# Business Continuity Manual

## Business Continuity Plan: F4

### Suspected CBRN Contaminated Arrival Aircraft Management Procedures

| | | Signature | Revision | Effective Date |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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## A. General

1. These procedures are intended to manage an arriving aircraft suspected to be contaminated with Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) agents.

2. The aims are to enable an integrated response to and management of arrival flights suspected of contamination from CBRN agents.

3. To ensure the safety of airport staff and other responders, major response elements will cover management of the passengers, crew, cabin & checked baggage, cargo, the aircraft itself, and precautionary measures taken.

## B. Airport Authority Emergency Procedures Manual

1. The Emergency Procedures Manual (EPM) has applicable procedures from the :
   a. CBRN Agent Incident Response (EPM Volume 2, Part 9B);
   b. Aircraft Accident Response (EPM Volume 1, Part 2);
   c. Public Health Emergencies Response (EPM Volume 3, Part 13);
   d. These can be built upon to manage an arrival aircraft suspected possibly contaminated by CBRN agents.

2. It was noted that a major principle recommended by ACI and IATA is to implement exit screening at the originating port to avoid contaminated passengers boarding the aircraft in the first place.

3. Major components to be addressed in managing arrival flights suspected of contamination from CBRN agents include :

   a. Alerting & Assessment;
   b. Establish an Enabling Body at Policy Level, e.g. RIAG or PHIAG;
   c. Aircraft Isolation;
   d. Initial Onboard Assessment;
   e. On-site Decontamination of Personnel (Passengers & Crew);
   f. Casualty Management & Conveyance to Hospitals;
   g. Non-hospitalized Persons Post-decontamination Management;
   h. Decontamination of the Aircraft, Cabin and Checked-in Baggage, and Cargo; and
   i. Media Management.

## C. . Response Framework Components

1. Alert & Assessment

   a. An alert is expected to come in, either via the aircraft, the aircraft operator’s ground center, or from the ATC;

   b. Once alerted, a government advisory group will be formed to take charge of the incident at the policy level;

c. In accordance with the CBRN response procedures, RIAG (CB**R**N **I**ncident **A**dvisory **G**roup) may be formed to take on the role of the government's advisory group;

d. If RIAG is not necessary, because the incident does not contain a security issue, then PHIAG (**P**ublic **H**ealth **I**ncident **A**dvisory **G**roup) will be convened, and its operational procedures implemented;

e. At the airport operational level, the AEC will be activated, and manage the incident; and

f. Depending on whether RIAG or PHIAG is formed, the AEC activation will include CBRN or Public Health Incident alerting proforma.

2. Aircraft Isolation & Screening

a. In the AEC, amongst the relevant departmental representatives, AA, aircraft operator, ramp operator, Police, FSD/AFC, ImmD, C&ED, Port Health, etc. coordination and decision making will take place;

b. Existing infectious diseases and CBRN procedures involving the use of the Isolated Aircraft Parking Position are to be implemented;

c. When the situation warrants, other isolated aircraft parking positions, as used in past incidents, between M1 and M2 at Maintenance & Long Term Parking Apron, will also be considered; and

d. In decontamination waste water management, existing communication links with Drainage Department/etc. are to be used.

3. Initial Onboard Assessment of Passengers & Crew

a. In the AEC, amongst the relevant departmental representatives (e.g. AA, aircraft operator, ramp operator, Police, FSD/AFC, ImmD, C&ED, Port Health, etc., coordination and decision making will take place;

b. If the incident involves RIAG and the existing CBRN procedures, then the Police EOD personnel will make onsite assessments;

c. Existing CBRN procedures have FSD responsible for the decontamination of the: area; equipment; baggage; cargo; aircraft; and structures; and

d. If the incident involves PHIAG, then Port Health personnel will conduct onboard assessments, and the existing infectious diseases procedures will be activated.

4. Onsite Passenger & Crew Decontamination

a. In the AEC, amongst the relevant departmental representatives (e.g. AA, aircraft operator, ramp operator, Police, FSD/AFC, ImmD, C&ED, Port Health, etc.), coordination and decision making will take place;

b. As per existing CBRN procedures, if necessary, onsite passenger and crew decontaminations will be carried out by FSD;

c. At the airport, transportation resources for passenger and crew are finite;

d. Additional transportation resources may need to be drawn upon;

e. Additional resources and procedures as per issued on 31st March 2011 by AS(ESU)2, Security Bureau, may be requested:

   i. New procedures set out the call out procedure for Government Logistics Department (GLD) medium coaches, and CAS members to assist FSD in carrying out decontamination in the HKIA;

   ii. To perform passenger voluntary radiation monitoring, AMS will man the Health Desk in the arrival hall of HKIA, at the APV-South Arrival and notify FSD FSCC of the presence of any abnormal case;

   iii. Upon notification of an abnormal case, FSCC , will call out the decontamination equipment;

   iv. When notified of an abnormal case, at the same time as requesting the decontamination equipment, FSCC are responsible to call out GLD coaches and CAS volunteers;

   v. For the transportation of contaminated travelers, GLD will provide medium coaches;

   vi. CAS will provide volunteers to escort contaminated travelers;

   vii. To shorten the response time, GLD has arranged a driver to be on duty round the clock and the first coach can arrive at the HKIA in about 1.5 hours. As part of a predetermined turn-out, apart from the first coach, GLD will arrange another coach, which can normally arrive at the HKIA within 3 hours. On a needs basis, additional coaches, subject to availability, may be called out;

   viii. FSCC will obtain the mobile telephone numbers of the GLD drivers and CAS team leader and, for the direct deployment of the resources, convey these numbers to the FSD Incident Commander;

   ix. In case of urgency and prior to the arrival of GLD's transport, or due to other operational needs, the buses of AA and AFC will be on stand-by;

   x. The AA bus will provide transport from the medical post manned by AMS at APV-South Arrival to on-site decontamination point set up by FSD at S6, the ground equipment staging area;

   xi. The AFC bus will provide transport duty from FSD's on-site decontamination point at S6, ground equipment staging area, to the designated hospital, as advised by DH; and

   xii. In accordance with Para. 7.12 of the Daya Bay Contingency Plan (DBCP) Part I, as issued by SB, in respect of injured and contaminated travelers, they will be conveyed by ambulances.

d. In order to lessen the chances of secondary contamination of their surroundings, e.g. inside transport vehicles and at indoor waiting areas, as well as secondary contamination to other responders, Port Health

may consider, when transporting them from various response sites, to suit up contaminated persons with PPE .

5. Post-Decontamination of Passenger & Crew

   a. This is a critical issue requiring multi-departmental coordination, as after going through the decontamination process, since all clothing and other personal properties that were on their persons would have been bagged as contaminated articles, all passengers & crew will have no money and identification ;

   b. After completing the onsite decontamination process, passengers and crew still showing signs of contamination will be transported to hospitals. Transportation arrangements are as per procedures issued by SB on the 31st of March 2011;

   c. After the decontamination process, passengers and crew showing a clean state will need to be looked after at the Passenger Reception Center (PRC);

   d. These passengers and crew will be wearing nothing except the post-decontamination gown (coveralls) and will have no ID's, no money, no glasses, no house keys, no mobile phones, etc.;

   e. To assist CIQ (Customs, Immigration & Quarantine) processes as well as to assist involved aircraft operators to provide humanitarian assistance to their passengers and crew, the Passenger Reception Center (PRC) will be activated; and

   f. As and when necessary, to assist aircraft operators to look after the affected meeters and greeters of involved passengers, the Family Reception Center (FRC) will be activated.

6. Decontamination of Aircraft, Cabin and Hold Baggage & Cargo

   a. For the cleaning of the aircraft exterior, aircraft cabins, cargo and cargo holds, as well as passengers' cabin and hold baggage, as necessary, the existing infectious diseases and CBRN decontamination procedures to be used ;

   b. Decontamination of the aircraft exterior, aircraft cabins, cargo and cargo holds have a lower priority than assisting passengers and crew;

   c. Actual decontamination methodologies of these areas will depend very much on the nature of the incident and the characteristics of the contaminant agent; and

   d. Policy decisions on decontamination / disposals / incineration and resultant compensation to passengers / crew / aircraft operator will also need to be addressed by the incident's advisor group at the policy level.

7. Staff & Responders Precautionary Measures

   a. To ensure the safety and well-being of airport staff and other responders, all possible precautionary safety measures must be taken; and

   b. During the initial and ongoing assessments of the incident / contaminants, existing infectious diseases and CBRN procedures for the responders' safety precautions will be reviewed and actioned, based upon recommendations from relevant government agencies including Port Health and Police.

8. Isolation, Screening & Decontamination of Vehicles & Equipment Used

   a. As necessary, existing infectious diseases and CBRN decontamination procedures are to be used; and

   b. Actual decontamination methodologies of these areas will depend very much on the nature of the incident and the characteristics of the contaminant agent.

9. Media Management

   a. Early activation and coordination by the Combined Information Center (CIC) of the Information Services Department (ISD) is important; and

   b. At the airport operational level, the AEC will coordinate the incident's media management activities with the CIC.

## D. Simplified Flow Diagrams Mapping Out Major Processes







Arrival Flights with CBRN Contaminants
Process Map – Post-Decontamination
Onsite Decontamination
Passenger/crew still contaminated after showers – Immediate transport to hospitals by GLD-LTD
Passenger/crew free from contaminants after showers – transport to Passenger Reception Center


Arrival Flights with CBRN Contaminants
Process Map – Passenger Reception Center
Passenger Reception Center (APV Lounge) for CIQ & Return to Care of Airline
Police Disaster Victim Registration Process
ImmD landing Process
C&E clearances
Airline Care
• May need assistance from Home Affairs & other relevant departments
• Family Reception Center (FRC) may also be activated to look after the meeters & greeters

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