

FIRST-ORDER LOGIC

CHAPTER 8

Outline

- ◇ Why FOL?
- ◇ Syntax and semantics of FOL
- ◇ Fun with sentences
- ◇ Wumpus world in FOL

Pros and cons of propositional logic

- ☹️ Propositional logic is **declarative**: pieces of syntax correspond to facts
- ☹️ Propositional logic allows **partial/disjunctive/negated information** (unlike most data structures and databases)
- ☹️ Propositional logic is **compositional**:
meaning of $B_{1,1} \wedge P_{1,2}$ is derived from meaning of $B_{1,1}$ and of $P_{1,2}$
- ☹️ Meaning in propositional logic is **context-independent** (unlike natural language, where meaning depends on context)
- ☹️ Propositional logic has **very limited expressive power** (unlike natural language)
E.g., cannot say “pits cause breezes in adjacent squares”
except by writing one sentence for each square



First-order logic

Whereas propositional logic assumes world contains facts,
(first-order logic (like natural language) assumes the world contains

- **Objects:** people, houses, numbers, theories, Ronald McDonald, colors, baseball games, wars, centuries . . .
- **Relations:** red, round, bogus, prime, multistoried . . . ,
brother of, bigger than, inside, part of, has color, occurred after, owns,
comes between, . . .
- **Functions:** father of, best friend, third inning of, one more than, end of
. . .



Logics in general

Language	Ontological Commitment	Epistemological Commitment
- Propositional logic	facts	true/false/unknown
- First-order logic	facts, objects, relations	true/false/unknown
- Temporal logic	facts, objects, relations, times	true/false/unknown
- Probability theory	facts	degree of belief
- Fuzzy logic	facts + degree of truth	known interval value

Syntax of FOL: Basic elements

Constants	<i>KingJohn, 2, UCB, ...</i>
Predicates	<i>Brother, >, ...</i>
— Functions	<i>Sqrt, LeftLegOf, ...</i>
Variables	<i>x, y, a, b, ...</i>
— Connectives	$\wedge \vee \neg \Rightarrow \Leftrightarrow$
— Equality	$=$
— Quantifiers	$\forall \exists$

Atomic sentences

Atomic sentence = *predicate*(*term*₁, ..., *term*_{*n*})
or *term*₁ = *term*₂

Term = *function*(*term*₁, ..., *term*_{*n*})
or *constant* or *variable*

E.g., *Brother*(*KingJohn*, *RichardTheLionheart*)
> (*Length*(*LeftLegOf*(*Richard*)), *Length*(*LeftLegOf*(*KingJohn*)))

Complex sentences

Complex sentences are made from atomic sentences using connectives

$$\neg S, \quad S_1 \wedge S_2, \quad S_1 \vee S_2, \quad S_1 \Rightarrow S_2, \quad S_1 \Leftrightarrow S_2$$

E.g. $Sibling(KingJohn, Richard) \Rightarrow Sibling(Richard, KingJohn)$

$$>(1, 2) \vee \leq(1, 2)$$

$$>(1, 2) \wedge \neg >(1, 2)$$

Truth in first-order logic

Sentences are true with respect to a **model** and an **interpretation**


Model contains ≥ 1 objects (**domain elements**) and relations among them

Interpretation specifies referents for

✓ [
constant symbols \rightarrow objects
predicate symbols \rightarrow relations
function symbols \rightarrow functional relations

An atomic sentence $\text{predicate}(\text{term}_1, \dots, \text{term}_n)$ is true
iff the **objects** referred to by $\text{term}_1, \dots, \text{term}_n$
are in the **relation** referred to by predicate

Models for FOL: Example



Truth example

Consider the interpretation in which

Richard → Richard the Lionheart

John → the evil King John

Brother → the brotherhood relation

Under this interpretation, *Brother*(*Richard*, *John*) is true just in case Richard the Lionheart and the evil King John are in the brotherhood relation in the model

Models for FOL: Lots!

KB \rightarrow a

Entailment in propositional logic can be computed by enumerating models

We **can** enumerate the FOL models for a given KB vocabulary:

For each number of domain elements n from 1 to ∞

For each k -ary predicate P_k in the vocabulary

For each possible k -ary relation on n objects

For each constant symbol C in the vocabulary

For each choice of referent for C from n objects ...

Computing entailment by enumerating FOL models is not easy!

Universal quantification

$\forall \langle \text{variables} \rangle \langle \text{sentence} \rangle$

Everyone at Berkeley is smart:

$\forall x \text{ At}(x, \text{Berkeley}) \Rightarrow \text{Smart}(x)$

$\forall x \ P$ is true in a model m iff P is true with x being **each** possible object in the model

Roughly speaking, equivalent to the conjunction of instantiations of P

$$\begin{aligned} & (\text{At}(\text{KingJohn}, \text{Berkeley}) \Rightarrow \text{Smart}(\text{KingJohn})) \\ & \wedge (\text{At}(\text{Richard}, \text{Berkeley}) \Rightarrow \text{Smart}(\text{Richard})) \\ & \wedge (\text{At}(\text{Berkeley}, \text{Berkeley}) \Rightarrow \text{Smart}(\text{Berkeley})) \\ & \wedge \dots \end{aligned}$$

A common mistake to avoid

Typically, \Rightarrow is the main connective with \forall

Common mistake: using \wedge as the main connective with \forall :

$$\forall x \text{ } At(x, Berkeley) \wedge Smart(x)$$

means “Everyone is at Berkeley and everyone is smart”

Existential quantification

$\exists \langle variables \rangle \langle sentence \rangle$

Someone at Stanford is smart:

$\exists x \text{ } At(x, Stanford) \wedge Smart(x)$

$\exists x \text{ } P$ is true in a model m iff P is true with x being **some** possible object in the model

Roughly speaking, equivalent to the disjunction of instantiations of P

$$\begin{aligned} & (At(KingJohn, Stanford) \wedge Smart(KingJohn)) \\ \vee & (At(Richard, Stanford) \wedge Smart(Richard)) \\ \vee & (At(Stanford, Stanford) \wedge Smart(Stanford)) \\ \vee & \dots \end{aligned}$$

Another common mistake to avoid

Typically, \wedge is the main connective with \exists

Common mistake: using \Rightarrow as the main connective with \exists :

$$\exists x \text{ } At(x, Stanford) \Rightarrow Smart(x)$$

is true if there is anyone who is not at Stanford!

Properties of quantifiers

$\forall x \forall y$ is the same as $\forall y \forall x$ (why??)

$\exists x \exists y$ is the same as $\exists y \exists x$ (why??)

$\exists x \forall y$ is **not** the same as $\forall y \exists x$

$\exists x \forall y \text{ Loves}(x, y)$

“There is a person who loves everyone in the world”

$\forall y \exists x \text{ Loves}(x, y)$

“Everyone in the world is loved by at least one person”

Quantifier duality: each can be expressed using the other

$\forall x \text{ Likes}(x, \text{IceCream}) \quad \neg \exists x \neg \text{Likes}(x, \text{IceCream})$

$\exists x \text{ Likes}(x, \text{Broccoli}) \quad \neg \forall x \neg \text{Likes}(x, \text{Broccoli})$

Fun with sentences

Brothers are siblings

Fun with sentences

— Brothers are siblings

$$\forall x, y \text{ } Brother(x, y) \Rightarrow Sibling(x, y).$$

“Sibling” is symmetric

Fun with sentences

Brothers are siblings

$$\forall x, y \text{ } Brother(x, y) \Rightarrow Sibling(x, y).$$

— “Sibling” is symmetric

$$\forall x, y \text{ } Sibling(x, y) \Leftrightarrow Sibling(y, x).$$

One’s mother is one’s female parent

Fun with sentences

Brothers are siblings

$$\forall x, y \text{ Brother}(x, y) \Rightarrow \text{Sibling}(x, y).$$

“Sibling” is symmetric

$$\forall x, y \text{ Sibling}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow \text{Sibling}(y, x).$$

— One's mother is one's female parent

$$\forall x, y \text{ Mother}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow (\text{Female}(x) \text{ and } \text{Parent}(x, y)).$$

A first cousin is a child of a parent's sibling

Fun with sentences

Brothers are siblings

$$\forall x, y \text{ Brother}(x, y) \Rightarrow \text{Sibling}(x, y).$$

“Sibling” is symmetric

$$\forall x, y \text{ Sibling}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow \text{Sibling}(y, x).$$

One's mother is one's female parent

$$\forall x, y \text{ Mother}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow (\text{Female}(x) \wedge \text{Parent}(x, y)).$$

— A first cousin is a child of a parent's sibling

$$\forall x, y \text{ FirstCousin}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow \exists p, ps \text{ Parent}(p, x) \wedge \text{Sibling}(ps, p) \wedge \text{Parent}(ps, y)$$



Equality

$term_1 = term_2$ is true under a given interpretation
if and only if $term_1$ and $term_2$ refer to the same object

E.g., $1 = 2$ and $\forall x \times(Sqrt(x), Sqrt(x)) = x$ are satisfiable
 $2 = 2$ is valid

E.g., definition of (full) *Sibling* in terms of *Parent*:

$$\forall x, y \text{ Sibling}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow [\neg(x = y) \wedge \exists m, f \neg(m = f) \wedge \\ \text{Parent}(m, x) \wedge \text{Parent}(f, x) \wedge \text{Parent}(m, y) \wedge \text{Parent}(f, y)]$$

Interacting with FOL KBs

Suppose a **wumpus-world** agent is using an FOL KB
and **perceives a smell and a breeze (but no glitter)** at **$t = 5$** :

✓ $\left[\begin{array}{l} \text{Tell}(KB, \text{Percept}([Smell, Breeze, None], 5)) \\ \text{Ask}(KB, \exists a \text{ Action}(a, 5)) \end{array} \right.$

I.e., does KB entail any particular actions at $t = 5$?

Answer: $Yes, \{a/Shoot\}$ \leftarrow substitution (binding list)

Given a sentence S and a substitution σ ,
 $S\sigma$ denotes the result of plugging σ into S ; e.g.,

$S = Smarter(x, y)$

$\sigma = \{x/Hillary, y/Bill\}$

$S\sigma = Smarter(Hillary, Bill)$

$Ask(KB, S)$ returns some/all σ such that $KB \models S\sigma$

Knowledge base for the wumpus world

“Perception”

$\forall b, g, t \text{ Percept}([Smell, b, g], t) \Rightarrow Smelt(t)$

$\forall s, b, t \text{ Percept}([s, b, Glitter], t) \Rightarrow AtGold(t)$

Reflex: $\forall t \text{ AtGold}(t) \Rightarrow \text{Action}(Grab, t)$

Reflex with internal state: do we have the gold already?

$\forall t \text{ AtGold}(t) \wedge \neg Holding(Gold, t) \Rightarrow \text{Action}(Grab, t)$

Holding(Gold, t) cannot be observed

\Rightarrow keeping track of change is essential

Deducing hidden properties

Properties of locations:

$$\forall x, t \text{ } At(Agent, x, t) \wedge Smelt(t) \Rightarrow Smelly(x)$$

$$\forall x, t \text{ } At(Agent, x, t) \wedge Breeze(t) \Rightarrow Breezy(x)$$

Squares are breezy near a pit:

Diagnostic rule—infer **cause** from **effect**

$$\forall y \text{ } Breezy(y) \Rightarrow \exists x \text{ } Pit(x) \wedge Adjacent(x, y)$$

Causal rule—infer **effect** from **cause**

$$\forall x, y \text{ } Pit(x) \wedge Adjacent(x, y) \Rightarrow Breezy(y)$$

Neither of these is complete—e.g., the causal rule doesn't say whether squares far away from pits can be breezy

Definition for the *Breezy* predicate:

$$\forall y \text{ } Breezy(y) \Leftrightarrow [\exists x \text{ } Pit(x) \wedge Adjacent(x, y)]$$

Keeping track of change

Facts hold in **situations**, rather than eternally

E.g., *Holding(Gold, Now)* rather than just *Holding(Gold)*


Situation calculus is one way to represent change in FOL:

Adds a situation argument to each non-eternal predicate

E.g., *Now* in *Holding(Gold, Now)* denotes a situation

Situations are connected by the *Result* function

Result(a, s) is the situation that results from doing *a* in *s*



Describing actions I

“Effect” axiom—describe **changes** due to **action**

$$\forall s \text{ } AtGold(s) \Rightarrow Holding(Gold, Result(Grab, s))$$

“Frame” axiom—describe **non-changes** due to **action**

$$\forall s \text{ } HaveArrow(s) \Rightarrow HaveArrow(Result(Grab, s))$$

Frame problem: find an elegant way to handle non-change

(a) representation—avoid frame axioms

(b) inference—avoid repeated “copy-overs” to keep track of state

Qualification problem: true descriptions of real actions require endless caveats—what if **gold is slippery** or nailed down or . . .

Ramification problem: real actions have many secondary consequences—what about the **dust on the gold**, wear and tear on gloves, . . .

Describing actions II

Successor-state axioms solve the representational frame problem

Each axiom is “about” a **predicate** (not an action per se):

$$\begin{aligned} P \text{ true afterwards} \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad & [\text{an action made } P \text{ true} \\ & \vee \quad P \text{ true already and no action made } P \text{ false}] \end{aligned}$$

For holding the gold:

$$\begin{aligned} \forall a, s \quad & Holding(Gold, Result(a, s)) \Leftrightarrow \\ & [(a = Grab \wedge AtGold(s)) \\ & \vee (Holding(Gold, s) \wedge a \neq Release)] \end{aligned}$$

Making plans

Initial condition in KB:

$At(Agent, [1, 1], S_0)$

$At(Gold, [1, 2], S_0)$

Query: $Ask(KB, \exists s \text{ Holding}(Gold, s))$

i.e., in what situation will I be holding the gold?

Answer: $\{s / Result(Grab, Result(Forward, S_0))\}$

i.e., go forward and then grab the gold

This assumes that the agent is interested in plans starting at S_0 and that S_0 is the only situation described in the KB

Making plans: A better way

Represent **plans** as action sequences $[a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n]$

$PlanResult(p, s)$ is the result of executing p in s

Then the query $Ask(KB, \exists p \text{ Holding}(Gold, PlanResult(p, S_0)))$
has the solution $\{p/[Forward, Grab]\}$

Definition of $PlanResult$ in terms of $Result$:

$$\forall s \text{ } PlanResult([], s) = s$$

$$\forall a, p, s \text{ } PlanResult([a|p], s) = PlanResult(p, Result(a, s))$$

Planning systems are special-purpose reasoners designed to do this type of inference more efficiently than a general-purpose reasoner

Summary

First-order logic:

- objects and relations are semantic primitives
- syntax: constants, functions, predicates, equality, quantifiers

Increased expressive power: sufficient to define wumpus world

Situation calculus:

- conventions for describing actions and change in FOL
- can formulate planning as inference on a situation calculus KB