
### Secure Virtual Architecture

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


#### Secure Virtual Machine



- What is it?
  - A compiler-based virtual machine running below an operating system
  - Enforces security policies for all software (including the OS kernel)
- Why build it?
  - Kernel code can be exploited
  - Allows analysis across traditional boundaries

# SVA System Architecture



#### SVA: OS Interface

- Kernels require new functionality
  - Hardware Control
    - Performing I/O
    - Installing interrupt handlers
  - State Manipulation
    - Context switching
    - Signal handler dispatch

#### Hardware Control

- Registration functions
  - void *Ilva\_register\_syscall* (int number, int (\*f)(void \* icontext, ...))
  - void *Ilva\_register\_interrupt* (int number, int (\*f)(void \* icontext))
  - void *Ilva\_register\_exception* (int number, int (\*f)(void \* icontext))
- I/O
  - int *IIva\_io\_read* (ioptr\_t ioaddress)
  - void *Ilva\_io\_write* (ioptr\_t ioaddress, int value)
- Atomic Operations
  - int *IIva\_swap\_and\_phi* (void \* address, int value)
  - int *Ilva\_compare\_and\_swap* (void \* address, int compare, int value)
- Memory Management
  - void *IIva\_load\_pgtable* (void \* table)
  - void \* IIva\_save\_pgtable ()

## State Manipulation

- Allow OS to see the existence of native state
- OS does not understand the semantics of native state

### Lazy State Saving on Interrupt

**Processor ControlReg 1:** 0xC025E525 **ControlReg 2:** 0x4EF23465 **GPR 1:** 0xBEEF0000 GPR N: 0x00000000

**Kernel Stack ControlReg 1:** 0xC025E525 **ControlReg 2:** 0x4EF23465 **GPR 1:** 0xBEEF0000 GPR N: 0x0000000

- How to take advantage of low latency interrupt facilities?
  - shadow registers (e.g. ARM)
  - register windows (e.g. SPARC)
- On interrupt, SVM saves subset of processor state on the kernel stack
- Can leave state in registers if kernel does not overwrite it
- Kernel can commit all state to memory if required
- Pointer to Interrupt Context passed to system call, interrupt, and trap handlers


### Manipulating Interrupt Context

- Interrupt Context ←→Memory
  - void *Ilva\_icontext\_save* (void \* icontext, void \* buffer
  - void *Ilva\_icontext\_load* (void \* icontext, void \* buffer)
- Commit
  - void *Ilva\_icontext\_commit* (void \* icontext)
- Push function frames
  - void *Ilva\_ipush\_function* (void \* icontext, void (\*f)(...), ...)

## Manipulating Processor State

- Context Switching (manipulates current state)
  - void *IIva\_save\_integer* (void \* buffer)
  - void *IIva\_load\_integer* (void \* buffer)
  - void *IIva\_save\_fp* (void \* buffer, bool save\_always)
  - void *IIva\_load\_fp* (void \* buffer)

### SVA: Memory Safety for OS Kernels



- Use static analysis to prove safe memory accesses
- Use alias analysis (DSA) to group objects into logical pools
- Virtual machine records object allocations in pools
- Run-time checks only check objects in a single pool

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# References (http://llvm.org/pubs)

- SVA
  - MICRO '03
  - VEE '06
  - WIOSCA '06
- Data Structure Analysis (DSA)
  - PLDI '07
- Automatic Pool Allocation
  - MSP '02
  - PLDI '05
  - Lattner PhD Thesis
- Memory Safety
  - LCTES '03
  - TECS '05
  - CASES '02
  - Dhurjati PhD Thesis

# Questions?

