




Business Continuity Manual

Business Continuity Plan: F3

Landside Security

		Signature	Revision	Effective Date
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A. LANDSIDE SECURITY

1.0 Introduction

1. For implementation of the Hong Kong Civil Aviation Risk Management Plan (CARMP), as set out in the Hong Kong Aviation Security Programme, the Hong Kong International Airport (HKIA) has the HKIA AVSEC Risk Management Plan (HKIARMP). The HKIA adjusts its security responses on various risk / emergency situations according to the level of perceived / actual threat based on the HKIARMP.
2. The HKIARMP operates on 4 levels of security threat. The threats are classified as Green, Amber, Red and Black, where, in terms of the enhanced security measures, Black is the most comprehensive.
3. For Landside Security, where intelligence suggests the airport is at risk, such as from possible terrorist activity, the HKIARMP is designed to progressively secure the airport such as by controlling access to Terminal 1, from various risks / emergency situations.
4. For Landside Security, the HKIARMP applies to the security activities provided to the landside areas of the airport such as: vehicular controls; daily patrols; CCTV monitoring; and other landside security activities.
5. For Landside Security, during risks / emergency situations, the HKIARMP progressively enforces airport security, restricts vehicular access to Terminal 1 and increases the clearance zone between parked vehicles and Terminal 1 facades.
6. In accordance with the activation of different levels of security threat, various restrictions to vehicular access into landside areas adjacent to Terminal 1 building are implemented.
7. The Airport Police, AA Duty Staff and AVSECO conduct increased daily patrols, progressively restrict access to Terminal 1, deploy additional security controls and suspend vehicle parking along Cheong Tat Road, that runs between Terminal 1 and the GTC.
8. AVSECO increases its mobile security patrols of key locations including power generator buildings, screens coaches, conducts surveillance of the airport perimeter, and conducts periodic integrity checks.
9. Coaches are directed to remote areas, e.g. Car Park 5 or SkyCity Car Park, and private vehicles to a passenger set down point, e.g. AsiaWorld- Expo Car Park, from where passengers are transferred to the Terminal 1 via shuttle buses that have already been pre-screened by AVSECO.
10. LD progressively suspends the parking at AA Staff, Visitor's Car Parks, and the Limousine Lounge Area of Car Park 1.

NOTE:

- a. In relation to the activated security threat level and in addition to those shown below, other Landside and Airside Security Measures are also implemented at HKIA.

- b. Implementation of these measures during any event will remain conditional upon measures imposed by Hong Kong Aviation Security Authority, or CAD as delegated by it.

B. SCENARIO 1 – GREEN ALERT

1.0 Security Level

1. Green Threat Level Summary

This level is used to indicate that the airport is unlikely to be attacked and there is nothing to indicate that a target at the HKIA would be singled out for attack, and is equivalent to “Negligible” and “Low” under the CARMP.

2.0 Level of Implementation – Green Threat Level

1. Routine daily patrols by the Airport Police;
2. AA Duty Staff conduct normal landside patrols;
3. Routine security patrols of the public areas (by AVSECO);
4. Conduct CCTV surveillance;
5. Implement TRA Security Programmes;
6. AA facilities routinely check secure by AVSECO;
7. Access to South Loading Dock secured by AVSECO; and
8. Power generators secured.

C. SCENARIO 2 – AMBER ALERT

1.0 Security Level

1. Amber Threat Level Summary

This level indicates that the airport may potentially be attacked, such that relevant required actions will be reinforced at the HKIA, and is equivalent to “Moderate” under the CARMP.

2.0 Level of Implementation – Amber Threat Level

1. Routine daily patrols by Airport Police;
2. AA Duty staff conduct normal landside patrols;
3. Routine security patrols of the public areas (by AVSECO);
4. Conduct CCTV surveillance;
5. Implement TRA security programmes;
6. AA facilities routinely check secure by AVSECO;
7. Access to South Loading Dock secured by AVSECO; and

8. Power Generators secured.

D. SCENARIO 3 – RED ALERT

1.0 Security Level

1. Red Threat Level Summary

This level indicates that, based on recent intelligence / terrorist activity and / or the political situation HKIA is likely to be a priority target, thus the overall security levels will be significantly increased at the HKIA. This threat level is equivalent to “Significant” under the CARMP.

2.0 Level of Implementation – Red Threat Level

1. Terminal 1

- a. AVSECO and AA Duty Staff, by means of landside CCTV actively monitor the entry points to Terminal 1);
- b. Suspend use of automated trolley return uplift, from car park areas to Level 5 Baggage Reclaim Hall at Terminal 1;
- c. AVSECO deploy security controls along the Cheong Tat Road entry points to allow access by authorised vehicles only;
- d. AVSECO suspend all vehicles parking along Cheong Tat Road, except for emergency service vehicles;
- e. AVSECO conduct vehicle checks of all coaches entering the Coach Staging Area; and
- f. AVSECO increase security patrol of the public areas.

2. AA Corporate Office

- a. AA Administration will consider the suspension of the use of AA Staff and Visitors’ Car Parks at LG Level.

3. Airport Island Roads

- a. AVSECO will deploy mobile security patrols at key locations, including the vehicular access and exit routes to Terminal 1.

4. Airport Car Parks

- a. LD will suspend vehicle parking at Limousine Lounge Area of Car Park 1; and
- b. To maintain a minimum clearance zone of > 50 metres between parked vehicles and Terminal 1 building facades, close the section of Car Park 1, including adjacent Taxi & LGV parking area.

5. Power Generator Buildings

- a. To conduct hourly check of power generator buildings, AVSECO will deploy mobile patrols on landside roads.

6. Airport Perimeter

- a. To conduct surveillance of airport perimeter, AVSECO will deploy mobile patrols on landside roads ; and
- b. AVSECO will conduct periodic integrity checks of all drainage grilles and barriers protecting the ARA.

E. SCENARIO 4 – BLACK ALERT

1.0 Security Level

1. Black Threat Level Summary

This level indicates that terrorist activity has been detected, by specific intelligence, and the HKIA is considered to be a high priority target. This level is equivalent to “High” and “Imminent” under the CARPM.

2.0 Level of Implementation – Black Alert

1. Terminal 1

- a. Airport Police/AVSECO will restrict access to passengers only;
- b. To allow entry only to ticketed passengers, aircrew & airport staff, deploy security at designated entry/check points to Terminal 1;
- c. In support of Police operations, on the up-ramp to Level 8 vehicle drop off kerb at Terminal 1, LD will deploy a traffic chicane ;
- d. Suspend use of Coach Staging Area;
- e. Redeploy coach operations to remote location, e.g. Car Park 5 or SkyCity Car Park;
- f. Direct and monitor rerouted traffic flow;
- g. Direct and monitor rerouted passenger traffic flow into and out of the Terminal 1;
- h. Ensure trolley services are compatible with the rerouted passenger traffic flows; and
- i. AVSECO will increase security patrol of the public areas.

2. AA Corporate Office

- a. AA Admin will suspend use of the AA Staff and Visitors’ Car Parks at LG Level.

3. Airport Island Roads

- a. AVSECO will deploy mobile security patrols at key locations vehicular access and exit routes to Terminal 1 ; and
- b. Where the situation warrants, suspend private vehicle access to Terminal 1 and establish remote drop off arrangements at the AsiaWorld-Expo Car Park. (See Remote Vehicle Drop Off below).

4. Airport Car Parks

- a. LD will suspend vehicle parking at the Limousine Lounge Area of Car Park 1; and
- b. Maintain a minimum clearance zone of > 50 metres between parked vehicles and the Terminal 1 building's facades.

5. Power Generator Buildings

- a. AVSECO will deploy security staff to guard each power generator building.

6. Airport Perimeter

- a. AVSECO will increase the frequency of checks of all drainage grilles and barriers protecting the ARA.

7. Remote Vehicle Drop Off

- a. Where the risk of a vehicle borne attack to the Terminal 1 or other airport facilities are considered likely, all private vehicle access via the ramp roads will be suspended by LD / Bus Franchisee / Airport Police / AVSECO, as appropriate;
- b. Private vehicles will be diverted to a passenger set down point, most likely at the AsiaWorld-Expo Car Park, from where passengers will be bussed to Terminal 1, as arranged by LD;
- c. A road diversion plan will be activated;
- d. Between the passenger set down point and the Terminal 1, a bussing plan will be activated;
- e. Rerouted traffic will be proactively monitored;
- f. Rerouted passenger/staff traffic will be proactively monitored; and
- g. Trolley services to be compatible with the rerouted passenger traffic flows.

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