

HO H.3307 Cyber Security Survey Time Table(Reference)

Date	Place	Time	Focused Items	Remark
Nov. 18th (Tue)	W/H	10:00	Pre-Audit Discussion / Documentation Review / Component Check Jacking System test	with Gusto & SEANET
	Breaktime			
	-	14:00	Visual check of Negligible risk system	with SEANET
	W/H	15:30	Integrated Navigation System (Including Remote Access)	with Wartsila & SEANET
	W/H	-	DNV Inspector's Audit Review	
Nov. 19th (Wed)	ECR	10:00	Pre-Audit Discussion / Documentation Review / Component Check	
	ECR	10:30	Integrated Automation System (Including Remote Access)	with ABB & SEANET
	Breaktime			
	W/H	14:00	Dynamic Positioning system (DNV TA acquired system)	with SEANET
	W/H	-	DNV Inspector's Audit Review	
Nov. 20th (Thu)	ECR	10:00	Pre-Audit Discussion / Documentation Review / Component Check	
	ECR	10:30	Thruster (DNV TA acquired system)	with Wartsila & SEANET
	ECR	-	DNV Inspector's Audit Review	
	Breaktime			
	-	-	Contingency time	

Note 1. Schedule can be changed due to test circumstance or participants request.

Note 2. November 20th (Thu.) afternoon will be contingency time for inspection follow-up.

Cyber Security Test Procedure For H3306s

Cadeler WTIV Project

< H.3306 / Integrated Navigation System (INS) >

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Cyber Security Test Procedure For Hanwha Ocean H3306s Cadeler WTIV Project

< H.3307 / Integrated Navigation System (INS) >

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CONTENTS

1.	History	3
2.	Introduction	3
2.1.	Background.....	3
2.2.	Scope	3
2.3.	Definitions	3
2.4.	Applicable Specifications and Standards.....	3
2.4.1.	Documents.....	3
2.4.2.	International Standards	3
3.	Test Circumstance	4
3.1.	System Topology	4
3.2.	Target Devices	5
3.3.	Initial Condition.....	5
3.4.	Statement of Assurance.....	5
4.	System Test.....	6
4.1.	TA Acquired System	6
4.1.1.	System Configuration Verification.....	6
4.2.	TA Non-Acquired System	7
4.2.1.	Use Control for Portable and Mobile Devices.....	7
4.2.2.	Auditable Events	8
4.2.3.	Malicious Code Protection	9
4.2.4.	Control System Backup & Restoration	10
5.	Integration Test.....	11
5.1.	Network Segmentation & Zone Boundary Test	11
5.2.	Denial of Service (DoS) Test	12
5.3.	Integration Test for Untrusted networks	13
5.3.1.	User identification and Authentication.....	13
5.3.2.	System Use Notification.....	14
5.3.3.	Access via untrusted networks	15
5.3.4.	Remote session termination.....	16
5.3.5.	Communication integrity	17
5.3.6.	Session integrity	18
5.3.7.	Information confidentiality.....	19
5.3.8.	Use of cryptography.....	20
5.3.9.	Zone boundary protection	21
5.3.10.	General purpose person-to-person communication restrictions	22
5.3.11.	Least functionality	23

Contents

1. History	3
2. Introduction.....	3
2.1. Background.....	3
2.2. Scope.....	3
2.3. Definitions	3
2.4. Applicable Specifications and Standards	3
2.4.1. Documents.....	3
2.4.2. International Standards	3
3. Test Circumstance	4
3.1. System Topology.....	4
3.2. Target Devices.....	5
This cyber security survey is limited to equipment available in Supplier scope, at the time of the survey.	5
The list of equipment is described in the below table.....	5
3.3. Initial Condition	5
3.4. Statement of Assurance	5
4.1. TA Acquired System	6
4.1.1. System Configuration Verification.....	6
4.2. TA Non-Acquired System.....	7
4.2.1. Use Control for Portable and Mobile Devices.....	7
4.2.2. Auditable Events.....	8
4.2.3. Malicious Code Protection	9
4.2.4. Control System Backup & Restoration	10
5. Integration Test	11
5.1. Network Segmentation & Zone Boundary Test	11
5.1.1. Test Prerequisite	11
5.1.2. Test Result.....	11
5.2. Denial of Service (DoS) Test.....	12
5.2.1. Test Prerequisite	12
5.2.2. Test Result.....	12
5.3. Integration Test for Untrusted networks	13
5.3.1. User identification and Authentication.....	13
5.3.2. System Use Notification.....	14
5.3.3. Access via untrusted networks	15
5.3.4. Remote session termination	16
5.3.5. Communication integrity	17
5.3.6. Session integrity	18
5.3.7. Information confidentiality	19
5.3.8. Use of cryptography	20
5.3.9. Zone boundary protection	21
5.3.10. General purpose person-to-person communication restrictions	22
5.3.11. Least functionality	23

1. History

No.	Date (DD/MM/YYYY)	Revision	Description	Remarks
1	16-12-2024	A	First Issue	First Issue

2. Introduction

2.1. Background

Under the H.3306, SeaNet conducts the cybersecurity survey. This survey assesses the implementation of cybersecurity requirements within the target system. SeaNet's responsibilities include ensuring the security of design and implementation, operating system, and application software throughout the inspection process. SeaNet also verifies adherence to various cybersecurity standards, such as those related to account management for software applications

2.2. Scope

Survey Date	27/01/2025	Surveyor(s) name(s)	Dong Ho, Park
Test Location	Bridge		

2.3. Definitions

Owner :	The entity responsible for possessing and managing the vessel
Yard :	Hanwha Ocean, a shipyard where ships are constructed
Supplier :	Wärtsilä, a company that supplies cyber-physical systems and components that are a part of the SuC
Integrator :	SEANET, a company that is responsible for acquiring, installing, and integrating systems and components of the SuC
Class :	DNV, a classification society that validates compliance with the standards for cyber security as denoted by the notation "Cyber Secure"

2.4. Applicable Specifications and Standards

2.4.1. Documents

Ref.	Title
HO01-CS-001	Cyber Security Design Philosophy

2.4.2. International Standards

Ref.	Title
DNV-RU-SHIP-Pt6Ch5.	Section 21 Cyber Security (Edition July 2020)
IEC-62443-3-3	Industrial communication networks – Network and system security – Part 3-3: System security requirements and security levels
NIST SP 800-82	Guide to industrial Control System (ICS) Security

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2.4.1. Documents


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
3. Test Circumstance

3.1. System Topology



3. Test Circumstance

3.1. System Topology



3.2.Target Devices

This cyber security survey is limited to equipment available in Supplier scope, at the time of the survey.

The list of equipment is described in the below table.

NO.	BRAND	MODEL	H/W TYPE	LOCATION	REMARKS
1	Adstec	RMT2200	Security	W/H	Remote Service
2	Moxa	EDS-408A	Network	W/H(7)	
3	Moxa	EDS-408A-MM-SC	Network	W/H(2)	Operation Panel
4	HP	HP 800 G6	PC	W/H(7)	MFD
5	Wartsila	IPRC 2	Embedded	Radar mast(2) AFT(1)	Radar operation
6	Wartsila	DPU 2020	Embedded	W/H(4)	Nav. Data Interface Nav. Data Interface Nav. Data Interface BNWAS Data Int
7	Wartsila	TPE20	Embedded	W/H	Positioning Monitoring

The list of test tools is described in the below table.

NO.	TOOL NAME	PURPOSE	REMARKS
1	Anti Malware Test File	Malware Protection Function Check	-
2	Wireshark	Packet Capture and Monitoring	Ver. 4.2.XX
3	Command Prompt	Ping Test	-
4	Advanced Port Scanner	Open Port Scan	Ver. 2.5.XX
5	IP Traffic Generator	DoS Test	-

3.3.Initial Condition

This survey is conducted in accordance with the DNV approved documentation.

To conduct the survey, followings should be fulfilled;

- Unauthorized modifications of security related software or configuration has not been done since the system was shipped, or has been applied as relevant.
- Temporary used accounts have been removed

3.4.Statement of Assurance

Professional survey procedures are completed, and evidence gathered to support the accuracy of the conclusions reached and contained in this report. The conclusions are based on comparing the situations that existed during the survey with the established criteria.

3.2. Target Devices

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4. System Test

[Sample]

No	Task Description	Expected Result	Test Result
1	Verify availability of:	Expected result after following descriptions	Pass / Fail / N/A

4.1. TA Acquired System

4.1.1. System Configuration Verification

As the system has a Type Approval document, it is required to verify that the system is appropriately set as its approved status.

(Requirement(s) : Regarding Class Rule 5.2.4 Type approved systems)

Step No	Task Description	Expected Result	Result
1	Check that the asset inventory matches the TA.	Asset inventory matches the TA.	N/A
2	Check the system's configuration information to verify that the system is appropriately set.	Configuration is appropriately set.	N/A
Detailed Steps	4.1.1.1. The asset inventory of installed hardware and software should be identical to the Type Approval document, or its regarding information. Target assets are: N/A 4.1.1.2. The system's configuration should be identical with Type Approval document, or its regarding information.		
Comments & Actual Results	- Comments : - Actual Results :		

4. System Test

[Sample]

No	Task Description	Expected Result	Test Result
1	Verify availability of:	Expected result after following descriptions	Pass / Fail / N/A

4.1. TA Acquired System

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Step No	Task Description	Expected Result	Result
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Detailed Steps	4.1.1.1. The asset inventory of installed hardware and software should be identical to the Type Approval document, or its regarding information. Target assets are: N/A 4.1.1.2. The system's configuration should be identical with Type Approval document, or its regarding information.		
Comments & Actual Results	- Comments : - Actual Results :		

4.2.TA Non-Acquired System

4.2.1. Use Control for Portable and Mobile Devices

The system shall enforce usage restrictions of portable and mobile devices.

(Requirement(s) : 4.3.4 Use control for portable and mobile devices / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 2.3)

Step No	Task Description	Expected Result	Result
1	<p>Connect portable and/or mobile devices to the system and check the system can control device usage.</p> <p>If the above step is failed, check that unused interfaces are blocked, and device connection is appropriately managed.</p>	Portable and mobile device usage is safely configured.	Pass
Detailed Steps	<p>4.2.1.1.</p> <p>Insert a USB/portable storage device and check if the INS system (MFD) can prevent the use of portable and mobile devices.</p> <p>There is an option in MFD Customizer for a toggle to allow or disallow the use of portable and mobile devices.</p>		
Comments & Actual Results	<p>- Comments :</p> <p>- Actual Results :</p> <p>Can't access any portable devices with operation level.</p> <p>Can identify the EICAR file and deleted by the system with service engineer level.</p> <p>Can't execute an .exe file. Checked if the system has whitelisted policies applied for executables.</p> <p>Password for service engineers are not shared with other parties.</p>		

4.2. TA Non-Acquired System

4.2.1. Use Control for Portable and Mobile Devices

The system shall enforce usage restrictions of portable and mobile devices.

(Requirement(s) : 4.3.4 Use control for portable and mobile devices / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 2.3)

Step No	Task Description	Expected Result	Result
1	<p>Connect portable and/or mobile devices to the system and check the system can control device usage.</p> <p>If the above step is failed, check that unused interfaces are blocked, and device connection is appropriately managed.</p>	Portable and mobile device usage is safely configured.	
Detailed Steps	<p>4.2.1.1.</p> <p>Insert a USB/portable storage device and check if the INS system (MFD) can prevent the use of portable and mobile devices.</p> <p>There is an option in MFD Customizer for a toggle to allow or disallow the use of portable and mobile devices.</p>		
Comments & Actual Results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comments : - Actual Results : 		

4.2.2. Auditable Events

The system shall generate audit records for various events which include sufficient information.

(Requirement(s): 4.3.9 Auditable events / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 2.8)

Step No	Task Description	Expected Result	Result
1	See various logs regarding application program, security, and system. Logs shall include timestamp, source, category, type, event ID and event result.	Various event logs can be checked	Pass
Detailed Steps	4.2.2.1. Check logs in NACOS Platinum Monitoring Network, MFD CAM (Central Alarm Management). Logs can also be checked on Windows Event Viewer. Check that logs can be saved on an external drive.		
Comments & Actual Results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comments : - Actual Results : Checked. Various event logs can be checked.		

4.2.2. Auditable Events


The system shall generate audit records for various events which include sufficient information.
(Requirement(s): 4.3.9 Auditable events / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 2.8)

Step No	Task Description	Expected Result	Result
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Detailed Steps	<p>4.2.2.1. Check logs in NACOS Platinum Monitoring Network, MFD CAM (Central Alarm Management).</p> <p>Logs can also be checked on Windows Event Viewer.</p> <p>Check that logs can be saved on an external drive.</p>		
Comments & Actual Results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comments : - Actual Results : 		

4.2.3. Malicious Code Protection

The system shall have a protection mechanism against malicious code or unauthorized software. The protection mechanism shall be kept updated.

(Requirement(s): 4.4.3 Malicious code protection / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 3.2)

Step No	Task Description	Expected Result	Result
1	<p>Check if the system's prevention mechanism against malicious code/program files is installed and running and the latest update is available.</p> <p><i>If there is no anti-malware mechanism or it is insufficient, check if the attack surface is minimized. If it is confirmed that the attack surface is minimized so that internal/external attacks are appropriately controlled, this section is considered as pass.</i></p>	Anti-Malicious code/program is running.	Pass
Detailed Steps	<p>4.2.3.1. No antivirus software is installed on the INS.</p> <p>In compliance with DNVGL-RU-SHIP 2020 Pt.6 Ch.5 Sec 21 Cyber Security regulations, the following information is used as compensating countermeasures:</p> <p>Integrated Navigation System (INS) is running on Wartsila's own operating system which is based off Windows IoT and is scanned for malware upon generation of OS image and before installation on vessel.</p>  <p>Best regards, HeeHwan Yoo Manager / PM Wartsila ANCS</p>		
Comments & Actual Results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comments : - Actual Results : <p>Refer to 4.2.1.</p>		

4.2.3. Malicious Code Protection

The system shall have a protection mechanism against malicious code or unauthorized software. The protection mechanism shall be kept updated.

(Requirement(s): 4.4.3 Malicious code protection / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 3.2)



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Detailed Steps	<p>4.2.3.1. No antivirus software is installed on the INS. In compliance with DNVGL-RU-SHIP 2020 Pt.6 Ch.5 Sec 21 Cyber Security regulations, the following information is used as compensating countermeasures:</p> <p>Integrated Navigation System (INS) is running on Wartsila's own operating system which is based off Windows IoT and is scanned for malware upon generation of OS image and before installation on vessel.</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 10px;"> <p>RE: WTIV H.3306 Wartsila INS 협조 요청</p> <p>  Yoo, Hee Hwan <hee.hwan.yoo@wartsila.com> 받는 사람 wbkang@sea-net.co.kr 참조 cs@sea-net.co.kr; ykyu@sea-net.co.kr; Choi, Jung Hwan; Son, Kyu Ho; Song, Young Jun; Kwon, MinGyung; Jeon, Chun Bae; +11 명 (목) 오전 9:28 </p> <p> (i) 추가 작업. 시작 날짜: 2024년 12월 20일 금요일. 기한: 2024년 12월 20일 금요일. 이 메시지는 추적된 대화의 일부입니다. 관련된 모든 메시지를 찾거나 플래그가 지정된 원본 메시지를 열려면 여기를 클릭하십시오. </p> <table style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%;">  IntegrationManager_restore.pdf 665 KB </td> <td style="width: 50%;">  IntegrationManager_backup.pdf 256 KB </td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">  MFD-OS-Installation.pdf 1 MB </td> </tr> </table> <p>6. Anti-Malware Program 미설치 상태로 확인하여, 본사의 방침/정책에 대해 질의를 부탁드립니다.</p> <p>→ Malware program은 windows defender를 사용합니다. "we confirm that both, the MFD-OS 1.6.2 image as well every runtime software released since V2.1.26.xx are being scanned by malware programs during generation in our automated build pipeline. Once installed at an MFD no further scanning by Malware program will take place."</p> <p>→ Windows IoT에 설치된 Windows patch는 하기와 같습니다.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Windows Patches added: KB890830, KB5035119, KB5035121, KB5034683, KB5034768 <p>Best regards, HeeHwan Yoo Manager / PM Wärtsilä ANCS</p> </div>	 IntegrationManager_restore.pdf 665 KB	 IntegrationManager_backup.pdf 256 KB	 MFD-OS-Installation.pdf 1 MB			
 IntegrationManager_restore.pdf 665 KB	 IntegrationManager_backup.pdf 256 KB						
 MFD-OS-Installation.pdf 1 MB							
Comments & Actual Results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comments : - Actual Results : 						

4.2.4. Control System Backup & Restoration

The system shall be able to create a complete backup during normal operation, and restore from a cyber incident.

(Requirement(s): 4.8.4 Control system back-up / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 7.3

4.8.5 Control system recovery and reconstitution / IEC-62443-3-3 SR 7.4)



Step No	Task Description	Expected Result	Result
1	Check that the control system data can be saved after following certain procedure.	System data can be saved	Pass
2	Check that the control system data can be restored after following certain procedure, to recover from data loss.	System data can be restored	Pass
Detailed Steps	<p>4.2.4.1. System configurations can be backed up using the Integration Manager tool.</p> <p>#Backup - #Backup Manager</p> <p>It is strongly recommended to make backups of your data to be able to easily reinstall your system data in case of any damage to the data in use.</p> <p>The Backup Manager can be started in two ways, but only if an existing project has been selected before.</p> <p>It can be started either from the start screen of the Integration Manager by pressing the  button, or later in the process via the Utilities >Backup Manager button shown in Figure 5-1.</p>  <p>4.2.4.2. The INS operates on a dedicated OS, Windows IoT, with a spare bootable USB provided to the vessel. In the event of OS issues, system configurations are backed up before the OS is reinstalled, allowing the configurations to be reapplied afterward. If the OS is functioning properly, the NACOS program can restore the backed-up configurations directly.</p> <p>Restore Backup</p> <p>#Restore Backup</p> <p>By pressing the button <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> "Restore Backup"</p> <p>A file-selector-box is called up to select the ZIP file from which to restore the data.</p> 		
Comments & Actual Results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comments : - Actual Results : <p>Checked that the system can backup and restore.</p>		

4.2.4. Control System Backup & Restoration

The system shall be able to create a complete backup during normal operation, and restore from a cyber incident.

(Requirement(s): 4.8.4 Control system back-up / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 7.3

4.8.5 Control system recovery and reconstitution / IEC-62443-3-3 SR 7.4)

Step No	Task Description	Expected Result	Result
1	Check that the control system data can be saved after following certain procedure.	System data can be saved	
2	Check that the control system data can be restored after following certain procedure, to recover from data loss.	System data can be restored	
Detailed Steps	<p>4.2.4.1. System configurations can be backed up using the Integration Manager tool.</p>  <p>#Backup - #Backup Manager It is strongly recommended to make backups of your data to be able to easily reinstall your system data in case of any damage to the data in use. The Backup Manager can be started in two ways, but only if an existing project has been selected before. It can be started either from the start screen of the Integration Manager by pressing the Backup button, or later in the process via the Utilities >Backup Manager button shown in Figure 5-1.</p>		
	<p>4.2.4.2. The INS operates on a dedicated OS, Windows IoT, with a spare bootable USB provided to the vessel. In the event of OS issues, system configurations are backed up before the OS is reinstalled, allowing the configurations to be reapplied afterward. If the OS is functioning properly, the NACOS program can restore the backed-up configurations directly.</p>  <p>Restore Backup #Restore Backup By pressing the button <input type="checkbox"/> "Restore Backup" A file-selector-box is called up to select the ZIP file from which to restore the data.</p>		
Comments & Actual Results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comments : - Actual Results : 		

5. Integration Test


5.1. Network Segmentation & Zone Boundary Test

Requirement(s): 4.6.2 Network segmentation / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 5.1, 5.1 RE 1
 4.6.3 Zone boundary protection / IEC-62443-3-3 SR 5.2, 5.2 RE 1

Test Prerequisite

- 1) Different network zones must be physically or logically separated.
- 2) Communication between different zones should be controlled and monitored.
 Communication should be controlled based on 'deny by default, allow by exception' principle.

5.1.1. Test Result

Step No	Task Description	Expected Result	Result																					
1	Check the zone boundary protection device's configuration; that network is well segmented and whitelisted, and data cannot be transferred to different zones without approval.	Zones are well segmented and unnecessary functions are disabled	Pass																					
2	Check that zone protecting device can stop communication manually.	Communication between zones can be stopped	Pass																					
Detailed Steps	<p>5.1.1.1. The INS is divided into two zones: the internal INS network zone and the external network zone. The external network zone extends from the Big-LinX (BLX) VPN to the LAN. The BLX VPN is secure, and only authorized personnel can access it. The internal zone is only connected to the INS itself.</p> <p>Check Firewall rulesets</p>  <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>IP configuration</th> <th>6 rule sets</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Packet filter</td> <td>▶ 8 SAM_I_BLXVPN_LAN from BLX-VPN to LAN (3 rules) Remote Service NETOP</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Cut & Alarm</td> <td>▶ 9 NACOS_out from LAN to WAN (4 rules) Access to the NACOS server</td> </tr> <tr> <td>▶ General settings</td> <td>▶ 10 NACOS_in from WAN to LAN (4 rules) Access to the NACOS server</td> </tr> <tr> <td>▶ Access control</td> <td>▶ 12 HTTP_IN from WAN to LAN (7 rules) added by Admin</td> </tr> <tr> <td>▶ Network</td> <td>▶ 13 HTTP_OUT from LAN to WAN (7 rules) added by Admin</td> </tr> <tr> <td>▶ VPN</td> <td>▶ 14 Dropall (1 rule) Drop all</td> </tr> <tr> <td>▶ Services</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>▶ IoT</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>▶ System</td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>5.1.1.2.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The system allows for manual disconnection of network segments through configured isolation points, particularly at secure router and MOXA Switches. 	IP configuration	6 rule sets	Packet filter	▶ 8 SAM_I_BLXVPN_LAN from BLX-VPN to LAN (3 rules) Remote Service NETOP	Cut & Alarm	▶ 9 NACOS_out from LAN to WAN (4 rules) Access to the NACOS server	▶ General settings	▶ 10 NACOS_in from WAN to LAN (4 rules) Access to the NACOS server	▶ Access control	▶ 12 HTTP_IN from WAN to LAN (7 rules) added by Admin	▶ Network	▶ 13 HTTP_OUT from LAN to WAN (7 rules) added by Admin	▶ VPN	▶ 14 Dropall (1 rule) Drop all	▶ Services		▶ IoT		▶ System				
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▶ Services																								
▶ IoT																								
▶ System																								
Comments & Actual Results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comments : - Actual Results : <p>Checked in accordance with the information under "Detailed Steps".</p>																							

5. Integration Test

5.1. Network Segmentation & Zone Boundary Test


Requirement(s): 4.6.2 Network segmentation / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 5.1, 5.1 RE 1

4.6.3 Zone boundary protection / IEC-62443-3-3 SR 5.2, 5.2 RE 1

5.1.1. Test Prerequisite

- 1) Different network zones must be physically or logically separated.
- 2) Communication between different zones should be controlled and monitored.
Communication should be controlled based on 'deny by default, allow by exception' principle.

5.1.2. Test Result

Step No	Task Description	Expected Result	Result																																									
1	Check the zone boundary protection device's configuration; that network is well segmented and whitelisted, and data cannot be transferred to different zones without approval.	Zones are well segmented and unnecessary functions are disabled																																										
2	Check that zone protecting device can stop communication manually.	Communication between zones can be stopped																																										
Detailed Steps	<p>5.1.1.1. The INS is divided into two zones: the internal INS network zone and the external network zone. The external network zone extends from the Big-LinX (BLX) VPN to the LAN. The BLX VPN is secure, and only authorized personnel can access it. The internal zone is only connected to the INS itself.</p> <p>Check Firewall rulesets</p>  <table border="1"> <caption>2 rule sets</caption> <thead> <tr> <th colspan="6">SAM_I_BLXVPN_LAN from BLX-VPN to LAN (2 rules)</th> </tr> <tr> <th>Position</th> <th>Name</th> <th>Source</th> <th>Destination</th> <th>Protocol</th> <th>Extra</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>NETOP</td> <td>=</td> <td>172.31.10.1/29</td> <td>TCP</td> <td>to port 6502</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2</td> <td>RDP</td> <td>=</td> <td>172.31.10.1/29</td> <td>TCP</td> <td>to port 3389</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <table border="1"> <caption>drop_all (1 rule)</caption> <thead> <tr> <th colspan="6">Block all layer 3 traffic</th> </tr> <tr> <th>Position</th> <th>Name</th> <th>Source</th> <th>Destination</th> <th>Protocol</th> <th>Extra</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>drop_all</td> <td>=</td> <td>=</td> <td>=</td> <td>=</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>5.1.1.2. The system allows for manual disconnection of network segments through configured isolation points, particularly at secure router and MOXA Switches.</p>	SAM_I_BLXVPN_LAN from BLX-VPN to LAN (2 rules)						Position	Name	Source	Destination	Protocol	Extra	1	NETOP	=	172.31.10.1/29	TCP	to port 6502	2	RDP	=	172.31.10.1/29	TCP	to port 3389	Block all layer 3 traffic						Position	Name	Source	Destination	Protocol	Extra	1	drop_all	=	=	=	=	
SAM_I_BLXVPN_LAN from BLX-VPN to LAN (2 rules)																																												
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Position	Name	Source	Destination	Protocol	Extra																																							
1	drop_all	=	=	=	=																																							
Comments & Actual Results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comments : - Actual Results : 																																											

5.2. Denial of Service (DoS) Test

Requirement(s): 4.8.2 Denial of Service (DoS) Protection / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 7.1

5.2.1. Test Prerequisite

- 1) It should generate busier-than-normal traffic. (e.g., at least tens of seconds, in some cases much longer).
- 2) Check how the device protects the network when overloaded traffic is generated. It should be able to operate in a degraded mode.

System	Target Device	Maximum Network Load	Remark
INS	RMT2200 EDS-408A EDS-408A-MM-SC	1 Gbps	

5.2.2. Test Result

Step No	Task Description	Expected Result	Result
1	If the target system communicates with a trusted network, simulate DoS attack to target device and network, and verify that the system functions normally as it prevents DoS attack or detects DoS attack and restart automatically to be resilient from the attack.	The system works normally, or restart automatically to resilient	Pass
2	If the target system communicates with untrusted network, simulate DoS attack to the zone boundary protection device to verify that the network and the target device are operating normally.	The system works normally, or restart automatically to resilient	Pass
Detailed Steps	Conduct a network storming test on the INS zone boundary protection device and confirm that the system runs properly with no degradation.		
Comments & Actual Results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comments : - Actual Results : <p>Internal Network Storm:</p> <p>ICMP Flooding – Alarm for network switch abnormal / System working as intended</p> <p>UDP Flooding – Alarm for network switch abnormal / System working as intended</p> <p>TCP SYN Flooding – no Alarms generated / System working as intended</p> <p>Broadcast – No alarm / System working as intended</p> <p>External Network Storm (Source: WAN; Target: MFD 01)</p> <p>For all protocols,</p> <p>Source sends packets to MFD 01, can be seen that router receives packets however are dropped before reaching MFD 01.</p>		

5.2. Denial of Service (DoS) Test

Requirement(s): 4.8.2 Denial of Service (DoS) Protection / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 7.1

5.2.1. Test Prerequisite

- 1) It should generate busier-than-normal traffic. (e.g., at least tens of seconds, in some cases much longer).
- 2) Check how the device protects the network when overloaded traffic is generated. It should be able to operate in a degraded mode.

System	Target Device	Maximum Network Load	Remark
INS	RMT2200 EDS-408A EDS-408A-MM-SC	1 Gbps	

5.2.2. Test Result



Step No	Task Description	Expected Result	Result
1	If the target system communicates with a trusted network, simulate DoS attack to target device and network, and verify that the system functions normally as it prevents DoS attack or detects DoS attack and restart automatically to be resilient from the attack.	The system works normally, or restart automatically to resilient	
2	If the target system communicates with untrusted network, simulate DoS attack to the zone boundary protection device to verify that the network and the target device are operating normally.	The system works normally, or restart automatically to resilient	
Detailed Steps	Generate network overload using traffic generator tool. Check whether the system detects DoS attack and gives alarm, and runs well from DoS attack.		
Comments & Actual Results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comments : - Actual Results : 		

5.3. Integration Test for Untrusted networks

5.3.1. User identification and Authentication

All human user access from untrusted networks shall use multifactor authentication.

Requirement: 4.2.2 User identification and authentication / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 1.1 RE 2




Step No	Task Description	Expected Result	Result
1	Check that the system asks multifactor authentication for user access.	Multifactor authentication process should be activated.	Pass
Detailed Steps	<p>5.3.1.1. The MFA Access of remote access is following;</p> <p>1. Access the Bin-LinX webpage and log in.</p>  <p>2. Log in to the Virtual Machine (VM).</p> 		
	<p>Fig. 4-10 Logon VM Machine</p> <p>3. Use the VM to log in to Netop.</p> 		
Comments & Actual Results	<p>- Comments :</p> <p>- Actual Results :</p> <p>Checked in accordance with "Detailed Steps" provided above.</p>		

5.3. Integration Test for Untrusted networks

5.3.1. User identification and Authentication

All human user access from untrusted networks shall use multifactor authentication.

Requirement: 4.2.2 User identification and authentication / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 1.1 RE 2

Step No	Task Description	Expected Result	Result
1	Check that the system asks multifactor authentication for user access.	Multifactor authentication process should be activated.	
Detailed Steps	<p>5.3.1.1. The MFA Access of remote access is following;</p> <p>1. Access the Bin-LinX webpage and log in.</p>  <p>2. Log in to the Virtual Machine (VM).</p>  <p>Fig. 4-10 Logon VM Machine</p> <p>3. Use the VM to log in to Netop.</p>  <p>Fig. 4-14 Logon Remote MFD / PC over NETOP</p> <p>4. On the vessel side, authorized crew approve the key switch on.</p>		
Comments & Actual Results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comments : - Actual Results : 		

5.3.2. System Use Notification

The system shall display a configurable use notification message before user authentication when accessed from untrusted networks.

Requirement(s): 4.2.13 System user notification / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 1.12

Step No	Task Description	Expected Result	Result
1	Check the system shows a use notification message when accessing remotely.	Notification message should be shown.	Pass
Detailed Steps	<p>5.3.2.1. When accessing the MFD via Big-LinX's virtual machine, a notification prompts the user with a warning message before creating a connection.</p> 		
Comments & Actual Results	<p>- Comments : - Actual Results :</p> <p>Checked in accordance with "Detailed Steps" provided above.</p>		

5.3.2. System Use Notification

The system shall display a configurable use notification message before user authentication when accessed from untrusted networks.

Requirement(s): 4.2.13 System user notification / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 1.12


Step No	Task Description	Expected Result	Result
1	Check the system shows a use notification message when accessing remotely.	Notification message should be shown.	
Detailed Steps	5.3.2.1. When accessing the MFD via Big-LinX's virtual machine, a notification prompts the user with a warning message before creating a connection. 		
Comments & Actual Results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comments : - Actual Results : 		

5.3.3. Access via untrusted networks

The system shall monitor and control all access methods from untrusted networks. It shall deny access requests via untrusted networks unless approved by an assigned crew member.

Requirement(s): 4.2.14 Access via untrusted networks / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 1.13

4.2.14 Access via untrusted networks / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 1.13 RE 1

Step No	Task Description	Expected Result	Result													
1	Check whether the system monitors and controls remote access. This can be checked from logs.	The system shall monitor and control access.	Pass													
2	Check whether the system deny access requests via untrusted networks, if the request is not approved.	The system can deny unapproved access request.	Pass													
Detailed Steps	<p>5.3.3.1. Wartsila headquarters replied regarding this requirement below. Remote access logs are logged on Big-LinX platform</p> <p>RE: WTIV H.3306 Wartsila INS 협조 요청</p> <p>  YH Yoo, Hee Hwan <heehwan.yoo@wartsila.com> 받는 사람 wbkang@sea-net.co.kr 참조 cs@sea-net.co.kr; ykyu@sea-net.co.kr; Choi, Jung Hwan; Son, Kyu Ho; Song, Young Jun; Kwon, MinGyung; Jeon, Chun Bae; '서석진(SEOK JIN SEO)' ; '조세호(SE HO CHO)' ; '이정계(JUNG GYE LEE)' ; '김대우(DAE WOO KIM)' ; +6 명 ① 추가 작업. 시작 날짜: 2024년 12월 17일 화요일. 기한: 2024년 12월 17일 화요일. 이 메시지는 추적된 대화의 일부입니다. 관련된 모든 메시지를 찾거나 플래그를 지정된 원본 메시지를 열려면 여기를 클릭하십시오. </p> <p>3. Remote Access 시 로그 기록이 남는지, 남는다면 해당 스크린샷을 보내주시면 좋겠습니다. 저희의 이해대로라면, 선박 시스템에는 남지 않아도 본사에서 접근 가능한 플랫폼 내에는 로그가 남고 확인이 가능한 것으로 보입니다. → 하기 내용을 참고 바랍니다.</p> <p>List of last Remote Service Records</p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">IMO No.: 9781891 Ship Name: COSTA TOSCANA Functional Location: 100079256 Type: Passenger Ship Shipping Company: n/a Ship Status: Active</td> <td style="text-align: right; padding: 5px;">Edit Record</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">WSAM Serial Number: AX20205598 Router Serial Number: AX20205598 Router Name: 9781891 Costa Toscana Automation User: [REDACTED] Name of VM: WSAM_Service_AUTNAV Remarks: 172_31_10_1</td> <td style="text-align: right; padding: 5px;">Edit Record</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">IMO No.: 9781891 Ship Name: COSTA TOSCANA Functional Location: 100079256 Type: Passenger Ship Shipping Company: n/a Ship Status: Active</td> <td style="text-align: right; padding: 5px;">Edit Record</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">WSAM Serial Number: AX20205598 Router Serial Number: AX20205598 Router Name: 9781891 Costa Toscana Automation User: [REDACTED] Name of VM: WSAM_Service_AUTNAV Remarks: 172_31_10_1</td> <td style="text-align: right; padding: 5px;">Edit Record</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">IMO No.: 9781891 Ship Name: COSTA TOSCANA Functional Location: 100079256 Type: Passenger Ship Shipping Company: n/a Ship Status: Active</td> <td style="text-align: right; padding: 5px;">Edit Record</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">WSAM Serial Number: AX20205598 Router Serial Number: AX20205598 Router Name: 9781891 Costa Toscana Automation User: [REDACTED] Name of VM: WSAM_Service_AUTNAV Remarks: 172_31_10_1</td> <td style="text-align: right; padding: 5px;">Edit Record</td> </tr> </table> <p>5.3.3.2. Wartsila headquarters replied regarding this requirement below. The key switch, controlled by an authorized crew member, is the only way to start and stop the session. When remote access is necessary, the crew turns the key switch on. Otherwise, the switch remains off.</p>	IMO No.: 9781891 Ship Name: COSTA TOSCANA Functional Location: 100079256 Type: Passenger Ship Shipping Company: n/a Ship Status: Active	Edit Record	WSAM Serial Number: AX20205598 Router Serial Number: AX20205598 Router Name: 9781891 Costa Toscana Automation User: [REDACTED] Name of VM: WSAM_Service_AUTNAV Remarks: 172_31_10_1	Edit Record	IMO No.: 9781891 Ship Name: COSTA TOSCANA Functional Location: 100079256 Type: Passenger Ship Shipping Company: n/a Ship Status: Active	Edit Record	WSAM Serial Number: AX20205598 Router Serial Number: AX20205598 Router Name: 9781891 Costa Toscana Automation User: [REDACTED] Name of VM: WSAM_Service_AUTNAV Remarks: 172_31_10_1	Edit Record	IMO No.: 9781891 Ship Name: COSTA TOSCANA Functional Location: 100079256 Type: Passenger Ship Shipping Company: n/a Ship Status: Active	Edit Record	WSAM Serial Number: AX20205598 Router Serial Number: AX20205598 Router Name: 9781891 Costa Toscana Automation User: [REDACTED] Name of VM: WSAM_Service_AUTNAV Remarks: 172_31_10_1	Edit Record			
IMO No.: 9781891 Ship Name: COSTA TOSCANA Functional Location: 100079256 Type: Passenger Ship Shipping Company: n/a Ship Status: Active	Edit Record															
WSAM Serial Number: AX20205598 Router Serial Number: AX20205598 Router Name: 9781891 Costa Toscana Automation User: [REDACTED] Name of VM: WSAM_Service_AUTNAV Remarks: 172_31_10_1	Edit Record															
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IMO No.: 9781891 Ship Name: COSTA TOSCANA Functional Location: 100079256 Type: Passenger Ship Shipping Company: n/a Ship Status: Active	Edit Record															
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Comments & Actual Results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comments : - Actual Results : <p>Checked in accordance with “Detailed Steps” provided above.</p> <p>Note:</p> <p>There were no indications shown on the MFD during the remote connection status. However, Windows Event Viewer was able to log the remote connection.</p>															

5.3.3. Access via untrusted networks

The system shall monitor and control all access methods from untrusted networks. It shall deny access requests via untrusted networks unless approved by an assigned crew member.

Requirement(s): 4.2.14 Access via untrusted networks / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 1.13


4.2.14 Access via untrusted networks / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 1.13 RE 1

Step No	Task Description	Expected Result	Result
1	Check whether the system monitors and controls remote access. This can be checked from logs.	The system shall monitor and control access.	
2	Check whether the system deny access requests via untrusted networks, if the request is not approved.	The system can deny unapproved access request.	
Detailed Steps	<p>5.3.3.1. Wartsila headquarters replied regarding this requirement below. Remote access logs are logged on Big-LinX platform</p> <p>RE: WTIV H.3306 Wartsila INS 협조 요청</p> <p>  Yoo, Hee Hwan <hee.hwan.yoo@wartsila.com> 받는 사람 wbkang@sea-net.co.kr 참조 cs@sea-net.co.kr; ykryu@sea-net.co.kr; Choi, Jung Hwan; Son, Kyu Ho; Song, Young Jun; Kwon, MinGyung; Jeon, Chun Bae; 서석진(SEOK JIN SEO); 권상아(SANG A KWON); 조세호(SE HO CHO); 이정계(JUNG GYE LEE); 김대우(DAE WOO KIM); +6 명 ① 추가 작업. 시작 날짜: 2024년 12월 17일 화요일. 기한: 2024년 12월 17일 화요일. 이 메시지는 추적된 대화의 일부입니다. 관련된 모든 메시지를 찾거나 플래그가 지정된 원본 메시지를 열려면 여기를 클릭하십시오. </p> <p>2024-12-17 (화) 오후 4:01</p> <p>3. Remote Access 시 로그 기록이 남는지, 남는다면 해당 스크린샷을 보내주시면 좋겠습니다. 저희의 이해대로라면, 선박 시스템에는 남지 않아도 본사에서 접근 가능한 플랫폼 내에는 로그가 남고 확인이 가능한 것으로 보입니다. → 하기 내용을 참고 바랍니다.</p> <p>List of last Remote Service Records</p> <p>IMO No.: 9781891 Ship Name: COSTA TOSCANA Functional Location: 100079256 Type: Passenger Ship Shipping Company: n/a Ship Status: Active</p> <p>WSAM Serial Number: AX20205598 Router Serial Number: AX20205598 Router Name: 9781891 Costa Toscana Automation User: [REDACTED] Name of VM: WSAM_Service_AUTNAV Remarks: 172_31_10_1</p> <p>IMO No.: 9781891 Ship Name: COSTA TOSCANA Functional Location: 100079256 Type: Passenger Ship Shipping Company: n/a Ship Status: Active</p> <p>WSAM Serial Number: AX20205598 Router Serial Number: AX20205598 Router Name: 9781891 Costa Toscana Automation User: [REDACTED] Name of VM: WSAM_Service_AUTNAV Remarks: 172_31_10_1</p> <p>IMO No.: 9781891 Ship Name: COSTA TOSCANA Functional Location: 100079256 Type: Passenger Ship Shipping Company: n/a Ship Status: Active</p> <p>WSAM Serial Number: AX20205598 Router Serial Number: AX20205598 Router Name: 9781891 Costa Toscana Automation User: [REDACTED] Name of VM: WSAM_Service_AUTNAV Remarks: 172_31_10_1</p>		
Comments & Actual Results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comments : - Actual Results : 		

5.3.4. Remote session termination

The system shall automatically terminate remote sessions after a configurable period of inactivity or upon manual termination by an assigned crew member. Termination shall not jeopardize vessel or crew safety.


Requirement(s): 4.3.7 Remote session termination / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 2.6

Step No	Task Description	Expected Result	Result	
1	Check whether the system automatically terminate a remote session after certain time has passed, or by manually.	The remote access can be terminated either automatically or manually.	Pass	
Detailed Steps	<p>5.3.4.1. Wartsila headquarters replied regarding this requirement below.</p> <p>Wartsila headquarters replied regarding this requirement below. The key switch, controlled by an authorized crew member, is the only way to start and stop the session. When remote access is necessary, the crew turns the key switch on. Otherwise, the switch remains off.</p> <p>RE: WTIV H.3306 Wartsila INS 협조 요청</p> <p>  Yoo, Hee Hwan <hee.hwan.yoo@wartsila.com> 받는 사람 wbkang@sea-net.co.kr 참조 cs@sea-net.co.kr; ykryu@sea-net.co.kr; Choi, Jung Hwan; Son, Kyu Ho; Song, Young Jun; Kwon, MinGyung; Jeon, Chun Bae; '서석진(SEOK JIN SEO)'; '권상아(SANG A Kwon)'; +9 명 <i>(i) 추가 작업. 시작 날짜: 2024년 12월 17일 화요일. 기한: 2024년 12월 17일 화요일. 이 메시지는 주제된 대화의 일부입니다. 관련된 모든 메시지를 찾거나 블로그가 지정된 원본 메시지를 열려면 여기를 클릭하십시오.</i> 7. Remote Access 접속을 본선 선박에서 거부하거나, 세션을 강제로 종료하는 방법이 키 박스 외에 다른 해결책이 있는지 여부를 알려주시길 바랍니다. 가령 원격 중, 선박에서 허용치 않은 원격 접속을 발견하여 접속을 거부하거나 세션을 강제 종료하는 기능이 있다면, 스크린샷과 함께 설명해주시면 좋겠습니다. → 하기 내용을 참고 바랍니다. <i>The key switch is the only way to stop the session. The second option is to turn off the router or disconnect the Ethernet cable between the router and the workstation.</i> Best regards, HeeHwan Yoo Manager / PM Wartsila ANCS Mob +82 10 9302 9278 hee.hwan.yoo@wartsila.com </p>	 2024-12-17 (화) 오후 4:01		
Comments & Actual Results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comments : - Actual Results : <p>The remote session can be terminated by turning off the physical key for the remote connection.</p> 			

5.3.4. Remote session termination

The system shall automatically terminate remote sessions after a configurable period of inactivity or upon manual termination by an assigned crew member. Termination shall not jeopardize vessel or crew safety.


Requirement(s): 4.3.7 Remote session termination / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 2.6

Step No	Task Description	Expected Result	Result
1	Check whether the system automatically terminate a remote session after certain time has passed, or by manually.	The remote access can be terminated either automatically or manually.	
Detailed Steps	<p>5.3.4.1. Wartsila headquarters replied regarding this requirement below.</p> <p>Wartsila headquarters replied regarding this requirement below.</p> <p>The key switch, controlled by an authorized crew member, is the only way to start and stop the session. When remote access is necessary, the crew turns the key switch on. Otherwise, the switch remains off.</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 10px;"> <p>RE: WTIV H.3306 Wartsila INS 협조 요청</p> <p>YH Yoo, Hee Hwan <hee.hwan.yoo@wartsila.com> 받는 사람 wbkang@sea-net.co.kr 장조 cs@sea-net.co.kr; ykyru@sea-net.co.kr; Choi, Jung Hwan; Son, Kyu Ho; Song, Young Jun; Kwon, MinGyung; Jeon, Chun Bae; '서석진(SEOK JIN SEO)'; '권상아(SANG A Kwon)'; +9 명</p> <p>① 추가 작업. 시작 날짜: 2024년 12월 17일 화요일. 기한: 2024년 12월 17일 화요일. 이 메시지는 추적된 대화의 일부입니다. 관련된 모든 메시지를 찾거나 클래그가 지정된 원본 메시지를 열려면 여기를 클릭하십시오.</p> <p>7. Remote Access 접속을 본선 선박에서 거부하거나, 세션을 강제로 종료하는 방법이 키 박스 외에 다른 해결책이 있는지 여부를 알려주시길 바랍니다. 가령 원격 중, 선박에서 허용치 않은 원격 접속을 발견하여 접속을 거부하거나 세션을 강제 종료하는 기능이 있다면, 스크린샷과 함께 설명을 해주시면 좋겠습니다. → 하기 내용을 참고 바랍니다.</p> <p><i>The key switch is the only way to stop the session. The second option is to turn off the router or disconnect the Ethernet cable between the router and the workstation.</i></p> <p>Best regards, HeeHwan Yoo Manager / PM Wartsila ANCS Mob +82 10 9302 9278 hee.hwan.yoo@wartsila.com</p>  </div>		
Comments & Actual Results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comments : - Actual Results : 		

5.3.5. Communication integrity

The system shall protect the integrity of transmitted information.


Requirement(s): 4.4.2 Community integrity / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 3.1

Step No	Task Description	Expected Result	Result
1	Check the system may protect the information integrity.	There is an information integrity protection method.	Pass
Detailed Steps	<p>5.3.5.1. Wartsila headquarters replied regarding this requirement below. Communication via TLS/SSL protocol is encrypted method of remote access.</p> <p>RE: WTIV H.3306 Wartsila INS 협조 요청</p> <p>  Yoo, Hee Hwan <hee.hwan.yoo@wartsila.com> 받은 사람 wbkang@sea-net.co.kr 참조 cs@sea-net.co.kr; ykryu@sea-net.co.kr; Choi, Jung Hwan; Son, Kyu Ho; Song, Young Jun; Kwon, MinGyung; Jeon, Chun Bae; '서석진(SEOK JIN SEO)'; '권상아(SANG A Kwon)'; +9 명 ① 추가 작업. 시작 날짜: 2024년 12월 17일 화요일. 기한: 2024년 12월 17일 화요일. 이 메시지는 추적된 대화의 일부입니다. 관련된 모든 메시지를 찾거나 클릭해보면 원본 메시지를 열려면 여기를 클릭하십시오. </p> <p>2. Remote Access 시 사용되는 암호화 통신 프로토콜 및 암호 알고리즘 및 키 길이에 대해, 본사에서 자세한 안내가 필요합니다. 가령, TLS v1.2 프로토콜을 사용하며, SHA256 암호 알고리즘 및 키 길이를 사용한다. 와 같은 설명입니다. → 하기 내용을 참고 바랍니다.</p> <p>Security Concept Big-LinX Overview</p>  <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Smartcard (Hardware Certificate) Software Certificate Authentication on both ends Encrypted communication Controlled connections, e.g. by allowing the service with keyswitch <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rendezvous server Extended user management Monitoring of all connection and accesses Operation in european data center <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Smartcard (Hardware Certificate assigned to one person) Two-Factor Authentication Temp. User permissions can be granted (e.g. Third Party) Individual User- and Groupmanagement Access to one or multiple user at once 		
Comments & Actual Results	<p>- Comments :</p> <p>- Actual Results :</p> <p>Refer to the manufacturer's information in the detailed step.</p>		

5.3.5. Communication integrity

The system shall protect the integrity of transmitted information.

Requirement(s): 4.4.2 Community integrity / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 3.1

Step No	Task Description	Expected Result	Result	
1	Check the system may protect the information integrity.	There is an information integrity protection method.		
Detailed Steps	<p>5.3.5.1. Wartsila headquarters replied regarding this requirement below.</p> <p>Communication via TLS/SSL protocol is encrypted method of remote access.</p>  <p>The screenshot shows an email from Yoo, Hee Hwan <hee.hwan.yoo@wartsila.com> to wbkang@sea-net.co.kr. The subject is "RE: WTIV H.3306 Wartsila INS 협조 요청". The email body discusses the use of TLS/SSL for remote access, mentioning the use of SHA256 for encryption. It also includes a diagram titled "Security Concept Big-LinX Overview" showing the authentication process between a client and a Big-LinX server.</p> <p>Security Concept Big-LinX Overview</p> <p>The diagram illustrates the Big-LinX security concept. It shows a client connecting to a Big-LinX server via a VPN Tunnel. The server then connects to a Rendezvous server (WWH) via another VPN Tunnel. The Rendezvous server manages user authentication and monitoring. The client is shown using a Smartcard (Hardware Certificate) for authentication. The diagram also lists several features of the Big-LinX system, such as two-factor authentication, temporary user permissions, and individual/group management.</p> <p>Authentication process in Big-LinX</p> <p>The authentication process is divided into two main steps:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1.) Connection: This step involves asymmetric encryption, key sharing via RSA2048, and the use of Gemalto SmartCard (Java Card, RSA2048, Signature Big-LinX CA, Private RSA-Key, Hardware Certificate). 2.) Data Share: This step involves symmetric encryption, AES key sharing via RSA, and the use of Gemalto SmartCard (Java Card, RSA2048, Hardware Certificate). It also includes a check for the validity of the signature. <p>Communication via TLS/SSL Protocol</p> <p>The diagram shows the communication flow between a client and a server using the TLS/SSL protocol. It highlights the exchange of RSA Public Key [Signature] and the AES key share.</p>			
Comments & Actual Results	<p>- Comments :</p> <p>- Actual Results :</p>			

5.3.6. Session integrity

The system shall protect the integrity of sessions over untrusted networks by rejecting invalid session IDs. Session IDs shall be invalidated upon logout or session termination, and each session shall use a unique session ID. Unexpected session IDs shall be treated as invalid.

Requirement(s): 4.4.9 Session integrity / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 3.8

 4.4.9 Session integrity / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 3.8 RE 1

 4.4.9 Session integrity / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 3.8 RE 2

Step No	Task Description	Expected Result	Result
1	Check the system may protect the session integrity.	There is a session integrity protection method.	Pass
2	Check the system may invalidate session IDs upon user logout or other session termination.	After termination, the session IDs become invalid.	Pass
3	Check the system may generate a unique session ID for each session.	All session IDs are unique.	Pass
Detailed Steps	5.3.6. Wartsila headquarters replied regarding this requirement below. Communication via TLS/SSL protocol is encrypted method of remote access.		
Comments & Actual Results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comments : - Actual Results : <p>See 5.3.5</p>		

5.3.6. Session integrity

The system shall protect the integrity of sessions over untrusted networks by rejecting invalid session IDs. Session IDs shall be invalidated upon logout or session termination, and each session shall use a unique session ID. Unexpected session IDs shall be treated as invalid.

Requirement(s): 4.4.9 Session integrity / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 3.8

4.4.9 Session integrity / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 3.8 RE 1

4.4.9 Session integrity / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 3.8 RE 2

Step No	Task Description	Expected Result	Result
1	Check the system may protect the session integrity.	There is a session integrity protection method.	
2	Check the system may invalidate session IDs upon user logout or other session termination.	After termination, the session IDs become invalid.	
3	Check the system may generate a unique session ID for each session.	All session IDs are unique.	
Detailed Steps	5.3.6. Wartsila headquarters replied regarding this requirement below. Communication via TLS/SSL protocol is encrypted method of remote access.		
Comments & Actual Results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comments : - Actual Results : 		

5.3.7. Information confidentiality

The system shall protect the confidentiality of information explicitly authorized for reading.

Requirement(s): 4.5.2 Information confidentiality / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 4.1

Step No	Task Description	Expected Result	Result
1	Check the system may protect the information confidentiality.	There is an information confidentiality protection method.	Pass
Detailed Steps	5.3.7.1 Wartsila headquarters replied regarding this requirement below. Communication via TLS/SSL protocol is encrypted method of remote access.		
Comments & Actual Results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comments : - Actual Results : <p>See 5.3.5</p>		

5.3.7. Information confidentiality

The system shall protect the confidentiality of information explicitly authorized for reading.


Requirement(s): 4.5.2 Information confidentiality / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 4.1

Step No	Task Description	Expected Result	Result
1	Check the system may protect the information confidentiality.	There is an information confidentiality protection method.	
Detailed Steps	5.3.7.1 Wartsila headquarters replied regarding this requirement below. Communication via TLS/SSL protocol is encrypted method of remote access.		
Comments & Actual Results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comments : - Actual Results : 		

5.3.8. Use of cryptography

The system shall use cryptographic algorithms, key sizes, and key management mechanisms aligned with best practices for communication over untrusted networks.


Requirement(s): 4.5.4 Use of cryptography / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 4.3

Step No	Task Description	Expected Result	Result
1	Check the system may use cryptographic algorithms.	There is a cryptographic algorithm used.	Pass
Detailed Steps	<p>5.3.8.1. Wartsila headquarters replied regarding this requirement below. The system uses the TLS/SSL protocol and AES key sharing via RSA2048.</p> <p>Authentification process in Big-LinX</p> <p>1.) Connection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Asymmetric Encryption • Key sharing via RSA2048 • Gemalto SmartCard: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Java Card • RSA2048 • Signature Big-LinX CA • Private RSA-Key • Hardware Certificate <p>2.) Data Share:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Symmetric Encryption • AES Key sharing via RSA • Gemalto SmartCard: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Java Card • RSA2048 • Hardware Certificate  <p>Communication via TLS/SSL Protokol</p>		
Comments & Actual Results	<p>- Comments :</p> <p>- Actual Results :</p> <p>See 5.3.5</p>		

5.3.8. Use of cryptography

The system shall use cryptographic algorithms, key sizes, and key management mechanisms aligned with best practices for communication over untrusted networks.


Requirement(s): 4.5.4 Use of cryptography / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 4.3

Step No	Task Description	Expected Result	Result	
1	Check the system may use cryptographic algorithms.	There is a cryptographic algorithm used.		
Detailed Steps	<p>5.3.8.1. Wartsila headquarters replied regarding this requirement below. The system uses the TLS/SSL protocol and AES key sharing via RSA2048.</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 10px;"> <p>Authentification process in Big-LinX</p> <p>1.) Connection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Asymmetric Encryption • Key sharing via RSA2048 • Gemalto SmartCard: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Java Card • RSA2048 • Signature Big-LinX CA • Private RSA-Key • Hardware Certificate <p>2.) Data Share:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Symmetric Encryption • AES Key sharing via RSA • Gemalto SmartCard: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Java Card • RSA2048 • Hardware Certificate <p>Communication via TLS/SSL Protokol</p>  </div>			
Comments & Actual Results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comments : - Actual Results : 			

5.3.9. Zone boundary protection

The system shall deny network traffic by default, allowing only traffic explicitly permitted through whitelisting.


Requirement(s): 4.6.3 Zone boundary protection / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 5.2 RE 1

Step No	Task Description	Expected Result	Result
1	Check the system deny network traffic by default, and allow whitelisted traffics only.	Firewall rules are relevantly set.	Pass
Detailed Steps	<p>5.3.9.1. Wartsila headquarters replied regarding this requirement below.</p> <p>Check firewall rule set</p> 		
Comments & Actual Results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comments : - Actual Results : <p>Refer 5.1.1</p>		

5.3.9. Zone boundary protection

The system shall deny network traffic by default, allowing only traffic explicitly permitted through whitelisting.

Requirement(s): 4.6.3 Zone boundary protection / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 5.2 RE 1

Step No	Task Description	Expected Result	Result
1	Check the system deny network traffic by default, and allow whitelisted traffics only.	Firewall rules are relevantly set.	
Detailed Steps	5.3.9.1. Wartsila headquarters replied regarding this requirement below. Check firewall rule set 		
Comments & Actual Results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comments : - Actual Results : 		

5.3.10. General purpose person-to-person communication restrictions

The system shall block person-to-person messages from users or systems external to the control system.

Requirement(s): 4.6.4 General purpose person-to-person communication restrictions / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 5.3

Step No	Task Description	Expected Result	Result
1	Check whether the system can block person-to-person messages from users or systems external to the control system.	Any unauthorized messages are blocked.	Pass
Detailed Steps	Human users access the system through INS OS PC. Therefore, check the list of software installed on the OS PC to verify that there is no messenger program.		
Comments & Actual Results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comments : - Actual Results : <p>Checked that no person to person message service are running.</p>		

5.3.10. General purpose person-to-person communication restrictions

The system shall block person-to-person messages from users or systems external to the control system.

Requirement(s): 4.6.4 General purpose person-to-person communication restrictions / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 5.3

Step No	Task Description	Expected Result	Result
1	Check whether the system can block person-to-person messages from users or systems external to the control system.	Any unauthorized messages are blocked.	
Detailed Steps	Human users access the system through INS OS PC. Therefore, check the list of software installed on the OS PC to verify that there is no messenger program.		
Comments & Actual Results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comments : - Actual Results : 		

5.3.11. Least functionality

The system shall prohibit or restrict unnecessary functions and services, such as file transfer protocols and instant messaging.

Requirement(s): 4.8.8 Least functionality / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 7.7

Step No	Task Description	Expected Result	Result
1	Check whether there is no unnecessary functions or services running in the system.	No unnecessary functions are running.	Pass
Detailed Steps	Verify that all services are minimally permitted by checking software list and firewall rule.		
Comments & Actual Results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comments : - Actual Results : <p>Checked that no unnecessary functions are running</p>		

5.3.11. Least functionality

The system shall prohibit or restrict unnecessary functions and services, such as file transfer protocols and instant messaging.

Requirement(s): 4.8.8 Least functionality / IEC 62443-3-3 SR 7.7

Step No	Task Description	Expected Result	Result
1	Check whether there is no unnecessary functions or services running in the system.	No unnecessary functions are running.	
Detailed Steps	Verify that all services are minimally permitted by checking software list and firewall rule.		
Comments & Actual Results	- Comments : - Actual Results :		