



**CERTORA**

Move fast and break nothing

# Inductive Reasoning about Smart Contracts

James Wilcox

Certora and University of Washington


# Topics

- Proofs by induction
- Transition systems and safety
- Counterexamples to Induction
- Strengthening Invariants



# “Mathematical” Induction

$P(n)$  is a property of natural number  $n$



To prove  $P(n)$  for all  $n$ , show:

- $P(0)$
- Given  $m$ , if  $P(m)$  then  $P(m+1)$


In logic

$$\begin{aligned} & ( P(0) \wedge \\ & \quad \forall m \in \mathbb{N}. P(m) \Rightarrow P(m+1) \\ & ) \Rightarrow \forall n \in \mathbb{N}. P(n) \end{aligned}$$

Why does this work?


# Another kind of induction...

- Four players pass a ball:
  - A will pass to C
  - B will pas to D
  - C will pass to A
  - D will pass to B
- The ball starts at player A
- Can the ball get to D?





# Another kind of induction...

- Four players pass a ball:
  - A will pass to C
  - B will pas to D
  - C will pass to A
  - D will pass to B
- The ball starts at player A
- Can the ball get to D?





# Formalizing with induction

- $x_0 = A$
- $x_{n+1} = \begin{cases} C & x_n = A \\ D & x_n = B \\ A & x_n = C \\ B & x_n = D \end{cases}$
- Prove by induction  $\forall n. x_n \neq D$ 
  - $x_0 \neq D$  ?
  - $x_m \neq D \Rightarrow x_{m+1} \neq D$  ?





# Formalizing with induction

- $x_0 = A$
- $x_{n+1} = \begin{cases} C & x_n = A \\ D & x_n = B \\ A & x_n = C \\ B & x_n = D \end{cases}$
- Prove by induction  $\forall n. x_n \neq D$ 
  - $x_0 \neq D$  ?
  - $x_m \neq D \Rightarrow x_{m+1} \neq D$  ?



# Formalizing with induction


- $x_0 = A$
- $x_{n+1} = \begin{cases} C & x_n = A \\ D & x_n = B \\ A & x_n = C \\ B & x_n = D \end{cases}$
- Prove by induction  $\forall n. x_n \neq D$ 
  - $x_0 \neq D$  ?
  - $x_m \neq D \Rightarrow x_{m+1} \neq D$  ?





# Strengthening

- $x_0 = A$
- $x_{n+1} = \begin{cases} C & x_n = A \\ D & x_n = B \\ A & x_n = C \\ B & x_n = D \end{cases}$



- Prove a stronger claim by induction  $\forall n. x_n \neq B \wedge x_n \neq D$ 
  - $x_0 \neq B \wedge x_0 \neq D$
  - $x_m \neq B \wedge x_m \neq D \Rightarrow x_{m+1} \neq B \wedge x_{m+1} \neq D$

# Other properties

Formula	Property	Correct?	Inductive?
$\forall n. x_n \neq D \Rightarrow x_{n+1} \neq D$	The ball is not passed to D		
$\forall n. x_n \neq B \wedge x_n \neq D \Rightarrow x_{n+1} \neq B \wedge x_{n+1} \neq D$	The ball is not passed to B or D		
$\forall n. x_n = A \vee x_n = C \Rightarrow x_n \neq D$	If the ball is in A or C then it is not in D		
$\forall n. x_n \neq C$	The ball never gets to C		

# Other properties

Formula	Property	Correct?	Inductive?
$\forall n. x_n \neq D \Rightarrow x_{n+1} \neq D$	The ball is not passed to D	Yes	No
$\forall n. x_n \neq B \wedge x_n \neq D \Rightarrow x_{n+1} \neq B \wedge x_{n+1} \neq D$	The ball is not passed to B or D	Yes	Yes
$\forall n. x_n = A \vee x_n = C \Rightarrow x_n \neq D$	If the ball is in A or C then it is not in D	Vacuous	Yes
$\forall n. x_n \neq C$	The ball never gets to C	No	No


# A Bank Contract serving two customers

```
contract Bank {  
  enum account {Alice, Bob}  
  mapping (account => uint256) balances;  
  uint256 total;  
}
```


```
function deposit(account a, uint256 amount) {  
  require(total + amount >= amount);  
  balances[a] += amount;  
  total += amount;  
}
```

```
function withdraw(account b, uint256 amount) {  
  require(balances[b] >= amount);  
  balances[b] -= amount;  
  total -= amount;  
}
```

# Smart Contract $\approx$ Infinite Transition Systems(TR)




# Safety of Infinite State Systems



System  $S$  is **safe** if all the **reachable** states satisfy the property  $\varphi = \neg \text{Bad}$

# Inductive invariants



System  $S$  is **safe** if all the **reachable** states satisfy the property  $\varphi = \neg \text{Bad}$

System  $S$  is safe iff there exists an **inductive invariant**  $Inv$  :


$Init \subseteq Inv$  (**Initiation**)

if  $\sigma \in Inv$  and  $\sigma \rightarrow \sigma'$  then  $\sigma' \in Inv$  (**Consecution**)

$Inv \cap Bad = \emptyset$  (**Safety**)


# Counterexample To Induction (CTI)

- States  $\sigma, \sigma'$  are a CTI of  $Inv$  if:
  - $\sigma \in Inv$
  - $\sigma' \notin Inv$
  - $\sigma \rightarrow \sigma'$
- A CTI may indicate:
  - A bug in the system
  - A bug in the safety property
  - A bug in the inductive invariant
    - Too weak
    - Too strong





# Strengthening & Weakening from CTI



# The Bank Contract(Invariant)

```
contract Bank {  
  enum account {Alice, Bob}  
  mapping (account => uint256) balances;  
  uint256 total;  
}
```

```
function deposit(account a, uint256 amount) {  
  require(total + amount >= amount);  
  // balances[Alice] ≤ total  
  // balances[Bob] ≤ total  
  balances[a] += amount; // no overflow  
  total += amount;  
}
```

```
function withdraw(acount b, uint256 amount) {  
  require(balances[b] >= amount);  
  balances[b] -= amount;  
  total -= amount;  
}
```

This can be checked by Certora see rule NoOverflow1

# The Bank Contract(Invariant)

```
contract Bank {  
  enum account {Alice, Bob}  
  mapping (account => uint256) balances;  
  uint256 total;  
}
```

```
function deposit(account a, uint256 amount) {  
  require(total + amount >= amount);  
  // balances[Alice] ≤ total  
  // balances[Bob] ≤ total  
  balances[a] += amount; // no overflow  
  total += amount;  
}
```

```
function withdraw(acount b, uint256 amount) {  
  require(balances[b] >= amount);  
  balances[b] -= amount;  
  total -= amount;  
}
```

Alice 40  
Bob 20  
50 total



withdraw(Alice, 38)

Alice 2  
Bob 20  
12 total




# The Bank Contract(Invariant)

```
contract Bank {  
  enum account {Alice, Bob}  
  mapping (account => uint256) balances;  
  uint256 total;  
}
```


$\text{balances[Alice]} + \text{balances[Bob]} = \text{total}$

```
function deposit(account a, uint256 amount) {  
  require(total + amount >= amount);  
  // balances[Alice] + balances[Bob] = total  
  balances[a] += amount; // no overflow  
  total += amount;  
}
```

```
function withdraw(account b, uint256 amount) {  
  require(balances[b] >= amount);  
  balances[b] -= amount;  
  total -= amount;  
}
```



withdraw(Alice, 38)



# Proof No-Overflow

`deposit(alice, amount)`

`require(total + amount >= amount)`



$total + amount \leq maxint$



$balances(alice) + amount \leq maxint$

$balances(alice) + balances(bob) = total$



$balances(alice) \leq total$



# Inductiveness Proof

## deposit(alice, amount)

$$\text{balances.start(alice)} + \text{balances.start(bob)} = \text{total.start}$$

$$\text{balances(alice)} = \text{balances.start(alice)} + \text{amount}$$

$$\text{total} = \text{total.start} + \text{amount}$$

$$\text{balances(alice)} + \text{balances(bob)} = \text{total}$$

# In Certora...

invariant smallerTotal()

    getBalanceAlice() <= getTotal() && getBalanceBob() <= getTotal()

# In Certora...

```
rule noOverflow1(uint256 amount) {  
  require getTotal() + amount <= max_uint; // No overflow  
  requireInvariant smallerTotal();  
  assert getBalanceAlice() + amount <= max_uint, "potential overflow in Deposit of Alice" ;  
  assert getBalanceBob() + amount <= max_uint, "potential overflow in Deposit of Bob" ;  
}
```



# In Certora...

invariant consistentTotal() getTotal() == (getBalanceAlice()+getBalanceBob())

# In Certora...

```
rule noOverflow2(uint256 amount) {  
    require getTotal() + amount <= max_uint; // No overflow  
    requireInvariant consistentTotal();  
    assert getBalanceAlice() + amount <= max_uint, "potential overflow in Deposit of Alice" ;  
    assert getBalanceBob() + amount <= max_uint, "potential overflow in Deposit of Bob" ;  
}
```

# The Bank Contract with transfer

```
contract Bank {  
  enum account {Alice, Bob}  
  mapping (account => uint256) balances;  
  uint256 total;  
}
```

$\text{balances[Alice]} + \text{balances[Bob]} = \text{total}$

```
function transfer(account from, account to, uint256 amount) {  
  require(balances[from] >= amount);  
  uint256 newFrom = balances[from]-amount;  
  uint256 newTo = balances[to]+amount;  
  balances[from] = newFrom;  
  balances[to] = newTo;  
}
```

Alice 40  
Bob 20  
60 total



Transfer(Alice, Bob, 38)

Alice 2  
Bob 58  
60 total



# The Bank Contract with transfer


$$\text{balances[Alice]} + \text{balances[Bob]} = \text{total}$$

function  
require  
uint  
uint  
balance  
balance  
}

t) {

Alice 40 60 total  
Bob 20

60 total



# The Bank Contract with correct transfer

```
contract Bank {  
  enum account {Alice, Bob}  
  mapping (account => uint256) balances;  
  uint256 total;  
}
```

$\text{balances[Alice]} + \text{balances[Bob]} = \text{total}$

```
function transfer(account from, account to, uint256 amount) {  
  require(balances[from] >= amount);  
  require from != to;  
  uint256 newFrom = balances[from]-amount;  
  uint256 newTo = balances[to]+amount;  
  balances[from] = newFrom;  
  balances[to] = newTo;  
}
```

Alice 40  
Bob 20  
60 total


Transfer(Alice, Bob, 38)

Alice 2  
Bob 58  
60 total



# Inductiveness Proof

## $\text{transfer}(\text{from}, \text{to}, \text{amount})$



# Generalization: Unbounded Maps

- Need to express sums over unbounded number of addresses
- Supported in Certora via ghost state


# The Bank Contract(Inductive Invariant)

```
contract Bank {  
  mapping (address => uint256) balances;  
  uint256 total;  
}
```


```
function deposit(address a, uint256 amount) {  
  require(total + amount ≥ amount);  
  //  $\forall \alpha. \text{balances}[\alpha] \leq \text{total}$   
   $\text{balances}[a] += \text{amount};$  // no overflow  
  total += amount;  
}
```

```
function withdraw(address b, uint256 amount) {  
  require(balances[b] ≥ amount);  
  balances[b] -= amount;  
  total -= amount;  
}
```

$$\Sigma_{\alpha} \text{balances}[\alpha] = \text{total}$$



withdraw(Alice, 38)





# Some interesting invariants of DeFi

Invariant	Protocol
Solvency – sum of cash is greater than sum of commitments	Aave, Compound, Opyn, Siren, SushiSwap, tBTC
Cannot register illegal addresses	Celo
Price is within bounds	Compound, SushiSwap
Correlation between variables $\phi(x) \Leftrightarrow \psi(y)$	Furucombo, Syndicate, SushiSwap, Opyn
Wallet has enough signers	Parity wallet

# Takeaways

- A property can be true but not inductive!
- As a smart contract developer, inductiveness means “preserved by all public functions of the contract”
- The Certora prover checks inductiveness and provides counterexamples and proofs