

13. Control Flow Hijack

Seongil Wi



### **Software Bug**

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
Software bug is an error in a program

**Q**: If you only have time for fixing one bug out of hundred, which bug will you fix first?

### **Exploitable Bugs**



We often call an exploitable bug as a vulnerability




### **Exploitable Bugs**



We often call an exploitable bug as a vulnerability

**Exploitation** is an act of taking advantage of a bug to cause unintended behavior of the target program




Some vulnerabilities allow an attacker to run any *arbitrary code* on victim's machines without their consent


# **Control Flow Hijack**

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## **Control Flow Hijack**



### **Control Flow Hijack**



### The Classic Exploitation



The first computer worm (called Morris Worm) was born



#### **Robert Tappan Morris**

- Creator of the worm
- Cornell graduate
- Professor at MIT now

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### **Morris Worm**



Exploited a buffer overflow vulnerability

```
int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
  char line[512];
  /* omitted ... */
  gets(line); /* Buffer Overflow! */
  /* omitted ... */
```

This simple line allowed the Morris Worm to infect 10% of the internet computers in 1988

### Replicating Historic Exploitation

```
int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
  char line[512];
  gets(line);
  return 0;
}
```

Compile this program with:

```
$ gcc -mpreferred-stack-boundary=2
-00 -fno-stack-protector -fno-pic
-no-pie -z execstack -o morris
morris.c -m32
```

#### Compiler Warning (ignore this for now):

morris.c:(.text+0x11): warning: the `gets' function is dangerous and should not be used.

### gets(char \*s)

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Reads a line from STDIN into the buffer pointed to by s until a terminating new line or EOF, which it replaces with a NULL byte ('\0')

### Disassembled Code for the Morris Worm \*\*

\$ objdump -M intel -d morris

```
08049162 <main>:
 8049162:
                                push
                                       ebp
          55
 8049163: 89 e5
                                       ebp, esp
                                mov
 8049165: 81 ec 00 02 00 00
                                sub
                                       esp,0x200
 804916b: 8d 85 00 fe ff ff
                                lea
                                       eax, [ebp-0x200]
                                push
 8049171:
         50
                                       eax
 8049172: e8 b9 fe ff ff
                                call
                                       8049030 <gets@plt>
         83 c4 04
                                add
 8049177:
                                       esp,0x4
                                       eax,0x0
 804917a:
          b8 00 00 00 00
                                mov
 804917f:
          c9
                                leave
 8049180:
           c3
                                ret
```

return address

0xbffff70c

eip: 0x8049162

ebp: 0x0

esp: 0xbffff70c

**Execution context** 

08049162 <main>:

8049162: push ebp

8049163: mov ebp,esp

8049165: sub esp,0x200

804916b: lea eax, [ebp-0x200]

8049171: push eax

8049172: call 8049030; gets

8049177: add esp,0x4

804917a: mov eax,0x0

804917f: leave

8049180: ret

return address

old ebp (= 0)

0xbfffff70c

0xbffff708

eip: 0x8049163

ebp: 0x0

esp: 0xbffff708

**Execution context** 

08049162 <main>:

8049162: push ebp

8049163: mov ebp,esp

8049165: sub esp,0x200

804916b: lea eax, [ebp-0x200]

8049171: push eax

8049172: call 8049030; gets

8049177: add esp,0x4

804917a: mov eax,0x0

804917f: leave

8049180: ret

return address

old ebp (= 0)

0xbffff70c

0xbffff708

eip: 0x8049165

ebp: 0xbffff708

esp: 0xbffff708

**Execution context** 

08049162 <main>:

8049162: push ebp

8049163: mov ebp,esp

8049165: sub esp,0x200

804916b: lea eax,[ebp-0x200]

8049171: push eax


8049172: call 8049030; gets

8049177: add esp,0x4

804917a: mov eax,0x0

804917f: leave

8049180: ret



08049162 <main>: push ebp 8049162: 8049163: ebp, esp mov 8049165: sub esp,0x200 804916b: lea eax, [ebp-0x200] 8049171: push eax call 8049030 ; gets 8049172: esp,0x4 8049177: add eax,0x0804917a: mov 804917f: leave 8049180: ret



```
08049162 <main>:
                                         8049162:
                                                  push
                                                         ebp
return address
                                         8049163:
                                                         ebp, esp
                                                  mov
                 0xbffff70c
                                         8049165: sub
                                                         esp,0x200
old ebp (= 0)
                 0xbffff708
                                        804916b: lea
                                                         eax, [ebp-0x200]
                                         8049171:
                                                  push
                                                         eax
                                                         8049030 ; gets
                                         8049172: call
   line 0x200
                                                         esp,0x4
                                                   add
                                         8049177:
                             int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
                  eip: 0x80
                                char line[512];
                  ebp: 0xbf
                                gets(line);
                  esp: 0xbf
                                return 0;
                   Execution
 Virtual memory
```

return address

old ebp (= 0)

line

Virtual memory

0xbffff70c

0xbfffff708

eip: 0x8049171

ebp: 0xbffff708

esp: 0xbffff508

eax: 0xbffff508

**Execution context** 

08049162 <main>:

8049162: push ebp

8049163: mov ebp,esp

8049165: sub esp,0x200

804916b: lea eax, [ebp-0x200]

8049171: push eax

8049172: call 8049030; gets

8049177: add esp,0x4

804917a: mov eax,0x0

804917f: leave

8049180: ret

return address 0xbffff70c old ebp (= 0)0xbfffff708 line 0x8049172 0xbffff508 0xbfffff708 ebp: 0xbffff504 eax: 0xbffff508 **Execution context** 

Virtual memory

08049162 <main>: push ebp 8049162: 8049163: ebp, esp mov 8049165: sub esp,0x200 804916b: lea eax, [ebp-0x200] push 8049171: eax 8049172: call 8049030 ; gets esp,0x4 8049177: add eax,0x0804917a: mov 804917f: leave

ret

8049180:

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### **Analyzing the Vulnerability**


```
<main>:
                                          08049162
                                          8049162:
                                                    push
                                                           ebp
return address
                                          8049163:
                                                           ebp, esp
                                                    mov
                  0xbfffff70c
                                                           esp,0x200
                                          8049165:
                                                    sub
old ebp (= 0)
                  0xbffff708
                                          804916b:
                                                    lea
                                                           eax, [ebp-0x200]
                                          8049171:
                                                    push
                                                           eax
                                          8049172:
                                                           8049030 ; gets
                                                    call
    line
                                                           esp,0x4
                                          8049177:
                                                    add
                              int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
                  eip: 0x80
 0xbffff508
                                 char line[512];
                   ebp: 0xbf
                                 gets(line);
                   esp: 0xb1
                                                      Address of the
                                 return 0;
                  eax: 0xbf
                                                       variable line
                    Execution
 Virtual memory
```

#### 2


### **Analyzing the Vulnerability**

<main>: 08049162 push ebp .62: What if user input is 163: return address ebp, esp mov 0xb 520 consecutive 'A's? L65: sub esp,0x200 old ebp (= 0)0xbf<del>+++708</del> 04916b: lea eax, [ebp-0x200] 49171: push eax 8049172: call 8049030 ; gets line esp,0x4 8049177: add 804917a: eax,0x0mov 0x8049177 804917f: leave 0xbffff508 0xbfffff708 ebp: 8049180: ret esp: 0xbffff504 eax: 0xbffff508 **Execution context** Virtual memory









Virtual memory

0xbffff70c

0xbffff708

eip: 0x804917a

ebp: 0xbffff708

esp: 0xbffff508

eax: 0xbffff508

**Execution context** 

08049162 <main>:

8049162: push ebp

8049163: mov ebp,esp

8049165: sub esp,0x200

804916b: lea eax, [ebp-0x200]

8049171: push eax

8049172: call 8049030; gets

8049177: add esp,0x4

804917a: mov eax,0x0

804917f: leave

8049180: ret

return address old ebp (= 0)414<u>1</u>41

Virtual memory

0xbffff70c

0xbffff708

eip: 0x804917f

ebp: 0xbffff708

esp: 0xbffff508

eax: 0x0

**Execution context** 

08049162 <main>:

8049162: push ebp

8049163: mov ebp,esp

8049165: sub esp,0x200

804916b: lea eax,[ebp-0x200]

8049171: push eax

8049172: call 8049030; gets

8049177: add esp,0x4

804917a: mov eax,0x0

804917f: leave

8049180: ret

mov esp, ebp

return address old ebp (= 0)1 Tiple

0xbffff70c

eip: 0x8049180

ebp: 0x41414141

esp: 0xbffff70c

eax: 0x0

**Execution context** 

08049162 <main>:

8049162: push ebp

8049163: mov ebp,esp

8049165: sub esp,0x200

804916b: lea eax, [ebp-0x200]

8049171: push eax

8049172: call 8049030; gets

8049177: add esp,0x4

804917a: mov eax,0x0

804917f: leave

8049180: ret

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## **Analyzing the Vulnerability**

return address old ebp (= 0)line

0xbffff70c

eip: 0x8049180

ebp: 0x41414141

esp: 0xbffff70c

eax: 0x0

**Execution context** 

08049162 <main>:

8049162: push ebp

8049163: mov ebp,esp

8049165: sub esp,0x200

804916b: lea eax,[ebp-0x200]

8049171: push eax

8049172: call 8049030; gets

8049177: add esp,0x4

804917a: mov eax,0x0

804917f: leave

8049180: ret

pop eip

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## **Analyzing the Vulnerability**

return address old ebp (= 0)line

■ 0xbffff70c

eip: 0x41414141

ebp: 0x41414141

esp: 0xbffff70c

eax: 0x0

**Execution context** 

08049162 <main>:

8049162: push ebp

8049163: mov ebp,esp

8049165: sub esp,0x200

804916b: lea eax,[ebp-0x200]

8049171: push eax

8049172: call 8049030; gets

8049177: add esp,0x4

804917a: mov eax,0x0

804917f: leave

8049180: ret

pop eip

return address
old ebp (= 0)

0xbffff70c

Control flow hijacked!

eip: 0x41414141

ebp: 0x41414141

esp: 0xbffff70c

eax: 0x0

**Execution context** 

08049162 <main>:

8049162: push ebp

8049163: mov ebp,esp

8049165: sub esp,0x200

4916b: lea eax,[ebp-0x200]

49171: push eax

49172: call 8049030 ; gets

€049177: add esp,0x4

804917a: mov eax,0x0

804917f: leave

8049180: ret

pop eip

### So Far ...




\*

 We hijacked the control flow of the program, i.e., we can jump to any where!


But, where do we jump to?

We want to inject some arbitrary code to run!

### Return-to-Stack Exploit




### Return-to-Stack Exploit





Return-to-Stack Exploit



### Executing Shellcode



- Shellcode can run any arbitrary logic
  - Download /etc/passwd
  - Install malicious software (malware)

**—** . . .

- Typically, executing /bin/sh is enough
  - This is the most powerful attack: we can run arbitrary commands
  - You can also achieve this with relatively *small piece of code*
  - This is the reason why we call it as shellcode (code that typically runs shell)



### **Shellcoding**



How to write code that executes /bin/sh?

## execve() Function in C Library

\$ man execve

```
EXECVE(2)
                   Linux Programmer's Manual
                                                     EXECVE(2)
NAME
     execve - execute program
SYNOPSIS
                                  Executable path
     #include <unistd.h>
     int execve(const char *filename, char *const argv[],
                    char *const envp[]);
```

Environment variables

Command line arguments

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### Shellcode in C

```
/*
    int execve(const char *filename, char *const argv[],
        char *const envp[]);
*/
#include <stdio.h>
void main(void) {
  char* argv[] = { "/bin/sh", NULL };
  execve("/bin/sh", argv, NULL);
```

## Compile with (-static) Option

```
08049162 <main>:
8049162: 55
                               push
                                      ebp
8049163: 89 e5
                                      ebp, esp
                               mov
8049165: 83 ec 08
                               sub
                                      esp,0x8
8049168: c7 45 f8 08 a0 04 08
                                      DWORD PTR [ebp-0x8],0x804a008
                               mov
804916f: c7 45 fc 00 00 00 00
                                      DWORD PTR [ebp-0x4],0x0
                               mov
8049176: 6a 00
                               push
                                      0x0
                                      eax, [ebp-0x8]
8049178: 8d 45 f8
                               lea
804917b: 50
                               push
                                      eax
 804917c: 68 08 a0 04 08
                               push
                                    0x804a008
                               call
8049181:
         e8 c7 29 02 00
                                      806c4b0 < execve>
```

Is it possible to use this assembly for our exploitation?

## Challenge #1: Null Bytes

```
08049162 <main>:
8049162: 55
                               push
                                      ebp
                                      ebp, esp
8049163: 89 e5
                               mov
                                      esp,0x8
8049165: 83 ec 08
                               sub
8049168: c7 45 f8 08 a0 04 08 mov
                                      DWORD PTR [ebp-0x8],0x804a008
804916f: c7 45 fc 00 00 00 00 mov
                                      DWORD PTR [ebp-0x4],0x0
                               push
 8049176: 6a 00
                                      0x0
8049178: 8d 45 f8
                               lea
                                      eax, [ebp-0x8]
                               push
804917b: 50
                                      eax
                               push
 804917c: 68 08 a0 04 08
                                      0x804a008
                               call
8049181: e8 c7 29 02 00
                                      806c4b0 < execve>
```

### gets(char \*s)





Reads a line from STDIN into the buffer pointed to by s until a terminating new line or EOF, which it replaces with a NULL byte ('\0')

## Challenge #1: Null Bytes

```
08049162 <main>:
8049162: 55
                                       ebp
                                push
                                       ebp, esp
 8049163: 89 e5
                                mov
                                       esp,0x8
 8049165: 83 ec 08
                                sub
8049168: c7 45 f8 08 a0 04 08 mov
                                       DWORD PTR [ebp-0x8],0x804a008
804916f: c7 45 fc 00 00 00 00 mov
                                       DWORD PTR [ebp-0x4],0x0
                                push
 8049176: 6a 00
                                       0x0
                                       eax,[ebp-0x8]
 8049178: 8d 45 f8
                                lea
 804917b: 50
                                push
                                       eax
 804917c: 68 08 a0 04 08
                                push 0x804a008
 8049191 - 09 - 67 - 20 - 62 - 69
```

**Solution:** 

Write your own assembly code (shellcode) that does not contain any zero (NULL) byte

## **Challenge #2: String Pointer**

```
08049162 <main>:
8049162: 55
                                push
                                       ebp
                                       ebp, esp
8049163: 89 e5
                                mov
                                       esp,0x8
8049165: 83 ec 08
                                sub
8049168: c7 45 f8 08 a0 04 08 mov
                                       DWORD PTR [ebp-0x8],0x804a008
804916f: c7 45 fc 00 00 00 00 mov
                                       DWORD PTR [ebp-0x4],0x0
8049176: 6a 00
                                push
                                       0x0
8049178: 8d 45 f8
                                       eax, [ebp-0x8]
                                lea
                                                       Pointer to "/bin/sh"
804917b: 50
                                push
                                       eax
804917c: 68 08 a0 04 08
                                push
                                       0x804a008
8049181: e8 c7 29 02 00
                                       806c4b0 < execve>
                                call
```

#### **Solution:**

Push "/bin/sh" string to stack and get the pointer from esp

## Challenge #3: External Call (execve)



```
08049162 <main>:
 8049162: 55
                                        ebp
                                push
                                        ebp, esp
 8049163: 89 e5
                                mov
 8049165: 83 ec 08
                                        esp,0x8
                                sub
 8049168: c7 45 f8 08 a0 04 08 mov
                                        DWORD PTR [ebp-0x8],0x804a008
 804916f: c7 45 fc 00 00 00 00 mov
                                        DWORD PI
                                                Just a wrapper function
 8049176: 6a 00
                                push
                                       0x0
                                                in the C library (libc)
 8049178: 8d 45 f8
                                        eax,[eb
                                lea
 804917b: 50
                                push
                                        eax
 804917c: 68 08 a0 04 08
                                push
                                        0x804a008
                                call
 8049181: e8 c7 29 02 00
                                        806c4b0 <
                                                   execve>
```

**Solution:** 

We can just inline this function

## Challenge #3: External Call (execve)

```
0806c4b0 < execve>:
 806c4b0:
                                push
                                       ebx
            53
806c4b1: 8b 54 24 10
                                       edx, DWORD PTR [esp+0x10]
                                mov
 806c4b5: 8b 4c 24 0c
                                       ecx, DWORD PTR [esp+0xc]
                                mov
                                       ebx, DWORD PTR [esp+0x8]
 806c4b9: 8b 5c 24 08
                                mov
 806c4bd: b8 0b 00 00 00
                                       eax,0xb
                                mov
                                       08x0
 806c4c2:
         cd 80
                                int
```

System Call!

**Solution:** 

We can just inline this function

## **System Calls**

### allow a program to interface with OS

0806c4b0 <\_\_execve>:

806c4b0: 53 push ebx

806c4b1: 8b 54 24 10 mov edx, DWORD PTR [esp+0x10]

806c4b5: 8b 4c 24 0c mov ecx, DWORD PTR [esp+0xc]

806c4b9: 8b 5c 24 08 mov ebx, DWORD PTR [esp+0x8]

806c4bd: b8 0b 00 00 00 mov eax,0xb

806c4c2: cd 80 int 0x80

Register	Meaning
eax	System call number
ebx	1 <sup>st</sup> argument
есх	2 <sup>nd</sup> argument
edx	3 <sup>rd</sup> argument

Register	Meaning
esi	4 <sup>th</sup> argument
edi	5 <sup>th</sup> argument
ebp	6 <sup>th</sup> argument
eax	Return value

## List of System Calls for x86

See: /usr/include/i386-linux-gnu/asm/unistd\_32.h

```
NR restart syscall 0
#define
#define
          NR exit 1
#define
          NR fork 2
#define
          NR read 3
#define
          NR write 4
#define
          NR open 5
          NR close 6
#define
#define
          NR waitpid 7
#define
          NR creat 8
#define
          NR link 9
                                  0xb
          NR unlink 10
#define
#define
          NR execve 11
#define
          NR chdir 12
```

## Writing a Shellcode



• Shellcode should run regardless of the address it is loaded. In other words, it should be *position independent*.



## Writing a Shellcode

.intel\_syntax noprefix

; This is a comment

Assemble this code to see the binary

## **Final Exploitation**



ebf1aa... 414141... 6000000x0

0xbffff70c

0xbffff508

•

 Fill the buffer with our shellcode (Let's assume that it is 31 bytes)

- The rest of the buffer (481 bytes = 512-31) can be filled with any characters
- The old ebp can be filled with any characters (4 bytes)
- The return address should point to the shellcode (0xbffff508)<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>The buffer address should differ from machine to machine. Thus, it is necessary to obtain the right address from a debugger (e.g., GDB)

Virtual memory

### **Caveat**





We assume that we know the exact address of the buffer

This is very difficult even without modern defenses such as ASLR

## **Using GDB**



- GDB reference: <a href="http://www.yolinux.com/TUTORIALS/GDB-Commands.html">http://www.yolinux.com/TUTORIALS/GDB-Commands.html</a>
- It is recommended to always turn on the Intel syntax by using this command:
  - \$ echo "set disassembly-flavor intel" > ~/.gdbinit

## Exploit w/ or w/o GDB

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\*

The buffer address identified through GDB is not the same as it without GDB

Thus, our exploit doesn't work outside GDB!

## Why Different?



Environment variable

0xbffff508

0x00000000

ebf1aa.. 414<u>1</u>41...

## The key problem is **Environment Variables**

- GDB puts extra environment variables
- Each machine has different environment variables

Not the start address of the line

## Making Exploit Robust: NOP Sled

- NOP sled (a.k.a., NOP slide) is used to make the exploit robust against different buffer addresses
  - -One-byte NO-OP (NOP) instruction is equivalent to xchg eax, eax
  - -0x90 represents the NOP instruction

## Making Exploit Robust: NOP Sled



- NOP sled (a.k.a., NOP slide) is used to make the exploit robust against different buffer addresses
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## Making Exploit Robust: NOP Sled

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## Making Exploit Robust: NOP Sled

- NOP sled (a.k.a., NOP slide) is used to make the exploit robust against different buffer addresses
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  - -0x90 represents the NOP instruction

# Off-by-One Error

### **Subtle Error**



```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#define BUFSIZE (512)
void printer(char* str) {
  char buf[BUFSIZE];
  strcpy(buf, str);
  printf("%s\n", buf);
int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
 if ( argc < 2 | | strlen(argv[1]) > BUFSIZE ) return -1;
  printer(argv[1]);
  return 0;
```

### **Subtle Error**



```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#define BUFSIZE (512)

void printer(char* str)
  char buf[BUFSIZE]:
  strcpy(buf, str);
  printf("%s\n", buf);
}
```

We can just overwrite 1 byte NULL beyond the size of the buffer (buf)

But, some off-by-one bugs are exploitable!

```
int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
  if ( argc < 2 || strlen(argv[1]) > BUFSIZE ) return -1;
  printer(argv[1]);
  return 0;
}
```

### **Subtle Error**

```
#include <stdio.h>
                                 Exercise: Can you
#include <string.h>
#define BUFSIZE (512)
                                 draw the stack
void printer(char* str) {
                                 diagram?
 char buf[BUFSIZE];
 strcpy(buf, str);
 printf("%s\n", buf);
int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
 if ( argc < 2 | | strlen(argv[1]) > BUFSIZE ) return -1;
 printer(argv[1]);
 return 0;
```

## Off-by-one Bugs Can be Exploitable

return address

old ebp (=0)

str

return address

old ebp

buf

Virtual memory



## Off-by-one Bugs Can be Exploitable

return address

old ebp (=0)

str

return address

old ebp

buf

Virtual memory

## **GDB** Usage

\*

- Start: \$ gdb <your binary>
- Disassemble:

```
(gdb) disass <func name>
```

Breakpoint setting:

```
(gdb) b *<address>
```

• Run:

```
(gdb) r
```

Step:

```
(gdb) step # Go to next instruction, diving into function
```

(gdb) next # Go to next instruction but don't dive into function

(gdb) continue # Continue normal execution

## **GDB** Usage



```
(gdb) i r <register_name>
(gdb) info register
```

Memory information:

```
(gdb) x/16w <address>
(gdb) x/4w <register_name>
```

•••

```
x/nfu <address>
    Print memory.
    n: How many units to print (default 1).
    f: Format character (like "print").
    u: Unit.

Unit is one of:
    b: Byte,
    h: Half-word (two bytes)
```

w: Word (four bytes)

g: Giant word (eight bytes)).



## Recommended Reading

### **GDB** Cheatsheet

-https://darkdust.net/files/GDB%20Cheat%20Sheet.pdf

Smashing the Stack for Fun and Profit, Phrack 1996, by Alphe One

-http://phrack.org/issues/49/14.html

## Summary



- Only some bugs are exploitable
- Some exploits allow an attacker to hijack the control flow of the program and to run any arbitrary code
- Return-to-stack exploit puts a shellcode into a stack buffer and jumps to it by overwriting the return address
- We can make return-to-stack exploit robust by using NOP sleds
- Off-by-one errors can sometimes be exploitable

## Question?