

CPSC 458-01 Lab 3-1

Wayne Muse

Question 1: What are this malware's imports and strings?






PEStudio has flagged 5 of the 16 imports. From the imports, it appears that the malware is attempting to access and write to the machine's memory. Additionally, it appears to affect


network connections by importing WnetCloseEnum. This import is responsible for closing network connections implying that this malware sample establishes or hijacks some network connection.

Question 2: What are the malware's host-based indicators?



Using PEStudio again to find the malware's host-based indicators there are 7 highly suspicious indicators and 4 mildly suspicious. From the indicators it seems that this code is self-modifying and accesses various networking processes such a WS2_32.dll which creates a socket and MPR.dll which handles computer communication between the OS and multiple network providers. We see in screenshots below that under a Dynamic Analysis, the malware writes to C\Users\IEUser\AppData\Roaming\vmx32to64.exe which allows it run on start up and establish a network connection.


File Edit Event Filter Tools Options Help



Showi	ina 7 of 991 266 e	vents	(0.00070%)	Racked by virtual memor	v	
ìme	Process Name	PID	Operation	Path	Result	Detail
12:1	■ Lab03 01 Alt.e	2916	CreateFileMapp	C:\Windows\System32\dwmapi.dll	FILE LOCKED WI	SyncType: SyncTy
				C:\Windows\System32\dwmapi.dll	SUCCESS	SyncType: SyncTy
12:1	■ Lab03 01 Alt.e	2916	Load Image	C:\Windows\Svstem32\dwmapi.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x7ffe
	■ Lab03 01 Alt.e			C:\Windows\System32\crypt32.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x7ffe
	Lab03_01_Alt.e			C:\Windows\System32\msasn1.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x7ffe
	■ Lab03_01_Alt.e			C:\Windows\System32\dwmapi.dll	SUCCESS	
	Lab03_01_Alt.e			HKCU	SUCCESS	Desired Access: M
	Lab03_01_Alt.e			HKCU	SUCCESS	Query: Handle Tag
	■ Lab03 01 Alt.e			HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\C		Desired Access: R
	Lab03_01_Alt.e			HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\C		Length: 12
	Lab03 01 At.e			HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\C		20119111112
	■ Lab03 01 Alt.e			HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Con.		Desired Access: Q
	■ Lab03 01 At.e			HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Contr		Desired Access: Q
	Lab03 01 At.e					
	Lab03 01 At.e			HKLM\Svstem\CurrentControlSet\Contr		Longan. 21
	Lab03 01 At.e			C:\Windows\Resources\Themes\aero\		Desired Access: R
				C:\Windows\Resources\Themes\aero\		Creation Time: 3/19
	Lab03_01_At.e			C:\Windows\Resources\Themes\aero\		Cication filine. 57 15
	Lab03_01_At.e			C:\Windows\Resources\Themes\aero\		Desired Access: G
				C:\Windows\Resources\Themes\aero\		
				C:\Windows\Resources\Themes\aero\		AllocationSize: 1.3
				C:\Windows\Resources\Themes\aero\		SyncType: SyncTy
	Lab03 01 At.e			C:\Windows\Resources\Themes\aero\		ojno rjpo. ojno rj
	Lab03_01_Alt.e			HKCU	SUCCESS	Desired Access: M
	Lab03_01_Alt.e			HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop\MuiCach		
	Lab03 01 At.e			HKCU	SUCCESS	, Decirca / 100000. 11
	Lab03_01_Alt.e			HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\MUI.		Desired Access: R
	Lab03_01_Alt.e			HKCU	SUCCESS	Desired Access: M
	Lab03 01 At.e			HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Con		
	Lab03_01_Alt.e			HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop\Languag		
	Lab03 01 At.e			HKCU	SUCCESS	Decired 7 60000. 11
	Lab03_01_At.e			HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\MUI.		Desired Access: R
	Lab03_01_Att.e			HKCU	SUCCESS	Desired Access: M
	Lab03_01_At.e			HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Con		
	Lab03_01_At.e			HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R
	Lab03_01_Alt.e					
	Lab03_01_At.e			HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop	SUCCESS	Lengur. 12
	Lab03_01_At.e			HKCU	SUCCESS	
			щ, -	HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\MUI.		Desired Assess D
	Lab03_01_Alt.e			HKCU	SUCCESS	Desired Access: H Desired Access: M
.12.1	Lab03_01_Alt.e	2316	negopenkey	TINCU	30CCE33	Desired Access: IVI
nowing 1.615 of 1.269.283 events (0.12%)			0.12%) Ba	acked by virtual memory		

Question 3: Are there any useful network-based signatures for this malware? If so, what are they?

1:12:4 📧 Lab03_01_Alt.e 2916 🝪 Load Image	C:\Windows\Svstem32\FWPUCLNT.DL		Image Base: 0x7ffe
1:12:4 📧 Lab03_01_Alt.e 2916 🖏 Load Image	C:\Windows\System32\bcrypt.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x7ffe
1:12:4 Lab03_01_Alt.e 2916 CloseFile	C:\Windows\Svstem32\FWPUCLNT.DL	LSUCCESS	
1:12:4 • Lab03 01 Alt.e 2916 😘 Thread Create		SUCCESS	Thread ID: 5340
1:12:4 • Lab03 01 Alt.e 2916 • TCP Reconnect	+ MSEDGEWIN10:49675 → MSEDGEWI		Length: 0. segnum:
1:12:4 • Lab03_01_Att.e 2916 • TCP Reconnec			Length: 0, seqnum:
1:12:4 Lab03_01_Atte 2916 TCP Reconnect			Length: 0, seqnum:
1:12:5 Lab03_01_Alt.e 2916 Thread Create	MSEDGEWIN 10.43675 -> MSEDGEWI		Thread ID: 4252
	t MSEDGEWIN10:49689 -> MSEDGEWI	SUCCESS	
			Length: 0, seqnum:
1:13:1 Lab03_01_Alt.e 2916 - TCP Reconnec			Length: 0, seqnum:
1:13:1 Lab03_01_Alt.e 2916 💂 TCP Disconnec	MSEDGEWIN10:49689 -> MSEDGEWI		Length: 0, seqnum:
1:13:1 • Lab03_01_Alt.e 2916 📆 Thread Exit		SUCCESS	Thread ID: 1988,
1:13:4 📧 Lab03_01_Alt.e 2916 🦚 Thread Exit		SUCCESS	Thread ID: 4672,
1:13:4 🎩 Lab 03_01_Alt.e 2916 😘 Thread Exit		SUCCESS	Thread ID: 1004,
1:13:4 📧 Lab03_01_Alt.e 2916 🕸 Thread Create		SUCCESS	Thread ID: 4596
1:13:4 📧 Lab03_01_Alt.e 2916 🖳 TCP Reconnection	t MSEDGEWIN10:49690 -> MSEDGEWI	SUCCESS	Length: 0, seqnum:
1:13:4 📧 Lab03_01_Alt.e 2916 💂 TCP Reconnection	t MSEDGEWIN10:49690 -> MSEDGEWI	SUCCESS	Length: 0, seqnum:
1:13:4 • Lab03 01 Alt.e 2916 🖵 TCP Disconnec	t MSEDGEWIN10:49690 -> MSEDGEWI	SUCCESS	Length: 0, segnum:
1:14:1 📧 Lab03_01_Alt.e 2916 😘 Thread Exit		SUCCESS	Thread ID: 5144
1:14:1 • Lab03 01 Alt.e 2916 TCP Reconnect	t MSEDGEWIN10:49691 -> MSEDGEWI	SUCCESS	Length: 0. seanum:
1:14:1 • Lab03_01_Alt.e 2916 \$\frac{1}{2}\$TCP Reconnect			Length: 0, segnum:
1:14:1 • Lab03 01 Alt.e 2916 TCP Disconnec			Length: 0, segnum:
1:14:2 • Lab03_01_Alt.e 2916 Thread Exit	A MOLDGEWINTO.40001 / MOLDGEWI	SUCCESS	Thread ID: 4252,
1:14:4 Lab03_01_Atte 2916 TCP Reconnect	+ MSEDGEWIN10:49692 -> MSEDGEWI		Lenath: 0. seanum:
	t MSEDGEWIN10:49692 -> MSEDGEWI		Length: 0, seqnum:
	t MSEDGEWIN10:49692 -> MSEDGEWI		Length: 0, seqnum:
1:15:1 Lab03_01_Alt.e 2916 TCP Reconnect			
			Length: 0, seqnum:
1:15:1 Lab03_01_Alt.e 2916 TCP Reconnect			Length: 0, seqnum:
1:15:1 • Lab03_01_Alt.e 2916 • TCP Disconnec	MSEDGEWIN 10:49693 -> MSEDGEWI		Length: 0, seqnum:
1:15:3 • Lab03_01_Alt.e 2916 🍪 Thread Exit		SUCCESS	Thread ID: 6392,
1:15:4 📧 Lab03_01_Alt.e 2916 🍪 Thread Create		SUCCESS	Thread ID: 6184
1:15:4 📧 Lab03_01_Alt.e 2916 💂 TCP Reconnec			Length: 0, seqnum:
	t MSEDGEWIN10:49694 -> MSEDGEWI	SUCCESS	Length: 0, seqnum:
	t MSEDGEWIN10:49694 -> MSEDGEWI		Length: 0, seqnum:
1:16:2 • Lab03_01_Alt.e 2916 • TCP Reconnect	t MSEDGEWIN10:49695 -> MSEDGEWI	SUCCESS	Length: 0, seqnum:
		01100500	
Showing 1,619 of 1,277,651 events (0.12%)	Backed by virtual memory		
155 222.999138 127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1 TCP	56 [TO	CP Port numbers reused] 49688 → 443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Le
156 222.999155 127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1 TCP		3 → 49688 [RST, ACK] Seg=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
157 240.271905 127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1 DNS		andard query 0x0269 A www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com
158 240.272323 127.0.0.1			andard query response 0x0269 A www.practicalmalwareanalysis
\\			1 2 1
159 240.273444 127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1 TCP		689 → 443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=65495 WS=256 SACK
160 240.273453 127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1 TCP		3 → 49689 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
161 240.774063 127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1 TCP	56 [TC	CP Port numbers reused] 49689 → 443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Le
162 240.774079 127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1 TCP	44 443	3 → 49689 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
163 241.274265 127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1 TCP	56 [TO	CP Port numbers reused] 49689 → 443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Le
164 241.274282 127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1 TCP	44 443	3 → 49689 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
165 271.280191 127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1 DNS	82 Sta	andard query 0x472c A www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com
166 271.280715 127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1 DNS		andard query response 0x472c A www.practicalmalwareanalysis
255 2721250725 227101012	22/10/012	50 500	January decrease of the same o



This malware is similar to the sample from the book because both attempts to request the www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com domain. I opened ApateDNS and created a fake DNS server, I opened wireshark to capture any packets and used process monitor and filtered for malware. The malware attempts to establish a TCP connection likely trying to download something from practicalmalwareanalysis website.