CyberTek Crypto Challenges Writeup

A Detailed Analysis of Cryptographic Puzzles

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1 Introduction

Welcome to an exciting journey through six CyberTek cryptography challenges: **ezRSA+**, **syb3lik**, **ezRSA**, **hash101**, **ezMATH**, and **QUANTUM-BB84**. These puzzles test skills in RSA, elliptic curves, complex number cryptography, and quantum key distribution. This writeup provides clear explanations, mathematical derivations, and code snippets to solve each challenge.

2 Challenge 1: ezRSA+

2.1 Overview

The **ezRSA**+ challenge is an RSA-based puzzle with a non-standard setup. We are given:

- **Modulus** n: A 2048-bit product of primes p and q.
- Gift: lcm(p-1, q-1), the least common multiple of p-1 and q-1.
- **Ciphertext** *c*: The encrypted flag.
- **Public Exponent** e = 54722: An even number.

The goal is to decrypt *c* to recover the flag.

2.2 Solution

The gift is lcm(p-1, q-1). The RSA totient is:

$$\phi = (p-1)(q-1). {1}$$

LCM and GCD are related:

$$lcm(a,b) = \frac{a \cdot b}{\gcd(a,b)}.$$
 (2)

Thus:

gift =
$$lcm(p-1, q-1) = \frac{(p-1)(q-1)}{gcd(p-1, q-1)} = \frac{\phi}{gcd(p-1, q-1)}$$
. (3)

Rearranging:

$$\phi = \mathbf{gift} \cdot \mathbf{gcd}(p-1, q-1). \tag{4}$$

The solution script sets $\phi = \operatorname{gift} \cdot 2$, implying $\operatorname{gcd}(p-1,q-1) = 2$. Since p and q are 1024-bit primes (odd), p-1 and q-1 are even, so their GCD is at least 2. The challenge ensures $\operatorname{gcd}(p-1,q-1) = 2$.

The exponent $e=54722=2\cdot 27361$ is even, so $\gcd(e,\phi)=2$. However, e/2=27361 is coprime with ϕ . The ciphertext is:

$$c = m^e \mod n = (m^2)^{e/2} \mod n.$$
 (5)

Compute the private key for e/2:

$$d = (e/2)^{-1} \mod \phi.$$
 (6)

Decrypt to get m^2 :

$$m^2 = c^d \mod n. \tag{7}$$

Take the square root:

$$m = \sqrt{m^2}. (8)$$

Convert m to bytes.

2.3 Key Code

```
phi = gift * 2
e = 54722
d = inverse(e//2, phi)
print(long_to_bytes(gmpy2.iroot(pow(c, int(d), n), 2)[0]))
```

2.4 Flag

3 Challenge 2: syb3lik

3.1 Overview

syb3lik is an elliptic curve-based challenge. We must decrypt three AES-encrypted messages. We are given:

- An elliptic curve over prime p with generator G, parameters a, b.
- Ability to choose a point *P*.
- Server-generated point Q.
- Three ciphertexts (IV + AES-CBC encrypted messages).

3.2 Solution

The challenge uses a weak RNG:

```
class RNG:
    def __init__(self, seed, P, Q):
        self.seed = seed
        self.P = P
        self.Q = Q
    def next(self):
        s = E.multiply(self.P, self.seed).x
```

```
self.seed = s
r = E.multiply(self.Q, s).x
return r & ((1 << 128) - 1)</pre>
```

Keys are derived as:

$$key = sha1(str(r))[: 16].$$
(9)

The solution assumes the first s (after one iteration) is small (0, 1, or 2). For small $s, r = (s \cdot Q).x \mod 2^{128}$ is predictable. We:

- 1. Choose a valid P (provided).
- 2. Receive *Q*.
- 3. Compute keys for s = 0, 1, 2.
- 4. Try each key to decrypt the three ciphertexts.
- 5. Send decrypted messages to the server.

3.3 Key Code

```
possible_s = [0, 1, 2]
possible_keys = []

for s in possible_s:
    output = E.multiply(Q, s).x & ((1 << 128) - 1)
    key = hashlib.sha1(str(output).encode()).digest()[:16]
    possible_keys.append(key)</pre>
```

3.4 Flag

Securinets{D0ubl2_Tr0ubl201574944849498474}

4 Challenge 3: ezRSA

4.1 Overview

ezRSA splits the flag into two RSA-encrypted parts:

- Part 1: n_1 , c_1 , $hint_1 = x_1p + y_1q 0x114$, $hint_2 = x_2p + y_2q 0x514$, $x_1, x_2 < 2^{11}$, $y_1 < 2^{114}$, $y_2 < 2^{514}$, e = 65537.
- Part 2: n_2 , c_2 , hint = $(514p 114q)^{n-p-q} \mod n$, e = 65537.

4.2 Solution

4.2.1 Part 1

Hints:

$$hint_1 = x_1 p + y_1 q - 0x114, (10)$$

$$hint_2 = x_2p + y_2q - 0x514. ag{11}$$

Rewrite:

$$\mathbf{hint}_1 + 0x114 = x_1p + y_1q, \tag{12}$$

$$hint_2 + 0x514 = x_2p + y_2q. (13)$$

Eliminate *q*:

$$(\mathbf{hint}_1 + 0x114) \cdot x_2 - (\mathbf{hint}_2 + 0x514) \cdot x_1 = (y_1x_2 - y_2x_1) \cdot q. \tag{14}$$

Brute-force $x_1, x_2 < 2^{11}$ to find $p = \gcd(\text{temp}, n_1)$. Compute $q = n_1/p$, ϕ , d, and decrypt c_1 .

4.2.2 Part 2

Hint:

$$hint = (514p - 114q)^{n-p-q} \mod n.$$
 (15)

Since $n - p - q = \phi$:

$$hint \cdot (514p - 114q)^{-1} = 1 \mod n.$$
 (16)

Solve:

$$514p - 114q = \text{hint}^{-1} \mod n_2,$$
 (17)

$$p \cdot q = n_2. \tag{18}$$

Compute ϕ , d, and decrypt c_2 .

4.3 Key Code

```
1 # Part 1
 for i in range(2**11 + 1):
      for j in range(2**11 + 1):
          temp = (hint1_1 + 0x114) * i - (hint1_2 + 0x514) * j
          g = GCD(temp, n1)
          if g != 1 and g != n1:
7
              p = g
8
              q = n1 // p
              phi = (p - 1) * (q - 1)
9
              d = inverse(e, phi)
10
              flag1 = long_to_bytes(pow(c1, d, n1))
11
              break
13 # Part 2
```

```
temp = inverse(hint2, n2)
p, q = symbols('p q')
equation1 = Eq(514 * p - 114 * q, temp)
equation2 = Eq(p * q, n2)
solutions = solve((equation1, equation2), (p, q))
```

4.4 Flag

 $\textbf{Securinets}\{\sim: L1n34r_Pr1m3E_114!!!!\}\\ \textbf{Securinets}\{\sim: L1n34r_Pr1m3E_114!!!!]\\ \textbf{Securinets}\{\sim: L1n34r_Pr1m3E_114!!!!]\\ \textbf{Securinets}\{\sim: L1n34r_Pr1m3E_114!$

5 Challenge 4: hash101

5.1 Overview

hash101 uses RSA over complex numbers and ChaCha20:

- $n = p \cdot q, e = 3$.
- $mh = [(m.re \gg 128 \ll 128), (m.im \gg 128 \ll 128)].$
- C = [c.re, c.im], where $c = m^3 \mod n$.
- enc: ChaCha20-encrypted flag with key sha256(str(m.re + m.im)).

5.2 Solution

```
Let m.\text{re} = a_{\text{high}} + a_{\text{low}}, m.\text{im} = b_{\text{high}} + b_{\text{low}}, where a_{\text{low}}, b_{\text{low}} < 2^{128}. From c.\text{re}:
(a_{\text{high}} + x)^3 - 3(a_{\text{high}} + x)(b_{\text{high}} + y)^2 - c.\text{re} = 0 \mod n. \tag{19}
```

Use Coppersmith's method to find $x,y<2^{128}.$ Compute $m.{\rm re,}\ m.{\rm im},$ the key, and decrypt with ChaCha20.

5.3 Key Code

```
P.<x,y>=PolynomialRing(Zmod(n))

f = (a_high+x)^3-3*(a_high+x)*(b_high+y)^2-hint1

a_low, b_low = small_roots(f, [2^128, 2^128], 3)[0]

key = hashlib.sha256(str(a + b).encode()).digest()

cipher = ChaCha20.new(key=key, nonce=b'Pr3d1ctmyxjj')

flag = cipher.decrypt(enc)
```

5.4 Flag

Securinets{h4sh3d w1th l0v3 and 0ff by 0ne err0rs}

6 Challenge 5: ezMATH

6.1 Overview

ezMATH is an RSA challenge with:

- $n = p \cdot q$, e = 65537.
- c: Encrypted flag.
- hint = $(2024p + 2025)^q \mod n$.

6.2 Solution

The hint:

$$hint = (2024p + 2025)^q \mod n.$$
 (20)

Compute:

$$hint - 2025^q \mod n.$$
 (21)

Since $(a+b)^q \equiv a^q + b^q \mod q$:

$$(2024p + 2025)^q \equiv 2025^q \mod q. \tag{22}$$

Thus, q divides hint $-2025^n \mod n$. Compute:

$$p = \gcd(n, \operatorname{hint} - 2025^n \mod n). \tag{23}$$

Then q = n/p, compute ϕ , d, and decrypt c.

6.3 Key Code

```
p = GCD(n, hint - pow(2025, n, n))
print(long_to_bytes(pow(c, inverse(e, (p-1)*(n//p-1)), n)))
```

6.4 Flag

Securinets{n0_m0r3_m4th_plz_just_g1v3_m3_th3_fl4g}

7 Challenge 6: QUANTUM-BB84

7.1 Overview

QUANTUM-BB84 simulates the BB84 protocol with:

- qubits: 100,000 qubits as complex numbers.
- bob_bases: Bob's measurement bases (+ or x).
- ciphertext: XOR-encrypted flag.
- Fixed random seed (99999999).

7.2 Solution

In BB84, Alice generates bits and bases:

```
+-basis: 0 = |0⟩ = (0,1), 1 = |1⟩ = (1,0).
x-basis: 0 = |+⟩ = (1/√2, 1/√2), 1 = |-⟩ = (1/√2, -1/√2).
```

Bob measures in random bases. If bases match, Bob gets Alice's bit; otherwise, a random bit. The shared key is Alice's bits where bases match.

The fixed seed makes all random choices deterministic. Given qubits and bob_bases, we:

1. Decode qubits:

```
• +-basis: (0,1) \to 0, (1,0) \to 1.
• x-basis: (1/\sqrt{2}, 1/\sqrt{2}) \to 0, (1/\sqrt{2}, -1/\sqrt{2}) \to 1.
```

- 2. Extract shared key where bob_bases match Alice's bases.
- 3. XOR with ciphertext bits to recover the flag.

7.3 Key Code

```
for i, base in enumerate(bob_bases):
      qubit = qubits[i]
      real = qubit['real']
      imag = qubit['imag']
      if base == '+':
          if imag == 1.0:
              alice bit = 0
          elif real == 1.0:
              alice_bit = 1
          else:
10
              continue
11
      elif base == 'x':
12
          if math.isclose(real, 1 / math.sqrt(2)) and
13
             math.isclose(imag, 1 / math.sqrt(2)):
              alice_bit = 0
          elif math.isclose(real, 1 / math.sqrt(2)) and
15
             math.isclose(imag, -1 / math.sqrt(2)):
              alice bit = 1
16
          else:
17
              continue
18
      shared_key_bits.append(alice_bit)
```

7.4 Flag

Securinets{QKD_zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzmrx0rd}

8 Conclusion

These challenges showcase diverse cryptographic techniques:

• ezRSA+: Non-standard RSA with a gift.

• syb3lik: Weak elliptic curve RNG.

• ezRSA: Linear algebra for RSA.

• hash101: Coppersmith's method.

• ezMATH: GCD-based factoring.

• **QUANTUM-BB84**: Deterministic BB84.

Each puzzle is educational and engaging.

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