Web 2.0 Lecture 7: Security in REST

doc. Ing. Tomáš Vitvar, Ph.D.

tomas@vitvar.com • @TomasVitvar • http://vitvar.com



Czech Technical University in Prague
Faculty of Information Technologies • Software and Web Engineering • http://vitvar.com/courses/w20





Evropský seriální řend Praha & EU: Inventujeme do valil budoucnosti

Modified: Fri Mar 17 2017, 12:53:43 Humla v0.3

Overview


- Security Concepts
- Authentication and Authorization
- OAuth 2.0
- OpenID


Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 2 -

Web Service Security Concepts

- Securing the client-server communcation
 - Message-level security
 - Transport-level security
- Ensure
 - Authentication verify a client's identity
 - Authorizaton rights to access resources
 - Message Confidentiality keep message content secret
 - Message Integrity message content does not change during transmission
 - Non-repudiation proof of integrity and origin of data





Overview

- Security Concepts
- Authentication and Authorization
- OAuth 2.0
- OpenID


Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

Authentication and Authorization

- Authentication
 - verification of user's identity
- Authorization
 - verification that a user has rights to access a resource
- Standard: HTTP authentication
 - HTTP defines two options
 - → Basic Access Authentication
 - → Digest Access Authentication
 - They are defined in
 - → RFC 2616: Hypertext Transfer Protocol HTTP/1.1
 - → RFC 2617: HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2018/2017 - @Tamped First

Basic Access Authentication



Realm

- an identifier of the space on the server (~ a collection of resources and their sub-resources)
- A client may associate a valid credentials with realms such that it copies authorization information in requests for which server requires authentication (by WWW-Authenticate header)

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 7

Basic Access Authentication – Credentials

Credentials

- credentials are base64 encoded
- the format is: username:password

```
# to encode in linux
echo "novak:heslo" | base64
> bm92YWs6aGVzbG8K

# and to decode
echo "bm92YWs6aGVzbG8K" | base64 -d # use capital "D" in OS X
> novak:heslo
```

Comments

- When SSL is not used, the password can be read
- An attacker can repeat interactions

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

-8-

Digest Access Authentication

- RFC 2617 Basic and Digest Access Authentication
 - No password between a client and a server but a hash value
 - Simple and advanced mechanisms (only server-generated nonce value replayattacks or with client-generated nonce value)
- Basic Steps
 - 1. Client accesses a protected area
 - 1 | > GET / HTTP/1.1
 - 2. Server requests authentication with WWW-Authenticate

3. Client calculates a response hash by using the realm, his/her username, the password, and the quality of protection (QoP) and requests the resource with authorization header

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitva

- 9

Nonce and QoP

- Nonce
 - A value to identify an interaction that should occur only once
 - nonce generated by the server
 - → may have a time period for which the nonce is valid
 - → may be computed using client IP, ETag of the resource, etc.
 - → this limits chances for the replay attack.
 - cnonce generated by the client
- QoP quality of protection
 - Further improvements to prevent replay attacks and enables non-repudiation

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 10 -

Algorithms


- Algorithm for response value of authorization header
 - No quality of protection (qop is missing or qop=none)
 - → limits chances of replay-attacks
 - 1 | HA1 = MD5(username:realm:password)
 - 2 HA2 = MD5(method:digestURI)
 - response = MD5(HA1:nonce:HA2)
 - with quality of protection (qop=auth)
 - 1 | HA1 = MD5(username:realm:password)
 - HA2 = MD5(method:digestURI)
 - 3 response = MD5(HA1:nonce:nonceCount:cnonce:qop:HA2)
 - with quality of protection for message integrity (qop=auth-int)
 - → enables non-repudiation (i.e., proof of integrity and origin of data)
 - 1 HA1 = MD5(username:realm:password)
 - 2 HA2 = MD5(method:digestURI:MD5(payload))
 - response = MD5(HA1:nonce:nonceCount:cnonce:qop:HA2)

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 11

Replay Attack

- Replay Attack Scenario (quality of protection is none)
 - The communication is not encrypted (i.e., no use of HTTPS)
 - Eve listens to the Alice's communication (e.g. on a proxy server)
 - Eve resends requests with headers from Alice's requests




Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 12 -

Replay Attack (Cont.)

- Replay Attack Scenario (quality of protection is auth or auth-int)
 - nonceCount should be incremented in every request to a response of the nonce value from the server



Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 13

Overview

- Security Concepts
- Authentication and Authorization
- OAuth 2.0
 - Client-side Web Apps
 - Server-side Web Apps
 - OAuth 2.0 vs. OAuth 1.0
- OpenID

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 14 -


Motivation

- Cloud Computing Software as a Service
 - Users utilize apps in clouds
 - → they access resources via Web browsers
 - → they store their data in the cloud
 - → Google Docs, PicasaWeb, etc.
 - The trend is that SaaS are open
 - → can be extended by 3rd-party developers through APIs
 - \rightarrow attract more users \Rightarrow increases value of apps
 - Apps extensions need to have an access to users' data
- Need for a new mechanism to access resources
 - Users can grant access to third-party apps without

ecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 15

When there is no OAuth



• Users must share their credentials with the 3rd-party app

user accesses the resource using its credentials

- Users cannot control what and how long the app can access resources
- Users must trust the app
 - In case of misuse, users can only change their passwords

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 16 -

OAuth 2.0 Protocol

• OAuth Objectives

- users can grant access to third-party applications
- users can revoke access any time
- supports:
 - → client-side web apps (implicit grant),
 - → server-side apps (authorization code), and
 - → native (desktop) apps (authorization code)

History

- Initiated by Google, Twitter, Yahoo!
- Different, non-standard protocols first: ClientLogin, AuthSub
- OAuth 1.0 first standard, security problems, quite complex
- OAuth 2.0 new version, not backward compatibile with 1.0

• Specifications and adoption

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 17 -

Terminology

• Client

- a third-party app accessing resources owned by **resource owner**

• **Resource Owner** (also user)

- a person that owns a resource stored in the resource server

• Authorization and Token Endpoints

 endpoints provided by an authorization server through which a resource owner authorizes requests.

• Resource Server

- an app that stores resources owned by a **resource owner** (e.g., pictures in Google PicasaWeb)

• Authorization Code

- a code that a **client** uses to request **access tokens** to access resources

Access Token

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitva

- 18 -

Overview

- Security Concepts
- Authentication and Authorization
- OAuth 2.0
 - Client-side Web Apps
 - Server-side Web Apps
 - OAuth 2.0 vs. OAuth 1.0
- OpenID

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

Client-side Web Apps

- Simplified version of OAuth 2.0 protocol
 - JavaScript/AJAX apps running in a browser
 - Apps that cannot easily "remember" app state
 - limited number of interactions
- Architecture
 - User-agent processes a javascript/HTML code from the client
 - No need of authorization code
- Basic Steps
 - A client redirects a user agent to the authorization endpoint
 - A resource owner grants an access to the client or rejects the request
 - Authorization server provides an access_token to the client
- Client access the resource with the access token

Demo – List of Contacts


• Display your Google contacts

- this demo requests authorization from you to access your Google contacts using client-side OAuth 2.0 protocol and then displays the contacts below. In order to transfer access_token from authorization window, it stores the access_token in a cookie.
- access_token [
- Show contacts or revoke access

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 21

Client-side Web Apps Protocol



Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 22 -

Redirection – Step 1

- Methods and Parameters
 - Methods: GET or POST
 - example authorazation endpoint url (Google):

https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/auth

- query string parameters or application/x-www-form-urlencoded
 - \rightarrow client id id of the client that was previously registered
 - → redirect uri an URI that auth. server will redirect to when user grants/rejects
 - → scope string identifying resources/services to be accessed
 - \rightarrow response type type of the response (token or code)
 - → state (optional) state between request and redirect
- Example

 - https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/auth? client_id=621535099260.apps.googleusercontent.com& redirect_uri=http://humla.vitvar.com/slides/w20/examples/oauth/callback.htr scope=fittps://www.google.com/m8/feeds& response_type=type=

 - response type=token

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 23 -

Callback – steps 4 and 5

- Resource owner grants the access
 - authorization server calls back redirect uri
 - client parses URL in JavaScript (Step 5)
 - → extracts access_token and expires_in (by using window.location.hash)
 - Example:
 - http://humla.vitvar.com/slides/w20/examples/oauth/callback.html#
 - access_token=1/QbZfgDNsnd&
 - expires in=4301
- Resource owner rejects the access
 - authorization server calls back redirect uri with query string parameter error=access_denied
 - Example:
 - 1 hhttp://humla.vitvar.com/slidos/w20/ovamplos/gauth/callhack.html?

Accessing Resources – Step 6

Request


- client can access resources defined by scope
- resources' URIs defined in a particular documentation
- Example Google Contacts
 - → to access all users' contacts stored in Google
 - → scope is https://www.google.com/m8/feeds
- Query string parameter oauth_token
 - curl https://www.google.com/m8/feeds/contacts/default/full? oauth token=1/dERFd34Sf
- HTTP Header Authorization
 - curl -H "Authorization: OAuth 1/dERFd34Sf" https://www.google.com/m8/feeds/contacts/default/full
- The client can do any allowed operations on the resource

Response


- *− Success −* **200 OK**
- Error 401 Unauthorized when token expires or the client hasn't performed the authorization request.

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitv

Cross-Origin Resource Sharing



Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar



Overview

- Security Concepts
- Authentication and Authorization
- OAuth 2.0
 - Client-side Web Apps
 - Server-side Web Apps
 - OAuth 2.0 vs. OAuth 1.0
- OpenID

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

– 28 –

Server-side Web Apps

• Additional interactions

- server-side code (any language), the app can maintain the state
- additional interactions, authorization code

Architecture

- Client at a server requests, remembers and refresh access tokens

• Basic steps

- Client redirects user agent to the authorization endpoint
- Resource owner grants access to the client or rejects the request
- Authorization server provides authorization code to the client
- Client requests access and refresh tokens from the auth. server
- Client access the resource with the access token
- When the token expires, client refreshes a token with refresh token

Advantages

- Access tokens not visible to clients, they are stored at the server
- more secure, clients need to authenticate before they can get tokens

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 29

Server-side Web Apps Protocol Authorization Endpoint Client Token Endpoint (authorization server) ver-side code (authorization server) client initiates the flow by pointing the resource owner's user agent to authorization dialog is usually presented to user only once (not in subsequent requests) endpoint. authorization server presents a dialog to user to grant access to specified resources. auth. server informs resource server to open access with access_token and expires_in authorization server calls redirect, url specified in the by using the authorization code, client requests access_token and request. The request contains results about the authorization and the authorization code Resource refresh token Server client can access the resource within time period specified in expires_in client refreshes access_token resource server responds with HTTP 401 Unauthorized when access_token expires Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

Redirection – Step 1

- Methods and Parameters
 - same as for client-side app, except response type must be code
- Example

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitva

Callback + Access Token Request - steps 4, 5

- Callback
 - authorization server calls back redirect_uri
 - client gets the code and requests access_token
 - example (resource owner grants access):

http://humla.vitvar.com/slides/w20/examples/oauth/callback.html? code=4/P7...

- when user rejects \rightarrow same as client-side access
- Access token request
 - POST request to token endpoint
 - *→ example Google token endpoint:*

https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/token

- POST /o/oauth2/token HTTP/1.1
- Host: accounts.google.com Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
- code=4/P7q7W91a-oMsCeLvlaQm6bTrgtp6&
- client_id=621535099260.apps.googleusercontent.com& client_secret=XTHhXh1S2UggyyWGwDk1EjXB& redirect_uri=http://humla.vitvar.com/slides/w20/examples/oauth/callback.htr grant_tvoe=authorization_code

Access Token (cont.)

- Access token response
 - Token endpoint responds with access_token and refresh_token

```
| { "access_token" : "1/fFAGRNJru1FTz70BzhT3Zg",
| "expires_in" : 3920,
| "refresh_token" : "1/6BMfW9j53qdGImsixUH6kU5RsR4zwl9IUVX-tqf8JXQ" }
```

- Refreshing a token
 - POST request to the token endpoint with grant_type=refresh_token and the previously obtained value of refresh token

```
POST /o/oauth2/token HTTP/1.1
Host: accounts.google.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

client_id=21302922996.apps.googleusercontent.com&
client_secret=XTHhXh1SIUNgvyWGwDk1EjXB&
refresh_token=1/6BMfW9j53gdGlmsixUH6kU5RsR4zwl9lUVX-tqf8JXQ&
grant type=refresh_token
```

• Accessing a resource is the same as in the client-side app

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 33

Overview

- Security Concepts
- Authentication and Authorization
- OAuth 2.0
 - Client-side Web Apps
 - Server-side Web Apps
 - OAuth 2.0 vs. OAuth 1.0
- OpenID

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 34 -

Why new version?

- OAuth 1.0 in brief
 - security not based on SSL
 - client must sign every request using a defined algorithm
 - → e.g., public-private key signatures by RSA
 - More complex to be implemented by clients
 - → although client libraries exist
 - not suitable for JavaScript-based clients
- OAuth 2.0 simplifies the process
 - SSL is required for all communications to generate the token
 - Signatures are not required for the actual API calls once the token has been generated
 - \rightarrow SSL is also strongly recommended here
 - supports various clients including JavaScript and mobile

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 35

Overview

- Security Concepts
- Authentication and Authorization
- OAuth 2.0
- OpenID

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 36 -


OpenID Protocol

- Motivation many user accounts
 - users need to maintain many accounts to access various services
 - multiple passwords problem
- Objectives
 - allows apps to utilize an OpenID provider
 - → a third-party authentication service
 - → federated login
 - users have one account with the OpenID provider and use it for apps that support the provider
- OpenID providers
 - it is a protocol, anybody can build a provider
 - Google, Yahoo!, Seznam.cz, etc.
- Specification
 - OpenID Protocol 🗗

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

- 37

Interaction Sequence



- Discovery discovery of a service associated with a resource
- XRDS eXtensible Resource Descriptor Sequence
 - format for discovery result
 - developed to serve resource discovery for OpenID
 - Web app retrieves endpoint to send login authentication requests

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitva

- 38 -

Login Authentication Request – Step 5

- Example Google OpenID provider

 - https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id ?openid.ns=http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0 &openid.return_to=https://www.example.com/checkauth &openid.realm=http://www.example.com/ &openid.assoc_handle=ABSmpf6DNMw &openid.mode=checkid_setup
- **Parameters**
 - **− ns** − protocol version (obtained from the XRDS)
 - mode type of message or additional semantics (checkid_setup indicates that interaction between the provider and the user is allowed during authentication)
 - return_to callback page the provider sends the result
 - realm domain the user will trust, consistent with return to
 - assoc_handle "log in" for web app with openid provider
 - * Not all fields shown, check the OpenID spec for the full list of fields and their values

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar

Login Authentication Response – Step 8

- User logins successfully
 - http://www.example.com/checkauth
 - ?openid.ns=http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0 &openid.mode=id_res

 - &openid.return_to=http://www.example.com:8080/checkauth &openid.assoc_handle=ABSmpf6DNMw &openid.identity=https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id/id=ACyQatiscWwqs4|
 - Web app will use identity to identify user in the application
 - response is also signed using a list of fields in the response (not shown in the listing)
- User cancels

 - http://www.example.com/checkauth ?openid.mode=cancel &openid.ns=http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0
 - * Not all fields shown, check the OpenID spec for the full list of fields and their values

Lecture 7: Security in REST, CTU Summer Semester 2016/2017, @TomasVitvar