

# Introduction to Computer Security

## Chapter 1: Overview

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# Focus: Three Fundamental Questions

- What assets do we need to protect?
- How are those assets threatened?
- What can we do to counter those threats?

# Outline

- Computer Security Concept
- Threats, Attacks, and Assets
- Security Functional Requirements
- Fundamental Security Design Principles
- Attack Surfaces and Attack Trees
- Computer Security Strategy

# Computer Security Concepts

## ● Definition of Computer Security


Measures and controls that ensure **confidentiality**, **integrity**, and **availability** of information system assets including hardware, software, firmware, and information being processed, stored, and communicated.

固件 ↓  
ROM 中的程序

By the NIST Internal/Interagency Report (NISTIR) 7298  
(Glossary of Key Information Security Terms, May 2013)

**NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology)**: a US federal agency that deals with measurement science, and technology related to US government use.

# CIA Triad: Three Key Objectives



# Confidentiality

- Assurance

→ 你的資訊別人不能知道

- ❑ **Data confidentiality**: private or confidential info is not disclosed to unauthorized individuals

- ❑ **Privacy**: individuals control or influence what information related to them may be collected and stored


- Requirements

→ 就是 privacy

- ❑ Preserving authorized restrictions on information access and disclosure
  - ❑ Including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary info

- Definition of loss

- ❑ Unauthorized disclosure of information



# Integrity 完整

- Assurance → 可以改的人才可以改

- Data integrity: information and programs are changed only in a specified and authorized manner

- System integrity: a system performs its intended function in an unimpaired manner

- Requirements


→ 系統能正常運作

- Guarding against improper info modification or destruction

- Including ensuring info non-repudiation and authenticity

- Definition of loss

- Unauthorized modification or destruction of information



不能被亂改

想拿就可以拿，而且要  
info可信賴

被亂改或刪掉

# Availability

## ● Assurance

- ❑ Systems work promptly and service is not denied to authorized users

可以用的人可以用

## ● Requirement


- ❑ Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of info

確定可以用

## ● Definition of loss

- ❑ Disruption of access to or use of info or an info system

可以用的人不能用





# Other Two Concepts to a Complete Security Picture

## ● Authenticity

可信賴

- ❑ Property is genuine and able to be verified and trusted
- ❑ Confident in the validity of a transmission, or a message, or **its originator**

訊息/來源要有效正當

## ● Accountability

責任性

- ❑ Requirement for actions of an entity to be traced uniquely to that entity
- ❑ Be able to trace a security breach to a responsible party

你的動作可以被追蹤

# Three levels of Security Impact

- Defined in FIPS 199

- ❑ Low: limited adverse effect (minor)
- ❑ Moderate: serious adverse effect (significant)
- ❑ High: catastrophic adverse effect (catastrophic)

- Confidentiality

- ❑ Low: directory information of departments
- ❑ Moderate: student enrollment information (covered by FERPA)
- ❑ High: student grade information (covered by FERPA)

FIPS: Federal Information Processing System

FERPA: Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act

# Three Levels of Security Impact (Cont.)

## ● Integrity

- ❑ Low: anonymous online poll
- ❑ Moderate: articles in a discussion forum
- ❑ High: patient allergy information

## ● Availability

- ❑ Low: online telephone directory lookup application
- ❑ Moderate: a public website for a university
- ❑ High: authentication services for critical systems

# Challenges of Computer Security

141法!

- Computer security is not simple
  - ❑ Requirements seem to be straightforward
  - ❑ Mechanisms can be quite complex
- One must consider potential (unexpected) attacks
  - ❑ Successful attacks look at the problem in a completely different way
  - ❑ Exploiting an unexpected weakness
- Procedures are usually counterintuitive
  - ❑ Typically, a security mechanism is complex
  - ❑ Make sense only when the various aspects of the threat are considered

# Challenges of Computer Security (Cont.)


- Must decide where to deploy mechanisms
  - ❑ At what points in a network
  - ❑ At what layer of an architecture
- Involve algorithms and secret info (keys)
  - ❑ How to create, distribute, and protect secret info?
  - ❑ Relying on underlying protocols may complicate the development
- A battle of wits between attacker and admin
  - ❑ Attacker: find holes, need only find a single weakness
  - ❑ Designer: Close holes, eliminate all weaknesses

# Challenges of Computer Security (Cont.)

- Users: not perceived on benefits until a security failure
- Requires constant monitoring
  - ▣ Difficult in today's short-term, overloaded environment
- Too often an after-thought (not integral)
  - ▣ Not an integral part of the design process
- Strong security is regarded as an impediment to use of system

# A Model for Computer Security

- Assets of a computer system (or system resource)



# A Model for Computer Security (Cont.)

- **Vulnerability:** weakness of system resources
  - ❑ Corrupted: loss of integrity
  - ❑ Leaky: loss of confidentiality
  - ❑ Unavailable or very slow: loss of availability
- **Threat:** capable of exploiting vulnerabilities
  - ❑ Potential harm to an asset



# A Model for Computer Security (Cont.)

- Attack: a threat that is carried out (threat action)
  - Passive: learn or make use of info, but doesn't affect system resources
  - Active: alter system resources or affect their operation
  - Inside: by an authorized user (using authorized resources in a way not approved)
  - Outside: by an unauthorized user

# A Model for Computer Security (Cont.)

## ● Countermeasures 補漏洞

- Means used to deal with security attacks

- Prevent attacks
- Detect them and then recover

- May itself introduce new vulnerabilities

可能產生新的洞

- Residual vulnerabilities may remain


- Goal is to minimize residual level of risk to the assets

盡量減少威脅

- Residual risk: the amount of risk associated with an action/event remaining, after inherent risks have been reduced by risk controls

# Security Concepts and Relationships

週而復始



# Threats and Attacks (RFC 4949)

Threat Consequence	Threat Action (Attack)
<b>Unauthorized Disclosure</b> - Threats to confidentiality 資訊被揭露	資訊直接暴露 (1) <b>Exposure</b> ; (2) <b>Interception</b> ; 攔截資訊 (3) <b>Inference</b> : inferring data/info from traffic patterns or repeated queries; 推斷：被猜到資訊 (4) <b>Intrusion</b> 侵入系統拿到資訊 假裝自己是官方欺騙大眾
<b>Deception</b> - Threats to system/data integrity 欺騙官方讓官方得到錯誤資料	(1) <b>Masquerade</b> : an unauthorized user who gains access to a system by posing as an authorized user, or a Trojan horse behaves; (2) <b>Falsification</b> ; 用錯誤的資訊欺騙官方 (3) <b>Repudiation</b> : falsely denying responsibility for an act 否認自己欺騙的行為

# Threats and Attacks (RFC 4949)

Threat Consequence	Threat Action (Attack)
<p><b><u>Disruption</u></b> 瓦解</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Threats to availability or system integrity</li> </ul>	<p>(1) <b>Incapacitation</b>: prevents or interrupts system operation;            (2) <b>Corruption</b>: undesirably alters system operation; 亂改系統            (3) <b>Obstruction</b>: interrupts delivery of system services</p> <p>癱瘓系統</p> <p>阻塞傳送</p> <p>侵吞別人的系統資源</p>
<p><b><u>Usurpation</u></b> 竄改 (系統)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Threats to system integrity</li> </ul>	<p>(1) <b>Misappropriation</b>: unauthorized logical or physical control of a system resource (e.g., DDoS attacks)            (2) <b>Misuse</b>: gaining unauthorized access to a system</p>


讓別人執行東西後變得不安全

# Threats and Assets

- Assets: hardware, software, data, and communication lines and networks
  - Threats: breaches of availability, confidentiality, and integrity
- Network security attacks
  - Passive attacks 沒改系統
    - Eavesdropping on, or monitoring of, transmissions
    - Goal: to obtain info that is being transmitted 打劫傳送的資訊
    - Two types: release of message content, and traffic analysis
  - Active attacks
    - Involving some modification of the data stream or the creation of a false stream
    - Four types: replay, masquerade, modification of messages, and DoS

# Scope of Computer Security

電腦安全の烏托邦



# Security Functional Requirements

- One computer security expert, Bruce Schneier, observed

If you think technology can solve your security problems, then you don't understand the problems and you don't understand the technology.

- Why?



# Security Functional Requirements (FIPS 200)

- Technical measures

- Access control; identification & authentication; system & communication protection; system & information integrity

- Management controls and procedures

- Awareness & training; audit & accountability; certification, accreditation, & security assessments; contingency planning; maintenance; physical & environmental protection; planning; personnel security; risk assessment; systems & services acquisition

- Overlapping technical and management

- Configuration management; incident response; media protection

# Outline

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# Fundamental Security Design Principles

- Why do we need principles?

都用同一套系統性方法很好，但是別人也知道

- ❑ No security design and implementation techniques that can **systematically** exclude security flaws and prevent all unauthorized actions
- ❑ But, good practices for good design have been documented

# Fundamental Security Design Principles

- Economy of mechanism

設計越簡單越好

- Design should be as simple and small as possible

- Fail-safe defaults

想你要什麼 而不是你不要什麼

- Access decisions should be based on permission rather than exclusion

- Complete mediation

要檢查

- Every access must be checked against the access control mechanism

- Open design

設計公開才會進步

- Design should be open rather than secret  
(e.g., widespread adoption of NIST-approved algorithms)

# Fundamental Security Design Principles (Cont.)

- Separation of privilege

把權力分級

- Separate users and processes based on different levels of trust, needs, and privilege requirements

- Least privilege

- Every process and every user of the system should operate using the least set of privileges necessary to perform the task

- Least common mechanism

盡量減少共同的方法量

- Design should minimize the functions shared by different users for mutual security

# Fundamental Security Design Principles (Cont.)

- **Psychological acceptability** 不能安全到影響使用者使用
  - ❑ Should not interfere unduly with the work of users or hinder the usability or accessibility of resources
- **Isolation** 隔離
  - ❑ Resources at public access systems
  - ❑ Processes and files of individual users
  - ❑ Security mechanisms
- **Encapsulation** 壓縮：用oop
  - ❑ A specific form of isolation based on object-oriented functionality

# Fundamental Security Design Principles (Cont.)

- **Modularity** 模組化

- Development of security functions as separate, protected modules
- Use of a modular architecture for mechanism design and implementation

- **Layering** 使用很多措施的話要分層

- Use of multiple, overlapping protection approaches

- **Least astonishment** 盡量不要嚇到使用者

- A program or user interface should always respond in the way that is least likely to astonish the user

# Attack Surfaces

- Consist of the reachable and exploitable vulnerabilities in a system
  - Network attack surface
    - Network protocol vulnerabilities
    - e.g., open ports on outward facing Web and other servers
  - Software attack surface
    - Vulnerabilities in application, utility, or operating system code
    - e.g., interfaces, SQL, and web forms
  - Human attack surface 攻擊有資料權限的使用者
    - Vulnerabilities created by personnel
    - e.g., an employee with access to sensitive info vulnerable to a social engineering attack




# Attack Surfaces (Cont.)

- Why is an attack surface analysis useful?

分層越少越危險

- Assess the scale and severity of threats to a system
- Make developers aware of where security mechanisms are required



# Attack Trees


規劃你的攻擊路徑



- A branching, hierarchical data structure: a set of potential techniques for exploiting security vulnerabilities

- ❑ Root: the attack goal
- ❑ Leaf: different ways to initiate an attack
- ❑ Each node (other than a leaf) is either an AND-node or an OR-node


- Why are attack trees needed?



# Attack Trees (Cont.)

## ● Using attack trees


- ❑ To effectively exploit the info available on attack patterns
- ❑ To document security attacks in a structured form that reveals key vulnerabilities
- ❑ To guide both the design of systems/apps and countermeasures



## An Internet banking authentication app

UT/U: User terminal and user  
CC: Communications channel  
IBS: Internet banking server

# Attack Trees (Cont.)



# Computer Security Strategy

- Involves three aspects

- ❑ Specification/policy: What is the security scheme supposed to do?

計畫先出來

- ❑ Implementation/mechanisms: How does it do it?

實作

- ❑ Correctness/assurance: Does it really work?

會不真的跟計畫一樣呢

# Security Policy

- A formal statement of rules and practices
  - ❑ that specify (or regulate) how a system (or organization) provides security services to protect critical system resources (RFC 4949)
- A security manager needs to consider:
  - ❑ The value of the assets being protected (e.g., critical files)
  - ❑ The vulnerabilities of the system (e.g., the system is open to guests)
  - ❑ Potential threats and the likelihood of attacks (e.g., data leakage)
  - ❑ Trade-off: ease of use vs. security (e.g., remember and type two passwords?)
  - ❑ Trade-off: cost of security vs. cost of failure and recovery

Security policy: a business decision, possibly influenced by legal requirements

# Security Implementation and Assurance

- Security implementation

- Prevention, detection, response, recovery

食品安全標章的感覺

- Assurance: provides grounds for having confidence that the system operates such that the system's security policy is enforced

- expressed as a degree of confidence
  - based on formal models

- Evaluation: examines a computer product or system w.r.t. certain criteria

# Questions?