

<u>Tutorial #9</u> <u>Security in Computing COSC2356/2357</u>

Q1. Discuss if the following authentication protocols are secure or not:




Answer:

- In the figure above, the **replay attack** is prevented by using **nonce (R)**
- Bob authenticates Alice with the help of **symmetric key cryptography**. Both Alice and Bob shares a **common key (K)**
- However, Alice does not authenticate Bob
- Problem: no mutual authentication



Answer:


- The message (3) is just a replay of the second. Thus, it does not prove anything about sender (i.e. Alice).
- The sender can be Alice or Trudy.
- We need to authenticate both Sender (Alice) and Receiver (Bob)
- Problem: no mutual authentication



Answer:

- Two nonce: R_A and R_B , are used to authenticate both Bob and Alice, respectively.
- Problem: Insecure. Man-in-the-Middle (MiM) attack is possible
- The attack is discussed below:


(Man-in-the-Middle attack Scenario)



Session-2

Q2. Discuss how can we achieve mutual authentication for the scenario specified in the Q1(c)?

Answer:



- Two nonce: R_A and R_B , are used to authenticate both Bob and Alice, respectively.
- Additionally, user's identity is encrypted together with nonce.
- Advantage:
- Trudy cannot use a response from Bob for the third message
- Bob will realize the he encrypted it himself
- Mutual Authentication achieved

Q3. Does the following authentication protocol achieves mutual authentication? Think and discuss:



Answer:


- Public-key cryptosystem is used to share a session key
- Bob authenticates Alice with the help of public-key cryptography. Alice and Bob shares a session key
- However, Alice does not authenticate Bob
 - o Alice is authenticated and session key is secure
 - o Alice's "nonce", R, useless to authenticate Bob
 - o The key K is acting as Bob's nonce to Alice
- Problem: No mutual authentication. NO, the protocol is <u>insecure</u>.



Answer:

- **Public-key cryptosystem** is used with signature.
- Signed the message first and encrypts (**signature and encryption**)
- Reveals less information. <u>Trudy cannot prove herself as Alice to Bob</u>.
- Both sender and receiver are authenticated. From that perspective, **mutual authentication** is achieved, and the protocol is secure.

However, Trudy can convince Alice that she is Bob. The scenario can be illustrated as follows:



- Trudy can get $[\mathbf{R}, \mathbf{K}]_{\mathbf{Bob}}$ and \mathbf{K} from step (3).
- Alice uses the same K
- Alice thinks that she is talking to Bob. From that perspective, **mutual authentication** is **not** achieved, and the protocol is not secure.