Business Continuity Manual

Business Continuity Plan: F2

Elevated Security Threat Response

		Signature	Revision	Effective Date
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A. ELEVATED SECURITY THREAT RESPONSE

1.0 Introduction

1. ICAO requires each Contracting State to adjust its security response according to the level of threat to civil aviation within its territory.
2. Based on the Risk Management Matrix of the ICAO Security Manual, with a view to adjusting the security responses for threat targeted at the airport, aircraft operators or high risk flights under different threat levels, a Civil Aviation Risk Management Plan (CARMP) for the HKIA has been developed. As part of the Hong Kong Aviation Security Programme, the CARMP serves as the sole reference indicator of threat level and corresponding countermeasures at the HKIA.
3. In the context of the CARMP, a high risk flight refers to a flight of a specific aircraft operator and / or to a destination which, based on intelligence from the Police, may be subject to a higher threat.
4. The CARMP adopts the 6-level threat system, as used by the Police. Under the Hong Kong Aviation Security Programme, the Police are responsible for the threat assessments. Where there is information to suggest that a credible threat exists to civil aviation in Hong Kong, the Police shall advise the Aviation Security Authority and Civil Aviation Department (CAD) accordingly.
5. When threat level is “negligible”, the security measures form the baseline responses on which more stringent security measures are built upon. To meet the raised levels of threat, for implementation at the centralised screening checkpoints prior to entering the sterile area, tighter security measures are proposed. Further enhancements to security responses are then adopted at departure gates to meet the specific levels of threat for high risk flights.
6. The security controls adopted under the different threat levels in the CARMP only set out the minimum requirements of the Aviation Security Authority. To further secure their operations, this does not prevent the airport manager or aircraft operators from tightening security controls as they may think fit.
7. To supplement the CARMP, the AA has developed its own internal HKIA AVSEC Risk Management Plan (HKIARMP), which, during any period of elevated threat, provides additional guidance and reference as to the additional measures that may be necessary. The HKIARMP is a four level threat response system, adopting the colour code of Green, Amber, Red and Black. The purpose of this document is to (1) allow the AA to adjust security measures at the HKIA pursuant to its own threat assessment in circumstances where, under the CARMP, no adjustment of the threat level is deemed necessary; and / or (2) allow the AA to supplement measures already contained under the CARMP with additional measures. The HKIARMP is included in this document as item G.
8. To identify the threat, according to Police’s specific intelligence, joint meetings will be convened and will, through consultation with Police, AA, AVSECO, aircraft operators and their handling agents as appropriate, decide on additional security controls that may be required.

2.0 Definitions

1. The threat levels in the CARMP are defined as follows:
    a. **Negligible:** A target is unlikely to be attacked;
    b. **Low:** There is nothing to indicate that a target would be singled out for an attack;
    c. **Moderate:** A target's circumstances indicate that there is potential for it to be singled out for attack;
    d. **Significant:** Recent general intelligence on terrorist activity, the overall security and political climate, or the target's general circumstances indicate that it is likely to be a priority target;
    e. **High:** Specific intelligence, recent events or a target's particular circumstances indicate that it is likely to be a high priority; and
    f. **Imminent:** Specific intelligence shows that a target is at a very high level of threat.
2. Under the HKIARMP threat levels are defined as follows:-
    a. **Green:** Equivalent to Negligible / Low;
    b. **Amber:** Equivalent to Moderate;
    c. **Red:** Equivalent to Significant; and
    d. **Black**: Equivalent to High / Imminent.

3.0 Objectives

1. To establish alerting channels for all internal / external affected parties;
2. To formalise the processes under which tightened security measures, in accordance with respective threat levels, are implemented; and
3. Under such circumstances, establish clear lines of command and co-ordination between organisations working in support of airport operations.

4.0 Alerting

Under normal circumstances, any escalation or de-escalation of the Threat Alert Level will be declared by the Aviation Security Authority, or CAD as delegated by it.

B. ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES

1.0 Aviation Security Authority / CAD

The Aviation Security Authority or CAD will convene joint meetings to decide, in consultation with Police, AA, AVSECO, aircraft operators and their handling agents, on additional security controls that may be required.

2.0 Airport Authority

1. In support of the Police, and to ensure safety and to minimise the impact of any incident on airport operations, oversee the safety of all operations at the airport and coordinate additional security controls by AVSECO, airport operators and aircraft operators; and
2. Where appropriate, conduct its own risk assessment and apply additional measures as contained in the HKIARMP.

3.0 Police

1. Conduct a threat assessment, and provide its assessment and advice to the Aviation Security Authority.
2. Where Police resources are deployed, the Police's most senior officer present shall have command and control of that aspect of the operation, and may summon representatives from other airport organisations to assist him / her in co-ordinating the additional security controls.
3. During an Imminent Threat Alert Level, in the interests of public safety, the Police may override the rights and privileges that the owner of a facility, or tenant, may otherwise enjoy. Under such circumstances, the owner of the facility, or tenant, shall act in support of the Police, until such time as the incident is stood down and control of the facility is returned to them.

C. ADDITIONAL SECURITY CONTROLS

1.0 Implementation

1. When an Imminent Threat Alert Level is declared by the Aviation Security Authority, or CAD as delegated by it, at the screening checkpoints prior to the Enhanced Security Restricted Area, additional security controls including but not limited to the following may be implemented with immediate effect:
   a. Increased use of pat-down search;

b. Increased hand search of passengers and crew cabin baggage and / or other restrictions, such as the prohibition of carry-on bags or handbags except for limited items e.g. passport, wallet, electronic paraphernalia and prescribed medicines essential for the duration of the flight etc.;

c. Explosive trace detection screening of all laptops and other electronic paraphernalia; and

d. Enhanced vehicle search.

2. Any persons not complying with the additional security controls will not be accepted for entry into the Enhanced Security Restricted Area.

D. INFORMATION DISSEMINATION AND MEDIA HANDLING

1. The Secretariat Press Office shall, in consultation with the Information Services Department, Police Public Relations Branch and AA Corporate Affairs Department, co-ordinate all media enquiries relating to the incident; and
2. All press or media enquiries to the AA regarding any such incident should be referred to the Senior Manager, Media Relations, who will liaise with the Secretariat Press Office for an appropriate response.

E. STAND-DOWN OF ALERT

When the Aviation Security Authority is satisfied that the threat level to civil aviation in Hong Kong has decreased, and additional security controls responses are no long required, it shall stand down the alert. Parties will be notified in accordance with alerting arrangements as per section A.4.0 above.

F. AIRPORT AUTHORITY AIRPORT EMERGENCY CENTRE

1.0 Implementation

1. As result of any elevated threat, and if substantial impact(s) is caused or expected to be caused to normal airport operations, the Airport Emergency Centre (AEC) will be activated by the Airport Duty Manager;
2. To facilitate the emergency responses and rapid restoration of the airport to normal operations, the Airport Emergency Centre, located inside the Integrated Airport Centre (IAC), adjacent to Airport Gate 1, (Plan 10 Airport Grid Map C-25), will be activated during an airport emergency, and function as an off-scene central point of command and co-ordination for the Police, AA, government departments, AVSECO, aircraft operators, handling agents and airport operators;

3. The Airport Emergency Centre will be staffed by the Airport Duty Manager and initially the IAC Duty Teams, until they are relieved by the support team from Safety, Security and Business Continuity Department; and
4. The operations of the Airport Emergency Centre will be supported as necessary, by representatives of: aircraft operators / handling agents concerned; AVSECO; Airline Operators Committee (AOC); Hong Kong Airline Service Providers Association (HASPA); Police; AA Corporate Affairs Department; Information Services Department; Airline's Ramp Handling Franchisee; Airline's Line Maintenance Franchisee; and AA Technical Services Infrastructure Department.

G. HKIA AVSEC RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN

Scope:

1. Protection of Airport Restricted Area;
2. Protection of the Enhanced Security Restricted Area;
3. Aircraft Security;
4. Hold Baggage Security;
5. Air Cargo, Courier & Express Parcels and Mail Security;
6. Aircraft Catering Security; and
7. Landside Security


1. Protection of the Airport Restricted Area
GREEN
AMBER
RED
BLACK
Physical Security (Airfield)
• Airport Gate Houses
• ARA perimeter fence & 3-meters clearance zone
• Security perimeter lighting
• Perimeter Intrusion Detection System
• Perimeter CCTV
• Metal grills for storm drainage
• Security Mobile Patrol Programme & incident response
• AVSECO to deploy 1 additional patrol vehicle on North Perimeter
• AVSECO to increase security patrols & checks of security seals of ventilation shafts & air ducts at landside/airside interface
• AVSECO to dedicate CCTV for active surveillance of strategic locations at North Perimeter
• AVSECO to step up security patrols of vulnerable points which should include but not limited to landside/airside storm drainage outfall; ARA/TRA interfaces; utility stations
• AVSECO to patrol on passenger apron
• AVSECO to guard exit lanes at MFS & MFN checkpoints
Physical Security (Terminal 1)
• Physical partition of landside/airside interface
• Passenger, aircrew & airport staff access channels
• Motion Detection Alarm System & Infra Red Alarm System
• Security Guarding Programme & incident response
• AVSECO to deploy 1 additional guard at T1 staff entry points
• AVSECO to step up crowd control management / tactics at PAX screening checkpoints
• AVSECO to increase security patrols & checks of security seals of ventilation shafts & air ducts at landside/airside interface
Access Control
• ARA Permits for airport staff
• ARA Vehicle Permits
• Aircrew documentation checks (CMC/Airline ID cards)
• Passenger boarding pass checks at designated passenger entry points
• Suspend issue of & using Visitor Pass


2. Protection of the Enhanced Security Restricted Area
GREEN
AMBER
RED
BLACK
Airport Staff, Aircrew, Vehicles & Goods
• 100% screening of airport staff & belongings at designated screening channels
• 100% screening of aircrew and crew baggage at designated screening channels
• 100% screening of all authorized goods at designated screening channels
Airport Staff & Crew
• Overall AMD alarm rate 15%
• Random hand search rate 3%
• Subject 3% of notebook computers to ETD
Vehicle Control
• 100% search of vehicles except for those vehicles authorized under Sealed Vehicle Protocol
• Access control of vehicles to South Loading Dock
Airport Staff & Crew
• Overall AMD alarm rate 20%
• Random hand search rate 5%
• Subject >10% of notebook computers to ETD
Vehicle Control
• 100% search of vehicles except for subject 25% of sealed vehicles authorized under Sealed Vehicle Protocol to searching
• Access control of vehicles to South Loading Dock
• Enhanced vehicle security searches at Airport Gate Houses and Midfield Screening Points:
➢ 100% underneath vehicle checks;
➢ Deployment of dedicated vehicle search team (to rotate between GH1, 2 & 3)
Airport Staff & Crew
• Overall AMD alarm rate 30%
• Random hand search rate 10%
• Reasoned secondary search to be conducted by HAND
• Subject >10% of notebook computers to ETD
Vehicle Control
• Vehicle security searches – same as RED except 100% search of vehicles

2. Protection of the Enhanced Security Restricted Area

Passengers & Cabin Baggage Screening

GREEN	AMBER	RED	BLACK
	• 100% screening of passengers at designated screening channels • 100% screening of cabin baggage at designated screening channels		
• Overall AMD alarm rate 15% • Random hand search of passengers 3%	• Overall AMD alarm rate 15% • Random hand search of passengers 3% • In addition to reasoned secondary search, random hand search of cabin baggage 6% • Subject 3% of notebook computers to ETD	• Overall AMD alarm rate 20% • Random hand search of passengers 5% • In addition to reasoned secondary search, random hand search of cabin baggage 10% • Subject >10% of notebook computers to ETD	• Overall AMD alarm rate 30% • All reasoned secondary search to ne conducted by HAND • Random hand search of passengers 10% • In addition to reasoned secondary search, random hand search of cabin baggage 20% • Subject ALL electrical items to ETD • One cabin baggage per passenger • 100% screening of PAX shoes
	For High-risk Flights • Aircraft Operator to conduct additional hand search of 10% of passengers and cabin baggage at the boarding gate	For High-risk Flights • Aircraft Operator to conduct additional hand search of 10% of passengers and cabin baggage at the boarding gate	For High-risk Flights • At boarding gate, Aircraft Operator to screen again: ➢ All PAX by hand; or by HHMD with 20% of the HHMD screened PAX subject to hand search ➢ All cabin baggage by hand; or by X-ray with 20% of cabin baggage which has been X-ray screened subject to hand search


2. Protection of the Enhanced Security Restricted Area
GREEN
AMBER
RED
BLACK
Segregation of Screened and Unscreened Passengers
Terminal
• Segregation of Departures and Arrivals passengers on separate levels
• Passengers & aircrew of Quick Return Flight are subject to security screening at Transfer Channels before re-entering the Departures Level
Apron
• Active management of passenger movement by Aircraft Operators to prevent mixing
• Suspend operation of passenger flights at Cargo Apron
For High-risk Flights
• AVSECO to escort departure passengers to flight at remote parking bay
Transport
• Separation of APV Departures passengers drop off points
• Separation of APM train for Departures and Arrivals passengers
Lounge boarding gates with APV Arrivals


3. Aircraft Security
GREEN
AMBER
RED
BLACK
Access Control to Aircraft
• Aircraft Operator to ensure that in respect of unattended aircraft, doors are closed, aircraft steps and/or airbridges are withdrawn
• Additional measures as per Aircraft Operator's own risk assessment
For High-risk Flights
• AVSECO to deploy step guards, ramp guards and conduct searches by HHMD
Aircraft Security Checks
• Aircraft Operator or AVSECO to conduct pre-flight security checks prior to passenger boarding
For High-risk Flights
• Aircraft Operator or AVSECO or HKP to conduct aircraft security search prior to passenger boarding


4. Hold Baggage Security
GREEN
AMBER
RED
BLACK
Hold Baggage Screening
• 100% screening of all hold baggage
• Reinforced by TIP insertion rates:
➢ Level 2 : 1%
➢ Level 3 : 0.5%
• 100% screening of all hold baggage
• Reinforced by TIP insertion rates:
➢ Level 2 : 2%
➢ Level 3 : 1%
• 100% screening of all hold baggage
• Reinforced by TIP insertion rates:
➢ Level 2 : 5%
➢ Level 3 : 2%
• Subject 10% of hold baggage to additional screening by one of the following methods:
➢ Explosive Detection Systems; or
➢ Advanced technology where the images of all bags are viewed by the operator; or
➢ Conventional X-ray equipment with each bag being viewed by the same operator at the same screening point; or
➢ Hand search supplemented by application of trace detection equipment on each piece of baggage
For High-risk Flights
• 100% screening by CTX
Hold Baggage Reconciliation
• 100% hold baggage reconciliation by means of ABRS


4. Hold Baggage Security
GREEN
AMBER
RED
BLACK
Unaccompanied Hold Baggage
• 100% screening of all hold baggage with TIP image insertion (i.e. through regular Hold Baggage Screening)
• Aircraft Operator to conduct checks to establish ownership and history of unaccompanied hold baggage's journey and cross check with outstations
• Additional screening of the baggage by one of the following methods:
➢ Explosive Detection Systems; or
➢ Advanced technology where the images of all bags are viewed by the operator; or
➢ Conventional X-ray equipment with each bag being viewed by the same operator at the same screening point; or
➢ Hand search supplemented by application of trace detection equipment on each piece of baggage
• Aircraft Operator to notify the Aircraft Commander that such baggage has been entered onto the Baggage Manifest
For High-risk Flights
• 100% screening by CTX
Mishandled Baggage
• 100% screening of all hold baggage with TIP image insertion (i.e. through regular Hold Baggage Screening)
• Aircraft Operator to conduct checks to establish ownership and history of unaccompanied hold baggage's journey and cross check with outstations
• Subject 10% of hold baggage to additional screening by one of the following methods:
➢ Explosive Detection Systems; or
➢ Advanced technology where the images of all bags are viewed by the operator; or
➢ Conventional X-ray equipment with each bag being viewed by the same operator at the same screening point; or
➢ Hand search supplemented by application of trace detection equipment on each piece of baggage
For High-risk Flights
• 100% screening by CTX


4. Hold Baggage Security
GREEN
AMBER
RED
BLACK
Protection of Hold Baggage
• Aircraft Operator to ensure hold baggage is only accepted from ticketed passengers at designated facilities
• Accepted hold baggage removed from passengers and conveyed to flight laterals by means of BHS / OOG / SkyPier Bonded Road / AEL train as appropriate
• Hold baggage from SkyPier and In-town Check-in delivered to security restricted area at HKIA in sealed containers
• Aircraft Operator to ensure hold baggage is protected from unauthorized interference from flight laterals to aircraft uplift
• AVSECO to deploy guard to surveillance baggage laterals
• Suspend In-town Check-in Facility
For High-risk Flights
• Aircraft Operator to ensure baggage containers to be escorted to aircraft


5. Air Cargo, Courier & Express Parcels and Mail Security
GREEN
AMBER
RED
BLACK
Air Cargo
• 100% X-ray screening on cargo tendered by a consignor other than known consignor assigned for carriage on board commercial aircraft
• 1% random X-ray screening on known cargo originated from known consignor assigned for carriage on board commercial aircraft
• 100% X-ray screening on cargo tendered by a consignor other than known consignor assigned for carriage on board commercial aircraft, and the additional application of a different type of security screening method randomly on 5% such cargo
• 5% random X-ray screening on known cargo originated from known consignor assigned for carriage on board commercial aircraft
For high-risk flights
• subject 100% of cargo to X-ray screening
• the additional application of a different type of security screening method randomly on 10% such cargo
Air Mail
• 100% X-ray screening on air mail


6. Aircraft Catering Security
GREEN
AMBER
RED
BLACK
Aircraft Catering
• Aircraft Operator to ensure aircraft catering supplies are prepared in premises subjected to security controls and are protected from unlawful interference
• Aircraft Operator to ensure aircraft catering supplies are delivered from the catering base to the Airport Restricted Area in sealed vehicles

Landside Security

7. Landside Security

GREEN	AMBER	RED	BLACK
• Daily patrol by Airport Police • Regular patrol by AA Duty staff • CCTV surveillance • TRA Security Programmes • AA facilities secured • Access to South Loading Dock secured • Major facilities secured: 1. Generator Building (GH1) - backup power to T1 2. T1 Chiller Plant Room (inside PTB) 3. Switching Station EX - power to T1S, GTC & APM (near Bus Terminus) 4. Switching Station AD - power to IAC 5. Switching Station D - power to Seawater Pump House 5, Vault A & D for airfield facilities (near DHL expansion) 6. Switching Station H - power to IAC, Seawater Pump House 1, Vaults B & C for airfield facilities (next Seawater Pump House 1 near Gate House 1A) 7. Switching Station T - power to Localizer Bldg., Comms. Room, Traffic Control Surveillance System (next to CLP Substation A) 8. Switching Station S - power to Comms. Room, Traffic Control Surveillance System (next to landside Fire Station)		Terminal 1 • Actively monitor entry points to T1 by means of landside CCTV • Consider to suspend use of automated trolley return uplift (from Car Park 1 to Level 5 Baggage Reclaim Hall at T1) • Deploy security controls at Cheong Tat Road entry point - - Authorized vehicles only • Suspend all vehicles parking at Cheong Tat Road (except emergency service vehicles) • Conduct vehicle screening of all coaches entering Coach Station • Ensure fast removal of unattended vehicles • Locate rubbish bins away from likely terrorist targets and windows; and increase frequency for emptying • AA to increase public announcements on security awareness • AA to encourage airport community to report any suspicious activities	• Restrict access to passengers only • Deploy security at all entry points to T1 to allow entry only to ticketed passengers, aircrew and airport staff. • In support of Police Operations – Deploy traffic chicane on up ramp to Level 8 vehicle drop off kerb at T1 • Suspend use of Coach Station. Redeploy coach operations to remote car park locations • Remote Vehicle Drop Off – Suspend private vehicles accessing T1 via ramp roads

Landside Security



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