Web 2.0

Lecture 7: Security in REST

doc. Ing. Tomáš Vitvar, Ph.D.

tomas@vitvar.com • @TomasVitvar • http://vitvar.com



Czech Technical University in Prague
Faculty of Information Technologies • Software and Web Engineering • http://vitvar.com/courses/w20







Modified: Wed Mar 22 2017, 17:38:58 Humla v0.3

Overview

- Security Concepts
- Authentication and Authorization
- OAuth 2.0
- OpenID


Web Service Security Concepts

• Securing the client-server communcation

- Message-level security
- Transport-level security

Ensure


- Authentication verify a client's identity
- Authorizaton rights to access resources
- Message Confidentiality keep message content secret
- Message Integrity message content does not change during transmission
- Non-repudiation proof of integrity and origin of data



Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 3 -

Data on the Web



Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 4

Overview

- Security Concepts
- Authentication and Authorization
- OAuth 2.0
- OpenID

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 5 -


Authentication and Authorization

- Authentication
 - verification of user's identity
- Authorization
 - verification that a user has rights to access a resource
- Standard: HTTP authentication
 - HTTP defines two options
 - → Basic Access Authentication
 - → Digest Access Authentication
 - They are defined in
 - \rightarrow RFC 2616: Hypertext Transfer Protocol HTTP/1.1
 - → RFC 2617: HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication
- Custom/proprietary: use of cookies

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 6 -

Basic Access Authentication



Realm

- an identifier of the space on the server (~ a collection of resources and their sub-resources)
- A client may associate a valid credentials with realms such that it copies authorization information in requests for which server requires authentication (by WWW-Authenticate header)

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

-7-

Basic Access Authentication – Credentials

• Credentials

- credentials are base64 encoded
- the format is: username:password

```
# to encode in linux
echo "novak:heslo" | base64

> bm92YWs6aGVzbG8K

# and to decode
echo "bm92YWs6aGVzbG8K" | base64 -d # use capital "D" in OS X

> novak:heslo
```

Comments

- When SSL is not used, the password can be read
- An attacker can repeat interactions

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 8 -

Digest Access Authentication

- RFC 2617 Basic and Digest Access Authentication
 - No password between a client and a server but a hash value
 - Simple and advanced mechanisms (only server-generated nonce value replayattacks or with client-generated nonce value)
- Basic Steps
 - 1. Client accesses a protected area
 - 1 | > GET / HTTP/1.1
 - 2. Server requests authentication with WWW-Authenticate

3. Client calculates a response hash by using the realm, his/her username, the password, and the quality of protection (QoP) and requests the resource with authorization header

```
> GET / HTTP/1.1
> Authorization: Digest username="novak", realm="ProtectedArea",
nonce="BbdQof3DBAA=a293ff3d724989371610f03015f2d23f3cd2c045", uri="/",
algorithm=MD5, response="c4ea2293aeb318826d1e533f363efd90", qop=auth,
nc=00000001, cnonce="531ee8ba7f2a8fd1"
```

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 9 -

Nonce and QoP

- Nonce
 - A value to identify an interaction that should occur only once
 - nonce generated by the server
 - \rightarrow may have a time period for which the nonce is valid
 - \rightarrow may be computed using client IP, ETag of the resource, etc.
 - \rightarrow this limits chances for the replay attack.
 - cnonce generated by the client
- QoP quality of protection
 - Further improvements to prevent replay attacks and enables non-repudiation

Algorithms


- Algorithm for response value of authorization header
 - No quality of protection (qop is missing or qop=none)
 - → limits chances of replay-attacks
 - 1 HA1 = MD5(username:realm:password)
 - 2 HA2 = MD5(method:digestURI)
 - 3 response = MD5(HA1:nonce:HA2)
 - with quality of protection (qop=auth)
 - 1 | HA1 = MD5(username:realm:password)
 - 2 | HA2 = MD5(method:digestURI)
 - 3 response = MD5(HA1:nonce:nonceCount:cnonce:qop:HA2)
 - with quality of protection for message integrity (qop=auth-int)
 - → enables non-repudiation (i.e., proof of integrity and origin of data)
 - 1 | HA1 = MD5(username:realm:password)
 - 2 HA2 = MD5(method:digestURI:MD5(payload))
 - response = MD5(HA1:nonce:nonceCount:cnonce:qop:HA2)

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 11

Replay Attack

- Replay Attack Scenario (quality of protection is none)
 - The communication is not encrypted (i.e., no use of HTTPS)
 - Eve listens to the Alice's communication (e.g. on a proxy server)
 - Eve resends requests with headers from Alice's requests




Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

– 12 –

Replay Attack (Cont.)

- Replay Attack Scenario (quality of protection is auth or auth-int)
 - nonceCount should be incremented in every request to a response of the nonce value from the server



Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

_ 13 _

Overview

- Security Concepts
- Authentication and Authorization
- OAuth 2.0
 - Client-side Web Apps
 - Server-side Web Apps
 - OAuth 2.0 vs. OAuth 1.0
- OpenID

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

– 14 –

Motivation

- Cloud Computing Software as a Service
 - Users utilize apps in clouds
 - → they access **resources** via Web browsers
 - \rightarrow they store their data in the cloud
 - → Google Docs, PicasaWeb, etc.
 - The trend is that SaaS are open
 - \rightarrow can be extended by 3rd-party developers through APIs
 - \rightarrow attract more users \Rightarrow increases value of apps
 - Apps extensions need to have an access to users' data
- Need for a new mechanism to access resources
 - Users can grant access to third-party apps without exposing their users' credentials

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 15 -

When there is no OAuth



Application with a resource

client access the resource on user's behalf

user accesses the resource using its credentials

- Users must share their credentials with the 3rd-party app
- Users cannot control what and how long the app can access resources
- Users must trust the app
 - In case of misuse, users can only change their passwords

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

– 16 -

OAuth 2.0 Protocol

• OAuth Objectives

- users can grant access to third-party applications
- users can revoke access any time
- supports:
 - \rightarrow client-side web apps (implicit grant),
 - → server-side apps (authorization code), and
 - → native (desktop) apps (authorization code)

History

- Initiated by Google, Twitter, Yahoo!
- Different, non-standard protocols first: ClientLogin, AuthSub
- OAuth 1.0 first standard, security problems, quite complex
- OAuth 2.0 new version, not backward compatibile with 1.0

• Specifications and adoption

- OAuth 2.0 Protocol ₫
- OAuth 2.0 Google Support ₺

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 17 -

Terminology

Client

- a third-party app accessing resources owned by **resource owner**

• **Resource Owner** (also user)

- a person that owns a resource stored in the resource server

Authorization and Token Endpoints

 endpoints provided by an authorization server through which a resource owner authorizes requests.

Resource Server

 an app that stores resources owned by a resource owner (e.g., pictures in Google PicasaWeb)

Authorization Code

- a code that a **client** uses to request **access tokens** to access resources

Access Token

- a code that a **client** uses to access resources

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

– 18 –

Overview

- Security Concepts
- Authentication and Authorization
- OAuth 2.0
 - Client-side Web Apps
 - Server-side Web Apps
 - OAuth 2.0 vs. OAuth 1.0
- OpenID

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

_ 19 _

Client-side Web Apps

- Simplified version of OAuth 2.0 protocol
 - JavaScript/AJAX apps running in a browser
 - Apps that cannot easily "remember" app state
 - limited number of interactions
- Architecture
 - User-agent processes a javascript/HTML code from the client
 - No need of authorization code
- Basic Steps
 - A client redirects a user agent to the authorization endpoint
 - A resource owner grants an access to the client or rejects the request
 - Authorization server provides an access_token to the client
 - Client access the resource with the access_token
 - When the token expires, client requests new token

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

_ 20 -

Demo – List of Contacts


Display your Google contacts

- this demo requests authorization from you to access your Google contacts using client-side OAuth 2.0 protocol and then displays the contacts below. In order to transfer access_token from authorization window, it stores the access token in a cookie.
- access_token
- Show contacts or revoke access

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 21 -

Client-side Web Apps Protocol



Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

– 22 -

Redirection - Step 1

- Methods and Parameters
 - Methods: GET or POST
 - example authorazation endpoint url (Google): https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/auth
 - query string parameters or application/x-www-form-urlencoded
 - \rightarrow client id id of the client that was previously registered
 - \rightarrow redirect uri an URI that auth. server will redirect to when user grants/rejects
 - \rightarrow scope string identifying resources/services to be accessed
 - → response_type type of the response (token or code)
 - \rightarrow **state** (optional) state between request and redirect
 - Example

 - https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/auth? client_id=621535099260.apps.googleusercontent.com& redirect_uri=http://humla.vitvar.com/slides/w20/examples/oauth/callback.htm
 - 4 | scope=https://www.google.com/m8/feeds& response_type=token

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

Callback – steps 4 and 5

- Resource owner grants the access
 - authorization server calls back redirect uri
 - client parses URL in JavaScript (Step 5)
 - → extracts access_token and expires_in (by using window.location.hash)
 - Example:
 - http://humla.vitvar.com/slides/w20/examples/oauth/callback.html#
 - access_token=1/QbZfgDNsnd&
 - expires in=4301
- Resource owner rejects the access
 - authorization server calls back redirect_uri with query string parameter error=access denied
 - Example:
 - hhttp://humla.vitvar.com/slides/w20/examples/oauth/callback.html?
 - error=access denied

Accessing Resources – Step 6

Request

- client can access resources defined by scope
- resources' URIs defined in a particular documentation
- Example Google Contacts
 - → to access all users' contacts stored in Google
 - → scope *is* https://www.google.com/m8/feeds
- Query string parameter oauth_token
 - 1 | curl https://www.google.com/m8/feeds/contacts/default/full? 2 | oauth_token=1/dERFd34Sf
- HTTP Header Authorization
 - curl -H "Authorization: OAuth 1/dERFd34Sf" https://www.google.com/m8/feeds/contacts/default/full
- The client can do any allowed operations on the resource


Response

- *Success* 200 OK
- Error 401 Unauthorized when token expires or the client hasn't performed the authorization request.

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 25 -


Cross-Origin Resource Sharing



- see Same Origin and Cross-Origin for details

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 26 -



Overview

- Security Concepts
- Authentication and Authorization
- OAuth 2.0
 - Client-side Web Apps
 - Server-side Web Apps
 - OAuth 2.0 vs. OAuth 1.0
- OpenID

Server-side Web Apps

Additional interactions

- server-side code (any language), the app can maintain the state
- additional interactions, authorization code

Architecture

- Client at a server requests, remembers and refresh access tokens

Basic steps

- Client redirects user agent to the authorization endpoint
- Resource owner grants access to the client or rejects the request
- Authorization server provides **authorization code** to the client
- Client requests access and refresh tokens from the auth. server
- Client access the resource with the access token
- When the token expires, client refreshes a token with refresh token


Advantages

- Access tokens not visible to clients, they are stored at the server
- more secure, clients need to authenticate before they can get tokens

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 29 -

Server-side Web Apps Protocol



Redirection - Step 1

- Methods and Parameters
 - same as for client-side app, except response_type must be code
- Example
 - https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/auth?
 - client_id=621535099260.apps.googleusercontent.com&
 - redirect_uri=http://humla.vitvar.com/slides/w20/examples/oauth/callback.html& scope=https://www.google.com/m8/feeds&

 - 5 response_type=code

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

Callback + Access Token Request - steps 4, 5

- Callback
 - authorization server calls back redirect_uri
 - client gets the code and requests access token
 - example (resource owner grants access):

http://humla.vitvar.com/slides/w20/examples/oauth/callback.html? code=4/P7...

- when user rejects \rightarrow same as client-side access
- Access token request
 - POST request to token endpoint
 - \rightarrow example Google token endpoint:

https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/token

- POST /o/oauth2/token HTTP/1.1
- Host: accounts.google.com
 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
- code=4/P7q7W91a-oMsCeLvIaQm6bTrgtp6&
- client_id=621535099260.apps.googleusercontent.com&
- client_secret=XTHhXh1S2UggvyWGwDk1EjXB&
 redirect_uri=http://humla.vitvar.com/slides/w20/examples/oauth/callback.htm
- grant_type=authorization_code

Access Token (cont.)

- Access token response
 - Token endpoint responds with access_token and refresh_token

- Refreshing a token
 - POST request to the token endpoint with grant_type=refresh_token and the previously obtained value of refresh_token

```
POST /o/oauth2/token HTTP/1.1
Host: accounts.google.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

client_id=21302922996.apps.googleusercontent.com&
client_secret=XTHhXh1SlUNgvyWGwDk1EjXB&
refresh_token=1/6BMfW9j53gdGImsixUH6kU5RsR4zwI9lUVX-tqf8JXQ&
grant_type=refresh_token
```

• Accessing a resource is the same as in the client-side app

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 33 -

Overview

- Security Concepts
- Authentication and Authorization
- OAuth 2.0
 - Client-side Web Apps
 - Server-side Web Apps
 - OAuth 2.0 vs. OAuth 1.0
- OpenID

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 34 -

Why new version?

- OAuth 1.0 in brief
 - security not based on SSL
 - client must sign every request using a defined algorithm
 - \rightarrow e.g., public-private key signatures by RSA
 - More complex to be implemented by clients
 - → although client libraries exist
 - not suitable for JavaScript-based clients
- OAuth 2.0 simplifies the process
 - SSL is required for all communications to generate the token
 - Signatures are not required for the actual API calls once the token has been generated
 - → SSL is also strongly recommended here
 - supports various clients including JavaScript and mobile

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 35 -

Overview

- Security Concepts
- Authentication and Authorization
- OAuth 2.0
- OpenID

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 36 -


OpenID Protocol

- Motivation many user accounts
 - users need to maintain many accounts to access various services
 - multiple passwords problem
- Objectives
 - allows apps to utilize an OpenID provider
 - → a third-party authentication service
 - \rightarrow federated login
 - users have one account with the OpenID provider and use it for apps that support the provider
- OpenID providers
 - it is a protocol, anybody can build a provider
 - Google, Yahoo!, Seznam.cz, etc.
- Specification
 - OpenID Protocol 🗗

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 37 -

Interaction Sequence



- Discovery discovery of a service associated with a resource
- XRDS eXtensible Resource Descriptor Sequence
 - format for discovery result
 - developed to serve resource discovery for OpenID
 - Web app retrieves endpoint to send login authentication requests

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

– 38 –

Login Authentication Request – Step 5

- Example Google OpenID provider
 - 1 | https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id
 - ?openid.ns=http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0
 - 8 & openid.return to=https://www.example.com/checkauth
 - 4 &openid.realm=http://www.example.com/
 - 5 & openid.assoc_handle=ABSmpf6DNMw
 - &openid.mode=checkid_setup

Parameters

- **− ns** − *protocol version (obtained from the XRDS)*
- mode type of message or additional semantics (checkid_setup indicates that interaction between the provider and the user is allowed during authentication)
- − return_to − callback page the provider sends the result
- realm domain the user will trust, consistent with return_to
- assoc_handle "log in" for web app with openid provider
- * Not all fields shown, check the OpenID spec for the full list of fields and their values

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 39 -

Login Authentication Response – Step 8

- User logins successfully
 - 1 | http://www.example.com/checkauth
 - ?openid.ns=http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0
 - 3 & openid.mode=id res
 - 4 & openid.return_to=http://www.example.com:8080/checkauth
 - 5 & openid.assoc_handle=ABSmpf6DNMw
 - 6 & openid.identity=https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id/id=ACyQatiscWvwqs4UQV_L
 - Web app will use identity to identify user in the application
 - response is also signed using a list of fields in the response (not shown in the listing)
- User cancels
 - 1 | http://www.example.com/checkauth
 - ?openid.mode=cancel
 - 8 & openid.ns=http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0
 - * Not all fields shown, check the OpenID spec for the full list of fields and their values

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 40 -