

# Econ7115: Structural Models and Numerical Methods in Economics

## Assignment W05

January 16, 2026

Due 6 March 2026

Zi Wang

HKBU

Spring 2026

---

1. Consider the equilibrium system of  $(w_i, X_i^j, P_i^j, L_i^j)$  for the workhorse trade model satisfying:

- Trade share and price index:

$$\lambda_{in}^j = \frac{T_i^j (L_i^j)^{\theta^j \psi^j} (c_i^j \kappa_{in}^j)^{-\theta^j}}{\sum_{h=1}^N T_h^j (L_h^j)^{\theta^j \psi^j} (c_h^j \kappa_{hn}^j)^{-\theta^j}}, \quad P_n^j = \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N T_i^j (L_i^j)^{\theta^j \psi^j} (c_i^j \kappa_{in}^j)^{-\theta^j} \right]^{-\frac{1}{\theta^j}}, \quad (1)$$

where

$$c_i^j \equiv w_i^{\gamma_i^j} \prod_{k=1}^J (P_i^k)^{\gamma_i^{k,j}}, \quad \kappa_{in}^j \equiv \tau_{in}^j (1 - s_i^j) (1 + e_{in}^j) (1 + t_{in}^j). \quad (2)$$

- Labor market clearing:

$$L_i^j = \frac{\gamma_i^j}{w_i} \sum_{n=1}^N \frac{\lambda_{in}^j X_n^j}{(1 - s_i^j) (1 + e_{in}^j) (1 + t_{in}^j)}, \quad \sum_{j=1}^J L_i^j = L_i. \quad (3)$$

- Total expenditure:

$$X_i^j = \alpha_i^j Y_i + \sum_{k=1}^J \gamma_i^{j,k} \sum_{n=1}^N \frac{\lambda_{in}^k X_n^k}{(1 - s_i^k) (1 + e_{in}^k) (1 + t_{in}^k)}, \quad (4)$$

where

$$Y_i = w_i L_i + \sum_{j=1}^J \sum_{n=1}^N \left[ -\frac{s_i^j}{1 - s_i^j} + \frac{e_{in}^j}{(1 - s_i^j) (1 + e_{in}^j)} \right] \lambda_{in}^j X_n^j + \sum_{j=1}^J \sum_{n=1}^N \frac{t_{ni}^j}{(1 - s_n^j) (1 + e_{ni}^j) (1 + t_{ni}^j)} \lambda_{ni}^j X_i^j. \quad (5)$$

Please express the equilibrium system in relative changes.

2. The “data” folder contains data for seven major economies with 44 sectors. Sector 1 to 22 are tradable goods subject to tariffs, while Sector 22 to 44 are services that are not subject to tariffs. Following are details of the data files:

- cal\_elasticities: calibrated values of  $\psi^j$  and  $\theta^j$
- finalshare:  $\alpha_n^j$
- vashare:  $\gamma_i^j$
- IOshare:  $\gamma^{k,j} / (1 - \gamma_i^j)$
- TradeFlow2017:  $X_{in}^j$
- tariff\_prewar2017:  $t_{in}^j$

We assume that  $s_i^j = e_{in}^j = 0$  for all  $(i, n, j)$ . There are two policies documented in the “data” folder:

- tariff\_Trump:  $t_{CHN,USA}^{j'} - t_{CHN,USA}^j$  for  $j = 1, \dots, 22$
- tariff\_China:  $t_{USA,CHN}^{j'} - t_{USA,CHN}^j$  for  $j = 1, \dots, 22$

Please

- Compute welfare changes under Trump’s tariffs.
- Compute welfare changes under both Trump’s tariffs and China’s retaliation.
- Under both Trump’s tariffs and China’s retaliation, compute  $(s_{CHN}^{j'})_{j=1}^{22}$  that maximizes the Chinese welfare, comparing them with  $(s_{CHN}^{j'})_{j=1}^{22}$  under pre-war tariffs.