary pseudo-romantic bourgeoisie. I read this book as saying that the roots of modern nationalism in Bohemia should be sought in the very nature of the Enlightenment project, its desire to classify everything, beginning with natural history, and ending with the origins of the human species. If I am correct in this reading then the main thesis of the book should stand out more clearly and not be burdened by appeals to scholarly authorities. Be this as it may, this is an excellent book that could be very useful not only for upper-level courses of Central and Eastern European history, but also to all interested in the early history of nationalism.

**Jack Goody. *The Theft of History*.** Cambridge University Press, 2006. 342 pp.

Jared Poley  
Georgia State University

Anthropologist Jack Goody gives readers of the *Theft of History* his perspective on the ways that the writing, even the plotting, of history has been conditioned by Eurocentric positions. He argues early in the text that “...one major problem with the accumulation of knowledge has been that the very categories employed are largely European...” and goes on to indicate the ways that the conceptual forms that we use to understand history are derived from a peculiar historical context that produces distorted images of the past (23). European social science, in other words, acts as a fun-house mirror: it disfigures, enlarging some aspects of the image while diminishing others. The result is an inappropriate, even monstrous, apparition. Goody concludes the argument by claiming that “...the domination of the world by Europe since its expansion in the sixteenth century, but above all since its leading position in the world’s economy through to the industrialization of the nineteenth century, resulted in the domination of accounts of the world’s history” (286–87).

The intervening chapters trace the implication of mapping Western notions of time and space onto other civilizations, thereby measuring all change with a Western yardstick. He considers the development of the West – examining antiquity and feudalism – and then takes up the question of the Western *Sonderweg*, the assumption that the West was on some sort of “special path” that culminated in individuals, capitalism, and democracy (as opposed to a stagnant “Asiatic Despotism”). The second section of the text, and one that is particularly interesting, is concerned with examining the work of three scholars whom Goody finds central to the larger intellectual trend of viewing development through a European lens: Joseph Needham (the great scholar of Chinese science), Norbert Elias (the great scholar of the “civilizing process”), and Fernand Braudel (the great scholar of, among other things, the Mediterranean world and the development of capitalism). That Goody is so clearly respectful of and excited by the work of these scholars makes his critical commentary on their contributions to world history all the more acute. The final section of the text takes up the question of the European “theft” from other cultures of institutions, urban life, learning, humanism, democracy, individualism, and most provocatively, emotions – specifically love.

The book will be welcomed to graduate seminars or to advanced classes in the historiography of world history. One could imagine a useful pairing of this text with Dipesh Chakrabarty’s *Provincializing Europe*. While the general argument and critique of Eurocentrism that Goody provides is a familiar one, the virtue of the text is found in the rich ways that Goody writes about



the social sciences and humanities. In the end, his forensic approach to the “theft” of history by the West is perhaps too conspiratorial (should Needham really be taken to task for assuming important changes in the nature of European science in the 17<sup>th</sup> century? Should Elias’s experiences in Ghana in the 1960s really be used to undermine his writings from the 1930s? Did “The West” really steal all those great ideas?). Still, the larger argument that Jack Goody produces in this book about the development of the West as a process of borrowing from, exchange with, and in some cases domination over other societies is a useful way to introduce students both to world history and to the political stakes of historiography.



**Jessie Childs.** *Henry VIII's Last Victim: The Life and Times of Henry Howard, Earl of Surrey*. St. Martin's Press/Thomas Dunne Books, 2007. 391 pp. \$27.95.

**Tina Shelby**  
Texas A&M University-Texarkana

First-time biographer Jessie Childs has hit a home run with *Henry VIII's Last Victim*. With the results of her meticulous research—as evidenced by the extensive Select Bibliography (368-375) and Manuscript Sources (364-67) included in the book—Childs brings to life a character of relative anonymity outside of Tudor England. Childs notes in her introduction that, “[d]espite having had his portrait painted more often than any other Tudor courtier, the Earl of Surrey is today an unfamiliar figure” (3).

According to Childs, Henry Howard, the oldest son of the third Duke of Norfolk, is remembered more for his poetry than his politics. Unfortunately for Surrey, his political claim to fame was being “the last person to be executed for treason in Henry VIII's reign” (3). It was Surrey's misfortune to be a hot-tempered, passionate young man during the final years of a king who had become a paranoid tyrant, where just a whisper of dissent could—and often did—cost a man his head.

Childs mixes a perfect blend of history, politics, and literature with a dry humor and a bit of romance. She writes dialogue based on actual comments, letters, and testimony gleaned from original sources. Her analysis of Surrey's poetry, with the intrigue of Henry VIII's court in the background, gives an added dimension to the man who is credited with creating “blank verse and the ‘English’ or ‘Shakespearean’ sonnet” (3).

The book is divided into three parts: Youth, Politics, and War. Part One: Youth gives an overview of Surrey's ancestry, including the rise and fall, then rise once again of the Howard for-

tunes. Several facets of Surrey's personality, and some of the situations he eventually found himself in, are a direct result of his upbringing and his desire to prove himself to his father. Part Two: Politics includes Henry VIII's attempt to obtain a divorce from Catherine of Aragon and the resulting religious upheaval. It also includes Henry VIII's marriage to Anne Boleyn, her execution, and his marriage to Jane Seymour, all of which had an effect on the Howards. Part Three: War relates Surrey's mercurial rise in Henry VIII's army and his failure—through no fault of his own—to win the Battle of St. Etienne, which began the downward spiral that eventually led to his execution for treason. Childs goes into considerable detail regarding Surrey's arrest, the trumped up charges, and his mockery of a trial. Ironically, Henry VIII died nine days after Surrey's execution, which resulted in a pardon for his father, the Duke of Norfolk, who had been arrested and charged with some of the same

crimes as Surrey.

*Henry VIII's Last Victim* includes numerous illustrations that add significantly to the overall effect of the book. A well-laid out genealogy chart provides the reader with a visual representation of Surrey's convoluted ancestry. Footnotes throughout the book supply additional or explanatory bits of information, and the Notes section provides extensive references.

This book is well-written and entertaining; it provides a great deal of historical information without being dry or tedious. It would be suitable for undergraduate survey courses, as well as graduate courses, in British history and, to a certain extent, British literature. The format is such that even high school students would find it interesting reading. *Henry VIII's Last Victim* would also appeal to anyone who has an interest in Henry VIII or Tudor England, as it reads more like a novel than an historical text.

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
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
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