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How UN Peacekeeping Missions Enforce Peace Agreements

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TITLE
How UN Peacekeeping Missions Enforce Peace Agreements

ABSTRACT
How do UN peacekeeping missions enforce peace agreements, and what effect do higher rates of enforcement have on agreement implementation and conflict recidivism? Peace agreement enforcement forms a central component of peacekeeping effectiveness, yet missions are often mandated to enforce a minority of agreement provisions, and they vary across both time and space in the ways in which they do so. I identify the three dimensions along which enforcement operates—the proportion and type of provisions that missions are mandated to enforce, alongside their mandated level of involvement in their implementation—and theorize about their positive effects on agreement implementation and conflict termination. Analyzing the Peacekeeping Enforcement Dataset, an original dataset of the enforcement patterns of all UN peacekeeping missions (1989-2015), I find that each dimension of enforcement has, at various time points, a distinct impact on agreement implementation and preventing conflict recidivism.

VERIFICATION MATERIALS
The data and materials required to verify the computational reproducibility of the results, procedures, and analyses in this article are available on the *American Journal of Political Science* Dataverse within the Harvard Dataverse Network, at: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/NBIKED.

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INTRODUCTION

Civil wars commonly come to an end through the adoption of comprehensive peace agreements ("peace agreement" or "agreement") (Kreutz 2010). Agreement adoption represents a significant moment in a country's transition from war to peace: not only are these agreements the result of years of sustained negotiation among warring parties; they also depart from traditional ceasefire agreements to include an array of provisions[1] committing the signatories and post-conflict society to processes of economic, political, and social reform in order to address the structural causes of conflict (Mac Ginty, Joshi, and Lee, 2019; Walter 1999). Tajikistan's 1997 General Agreement, for example, which sought to bring the country's five-year civil war to a permanent end, included provisions not just for instituting an immediate ceasefire but also for transforming the country's media system and reforming its judiciary, military, and police.

These agreements are arduous to implement. Consequently, the United Nations (UN) regularly deploys peacekeeping missions ("missions") to enforce the process (Joshi 2013; Stedman, Cousens, and Rothchild 2002). Previous scholarship on UN missions has demonstrated their robust effectiveness at reducing violence and ending conflict (Di Salvatore 2019; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fjelde, Hultman, and Nilsson 2019; Fortna 2004a, 2008; Hegre, Hultman, and Nygård 2019; Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2016; Kathman and Benson 2019). Their effectiveness relies, in no small part, on the enforcement of these agreements (Doyle and Sambanis

[1] Provisions are "goal-oriented reform[s] or stipulation[s] [in an agreement] that [are] costly to one or [more] actors, falling under relatively discrete policy domain[s]" (Joshi, Quinn and Regan 2015, 1).

2006; Fortna 2004a; 2008; Joshi, Lee and Mac Ginty 2017; Maekawa, Arı, and Gizelis 2019; Mattes and Savun 2010; Stedman 1997; Walter 1997, 2002). Indeed, the *vast majority* (82 percent) of post-Cold War missions' mandates make explicit reference to the enforcement of peace agreements—including those for the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) and the corresponding General Agreement.[2] However, these studies often (implicitly or explicitly) treat the enforcement of peace agreements and their constitutive provisions as a homogenous condition, yet missions are rarely mandated to enforce[3] peace agreements in their entirety, instead being mandated to enforce, on average, a *minority* (45 percent) of agreement provisions at any given time.[4] UNMOT was mandated, for example, to enforce the Agreement's ceasefire and dispute resolution provisions, yet it was *not* mandated to enforce the agreement's judicial, media, military, or police reform provisions. If peacekeeping enforcement is crucial both to agreement implementation and conflict termination (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004b, 2008; Joshi, Lee, and Mac Ginty 2017; Stedman 1997; Walter 2002),[5] how do missions actually enforce peace

[2] Per the author's analyses.

[3] Throughout this article, I use the term "mandated enforcement" to refer the directive of a mission to engage *and* the subsequent involvement of the mission in a particular provision activity, in order to promote its fulfillment. Crucially, I use the qualifying term "mandated" because "enforcement," when used on its own, implies achievement or fulfillment.

[4] Derived from the author's original data. See below.

[5] More specifically, armed conflict among the major warring parties. While it only represents one conceptualization and measurement of peace (Höglund and Kovacs 2010), conflict termination is one of the primary outcomes that peace agreements and UN missions aim to achieve.

agreements, and what effect do higher rates of enforcement have on agreement implementation and patterns of armed conflict?

While past scholarship has given broad classifications to the different purposes that missions can serve (e.g., Doyle and Sambanis, 2006; Fortna, 2008; Joshi 2013), recent scholarship has begun to study the activities of missions (Blair, Di Salvatore, and Smidt 2022; Diehl and Druckman 2018; Di Salvatore et al. 2022; Lloyd 2021). However, nuance and variation in the peace agreement enforcement practices of missions remains largely underexplored in both research agendas. As such, much remains to be understood, theoretically and empirically, about how mission enforcement of peace agreements operates in practice and the downstream effects of variation therein.

I answer these questions in three steps. First, I identify missions' mandated agreement enforcement patterns along three dimensions: (1) the *proportion* of peace agreement provisions that missions are mandated to enforce, (2) the *types* of provisions that missions are mandated to enforce, and (3) the *level* of missions' mandated involvement in the provision implementation process. These dimensions, I demonstrate, capture the primary dimensions along which missions are empirically mandated to enforce peace agreements. Second, I theorize about the independent, positive impact that these dimensions of enforcement have on agreement implementation and conflict termination, including the mediating role of the former on the latter.

Third, I test my claims by leveraging insights from the Peacekeeping Enforcement Dataset (Mailhot 2023). Moving beyond past efforts to map the characteristics and practices of missions, this time-series cross sectional dataset identifies, in detail, patterns of continuity and change along the three primary dimensions of peace agreement enforcement—the proportion and type of provisions that missions enforce, alongside their level of involvement in the implementation

process—for *all* UN peacekeeping missions deployed between 1989 and 2015. Consistent with my argument, I find that both the mandated enforcement of more peace agreement provisions and more direct forms of involvement are positively and statistically significantly associated with peace agreement implementation—especially in the early post-conflict period. However, I find that the relationship between each dimension of mandated enforcement and conflict termination is independently insignificant, yet the impact of the mandated enforcement of specific types of provisions—here, security-oriented provisions—and conflict recidivism is significantly mediated by peace agreement implementation itself. These results suggest that missions may be most impactful when they prioritize the enforcement of more of the provisions in peace agreements and engage in deeper, more direct forms of involvement in the early post-conflict period. Moreover, while they imply that higher levels of peace agreement enforcement may not reliably contribute to bringing about a durable end to armed conflict, these findings also reinforce others' assessments that conflict termination necessarily depends upon the commitments made by the warring parties (Bell and Badanjak 2019). Taken together, these results demonstrate the unique, divergent impact that each dimension of mandated enforcement has on two key outcomes of normative importance to researchers, practitioners, and policymakers. I employ multiple estimation strategies, including two-way fixed effects, and conduct additional analyses to help address the various biases and endogeneity concerns that often accompany the study of peacekeeping, peace agreements, and post-conflict peace.

Ultimately, this article draws attention to and empirically examines a set of crucial—but heretofore-underspecified—sources of theoretical and empirical variation linking UN peacekeeping missions to peace agreement implementation and patterns of armed conflict. In doing so, it both expands our understanding of how peace agreement enforcement operates and

provides researchers, policymakers, and practitioners with a clearer sense of the processes through which missions may effectively contribute to the post-conflict peace process.

PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF PEACE AGREEMENTS

Established scholarship has consistently demonstrated that UN peacekeeping missions play a crucial role in the enforcement of peace agreements. First, past research has drawn our attention to the immense difficulties that warring parties face credibly committing both to agreement implementation and conflict termination without confirmation that their opponents will act accordingly (Fearon 1995; Reiter 2009). This research agenda argues that missions can serve to enforce peace agreements by observing the activities of the agreement signatories and imposing material (e.g., sanctions, casualties) or immaterial (e.g., audience costs, social capital) costs if they renege on their end of the bargain (Fortna 2004a; 2004b; 2008; Howard 2019; Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2016; Joshi 2013; Matanock 2020). In doing so, they offer various guarantees to the warring parties, thereby reducing the insecurities they face transitioning out of conflict and increasing the costs of defection (Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007).

Second, established scholarship has also demonstrated that peacekeeping missions play a crucial role in the enforcement of peace agreements by assisting in the implementation process itself. Here, missions provide the support necessary to overcome the obstacles of implementing agreements (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Huber and Karim 2018; Joshi and Quinn 2017; Stanley and Holiday 1997), especially in contexts where warring parties may desire change but lack the capacity or political capital (Maekawa, Arı, and Gizelis 2019). In doing so, peacekeeping missions reduce the direct costs that the warring parties engaging in the peace process, increasing their ability and likelihood of doing so.

These efforts to theorize and empirically examine mission effectiveness are invaluable. As Walter, Howard, and Fortna (2021) remind us, missions are *extraordinarily* successful at reducing and preventing conflict, and the repeated focus on the enforcement of peace agreements, to do so, cannot be understated (e.g., Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2003; 2008; Joshi, Lee, and Mac Ginty 2017; Walter 1997; 2002). However, this scholarship often overlooks the degree to which missions actually enforce peace agreements: by focusing, importantly, on variation in mission type, mission personnel characteristics, or separate activities of missions altogether, this research agenda often treats agreement enforcement as uniform and consistent: either missions are deployed to enforce a peace agreement in its entirety, or they are not.

Indeed, this presumption is not without a degree of rhetorical basis: UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 729 (1992), for example, states that the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador's (ONSUAL) primary objective is the "verification and monitoring of the ***implementation of all of the agreements*** [Chapultepec Peace Accords]."[6] Yet while the Accords included provisions for rebuilding the country's media and education system, implementing an economic development program, and reforming public services, the same resolution mandates that ONUSAL initially enforce a separate subset of the agreement's provisions: a ceasefire arrangement, a restructuring of the Salvadoran security sector and judiciary, and a reforming of the country's electoral system. Thus, what we miss when we treat enforcement as a fixed condition applied to peace agreements as a whole—and not a highly variant process applied at the level of the agreement's individual, constitutive provisions—is (1) a nuanced understanding of the dimensions along which

[6] Bold and italics added for emphasis.

enforcement varies empirically and, consequently, (2) a greater appreciation of the ways in which such variation affects two key outcomes: agreement implementation and conflict termination.

DIMENSIONS OF ENFORCEMENT, AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION, AND CONFLICT TERMINATION

My point of departure is this empirical variation in the enforcement practices of peacekeeping missions. In this section I explicate and theorize about the ways in which each of these three dimensions of enforcement—(1) the *proportion* of provisions mandated to enforced, (2) the *type* of provisions mandated to enforced, and (3) the *level* of mandated involvement—contributes to agreement implementation and the prevention of conflict recidivism.

Dimension I: *Proportion* of Provisions Mandated to Enforce

The first dimension of enforcement is the *proportion* of provisions missions are mandated to enforce. Missions may be mandated to enforce a small proportion of agreement provisions; the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon was mandated throughout much of the 1990s to enforce one of the 18 provisions in the 1989 Taif Accord (6 percent). They may also be mandated to enforce higher proportions of agreement provisions; the United Nations Operation in Mozambique was mandated at different times to enforce 12 of the 24 provisions in the 1992 General Peace Agreement (50 percent).

Because enforcement can shift warring parties' incentives and behavior, there is reason to expect the proportion of provisions that missions are mandated to enforce to play an important role in the agreement implementation process. Missions may coerce warring parties to enact change (Howard 2019). This was the case of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, which

maintained the authority to dismiss local officials working in the institutions whose reform provisions it was mandated to enforce (Wang 1996, 18). Missions may also induce actors to implement more provisions by providing material or immaterial incentives (e.g., employment opportunities or political resources) (Fortna 2008, 92). The United Nations Mission in Bosnia (UNMIBH) had committed the major warring factions to the peace process with its enforcement of a power-sharing arrangement (Day 2000). Missions may enforce provisions by transforming warring parties' beliefs and perceptions (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 900; Howard 2019). In El Salvador, ONUSAL enforced the implementation of the Accords' police reform provision by persuading officials of the necessity of a professional, integrated police force detached from the wartime security institutions (Stanley 1990, 120-121).

Missions that are mandated to enforce more peace agreements are in a better position to influence the behavior of warring parties across a greater proportion of provisions, bringing the parties more in line with the agreement's obligations. They can confirm more instances of implementation commitment (or reneging) and reward (or punish) parties accordingly. Thus, my first hypothesis is as follows:

> **Hypothesis 1a (Dimension I): The higher the proportion of peace agreement provisions that missions are mandated to enforce, the higher the rate of peace agreement implementation.**

Dimension II: The Mandated Enforcement of Specific *Types* of Provisions

By their very inclusion in peace agreements, each provision is believed to contribute to the peace process. However, different *types* of provisions may vary in the ways in which they do so.

For example, provisions for economic development and the promotion of women's rights aim to restructure the country's political, economic, and social system to establish the conditions which make conflict recidivism unlikely in the long run. However, security-oriented provisions pertaining, for example, to demobilization and power-sharing can serve to address many of the first-order concerns combatants face participating in the agreement implementation process.

First, security-oriented provisions address the immediate security concerns of the warring parties by forcing them to engage in threat-reducing processes. While other types of provision arrangements, such as media and education reform, may set the stages for peace, in the long-run, security-oriented reforms tie the hands of the warring parties (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008) by asking them to put down their arms or demobilize their combatants. In this way, they help set the stage for agreement implementation and the broader peace process to develop, in the immediate term, by helping address the insecurities that the warring parties face participating in the process.

Second, security-oriented provisions also help to address political legitimacy concerns. Peace agreements are contentious, with members of the warring parties often questioning their utility and benefits. By allowing warring parties to gain a foothold in the post-conflict political arena, security-oriented provisions—especially those relating to political-institutional arrangements—help to legitimate the peace agreement and broader peace process (Joshi, Lee and Mac Ginty 2017). When these actors perceive the agreement and peace process as legitimate, they are more likely to engage with them.

While security-oriented provisions help build the conditions for agreement implementation, peacekeeping missions that provide the crucial backing—but only when mandated to do so. Missions develop transparent means of gathering and sharing information on the warring parties' activities, and they can protect warring parties when implementing these

security-oriented provisions (Walter 1999). They can also absorb much of the political fallout when the warring parties engage with contentious security-oriented provisions (Huber and Karim 2018). These practices describe an array of missions, including the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) (UNSC 2007b), UNMIL (UNSC 2004b), and the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire's (UNOCI) (UNSC 2004).

Ultimately, the types of provisions that missions are mandated to enforce may have a differential effect on the broader implementation process. Based on this discussion, I put forth the following hypothesis:

> **Hypothesis 2a (Dimension II): The more security-oriented provisions that missions are mandated to enforce, the higher the rate of peace agreement implementation.**

Dimension III: *Level of Involvement* in the Provision Implementation Process

The third dimension of mandated enforcement is the *level* to which missions are involved in the provision implementation process. More specifically, missions may be either *indirectly* or *directly* involved in the implementation process: while the former represents hands-off observing or witnessing of the implementation process, the latter dictates that the mission actively partake in the implementation process. There are three ways in which this dimension varies, empirically, across time and space.

First, a mission can vary its level of involvement in implementing *different* provisions *at the same time*. For example, UNMOT was mandated in 1997 to "***monitor*** the assembly of [United Tajik Opposition] fighters and their…disarmament" while also "***assist[ing]*** in the reintegration

into government power structures or demobilization of ex-combatants" (UNSC 1997).[7] Here, UNMOT was indirectly involved (via *monitoring*) in implementing the disarmament provisions of Tajikistan's 1997 General Agreement and directly involved (via *assisting*) in implementing the agreement's demobilization and reintegration provisions.

Second, missions may vary their level of involvement in implementing the *same* provision *at different times*. An example is the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), UNMIBH, and the Dayton Accords' human rights provision. In its final mandate, UNPROFOR relied on indirect forms of enforcement by praising "the parties' commitment, as specified in the Peace Agreement, to securing…the highest level of internationally recognized human rights…" (UNSC 1995). In contrast, when it took over for UNPROFOR a week later, UNMIBH was mandated to *work closely with* Bosnia's new Human Rights Commission in order to enforce the agreement's human rights provision (UNSC 1995). This represents a more direct form of engagement.

Third, *different* missions can vary in their level of involvement in implementing the *same* types of provisions *at the same time.* A clear example is UNMIN and UNOCI's mandated enforcement of the disarmament provisions in, respectively, the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) and the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (2007). In its initial mandate, UNMIN was mandated to enforce the disarmament of the Maoist rebels and Nepalese forces by "***[m]onitoring*** the management of arms and armed personnel…in line with the provisions of the [CPA]" (UNSC 2007b). In contrast, UNOCI's mandate, extended just two weeks earlier, included enforcement of the disarmament provision by "***assisting*** the Government of Côte d'Ivoire in undertaking the regrouping of all the Ivorian forces involved and…their disarmament…" (UNSC

[7] Bold and italics added for emphasis.

2007a). While the former mandate ("*monitor*") exhibits a passive, indirect level of involvement with combatant disarmament, the latter mandate ("*assist*") adopts a more active, direct level of involvement.

More direct forms of involvement may improve agreement implementation for two reasons. First, agreement signatories may genuinely desire to implement provisions yet lack the expertise or capacity to do so. Missions that are more directly involved in the implementation process—for example, those which *administer* (versus *monitor*) the process—can help governments overcome such challenges by providing the resources necessary for implementation (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; 2006; Maekawa, Arı, and Gizelis 2019). A clear instance is UNMIL, which was authorized for 14 years to *administer*, with nearly 5 billion USD and 14,000 personnel (Mailhot, Kriner, and Karim 2022), the police reform provision in the Accra Peace Agreement.

Second, deeper involvement can better mitigate the parties' credible commitment problems. Indirect forms of engagement (e.g., *report*, *verification*) improve the chances of agreement implementation because of the ability of information sharing to impact public and private support for the warring parties. However, these forms of involvement may still allow for a degree of reneging. Take, for example, UNMIN's verification of the CPA's disarmament provision. In May 2009, Nepal's then-interim Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal was able to deceive UNMIN of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) troop totals: by self-reporting a reduction in personnel totals from 35,000 to 20,000 combatants, the PLA maintained its true personnel total (8,000) while also appearing to comply with the proportional reduction component of the disarmament provision (*India Today* 2009). Indeed, indirect involvement—here, *verification*—had promoted a minimum degree of rhetorical compliance but fell short of ensuring complete implementation. A more direct form of involvement, such as *administering*, may have

mitigated deception, thereby ensuring a higher rate of implementation. My third hypothesis is as follows:

> **Hypothesis 3a (Dimension III): The more directly involved missions are mandated to be in the implementation of peace agreement provisions, the higher the rate of peace agreement implementation.**

Mandated Enforcement and the Prevention of Conflict Recidivism

While I have focused thus far on agreement implementation as the primary outcome, each dimension of mandated enforcement may also have an impact on the conflict dynamics among agreement signatories. By being mandated to enforce a higher proportion of peace agreement provisions (Dimension I), or involving themselves more directly in the implementation process (Dimension III), missions are better positioned to force the warring parties to offer costly concessions (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Hoddie and Hartzell 2003); provide security guarantees (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; 2007); and institutionalize stability- and equality-promoting measures (Mac Ginty, Joshi, and Lee 2019; Walter 1997). Each of these procedures reduces the chances of conflict recidivism by diverting attention and resources away from conflict, thereby increasing both the costs of war and the benefits of channeling conflict through political institutions.

The impact of peacekeeping missions may be particularly true when it comes to the mandated enforcement of security-oriented provisions (Dimension II): because one-sided disarmament, combined with first-strike advantages, open former combatants up to tremendous vulnerability (Fearon 1995), the warring parties often face heightened insecurities transitioning out of armed conflict (Reiter 2009). Security-oriented provisions in both spheres are thus

especially crucial for mitigating challenges to durably ending armed conflict (Joshi, Quinn, and Regan 2015). When missions are mandated to enforce such provisions, they provide an additional layer of accountability and protection, reducing the likelihood of conflict recidivism (Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007; Stedman, 1997; Walter 1997; 2002).

Based on this discussion, I put forth the following three hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1b (Dimension I): The higher the proportion of peace agreement provisions that missions are mandated to enforce, the longer the time period without conflict recidivism among agreement signatories.

Hypothesis 2b (Dimension II): The more security-oriented provisions that missions are mandated to enforce, the longer the time period without conflict recidivism among agreement signatories.

Hypothesis 3b (Dimension III): The more directly involved missions are mandated to be in the implementation of peace agreement provisions, the longer the time period without conflict recidivism among agreement signatories.

Because peace agreements are adopted by warring parties, and the warring parties ultimately determine instances of conflict recidivism (Bell and Badanjak 2019; Joshi and Quinn 2017), agreement implementation itself is often an important determinant of conflict termination (Joshi and Quinn 2017). In these contexts, peacekeeping missions promote peace agreement implementation which, in turn, helps prevent the return of armed conflict. Thus, while each

dimension of mandated enforcement may contribute independently to preventing conflict recidivism, they may be particularly impactful when they operate *through* the agreement implementation process itself. My final hypothesis is as follows:

> **Hypothesis 4 (Agreement Implementation Mediation): Peace agreement implementation mediates the relationship between each dimension of mandated enforcement and conflict recidivism among agreement signatories.**

RESEARCH DESIGN

I test these hypotheses by combining data on peace agreements and armed conflict with an original, comprehensive dataset on the mandated enforcement practices of *all* UN peacekeeping missions (1989 – 2015). I briefly discuss the former before describing the structure of the latter and their collection process.

Outcome I: Peace Agreement Implementation

Hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 3a examine the relationship between each dimension of mandated enforcement and agreement implementation. These claims rely on the ability to disaggregate peace agreements into their constitutive provisions and identify the rate of implementation because, as I demonstrate, enforcement is applied first and foremost to individual provisions.

To identify provisions and operationalize implementation, I rely on the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM), a dataset of the 34 comprehensive peace agreements adopted between 1989 and 2012 (Appendix A, page 2). This dataset is extensive, also identifying the presence of up to 51 unique types of peace agreement provisions (Appendix A, page 3) that address an array of

economic, political, and social issues related directly or indirectly to armed conflicts (e.g., ceasefires, police reform, minority rights) (Joshi and Darby 2013).

I use this dataset to construct a composite measurement of each agreement's implementation rate by summing the implementation scores for each individual provision and dividing this value by the maximum implementation score possible (three, "full implementation").[8] This creates a standardized score at the agreement-year level that is comparable across both time and agreement. While the average agreement experiences an implementation rate of 76 percent a decade following adoption, there is significant variation: the Chapultepec Peace Accords (El Salvador) has an implementation rate of 96 percent, while the Memorandum of Settlement (India) has an implementation rate of 24 percent. Figure 1 maps the annual implementation score for five agreements.

Outcome II: Conflict Recidivism

The fundamental purpose of agreement enforcement is to bring a durable end to armed conflict among its signatories (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2008; United Nations N.d). Relying on data from UCDP/PRIO (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Pettersson et al. 2021), I measure the return of armed conflict between agreement signatories annually as either minor or major conflict (25 or more annual battle-related deaths). Operationalizing armed conflict this way follows established

[8] The maximum implementation score is equal to the total number of provisions in the agreement, multiplied by three (full implementation). For instance, with 15 provisions, Bangladesh's 1997 Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord has a maximum possible implementation score of $15 \times 3 = 45$ (Joshi, Quinn, and Regan 2015).



Figure 1. Implementation of Five Agreements

Note: Peace agreement implementation varies over time and from one agreement to the next.

practice (Hegre, Hultman and Nygård 2019). These observations are necessarily made at the agreement-year level. Because peace agreements may be signed at any point throughout the year, I allow peace to "survive" in the year in which the agreement is signed (Joshi and Quinn 2017).

Measuring Each Dimension of Agreement Enforcement: The Peacekeeping Enforcement Dataset

The three dimensions of enforcement are (1) the *proportion* of provisions missions are mandated to enforce, (2) the *type* of provisions missions are mandated to enforce, and (3) the *level* of mandated involvement in the implementation process. Indeed, a nascent body of scholarship has begun to map the activities in which missions engage, yet they are not without their limitations. Di Salvatore et al. (2022) have compiled a dataset of (up to) 41 different activities in which UN

missions engage between 1989 and 2017. However, these data exclude activities related to the content of agreements. Furthermore, by including only a subset of missions in Africa, their data omit the nearly two dozen additional missions deployed to enforce peace agreements on other continents. Lloyd's (2021) data is even more ambitious, identifying (up to) 51 different tasks performed by over 70 missions between 1948 and 2015. Nevertheless, this dataset includes only one variable for a peace agreement enforcement mandate.[9]

To overcome these shortcomings, I rely on the first systematic dataset identifying the mandated enforcement practices of *all* UN peacekeeping missions deployed between 1989 and 2015: the Peacekeeping Enforcement Dataset (Mailhot 2023). The construction of this original, time-series cross-sectional dataset relied on a multi-step process. First, I identified all peacekeeping missions deployed with a mandate to enforce one of the 34 comprehensive peace agreements in the data (Appendix A, page 4). This authorization often appears in the mandates establishing missions (e.g., UNMIL) or in the peace agreements themselves (e.g., UNMIBH). Overall, 56 percent of agreements (19 of 34) are enforced by a mission for any amount of time.

Second, I gathered information on the mandated enforcement practices of each mission. This process relied on a careful analysis of all UNSC resolutions and associated, authoritative documents establishing, extending, restructuring, or providing further clarification on the activities

[9] Dorussen and Gizelis (2013) and Diehl and Druckman's (2018) data either capture a small number of mission activities or fail to disaggregate in ways meaningful for capturing the dimensions of enforcement.

of UN missions.[10] A mission is coded as being mandated to enforce a given provision if it is directed to be involved with that specific provision *and* attempts to engage, to a minimum degree, in that activity. For example, UNSC Resolution 1561 (September 2004b) authorized UNMIL to "assist the transitional government of Liberia in monitoring and restructuring the police force of Liberia…," and UNMIL had immediately thereafter deployed civilian and police personnel to assist the Liberians in police reform. Thus, UNMIL is coded as being mandated to enforce the police reform provision of the Accra Peace Agreement at that time. I also include for each observation a corresponding measurement of the level of mission involvement in the implementation process. As previously noted, missions are mandated to enforce agreement provisions through a variety of procedures: for example, they may "***monitor*** the ceasefire agreement"[11] or "***assist*** the government...in implementing... disarmament."[12,13] These represent distinct levels of involvement. In line with my theorization and with confirmation from reports on missions' activities, I create a standardized ordinal measurement of the level of mission involvement in the provision implementation process: no involvement (0), indirect involvement (1), and direct involvement (2). Table 1 provides a summary of the actions and the corresponding levels of involvement.

[10] These include, for example, Secretary General reports; UN General Assembly resolutions; or peace agreements themselves. These additional documents provide a more complete picture of the provisions that missions are mandated to enforce.

[11] UNMIN, UNSC Resolution 1740 (January 2007).

[12] UNOCI, UNSC Resolution 2112 (July 2013).

[13] Bold and italics added for emphasis.

Level of Mission Involvement	Actions				
Indirect (1)	Investigate Verify	Maintain Contact	Monitor	Observe	Report
Direct (2)	Advise Facilitate Promote	Assist Guide Protect	Contribute Organize Supervise	Coordinate Oversee Support	Ensure Participate

Table 1. Actions and Corresponding Levels of Involvement

Note: UN peacekeeping missions engage in different levels of provision enforcement through different activities.

Because the mandated enforcement practices of missions can change over time, this dataset also captures temporal variation for each dimension. As Table 2 highlights, UNSC Resolution 1924 (2010) authorizes UNOCI to "support… the disarmament and dismantling of militias." This demonstrates direct involvement in the disarmament provision of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement. Just one year later, the UNSC expanded UNOCI's mandate by requesting that it also "support the Ivorian authorities to extend and re-establish effective State administration…" (UNSC 2011). This corresponds to the civil administration reform provision of the agreement.

With this information, I am able to calculate each of the three dimensions of mandated enforcement. For Dimension I, I create an aggregate rate by summing the total number of provisions that missions are mandated to enforce and dividing this value by the total number of provisions in the agreement. This creates a proportion that is comparable across time and space. Dimension II focuses on the *type* of provisions that missions are mandated to enforce—here, provisions promoting the physical and political securities of the warring parties. Relying on the coding processes for Dimension I, I created a proportional index of the total annual number of (temporally proximate) security-oriented provisions that missions are mandated to enforce:

Mission	Mandate	Agreement Civil Admin. Reform Provision (Dimension I)	Agreement Civil Admin. Reform Lvl. Involvement (Dimension III)	Civil Admin. Reform Mandate Text	Disarmament Provision (Dimension I)	Disarmament Lvl. Involvement (Dimension III)	Mission Mandate Text
UNOCI	**UNSC Res. 1924 (2010)**	0	0	--	1	2 (Direct)	"support…the disarmament and dismantling"
UNOCI	**UNSC Res. 2000 (2011)**	1	2 (Direct)	"support the Ivorian authorities to extend and re-establish effective state administration and strengthen public admin."	1	2 (Direct)	"assist the Government… in developing and implementing …a new national programme for the disarmament"

Table 2. Temporal Changes in UNOCI's Enforcement of Two Provisions within the Ouagadougou Political Agreement

Note: UN peacekeeping missions vary their activities and level of involvement over time.

ceasefires, disarmament, demobilization, territorial power-sharing, transitional power-sharing, reintegration, and withdrawal (Fortna 2004c; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; 2007; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Joshi, Quinn, and Regan 2015; Mattes and Savun 2009). To create an aggregate measurement of involvement (Dimension III), I sum the annual total level of involvement for each agreement provision in a mission's mandate and divide this value by the total number of provisions in the agreement.

As an example, Figure 2 presents the scores for each of the three dimensions for UNMOT in Tajikistan. As we can see, there are clear patterns of continuity and change over time. For example, UNMOT was mandated under Resolution 1138 (in 1997) to enforce 21 of the provisions in the country's General Agreement, creating a proportion equal to 23.8 for Dimension I. At that same time, UNMOT was mandated to enforce three of the five security-oriented provisions in the



Figure 2: Changes in Dimensions I, II and III for UNMOT

Note: The three dimensions of enforcement for UNMOT and Tajikistan's General Agreement are distinct from one another and vary over time.

General Agreement, creating a score of 60.00 for Dimension II, and its total level of involvement at that time was 17,[14] creating a score of 80.95 for Dimension III. While the scores for Dimensions I and II rose in 1998 as a result of an expanded enforcement mandate, the score for Dimension III steadily dropped off from 1998 to 2000 as UNMOT adopted a more reserved, hands-off approach to the enforcement of the provisions in its mandate.

[14] For example, it was mandated to "***cooperate*** with the [**dispute resolution commission**]" and "***monitor*** the assembly of UTO fighters and their…**disarmament**" (UNSC 1997; italics and bold added for emphasis).

Each observation in this dataset is initially made at the level of the individual mission. To merge these data with the two outcome variables, I collapse the observations down to the agreement-year and take the highest annual coding.[15] Table 3 provides a descriptive summary for each measurement. Because these data are derived from mission mandates and associated documents, there is the potential for discrepancies between mandated enforcement activities and those actually carried out by missions. First is the potential for a sequencing of activities. This may undermine my argument (Hypotheses 2a and 2b) if missions prioritize the enforcement of non-security-oriented provisions. Second is the potential for missions to fail to implement enforcement activities altogether. This would lead to an underestimation of the impact of each dimension of enforcement I identify in the data.

Beyond leveraging additional reports and documents on mission activities to ensure the coding corresponds to the empirical practices of missions, there is good reason to believe that

Indicators	Obs.	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Years with Mission Enforcement (Per Agreement)	323	3.1	3.5	0	10
Dimension I (Proportion of Provisions)	323	10.8	17.79	0	90
Dimension II (Type of Provisions – Security-Oriented)	323	12.9	25.2	0	80
Dimension III (Level of Involvement)	323	22.5	37.9	0	180

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for the Three Dimensions of Enforcement

Note: The average and standard deviation for each dimension of enforcement vary considerably.

[15] This decision is in line with past research (Blair, Di Salvatore, and Smidt 2022; Lloyd 2021).

neither of these conditions bias my data in any clear direction. While it is true that missions necessarily focus on certain activities at specific periods of time, recent findings demonstrate that missions do not sequence their activities in any coherent way (Blair, Di Salvatore, and Smidt 2022). Additionally, if any idiosyncratic sequencing *does* arise, the level of analysis allows me to overcome any potential impacts: because mandates are usually updated, at most, annually, within-mandate sequencing would disappear before my analyses capture such biases.

Control Variables and Estimation

There are three primary challenges to estimating the relationship between mandated enforcement and the outcomes of interest. First, it is well known that peacekeeping missions are not deployed at random but rather are disproportionately deployed to deadlier conflicts and to countries with weaker central governments (Fortna 2008; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Hegre, Hultman, and Nygård 2019). This introduces two biases: first, the deployment of missions to more difficult locations may lead me to underestimate the relationship between the dimensions of mandated enforcement and the durable end to armed conflict; second, the deployment of missions to countries with weak states may underestimate both the ability of each dimension to prevent conflict recidivism and the ability of post-conflict states to implement agreement provisions.

A unique advantage of my data is that they incorporate the full universe of comprehensive peace agreements, regardless of whether a mission was ever deployed to enforce its implementation (e.g., Mali's 1991 National Pact) or had withdrawn after a period of time (e.g., UNMIBH). The inclusion of systematic observations of no enforcement biases the results against my expectations. Nevertheless, I include three control variables that often dictate where missions

are deployed: the annual total number of battle-related deaths (Davies et al. 2022);[16] the Correlates of War's annual composite index of each country's material capabilities (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972/2017); and measurements of the annual per-capita GDP from the Varieties of Democracy Project (VDEM) (Coppedge et al. 2021).

Second is the matter of non-randomized selection into peace agreements and specific provisions. Agreements are often adopted following strategic considerations of the warring parties acting under structural conditions that make conflict less attractive (Colllier, Hoeffler and Söderbom 2004). Agreement adoption may thus already signal that the warring parties are less committed to returning to armed conflict. This may lead to an overestimation of the effect of mandated enforcement on conflict termination.

Provisions are also unlikely to be randomly assigned to agreements, instead being selected because of the belief that they will address the proximate and distal causes of the conflict (Joshi and Quinn 2017). Importantly, the UN plays an increasingly central role in the agreement construction process (Greig and Diehl 2012). When involved, the UN may guide the signatories to adopt agreements with provisions that a future mission is likely to enforce, either for simplicity's sake or because of its beliefs regarding the appropriate constitution of agreements.

I include in my analyses two sets of controls that are likely to determine the non-random assignment of provisions, missions' mandated enforcement practices; conflict termination; and, thus, agreement adoption. First, to consider how the UN may hasten the conflict termination process (Kathman and Benson 2019) and influence both the type of provisions in agreements and the ones that missions are ultimately mandated to enforce, I include from Clayton, Dorusssen and

[16] For the analyses with conflict recidivism as the outcome variable (see below), I rely on the total number of wartime, battle-related deaths (Davies et al. 2022).

Böhmelt (2021) a control for the presence of either a UN in-country body or entity established with the goal of resolving the conflict (e.g., commission, mission, political office) during the wartime period. Second, because conflict and development levels may influence both selection into conflict termination (Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2004) as well as the type of provisions included,[17] I once again include a control for per-capita GDP and the total number of annual fatalities (Pettersson et al. 2021).

Third are the determinants of mission capabilities. Enforcement is indeed a demanding task. First, missions with fewer personnel are likely to be mandated to enforce fewer provisions (Maekawa, Arı, and Gizelis 2019). The same condition applies to securing an end to armed conflict: without sufficient personnel, missions are poorly equipped to engage in enforcement practices, thus reducing the chances that the warring parties overcome their commitment problems (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2016). I therefore incorporate from Perry and Smith (2013) measurements for the average annual number of mission personnel.

Finally, Blair, Di Salvatore, and Smidt (2022) find that the primary drivers of the failure to implement mission mandates are both increased levels of armed conflict and fragmented (larger) mandates. To consider the former, I include a control variable for the annual total number of battle-related deaths (Davies et al. 2022). Regarding the latter, because my theory focuses implicitly on the benefits of broader mandates, instances of non-implementation due to mandate enlargement bias the results *against* my expectations.

[17] For example, countries with deadlier conflicts may include additional security-oriented provisions in their agreements (e.g., military or police reform), while less-developed countries may include economic development provisions in their agreements.

I rely on two primary analyses to test my hypotheses. First, I estimate the relationship between each dimension of mandated enforcement and agreement implementation (Hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 3a) using two-way fixed effects models.[18] This provides me two advantages. First, they allow me to consider across time and space any concerns for correlational endogeneity tied to agreement implementation; second, they allow me to mitigate concerns for contextual variation in how missions understand each dimension of enforcement. To examine any potential changes in impact over time, I include results at yearly intervals up to five and 10 years after agreement adoption, the final year of observation in PAM.

Second, I model the relationship between each dimension of mandated enforcement and the conflict recidivism (Hypotheses 1b, 2b, and 3b) using a Weibull survival model because it allows for an uneven distribution of the risk of failure and the effect of covariates over time (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). This is necessary because the chances of conflict recidivism are higher in the years immediately following agreement adoption (Collier et al. 2003; Joshi and Quinn 2017). For Hypothesis 4, I consider three additional decomposed causal pathways in the relationship between each dimension of mandated enforcement and conflict termination: (1) the moderating role of peace agreement implementation, (2) the mediating role of peace agreement, and (3) the combined mediating and moderating role of peace agreement implementation (Discacciati et al. 2019; VanderWeele 2014). For these analyses, I hold each dimension of mandated enforcement, as well as the peace agreement implementation score, at their mean values.

RESULTS

[18] All time-invariant control variables are included in the additional models in the appendices.

I begin with the results for agreement implementation before discussing the results for conflict recidivism. Because of their high degree of collinearity (Appendix G, page 22), each dimension is examined individually. I report the results graphically, though the coefficient tables for all figures are provided in Appendix B (pages 5-7).

Figure 3 presents the results for Hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 3a. As expected, the relationship between Dimension I (proportion) and agreement implementation is consistently and statistically significantly positive over time. This demonstrates that missions' mandated enforcement of a higher proportion of agreement provisions is associated with higher rates of agreement implementation: a one-unit increase in Dimension I is associated with anywhere from a 0.11 to



Figure 3. The Relationship between Each Dimension of Enforcement and Agreement Implementation (Two-Way Fixed Effects, 95% CIs)

Note: The first dimension of enforcement is consistently associated with agreement implementation, while the third level of involvement is only significantly associated with agreement implementation in the early post-conflict period.

0.25-point increase in an agreement's implementation score. Moreover, though significant, the estimates steadily decrease over time, highlighting that higher proportions of mandated provision enforcement may be more impactful earlier in the post-conflict period.

The results for the second and third dimensions of enforcement are mixed. Though in the hypothesized direction, the results for Dimension II (type-security) are not significant at conventional significance levels ($p<0.05$). In contrast, the estimates for Dimension III (level of involvement) demonstrate a significant and positive association with agreement implementation, yet this relationship only holds through the six years after agreement adoption, before steadily dropping off. Falling in line with the conclusions for the first dimension of mandated enforcement, this suggests that more direct forms of involvement in the implementation process are particularly effective in the early post-agreement period.

While the results for the first and third dimension of mandated enforcement may appear small, the substantive impacts vary. For example, within five years of agreement adoption, the decision of a mission to increase its level of involvement by a single level, for a single provision (Dimension III)—e.g., from indirect to direct involvement—is associated with an increase in an agreement's implementation score by about 0.4. In contrast, with an average of 8 provisions mandated to enforce in the first five years following agreement adoption, the decision to mandate a deployed mission to enforce an additional provision (Dimension I) is associated with an increase in the agreement implementation score by 1.3. With the impact being greater than a one-to-one increase, this suggests a synergistic relationship. Figure 4 presents the estimated impact of Dimension I on agreement implementation at various point estimates. A movement from the mandated enforcement of 10 percent of agreement provisions to 90 percent of provisions is associated with an increase in an agreement's implementation score by 20—from 57 to 77. Thus,



Figure 4. Predicted Probabilities for the Impact of the Dimension I (Proportion) on Agreement Implementation

Note: The predicted probabilities for agreement implementation steadily increases as the first dimension of enforcement increases.

while improvements along either of these dimensions of mandated enforcement may have an impact on agreement implementation—especially in the early post-conflict period—it may be most impactful for missions to increase the overall proportion of agreement provisions that they are mandated to enforce at any given time over, say, prioritizing the type of provisions (Dimension II) or deeper levels of involvement (Dimension III). This finding is particularly important as the UNSC decides how to configure mission mandates in order to meet the challenges of contemporary peacekeeping.

Figure 5 presents the results for the accelerated failure time models estimating the total and direct impact that each dimension of mandated enforcement has on preventing conflict recidivism (Hypotheses 1b, 2b, and 3b), as well as the relationship between each dimension of mandated



Figure 5. Total, Direct, Moderated, and Mediated Impact of Each Dimension of Enforcement on Time without Conflict Recidivism

Note: The relationship between the first and second dimensions of enforcement and time without conflict recidivism, both independent and mediated or moderated by peace agreement implementation, are insignificant. Only the second dimension, when mediated by peace agreement implementation, is significant and negatively associated with the length of time without conflict recidivism.

enforcement and conflict recidivism when mediated and moderated by agreement implementation itself (Hypothesis 4).[19] Though the estimated total and direct impact for each dimension is positive,

[19] I estimate the models using the mean values for each dimension of mandated enforcement and agreement implementation across all observations in which a mission is present. For further

as expected in Hypotheses 1b, 2b, and 3b, the results are insignificant. This suggests, in contrast to my expectations, that higher scores along any dimension of mandated enforcement do not consistently contribute to longer time periods without the return of armed conflict. Taken together with the results for Hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 3a, these findings suggest that the three dimensions of mandated enforcement do a comparatively better job at promoting agreement implementation than they do preventing conflict recidivism.

Turning to the results for Hypothesis 4, the mediating and moderating effects of peace agreement implementation present unique findings: while the mediated effect of agreement implementation for Dimension I (proportion) and Dimension III (level of involvement) hover around zero and are insignificant, the mediated impact for the mandated enforcement of security-oriented provisions (Dimension II-type) is negative and statistically significant: with an average of just under two security-oriented provisions mandated to enforce when deployed, the decision to include an additional security-oriented provision is significantly associated with an *increased* chance of conflict recidivism by about 0.15 percent. This suggests that the mandated enforcement of *more* security-oriented provisions is significantly correlated with an earlier return of armed conflict among agreement signatories.

While they ultimately suggest that higher levels of agreement enforcement do not reliably contribute to preventing conflict recidivism, these findings nevertheless fall in line with two conflict trends. First is the seemingly paradoxical relationship between the mandated enforcement of security-oriented provisions and conflict recidivism. Rather than withdraw when conflict

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discussion of the analyses and the regression results, see Section B (page 8) and Table B4 in the Appendix.

appears imminent, missions often receive mandates to reinforce security-oriented provisions, such as ceasefire arrangements and disarmament programs, upping their mandated enforcement levels of these types of provisions in times of instability. Indeed, evidence from the rebel resurgences and shifting mandates of the UN missions in Sierra Leone in Tajikistan (see Figure 4) at the turn of the century suggest as much.

More broadly, the largely insignificant findings across all dimensions of mandated enforcement may be capturing a second and related process: the UNSC's decision to cut back on missions' mandated enforcement activities as the agreement implementation process comes to an end and peace becomes sustainable. This appears to be true for many of the cases here: from El Salvador to Liberia, from Sierra Leone to Croatia, the proportion of peace agreement provisions that missions were mandated to enforce steadily increased over time before dropping off at the end of their tenure. At the same time, the implementation rates of their respective peace agreements began to stabilize as the threat of conflict recidivism subsided. It is during this latter period that the UNSC also began to remove the enforcement of security-oriented provisions from each mission's mandate. While this ultimately produces net-null results for conflict termination, importantly, it also suggests that missions are responsive to contextual developments and that it is precisely through the mandated enforcement of agreement implementation that missions become better positioned to contribute to preventing the recidivism of armed conflict.

These results also make sense from a practitioner's standpoint. The UNSC consistently deploys missions alongside peace agreements with the stated goal of promoting peace by enforcing their implementation (United Nations 1996, 162-163; UNSC 1995b). However, this commitment is not sufficient on its own: while the first and second dimensions of mandated enforcement may have a positive impact on agreement implementation, these results suggest that it is ultimately up

to the combatants themselves to bring an end to armed conflict (Joshi and Quinn 2017). In this way, missions' mandated enforcement practices only extend to durable peace when the implementation activities of the agreement signatories allow it. Taken together, the results become increasingly clear: while missions may promote peace agreement implementation when they prioritize the enforcement of more provisions and engage more directly with the implementation process in the initial post-conflict period, the mandated enforcement of security-oriented provisions largely impacts conflict recidivism through a dynamic relationship with agreement implementation itself.

Robustness and Alternative Specifications

I include in the Appendix a variety of additional analyses and alternative model specifications. The results are similar to or stronger than those presented here. First, to consider endogeneity concerns further and to consider a more temporally distant relationship between each dimension of mandated enforcement and implementation, Appendix C (page 9) includes analyses for Hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 3a with the first-differences values for agreement implementation; it also includes analyses for H1b, 2b, and 3b with an instrumental variables approach to further mitigate bias in the relationship between each dimension of mandated enforcement and conflict recidivism. Second, Appendix D (page 14) includes analyses for agreement implementation with lagged values of all temporally variant variables. Third, in Appendix E (page 17), I analyze the relationship between each dimension and agreement implementation using propensity score weighting techniques for the primary confounding variables (Fong, Hazlett and Imai 2018; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008). Appendix F (page 20) incorporates medium- and long-term security reforms (military and police reform) for the analyses focusing on the mandated enforcement of security-

oriented provisions (Dimension II): Hypotheses 2a and 2b (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008). Appendix H (page 23) presents results for the subset of country-year observations in which missions are present. In Appendix I (page 26), I examine the broader impacts of each dimension of mandated enforcement on fatalities. Appendix J (page 29) presents results for a set of sensitivity analyses for Hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 3a.

CONCLUSION

While it is well known that agreement enforcement is central to peacekeeping effectiveness, existing studies have often treated (implicitly or explicitly) enforcement as a condition applied to agreements as a whole and not to their constitutive provisions. While the UNSC often claims as much in its mission-mandate resolutions, the reality is that missions are often mandated and empirically enforce a *minority* of agreement provisions at any point in time and vary significantly in the *types* of provisions they are mandated enforce and their *level* of involvement in the provision implementation process. Failing to account for such variation risks overestimating the degree to which missions contribute to agreement implementation and preventing conflict recidivism.

In this article, I develop a theory linking the three dimensions of peace agreement enforcement—the (1) *proportion* and (2) *type* of provisions missions are mandated to enforced, alongside the (3) *level* of mandated involvement in the implementation process—to two crucial post-conflict outcomes: agreement implementation and conflict termination. To test my argument, I leverage the Peacekeeping Enforcement Dataset (Mailhot 2023), an original, time-series cross-sectional dataset identifying the spatial and temporal variation in the mandated enforcement practices of *all* UN peacekeeping missions (1989-2015). The results present unique insights into the distinct impact that each dimension of mandated enforcement has on the implementation of

agreements and conflict recidivism. First, I find that the mandated enforcement of a higher proportion of peace agreement provisions (Dimension I), alongside higher levels of involvement in the implementation process (Dimension III), are positively and significantly associated with agreement implementation—especially in the early post-conflict period. Second, while I find that these two dimensions of mandated enforcement are insignificantly associated with the durable end to armed conflict, the mandated enforcement of specific types of provisions (Dimension III)—here, security-oriented provisions—is negatively and significantly associated with conflict termination when mediated by the agreement implementation process itself. As missions often seek to enforce security-oriented provisions when conflict appears on the horizon, this makes sense from a practical standpoint. Nevertheless, it ultimately implies that the mandated enforcement of peace agreements does not reliably contribute to bringing about a durable end to armed conflict. With their divergent contributions to agreement implementation and conflict termination, the three dimensions of mandated enforcement ultimately paint a more holistic picture of the role that peacekeeping missions play in peace processes.

Overall, by highlighting the unique effects that each dimension of mandated enforcement has on both the implementation of peace agreements and conflict termination, the results underscore the importance of nuance and variation across time and space in the mandated enforcement practices of UN peacekeeping missions. For policymakers, it demonstrates the potential tradeoffs that missions are faced with as they consider prioritizing certain dimensions of agreement enforcement over others. Importantly, it also highlights the crucial role that agreement implementation itself plays in the relationship between enforcement and the durable end to armed conflict: because the ability of enforcement to prevent the recidivism of armed conflict ultimately relies on the commitments that warring parties make to agreement implementation, peacekeeping

missions' mandated enforcement practices and peace agreements form an increasingly symbiotic relationship. Missions must focus their efforts on maximizing their enforcement of peace agreements' constitutive provisions in order to contribute effectively to the larger post-conflict peace process.

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How UN Peacekeeping Missions Enforce Peace Agreements

Appendix

Table of Contents

Appendix A: List of Peace Agreements, Constitutive Provisions, and UN Peacekeeping Missions

Peace Agreement	Date of Adoption	Country
Lusaka Protocol	15 Nov. 1994	Angola
Luena Memorandum of Understanding	4 Apr. 2002	Angola
Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord	2 Dec. 1997	Bangladesh
General Framework Agreement	21 Nov. 1995	Bosnia & Herzegovina
Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement/Pretorial Protocol	2 Nov. 2003	Burundi
Framework for Comprehensive Settlem. of the Cambodia Conflict	23 Oct. 1991	Cambodia
Ouagadougou Political Agreement	4 Mar. 2007	Côte d'Ivoire
Agreement On Ending Hostilities in the Rep. of Congo	29 Dec. 1999	Congo
Erdut Agreement	12Nov. 1995	Croatia
Agreement for the Reform and Civil Concord	12 May 2001	Djibouti
Accord De Paix Et De La Reconciliation Nationale	26 Dec. 1994	Djibouti
Chapultepec Peace Agreement	16 Jan. 1992	El Salvador
Accord For a Firm and Lasting Peace	29 Dec. 1996	Guatemala
Abuja Peace Agreement	1 Nov. 1998	Guinea-Bissau
Bodo Accord	20 Feb. 1993	India
MoU Between Rep. of Indonesia and Free Aceh Movement	15 Aug. 2005	Indonesia
Taif Accord	22 Oct. 1989	Lebanon
Accra Peace Agreement	18 Aug. 2003	Liberia
Ohrid Agreement	13 Aug. 2001	Macedonia
National Pact	11 Apr. 1992	Mali
General Peace Agreement	4 Oct. 1992	Mozambique
Comprehensive Peace Agreement	21 Nov. 2006	Nepal
Agreement Between the Rep. Niger Government and the ORA	15 Apr. 1995	Niger
Bougainville Peace Agreement	30 Aug. 2001	Papua New Guinea
Mindanao Final Agreement	2 Sep. 1996	Philippines
Arusha Accords	4 Aug. 1993	Rwanda
General Peace Agreement Btw. the Rep. of Senegal and MFDC	30 Dec. 2004	Senegal
Abidjan Peace Agreement	30 Nov. 1996	Sierra Leone
Lomé Peace Agreement	7 Jul.1999	Sierra Leone
Interim Constitution	17 Nov. 1993	South Africa
Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement	9 Jan. 2005	Sudan
General Agreement on the Establish. of Peace and Nat'l Accord	27 Jun. 1997	Tajikistan
Agreement on the Question of East Timor	5 May 1999	East Timor
Good Friday Agreement	10 Apr. 1998	United Kingdom

Table A1. List of Comprehensive Peace Agreements, 1989 - 2012 (Source: Joshi and Darby 2013; Joshi et al. 2015)

Provision	Agreements with Provision	Provision	Agreements with Provision
Agreement Review	10	Int'l Arbit. Commission on Land	1
Amnesty	20	Judicial Reform	16
Arms Embargo	3	Legislative Branch Reform	11
Boundary Demarcation	7	Media Reform	14
Ceasefire	29	Military Reform	26
Children's Rights	5	Minority Rights	5
Citizenship	9	Natural Resource Usage	10
Civilian Admin. Reform	18	Official Lang. and Symbols	9
Constitutional Changes	19	Paramilitary Groups	16
Cultural Protections	8	Police Reform	24
Damages/Losses Commission	1	Power-Sharing Transit. Govt.	17
Decentralization	20	Prisoner Release	20
Demobilization	25	Ratification Mechanism	9
Disarmament	28	Refugees	22
Dispute Resolution Committee	19	Regional Peacekeeping Force	7
Donor Support	19	Reintegration	27
Econ. And Soc. Development	23	Reparations	8
Education Reform	15	Self-Determination Right	4
Electoral and Political Reform	26	Territorial Power-Sharing	3
Executive Branch Reform	12	Troop Withdrawal	14
Human Rights	21	Truth or Reconcil. Mechanism	12
Implementation Timeline	24	UN Peacekeeping Force	12
Indep. Referendum	4	UN Transitional Authority	3
Indig. and Minority Rights	5	UN Verification Mechanism	20
Interethnic State Relations	7	Women's Rights	7
Internally Displaced Persons	24		

Table A2. Provisions and Their Rate of Appearance in Agreements (Source: Joshi and Darby 2013; Joshi et al. 2015)

Peace Agreement	Missions with Agreement Enforcing Mandates	Mission(s) Active Years
Lusaka Protocol	UNAVEM II, UNAVEM III, MONUA	1991 - 1999
General Framework Agreement	UNMIBH	1995 - 2002
Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement/Pretorial Protocol	ONUB	2004 - 2007
Framework for Comprehensive Settlem. of the Cambodia Conflict	UNAMIC, UNTAC	1991 - 1993
Ouagadougou Political Agreement	UNOCI	2004 - 2017
Erdut Agreement	UNCRO, UNPROFOR, UNTAES, UNMOP	1992 - 1997
Chapultepec Peace Agreement	ONUSAL	1991 - 1995
Accord For a Firm and Lasting Peace	MINUGUA	1996 - 1997
Taif Accord	UNIFIL	1979 - Present
Accra Peace Agreement	UNMIL	2003 - 2017
General Peace Agreement	ONUMOZ	1992 - 1995
Comprehensive Peace Agreement	UNMIN	2007 - 2010
Bougainville Peace Agreement	UNOMB (incl. UNPOB)	1998 - 2005
Arusha Accords	UNAMIR	1993 - 1996
Lomé Peace Agreement	UNOMSIL, UNAMSIL	1998 - 2005
Abidjan Peace Agreement	UNOMSIL	1998
Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement	UNMIS, UNAMID	2005 - Present
General Agreement on the Establ. of Peace and National Accord	UNMOT	1997 - 2001
Agreement on the Question of East Timor	UNAMET, UNTAET, UNMISET, UNMIT	1999 - 2012

Table A3. Peace Agreements and the Missions Enforcing Them

Appendix B: Results for Analyses in Main Text

The results in Tables B1-B3 demonstrate a consistently negative and significant relationship between military capabilities and agreement implementation, suggesting that the more military resources that the host country has the lower the level of agreement implementation. At the same time, there is no significant relationship (in either direction) among the host country's per-capacity GDP, the total number of mission personnel in the host country, and the annual fatality totals in the host country, on the one hand, and agreement implementation on the other.

Years Since Agreement Adopt.	Up to 5 Years	Up to 6 Years	Up to 7 Years	Up to 8 Years	Up to 9 Years	Up to 10 Years
Dimension I (Proportion)	0.26***	0.22***	0.18**	0.16**	0.14**	0.12*
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Military Capabilities	-6071.61**	-5083.67**	-5068.83***	-5196.27***	-4915.64***	-4299.94***
	(2290.46)	(1780.29)	(1485.55)	(1295.02)	(1124.02)	(868.53)
Per-Capita GDP	-3.06	-3.16	-2.80	-2.58	-1.93	-1.41
	(2.84)	(2.23)	(1.73)	(1.36)	(1.10)	(0.92)
Annual Mission Personnel	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Annual Fatalities	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Year FEs	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	167	198	230	261	292	322
AIC	1176.35	1405.45	1633.35	1855.50	2073.93	2280.82
R^2	0.68	0.67	0.66	0.65	0.64	0.64
p	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B1. Impact of Dimension I (Proportion) on Agreement Implementation (Two-Way Fixed Effects)

Years Since Agreement Adopt.	Up to 5 Years	Up to 6 Years	Up to 7 Years	Up to 8 Years	Up to 9 Years	Up to 10 Years
Dimension II (Type-Security)	0.09 (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)	0.06 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)
Military Capabilities	-5289.42* (2369.03)	-4643.14* (1826.59)	-4754.90** (1513.11)	-4986.42*** (1318.70)	-4807.74*** (1141.95)	-4240.05*** (880.86)
Per-Capita GDP	-1.61 (2.92)	-2.27 (2.27)	-2.37 (1.77)	-2.38 (1.40)	-1.96 (1.14)	-1.49 (0.95)
Annual Mission Personnel	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Annual Fatalities	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Year FEs	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	167	198	230	261	292	322
AIC	1189.64	1417.07	1643.08	1865.10	2082.08	2288.09
R^2	0.65	0.65	0.64	0.64	0.63	0.63
p	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B2. Impact of Dimension II (Type-Security) on Agreement Implementation (Two-Way Fixed Effects)

Years Since Agreement Adopt.	Up to 5 Years	Up to 6 Years	Up to 7 Years	Up to 8 Years	Up to 9 Years	Up to 10 Years
Dimension III (Lvl. of Invole.)	0.09* (0.04)	0.07* (0.03)	0.06 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)
Military Capabilities	-5357.64* (2346.30)	-4686.33* (1817.14)	-4748.59** (1507.93)	-4955.72*** (1313.54)	-4768.18*** (1137.42)	-4214.44*** (877.35)
Per-Capita GDP	-1.65 (2.89)	-2.14 (2.25)	-2.15 (1.75)	-2.13 (1.37)	-1.70 (1.11)	-1.30 (0.94)
Annual Mission Personnel	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Annual Fatalities	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Year FEs	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	167	198	230	261	292	322
AIC	1186.36	1414.95	1641.92	1864.21	2081.58	2287.80
R^2	0.66	0.65	0.65	0.64	0.63	0.63
p	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B3. Impact of Dimension III (Level of Involvement) on Agreement Implementation (Two-Way Fixed Effects)

First explicated by Baron and Kenny (1986) and expanded for survival analysis by VanderWeele (2011) and Tein and MacKinnon (2003), mediation analysis is a useful process for identifying a potential mediator, M_i, on an observed relationship between an explanatory variable, A_i, and an outcome variable, Y_i.

Utilizing the med4way package in Stata (Discacciati et al. 2019), I calculate the total estimated effect of each dimension of mandated enforcement (A_i) on the duration of post-conflict peace (Y), taking into consideration the four decomposed pathways of mediation for agreement implementation (M):[1] (1) the effect of the exposure in the absence of the mediator, (2) the interactive effect when the mediator is left to what it would be in the absence of exposure, (3) a mediated interaction, and (4) a pure mediated effect (VanderWeele 2014).

	Dimension I (Proportion)	Dimension II (Type-Security)	Model III (Lvl. of Involve.)
Total Impact	107.29	0.68	3.79
	(582.11)	(2.04)	(13.20)
Direct Effect	0.85	0.05	-0.19
	(2.19)	(0.39)	(0.64)
Moderated Effect	106.78	2.49	5.30
	(581.40)	(4.84)	(16.95)
Moderated & Mediated Effect	-0.34	-1.59	-1.28
	(40.31)	(3.18)	(4.54)
Mediated Effect	-0.00	-0.27*	-0.04
	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.05)
N	322	322	322

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B4. Effect of Each Dimension of Mandated Enforcement on Post-Conflict Peace, with Agreement Implementation Mediating and Moderating (Weibull, AFT)

Note: Test statistics are unavailable for the four-way decomposition analysis

[1] I estimate the models using the mean values for each dimension of mandated enforcement and agreement implementation across all observations in which a mission is present.

Appendix C: Analyses for Hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 3a with First Differences of Agreement Implementation; Analyses for Hypotheses 1b, 2b, and 3b with Instrumental Variable

The results presented here are the same as—or stronger than—those presented in the main text. As Tables C1-C3 demonstrate, I find that each dimension of mandated enforcement is positively and significantly associated with agreement implementation for 7-10 Years following agreement adoption; for Dimension III, the results are significant for all temporal cuts of the data. I also find, at times, a consistently negative and significant relationship between the presence of a UN body during the war and agreement implementation, which suggests that, even if the wartime

Years Since Agreement Adopt.	Up to 5 Years	Up to 6 Years	Up to 7 Years	Up to 8 Years	Up to 9 Years	Up to 10 Years
Dimension I (Proportion)	0.07	0.10	0.10*	0.11**	0.11**	0.12***
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Battle-Related Deaths	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Material Capabilities	-103.54	-92.10	-78.36	-71.60	-64.73	-56.59
	(79.24)	(63.98)	(53.12)	(46.39)	(41.07)	(36.71)
Per-Capita GDP	0.22	0.13	0.11	0.08	0.07	0.08
	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)
UN Presence During Conflict	-4.42	-3.82*	-3.41*	-3.12*	-2.82*	-2.85**
	(2.26)	(1.84)	(1.52)	(1.33)	(1.18)	(1.06)
Annual Mission Personnel	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Annual Fatalities	0.00 0.07	0.00 0.10	0.00 0.10*	0.00* 0.11**	0.00* 0.11**	0.00* 0.12***
Agreement Decade (1 = 2000s)	-2.19	-2.14	-1.88	-1.85	-1.72	-1.77
	(2.02)	(1.66)	(1.39)	(1.23)	(1.09)	(0.99)
Mission Present Any Time	0.68	-0.46	-0.66	-0.87	-0.95	-0.75
	(2.74)	(2.14)	(1.72)	(1.46)	(1.27)	(1.12)
N	133	164	196	227	258	288
X^2	13.78	18.63	24.20	29.91	35.13	36.01
p	0.13	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C1. Impact of Dimension I (*Proportion* of Provisions Enforced) on Agreement Implementation (First Differences)

presence of the UN *may* help bring about the adoption of a peace agreement, it may have a detrimental impact on the extended implementation process. Furthermore, I generally find a positive and significant relationship in the larger temporal cuts between fatality totals and agreement implementation, and a slightly negative relationship between the decade of agreement adoption and overall agreement implementation, which suggests that agreements adopted earlier on—and in the 1990s, in particular—experienced better implementation processes. Lastly, I find

Years Since Agreement Adopt.	Up to 5 Years	Up to 6 Years	Up to 7 Years	Up to 8 Years	Up to 9 Years	Up to 10 Years
Dimension II (Type-Security)	0.05 (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)	0.07* (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)	0.07** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)
Battle-Related Deaths	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Material Capabilities	-112.47 (80.01)	-102.33 (64.66)	-87.66 (53.53)	-80.03 (46.69)	-71.79 (41.43)	-62.39 (37.86)
Per-Capita GDP	0.26 (0.16)	0.18 (0.13)	0.15 (0.11)	0.12 (0.09)	0.10 (0.08)	0.10 (0.07)
UN Presence During Conflict	-4.84* (2.24)	-4.33* (1.83)	-3.85* (1.52)	-3.54** (1.33)	-3.15** (1.18)	-2.90** (1.09)
Annual Mission Personnel	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Annual Fatalities	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)
Agreement Decade (1 = 2000s)	-2.93 (2.06)	-2.99 (1.69)	-2.62 (1.40)	-2.50* (1.23)	-2.26* (1.10)	-2.18* (1.02)
Mission Present Any Time	1.07 (2.53)	0.23 (2.00)	0.10 (1.61)	-0.11 (1.38)	-0.27 (1.21)	-0.27 (1.10)
N	133	164	196	227	258	288
X^2	13.84	18.26	23.67	28.79	33.45	38.75
p	0.13	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C2. Impact of Dimension II (Type-Security) on Agreement Implementation (First Differences)

in these models an insignificant relationship among the total number of battle-related deaths, the host country's material capabilities, the host country's per-capita GDP, the annual mission personnel totals, and the presence of a UN mission (at any time), on the one hand, and agreement implementation on the other hand. Ultimately, the consistently positive and significant estimates for each dimension of mandated enforcement suggests that it plays a robust, reliable, and positive role in the agreement implementation process that is distinct from these other characteristics of UN missions and host countries.

Years Since Agreement Adopt.	Up to 5 Years	Up to 6 Years	Up to 7 Years	Up to 8 Years	Up to 9 Years	Up to 10 Years
Dimension III (Level of Involvement)	0.07*	0.08***	0.07***	0.07***	0.07***	0.07***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Battle-Related Deaths	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Material Capabilities	-95.46	-85.17	-72.54	-66.52	-60.69	-53.01
	(77.06)	(62.26)	(51.85)	(45.31)	(39.99)	(36.20)
Per-Capita GDP	0.16	0.08	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.06
	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)
UN Presence During Conflict	-3.34	-2.97	-2.76	-2.55	-2.35*	-2.27*
	(2.25)	(1.82)	(1.50)	(1.31)	(1.15)	(1.05)
Annual Mission Personnel	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Annual Fatalities	-1.47	-1.48	-1.30	-1.33	-1.27	-1.31
	(1.99)	(1.63)	(1.37)	(1.21)	(1.07)	(0.98)
Agreement Decade (1 = 2000s)	-1.47	-1.48	-1.30	-1.33	-1.27	-1.31
	(1.99)	(1.63)	(1.37)	(1.21)	(1.07)	(0.98)
Mission Present Any Time	-1.27	-1.86	-1.69	-1.71	-1.61	-1.40
	(2.65)	(2.07)	(1.67)	(1.42)	(1.23)	(1.10)
N	133	164	196	227	258	288
X^2	19.30	26.68	33.82	41.23	48.00	55.09
p	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C3. Impact of Dimension II (Level of Involvement) on Agreement Implementation (First Differences)

Instrumental Variable: Two-Year Lag of Each Dimension of Mandated Enforcement

Following Reed (2015), I leverage a two-year lag of each dimension of mandated enforcement to instrument the relationship between each dimension of mandated enforcement and post-conflict peace. There are two core assumptions that must be met to utilize instrumental variable analysis as an identification strategy: exogeneity and independence.

First, exogeneity requires that the instrument not be directly related to the outcome (post-conflict peace). It is highly unlikely that the warring parties will engage in conflict recidivism in time T_0 because of the enforcement dynamics from two years past (T_{-2}). Rather, it is more likely that they decide to return to armed conflict because of the more proximate enforcement dynamics for which I am instrumenting: dimensions of mandated enforcement at time T_0 (or, relatedly, T_{-1}).

Second, independence requires that the instrument not be correlated with unobserved variables that correspond to the outcome (post-conflict peace). The most obvious violation of the independence restriction is that each dimension of mandated enforcement at time T_{-2} is correlated with agreement implementation, which, in turn, shapes conflict dynamics today. Pearson's correlation coefficients suggest that this relationship is minimal (see Table C1); however, for additional guarantee, I include agreement implementation scores in the instrumental variable models.

	Agreement Implementation Score	Dimension I (T_{-2})	Dimension II (T_{-2})	Dimension III (T_{-2})
Agreement Implementation Score	1.000			
Dimension I (T_{-2})	0.1983	1.000		
Dimension II_{-2} (T_{-2})	0.0096	0.6547	1.000	
Dimension III_{-2} (T_{-2})	0.1762	0.9351	0.5686	1.000

Table C4. Pearson's Correlation Coefficients for Two-Year Lags of Each Dimension of Mandated Enforcement and Post-Conflict Peace

As demonstrated in Table C2, the results remain the same as those presented in the main text: each dimension of mandated enforcement is slightly positively—but still insignificantly—associated with conflict recidivism.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Dimension I (Proportion)	0.004 (0.005)		
Dimension II (Type-Security)		0.003 (0.004)	
Dimension III (Lvl. of Involve.)			0.002 (0.002)
Military Capabilities	-3.781 (23.468)	-6.006 (24.456)	-4.477 (23.663)
Per-Capita GDP	0.029 (0.031)	0.003 (0.030)	0.041 (0.037)
Annual Mission Personnel	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Agreement Implem. Score	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	254	254	254
X^2	42.175	43.309	41.799
p	0.975	0.966	0.977

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C5. Impact of Each Dimension of Mandated Enforcement on Post-Conflict Peace, Instrumented with Two-Year Lag of Each Dimension (Two-Way Fixed Effects)

Appendix D: Alternative Analyses for Hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 3a with Lagged Time-Variant Variables

The results in Tables D1-D3 demonstrate a consistently positive and significant impact of each agreement's lagged implementation scores. At the same time, they also demonstrate that each (lagged) dimension of mandated enforcement has an insignificant impact on agreement implementation. Taken with the results presented in the main text, this suggests that each dimension of mandated enforcement may only play a limited, immediate impact on the implementation of agreements.

Moreover and similar to the results presented in B1-B3, I find a significant, negative relationship between the host country's per-capita GDP and agreement implementation, as well as the host country's (lagged) military capabilities and peace agreement implementation for the full range of data. This suggests that more developed countries and countries with more military capabilities may pay less attention to the implementation of peace agreements. I also find a positive and significant relationship between the (lagged) total number of mission personnel and agreement implementation, suggesting that more mission personnel in time period T_0 may help set the stages for higher levels of agreement implementation later on, in time period T_1.

Years Since Agreement Adopt.	Up to 5 Years	Up to 6 Years	Up to 7 Years	Up to 8 Years	Up to 9 Years	Up to 10 Years
Agreement Implem. (Lag)	0.28***	0.35***	0.40***	0.43***	0.47***	0.50***
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Dimension I (Proportion, Lag)	0.08	0.06	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Military Capabilities (Lag)	-4215.87	-2002.97	-1666.89	-1589.04	-1308.67	-1195.65*
	(2149.66)	(1374.94)	(993.22)	(813.77)	(688.44)	(584.98)
Per-Capita GDP (Lag)	-3.37	-3.14	-2.90*	-2.81**	-2.23**	-1.69**
	(2.19)	(1.67)	(1.21)	(0.93)	(0.70)	(0.55)
Annual Mission Personnel (Lag)	0.00	0.00**	0.00**	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	133.00	164.00	196.00	227.00	258.00	288.00
p	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table D1. Impact of Dimension I (*Proportion* of Provisions Enforced) on Agreement Implementation, with Lagged Time-Variant Variables and TWFE

Years Since Agreement Adopt.	Up to 5 Years	Up to 6 Years	Up to 7 Years	Up to 8 Years	Up to 9 Years	Up to 10 Years
Agreement Implem. (Lag)	0.30***	0.36***	0.41***	0.44***	0.47***	0.50***
	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Dimension II (Type-Security, Lag)	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Military Capabilities (Lag)	-3717.32	-1768.72	-1577.43	-1535.00	-1296.21	-1206.68*
	(2122.28)	(1354.68)	(983.54)	(807.14)	(685.03)	(584.23)
Per-Capita GDP (Lag)	-2.73	-2.86	-2.79*	-2.78**	-2.27**	-1.74**
	(2.13)	(1.64)	(1.20)	(0.92)	(0.71)	(0.56)
Annual Mission Personnel (Lag)	0.00*	0.00**	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	133.00	164.00	196.00	227.00	258.00	288.00
p	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table D2. Impact of Dimension II (*Type-Security*) on Agreement Implementation, with Lagged Time-Variant Variables and TWFE

Years Since Agreement Adopt.	Up to 5 Years	Up to 6 Years	Up to 7 Years	Up to 8 Years	Up to 9 Years	Up to 10 Years
Agreement Implem. (Lag)	0.29***	0.36***	0.40***	0.44***	0.47***	0.50***
	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Dimension III (Lvl. of Involve., Lag)	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Military Capabilities (Lag)	-3909.51	-1832.21	-1614.87	-1550.18	-1297.59	-1199.32*
	(2113.77)	(1350.58)	(981.00)	(804.21)	(682.14)	(581.47)
Per-Capita GDP (Lag)	-2.95	-2.87	-2.75*	-2.70**	-2.18**	-1.66**
	(2.12)	(1.63)	(1.19)	(0.91)	(0.69)	(0.55)
Annual Mission Personnel (Lag)	0.00*	0.00**	0.00**	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	133.00	164.00	196.00	227.00	258.00	288.00
p	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table D2. Impact of Dimension III (*Level of Involvement*) on Agreement Implementation, with Lagged Time-Variant Variables and TWFE

Appendix E: Alternative Analyses for Hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 3a Using Covariate Balancing Propensity Score Matching (Weighting) Techniques

Peacekeeping missions are not randomly assigned to enforce peace agreements. Rather, as noted in the main text, they are most often deployed to deadlier conflicts and to countries with weaker and less democratic governments (Fortna 2008; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Hegre, Hultman, and Nygård, 2019). Because of our strong theoretical priors regarding the timing and location of mission deployment, matching is a strong candidate for strengthening any causal inferences made regarding the relationship between mission deployment and agreement implementation (Gilligan and Sergenti 2008). Matching may also be beneficial in overcoming other obstacles to inference inherent to observational data (Sekhon 2009).

Most matching techniques rely on a binary treatment variable. However, as I demonstrate in the main text, the enforcement dimensions (the "treatments") are continuous measurements: a mission can enforce a higher (or lower) number of agreement provisions, enforce more (or fewer) security-related missions, or can be involved to a higher (or lower) degree in the provision implementation process. While propensity score matching is a popular matching technique, this classification of the treatment variables makes it especially difficult to estimate the unknown generalized propensity score accurately. Instead, I rely on the covariate balancing propensity score (CBPS) technique, developed by Imai and Ratkovic (2014) and further advanced in Fong, Hazlett and Imai 2018,[2] to create propensity score-based weights for the key confounding variables. Beyond its ability to estimate the effect of continuous treatment variables, it estimates generalized propensity scores by maximizing both covariate balance and treatment prediction, thereby

[2] The analyses were conducted in R using the CBPS package from Fong et al. (2021).

circumventing the need for separate processes for model fitting and balance checking. Drawing from our theoretical and empirical priors regarding the determinants of mission deployment, I use the following variables in developing the CBPS: UCDP PRIO's best estimates of the total number of battle-related deaths in the conflict to which the agreement pertains (Pettersson et al. 2021), the Correlates of War Project's National Material Capabilities Index (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972/2017), and the electoral democracy index from the Varieties of Democracy Project (Version 12, Coppedge 2021). I rely on an exact matching technique to create weights in order to model the average treatment effect. As with the results presented in the main text, I construct panel linear models because of the structure of the data.

As demonstrated in Tables D1, D2, and D3, the results are similar to—if not stronger than—those presented in the main text: each dimension of mandated enforcement is positively and largely statistically significantly associated with the rate at which peace agreements are implemented. With a reliance on matching techniques to overcome many difficulties to causal inference, these results lend both additional and stronger support to the claim that each dimension of mandated enforcement is positively associated with agreement implementation, with a particular emphasis on the first dimension (Proportion).

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Dimension II (Type)	0.184*** (0.037)	0.138*** (0.037)	0.095** (0.044)
Per-Capita GDP		-2.504*** (0.559)	-2.599*** (0.560)
Mission Personnel			0.001* (0.0003)
N	289	289	288
R^2	0.111	0.190	0.217
Adjusted R^2	-0.009	0.078	0.105
F Statistic	25.022*** (df = 1; 254)	23.475*** (df = 2; 253)	17.067*** (df = 3; 251)

Standard errors in parentheses;
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

E1. Impact of Dimension I (*Proportion*) on Agreement Implementation (First Differences) Using CBPS Matching Weights

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Dimension II (Type)	0.101*** (0.030)	0.085*** (0.028)	0.050 (0.031)
Per-Capita GDP		-3.647*** (0.600)	-3.576*** (0.593)
Mission Personnel			0.001*** (0.0003)
N	289	289	288
R^2	0.078	0.189	0.223
Adjusted R^2	-0.045	0.077	0.111
F Statistic	11.351*** (df = 1; 254)	24.930*** (df = 2; 253)	20.097*** (df = 3; 251)

Standard errors in parentheses;
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

E2. Impact of Dimension II (*Type-Security*) on Agreement Implementation (First Differences) Using CBPS Matching Weights

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Dimension III (Level of Involve.)	0.120*** (0.017)	0.091*** (0.018)	0.072*** (0.021)
Per-Capita GDP		-2.562*** (0.632)	-2.734*** (0.640)
Mission Personnel			0.0005 (0.0003)
N	289	289	288
R^2	0.174	0.227	0.242
Adjusted R^2	0.064	0.120	0.133
F Statistic	48.655*** (df = 1; 254)	34.016*** (df = 2; 253)	23.700*** (df = 3; 251)

Standard errors in parentheses;
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

E1. Impact of Dimension III (*Level of Involvement*) on Agreement Implementation (First Differences) Using CBPS Matching Weights

Appendix F: Expanded Operationalization of Dimension II (Type-Security), Including Military and Police Reform)

The results presented in Table F1 demonstrate that a broader operationalization of Dimension II—i.e., one that includes the mandated enforcement of military and police reform provisions—is positively and significantly associated with agreement implementation. Given that the results are only significant in the larger temporal cuts of the data and that police and military reform are often long-term security reform processes (in contrast to immediate, first-order security processes), these findings suggest that missions' extended attention to a wide array of security-oriented provisions can contribute positively to agreement implementation. Furthermore, the

Years Since Agreement Adopt.	Up to 5 Years	Up to 6 Years	Up to 7 Years	Up to 8 Years	Up to 9 Years	Up to 10 Years
Dimension II (Type - Security)	0.02 (0.05)	0.05 (0.04)	0.06 (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	0.07** (0.02)
Battle-Related Deaths	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Military Capabilities	-109.90 (78.75)	-100.91 (63.30)	-87.06 (52.57)	-79.93 (45.69)	-71.99 (40.48)	-62.59 (37.09)
Per-Capita GDP	0.25 (0.16)	0.17 (0.13)	0.15 (0.10)	0.12 (0.09)	0.11 (0.08)	0.11 (0.07)
UN Presence During Conflict	-5.18* (2.20)	-4.59* (1.78)	-4.09** (1.48)	-3.78** (1.29)	-3.38** (1.15)	-3.14** (1.06)
Annual Mission Personnel	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Agreement Decade (1 = 2000s)	-2.88 (2.04)	-3.04 (1.66)	-2.75* (1.38)	-2.68* (1.21)	-2.47* (1.08)	-2.39* (1.00)
Mission Present	2.06 (2.60)	0.82 (2.02)	0.46 (1.62)	0.14 (1.38)	-0.06 (1.20)	-0.10 (1.10)
N	133.00	164.00	196.00	227.00	258.00	288.00
X^2	10.86	13.99	18.11	22.42	25.65	29.89
p	0.21	0.08	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table F1. Impact of Dimension II (Type-Security) on Agreement Implementation (Expanded Operationalization: Military and Police Reform)

results for the control variables here largely fall in line with various results presented in the previous sections of the Appendix: the presence of a UN body during the conflict *and* the agreement decade are negatively and significantly associated with agreement implementation, while war-time, battle-related deaths, the host country's military capabilities, the host country's per-capita GDP, and the total number of mission personnel do not contribute significantly (in either direction) to agreement implementation.

The results in Table F2 also fall in line with those presented in the main text: mission's mandated enforcement of a wider array of security provisions does not reliably contribute to longer—or shorter—periods without conflict recidivism. I also find that the host country's military capabilities, per-capita GDP, the wartime presence of a UN body, and the mission personnel totals do not significant impact the length of time without conflict recidivism.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Dimension II (Type-Security)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Battle-Related Deaths		-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Military Capabilities			3237.33 (1862.75)	2613.21 (1659.30)	2525.36 (1656.91)	2525.36 (1656.91)	2569.05 (1702.31)
Per-Capita GDP				0.94 (0.61)	0.96 (0.61)	0.96 (0.61)	1.03 (0.64)
UN Presence During Conflict					-0.52 (1.18)	-0.52 (1.18)	-0.85 (1.32)
Annual Mission Personnel							0.00 (0.00)
N	235.00	235.00	235.00	235.00	235.00	235.00	234.00
AIC	67.52	68.87	63.61	60.87	62.66	62.66	64.33
X^2	0.52	1.17	8.43	13.18	13.38	13.38	13.66
p	0.47	0.56	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table F2. Impact of Dimension II (Type-Security) on the Duration of Post-Conflict Peace (Expanded Operationalization: Military and Police Reform)

Appendix G: Correlation Coefficients for Each Dimension of Mandated Enforcement

	Proportion (Dimension I)	Type (Dimension II)	Level of Involvement (Dimension III)
Proportion (Dimension I)	1.0000		
Type (Dimension II)	0.6751	1.0000	
Level of Involvement (Dimension III)	0.9356	0.5905	1.0000

Table G1. Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Each Dimension of Mandated Enforcement

Appendix H: Analyses for Agreement Adoption with Observations Subsetted to Years with Mission Present

The results in Tables H1-H3 fall in line with those presented in the main text: while the first dimension of mandated enforcement (Proportion of Provisions) is positively and significantly associated with agreement implementation in time periods and locations in which a mission is present, Dimensions II (Type-Security) and III (Level of Involvement) do not reliably contribute to agreement implementation. As noted in the main text, this suggests that missions may be most impactful when they focus their attention on increasing the proportion of provisions that they are mandated to enforce.

At the same time, I find, as with many of the results presented throughout the rest of the Appendix, that the host country's military capabilities, the host country's per-capita GDP, and the number of mission personnel do not contribute significantly to agreement implementation. With regards to the latter most finding, then, this suggests that what matters is *quality*—i.e., what a mission does—over *quantity* of personnel in a mission.

Years Since Agreement Adopt.	Up to 5 Years	Up to 6 Years	Up to 7 Years	Up to 8 Years	Up to 9 Years	Up to 10 Years
Dimension I	0.29*	0.30*	0.21*	0.21*	0.28*	0.32**
(Proportion)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Military Capabilities	-1342.48 (14651.45)	-2991.44 (13379.67)	-9817.56 (12862.09)	-9817.56 (12862.09)	-17362.29 (14042.79)	-20787.60 (14047.90)
Per-Capita GDP	-5.86 (5.39)	-3.49 (5.00)	-1.79 (4.61)	-1.79 (4.61)	-1.79 (4.16)	-0.93 (4.15)
Annual Mission Personnel	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Year FEs	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	78	86	94	94	103	106
AIC	521.68	587.98	655.68	655.68	747.58	772.95
R^2	0.86	0.83	0.79	0.79	0.72	0.70
p	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table H1. Impact of Dimension I (Proportion) on Agreement Adoption, Subsetted to Years with Mission Present

Years Since Agreement Adopt.	Up to 5 Years	Up to 6 Years	Up to 7 Years	Up to 8 Years	Up to 9 Years	Up to 10 Years
Dimension II (Type-Security)	0.11 (0.12)	0.09 (0.12)	0.06 (0.09)	0.06 (0.09)	0.07 (0.09)	0.08 (0.09)
Military Capabilities	-6541.73 (15610.45)	-10009.19 (14200.29)	-13345.21 (13330.47)	-13345.21 (13330.47)	-23118.74 (14545.84)	-28384.21 (14698.97)
Per-Capita GDP	-4.10 (5.78)	-2.62 (5.46)	-2.48 (4.87)	-2.48 (4.87)	-3.78 (4.28)	-2.93 (4.35)
Annual Mission Personnel	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Year FEs	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	78	86	94	94	103	106
AIC	532.92	600.74	663.14	663.14	756.98	785.57
R^2	0.84	0.80	0.78	0.78	0.69	0.66
p	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table H2. Impact of Dimension II (Type-Security) on Agreement Adoption, Subsetted to Years with Mission Present

Years Since Agreement Adopt.	Up to 5 Years	Up to 6 Years	Up to 7 Years	Up to 8 Years	Up to 9 Years	Up to 10 Years
Dimension III (Lvl. of Involve.)	0.10 (0.05)	0.09 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	0.08 (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)
Military Capabilities	52.38 (15483.33)	-4448.78 (14070.89)	-9395.40 (13375.77)	-9395.40 (13375.77)	-17828.22 (14668.81)	-23297.82 (14962.00)
Per-Capita GDP	-2.80 (5.65)	-1.41 (5.35)	-1.21 (4.92)	-1.21 (4.92)	-1.92 (4.47)	-1.31 (4.59)
Annual Mission Personnel	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Year FEs	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	78	86	94	94	103	106
AIC	527.66	595.83	660.61	660.61	753.98	783.94
R^2	0.85	0.81	0.78	0.78	0.70	0.67
p	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table H3. Impact of Dimension III (Level of Involvement) on Agreement Adoption, Subsetted to Years with Mission Present

Appendix I: The Impact of Each Dimension of Mandated Enforcement on Fatalities from Organized State Violence

To conduct an initial investigation into the impact that each dimension of mandated enforcement has on additional violations of peace, I include here the results with the annual total count of fatalities from organized state violence (Davies et al. 2022).

Overall, the results demonstrate an insignificant relationship between each dimension of mandated enforcement and fatality totals. This suggests that the impact of peace agreement enforcement may not extend far beyond conflict recidivism between agreement signatories.

Years Since Agreement Adopt.	Up to 5 Years	Up to 6 Years	Up to 7 Years	Up to 8 Years	Up to 9 Years	Up to 10 Years
Dimension I (Proportion)	417.69 (386.79)	339.51 (308.33)	274.92 (248.67)	246.24 (215.73)	225.52 (188.81)	210.77 (170.35)
Military Capabilities	2626999.27 (11731995.45)	1505843.51 (8197849.32)	1422399.31 (6374371.05)	1120361.99 (5227025.50)	846689.93 (4305026.07)	690266.94 (3203541.76)
Per-Capita GDP	1347.93 (14190.65)	-181.48 (10028.00)	882.36 (7252.26)	1010.77 (5323.60)	1119.57 (4072.85)	1142.25 (3258.66)
Annual Mission Personnel	0.21 (1.67)	0.13 (1.38)	0.18 (1.15)	0.21 (1.01)	0.20 (0.93)	0.20 (0.86)
Agreement Implementation	106.00 (481.80)	43.33 (383.56)	-17.11 (321.08)	-63.89 (276.49)	-93.08 (244.07)	-116.75 (219.73)
Year FEs	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	167	198	230	261	292	322
AIC	4018.51	4734.17	5465.47	6169.26	6868.72	7540.70
R^2	0.15	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.12
p	0.95	0.90	0.77	0.59	0.39	0.18

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table I1. Impact of Dimension I (Proportion) on Annual Fatality Totals (Two-Way Fixed Effects)

Years Since Agreement Adopt.	Up to 5 Years	Up to 6 Years	Up to 7 Years	Up to 8 Years	Up to 9 Years	Up to 10 Years
Dimension II (Type-Security)	-64.77 (257.16)	-84.32 (206.59)	-81.22 (166.15)	-84.78 (143.75)	-86.61 (129.37)	-88.65 (118.58)
Military Capabilities	5157574.93 (11606990.28)	3155831.89 (8147291.51)	2870290.53 (6340729.07)	2323376.61 (5214070.41)	1736262.70 (4308885.68)	1286399.57 (3210258.00)
Per-Capita GDP	4851.67 (13991.23)	2486.81 (9929.71)	2816.35 (7242.16)	2544.03 (5368.99)	2071.19 (4150.88)	1764.55 (3333.85)
Annual Mission Personnel	0.91 (1.63)	0.78 (1.34)	0.66 (1.13)	0.72 (1.00)	0.74 (0.91)	0.75 (0.84)
Agreement Implementation	291.07 (464.64)	183.89 (373.57)	84.59 (315.22)	16.40 (272.14)	-31.65 (241.28)	-69.45 (217.76)
Year FEs	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	167	198	230	261	292	322
AIC	4020.24	4735.68	5466.82	6170.52	6869.98	7541.91
R^2	0.14	0.13	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12
p	0.97	0.94	0.83	0.66	0.46	0.23

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table I2. Impact of Dimension II (Type-Security) on Annual Fatality Totals (Two-Way Fixed Effects)

Years Since Agreement Adopt.	Up to 5 Years	Up to 6 Years	Up to 7 Years	Up to 8 Years	Up to 9 Years	Up to 10 Years
Dimension III (Lvl. of Involve.)	234.01 (191.25)	191.74 (152.21)	174.34 (126.69)	161.92 (110.18)	147.34 (95.91)	139.56 (86.07)
Military Capabilities	3824153.20 (11548269.87)	2056157.47 (8114413.79)	1728822.25 (6307157.82)	1325697.70 (5179745.19)	1002616.56 (4277182.52)	826823.27 (3186151.88)
Per-Capita GDP	3271.79 (13892.91)	1092.00 (9840.72)	1664.72 (7140.15)	1598.26 (5254.06)	1723.76 (4053.09)	1779.66 (3266.54)
Annual Mission Personnel	0.33 (1.62)	0.18 (1.34)	0.12 (1.14)	0.09 (1.02)	0.07 (0.93)	0.06 (0.86)
Agreement Implementation	149.31 (466.73)	76.09 (373.91)	6.00 (314.53)	-40.42 (271.35)	-69.04 (240.44)	-91.27 (216.95)
Year FEs	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	167	198	230	261	292	322
AIC	4017.99	4733.63	5464.56	6168.14	6867.53	7539.33
R^2	0.15	0.14	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13
p	0.93	0.88	0.73	0.52	0.33	0.14

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table I3. Impact of Dimension III (Level of Involvement) on Annual Fatality Totals (Two-Way Fixed Effects)

Appendix J: Sensitivity Analysis for Hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 3a

Utilizing Cinelli, Ferwerda, and Hazlett's (2020) sensemakr package, I conduct sensitivity analyses to examine the potential impact that unobserved confounders have on the relationship between each dimension of mandated enforcement and agreement implementation. The results are presented in Table J.1

	Coefficient	**Robustness Value**
Dimension I (Proportion)	0.1175** (0.0477)	0.1421
Dimension II (Type-Security)	0.0203 (0.0339)	0.0367
Dimension III (Level of Involvement)	0.0178 (0.0247)	0.0438

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table J1. Sensitivity Analyses for the Impact of Each Dimension on Agreement Implementation

The sensitivity analyses demonstrate relatively small bias due to unobserved confounders. For example, the results demonstrate that an unobserved confounder would need to explain at least 14.2 percent of the residual variance of both the treatment and the outcome in order to be strong enough to bring the estimated impact (coefficient) for Dimension I (proportion) to zero. For Dimensions II (type-security) and Dimension III (level of involvement), though insignificant, unobserved confounders must explain, respectively, at least 3.7 and 4.4 percent of the residual variance of both the treatment and the outcome to bring each of the estimated impacts (coefficients) to zero.

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