

Airport Authority Hong Kong

Integrated Airport Centre Manual

CONTENTS

Part 1	Preface
1.1.	About this manual
1.2.	Manual issuance & distribution
1.3.	Amendments & updates
1.4.	Reference documents
1.5.	Manual disclaimer
Part 2	Introduction to Integrated Airport Centre
2.1.	Vision & Missions
2.2.	About the Integrated Airport Centre
2.3.	Organization structure
2.4.	Roles of Airport Duty Manager
2.5.	Tasks and responsibilities of each function
2.6.	Functional description, special systems and equipment of each work bench of IAC layout
Part 3	Incident & Emergency Handling and Reporting
3.1	General
3.2	Reportable Items
3.3	Aircraft Accident
3.4	Full Emergency
3.5	Aircraft Ground Incident
3.6	Fuel Spillage from Aircraft
3.7	Local Standby
3.8	Aircraft Recovery
3.9	Bomb Threat against Aircraft
3.10	Bomb threat in Buildings
3.11	Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
3.12	Major Security Incident (Police)
3.13	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Agent Incident
3.14	Intrusion
3.15	Fire in Passenger Terminal Building
3.16	Fire in Ground Transportation Centre
3.17	Fire in AA Ancillary Buildings
3.18	Fire in Airfield Tunnels

- 3.19 Damage to Consignment of Dangerous Goods
- 3.20 Weather Warnings
- 3.21 Public Health Emergencies
- 3.22 Landside Transport Emergencies
- 3.23 Dangerous Goods and Chemical Spills
- 3.24 Landside Traffic Disruption
- 3.25 Airside Protest

Part 4 Information Dissemination

- 4.1. Emergency Notification Mechanism

Part 5 Control Authority (CA) Pass

Part 6 IAC Access Control

- 6.1. Access and Authorization
- 6.2. Visit
- 6.3. Misuse of Access

Part 7 IAC Maintenance and Works

- 7.1 Property Management and Maintenance
- 7.2 Work Application and Approval
- 7.3 Work Management
- 7.4 General Dos and Don'ts

Part 8 IAC House Rules

- 8.1 General
- 8.2 Personal Appearance & Uniform
- 8.3 Attendance
- 8.4 Media Inquiries

Part 9 Use of facilities and Equipment

- 9.1 General
- 9.2 Use of Personal Telecommunication Devices
- 9.3 Use of Storage Area
- 9.4 Use of Pantry & Common Room
- 9.5 Use of Assigned Personal Lockers

Part 10 Decentralization Plan

- 10.1 General
- 10.2 Fallback procedure for IAC-AD
- 10.3 Fallback procedure for IAC-TOD
- 10.4 Fallback procedure for IAC-LD
- 10.5 Fallback procedure for IAC-ABD
- 10.6 Fallback procedure for IAC-APM
- 10.7 Fallback procedure for IAC-TSI/TSS
- 10.8 Fallback procedure for IAC-AVSECO
- 10.9 Fallback procedure for IAC-ITD

- Appendix 1 Fire Safety Inspection Checklist
- Appendix 2 Summary of Phone / Fax numbers for forwarding during
Decentralization

Part 1 Preface

1.1 About this Manual

1.1.1 This Integrated Airport Centre (IAC) Manual aims to enable designated personnel working in IAC and those reporting to the Airport Duty Manager (ADM) to understand their roles and responsibilities by describing the IAC key functions, procedures and action checklists, so that they can perform their duties and responsibilities as required by the ADM and their respective companies or departments.

1.2 Manual Issuance and Distribution

1.2.1 This Manual is an Airport Authority Hong Kong (AAHK) document, issued by the ADM and authorized for use by the Executive Director, Airport Operations.

1.2.2 An electronic copy of the IAC Manual is issued to each the following parties:

- Chief Operating Officer, AAHK
- Executive Director, Airport Operations, AAHK
- Executive Director, Engineering & Technology, AAHK
- Deputy Director, Airport Operations, AAHK
- Chief Information Officer, AAHK
- General Manager, Airfield, AAHK
- Deputy General Manager, Airfield, AAHK
- General Manager, APM & Baggage, AAHK
- General Manager, Terminal Operations, AAHK
- General Manager, Landside, AAHK
- General Manager, Safety, Security & Business Continuity, AAHK
- General Manager, Technical Services Infrastructure, AAHK
- General Manager, Technical Services Systems, AAHK
- General Manager, Corporate Affairs, AAHK
- General Manager, Aviation Logistics, AAHK
- Airport Duty Manager, AAHK
- Assistant General Manager, APM Operations, AAHK
- Assistant General Manager, Airfield, AAHK
- Assistant General Manager, Terminal Operation & Government Facilitation, AAHK
- Assistant General Manager, Landside Services, AAHK
- Assistant General Manager, Baggage Operations, AAHK

- Senior Manager, IT Operations, AAHK
- Airfield Duty Manager, AAHK
- Assistant Manager, Airfield (IAC-AD), AAHK
- Terminals & Landside Duty Manager, AAHK
- Assistant Manager, Terminal Operations, AAHK
- Assistant Manager, Landside Services, AAHK
- Duty Manager, Baggage Operations, AAHK
- Manager, Customer Communications, AAHK
- Duty Manager, Fault Response Team, AAHK
- Assistant Manager, System Operations, AAHK
- Assistant Executive Director (Ops I), Aviation Security Company Limited (AVSECO)
- Duty Security Manager, AVSECO
- Head of Hub Operation, Cathay Pacific (CPA)
- Hong Kong Observatory (HKO)
- Assistant Manager, Ramp Operations, Hong Kong Airlines (CRK)
- Deputy General Manager, Hong Kong Express Airways (HKE)
- Operations Controller, Pan Asia Pacific Aviation Services (PAPAS)
- Senior Ramp Services Manager, SATS HK
- Dragonair Airport GSE Service (DAS)
- Ramp Services Manager, Hong Kong Airport Services (HAS)
- Head of Section (Ramp Equipment), Hong Kong Aircraft Engineering Company (HAECO)
- Senior Manager, Ramp Services, Jardine Air Terminal Services (JATS)
- Ramp Service Manager, China Aircraft Services Limited (CASL)

1.3 Amendments & Updates

1.3.1 The distribution of the IAC Manual is controlled by the ADM of the Airport Management Division (AMD), AAHK. Amendments and updates of this manual will be issued and notified on need basis.

1.3.2 All requests shall be raised to the ADM (AIRPORTDM@hkairport.com) containing the following information:

- a. Name, job title and contact phone number of the person(s) raising the requests.
- b. The existing text, procedures or information to be amended.
- c. The proposed text, procedures or information.
- d. The effective date for the proposed amendment to take place.
- e. Justification for the proposed amendment.

1.4 Reference Documents

1.4.1 The procedures, checklists, requirements and information stipulated in this manual are of a high-level approach. Users of this manual shall cross-reference the following documents issued by the AAHK as appropriate:

- a. Emergency Procedures Manual
- b. Business Continuity Manual
- c. Airport Operations Manual – Airfield Operations
- d. Terminal & Landside Procedure Manual
- e. ABD Procedure Manual
- f. HKIA Airport Security Programme
- g. Safety Management System Manual / Quality & Health Management Plan

1.5 Manual Disclaimer

1.5.1 This manual is the property of the AAHK and is intended as a reference for designated personnel with operations at IAC only.

1.5.2 No part of this controlled copy may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means whatsoever for any purpose without the written permission of the ADM.

- 1.5.3 The AAHK accepts no liability for any damage, indirect or direct (including loss of profits or consequential loss) which may be sustained by any individual, property or organization as a result of activities carried out in association with the contents of this manual.
- 1.5.4 The AAHK cannot be held responsible for any inaccurate or superseded information contained in this manual.

Part 2 Introduction to the Integrated Airport Centre

2.1 Vision and Missions

2.1.1 Vision Statement

***To be a Real-Time Operations Integrator
enabling optimum efficiency of Airport Flow***

2.1.2 Mission Statement

Reinforce the health of airport flows at HKIA by:

- Upholding the high standards of airport management KPIs
- Pre-empting incidents from developing and/or escalating to crisis situations
- Facilitating business continuity during crisis situations
- Initiating continuous process improvements
- Integrating airport services
- Functioning as training ground for future airport leaders

2.2 About the Integrated Airport Centre

2.2.1 The IAC is located inside the Airport Restricted Area near Gate House 1.

2.2.2 The IAC is to amalgamate real-time airport operations through the co-location and integration of major airport functions, namely;

- airfield operations
- T1, T1 Satellite Concourse (T1S) & T1 Midfield Concourse (T1M) operations,
- SkyPier and landside transport operations
- APM & baggage handling
- aviation security
- airport infrastructure and systems maintenance and supports
- airport IT systems maintenance and supports
- customer feedback & social media
- cargo operations

2.2.3 Led by the Airport Duty Manager (ADM) on 24-hours basis, the IAC serves to monitor the real-time airport operations and management, and to provide expeditious and coordinated response to incidents so that the impact on airport operations is mitigated and any potential disruption is averted.

- 2.2.4 Through the video wall displays of CCTV & system status images, and the alarm annunciation platform at the IAC, staff of each major airport functions share the latest information and status of airport conditions such as weather, airport emergencies, APM incidents, fire alarms and etc.

2.3 Organization Structure



HB carriers = Home-based carriers
RHO = Ramp handling operators
LMO = Line maintenance operators

2.4 Roles of Airport Duty Manager

- 2.4.1 The ADM acts with delegated authority of CEO and Airport Management Director to make decisions on behalf of the Authority on a real time and crisis management basis. He/She is the senior AAHK staff to monitor the real-time airport operations and management, and to handle real-time crisis

situations. In the absence of more senior staff, i.e. at weekends and outside office hours, the ADM will make real-time operational decisions on behalf of the AAHK.

- 2.4.2 Directly supervises staff working at IAC in each shift. Leads, coordinates and monitors all different functional teams to ensure efficient, safe and smooth airport operations.
- 2.4.3 Proactively manages airport operations to facilitate the safe and efficient flow of passenger, cargo, baggage and air traffic movements and information, and to maintain good public profile.
- 2.4.4 Identifies real time operation issues, coordinate responses from all stakeholders, redeploys resources to contain disruptions and restore normal operations.
- 2.4.5 Manages airport operation crisis and incidents according to laid-down procedures, authorizes the activation of contingency plan, ensure the impact of incidents is mitigated and timely resumption of normal operations.
- 2.4.6 Daily monitoring of airport performance standards by random audit checks. Actively participate in day-to-day operations and provide comments and suggestions to stakeholders and AA line department.
- 2.5 Tasks and responsibilities of each function
 - Support and facilitates HKSAR Government in all kinds of events with HKIA involvement
- 2.5.1 Airfield operations
 - a) Stand Allocation and Apron Control i.e. IAC-Airfield (AD), AAHK:
 - Aircraft stand allocation
 - Coordination of apron activities with ATC, airlines and aircraft ground services franchisees
 - Logging of aircraft movement
 - Surveillance of airfield activities
 - Alerting and coordinating aircraft emergency actions
 - Airside passenger bus dispatch and control
 - b) Flight Schedule Management i.e. IAC-AD, AAHK:
 - Flight schedule management and update
 - Real-time flight data processing

- c) Services and Standard Monitoring i.e. IAC-AD (Standards and Service Delivery (S&SD), AAHK:
- Real-time performance monitoring and service shortfall rectification of ramp franchisees or licensees.
 - Conduct investigation in complaint cases on ramp franchisees or licensees
 - Equipment pooling monitoring
- d) Airlines & Ramp Operators
- In order to enhance the coordination amongst AA, airlines and ramp operators so as to uphold the efficiency and service standards of HKIA, representatives of the home-base carriers, RHO and LMO are stationed at the IAC, either part-time or on 24 hours basis
 - Conduct daily briefing to Business Partners

2.5.2 T1, T1S and T1M operations, i.e. IAC-Terminal Operations (TOD), AAHK

- a) Overall monitoring and control of T1, T1S and T1M operations:
- Centralized monitoring and co-ordination of all activities in Terminal 1, T1S and T1M
 - Assures integrity and serviceability of all essential components running Terminal 1, T1S and T1M
 - Reacts and makes adjustment of the operating mode to cope with real time situation
 - To alert, make emergency liaison and co-ordination with Government Departments, airlines and business partners etc. when abnormal situation arises

2.5.3 SkyPier & landside operations, i.e. IAC- Landside (LD), AAHK

- a) Overall monitoring and control of Ground Transportation Centre, landside road networks:
- Centralized monitoring and co-ordination of all activities in Ground Transportation Centre, landside road networks and SkyPier
 - Assures integrity and serviceability of all essential components running Ground Transportation Centre, landside road networks and SkyPier
 - Reacts and makes adjustment of the operating mode to cope with real time situation
 - To alert, make emergency liaison and co-ordination with Government Departments, airlines and business partners etc. when abnormal situation arises

- b) Berth allocation and control of berthing activities at SkyPier

2.5.4 APM & Baggage, i.e. IAC-APM & Baggage (ABD), AAHK

a) Real time management of Baggage Handling System:

- Relates and alerts fault message to the concerned parties for follow up actions
- Balances and re-diverts baggage flow to maintain the operating flow of the system
- Distributes essential operation information to the communities
- Activates contingency procedure during system failure or handling of ad hoc community needs

b) Real time management of Sortation Allocation Control System:

- Allocation of flight laterals as per the daily flight schedule
- Locates and offloads EBS baggage as per RHO request
- Pre-assigns, adjusts and modify flight lateral allocation to meet the daily dynamic changes
- Controls, arranges and monitors Early bag storage (EBS) status

c) Reclaim Belt Allocation System (RBAS)

- Allocation of reclaim belt as per daily flight schedule
- Monitoring and control of reclaim belt allocation in response to real-time situation
Overall monitoring of arrival baggage unloading activity and liaise with related parties to maintain smooth real-time operation
- Monitoring and maintain of ABMS record in precise condition

d) Real time management of APM (currently handled by IAC – Terminal Operations)

e) Real time management of Autonomous Electric Tractor (AET) for the delivery route between T1 and SkyPier Baggage Hall

- Monitoring and control of Remote Monitoring Unit (RMU) in response to alarms generated from RMU under real-time situation
- Through cameras installed on the AET to monitor container and dolly delivery status
- Reacts and makes adjustment of the AET deployment to cope with real time operations

2.5.5 Airport Infrastructure and Systems, i.e. IAC-Technical Services Infrastructure (TSI), AAHK

a) Provides technical support to the IAC for real time management of airport operation

b) Performs remote system control and monitoring as per request from Airport Duty Manager and his authorized delegates

- c) Coordinates with Fault Response Team (FRT) for handling fault cases and incidents
 - d) Liaison between the IAC and Fault Response Team Management Office (FRTMO)
- 2.5.6 Airport IT, i.e. IAC-Information Technology (ITD)
- a) Servers and network real-time monitoring
 - b) Data backup and restoration
 - c) System administration
 - d) Communications rooms management
 - e) PTW and SCRS execution and control
 - f) Fault reporting, handling, escalation and rectification
 - g) Problem resolution
 - h) Preventative and corrective management
 - i) Execution of contingency procedures
- 2.5.7. Customer Feedback & Social Media i.e. IAC-Customer Communications, Corporate Affairs
- a) Responsible for responding to request for help, information requests and public enquiries
 - b) Responsible for in-terminal and ad-hoc announcements through the Public Address (PA) system and tracing social media platform
- 2.5.8 Airport Security, i.e. IAC-AVSECO
- a) Centralized monitoring and co-ordination of all aviation security related activities of the Hong Kong International Airport
 - b) Assures security integrity of the Airport Restricted Area by monitoring all access control points, CCTV, the ACS system, PIDS system and etc
 - c) Reacts and responses to any possible activities that may be in violation of the Airport Security Programme such as intrusion
 - d) To alert, make emergency liaison and co-ordinate with Government Departments, airlines business partners and etc. when security incidents occur
- 2.5.9. HB Carriers and Ramp Operators
- a) In order to enhance the coordination amongst AA, HB carriers and ramp operators so as to uphold the efficiency and service standards of HKIA, representatives of the home-base carriers, ramp handling operators (RHO) and line maintenance operators (LMO) are station at the IAC, either part-time or on 24 hours basis.
- 2.5.10 Hong Kong Observatory (HKO)

a) In order to enhance the coordination between AA and HKO so as to uphold the efficiency and service standards of HKIA, HKO representatives are station at the IAC on regular basis.

2.5.11 Airport Emergency Centre (AEC)

a) Airport Emergency Centre is a command, control and communication centre with the following off-accident scene functions when in activation:

- Crisis management at HKIA (e.g. aircraft related incident, accident)
- Business continuity incident management (e.g. system failure)

2.6 Functional description, special systems and equipment of each work bench of IAC layout



<p><u>L1: IAC-TOD</u> Function: OIC for operations in T1, T1S & T1M pax flow monitoring , fire alarm, APM, thermal detector, fault reporting Systems and equipment: fire systems and delay panels, AVMD, Smart CCTV, EMS, APM depot HL, TDMO HL, FSD HL, T1-ATS APM alarm panel, TMR, thermal TDS, ALWS Panel, IAC Fire alarm</p>	<p><u>R1: IAC-AD</u> Function: Update ETA/D, flight schedule, APV lounge allocation (Departure Gate) and airside bus dispatch Systems and equipment: IIDS, MMI, IN/UA, Smart CCTV, VHF, ABDS</p>
<p><u>L2: IAC-LD</u> Function: OIC for operations at SkyPier and landside, TCSS, fault reporting, fire alarm, APM, lift intercom, SkyPier berthing allocation Systems and equipment: lift intercom panels ,Smart CCTV, TCSS, VHF & UHF radio, sea pro, PIMS, DL to APM, marine band channel 82, Kap Shui Mun bridge impact alarm, Tsing Ma bridge impact alarm, UASDS, SP Line APM alarm</p>	<p><u>R2: IAC-AD</u> Function: Chock-on/off , reg marks logging, marshalling duty assignment, aircraft towing& stand availability, FOD system monitoring Systems and equipment: Smart CCTV, APSAS, MDAS, ASMGCS, IIDS, ALWS SSD, AFODDS</p>
<p><u>L3 : IAC-CAF (Customer Feedback)</u> Function: TRC, Help phone, PA & CICA Systems and equipment: TRC AVAYA system, FIDS</p>	<p><u>R3: IAC-AD</u> Function: OIC of apron operations, stand allocation, airlines contact & engine run coordination Systems and equipment: ALWS, AVMD, APSAS, SAS, Smart CCTV, Crash alarm, IIDS, ASMGCS, VHF, Direct Line to ATC, FSCC, CX</p>
<p><u>L4: IAC-HB carriers</u></p>	<p><u>R4: IAC-HB carriers</u></p>

Function: Coordination between IAC and HKA	Function: Coordination between IAC and CX
<u>L5: IAC-LMO/RHO, GSE dispatch and control</u> Function: Coordination between IAC and PAPAS SATS and DAS. GSE dispatch and control	<u>R5: IAC-LMO/RHO</u> Function: Coordination between IAC and HAS & HAECO
<u>L6: IAC-AD(S&SD) & ABD</u> Function: Real-time monitoring of ramp franchisees/ licensees services and standard by CCTV (IAC-AD(S&SD)). SAC (IAC-ABD) Systems and equipment: Smart CCTV, ACDM, RSPMS (IAC-AD (S&SD)). BMS, SACLAU, BASIS (IAC-ABD)	<u>R6: IAC-LMO/RHO & HB carriers</u> Function: Coordination between IAC and JATS, CASL, UO
<u>L7: IAC-ABD</u> Function: MICS Systems and equipment: BMS, lateral reset panel, TRMICS display graphic, MICS display message, SACLAU, Smart CCTV	<u>R7: IAC-AVSECO</u> Function: ACS control, DDSC, ADSC & IDSS control systems and equipment: NVR, Smart CCTV, ACS, MDAS, AVS, IDSS
<u>L8 : IAC-ABD</u> Function: OIC for baggage operations, SAC, reclaim belt allocation, BUS control Systems and equipment: BHS CCTV, TRMICS, MMI, ABS, RBAS, PA system, IAC BHS alarm	<u>R8: IAC-AVSECO</u> Function: DSC, PABX I/II & T1 VCA control, AVSECO/CDSC, QA, NVR system control Systems and equipment: DSC computer, NVR, PABX I, PABX II, ACS, SkyPier APM, VCA, T1 APM, IAC security alarm
<u>IAC-HKO</u> Function: Coordination between IAC and HKO	<u>IAC-TSI/TSS</u> Function: Critical TS systems alarm monitoring and testing Systems and equipment: CMIS, HVSCADA, SMS, AGL DL-C, AGL DL-S, MBMS , AF SCADA, GBMS, Fixed AGLABD-C, Fixed AGLABD-S, MBMS SWPH <u>IAC-ITD</u> Function: OIC for airport systems, monitoring of airport databases Systems and equipment: ACS, BMS, WEMS, FIDS, CCTV, FMS, ACIS, UDS, IVRS, OOBM, PABX, ANMS, MICS

*Non-special systems and equipment such as OA, telephone console, printer and fax machines are excluded;


*Actual allocation subject to operational need

Facilities & equipment of IAC benches




Legend:
LIFT PANELS
a: T1 Jumbo L83
b: T1 QF L111
c: TIV Lounge L84
d: T1 The Pier L112
e: TIV Lounge L85
f: T1 the Wing L38
g: GTC C10
h: Sky Pier
i: NSC
j: T1
k: T2
l: MFC
m: Kap Shui Mun Bridge Ship Impact Alarm Panel
n: APM Depot
o: VIP suite
p: L114-116
q: L65
r: Tsing Ma Bridge Ship Impact Alarm Panel
S: L501-L508 & C1-C2

TRC Avaya lines:
20006: TRC Avaya
74109: IAC Phone Dispatcher
25958: Back up system from West Hall Comm Room
34529: Back up system from West Hall Comm Room







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RHO /LMO / AIRLINES




RHO /LMO / AIRLINES




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
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
RHO /LMO / AIRLINES




RHO /LMO / AIRLINES




AVSECO




AVSECO



Layout of Primary IAC – G/F



Layout of Primary IAC – 1/F



Part 3 Incident & Emergency Handling and Reporting

List no.	Item	EPM reference
1	Aircraft Accident	Part 2
2	Full Emergency	Part 3
3	Aircraft Ground Incident	Part 4
4	Fuel Spillage from Aircraft	Part 4A
5	Local Stand-by	Part 5
6	Aircraft Recovery	Part 6
7	Bomb Threat against Aircraft	Part 7
8	Bomb Threat in Buildings	Part 8
9	Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft	Part 9
10	Major Security Incident (Police)	Part 9A
11	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Agent Incident	Part 9B
12	Intrusion	Part 9C
13	Fire in Passenger Terminal Building	Part 10A
14	Fire in Ground Transportation Centre	Part 10B
15	Fire in AA Ancillary Buildings	Part 10C
16	Fire in Airfield Tunnels	Part 10D
17	Damage to Consignment of Dangerous Goods	Part 11
18	Weather Warnings	Part 12
19	Public Health Emergencies	Part 13
20	Landside Transport Emergencies	Part 14
21	Dangerous Goods and Chemical Spills	Part 15
22	Landside Traffic Disruption	Part 14
23	Airside Protest	N/A

Part 3 Incident & Emergency Handling and Reporting

3.1 General

3.1.1 The IAC serves to monitor the real-time airport operations and management, and to provide expeditious and coordinated response to incident so that the impact on airport operations is mitigated and any potential disruption is averted.

3.2 Reportable Items

3.2.1 Immediate attention of the ADM must be drawn to the following incidents or emergencies by the respective IAC functions, including but not limited to:

Incident Categories	Description of Activity / Incident / Event
1. Airport Emergencies	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Aircraft Accident• Full Emergency• Aircraft Ground Incident (declared by ATC)• Local Standby• Fuel Spillage• Activation of Crash Alarm by ATC/AFC
2. Inclement Weather	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Typhoon at Hong Kong• Red Airport Lightning Warnings• Inclement weather such as thunderstorm, rainstorm and fog that affects airport operations• ATC flow control imposed due to inclement weather over HKG FIR airways• Low Visibility Operations
3. System Outage	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• CLP Power dip• Suspension of power, air-conditioning, water and gas in terminals and aprons• System outage affects airport operations such as FIDS, TMS, AODB, WADI, BHS, MICS, SACLAU, CUTE, CUSS, SPMV, RBAS, ACS, upstream check-in systems, in-town-check-in systems and etc• AGL failure• FIDS display monitors failure

4. Operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Birdstrikes • FOD incidents including tyres fragments on runway • Airside passenger bus incidents • Flights disruption to HKIA caused by inclement weather, volcanic activities, strike, political unrest and etc at other airports • Airfield incidents such as takeoff on taxiways, aircraft towing incident; aircraft evacuation chute activation; blockage of runways, taxiways, taxilanes; • Delayed handover or ad hoc closure of runways/taxiways • Full carpark • Terminals / Passenger flow affected by false fire alarm, water pipe burst • Massive stranded passengers at HKIA • Damage to DG consignments • CBRN Incidents • Public health incidents • Crowd control issues in terminals • Aviation fuel suspension • APM service disruption • Diverted flights to HKIA
5. Transportation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Service disruption to AEL service • Closure of the North Lantau Highway • Closure of Tuen Mun – Chek Lap Kok Link (TM-CLKL) • Disruption of traffic to/from Tung Chung • Taxi Incidents
6. Safety and Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Aircraft ground damage incident • Traffic accident with injury, i.e. both airside and landside • Ramp personnel injury • Serious injury to airport staff or passengers • Genuine fire in terminals, GTC, ancillary buildings, airside vehicular tunnel, airside passenger bus and etc. • Intrusion • Bomb Warnings • Major security incident • Unauthorized access
7. Special Arrangements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • VVIP movement on apron • Major events such as arrival of Buddha's teeth, events held by government, HKTB and etc • Major events that requires significant landside road closure and traffic diversion

8. Media Interest	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Unattended bags requires closure of terminals,• Suspicious items reported by AVSECO• Passenger disputes• Vehicles on fire on landside• Return of persons/crews involved in overseas accidents/in-flight incidents• Major incidents involving airlines operating in HKIA• Rodents reported on flights• Strikes of home-based airlines or business partners• Turbulence incidents• Dead birds (H5N1 positive) /dolphins found• Protest by general public or airport staff
9. Others	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Big drills and exercises such as Annual Aircraft Crash Exercise,• Outbound Travel Alerts issued by SB• Arrival of new aircraft type to HKIA

3.3 Aircraft Accident (EPM Part 2)

3.3.1 *An aircraft accident is an occurrence during the operation of an aircraft in which any person involved suffers death or serious injury or in which the aircraft receives substantial damage.* The checklist below summarized the action items for handling an Aircraft Accident:

	Action	By #
1	Alerting a) Flight information & location b) Airfield Reform Plan activation c) Closure of runway & taxiways d) Confirmation of airside assembly point & triage location e) AVMD alerting f) Activation of Emergency Message Broadcast	IAC-AD AD AD AD/AFC IAC-AD ADM
2	Rescue & Fire Fighting Phase a) Conveyance of doctors, medical van and MLC b) Leading services, and Setup of Ingress & egress routings c) Manifest from airlines d) Cordoning of accident scene e) Emergency Permit Regime f) Deployment of airside buses for passengers & crews g) Conveyance of passengers & crews to PRC h) MLC representatives from airlines, LMO, RHO, Refullers i) POB headcount reconciliation j) Causality management & information update	AD AD/LD IAC-AD HKP AVSECO IAC-AD IAC-AD IAC-AD HKP AFC
3	Passenger Reception Centre Phase a) APV Lounge settings b) Alert ID, C&E, Police & AVSECO c) Relocation of buses and remote departure gates d) Cordoning	TOD IAC-TOD IAC-AD AVSECO
4	Family Reception Centre Phase a) Confirm activation with airlines and Regal b) Activation of Family Reception Centre c) Brief CS staff on directing families to Regal	IAC-TOD TOD TOD
5	Business Continuity a) Activation of Airport Emergency Centre b) Crowd control measures & Passenger Care Team c) Runway capacity from ATC & Base carriers' schedules d) Flight Rescheduling Control Regime e) Update on Emergency Message Broadcast f) Storage of misconnected bags g) Extend MCT or stop accepting pax from upstream ports h) FIDS display contingency i) Extension of staff and contractor manpower after mid-night j) Extension of public transportation service after mid-night k) Report on damage caused on airport facilities	ADM ADM/TOD IAC-AD AD ADM ABD LD TOD All LD TSI/ TSS

Airport Authority Hong Kong
Integrated Airport Centre Manual

	l) Investigation by CAD m) Aircraft Recovery Committee	AD CAD
6	Media Phase a) Corporate Communication Room activation b) Press Conference & Arrange media to the accident scene	CCD CCD

3.4 Full Emergency (EPM Part 3)

3.4.1 *Full emergency will be declared when an aircraft approaching the airport is, or suspected to be, in such difficulty that there is imminent danger of an accident.* The checklist below summarized the action items for handling a Full Emergency:

	Action	By
1	Alerting a) Flight information & location b) Airfield Reform Plan activation c) Closure of runway & taxiways d) Confirmation of airside assembly point e) AVMD alerting f) Arrange standby of aircraft tractor by LMO g) Alert MTRC & HKP if Rwy 25L is in use h) Alert CAD DG Office if DG on board i) Activation of Emergency Message Broadcast	IAC-AD AD AD/ATC AD IAC-AD IAC-AD IAC-LD IAC-AD ADM
2	Standby for Rescue & Fire Fighting a) Conveyance of doctors, medical van and MLC b) Leading services, and Setup of Ingress & egress routings c) Standby of airside buses for passengers & crew	AD AD/LD IAC-AD
3	Standby of Passenger Reception Centre a) APV Lounge settings b) Alert ID, C&E, Police & AVSECO c) Relocation of buses and remote departure gates d) Cordoning	TOD IAC-TOD IAC-AD AVSECO
4	Business Continuity a) Activation of Airport Emergency Centre b) Update on Emergency Message Broadcast c) Report & rectification on damage/contamination caused on airport facilities such as fuel or hydraulic leakage	ADM ADM TSI / TSS
5	Media Handling a) Keep CCD update of the incident and prepare press statement	ADM/CCD

3.4.2 Prepare for upgrade of the incident to Aircraft Accident or Aircraft Ground Incident.

3.5 Aircraft Ground Incident (EPM Part 4)

3.5.1 *An aircraft ground incident is an occurrence other than an accident when an aircraft on the ground requires the direct attendance of the Airport Fire Contingent for assistance or investigation. Examples: aircraft damage due to hard landing, inclement weather, or collision with vehicle/equipment/structure/aircraft; passenger or crew injury; immobilized aircraft; passenger evacuation.* The checklist below summarized the action items for handling an Aircraft Ground Incident:

	Action	By
1	Alerting a) Flight information & location b) Closure of runway & taxiways c) AVMD alerting d) Arrange standby of aircraft tractor by LMO e) Alert AFC and CAD DG Office if DG on board f) Activation of Emergency Message Broadcast	ACC AD/ATC ACC ACC ACC ADM
2	Rescue & Fire Fighting Phase, if required a) Conveyance of doctors, medical van and MLC b) Cordoning of accident scene c) Deployment of airside buses for passengers & crews d) Conveyance of passengers & crews to PRC e) POB headcount reconciliation f) Causality management & information update	AD HKP ACC ACC HKP AFC
3	Passenger Reception Centre Phase, if required a) APV Lounge settings b) Alert ID, C&E, Police & AVSECO c) Relocation of buses and remote departure gates d) Cordoning	TOD IAC-TOD ACC AVSECO
4	Family Reception Centre Phase, if required a) Confirm activation with airlines and Regal b) Activation of Family Reception Centre c) Brief Customer Services staff on directing families to Regal	IAC-TOD TOD TOD
5	Business Continuity a) Activation of Airport Emergency Centre b) Crowd control measures c) Runway capacity from ATC & Base carriers' schedules d) Flight Rescheduling Control Regime e) Update on Emergency Message Broadcast f) Storage of misconnected bags g) Extend MCT or stop accepting pax from upstream ports h) FIDS display contingency i) Extension of staff and contractor manpower after mid-night j) Extension of public transportation service after mid-night k) Report on damage caused on airport facilities l) Aircraft Removal	ADM ADM/TLDM ACC AD ADM ABD LD TOD All IAC-LD TSI / TSS AD

6	Media Handling a) Keep CCD update of the incident and prepare press statement	ADM/CCD
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3.5.2 AFC will liaise with ATC for the upgrading of incident in the event of death or serious injury, or the aircraft receives substantial damage.

3.6 Fuel Spillage from Aircraft (EPM Part 4A)

3.6.1 *Fuel spillage is categorized into minor spill (i.e. <20L and not of running nature) and major spill (>20L and of running nature). Immediate actions should be taken to stop, contain and remove the spilt fuel to prevent any safety hazard and contamination to the environment. The checklist below summarized the action items for handling an Aircraft Ground Incident:*

	Action	By
1	Alerting a) Flight information & location b) Closure of runway, taxiways or taxilanes, if required c) AVMD alerting d) Alert AFC to attend the scene e) Activation of Emergency Message Broadcast	ACC AD/ATC ACC ACC ADM
2	Critical Tasks a) Stop the fuel spill, contain and remove the spilt fuel b) Confirm area affected c) Confirm the spillage is minor or major with AFC d) Confirm if pax disembarkation is required e) Standby of airside buses for passengers & crew f) Report & rectification on damage/contamination caused on airport facilities and pavement	AD/LMO AD/LMO AD AD ACC AD/TSI/ TSS
3	Standby of Passenger Reception Centre, if required a) APV Lounge settings b) Alert ID, C&E, Police & AVSECO c) Relocation of buses and remote departure gates d) Cordoning	TOD IAC-TOD ACC AVSECO
4	Business Continuity a) Activation of Airport Emergency Centre, if required b) Update on Emergency Message Broadcast	ADM ADM
5	Media Handling a) Keep CCD update of the incident and prepare press statement	ADM/CCD

3.6.2 Prepare for upgrade of the incident to Aircraft Ground Incident.

3.7 Local Standby (EPM Part 5)

3.7.1 *Local Standby will be declared when an aircraft approaching the airport is known or is suspected to have developed defects, the nature of which would not normally involve any serious difficulty in effecting safe landing; when an aircraft is subject to bomb threat; or when an aircraft is under unlawful seizure. The checklist below summarized the action items for handling a Local Standby:*

	Action	By
1	Alerting a) Flight information & location b) Standby of equipment at Staging Area c) AVMD alerting d) Arrange standby of aircraft tractor by LMO if required	ACC AD ACC ACC
2	Business Continuity a) Arrange runway inspection b) Activation of Airport Emergency Centre if required c) Report & rectification on damage/contamination caused on airport facilities such as fuel or hydraulic leakage	AD ADM AD/TSI/TSS

3.7.2 Prepare for upgrade of the incident to Aircraft Accident or Aircraft Ground Incident.

3.8 Aircraft Recovery (EPM Part 6)

3.8.1 *Disabled aircraft involved in an accident, or debris resulting from an accident, should not be interfered with or removed until released by the CAD accident investigator.* The checklist below summarized the action items for Aircraft Recovery:

	Action	By
1	Initial Assessment Stage a) Convene the Aircraft Recovery Committee (ARC) b) Release of wreckage for recovery c) Cordoning of the crash site d) Recovery methodology, technical support and equipment e) MLC for incident comment f) AEC for off-scene co-ordination and command centre g) Photographs / video documentation	CAD CAD HKP ARC AD ADM CCD
2	Planning Stage a) Determine the aircraft recovery plan b) Consultation with aircraft airframe and engine manufacturers or aircraft operators	ARC LMO
3	Recovery Operations Stage a) Communication equipment b) Defueling c) Off-loading mail, baggage and cargo d) Designate routes for conveying equipment and personnel e) Access Control f) Supply of general and specialized equipment g) Light Towers h) Temporary pavement i) Obstacle clearance during lifting of aircraft	AD AD AD AD HKP AD/TSI/ TSS TSI / TSS TSI / TSS AD/CAD
4	Post-Recovery a) Restoration of airfield pavement and cleaning b) Inspection of airfield navigational aids, lighting and signs c) Press release and arrange site visit d) NOTAM for resumption of area for aircraft operations e) ARE inventory check	AD/CAD AD/CAD CCD AD/ATC AD/LMO

3.9 Bomb Threat against Aircraft (EPM Part 7)

3.9.1 *There are two types of bomb threat (could be CBRN related): (1) Against an aircraft either on the ground or about to land at HKIA; and (2) Against an airborne aircraft on route to a destination other than HKIA. The checklist below summarized the action items for Bomb Threat against Aircraft:*

	Action	By
1	Alerting a) Complete Bomb Threat Report Form & submit to AVSECO b) Flight information, aircraft location & flight status c) Alerting d) Call for the Bomb Threat Assessment Group (BTAG)	Receiver ACC ACC/T1/ AVSECO ADM
2	Bomb Threat Assessment a) Convene BTAG (at AEC or another location or by conference call) b) Agree Threat Assessment category by fill out the Bomb Threat Assessment Form. c) Agree the countermeasures	ADM BTAG BTAG
3	Countermeasures & Contingency Measures for RED: a) Activate Airport Emergency Centre, if required b) Consider upgrade to Major Security Incident c) Declare "Full Emergency" if aircraft is airborne & explosive device found d) Declare "Ground Incident" if evacuation by slide chutes e) Declare "Local Standby" if taxi to IAPP, i.e. CCP or G1 f) Closure of adjacent stands or taxiways, if necessary g) Cordoning of aircraft (200m away) h) Designate an APV Lounge for temporary passenger holding, if necessary (alert ID, C&E, AD & AVSECO as appropriate) i) Deploy Mobile Liaison Centre to scene j) Unload baggage (i.e. rescreen at the RTA), mail & cargo (return, search and isolate) k) Search of aircraft by Police l) Reconciliation of Passengers and Checked baggage m) Suspicious/suspected baggage handling & removal n) Incident Stand down	ADM HKP ATC ATC ATC AD/ ATC HKP ADM/ TLDM AD AD/ABD HKP HKP HKP BATG
4	Stopping/Delaying a departing aircraft	HKP
5	Media Handling a) Keep CCD update of the incident and prepare press statement	ADM/CCD

3.10 Bomb Threat in Buildings (EPM Part 8)

3.10.1 *This part covers threats (bombs, sabotage or CBRN) against the Passenger Terminal Building (including T1, NSC, SkyPier, & AA ancillary buildings) and other airport facilities including tenant properties. The checklist below summarized the action items for Bomb Threat against Buildings:*

	Action	By
1	Alerting a) Complete Bomb Threat Report Form b) Confirm location and involved parties c) Alerting d) Call for the Bomb Threat Assessment Group (BTAG)	Receiver ACC ACC/T1/ AVSECO ADM
2	Bomb Threat Assessment a) Convene BTAG (at AEC or another location or by conference call) b) Agree Threat Assessment category by fill out the Bomb Threat Assessment Form. c) Agree the countermeasures d) Activation of Emergency Message Broadcast as appropriate e) If an airport tenant or licensee's facility is under threat, the tenant/operator shall be responsible for the threat assessment and the subsequent actions.	ADM BTAG BTAG BATG/ADM Tenants/ HKP
3	Countermeasures & Contingency Measures for RED: a) Activate Airport Emergency Centre, if required b) Consider upgrade to Major Security Incident c) Removal of aircraft away from area under threat d) Pre-alert AA and AVSECO for crowd control/movement e) Determine the PA script for all/ specific zones of the PTB f) Notify AFC/FSD of the area under threat g) Partial or Full evaluation to Fire Assembly Point, if required h) Consider suspension of AEL or other transport services i) Searching of PTB j) Setup 100m(up to suitcase size) /200m (larger object) cordon if a suspect object is found k) Suspicious/suspected baggage handling & removal l) Incident Stand down	ADM HKP AD/ATC IAC- TOD/LD/ AVSECO BATG/TOD IAC- TOD/LD BATG HKP/LD HKP HKP HKP BATG
4	Business Continuity a) Liaise with HKP, ID, C&E & AOC regarding post-evacuation handling of formalities for passengers b) Activation of Emergency Message Broadcast	ADM ADM
5	Media Handling a) Keep CCD update of the incident and prepare press statement	ADM/CCD

3.11 Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (EPM Part 9)

3.11.1 *There are two types of Unlawful Seizure situations: (1) An airborne aircraft en route to a destination other than Hong Kong, which has been unlawfully seized; and (2) An aircraft on the ground or expected to land in Hong Kong which has been unlawfully seized. The checklist below summarized the action items for Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft:*

	Action	By
1	Alerting a) Flight information, aircraft location & flight status b) Alerting	ATC/ACC ACC/ AVSECO
2	Aircraft in flight (is airborne or taxiing) a) Command & control rests with DGCA b) Initial communications with terrorists by ATC until replaced by Police negotiator c) Attend briefing at ATC Tower, if necessary d) For en-route flight, stand down when handed over to another FIR e) For landing/on ground flight, activation of Airport Emergency Centre f) Ensure aircraft taxiing, aircraft towing or equipments is clear of the area where the aircraft is parked. g) Assign the aircraft to park at IAPP, i.e. CCP or G1 h) Initial Local Standby	ATC ATC/ HKP AD/AVSECO ATC ADM ATC/AD ACC AFC
3	Aircraft on the Ground or Stopped a) Command & control rests with Commissioner of Police b) Consider upgrade to Major Security Incident c) Cordon setting up d) Proceed to Incident Command Centre at Airport Police Station e) Proceed to Police Forward Control Point f) Remove aircraft from the affected aircraft if required g) Deploy MLC for on scene liaison h) Standby of LMO, RHO, Refueller, Caterers, Bus & TSID i) Deploy mobile lightings j) Incident Stand down	HKP HKP HKP AVSECO AD ACC AD AD AD/ TSI / TSS HKP
4	Stopping/Delaying a departing aircraft	HKP
5	Standby of Passenger Reception Centre a) APV Lounge settings b) Alert ID, C&E, Police & AVSECO, and cordoning c) Relocation of buses and remote departure gates	TOD IAC-TOD ACC
6	Standby of Family Reception Centre Phase d) Alert airlines and Regal	IAC-TOD

Airport Authority Hong Kong
Integrated Airport Centre Manual

	e) Brief Customer Services staff on directing families to Regal	TOD
7	Media Handling b) Keep CCD update of the incident and prepare press statement	ADM/CCD

3.12 Major Security Incident (Police) (EPM Part 9A)

3.12.1 *A Major Security Incident can take many forms: (1) a bomb or suspect explosive device is discovered; (2) a bomb has exploded; (3) an attack involving CBRN; (4) an armed attack; (5) a hostage; (6) a bomb threat assessed as Red. The checklist below summarized the action items for Major Security Incident:*

	Action	By
1	Alerting a) Report to Police and AVSECO b) Alerting	All HKP/ ACC
2	Contingency Measures a) Command & control rests with Commissioner of Police b) Re-route aircraft ground movement or even divert arrival flights to alternate destination if necessary c) Declare "Full Emergency" if against an aircraft d) Declare "Aircraft Accident" if explosion or fire involving aircraft e) Activation of Airport Emergency Centre f) Cordoning of incident scene setup g) Pre-alert AA and AVSECO for crowd control/movement h) Determine the PA script for all/ specific zones of the PTB i) Partial or Full evaluation to Fire Assembly Point, if required j) Proceed to Incident Command Centre at Airport Police Station k) Remove aircraft from the affected aircraft if required l) Deploy MLC for on scene liaison m) Standby of LMO, RHO, Refueller, Caterers, Bus & TSID n) Deploy mobile lightings o) Setup 100m (up to suitcase size) /200m (larger object) cordon if a suspect object is found p) Suspicious/suspected baggage handling & removal q) Casualty management r) Consider if secondary search is necessary s) Incident Stand down	HKP ATC/HKP AFC AFC ADM HKP IAC- TOD/LD/ AVSECO ADM/HKP HKP/ADM AVSECO ATC/AD AD AD AD/TSI/TSS AD HKP HKP FSD HKP HKP
3	Stopping/Delaying a departing aircraft	HKP
4	Standby of Family Reception Centre Phase a) Alert airlines and Regal b) Brief CS staff on directing families to Regal	IAC-TOD TOD
5	Media Handling a) Keep CCD update of the incident and prepare press statement	ADM/CCD

3.13 Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Agent Incident (EPM Part 9B)

3.13.1 *Likely scenarios of CBRN Agent incidents are (1) a suspected CBRN agent (e.g. Anthrax powder) discovered on board an aircraft at or about to land at the airport; (2) A suspected CBRN agent found in the public area of the airport.* The checklist below summarized the action items for CBRN Agent Incident:

	Action	By
1	Alerting a) Report to Police and AVSECO b) Alerting	All HKP/IAC-TOD
2	Phase 1: Risk Assessment and on site verification a) Command & control rests with Commissioner of Police – appointment of Police Field Commander b) If aircraft in flight, ATC responsible until it halt at airport c) Activation of Airport Emergency Centre d) Convene the CBRN Incident Advisory Group (RIAG) e) Setup cordon: Hot Line 25-100m from incident site; Warm Line 25-50m from Hot Line; Police Cordon Line 50m from Warm Line f) Switch off air-conditioning of the faculty if required g) Arrange aircraft to park at remote stand or IAPP h) Operate GSE to serve the aircraft i) Pre-alert AA and AVSECO for crowd control/movement j) Determine the PA script for all/ specific zones of the PTB k) Partial or Full evaluation to Fire Assembly Point, if required l) Deploy MLC for on scene liaison m) Standby of LMO, RHO, refueller, Caterers, buses & TSID n) Conveyance of AA Medical Team and Port Health doctors	HKP ATC ADM HKP HKP/ AVSECO HKP/TSI / TSS ACC HKP HKP/TOD/ LD ADM/HKP ADM/HKP AD AD AD
3	Phase 2: Decontamination and casualty management a) Determine the location for decontamination b) Decontamination c) Replacement clothing d) Casualty Management e) Incident Stand down	RIAG/ADM/AD/LD HKP/ FSD FSD/ TOD FSD HKP
4	Handling of Non-hospitalized Persons a) APV Lounge settings b) Alert ID, C&E, Police & AVSECO c) Relocation of buses and remote departure gates	TOD IAC-TOD ACC

Airport Authority Hong Kong
Integrated Airport Centre Manual

	d) Cordoning	AVSECO
5	<i>Media Handling</i> a) Keep CCD update of the incident and prepare press statement	ADM/CCD

3.14 Intrusion (EPM 9C)

3.14.1 *Intrusion is a general term descriptive of any unauthorized access into the Airport Restricted Area or part of it. It covers both deliberate (i.e. “Forced Intrusion”) and unwitting incidents of unauthorized access. The checklist below summarized the action items for Intrusion Incident:*

	Action	By
1	Alerting a) Report to AVSECO b) Declare “Intrusion” Incident c) Alerting	All ADM/HKP IAC-TOD/ AVSECO
2	Immediate Contingency Measures a) Execute Intrusion Containment Plan b) Instruct MTRC to suspend APM / ACC to suspend NSC shuttle bus, i.e. hold door open, if necessary c) Command & control rests with Police Field Commander d) IAC- AVSECO as Incident Command Centre e) Activation of Airport Emergency Centre, if necessary	AVSECO/HKP/ C&E/ID IAC-T1/LD/AD HKP IAC-AVSECO ADM
3	Incident Assessment (if not resolved) a) Attend the Incident Assessment Group b) Consider upgrade to Major Security Incident c) Ensure safety and minimize impact to operations d) Activation of Emergency Message Broadcast, if required	ADM/ AVSECO HKP ADM ADM
3	Interception & Containment a) Initiate the use of dedicated TMR channel “HKP-9909” b) If “Intruder Confined”, intercept the intruder c) If “Intruder Not Confined”: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Containment Contingency Plan • Additional manpower • Gates and airbridges guarded • Re-screen departing pax and hand carried bags • Travel documents check • Apron patrol • Cordon Points and Observation Points on apron • Sweeping plan to locate the intruder 	AVSECO HKP/ AVSECO AVSECO/HKP/ C&E/ID AVSECO/ HKP AVSECO AVSECO Airlines AVSECO/ HKP AVSECO/ HKP AVSECO/ HKP

Airport Authority Hong Kong
Integrated Airport Centre Manual

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assessment result & countermeasures pass to all relevant parties <p>d) If “Intruder Not Identified”, initial enquiry at vicinity</p>	ADM AVSECO/ HKP
4	<i>Incident Stand down</i>	ADM/ AVSECO/ HKP/IAG
5	<i>Media Handling</i> <p>a) Keep CCD update of the incident and prepare press statement</p>	ADM/CCD

3.15 Fire in Passenger Terminal Building (EPM Part 10A)

3.15.1 *This part covers fire with in the Passenger Terminal Building which includes T1, T1S, T1M and the Skypier. The checklist below summarized the action items for fire in Passenger Terminal Building:*

	Action	By
1	Fire Alarm Activation a) Determine leading pickup at Gatehouse 1 or 2 if in airside a) Leading service for fire engines to scene b) Assign "Incident Coordinator" to fire alarm site c) Locate the fire/smoke sensor and confirm if genuine fire d) Reset after FSD authorized if false alarm is confirmed	IAC-TOD ACC IAC-TOD/LD TOD/LD IAC-TOD/LD
2	Confirmed genuine fire a) Alerting b) Overall command rests on FSD c) Rescue and fire fighting d) Suspend APM, i.e. T1 line &/or T2 line, if required e) Isolate relevant electrical supplies and utilities, if required f) Access control of the fire scene g) Casualty Management e) Ensure safety and minimize impact to operations h) Activation of Emergency Message Broadcast i) Activate Airport Emergency Centre, if required	IAC-TOD FSD CLK FSD ADM/TOD/ LD TSI / TSS HKP/TOD/ LD/AVSECO FSD ADM ADM ADM
3	Evacuation, if required: a) If landside, dispatch Evacuation Coordinators to FAP b) Activation of T2 pax backflow procedure, if APM T2 Line is suspended c) Activation of contingency shuttle service between T1&T2/Skypier, if APM T2 Line is suspended d) If airside, dispatch Evacuation Coordinators to FAP e) Removal of aircraft away from area under threat f) Suspend aircraft refueling and shutdown fuel hydrant g) Deploy sufficient staff to assist apron crowd control	IAC-TOD/LD IAC-LD IAC-LD/AD ACC ACC ACC ACC
4	Business Continuity & Recovery a) Stand down of the Incident b) Reset of fire alarm after authorized by FSD c) Reset of all ACS doors and security sweep if necessary d) Reactivate/deactivate electrical supplies and utilities e) Clean up affected areas, including L&F of left items f) Liaise with HKP, ID, C&E & AOC regarding controlled return of evacuees, e.g. is re-screening required	FSD IAC-TOD/LD AVSECO TSI/TSS TOD/LD ADM

5	Media Handling a) Keep CCD update of the incident and prepare press statement	ADM/CCD
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3.16 Fire in Ground Transportation Centre (EPM Part 10B)

3.16.1 *This part covers fire within the Ground Transportation Centre, the checklist below summarized the action items:*

	Action	By
1	Fire Alarm Activation a) Assign "Incident Coordinator" to fire alarm site b) Locate the fire/smoke sensor and confirm if genuine fire c) Reset after FSD authorized if false alarm is confirmed	IAC-LD LD IAC-LD
2	Confirmed genuine fire a) Alerting b) Overall command rests on FSD c) Rescue and fire fighting d) Closely liaise with MTRC to regulate AEL trains, if required e) Liaise with bus operators if service enhancement required f) Isolate relevant electrical supplies and utilities, if required g) Access control of the fire scene h) Casualty Management i) Ensure safety and minimize impact to operations j) Activation of Emergency Message Broadcast k) Activate Airport Emergency Centre, if required	IAC-LD FSD CLK FSD IAC-LD IAC-LD TSI/TSS HKP/LD FSD ADM ADM ADM
3	Evacuation, if required: a) Dispatch Evacuation Coordinators to FAP b) Deploy sufficient staff to assist crowd control	IAC-LD IAC-LD /AVSECO
4	Business Continuity & Recovery a) Stand down of the Incident b) Reset of fire alarm after authorized by FSD c) Reactivate/deactivate electrical supplies and utilities d) Clean up affected areas, including L&F of left items	FSD IAC-LD TSI/TSS LD
5	Media Handling a) Keep CCD update of the incident and prepare press statement	ADM

3.17 Fire in AA Ancillary Buildings (EPM Part 10C)

3.17.1 *This part covers fire in the Ancillary Buildings on the CLK airport island under management control of the AAHK and the checklist below summarized the action items:*

	Action	By
1	Fire Alarm Activation a) Determine leading pickup at Gatehouse 1 or 2 if in airside b) Leading service for fire engines to scene, if airside c) Assign "Incident Coordinator" to fire alarm site d) Locate the fire/smoke sensor and confirm if genuine fire e) Reset after FSD authorized if false alarm is confirmed	ACC ACC ACC/LD AD/LD IAC-T1/LD
2	Confirmed genuine fire a) Alerting b) Overall command rests on FSD c) Rescue and fire fighting d) Isolate relevant electrical supplies and utilities, if required e) Access control of the fire scene f) Casualty Management g) Ensure safety and minimize impact to operations h) Activation of Emergency Message Broadcast i) Activate Airport Emergency Centre, if required	IAC-TOD FSD CLK FSD TSI/TSS HKP/AD/LD FSD ADM ADM ADM
3	Evacuation, if required: a) If landside, dispatch Evacuation Coordinators to FAP b) If airside, dispatch Evacuation Coordinators to FAP c) Removal of aircraft away from area under threat d) Suspend aircraft refueling and shutdown fuel hydrant	IAC-LD ACC ACC ACC
4	Business Continuity & Recovery a) Stand down of the Incident b) Reset of fire alarm after authorized by FSD c) Reset of all ACS doors and security sweep if necessary d) Reactivate/deactivate electrical supplies and utilities e) Clean up affected areas, including L&F of left items	FSD IAC-TOD/LD AVSECO TSI/TSS AD/LD
5	Media Handling a) Keep CCD update of the incident and prepare press statement	ADM/CCD

3.18 Fire in Airfield Tunnels (EPM Part 10D)

3.18.1 *This part covers fire with in the East Vehicle Tunnel & West Vehicle Tunnel at airside linking the cargo and passenger aprons and the checklist below summarized the action items:*

	Action	By
1	Fire Alarm Activation (i.e.break glass, emergency phone) a) Determine leading pickup at Gatehouse 1 or 2 if in airside b) Leading service for fire engines to scene c) Assign "Incident Coordinator" to fire alarm site d) Locate the fire if genuine fire e) Reset after FSD authorized if false alarm is confirmed	ACC ACC ACC AD IAC-TOD
2	Confirmed genuine fire a) Alerting b) Overall command rests on FSD c) Rescue and fire fighting d) Closure of affected tunnel and traffic control e) Isolate relevant electrical supplies and utilities, if required f) Access control of the fire scene g) Casualty Management h) Ensure safety and minimize impact to operations i) Activation of Emergency Message Broadcast j) Activate Airport Emergency Centre, if required	ACC FSD CLK FSD ADM/ AD TSI / TSS HKP/AD FSD ADM ADM ADM
3	Business Continuity & Recovery a) Stand down of the Incident b) Reset of fire alarm after authorized by FSD c) Reactivate/deactivate electrical supplies and utilities d) Clean up affected areas, including L&F of left items	FSD IAC-TOD TSI / TSS AD
4	Media Handling a) Keep CCD update of the incident and prepare press statement	ADM/CCD

3.19 Damage to Consignment of Dangerous Goods (EPM Part 11)

3.19.1 *Dangerous Goods Accident is an occurrence associated with and related to the transport of DG (i.e. acids, radioactive, poisons, explosives, magnets, wet-cell batteries, compressed air cylinders, dry ice packing, pesticides, etc) by air which results in fatal or serious fatal injury to person or major property damage. A DG Incident is that the packing has not been maintained or which seriously jeopardizes an aircraft or its occupants.* The checklist below summarized the action items:

	Action	By
1	Alerting a) Obtain DG information from airlines or cargo franchisee b) Alerting	ACC ACC
2	Contingency Measures a) Allocate the aircraft to isolated location and vacate adjacent stands and areas b) Rescue and casualty management c) Scene cordoning if required d) If radioactive materials, call for assistance from Department of Health e) If infectious substances, alert Port Health for assessment: • If Biohazard L1 & 2, airlines to remove & clean up • If Biohazard L3 & 4, Port Health take charge in the containment, disposal and decontamination f) Ensure safety and minimize impact to operations g) Activation of Emergency Message Broadcast h) Activate Airport Emergency Centre, if required i) Stand down of the Incident	ACC AFC/FSD AD/ HKP AFC/ FSD AFC/ FSD Airlines PH ADM ADM ADM ADM
3	Media Handling a) Keep CCD update of the incident and prepare press statement	ADM/CCD

3.20 Weather Warnings (EPM Part 12)

3.20.1 The Hong Kong Observatory is responsible for the issuance of the Tropical Cyclone Signals, Strong Wind Signals, Strong Monsoon, Rainstorm Warnings, Aerodrome Thunderstorm Warnings and Aerodrome Tsunami Warning. The red and ABDer Airport Lightning Warnings are also provided by the HKO.

	Action	By
1	Alerting a) Alerting b) Activate & update of Emergency Message Broadcast c) Activate Airport Emergency Centre	ACC/TOD ADM ADM
2	Apron Operations & Flight Scheduling a) Complete action checklist b) Activate contingency aircraft parking procedure c) Cancel of stands/runway closure d) Obtain latest flight schedules & airlines recovery plan e) Obtain manpower status from ramp operators f) Secure aircraft at T-stands and BAC aircraft g) Closely monitor the circulation of dollies h) Consult EDAO for Flight Rescheduling Control i) Prepare for early bags and misconnected bags storage	AD AD AD AD AD AD AD ADM ABD
3	T1 Operations a) Complete action checklist b) Passenger care items stock check c) Activate airside & landside crowd control measures d) Consult GM T1 for activation of Passenger Care Team e) Activate FIDS contingency display f) Deploy additional FIDS displays at Dep Hall, L6 & BRH g) Request medical support from St. John h) Control Check-in counter bookings	TOD TOD TOD ADM ADM TOD TOD TOD
4	SkyPier & Landside Transport Operations a) Complete action checklist b) Passenger care items stock check c) Activate crowd control measures d) Survival mode of berths e) Obtain latest ferry operation & suspension status f) Suspend ATS tickets selling or refund g) Liaise with AEL for status update and service extension h) Liaise with bus franchisees on service extension i) Liaise with airlines for own transportation for passengers j) Secure adequate taxi supply	LD LD LD LD LD LD LD LD LD LD

5	<i>Other Administrative Measures</i> a) Staff callout arrangement b) Activate contingency staff transportation	ADM ADM
6	<i>Media Handling</i> a) Provide regular update of affected flights b) Keep CCD update of the airport operation status	ADM ADM

3.21 Public Health Emergencies (EPM Part 13)

3.21.1 The Department of Health is responsible for monitoring the development of the outbreak of serious disease overseas, and to decide what and when the precautionary and quarantine measures to be taken.

	Action	By
1	General (to prevent introduction of any serious infectious diseases into Hong Kong by Department of Health) a) Distribution of health education information materials b) Broadcast on board arriving flights from affected ports c) Pilots to declare the health status of pax and crews d) Arriving pax to complete Health Declaration Forms e) Airlines to provide list of pax arriving from affected ports f) Airline to carry out disinfection on aircraft from affected ports g) Airlines to present persons with symptoms for inspection h) Airlines to provide cargo manifest	PH
2	Alerting a) Inflight commander to report of “Communicable Disease” b) Relay information of sick passenger on board to Port Health c) Alerting	ATC ATC PH/ACC
3	Assessment & Quarantine Measures a) Convene Public Health Incident Assessment Group b) Activate Airport Emergency Centre, if required c) Request further information from inflight commander d) Assignment aircraft to park at South remote stand e) Deploy MLC for on scene liaison f) Standby of LMO, RHO, Refueller, Caterers, Bus & TSID g) Conduct on board assessment, sick passenger/crew: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To be released immediately • To be further assessed at Health Post • To be transferred to hospital h) Ambulance service	PH ADM Airline/ATC ACC AD ACC PH FSD
4	Setup of Temporary holding facilities a) South APV Lounge settings b) Alert ID, C&E, Police & AVSECO c) Relocation of buses and remote departure gates d) Cordoning e) Call for assistance from AMS, if required f) Categorization of pax and holding of pax at APV Lounge	TOD IAC-TOD ACC AVSECO PH PH
5	Disinfection a) Disinfection of baggage, cargo, and aircraft, if required b) Disinfection of passenger buses	Airlines AD
6	Media Handling a) Keep CCD update of the incident and prepare press statement	ADM/CCD

3.22 Landside Transport Emergencies (EPM Part 14)

3.22.1 Landside Transport Emergencies refer to prolonged disruption to the land public transport connecting airport, i.e. AEL and road links. The checklist below summarized the action items:

	Action	By
1	<i>Major airport railway disruption with normal road access</i> a) Bypass tracks to maintain service, if possible b) Mobilize emergency bus services c) Request franchised bus to strengthen services d) Activate Emergency Message Broadcast Procedure e) Activate Airport Emergency Centre f) Activate Flight Rescheduling Control, if required g) Activate crowd control measures	MTRC MTRC Bus/IAC-LD/ ETCC ADM ADM EDAO/ATC LD/ HKP
2	<i>Major road disruption with rail links in operation</i> a) Encourage the use of railway services b) Strengthen AEL and railway services c) Strengthen ferry services of Tuen Mun & Tung Chung d) Emergency ferry services of Tsuen Wan & Tung Chung, if necessary e) Post notice at each car park exit f) Activate Emergency Message Broadcast Procedure g) Activate Airport Emergency Centre h) Activate Flight Rescheduling Control, if required i) Activate crowd control measures	(a-e)MTRC /Bus/IAC-LD/ ETCC LD ADM ADM EDAO / ATC LD/HKP
3	<i>No Land Link</i> a) Set up High-Level Command Centre b) Enhance existing ferry services of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tuen Mun & Tung Chung • Central & Mui Wo • Central & Discovery Bay c) Mobilize emergency ferry services of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tung Chung & Tsuen Wan • SkyPier & Central (for air passengers only) • SkyPier & Tuen Mun (for air passengers only) d) Enhance bus services to Tung Chung, Discovery Bay & Mui Wo e) Special coach services between T1 and SkyPier f) Activate AWE as temporary passengers holding area g) Emergency cargo alternative routing by sea h) Activate Emergency Message Broadcast Procedure i) Activate Airport Emergency Centre j) Activate Flight Rescheduling Control k) Activate crowd management measures	THB (b-d)MTRC/ Bus/IAC-LD/ ETCC LD LD ALD/AEC ADM ADM EDAO/ATC HKP/TOD/ AVSECO
4	<i>Media Handling</i>	

	a) Keep CCD update of the incident and prepare press statement	ADM/CCD
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3.23 Dangerous Goods and Chemical Spills (EPM Part 15)

3.23.1 There is a range of dangerous goods and other chemicals stored, handled, and used at the HKIA. The checklist below summarized the action items:

	Action	By
1	Reporting a) Report to IAC b) Alerting c) Ensure attendance by AA Senior Environment Manager	All ACC/TOD ADM
2	Control and Containment of the spillage a) Stop, control and contain the spillage according own's response plan and procedure b) Assign AA's Incident Coordinator if in apron/airfield c) Firefighting & rescue, and contain any safety hazards d) Deploy MLC to scene if required e) Cordoning and traffic control f) Relocate aircraft if required g) Identify suitable location for FSD decontamination facility h) Activate Airport Emergency Centre	Owner/ Agent AD FSD AD AD AD/LD AD/LD ADM
3	Evacuation a) Pre-alert AA and AVSECO for crowd control/movement b) Determine the PA script for all/ specific zones of the PTB c) Activate Emergency Message Broadcast Procedure	IAC-TOD/LD ADM ADM
4	Removal, clean up and recovery of spilt material a) Spill removal if cannot be ruled as safe b) Removal of the spill if declared safe by FSD c) Coordinate the appropriate parties for the removal of spill and cleaning up of affected area d) Assess for any damage to AA properties e) Assess for any environmental implications and to provide advice f) Stand down of the incident	FSD Owner AD/TOD/ LD TSI / TSS Environment FSD
5	Media Handling a) Keep CCD update of the incident and prepare press statement	ADM/CCD

3.25 Airside Protest

3.25.1 Airside Protest refers to protest by arrival / transit / departure passengers inside the Airport Restricted Area of PTB. The checklist below summarized the action items:

	Action	By
1	Alerting a) Access the scale and impact of the protest b) Alerting c) Activate Emergency Message Broadcast Procedure	ADM/HKP IAC-TOD ADM
2	Contingency Plans for Business Continuity a) Initiate meeting with the relevant parties to ascertain the nature of the incident and scope of the protest : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No. of people involved • Airlines involved • Arrival schedule of protesters • Anticipated actions of the protesters b) Establish an action plan to handle the protesters in response to protesters' behaviors or action taking: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Physical obstruction of passenger flow will dictate a higher and expedited level of response • Other actions in contravention of AA Bylaw but without physical disruption of airport flow, i.e. silent protest, banner erection, slogan shouting or otherwise causing a nuisance or disturbance, will merit some lower level of response • Identify protest group leaders to ascertain the protesters' objectives and intentions • Assign the involved flights to designated gates to facilitate handling of the protesters • Arrangement to be made with Immigration, AVSECO and the airlines to interdict the protesters from arriving at the identify and intercepting the protesters at arrival gates • Removal of the protesters: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. AA, as the owner of PTB, will publicly inform the protesters that they need to report to Immigration for processing immediately ii. Failure to convince the protesters to adhere to the instruction, AVSECO shall be instructed to use minimal physical means, in a symbolic gesture, to remove the protesters iii. Should the protesters still refuse to budge, Immigration officers, possibly supported by 	ADM/HKP/ID/ AVSECO/TLD M

	<p>AVSECO or Police, will remove the protesters to identified detention rooms for further processing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Consider to cordon off the protesters by movable screens• Airlines is responsible for the welfare of the protesters• Airlines to dissuade the protesters from coming to HK at the origin airport• AA staff to avoid participate in the physical removal of the protesters• Deploy sufficient staff and contractors to direct passengers <p>c) Stand down of incident</p>	
3	<p>Media Handling</p> <p>a) Keep CCD update of the incident and prepare press statement</p>	ADM

Abbreviations:

1) Airport Authority Hong Kong & AVSECO

- EDAO = Executive Director, Airport Operations
- DDAO = Deputy Director, Airport Operations
- DDSD = Deputy Director, Service Delivery
- ADM = Airport Duty Manager
- TLDM = Terminals & Landside Duty Manager
- DMA = Airfield Duty Manager
- AD = Airfield Department
- TOD = Terminal Operations Department
- LD = Landside Department
- ABD = APM and Baggage Department
- TSI / TSS = Technical Services Infrastructure / Technical Services System
- CCD = Delegated officer of the Corporate Communication Department
- ALD = Delegated officer of the Aviation Logistics Department
- Environment = Senior Manager, Environment
- AVSECO = Aviation Security Company Limited

2) Integrated Airport Centre

- ACC = The Airfield operations function
- IAC-TOD = The Terminal operations function
- IAC-LD = The SkyPier & landside operations function
- IAC-ABD = The Baggage handling function
- IAC-TSI/TSS = The Technical Service function
- IAC-ITD = The Information Technology function
- IAC-AVSECO = The aviation security function performed by AVSECO

3) Government Departments

- ATC = Air Traffic Control Tower
- CAD = Civil Aviation Department
- AFC = Airport Fire Contingent
- FSD = Fire Service Department
- HKP = Hong Kong Police
- C&E = Customs & Excise
- ID = Immigration Department
- PH = Port Health Office of Department of Health at HKIA
- THB = Transport & Housing Bureau

- ETCC = Emergency Transport Coordination Centre of the Transport Department

4. Airport

- Airlines = The involved airline operators
- LMO = Line maintenance operators
- RHO = Ramp handling operators
- Refuellers = Refuelling operators
- Caterers = Catering operators
- MTRC = The MTR Corporation
- Bus = The franchised bus operators

Part 4 Information Dissemination

4.1 Emergency Notification Mechanism

- 4.1.1 There is a well-defined alerting mechanism for airport emergencies covered by the Emergency Procedure Manual mainly by the Auto-Voice Message Distribution System (AVMDS).
- 4.1.2 The ADM will make discretion on the most appropriate means of emergency notification and alerting to the AAHK senior management via telephone calls, Short Message Service (SMS), or smartphone applications such as Whatsapp.
- 4.1.3 For airport-wide disruptions and crisis such as prolonged inclement weather and single-runway operations, the ADM will instruct IAC-TOD, or IAC-LD to broadcast emergency messages to the airport community and passengers via SMS, Public Address (PA) System, Universal Display System (UDS), multi-media walls, AAHK website and notice displays at AEL stations by MTRC. Pre-approved texts for certain pre-defined scenarios vetted are available in the common access computer drive. Any ad-hoc messages shall be endorsed by the ADM before broadcasting to the public.
- 4.1.4 SMS should be issued, either by ADM or ACC, to the Civil Aviation Department (CAD) for the following incidents:
- Airport emergencies, other than aircraft accident, ground incident, full emergency and local standby
 - In-flight incidents, if the information source is not from the ATC
 - Airfield incidents
 - Public interest.

The alerting list is maintained by Airfield, AAHK.

4.1.5 Use of Short Message System

- a) Short Message System (SMS) is the major tool that IAC will use to alert and update the senior management of operation events or incidents. Each web-based SMS account is associated with the duty mobile phone number of each duty team.

- b) Each IAC function may issue SMS by using the duty mobile account to report cases of minor impacts to operations according to internal requirements. The SMS message is required to copy to the ADM for reference.
- c) The SMS distribution list of the ADM mobile phone account is maintained by the ADM or its delegates only. The numbers of recipients to be included in the distribution list for stakeholders are limited to avoid long lead time required for SMS distribution. Stakeholders are required to proactively provide updates on the distribution list under their purview including business partners when and if needed.
- d) If the SMS message is issued by the ADM mobile phone account, the respective IAC function is required to obtain endorsement from the ADM in advance. For the sake of simplicity and ease of application, the recipients of SMS should at all times include senior management of AAHK, airlines, RHO, LMO, other related external parties and the duty managers/assistant managers of AAHK's duty teams. In certain cases, representatives of Retail & Advertising and Aviation Logistic, AAHK are included at the discretion of ADM.
- e) Each SMS message should be in the following format to facilitate the recipients' understanding on the situation

IAC: (Nature of incident) TIME: (Issuing time of the SMS) TO: (Recipient group if the SMS is also issued to external parties) DETAILS: (Details of the incident and cause) IMPACT: (Immediate or possible impact to airport operations) CONTINGENCY: (contingency actions adopted) RECOVERY: (Expected recovery means and resumption time) (Other relevant information if necessary) <END>c

4.1.6 Alarm Annunciation Platform

- a) The alarm on the alert message display panel located at IAC will be triggered automatically or manually in the event of possible incidents happened to critical operational components i.e. crash alarm, airport lighting warning, fire, security and systems i.e. automated people

mover and baggage handling system, full emergency, landside transport, tropical cyclone, rainstorm warning

- b) Excluding crash alarm, airport lighting warning, fire, tropical cyclone, and rainstorm warning, other alarm such as security, automated people mover and baggage handling system, full emergency, and landside transport are triggered by respectively operating functions.

4.1.7 Total Airport Management (TAM)

- a) The TAM with a display of approximate 45.7m video wall is designed to provide visualization on real-time airport operations and performance to facilitate effective and efficient operational decisions. The critical information for apron, baggage, terminal and landside operations are incorporated into the TAM.
- b) An established fallback plan will be activated in the event of system failure.



Part 5 Control Authority (CA) Pass

5.1 General

- 5.1.1 (Ten) CA passes are kept in IAC controlled by ADM to enable temporary escorted access into the Airport Restricted Area of their officers, agents or associates who have an urgent operational access requirement for performing duties or conducting business at the airside and that the time taken to apply / issue of Visitor Pass will inhibit them to proceed with the official duty or business without delay.
- 5.1.2 Use of the CA Pass is only permitted in circumstances where urgent operational access into the ARA is required.
- 5.1.3 Request for use should be made by a staff member in the capacity of Assistant General Manager / Senior Manager or above, or on their behalf, for the approval by ADM
- 5.1.4 The requestor should provide the details including but not limited to the following information upon request:
- Number of CA pass required
 - Date / time of the use
 - Name of the person(s) who use the pass
 - Purpose of using the pass
 - Name of the accompanying officer
- 5.1.5 Detailed requirements for the use of CA pass are stipulated in Annex II of the Airport Restricted Area Permit System Manual.

Part 6 IAC Access Control

6.1 Access and Authorization

- 6.1.1 Access to IAC is only granted in circumstances where operational access is required.
- 6.1.2 Sponsoring department of AAHK is required to submit the “Operational Access Requisition Form” maintained by Safety, Security and Business Continuity Department for the endorsement by ADM or their delegates.
- 6.1.3 Unless approved by ADM, only authorized personnel himself / herself can access to the IAC. No tailgating is allowed.
- 6.1.4 At ADM’s discretion, the access right will be granted with reference to the assessment criteria below:

Company	Division/Department	Eligibility
AAHK	AMD/CCD	All staff with justification provided
	ITD and TSI/TSS	Only FRT and System Operations Control Centre (SOCC) staff
	ADMIN	Only staff responsible for administration and mailing service
	Others	Only Assistant General Manager / Senior Manager or above for divisions / departments that have a role during AEC activation
Non-AAHK	Contractors / business partners	On request basis - only staff with long-term deployment to IAC i.e. manning an operating posts

- 6.1.5 Sponsoring departments of AAHK should maintain a list of access control for their staff (including business partners & contractors, where applicable) who have granted with access to IAC. They should also maintain regular housekeeping of the list and pro-actively provide updates to ADM or their delegates when there is staff movement.

6.1.6 Staff with long-term deployment i.e. manning an operating posts in IAC should attend to a mandatory course arranged by IAC within 6 months of their access being granted to IAC. Failure to attend the course within the prescribed period will result in the immediate suspension of access.

6.2 Visit

6.2.1 Visit to IAC should be approved by ADM in advance. It should be at the invitation by the ADM or sponsored by departments of AAHK.

6.2.2 Visitors must be under the escort by the responsible personnel of the sponsoring departments.

6.2.3 Visit should normally be allowed at the viewing gallery in IAC only. Prior approval from ADM should be sought for visits to IAC Main Hall including Airport Emergency Centre, Crisis Management Room & Corporate Communication Room, or the working benches.

6.3 Misuse of Access

6.3.1 Any misuse or violation of the access may result in permanent or temporarily suspension of the access.

Part 7 Maintenance and Works

7.1 Property Management and Maintenance

7.1.1 IAC-TSI/TSS, IAC-ITD and sponsoring departments are required to conduct preventive, routine maintenance and health check to IAC fitting, fixture, and mission critical system to ensure smooth airport operations. IAC users are required to report promptly to fault reporting hotline (#2183 6888), ADM or IAC Office Support for the fault and irregularities found.

7.2 Work Application and Approval

7.2.1 Sponsoring departments are required to submit the work information including work scope, date and time, number of workers entering IAC, onsite contact person and phone number for the review by IAC Office Support.

7.2.2 The general approval principles are as follows subject to the discretion by ADM.

Work Type	No/Minor impact to IAC operations <i>e.g. site survey, quick fix with less than 4 workers</i>	Significant impact to IAC operations <i>e.g. noisy works, maintenance with suspension of critical system (such as electricity and A/C, mission critical system)</i>
Review by IAC Office Support	✓ (project works, scheduled preventive maintenance) X (ad hoc fault repairing, urgent maintenance which are not required to register in TSI/TSS (AWMS) and ITD (WPS))	✓

Review & approval by ADM	X	✓
Allowed working hours	Anytime but prefer small hours or off-peak hours	01:00 – 05:00 hours except special approval

7.2.3 IAC Office Support is responsible for reviewing the operational impacts to IAC and to ensure that the works are acceptable to the affected users. Technical impacts shall be reviewed and approved by the sponsoring departments and Work Permit Office through Work Permit Application process.

7.2.4 Only two work permits will be approved at the same time zone.

7.2.5 Sponsoring departments/IAC-TSI/TSS/IAC-ITD is responsible for the management of all approved works.

7.2.6 Departmental IAC representative is responsible and to work closely with /IAC-TSI/TSS/IAC-ITD for ad hoc fault repairing and urgent maintenance raised during the real time operation. Work details are required to share with ADM as deemed appropriate.

7.2.7 Design colour must align with IAC atmosphere. Scheduled design, position and space allocation of equipment and system are subject to ADM's approval

7.3 Work Management

7.3.1 Contractors are required to register the details of the approved works to the Airport Work Management System (AWMS) maintained by TSI/TSS or Permit to work System (PTW) maintained by ITD.

7.3.2 On the day of works, IAC-TSI/TSS/IAC-ITD is responsible for providing a list of IAC works during the briefing session for ADM's information / approval. Depending on real-time operational situation, ADM retains his/her jurisdiction to suspend the works.

- 7.3.3 Works (excluding ad-hoc / urgent) without being registered to AWMS / PTW are not allowed.
- 7.3.4 The contractor is required to attend the night work briefing session prior to work commencement.
- 7.3.5 Sponsoring department/IAC-TSI/TSS/IAC-ITD is responsible for monitoring of onsite IAC works within their subject areas. In addition, access control to IAC for the contractors shall be managed by sponsoring department/IAC-TSI/TSS/IAC-ITD.
- 7.3.6 Upon completion of works, sponsoring department/IAC-TSI/TSS/IAC-ITD is responsible for inspecting the work areas to ensure a proper resumption for normal operations.
- 7.3.7 The contractor shall comply the Integrated Airport Centre Manual and report promptly to sponsoring department/IAC-TSI/TSS/IAC-ITD of any irregularities / damages / incompleteness of works etc during the work is in progress.
- 7.4 General Dos and Don'ts
 - 7.4.1 All works at IAC shall comply with the terms in "Conditions of Work Permit" issued by TSS and ITD of AAHK.
 - 7.4.2 Contractors must strictly follow the approved work scope and schedule or otherwise the works will be suspended. Should there be any changes, sponsoring departments shall notify IAC Office Support/TSI/TSS/ITD as soon as possible.
 - 7.4.3 Contractors shall keep the work areas neat, tidy and free from safety hazards at all times. Upon the completion of works, the work areas should be resumed in a clean and tidy condition.
 - 7.4.4 In general, storage of materials are not allowed inside IAC premises except special approval by ADM. Approval must be obtained from AD for space use outside and surrounding IAC.
 - 7.4.5 Contractor workers must be in uniform or decent outfit to maintain good conduct.

Part 8 House Rules

8.1 General

- 8.1.1 Apart from the house rules and best practices (IAC House Rules) stipulated in this Part of the IAC Manual, all staff working in IAC must fully observe and comply with the Laws of Hong Kong.
- 8.1.2 The supervisors of each IAC functions are entrusted to supervise and monitor the compliance to the IAC House Rules by their staff. Non-compliances must be rectified immediately.
- 8.1.3 Prior approval from the ADM must be sought for exemption from any IAC House Rules. Any personnel who fail to comply intentionally or without an acceptable reason may be required to leave the IAC or disciplined.
- 8.1.4 IAC must be kept clean and tidy at all time. Staff working in IAC are required to maintain the professional-look of the workstations at IAC and keep them neat and in good order.
- 8.1.5 Smoking is strictly prohibited in and surrounding the IAC premise and for apron area it must fulfill relevant Ancillary Building requirement by Airfield

8.2 Personal Appearance & Uniform

- 8.2.1 Staff working in IAC who are issued with uniform must wear their full uniform at all time. The uniform worn must be neat, clean and tidy. New staff who are yet issued with uniform must dress in business attire as temporary arrangement.
- 8.2.2 Staff who are not provided with uniforms must also dress in business attire with company identification shown.

8.3 Attendance

- 8.3.1 All staff must report duty at IAC according to the roster issued by their respective companies or line departments and takeover duties from the staff of the previous shift properly. Functions operated by non-AA staff must be manned during the agreed operations hours. Late for duty is not acceptable. Continuity in airport operations and incident handling must be ensured by proper handover.
 - 8.3.2 External parties are required to report their manning level and working rosters to AAHK.
 - 8.3.3 Prior approval must be sought from the respective supervisors of each IAC functions for early leave from duty. Replacement must be arranged to maintain the IAC manpower at adequate level unless consent obtained from the ADM.
 - 8.3.4 Lunch breaks and short breaks during the shift hours shall be taken in accordance with the arrangements made by the supervisors of each IAC functions in order to ensure adequate IAC manpower is maintained.
- 8.4 Media Inquiries
- 8.4.1 Any inquiries from the media by the IAC staff must be referred to the CCD of AAHK or the ADM.

Part 9 Use of Facilities and Equipment

9.1 General

- 9.1.1 All facilities and equipment at the IAC are limited for use for performing job duties. Abuse of any IAC facilities and equipment is strictly prohibited.
- 9.1.2 Use of the facilities and equipment at the AEC is allowed only when the AEC is activated or prior approval is obtained by the ADM or by Security, Safety & Business Continuity (SSBC) of AAHK.
- 9.1.3 Use of personal data due to operational needs should be handled in accordance with the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap. 486) and other policies issued by AAHK e.g. Closed Circuit Television CCTV Policy.
- 9.1.4 All IAC functions are responsible for the provision and maintenance their own equipment and systems according to their operational needs other than the standard provisions. The installation of equipment and systems are subject to the approval by ADM.
- 9.1.5 General office supplies such as stationeries that are up to the standards applied for IAC should be provided by their departments or companies. Business partners are required to bring in their own printers and corresponding consumables in the designated areas at their own expense for the operational use.
- 9.1.6 For common-used facilities, supplies and consumable items e.g. pantry items, IAC may chargeback the expenses from AAHK's departments with reference to their seat occupancies if needed. For avoidance of doubt, departments of AAHK are responsible for the expenses of the business partners and contractors invited or sponsored by them to IAC. They may make their own arrangements to reimburse the expenses from the business partners and contractors.

9.2 Use of Personal Telecommunication Devices

- 9.2.1 Use of personal electronic telecommunication devices is very common nowadays. Staff must concentrate at their job duties at IAC and minimize

the use of personal electronic telecommunication devices in whatever ways including telephone calls or using any applications.

- 9.2.2 Ring tone of all personal electronic telecommunication devices and TMRs must be turned down, or changed to silent mode if possible, so that it will not cause any disturbance to other IAC staff of performing their job duties.
- 9.2.3 If the information to be accessed using desktop, laptop or mobile devices is sensitive or treated as confidential to companies, staff should follow the corresponding policies of their companies or consult their supervisors or responsible departments in advance.

9.3 Use of Storage Area

- 9.3.1 Various cabinets are assigned to different IAC functions for storage of working documents and the necessary reference documents. Archive documents must be removed from IAC. No cabinets, racks or boxes, and equipment shall be placed inside IAC without the prior approval from the ADM. Subject to approval from ADM, the cabinets are allocated on request basis for internal and external parties.
- 9.3.2 Umbrellas are required to be placed at designated location (i.e. locker, umbrella rack etc.)

9.4 Use of Pantry & Common Room

- 9.4.1 Eating in the IAC is prohibited and is allowed only in the pantry and common room on the resting area on the mezzanine floor of the IAC. All facilities and equipment in the pantry and common room are for common use and shall be returned to their original locations after use.
- 9.4.2 Lunch boxes must be disposed properly after use and all personal pantry items must be retrieved properly after use.
- 9.4.3 Staff must use the provided bottle at their workstations and store them at the designated hanging cabinets in the pantry after use. Staff who are not provided with the bottles may bring their own bottles with sealable lids that are equivalent to AA bottle's standard for use temporally.

9.4.4 Eating may be allowed in the IAC under special circumstances such as prolonged activation of Airport Emergency Centre, and with prior approval granted by the ADM.

9.4.5 Staff are not allowed to bring their own electrical appliances such as cooker and water boiler or use any substandard plugs in IAC pantry area. On the contrary, to comply with occupational safety and safeguard the workplace safety, they should use electrical appliances provided by IAC.

9.5 Use of Assigned Personal Lockers

9.5.1 A half-size personal locker is only assigned to AA staff who are deployed to work at IAC on long term basis. Staff are responsible for all their personal belongings. No excessive personal belongings are allowed at the workstations or in the locker rooms, and the staff must properly store all personal belongs in their personal lockers.

9.5.2 The number of lockers for departments are allocated with reference to the seating occupancies and on request basis subject to approval by ADM.

9.5.3 The supervisors of the respective IAC functions must return the keys of the vacant lockers to the ADM if the staff are no longer deployed to work at IAC. With the approval by the ADM, the lockers may be reassigned to the staff who are newly rotated to work at IAC on long term basis.

9.5.4 No male staff is allowed to enter into the female locker room, and no female staff is allowed to enter into the male locker room.

9.6 Staff Resting Rooms

9.6.1 The use of staff resting rooms will be activated by ADM in the event of extended disruptions.

9.6.2 Staff rest rooms will only be assigned to AA staff who are deployed to work in IAC. No male staff is allowed to enter into the female rest room, and no female staff is allowed to enter into the male rest room.

Part 10 – Decentralization Plan

10.1 General

10.1.1 IAC may require evacuation due to major facilities failure or occurrences that would endanger the health and safety of its occupants and/or render the IAC unsuitable for operation, e.g. fire, building structure defects, electricity outage, hostile attack, biological/chemical pollution or other causes.

10.1.2 The IAC decentralization plan is a procedure to ensure the continuous operation in the fallback centres during emergency evacuation of IAC.

10.1.3 Airport Duty Manager (ADM) will make the decision to activate the procedure of full decentralization or partial decentralization of the IAC, and the stand-down procedure. However, when IAC is no longer suitable for real-time operation due to emergencies / substantial incidents which will endanger the health and/or safety of the occupants, full decentralization should be applied automatically.

10.1.4 Representatives of the airlines and ramp operators should evacuate from the IAC, fall back to their respective control centres or office and resume operations at IAC upon notification by ACC.

10.1.5 ADM will vacate to TDMO upon activation of decentralization of IAC.

10.1.6 In the event of fire, the IAC will be vacated according to the IAC Fire Evacuation Plan and Emergency Escape Plan. (See Appendix 3 and 4)

10.1.7 Fire wardens are appointed by respective operating functions with deployment sufficient to cover their operating hours. IAC office support are appointed Fire Manager of IAC.

10.1.8 Fire Warden acts as a leader to coordinate with AA Incident Coordinator for the evacuation of staff at IAC in case of fire emergency. He/She will assist staff to evacuate to fire assembly points during fire emergency. Besides, Fire Warden is responsible for the daily inspection of items (See Appendix 1) related to fire hazard in IAC premise. On the other hand, Fire Manager is responsible for the daily management of fire safety and Fire Wardens of their workplace (Please refer to details in 5.1 – Responsibilities of Fire

Manager and 5.2 - Responsibilities of Fire Warden in Appendix A of the Fire Safety Management Plan). Other than the emergency role, Fire Wardens are required to carry out the fire safety related work assigned by the Fire Manager.

10.1.9 Transportation service will be provided and organized by Airfield Department to facilitate decentralization and transfer AA and non-AA duty staff from IAC fire assembly points to the bus stop located at Stand N10.

10.1.10 Communication tools including but not limited to telephone calls, Trunked Mobile Radio (TMR) (Channel ADM 1) and all other effective communication means will be used during real time IAC fall back and decentralization situation.

10.1.11 The Airport Emergency Centre (AEC) will be relocated to HKIA Tower to provide basic facilitation and communication with stakeholders upon activation of decentralization of IAC/AEC. Please refer to details in Part J – AEC Fallback in AEC Operations Manual.

10.2 Fallback procedure for ACC

10.2.1 When the fallback procedure is activated, the ACC functions of stand allocation, apron control would move to the fallback centre of Backup Apron Control Centre (Backup ACC) at AOC, 2/F of Midfield Operation and Maintenance Building II (MOMB II). Bus Control would move to Bus Control Office. FIDS would move to location that is subject to MMI's availability. For the function of services and standard monitoring, it will be performed at AOC.

10.2.2 Airfield Department is responsible for the management, system provision and operation procedure of the fallback centre. Latest update of the equipment list and redundancy level shall be referred to Airfield Department. The equipment list at the fallback centre are as follow (the locations of systems at the fallback centre is shown in Illustration 1-2):

<i>Equipment / System</i>	<i>Location</i>
Terminal Management System (MMI)	Backup ACC ¹
Aircraft Parking Stand Allocation System (APSAS)	Backup ACC
Stand Allocation System (SAS) <i>*Backup of APSAS</i>	Backup ACC
Marshalling Duty Assignment System (Web-based)	Backup ACC
Airside Bus Dispatch System (Web-based)	Bus Control Office
Airport - Collaborative Decision System(A-CDM) (Web-based)	Backup ACC
Stand Status Display (Web-based)	Backup ACC
Auto-Voice Message Distribution System (Web-based)	Backup ACC
Airport Lightning Warning System	Backup ACC
Unmanned Aircraft System Detection System (UASDS)	Backup ACC
Taller Vessel Movement Monitoring System (TVMMS)	Backup ACC

¹ Due to system availability, MMI's location would be at 4Y542 by end of Nov 2023. It would be migrated to TDMO starting from Dec 2023 until migration of MMI into new interface (HCI) at IAC in Q1 2024

TMR/VHF console & handhelds	Backup ACC
CCTV monitor & control panels	Backup ACC
Phone dispatchers	Backup ACC
Fax machine	Backup ACC
Crash alarm	Backup ACC
OA PC for FIDS	Backup ACC
Phone dispatcher (for FIDS)	Backup ACC
Fax machines (for FIDS)	Backup ACC

10.2.3 Relocation of ACC to Backup ACC at AOC 2/F of MOMB II

- a) Function of stand allocation, apron control, airfield standards & service monitoring will continue at Backup ACC; airside bus control will continue at Bus Control office; while the function of flight schedule management will continue at T1 4Y542. Essential forms and documents are maintained at Backup ACC to facilitate the backup operations.
- b) Redirect the incoming fax line 2910 1107 to 2183-7359 in Backup ACC as follows:
 - Use the fax machine 29101107 to dial:
 - *15
(Or Dial 2626-2626 by any telephone for remote forwarding)
 - 3
 - 29101107#
 - 1107#
 - 1
 - 2183 7359#
- c) AM ACC to inform ATC Tower Supervisor that stand allocation and apron control function is being relocated from IAC to Backup ACC. Urgent communication between ATC and Airfield Department would be via the Airfield DM at 9304-3600 or the AM, Airfield at 9150-3103.
- d) If feasible, AM ACC should:
 - log-out and shut down the FIDS, APAS workstations and all the web-based systems in IAC;
 - Ensure the serviceability of ALWS and AVMDS at Backup ACC.
- e) If feasible, AM ACC should seek airfield/apron units' assistance to activate the standby equipment at Backup ACC to safeguard the transition of ACC functions at Backup ACC before the closure of IAC.


- f) The MMI workstations, PC workstations for web-based systems, A-CDM, TMR/VHF console and handhelds at Backup ACC are consistent to that at IAC to support stand allocation and apron control function
- g) Marshalling duty assignment would be continued by using the Marshalling Duty Assignment System (MDAS) with support of TMR communication.
- h) Stand occupancy will be monitored by using the Stand Status Display (SSD) or A-CDM.
- i) Airside bus control team will keep using Airside Bus Dispatch System (ABDS) for bus dispatch and control at Bus Control Office.
- j) Report to the ADM when the handover of all functions of ACC is completed at backup ACC.
- k) All IAC RHOs, LMOs, HKO, service providers and Airlines representatives should be vacated from IAC and returned to their own control offices.
- l) Duty SOO/ S&SD would forward the line 2183 4402 to duty mobile phone i.e. 6391 7126/ 6398 3975. Real-time services and standard monitoring of ramp franchisees/ licensees could be performed through CCTV at AOC.

10.2.4 Resumption of IAC Operation

- a) Before the stand-down of contingency operation at Backup ACC, AM ACC should deploy Operations Officers to IAC to activate all the operations systems and communication equipment, and commence the operation at IAC.
- b) AM ACC to inform ATC Tower Supervisor that stand allocation and apron control function is being relocated back from Backup ACC to IAC. Urgent communication between ATC and Airfield Department would be via the Airfield DM at 9304-3600 or the AM, Airfield at 9150-3039. After the relocation, AM ACC must inform ATC Tower Supervisor that IAC has resumed normal operation and the normal alerting procedures will resume.
- c) Cancel the forwarding function of incoming fax line 2910-1107 as follows:
 - d) Use the fax machine 29101107 to dial:
 - e) *15
(Or Dial 2626-2626 by any telephone for remote forwarding)
 - f) 3
 - g) 29101107#
 - h) 1107#

- i) 2
- j) FIDS Team to request SOCC to cancel the forwarding function of 2182-2065 and 2182-2064.
- k) Log-off and shut down the standby systems at Backup ACC.
- l) Report to the ADM when the handover of all functions of ACC is completed at backup ACC.
- m) Duty SOO/ S&SD cancels phone forwarding from the line 6391 7126/ 6398 3975 and resumes direct line 2183 4402 for real-time services and standard monitoring of ramp franchisees/ licensees at IAC.
- n) AM ACC and Duty SOO/S&SD notify the representatives of RHOs, LMOs, HKO and airlines representative to resume operations at IAC.

Illustration 2.
Floor Plan of Backup ACC at AOC, 2/F of MOMB II



10.3 Fallback procedure for IAC-TOD

10.3.1 When the fallback procedure is activated, operations of IAC-TOD will be moved to the fallback centre of Terminal Duty Management Office (TDMO) at 3E014C at L3 T1 to maintain most of its functions and communication between all decentralized fallback operation centers.

10.3.2 Terminal Operations Department is responsible for the management, system provision and operation procedure of the TDMO. Latest update of the equipment list and redundancy level shall be referred to TO Department. The equipment list at the fallback centre is as follows (the locations of systems at the TDMO is shown in Illustration 4):

<i>Equipment / System</i>	<i>Location</i>
PABX Dispatcher	TDMO
PABX phone	TDMO
Fax Machine	TDMO
TMR Console & Handhelds	TDMO
T1 Line APM Monitoring System	TDMO
T1 Thorngraph and Fire delay Panel	TDMO
Lift Intercom Panels	TDMO
CCTV monitor & control panel	TDMO
CCTV monitor & Playback system	TDMO
OA PC (with access to FRS)	TDMO
Airport Lightning Warning System alarm panel	TDMO
Auto Voice Message Distribution System	TDMO
Central Control Console (TRC)	TDMO
AVAYA ONE X Agent (TRC)	TDMO
PABX phone (TRC)	TDMO

10.3.3 Relocation of IAC-TOD operations to TDMO

- a) Deploy Operation Officers from other posts to start up essential operations systems / equipment in TDMO and ensure the system readiness with technical support from TSI and SOCC.
- b) Request SOCC to:
 - Reactivate PABX dispatcher for 2181-8110
 - Redirect the CICA phone line 2182-2019 to 2183-5240
 - Redirect the line of PA 2182-2074 to 2182-5974
 - Redirect phone line of 2182-0055 to 2182-5955
 - Redirect phone line of 2182-0059 to 2182-5954
- c) Report to the ADM when all functions of IAC-TOD are taken over at the TDMO and any system problems encountered.

10.3.4 Resumption of IAC Operation

- a) Before the stand-down of contingency procedure, TLDM should deploy Operation Officers to IAC to activate all the systems and communication equipment, and commence the operation at IAC.
- b) Request SOCC for the withdrawal of all telephone / fax lines redirection.
- c) Log off or shut down operations system and equipment in TDMO.
- d) Report to the ADM when all functions of IAC-TOD are taken over at IAC and any system problems encountered.

10.4 Fallback procedure for IAC-LD

10.4.1 When the fallback procedure is activated, the function of overall monitor and control of SkyPier, Ground Transportation Centre and landside road networks, and berthing activities of SkyPier will be moved to the fallback centre of Terminal Department Management Office (TDMO) at 3E014C at L3 T1.

10.4.2 Landside Department is responsible for the management, system provision and operation procedure of the backup centres. Latest update of the equipment list and redundancy level shall be referred to Landside Department. The equipment list at the fallback centres are as follows (the locations of systems at the TDMO is shown in Illustration 5):

<i>Equipment / System</i>	<i>Location</i>
PABX Dispatcher	TDMO
TCSS	TDMO
TMR Console	TDMO
CCTV – SkyPier	TDMO
CCTV – Road network	TDMO
SkyPier line APM Monitoring System	TDMO
Lift panels	TDMO
PIMS (Berthing Control)	TDMO
Marine VHF/UHF	TDMO

10.4.3 Relocation of IAC-LD from IAC to TDMO

- a) Deploy Operation Officers of other posts to TDMO to activate the LD position in TDMO and start performing the function until relieved.
- b) Request SOCC to redirect phone line 2182-0054 to 2182-0057 at TDMO.
- c) Request SOCC to redirect phone line 2183-9075 to 21835290 at TDMO.
- d) Evacuate IAC with the TMR handsets



- e) Upon arrival at TDMO, activate and conduct health check of the fallback equipments and systems at the LD position.
- f) Broadcast via TMR to notify all duty staff of transfer of function from IAC to TDMO
- g) During SkyPier operating hours, i.e. from 0700hrs to 2315hrs, regularly monitor all lift CCTVs of SkyPier if any passenger/staff may be trapped.
- h) Report to the ADM when all functions of IAC-LD are taken over at the TDMO, and any system problems encountered.
- i) Activate the “Bypass” buttons for designated lifts”

10.4.4 Resumption of IAC Operations

- a) Upon notification by ADM of resumption of IAC, deploy Operation Officers to return to IAC and conduct health check on all systems
- b) Request SOCC to cancel the redirection of phone lines for both 2182-0054 and 2183-9075.
- c) Broadcast via TMR to notify duty staff of resumption of IAC function
- d) Deactivate the “Bypass” buttons for designated lifts at GTC and landside
Sign off the backup systems in TDMO.

Airport Authority Hong Kong Integrated Airport Centre Manual

Illustration 5.



10.5 Fallback procedure for IAC-ABD

10.5.1 When the fallback procedure is activated, operations of IAC-ABD will be moved to the fallback centre of Baggage Management Office (BMO) at 3T505 at L2 Basement T1 to maintain all of its functions and communication between all decentralized backup operation centers.

10.5.2 APM & Baggage Department is responsible for the management, system provision and operation procedure of the BMO. Latest update of the equipment list and redundancy level shall be referred to APM & Baggage Department. The equipment list at the BMO is as follows:

<i>Equipment/System</i>	<i>location</i>
Management Information & Control System (MICS)	BMO
Sort Allocation Computer (SAC)	BMO
Reclaim Belt Allocation System (RBAS)	BMO
FIDS MMI Workstation	BMO
BEUMER Group Fusion (BG Fusion)	BMO
Baggage Based IT (BBIT)	BMO
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)	BMO
Remote Monitoring Unit (RMU)	BMO
Smart CCTV	BMO
Phone lines	BMO
FAX	BMO
TMR Console	BMO

10.5.3 Scenario1 (no immediate threat situation) Relocation of IAC-ABD to BMO

- a) During the period of IAC closure, the function of MICS, BBIT, SAC, RBAS and RMU will continue at T1 L2 BMO. Essential forms and documents are maintained and updated periodically by IAC-ABD to facilitate the backup operations.
- b) Duplicate set of operation systems (MICS, BBIT, SAC, RBAS and RMU) and communication equipment are on hot standby at BMO.

- c) The SOO of IAC-ABD shall deploy OOs from IAC to BMO (1xMICS, 1x SCADA, 1x BBIT, 1x SAC, 1xRBAS and 1x RMU) as the startup team. The rest of the staff include SOO shall remain operating in IAC until BMO is ready for operations.
- d) If feasible, the last IAC-ABD staff should log-out and shut down the following system; MICS, BBIT, SAC, RBAS and RMU before relocation to BMO. Inform upcoming shift staff to report directly to BMO. Headcount of IAC-ABD will be checked before departure and upon arrival at BMO.
- e) Startup Team should arrive at BMO with the key items in 15 mins:
 - TMRs
 - All necessary operation logs and forms
- f) BMO phones and fax lines have been diverted from BMO to IAC-ABD. Once the startup team is ready for operation at BMO, all the diverted function of the phones and fax lines need to be cancelled. The cancellation procedure as below:
 - i. Cancellation of fax line diversion:
 - ii. Use of any control phone dial 9 26262626
 - iii. 3
 - iv. 22612058#
 - v. 2058#
 - vi. 2
 - i. Cancellation of phone line diversion in L2 BMO :
 - i. Press Left arrow icon
 - ii. Press Tick icon
 - iii. 21825770 SAC
 - iv. 21830061 & 21825767 BMO
 - v. 21825771 RBAS
- g) Report to Airport Duty Manager (ADM) when operation at BMO is ready. Start to redeploy the rest of the operation staff to BMO.

10.5.4 Scenario 2 (Immediate threat situation) Relocation of IAC-ABD to BMO

- a) During the period of IAC closure, the function of MICS, BBIT, SAC, RBAS and RMU will be suspended and immediately relocated to BMO. Essential forms and documents are maintained and updated periodically by IAC-ABD to facilitate the backup operations.
- b) Duplicates set of operation systems (MICS, BBIT, SAC, RBAS and RMU) and communication equipment are on hot standby at BMO.


- c) Interim IAC-ABD operation will be taken up by OOs at BMO in order to keep the main system MICS, BBIT, SAC, RBAS and RMU in operation.
- d) Redeploy all staff to BMO within 15 mins and take over the operation from L2 interim operators.
- e) Inform upcoming shift staff to report directly to BMO. Headcount of IAC-ABD will be checked before departure and upon arrival at BMO.
- f) The following items shall be collected during relocation:
 - TMRs
 - All necessary operation logs and forms
- g) BMO phones and fax lines have been directed from BMO to IAC-ABD. Once the interim team is ready for operation at BMO, all the directed function of the phones and fax lines need to be cancelled. The cancellation procedure as below:
 - Use the any control phone
 - i. Dial 9 26262626
 - ii. 3
 - iii. 22612058#
 - iv. 2058#
 - v. 2
 - Cancel redirect phone line in L2 BMO as follows:
 - i. Press Left arrow icon
 - ii. Press Tick icon
 - iii. 21825770 SAC
 - iv. 21830061 & 21825767 BMO
 - v. 21825771 RBAS
- h) All the service providers should be vacated and returned to their own control offices for carrying out their normal duties continuously.
- i) Report to Airport Duty Manager (ADM) when operation at BMO is ready

10.5.5 Resumption of IAC Operation

- a) Before the stand-down of contingency functioning in BMO, SOO IAC-ABD shall deploy OO to IAC (1xMICS, 1x BBIT, 1Xsac, 1Xrbas and 1x RMU) to activate all the operation systems including the communication equipment, and commence the functioning at IAC.
- b) Once the operation in IAC-ABD is ready, redirect the fax line 22612058 from BMO back to IAC as follows:

- Use the any control phone
 - i. Dial 9 26262626
 - ii. 3
 - iii. 22612058#2058#
 - iv. Select 1
 - v. 21825900
 - vi. Hang up
 - Redirect the phone lines to the corresponding phone line from BMO back to IAC as follows:
 - i. Right arrow icon
 - ii. Press “Tick” icon
 - iii. Press Phone number
 - iv. Press “Tick”
- c) Log-off standby workstation at BMO.
- d) The remaining OOs in BMO return to IAC.

Airport Authority Hong Kong Integrated Airport Centre Manual



10.6 Fallback procedure for IAC-APM

10.6.1 When the fallback procedure is activated, operations of IAC-APM will be moved to the Center Control Room (CCR) at 1ND017 at L1 APM Depot to maintain all of its functions and communication between all decentralized backup operation centers.

10.6.2 APM & Baggage Department is responsible for the management, system provision and operation procedure of the CCR. Latest update of the equipment list and redundancy level shall be referred to APM & Baggage Department. The equipment list at the CCR is as follows:

<i>Equipment/System</i>	<i>Location</i>
Smart CCTV	CCR
SCADA System	CCR
ATS Line Overview	CCR
SPL Central ATS Workstation	CCR
T1L/RRL Central ATS Workstation	CCR
SPL PSD Monitoring System	CCR
T1L PSD Monitoring System	CCR
RRL PSD Monitoring System	CCR
IPPA Console	CCR
Phone Lines	CCR
Emergency button	CCR

10.6.3 Procedure of changeover

To implement the changeover process, the reference procedure is as below:

- a. APMOC shall inform APM Maintenance Controller (APMMC) and APM Assistant Duty Manager (APMAM) before changeover of control from IAC to CCR.

- b. APMOC shall activate “System Hold” in ATS; Broadcast pre-recorded PA to all vehicles to inform passengers about the suspension of APM service.
- c. APMOC shall relinquish ATS control and then log off the ATS workstations.
- d. APMAM and APMOC shall carry his/her duty mobile phone and TMR when leaving from IAC.
- e. APMAM shall arrange the transportation for APMOC from IAC to CCR immediately. APMAM shall request SOCC to:

Redirect the SPL Console1 phone line 2181-6054 to 2183-9787
Redirect the T1L Console2 phone line 2181-6055 to 2183-9694
Redirect the RRL Console3 phone line 2181-6056 to 2183-9883
Redirect the APMAM Console4 phone line 2181-6057 to 6289-1297
Redirect the APM Emergency Tunnel phone line 2188-9120 to 2183-9883

- f. When APMOC arrives CCR, the control of APM shall be transferred from IAC to CCR by logging in the ATS workstation.
- g. APMOC shall then inform APM and Baggage Duty Manager (ABDM) or his/her delegate and APMMC that the changeover from IAC to CCR is successful thus the operation control of APM system from CCR will be started.
- h. APMAM shall inform Airport Duty Manager that the changeover from IAC to CCR is successful thus the operation control of APM system will be started
- i. Before resuming the APM operation control, APMOC must obtain confirmation from ABDM or his/her delegate.

10.6.2 Resumption of the APM Operation to IAC

To implement the changeover process, the reference procedure is as below:

- a. APMAM shall remain at least one APMOC to maintain operation at CCR.
- b. APMAM and APMOC shall carry his/her duty mobile phone and TMR when leaving from CCR
- c. APMAM shall arrange the transportation for APMOC from CCR to IAC immediately.
- d. When APMOC arrives IAC, the control of APM shall be transferred from CCR to IAC by logging in the ATS workstation.
- e. APMOC shall then inform APM and Baggage Duty Manager (ABDM) or his/her delegate and APMMC that the changeover from CCR to IAC is successful thus the operation control of APM system will be started.
- f. APMAM shall inform SOCC for the withdrawal of all phone lines redirection.
- g. APMAM shall inform Airport Duty Manager that the changeover from CCR to IAC is successful thus the operation control of APM system will be started.

10.7 Fallback procedure for IAC-TSI/TSS

10.7.1 When the fallback procedure is activated, operations of IAC-TSI/TSS will be moved to the backup centre of Fault Report Team Management Office (FRTMO) at 4Z564 at L4 T1 to maintain all of its functions and communication between all decentralized backup operation centers

10.7.2 Technical Services Infrastructure (TSI) and Technical Services Systems (TSS) are responsible for the management, system provision and operation procedure of the FRTMO. Latest update of the equipment list and redundancy level shall be referred to TSI/TSS.

10.7.3 Relocation of IAC-TSI/TSS to FRTMO

- a) The Superintendent IAC-TSI shall advise the Manager, FR/Assistant Manager, FR that the contingency procedure has been activated. The Manager, FR/Assistant Manager, FR will alert the GM-TSI, GM-TSS and all SMs.
- b) There is no individual fax machine for IAC-TSI/TSS. Fax all information to FRT staff temporarily stationed at FRTMO through fax no. 2183 6587.
- c) Redirect the phone lines of IAC-TSI/TSS to FRTMO as follows:
2183 4422 -> 2183 3412
- d) The Superintendent IAC-TSI/TSS shall log out and shut down all monitoring workstations and consoles at IAC before leaving the facility unsupervised
- e) The Superintendent IAC-TSI/TSS will then redeploy to the FRTMO and maintain contact with the ADM

10.7.4 Resumption of IAC Operation

- a) Upon resumption of the IAC, the Superintendent IAC-TSI/TSS shall deploy to IAC to activate and check all systems and communications equipment.
- b) Once the health-check of IAC-TSI/TSS is confirmed, the Superintendent IAC-TSI/TSS shall advise the Manager, FR/Assistant Manager, FR that the IAC-TSI/TSS has resume normal operations. The Manager, FR/Assistant Manager, FR shall advise the GM, TSI, GM, TSS and all SMs.

- c) Redirect all phone back to IAC-TSI/TSS as follows:
 - 2183 3412 -> 2183 4422
- Use the 2183 4422 telephone set to dial #44

10.8 Fallback procedure for IAC-AVSECO

10.8.1 When the fallback procedure is activated, operations of IAC-AVSECO will be moved to the fallback centre at Terminal Department Management Office (TDMO) at 3E014C at L3 T1 to maintain most of its functions and communication between all decentralized fallback operation centers. This fallback procedure is provided by AVSECO.

10.8.2 AVSECO is responsible for the management, system provision and operation procedure of the TDMO. Latest update of the equipment list and redundancy level shall be referred to AVSECO. The equipment list at the TDMO is as follows (the locations of systems at TDMO are shown in Illustration. 8):

<i>Equipment /System</i>	<i>Location</i>
AC2000	TDMO
PIDS	TDMO
MDAS	TDMO
CCTV (Milestone)	TDMO
APM VCA System	TDMO
PABX Systems	TDMO
RMU	HQ-AAD (deployed by IAC officer)

10.8.3 a) Action Card: Partial or Full Decentralization of IAC – AVSECO

This Action Card should be enforced in the event of a Partial or Full Decentralization is required of the Integrated Airport Centre (IAC) due to:

- Power Failure in IAC;
- Security System(s) Breakdown in IAC;
- In the event of a Fire in IAC; or
- Security reasons under any other unforeseen circumstances which would lead to a partial or full evacuation of IAC.

b) Actions:

- Duty Security Controller (DSC) at IAC shall alert Duty Security Manager (DSM) whether partial or full evacuation is required due to reasons stated above;
- Upon DSM's instruction to activate the IAC Decentralization Plan, notify AVSECO Senior Management and all Command Posts;
- Inform AAD Command Post or Transport Unit to send transports to IAC to assist in the decentralization actions as stated below for partial or full evacuations of the IAC.

10.8.4 Partial Evacuation of IAC:

a) DSC shall:

- Alert DSM, HKP, C&ED, ImmD & all Command Posts when partial decentralization starts;
- Upon arrival of the transport at IAC, send the Deputy Duty Security Controller (DDSC) or Assistant Duty Security Controller (ADSC) and the ACS or IDSS controller to the designated backup point at Room 3E014C (TDMO) at L3 taking with them the TAD, AAD, TRA TMR/Radio.

b) DDSC or ADSC shall:

- Upon arrival at the backup point, switch on all equipment and confirm their serviceability, otherwise, assistance from AA maintenance staff should immediately be requested;
- Open an Incident Log to record actions taken until stand down order from DSM or AVSECO Senior Management is received.

c) DSM shall:

- Take up position in the backup location to monitor the transition of staff and AVSECO operations. Deploy any resources if required to ensure operational effectiveness is maintained at both locations (IAC and backup location) until partial decentralization alert is called off;
- Instruct DSC to notify all concerned parties when a stand-down message is received.

10.8.5 Full Evacuation of IAC:

a) DSC shall:

- Alert DSM, HKP, C&ED, ImmD and all Command Posts when full decentralization starts;
- Upon arrival of the transport at IAC, initially send the DDSC or ADSC and the ACS or IDSS controller to the backup location at Room 3E014C (TDMO) at L3 taking with them all TMR/Radio;

- Call AA – IT at 2182 0030 and request to forward the IAC fixed landline numbers to the backup location as stated below:

<u>Current IAC Numbers</u>		<u>Forward to L3 TDMO Numbers</u>	
1.	2183 9074 (PABX I)	1.	2187 4121
2.	2183 9078 (PABX II)	2.	2187 4121
3.	2182 0036 (ACS)	3.	2182 5936
4.	2182 0056 (IDSS)	4.	2188 1528
5.	2182 0095 (Fax line)	5.	2182 5995
6.	2183 4413	6.	2188 1527
7.	2183 4412	7.	9869 5900


- Together with the remaining staff, bring the DSC mobile phone, collect the emergency box (containing HQ access cards, control PASSES and DMD vital keys) from the safe and proceed to the backup location by an additional transport provided by AAD or Transport Unit.
- b) DDSC or ADSC shall:
- Upon arrival at the backup location, switch on all equipment and confirm their serviceability, otherwise immediate request for AA maintenance staff assistance is to be made;
 - Open an Incident Log to record actions taken until stand down order from DSM or AVSECO Senior Management is received;
- c) DSM shall:
- Take up position at the backup location to monitor the transition of staff and AVSECO operations. Deploy any resources if required to ensure operational effectiveness is maintained;
 - Proceed to AEC if activated or deploy AVSECO resources to deal with such emergency situations to ensure the integrity of the HKIA security operations;
 - Instruct DSC to notify all parties concerned when a stand-down message of full decentralization of IAC is received;
 - Apprise the Senior Management of the situation from time to time.

10.8.6 Stand Down:

- When IAC resumes operational, all staff will return to IAC in similar arrangement but in a reverse order.
- DSC to notify all parties concerned when a stand-down message of full decentralization of IAC is received.

Illustration. 8

The Current Setting of AVSECO Backup Centre



10.9 Fallback procedure for IAC-ITD

10.9.1 When the fallback procedure is activated, operations of IAC-ITD will be moved to the System Operation Control Centre (SOCC) at L3 T1 adjacent to the TDMO to maintain all of its functions and communication between all decentralized backup operation centers.

10.9.2 IT Department is responsible for the management, system provision and operation procedure of the SOCC. Latest update of the equipment list and redundancy level shall be referred to IT Department. The equipment list at the SOCC is as follows (the locations of systems at SOCC is shown in Illustration. 9):

<i>Equipment /System</i>	<i>Location</i>
CCTV Monitoring Console	SOCC
CR Activities Monitoring Console	SOCC
ANMS Workstation	SOCC
FIDS MMI Workstation	SOCC
FIDS Contingency Workstation	SOCC
APABX Workstation	SOCC
UDS Administration Console	SOCC
ACIS Workstation	SOCC
ACS Workstation	SOCC
IVRS Workstation	SOCC
TRMICS Workstation	SOCC
BMS Workstation	SOCC
WEMS Monitoring Workstation	SOCC
Out-of-Band Network Management Workstation	SOCC

10.9.3 Relocation of IAC-ITD to SOCC

- a) IAC-ITD AM, Systems Operations must inform Manager, System Operations that IAC contingency plan is activated.
- b) IAC-ITD Duty Officers (SDO), if feasible, should send out EMM messages to alert IT management for IAC-ITD evacuation.
- c) During the period of IAC closure, IAC-ITD operation will be relocated to the SOCC at T1. Essential documents and tools are maintained at the SOCC to conduct the contingency operations.
- d) Duplicates of operations systems (FIDS, AODB, BHS, BMS, IVRS, VADI, AANET, WEMS, UDS and CR Facility Management), network and communications equipment are installed at the SOCC
- e) Activate SOCC TMR to join TMR Channel – “ITD-SOCC” in order to maintain TMR Communication with ADM.
- f) If the phone services of IAC are STILL operable and accessible,
 - Redirect the phone lines of IAC-IT to Backup SOCC as follows:
 - i. 2182 0031 -> 9020 6372
 - ii. 2182 0029 -> 2182 0030
 - iii. 2183 4423 -> 2182 5929
 - Use the 2182 0031 telephone set to dial *15 9 90206372
 - Use the 2182 0029 telephone set to dial *15 20030
 - Use the 2183 4423 telephone set to dial *15 25929
- g) If the fax and phone services of IAC are NOT operable and accessible, follow the master IAC phone contingency procedures.
- h) Remarks: SDO should also execute the master IAC phone contingency procedures to facilitate other IAC functions' contingency operations.
- i) AM, System Operations if feasible, should deploy duty officers to activate the standby equipment at SOCC and take over the operations before the closure of IAC-ITD
- j) SDO, if feasible, should log out and shut down all monitoring workstations and consoles at IAC before leaving the facility unsupervised.
- k) AM, System Operations should keep the SOCC mobile phone (9020-6372) on at all times in order to facilitate full communication with all interested parties, including ADM, IT management, Sub-Centre Line Management and Technical Support Leaders.

- l) AM, System Operations should inform the next SOCC Duty Team to report duty at SOCC immediately.

10.9.4 Resumption of IAC operation


- a) Before the stand-down of SOCC, AM, System Operations should deploy SDO to IAC to activate and check all systems and communications equipment, and start commencing the operations functions at IAC.
- b) Once the health-check of IAC-ITD is confirmed, AM, System Operations must inform Manager, Systems Operations that IAC-ITD will resume normal operations.
- c) If the phone services of IAC were STILL operable and accessible before the closure of IAC
 - Redirect all phone back to IAC-SOCC as follows:
 - i. 9020 6372 -> 2182 0031
 - ii. 2182 0030 -> 2182 0029
 - iii. 2182 5929 -> 2183 4423
 - Use the 2182 0031 telephone set to dial #15
 - Use the 2182 0030 telephone set to dial #15
 - Use the 2182 5929 telephone set to dial #15
- d) If the phone services of IAC were NOT operable and accessible before the closure of IAC, follow the master IAC phone recovery procedures.
- e) Remarks: SDO should also execute the master IAC phone Recovery procedures to resume other IAC functions' normal operations back to IAC.
- f) Activate SOCC TMR and confirm the TMR Channel – "ITD-SOCC"
- g) AM, System Operations must inform IT Management that IAC has resumed normal operations and SDO to notify other IT colleagues via EMM.

10.9.5 Interface with Other Operational Organizations during Contingency

- a) ARNIC for BMS and ACIS support
- b) ADS(ARINC) for FIDS displays support
- c) SOCC for BHS support

- d) ITS(PCCW) for CR Facility management
- e) ATS(HKT) for APABX support
- f) ARINC for analog phone support at check-in counter and boarding gate.
- g) Other external vendors and suppliers for hardware and Software support

Illustration 9.



Appendix 1

Fire Safety Inspection Checklist (SAMPLE)

Name of Fire Warden: _____ Date of Inspection: _____

*Tick ☒ as appropriate

Item	Description	*Yes	*No	*N/A
	<u>Fire Prevention</u>			
1	No improper handling of flammable material			
2	No electrical fire hazard such as misuse of multi or extension socket, obstruction of exhaust vent etc			
3	No smoking inside the building except in designated outdoor smoking areas			
	<u>Emergency Evacuation</u>			
4	Evacuation Escape Plan & Fire Evacuation Plan are prominently displayed			
5	No obstruction to the means of escape			
6	No obstruction to the emergency EXIT door			
7	Emergency lightings and EXIT signs are properly functioned and maintained			
8	No defective lighting inside the staircase			
9	Emergency EXIT door/Smoke door always kept closed but not locked			

Airport Authority Hong Kong
Integrated Airport Centre Manual

Item	Description	*Yes	*No	*N/A
	<u>Fire Suppression & Detection System</u>			
10	The fire alarm call point is easily accessed			
11	No obstruction to fire hose reels			
12	No obstruction to smoke detectors/heat detectors			
13	No obstruction to sprinkler heads (minimum of clearance 0.5m)			
14	No obstruction to fire extinguishers			
15	The type of fire extinguisher is appropriate to the nature of occupancy			
16	Fire extinguishers are prominently located and properly maintained			
	<u>Fire & Smoke Confinement</u>			
17	No obstruction to the smoke curtain			
18	No obstruction to the fire shutter/horizontal sliding shutter			
19	No unauthorized alteration, installation or dismantling of fire rated partitions or emergency EXIT door according to the submitted floor plan			
20	No damage of fire rated partitions or emergency EXIT door			

Appendix 2

Summary of Phone /Fax Numbers for forwarding during Decentralization

Department	Phone / Fax no.	Phone / Fax no. in IAC	Phone / Fax no. in Fallback Center
TOD	Dispatcher activation	21818110	2181 8110
TRC	CICA phone line	21822019	2183 5240
TRC	PA line	21822074	2182 5974
	TOD phone line	21820055	2182 5955
	TOD phone line	21820059	2182 5954
	Fax Line	21822075	2182 5961
	Fax Line	21822061	2182 5961
LD	Dispatcher activation	21818118	2181 8118
	LD phone line	21820054	2182 0057
	Fax Line	21832277	2182 9118
	Berthing Control phone line	21839075	2183 2030
AD (ACC)	FIDS	21822064	2182 5964
	FIDS	21822065	2182 5965
	Fax Line	29101107	2183 7359
	S&SD	21834402	6391 7126 / 6398 3975
AVSECO	Dispatcher activation	21839074	2187 4121
	AVSECO	21820036	2182 5936
	AVSECO	21820056	2188 1528
	AVSECO	21834413	2188 1527
	AVSECO	21834412	9869 5900
	Dispatcher activation	21839078	2187 4121
	Fax Line	21822095	2182 5995
SOCC	SOCC	21820029	2182 5929
	SOCC	21820030	2182 5930
	SOCC	21820031	9020 6372
TSD	TSD	21834422	2183 3412
ABD	ABD	21825770	2183 0061 / 2182 5767
	Fax Line	21825900	2261 2058
APM	APM SPL	21816054	2183 9883
	APM T1L	21816055	2183 9879
	APM RRL	21816056	6289 1297
	APM AM	21816057	6289 1297
	Emergency Tunnel phone line	2188 9120	2183 9883
AEC	AEC phone line	2182 0088	2188 7350 (T1 Training Centre 5Z539) 218 87489 (HKIAT Rm 3A)

Appendix 3

Integrated Airport Centre Fire Evacuation Plan



Integrated Airport Centre Fire Evacuation Plan

機場中央控制中心火警疏散計劃

This Fire Evacuation Plan is to be followed in the event of a fire in the Integrated Airport Centre
若機場中央控制中心發生火警，所有人士須依照以下計劃疏散：

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. IF YOU DISCOVER A FIRE
發現火警時： | 2. IF YOU HEAR A FIRE ALARM
聽到火警鐘響起： |
| 1.1 Remain calm.
保持鎮定。 | 2.1 Remain calm.
保持鎮定。 |
| 1.2 Alert others by shouting "FIRE" and activate fire alarm by breaking the nearest fire alarm call point.
大叫火警以通知他人，敲碎就近火警鐘的玻璃。 | 2.2 Leave your workplace via the nearest exit and follow the instructions given by the Fire Warden and evacuate to the designated assembly point.
利用就近的出口離開工作地點，依照消防糾察的指示，疏散至指定的集合點。 |
| 1.3 Dial '999' to report the fire to the Fire Services Department.
致電 999 通知消防處發生火警。 | 2.3 Never use the lift.
切勿使用升降機。 |
| 1.4 If you are trained and it is SAFE to do so, try to tackle the fire using available firefighting equipment.
若你曾接受訓練，在安全情況下，可嘗試利用現場的消防設備滅火。 | 2.4 To stop the spread of fire/smoke, close doors behind you when you leave the building.
逃離大樓時應關上你走過的門，防止火勢／煙霧蔓延。 |
| 1.5 Never use water to tackle electrical fire.
切勿用水撲滅電器引起的火警。 | 2.5 Report any missing person to the Evacuation Coordinator at the assembly point.
若有人失蹤，於集合點向疏散協調員報告。 |
| 1.6 If the fire becomes uncontrolled, evacuate immediately via the nearest exit.
若火勢不受控制，立即利用就近出口逃離現場。 | 2.6 Do not re-enter the building until it is declared safe to do so by the Evacuation Coordinator.
離開後不應再次進入大樓，直至疏散協調員宣布大樓安全為止。 |

The Airport Authority will provide safety advice to all occupants. Occupants must report any potential fire hazard to AA Manager, Safety Compliance
(Tel: 2183 3117, fax: 2182 2188)

機場管理局為所有租戶提供有關安全的意見。若租戶發現潛在火警危險，須通知本局的安全審查經理（電話號碼：2183 3117；傳真號碼：2182 2188）。

