

Remote DNS Cache Poisoning Attack Lab

Due: Feb 25th by 11:59 PM

1 Lab Overview

The objective of this lab is to gain first-hand experience on the remote DNS cache poisoning attack, also called the Kaminsky DNS attack [1]. DNS [2] (Domain Name System) is the Internet's phone book; it translates hostnames to IP addresses and vice versa. This translation is through DNS resolution, which happens behind the scene. DNS Pharming [4] attacks manipulate this resolution process in various ways, with an intent to misdirect users to alternative destinations, which are often malicious. This lab focuses on a particular DNS Pharming attack technique, called *DNS Cache Poisoning attack*. There are two main ways to perform this attack, local (where the attacker and the victim DNS server are on the same network, where packet sniffing is possible) and remote (where packet sniffing is not possible, so the attack becomes much more challenging than the local attack). This lab will focus on the remote attack.

2 Before You Begin

2.1 Remove Old Virtual Machines

Make sure you have a clean VirtualBox configuration before you begin this lab. To do that follow the following steps:

1. Start by making sure you have no running virtual machines on your mcXX machine. To do that run the following command:

```
VBoxManage list runningvms
```

If this command shows any running virtual machines stop them with the following command:

```
VBoxManage controlvm VMNAME poweroff
```

Replace VMNAME with the name of the virtual machine to stop.

2. Now make sure that there are no VirtualBox processes running:

```
ps aux | grep -v grep | grep VBox | grep $USER
```

If this command output any running VBox processes make sure to kill them.

3. Now that you do not have any running virtual machines, to ensure you have a clean configuration run the following command and make it doesn't output anything:

```
VBoxManage list vms
```

If the command outputs the existence of any virtual machines make sure you unregister and delete them with the following command:

```
VBoxManage unregistervm VMNAME --delete
```

Replace `VMNAME` with the name of the virtual machine to delete.

NOTE: this command will remove all contents of the virtual machine. Make sure to backup anything you want to save from the virtual machine before unregistering it.

2.2 Remove Old NAT Networks

Make sure you have removed all existing NAT networks before you begin the lab. To ensure you have a clean network configuration run the following command and make sure it doesn't output anything:

```
VBoxManage list natnets
```

If the command outputs the existence of any NAT network make sure you remove it with the following commands:

```
VBoxManage natnetwork stop --netname NETNAME
VBoxManage natnetwork remove --netname NETNAME
VBoxManage dhcpserver remove --netname NETNAME
```

Replace `NETNAME` with the name of the network you want to remove.

2.3 Stop VirtualBox Processes

At this point there shouldn't be any VirtualBox processes running, but to make sure you have a clean configuration run the following command to check for VirtualBox processes:

```
ps aux | grep $USER | grep VBox | grep -v grep
```

If any VirtualBox processes are listed kill them with the following command:

```
kill PID
```

Replace `PID` with the process identifier output from the `ps` command.

3 Lab Environment

The lab environment involves using one single physical machine, which runs three virtual machines:

1. A computer for the victim user
2. A DNS server
3. The attacker's computer

These will be three different virtual machines, running the provided virtual machine image that you used for the previous lab.

Import three virtual machines as described in `Lab_Setup.pdf`. Name one virtual machine `Apollo` (this will be the victim DNS Server), name the second `dns_user`, and the third `dns_attacker`.

Figure 1 illustrates the setup of the lab environment. For the sake of simplicity, all these virtual machines are on the same LAN, but for your final submission you are not allowed to exploit this fact in your attacks,




Figure 1: The Lab Environment Setup

and the environment should treat the attacker machine as a remote machine, i.e., the attacker cannot sniff the victim DNS server's packets. While testing your attacker feel free to exploit the fact that the victim DNS server is on the same LAN, but for your final submission you are not allowed to exploit this situation. In these instructions, it is assumed that the user machine's IP address is 192.168.15.5, the DNS Server's IP is 192.168.15.4 and the attacker machine's IP is 192.168.15.6. However, in your lab, you can use other IP addresses, as long as you make it clear in your report which address is for which machine.

3.1 Configure the Local DNS server Apollo

For this lab you will be using the BIND9 server program for your DNS server. This program is included in the provided virtual machine image.

Step 1: Create the `named.conf.options` file. The DNS server needs to read a configuration file `/etc/bind/named.conf` to start. This configuration file usually includes an option file, which is called `/etc/bind/named.conf.options`. Please add the following contents to the option file:

```
options {
    dump-file      "/var/cache/bind/dump.db";
};
```

It should be noted that the file `/var/cache/bind/dump.db` is used to dump DNS server's cache. Here are some related commands that you may find useful:

```
% sudo rndc flush           // Flush the DNS cache
```

```
% sudo rndc dumpdb -cache // Dump the cache to dump.db
```

Step 2: Start DNS server. We can now start the DNS server using the following command:

```
% sudo /etc/init.d/bind9 restart  
or  
% sudo service bind9 restart
```

3.2 Configure the User Machine

On the user machine 192.168.15.5, we need to use 192.168.15.4 as the default DNS server. This is achieved by changing the DNS setting file `/etc/resolv.conf` of the user machine:

```
nameserver 192.168.15.4 # the ip of the DNS server you just setup
```

Note: make sure that this is the only `nameserver` entry in your `/etc/resolv.conf`. Also note that, in Ubuntu, `/etc/resolv.conf` is overwritten by the DHCP client. As a result you will need to manually edit the `resolv.conf` file every time you reboot the client machine.

4 The Wireshark Tool

Wireshark is a very important tool for this lab and is already installed on the virtual machine. It is a sophisticated tool for packet sniffing. Full documentation on Wireshark can be found here:

https://www.wireshark.org/docs/wsug_html_chunked/index.html

5 Lab Tasks

The main objective of "pharming" attacks is to redirect the user to another machine *B* when the user tries to get to machine *A* using *A*'s host name. For example, assume `www.example.edu` is an online banking site. When the user tries to access this site using the correct URL `www.example.edu`, if the adversaries can redirect the user to a malicious web site that looks very much like `www.example.edu`, the user might be fooled and give away his/her credentials to the attacker.

In this task, you will use the domain name `www.example.edu` as our attacking target. It should be noted that the `example.edu` domain name is reserved for use in documentation, not for any real company. The authentic IP address of `www.example.edu` is 93.184.216.34, and its name server is managed by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). When a user runs the `dig` command on this name or types the name in the browser, the user's machine sends a DNS query to the local DNS server, which will eventually ask for the IP address from `example.edu`'s name server.

The goal of this lab is to launch a DNS cache poisoning attack on the local DNS server, such that when the user runs the `dig` command to find out `www.example.edu`'s IP address, the local DNS server will end up going to the attacker's name server `ns.dnslabattacker.net` to get the IP address, so the IP address returned can be any number that is decided by the attacker. As a result, the user will be led to the attacker's web site, instead of the authentic `www.example.edu`.

There are two tasks in this attack: cache poisoning and result verification. In the first task, you need to poison the DNS cache of the user's local DNS server `Apollo`, such that, in `Apollo`'s DNS cache, `ns.dnslabattacker.net` is set as the name server for the `example.edu` domain, instead of the domain's registered authoritative name server. In the second task, you need to demonstrate the impact of the attack. More specifically, you need to run the command "`dig www.example.edu`" from the user's machine, and the returned result must be a fake IP address.




Figure 2: The complete DNS query process

5.1 Task 1: Remote Cache Poisoning

In this task, the attacker sends a DNS query request to the victim DNS server (`Apollo`), triggering a DNS query from `Apollo`. The query may go through one of the root DNS servers, the `.COM` DNS server, and the final result will come back from `example.edu`'s DNS server. This is illustrated in Figure 2. In the case that `example.edu`'s name server information is already cached by `Apollo`, the query will not go through the root or the `.COM` server; this is illustrated in Figure 3. In this lab, the situation depicted in Figure 3 is more common, so we will use this figure as the basis to describe the attack mechanism.

While `Apollo` waits for the DNS reply from `example.edu`'s name server, the attacker can send forged replies to `Apollo`, pretending that the replies are from `example.edu`'s name server. If the forged replies arrive first, it will be accepted by `Apollo`. The attack will be successful.

In a local DNS attack, the attacker and the DNS server are on the same LAN, i.e., the attacker can observe the DNS query message. When the attacker and the DNS server are not on the same LAN, the cache poisoning attack becomes more difficult. The difficulty is mainly caused by the fact that the transaction ID in the DNS response packet must match with that in the query packet. Because the transaction ID in the query is usually randomly generated, without seeing the query packet, it is not easy for the attacker to know the correct ID.




Figure 3: The DNS query process when `example.edu`'s name server is cached

Obviously, the attacker can guess the transaction ID. Since the size of the ID is only 16 bits, if the attacker can forge K responses within the attack window (i.e. before the legitimate response arrives), the probability of success is K over 2^{16} . Sending out hundreds of forged responses is not impractical, so it will not take too many tries before the attacker can succeed.

However, the above hypothetical attack has overlooked the cache effect. In reality, if the attacker is not fortunate enough to make a correct guess before the real response packet arrives, correct information will be cached by the DNS server for a while. This caching effect makes it impossible for the attacker to forge another response regarding the same domain name, because the DNS server will not send out another DNS query for this domain name before the cache times out. To forge another response on the same domain name, the attacker has to wait for another DNS query on this domain name, which means he/she has to wait for the cache to time out. The waiting period can be hours or days.

The Kaminsky Attack. Dan Kaminsky came up with an elegant technique to defeat the caching effect [1]. With the Kaminsky attack, attackers will be able to continuously attack a DNS server on a domain name, without the need for waiting, so attacks can succeed within a very short period of time. Details of the attacks are described in [1]. In this task, you will use this attack method. The following steps with reference to Figure 3 outlines the attack.

1. The attacker queries the DNS Server Apollo for a non-existing name in `example.edu`, such as `twysw.example.edu`, where `twysw` is a random name.
2. Since the mapping is unavailable in Apollo's DNS cache, Apollo sends a DNS query to the name server of the `example.edu` domain.
3. While Apollo waits for the reply, the attacker floods Apollo with a stream of spoofed DNS re-

sponse [6], each trying a different transaction ID, hoping one is correct. In the response, not only does the attacker provide an IP resolution for `twysw.example.edu`, the attacker also provides an “Authoritative Nameservers” record, indicating `ns.dnslabattacker.net` as the name server for the `example.edu` domain. If the spoofed response beats the actual responses and the transaction ID matches with that in the query, Apollo will accept and cache the spoofed answer, and thus Apollo’s DNS cache is poisoned.

4. Even if the spoofed DNS response fails (e.g. the transaction ID does not match or it comes too late), it does not matter, because the next time, the attacker will query a different name, so Apollo has to send out another query, giving the attack another chance to do the spoofing attack. This effectively defeats the caching effect.
5. If the attack succeeds, in Apollo’s DNS cache, the name server for `example.edu` will be replaced by the attacker’s name server `ns.dnslabattacker.net`. To demonstrate the success of this attack, you need to show that such a record is in Apollo’s DNS cache. Figure 5 shows an example of poisoned DNS cache.

Attack Configuration. You need to make the following configuration for this task:

1. *Configure the Attack Machine.* You need to configure the attack machine, so it uses the targeted DNS server (i.e., Apollo) as its default DNS server. Please see Section 3.2 for the instruction.
2. *Source Ports.* Some DNS servers now randomize the source port number in the DNS queries; this makes the attacks much more difficult. Unfortunately, many DNS servers still use predictable source port number. For the sake of simplicity in this lab, we assume that the source port number is a fixed number. We can set the source port for all DNS queries to 33333. This can be done by adding the following option to the file `/etc/bind/named.conf.options` on Apollo:
3. *DNSSEC.* Most DNS servers now adopt a protection scheme called “DNSSEC”, which is designed to defeat the DNS cache poisoning attack. If you do not turn it off, your attack would be extremely difficult, if possible at all. In this lab, you will turn it off by changing the file `/etc/bind/named.conf.options` on Apollo. Please find the line `"dnssec-validation auto"`, comment it out, and then add a new line. See the following:

```
//dnssec-validation auto;  
dnssec-enable no;
```

4. *Flush the Cache.* Flush Apollo’s DNS cache, and restart its DNS server.

Forge DNS Response Packets. In order to complete the attack, the attacker first needs to send DNS queries to Apollo for some random host names in the `example.edu` domain. Right after each query is sent out, the attacker needs to forge a large number of DNS response packets in a very short time window, hoping that one of them has the correct transaction ID and it reaches the target before the authentic response does. It is better to write C code to achieve this. To make your life easier, a sample code file called `"udp.c"` has been provided. This program can send a large number of DNS packets. Feel free to use this sample code when writing your attack programs.

```

▶ Frame 7983: 178 bytes on wire (1424 bits), 178 bytes captured (1424 bits)
▶ Linux cooked capture
▶ Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 199.43.132.53 (199.43.132.53), Dst: 10.0.2.6 (10.0.2.6)
▼ User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: domain (53), Dst Port: 33333 (33333)
  Source port: domain (53)
  Destination port: 33333 (33333)
  Length: 142
  ▶ Checksum: 0x746e [validation disabled]
▼ Domain Name System (response)
  Transaction ID: 0x8e01
  ▶ Flags: 0x8400 (Standard query response, No error)
  Questions: 1
  Answer RRs: 1
  Authority RRs: 1
  Additional RRs: 2
  ▼ Queries
    ▶ twysw.example.com: type A, class IN
  ▼ Answers
    ▼ twysw.example.com: type A, class IN, addr 1.1.1.1
      Name: twysw.example.com
      Type: A (Host address)
      Class: IN (0x0001)
      Time to live: 388 days, 8 hours, 40 minutes, 32 seconds
      Data length: 4
      Addr: 1.1.1.1 (1.1.1.1)
    ▼ Authoritative nameservers
      ▼ example.com: type NS, class IN, ns ns.dnslabattacker.net
        Name: example.com
        Type: NS (Authoritative name server)
        Class: IN (0x0001)
        Time to live: 388 days, 8 hours, 40 minutes, 32 seconds
        Data length: 23
        Name Server: ns.dnslabattacker.net
      ▼ Additional records
        ▼ ns.dnslabattacker.net: type A, class IN, addr 1.1.1.1
          Name: ns.dnslabattacker.net
          Type: A (Host address)
          Class: IN (0x0001)
          Time to live: 388 days, 8 hours, 40 minutes, 32 seconds
          Data length: 4
          Addr: 1.1.1.1 (1.1.1.1)
        ▶ <Root>: type OPT
  0020  0a 00 02 06 00 35 82 35  00 8e 74 6e 8e 01 84 00  ....5.5 ..tn...
  0030  00 01 00 01 00 01 00 02  05 74 77 79 73 77 07 65  ....twysw.e
  0040  78 61 6d 70 6c 65 03 63  6f 6d 00 00 01 00 01 c0  xample.c om.....
  0050  0c 00 01 00 01 02 00 00  00 00 04 01 01 01 01 c0  .....
  0060  12 00 02 00 01 02 00 00  00 00 17 02 6e 73 0e 64  .....ns.d
  0070  6e 73 6c 61 62 61 74 74  61 63 6b 65 72 03 6e 65  nslabatt acker.ne
  0080  74 00 02 6e 73 0e 64 6e  73 6c 61 62 61 74 74 61  t..ns.dn slabatta
  0090  63 6b 65 72 03 6e 65 74  00 00 01 00 01 02 00 00  cker.net .....
  00a0  00 00 04 01 01 01 01 00  00 29 10 00 00 00 80 00  .....).
  00b0  00 00

```

Figure 4: A Sample DNS Response Packet

1. When modifying the `udp.c` program, you need to fill each DNS field with the correct value. To understand the value in each field, you can use Wireshark to capture a few DNS query and response

packets.

2. DNS response packet details: it is not easy to construct a correct DNS response packet. A sample packet to help you is provided. Figure 4 is the screen shot of an example response packet: 10.0.2.6 is the local DNS server address, and 199.43.132.53 is the real name server for example.edu. The highlighted bytes are the raw UDP payload data, and you need to figure out what they are. The details about how each byte works are explained clearly in Appendix A. There are several techniques used in the response packet, such as the string pointer offset to shorten the packet length. You may not have to use that technique but it is very common in real packets.

Check the dump.db file to see whether your spoofed DNS response has been successfully accepted by the DNS server. See an example in Figure 5.

```

172660 NS h.gtld-servers.net.
172660 NS i.gtld-servers.net.
172660 NS j.gtld-servers.net.
172660 NS k.gtld-servers.net.
172660 NS l.gtld-servers.net.
172660 NS m.gtld-servers.net.
; additional
86260 DS 30909 8 2 (
E2D3C916F6DEEAC73294E8268FB5885044A8
33FC5459588F4A9184CFC41A5766 )
; additional
86260 RRSIG DS 8 1 86400 201411201170000 (
201411201170000 22603 .
LtkTupSuz/a0GV4FxKx0wnEdfutvv4xcM8YC
BWLAL2DLGIumuQGbkTE6RUM91+k6B2WXcdgo
u/EsAKnyFx4lj/f9iPsiIvgda950rEadmCxd
xYkwnVMNkoV5sDfyev4NYwxfy3tai6ro0ngS
TQcm5NrWr+r/Q8XhIhDCLYKDeKs= )
; authauthority
example.com.
; additional
172660 NS ns.dnslabattacker.net.
86260 DS 31589 8 1 (
3490A6806D47F17A34C29E2CE80E8A999FFB
E4BE )
86260 DS 31589 8 2 (
CDE0D742D6998AA554A92D890F8184C698CF
AC8A26FA59875A990C03E576343C )
; additional
86260 RRSIG DS 8 2 86400 20141128051526 (
20141128051526 48758 com.
e2Zclaahc5xiHjzEj+prLZm5Qs0IwTPfEMa/
VhoOguxIfupGnebs206WffE3Pc+ZjQp+QNzN
Nv33N/Kg4WymFg9soQxJpXFeYrcnkNmkaXh8
T5Rva4/M5+stP/tENNfiQuZG6klQECiNC9CA
r5QckZNJExCN+7mZLuc/C4BufQQ= )

```

Figure 5: A Sample of Successfully Poisoned DNS Cache

5.2 Task 2: Result Verification

If your attack is successful, Apollo's DNS cache will look like that in Figure 5, i.e., the NS record for example.edu becomes ns.dnslabattacker.net. To make sure that the attack is indeed successful, run the dig command on the user machine (see Figure 1) to ask for www.example.edu's IP address.

When Apollo receives the DNS query, it searches for example.edu's NS record in its cache, and finds ns.dnslabattacker.net. It will therefore send a DNS query to ns.dnslabattacker.net.

However, before sending the query, it needs to know the IP address of `ns.dnslabattacker.net`. This is done by issuing a separate DNS query. That is where we get into trouble.

The domain name `dnslabattacker.net` does not exist in reality. It was created for the purpose of this lab. `Apollo` will soon find out about that, and mark the NS entry invalid, essentially recovering from the poisoned cache. One may say that when forging the DNS response, we can use an additional record to provide the IP address for `ns.dnslabattacker.net`. The sample response packet in Figure 4 actually does that. Unfortunately, this additional record will not be accepted by `Apollo`. Please think about why and give your explanation in your lab report (hint: think about the *zones*).

To solve this requires some extra configuration on `Apollo` to demonstrate the impact of a successful cache-poisoning attack (the attack is indeed successful, the problem is that we cannot show it):

Use A Fake Domain Name. This step requires some extra configuration on `Apollo`, so it recognizes `dnslabattacker.net` as a real domain. We basically add the `ns.dnslabattacker.net`'s IP address to `Apollo`'s DNS configuration, so `Apollo` does not need to go out asking for the IP address of this hostname from a non-existing domain. The instructions are provided in the following.

We first configure the victim DNS server `Apollo`. Find the file named `conf.default-zones` in the `/etc/bind/` folder, and add the following entry to it:

```
zone "ns.dnslabattacker.net" {
    type master;
    file "/etc/bind/db.attacker";
};
```

Create the file `/etc/bind/db.attacker`, and place the following contents in it. We let the attacker's machine and `ns.dnslabattacker.net` share the same IP (e.g `192.168.15.6`). Be aware that the format of the following contents can be messed up in the PDF file if you copy and paste, and make sure that the IP address in the file has to match the IP address of the attacker machine. We have linked the file `db.attacker` in the lab's web site.

```
$TTL 604800
@ IN SOA localhost. root.localhost. (
    2; Serial
    604800 ; Refresh
    86400 ; Retry
    2419200 ; Expire
    604800 ) ; Negative Cache TTL;
@ IN NS ns.dnslabattacker.net.
@ IN A 192.168.15.6
@ IN AAAA ::1
```

Once the setup is finished, if your cache poisoning attack is successful, any DNS query sent to `Apollo` for the hostnames in `example.edu` will be sent to `192.168.15.6`, which is attacker's machine.

We need to configure the DNS server on `192.168.15.6`, so it answers the queries for the domain `example.edu`. Add the following entry in `/etc/bind/named.conf.local` on `192.168.15.6`:

```
zone "example.edu" {
    type master;
```

```
file "/etc/bind/example.edu.db";  
};
```

Create a file called `/etc/bind/example.edu.db`, and fill it with the following contents. Please do not directly copy and paste from the PDF file, as the format may be messed up. You can download the `example.edu.db` file from the lab's web site.

```
$TTL 3D  
@                IN          SOA ns.example.edu. admin.example.edu. (  
                2008111001  
                8H  
                2H  
                4W  
                1D)  
@                IN          NS          ns.dnslabattacker.net.  
@                IN          MX          10 mail.example.edu.  
www              IN          A           1.1.1.1  
mail             IN          A           1.1.1.2  
*.example.edu.  IN          A           1.1.1.100
```

When the configurations are finished, do not forget to restart both Apollo's and the attacker's DNS servers; otherwise, the modification will not take effect. If everything is done properly, you can use the command like `"dig www.example.edu"` on the user machine. The reply would be `1.1.1.1`, which is exactly we put in the above file.

6 Importance of Reporting Results

The results from this lab are very binary in nature. Either your attacker is going to be able to successfully poison the DNS cache, or it will not. Therefore, thorough documentation specifics of your process for creating your attacker are very important. A poorly documented attack program (even if it is able to successfully poison the DNS cache) will not receive full credit.

7 Submission

7.1 What to Submit

Your submission directory should contain:

- All source files written by you to perform the lab tasks.
- A README text file describing how to compile and execute your source code.
- A detailed report containing an explanation of the observations. Name this report *Analysis-lab2.pdf*. Be sure to put your name in your report.

7.2 How to submit

Submit every time you have a stable version of any part of the functionality. Make sure to submit early to make sure you do not miss the deadline due to any last minute congestion.

1. Login or ssh to an mcXX machine, e.g., mc01.cs.purdue.edu
2. In the parent directory of your submission directory, type the command:

turnin -c cs528 -p lab2 <submission-dir-name>

where <submission-dir-name> is the name of the directory containing your files to be submitted. For example, if your program is in a directory /homes/abc/assignment/src, make sure you cd to the directory /homes/abc/assignment and type:

turnin -c cs528 -p lab2 src

3. If you wish to, you can verify your submission by typing the following command:

turnin -v -c cs528 -p lab2

Do not forget the **-v** above, as otherwise your earlier submission will be erased (it is overwritten by a blank submission).

Note that resubmitting overwrites any earlier submission and erases any record of the date/time of any such earlier submission.

We will check that the submission time-stamp is **before the due date**; we will not accept your submission if its time-stamp is after the due date, even by 3 minutes. Do NOT submit after 11:59 PM Eastern Time.

NOTE: Do not submit your virtual machine disk image. Copy the files for submission off of your virtual machine and into a directory on the mcXX machine.

References

- [1] D. Schneider. Fresh Phish, How a recently discovered flaw in the Internet's Domain Name System makes it easy for scammers to lure you to fake Web sites. *IEEE Spectrum*, 2008 <http://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/software/fresh-phish>
- [2] RFC 1035 Domain Names - Implementation and Specification : <http://www.rfc-base.org/rfc-1035.html>
- [3] DNS HOWTO : <http://www.tldp.org/HOWTO/DNS-HOWTO.html>
- [4] Pharming Guide : <http://www.technicalinfo.net/papers/Pharming.html>
- [5] DNS Cache Poisoning: http://www.secureworks.com/resources/articles/other_articles/dns-cache-poisoning/
- [6] DNS Client Spoof: http://evan.stasis.org/odds/dns-client_spoofing.txt

A Details of DNS Response Packet

```

0x8e 0x01 transaction ID
0x84 0x00 flags:means a no-error answer
0x00 0x01 Questions No.      (1 question session)
0x00 0x01 Answer No.        (1 answer session)
0x00 0x01 Authority No.     (1 authority session)
0x00 0x02 Additional No.    (2 additional sessions)
query session: eggdd.example.edu:type A, class IN
0x05 5 characters follow
0x74 t
0x77 w
0x79 y
0x73 s
0x77 w
0x07 7 characters follow
0x65 e
0x78 x
0x61 a
0x6d m
0x70 p
0x6c l
0x65 e
0x03 3 characters
0x63 c
0x6f o
0x6d m
0x00 end of the string
0x00 0x01 type:A(address)
0x00 0x01 Class:IN
the Answer session:
0xc0 first two bits set to 1 to notify this is a pointer for a name string,
not a standard
string as before
0x0c the offset of the start point: here from transaction ID field to the
name string
12 bytes. The string will shows from the offset point to the end of the
string
0x00 0x01 type:A
0x00 0x01 Class:IN
0x02 0x00 0x00 0x00 time to live
0x00 0x04 DataLength:4 bytes
0x01 0x01 x01 0x01 1.1.1.1
Authoritative Nameservers session:
0xc0 first two bits set to 1 to notify this is a pointer for a name string,
not a standard
string as before
0x12 Offset 18 the string should be "/7example/3com/0"
0x00 0x02 type:NS
0x00 0x01 Class:IN
0x02 0x00 0x00 0x00 time to live
0x00 0x17 DataLength:23 bytes
The string represent "/2ns/14dnslabattacker/3net"
0x02 2 characters follow
0x6e n
0x73 s
0x0e 14 characters

```

```

0x64 d
0x6e n
0x73 s
0x6c l
0x61 a
0x62 b
0x61 a
0x74 t
0x74 t
0x61 a
0x63 c
0x6b k
0x65 e
0x72 r
0x03 3 characters
0x6e n
0x65 e
0x74 t
0x00 end of the string
*****additional session*****
first session :example.edu:type NS,class IN ns ns.dnslabattacker.net

notice: you can use the same pointer technique we
talked before to shorten
the packet, this is just to show you both ways work.
The string represent "/2ns/14dnslabattacker/3net"
0x02 2 characters follow
0x6e n
0x73 s
0x0e 14 characters
0x64 d
0x6e n
0x73 s
0x6c l
0x61 a
0x62 b
0x61 a
0x74 t
0x74 t
0x61 a
0x63 c
0x6b k
0x65 e
0x72 r
0x03 3 characters
0x6e n
0x65 e
0x74 t
0x00 end of the string
0x00 0x01 type:A
0x00 0x01 Class:IN
0x02 0x00 0x00 0x00 time to live
0x00 0x04 DataLength:4 bytes
0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 1.1.1.1
second session: not related to the lab. Just set a rule that during the DNS
communication, the server won't accept
the packet which is larger than a certain size

```

```
0x00 0x00 0x29 0x10 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x88 0x00 0x00 0x00
```

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