WebID

TPAC 2020

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
https://wicg.github.io/WebID

Agenda

- The Problem
 - Premise: federation is good, we want to preserve it.
 - How federation works
 - User activity tracking on the web
 - Scope of this project
- Solution Framework
 - Directed identifiers
 - High-level approaches for an identity API
- Moving Forward
 - Challenges
 - Community engagement

The Problem


Federation is Safer Than Usernames/Passwords



RP

IDP

Reliance on General-purpose Web Primitives



RP


IDP

Iframes

Cookies Redirects

Pop-ups URL **Parameters**

Third-Party Cookie Access




Browser


RP

IDP

Navigational/Bounce Tracking and Link Decoration




The Classification Problem




RP

IDP

RP Consequences of Web Identity



IDP Consequences of Federated Sign-in



RP


IDP

Scope and Limitations

Currently out of scope

- IDP Impersonation
- Cross-device sign-in state
- The "NASCAR flag" problem

Enterprise Use Cases




WebID Proposals for Sign-In / Sign-Up

Important caveat

This project is in very early stages and everything below is still considered exploratory.


Complex Trade-offs Ease of Deployment Usability Developer Control Privacy **Properties** Use Case Coverage

Directed Identifiers



Alternatives under consideration

- Approaches for designing a new API fall into three general buckets:
 - The Permission-oriented Variation
 - The Mediation-oriented Variation
 - The Delegation-oriented Variation





IDP Tracking

- Neither the permission-based nor mediation-based approach limits the ability of the IDP to know where the user has signed in using the IDP credentials.
- Delegation-based approach redefines the role of an IDP to address that.












User Agent

Email Proxy (proxy.com) **Email Provider** (email.com)

Identity Provider (idp.com)

Relying Party (rp.com)





#3 The Delegation-oriented Variation



















Server-Side Relying Party Backwards Compatibility

https://example.com

Welcome Sam!

We got your verified email on record!

Logout


Browser

RP

IDP

```
If the user grants access, the id token is passed back to the
application:
  "alg": "HS256",
  "typ": "JWT"
 "iss": "https://accounts.a.com",
 "sub": "110169484474386276334",
 "aud": "https://example.com",
 "name": "Sam",
 "given_name": "<mark>Sam</mark>",
 "family_name": "G.",
 "email": "242423asf390@email.example",
 "email_verified": "true",
HMACSHA256(
  base64UrlEncode(header) + "." +
  base64UrlEncode(payload),
  SECRET
```

Aside: Authorization



Looking Forward

Challenges

- Ecosystem design
 - Can RPs do their job well enough with directed identifiers? Customer support classic example.
- Technical questions
 - To what extent can we programmatically enforce directed identifiers?
 - How valuable are technical enforcement measures over policy requirements for IDP behaviour?
 - What about server-to-server communication that is in common use today?
- Accommodating other use cases
 - Should enterprise policies play a role in setting a different privacy bar for <u>enterprise SSO</u>? How would we handle "bring your own device" scenarios?

Engagement

- Many stakeholders:
 - RPs
 - IDPs
 - Browsers
 - Other identity ecosystem participants
- Feedback is welcome on https://github.com/WICG/WebID

This deck is shared publicly.